PUBLIC VALUE INTERNATIONAL
publishes contributions from scientists, media experts and journalists focusing on specific challenges for Pubic Service Media.
• How can PSM defend and protect its independence?
• How can PSM produce distinctive media quality?
• How can PSM fullfil its mission & remit?
• How can PSM deliver public value for all segments of society?
• How can PSM keep pace with the tremendous competition from digital giants?
• How can PSM counteract fake news, filter bubbles and hate speech?
• How can PSM find solutions for upcoming challenges?
Digital transformation and polarisation of society are creating severe disruptions for our societies. PUBLIC VALUE INTERNATIONAL investigates the future role of public service media supporting social cohesion, democracy and citizenship.
Already published:
#1 WHY GREECE MATTERS
#2 ESC - MORE THAN MUSIC
#3 WHY POLAND MATTERS
#4 WHY INDEPENDENCE MATTERS
#5 BETWEEN THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE FIFTH POWER
#6 PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN EUROPE
#7 UNDER ATTACK
All documents are available at zukunft.ORF.at
PUBLISHED AND PRODUCED BY: Österreichischer Rundfunk, ORF, Hugo-Portisch-Gasse 1, 1136 Wien
DESIGN: ORF Marketing & Creation GmbH & Co KG
RESPONSIBLE: ORF-Generaldirektion Public Value
PRINTED BY: ORF Druckerei
© ORF 2026 Send reviews and hints to: zukunft@ORF.at
NUMBERS DON‘T LIE
Contrary to urgent calls for cost cutting, it is evident: There is enough money. Especially in the world of communication and media: 92,5 billion€ profits generated by Alphabet1. Within one year revenues of TIKTOK went up +42%, of Meta +22%. From 2020 to 2024, the revenue growth of the top 10 technology corporations exploded by 66.6% and those of the non-European top 10 social media companies by 93.4%. The gap is increasingly widening: €1.970 billion revenues for the ten biggest tech giants, €41 billion for the entire sector of European Public Service Media, whose revenues -calculated according to inflation- fell by 10.9% between 2014 and 2023. The ten most powerful digital corporations generated 48 times more than all 64 Public Service Media in Europe. Last year the ratio was 1:44 (in 2019 =1:26).
This is more than a gap, it‘s an abyss. Digital technologies have created an alarming development in media economics causing dramatic consequences: While American and Chinese companies generate billions in profits, the financial resources of European quality media are being consistently reduced. The consequences are disastrous: A handful of globally operating companies are capable to create new tools in artificial intelligence gaining an almost uncatchable lead in media usage, at the same time quality media are losing reach, relevance, and opportunities to invest in the digital future.
Amidst this historic disruption there is a remarkable contradiction: While complaints about fake news, filter bubbles, manipulation by uncontrollable artificial intelligence have become common consensus, a massive downsizing is simultaneously imposed on quality media, presented as an unavoidable cost cutting. May this be the future then: Even fewer journalists? Even lower budgets for quality media? What is officially declared as a boost in efficiency turns out to be a dramatic loss in scope and quality. If cost cutting tightens the belt, journalists often run out of breath. May this be a solution to cope with the enormous power of the digital giants? Is this the way forward to protect European democracy from fake news and hate speech? Is it clever strategy or just bullshit: strengthening quality media by reducing its resources?
1 In 2024; all data: “Public Service Media – competitive environment”, EBU, Media Intelligence Service, November 2025
A total of 18 European media experts is addressing these questions. They analyze the consequences of the radical shift and transformation in the world of media and provide an overview of the dramatic effects of cost cutting. Certainly, there is no recipe at hand. However, the contributions of the authors provide analyses, insights, and commentary that could serve as a wake-up call as well as an inspiration to act: How Europe could withstand the dominance of global acting digital giants. Why quality media is an indispensable contribution to safeguard democracy in Europe. What could be done against the defunding of its future.
KLAUS UNTERBERGER KONRAD MITSCHKA ORF PUBLIC VALUE
DEFUND BIG TECH, REFUND PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA1
JOAN PLA VIVOLES ØSTFOLD UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
In August 2018, The New York Times reported an unprecedented financial milestone: Apple had become the first company to reach a market capitalisation of $1 trillion2 . It had taken 42 years to summit that peak. But then, within just four years, Apple tripled that figure, hitting $3 trillion in 2022 3. As of early 2026, four tech companies were worth more than $3 trillion: Nvidia, Alphabet, Apple, and Microsoft. Nvidia hit the $4 trillion mark in August 2025 and needed only four months to add another trillion. These valuations are highly volatile and might look very different when you read this (has the AI bubble burst yet?), but bear with me. Give or take a trillion, the combined market capitalisation of seven Big Tech giants (Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia, Meta, and Netflix) was around $20 trillion in early 2026, dwarfing the GDP of most G7 nations and trailing only the US and China. It could be argued that comparing GDP with market valuations is like of comparing apples and oranges—a stock of value versus a flow of income. But my intention is simply to establish a political economy snapshot of the last decade: the emergence of Big Tech, the new monarchies of our world. A predatory digital capitalism that has not been properly tamed by the democratic checks and balances created precisely to handle such power disequilibria.
All that concentration of capital has not emerged from a vacuum. For these giants to thrive on such a gargantuan scale, countless other companies have been displaced. Big Tech conquered the terra incognita of the internet by colonising the businesses of the real world. They leveraged the technological advantage
1 This title is adapted from the 2021 article Defund Big Tech, Refund Community by Barendregt et al. While their argument focuses on community-owned tech infrastructure, I have used the phrasing here to advocate specifically for the revitalisation of Public Service Media as the necessary democratic counterweight to digital capitalism.
2 Nicas, J. (2018, August 2). Apple Is Worth $1,000,000,000,000. Two Decades Ago, It Was Almost Bankrupt. - The New York Times. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2018/08/02/technology/apple-stock-1-trillion-market-cap.html
3 Nicas, J. (2022, January 3). Apple Becomes First Company to Hit $3 Trillion Market Value. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/03/technology/apple-3-trillion-market-value.html
of zero marginal costs and the exponential growth enabled by digital engineering and brute computing force. But of all the sectors disrupted, journalism is uniquely sensitive. Public information is not just another commodity; it is the essential mechanism for democracy’s capacity for self-correction. It is the source that equips citizens with the necessary knowledge to make up their minds about the state of the world—and to cast their votes accordingly.
Skeptics might argue that this is just journalists complaining because the internet broke their publishing monopoly. That is partly true. When the internet emerged, millions of people suddenly held “the power of a printing press at their fingertips”4 . However, thirty years later, this privilege has been recentralised to an extreme degree. What was once a plural landscape of thousands of newspapers and broadcasters–some local, others national; some public, others private; some right-wing, others centrist or left-wing; some holding editorial independence, others controlled by governments or media moguls; some sensationalist, others distinguishing clearly between opinion and facts—is now being increasingly reduced to a handful of attention-seeking, algorithmically driven social media apps dominated by a small circle of hyper-wealthy individuals. History shows that the wealthiest men invariably seek to control the flow of information. Jeff Bezos followed a traditional path—a Citizen Kane-style move—when he acquired The Washington Post in 2013. Yet, the strategy of figures like Zuckerberg and Musk is far more totalising and dangerous. By securing absolute control over the defining platforms of our age, the owners of Facebook and X have moved beyond influencing editorial lines to managing the infrastructure of public debate itself. What is at stake is how society is provided with knowledge. If left unchecked, this crisis will only deepen under the looming epistemic capture of generative, agentic AI.
How, then, can this crisis be addressed? The European Commission enacted significant regulations—notably the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)—but enforcement has been fiercely contested by Big Tech’s army of lawyers and lobbyists in a test of strength between popular sovereignty and corporate power. National governments across Europe, meanwhile, have made modest attempts that appear more cosmetic than substantive. For instance, in 2018 the UK government
4 Williams, E. (2015, February 9). Welcome to Medium. Medium. https://ev.medium.com/welcome-to-medium-9e53ca408c48
commissioned Dame Frances Cairncross to review the sustainability of highquality journalism in the face of digital platform dominance. She delivered her findings a year later 5, but her recommendations have been largely neglected. This serves as a prime example of the lack of political will to support independent journalism while Big Tech dismantles it. Cynically, this is understandable: politicians are rarely eager to invest in institutions designed to criticise them. In the introduction to her report, Cairncross noted that the review focused on journalism’s most significant functions: “ensuring public accountability and investigating possible wrongdoing”.
The tragedy is that the solution already exists, it is called Public Service Media. Created a century ago to champion the public interest in communication technology, this institution has been systematically squeezed by legislators during the last decades, often under the guise of “fair competition” with commercial outlets that are themselves disappearing. In 2023/24, the annual revenue from the BBC licence fee was £1.3 billion (approx. $1.7 billion) lower in real terms than it was in 2012/13 6. This is indefensible considering the massive scale of the commercial Big Tech interference. Netflix’s annual content spend in 2025 was approximately $18 billion; by contrast, the BBC’s total content spend across TV, Radio, and Online fell to £2.55 billion (approx. $3.3 billion) for 2025-26 financial year. With its current market value, Apple could fund the entire BBC for 500 years. Patrick Barwise captured this in a 2024 article with a self-explanatory title: “BBC Funding: Much Ado about the Cost of a Coffee a Week”. The UK now faces a crucial moment regarding the BBC’s future. In 2028 the Royal Charter must be renewed; the decision made by UK government will determine not only the informational independence of UK citizens but will resonate with PSM organisations across Europe, given the BBC’s historic status as a role model.
What’s left to be done? In a democratic logic, it is the citizen’s turn to demand their representatives protect their right to public interest information and the communication infrastructure that supports it. If current politicians will not
5 Cairncross, F. (2019). The Cairncross review: A sustainable future for journalism [Independent Review]. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport. https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/the-cairncross-review-a-sustainable-future-for-journalism
6 Born, G., & Lewis, J. (Eds). (2025). Public service media: Funding and governance options. An international comparison to inform BBC Charter review 2027. The British Academy. https://www. thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/5984/00009_Public_Service_Media_Policy_Briefs_Final2.pdf
deliver, they must be outvoted and replaced. This may sound naive so let me finish with two illustrative stories.
The first involves Jeff Bezos. In 2022 he commissioned a $500 million, 127-metre sailing yacht, Koru. But, alas, there was an issue: the yacht’s massive masts would interfere with his helicopter. The solution? Build a second yacht whose sole job is to shadow Koru, carrying the helipad, crew, and supplies. Douglas Rushkoff tells this story in Survival of the Richest. But the story is not over. Koru was built in a shipyard inland within the Dutch canal system. To reach the sea, it had to pass under the Koningshaven Bridge in Rotterdam, a protected national monument. The yacht’s masts were too tall (70 meters). The shipbuilder requested the bridge be dismantled so the yacht could pass. Initially, the municipality agreed, but there was an immediate backlash from the citizens of Rotterdam, threatening to pelt the vessel with rotten eggs. In the end, the shipyard backed down and towed the yacht without its masts, discreetly at night.
The second tale about citizens standing up to billionaires is set in Sweden. Tesla’s mechanics requested to sign a collective bargaining agreement, but Musk refused, so the workers decided to strike in late 2023. Tesla tried to bypass the strike by delivering license plates via mail, but workers at PostNord (the Swedish postal service) halted the deliveries in solidarity. Unions in neighbouring countries soon joined the fight: Danish dockworkers refused to unload Musk’s cars, and Finnish transport unions blockaded transit routes. Musk called the postal blockade “insane”, failing to understand that he was not fighting a handful of Swedish workers, but a culture and a nation’s dignity. As of this writing, the Tesla strike has become the longest in Swedish in modern times.
This is not a matter of political preference, left against right. It is about people refusing to accept a regime of voluntary servitude.
No, we do not want to dismantle our bridges just so your silly yacht can pass. And yes, we demand a collective agreement. Above all, we want our taxes to fund strong Public Service Media so that we receive information we can trust, and so that new communication technologies are designed to serve our collective interests. We want ourselves and our children to be well informed, educated and entertained.
THE COST OF SHRINKING THE COMMON GOOD
NATALIA BEREGOI CONSULTANT, TRANSFORMATION SERVICES, EUROPEAN BROADCASTING UNION
Public service media were never built to be flawless institutions; they were built to be infrastructures of trust. Yet today, trust is often treated as optional, and funding as negotiable. In the transformation projects I have carried out across Europe, I have seen how quickly the ground shifts when budgets tighten and how profoundly this affects people, journalism, and society.
Cuts do more than reduce resources; they reshape what becomes possible. Conversely, sustainable investment expands imagination, experimentation, and courage. As a lecturer, I watch my students navigate a chaotic information ecosystem where truth is often crowded out by volume and speed, and where public service media remain one of the few anchors of reliability.
This article brings these two worlds together to ask a simple and uncomfortable question: What happens to a society when the institutions meant to inform and educate it are starved or strengthened?
The reality of cuts: what we lose when we shrink PSM
Funding cuts never arrive as abstractions. They appear first as cancelled programs, overloaded teams, and newsrooms quietly stepping away from investigative stories because there is no longer time or capacity to pursue them. In every organisation facing reductions, the same sentence eventually surfaces: “We still want to do everything, just with less.” But less money always means fewer journalists, fewer checks and balances, fewer voices represented, and fewer spaces where nuance can survive.
Cuts also reshape the mission. When pressure intensifies, organisations retreat into the safest content formats that promise predictable performance rather than deeper democratic value. Public service becomes thinner, faster, quieter. Communities become invisible, audience trust erodes, and information deserts widen.
Underlying all this is an emotional shift. People begin working with caution rather than curiosity. They become protectors of tasks instead of creators of value. Innovation fades into the background, replaced by the need to „just get through the week.” Cuts, ultimately, diminish not only what public service media produce but what they allow themselves to imagine.
Lessons from transformation projects across Europe
In various European PSM organisations I have worked with, one pattern repeats itself: constructive change becomes possible only when there is financial oxygen. Where funding is stable, teams explore new formats, reorganise around audiences, and build collaborative cultures. Where funding is fragile, the same organisations become paralysed, knowing what must be done but unable to move.
This tension becomes visible very quickly when you sit with people in a room. During these projects, I met leadership teams trying to modernise workflows while simultaneously negotiating layoffs. I facilitated workshops where people discussed product thinking with enthusiasm, then admitted privately that their future roles might disappear. I saw digital departments without the tools they needed, audience research teams with brilliant insights but no resources to act on them, and content creators who wanted to diversify formats but had no time to learn new skills. Each conversation carried the same undercurrent: we know what our audiences need, but we no longer know if we will have the means to serve them.
One moment stays with me from a recent workshop in a major broadcaster, where the situation was particularly sensitive. During an exercise on “Hopes and Fears,” a participant said, with a half-smile that hid exhaustion: “I hope to be here still next year. And my fear… is the same. To be here, in the uncertainty, without clarity.” The room fell into a reflective silence. That sentence captured the collective emotional landscape of teams caught between commitment and instability. It expressed a truth rarely said aloud: people want to stay, to contribute, to build, but they fear being anchored to systems that cannot promise direction.
This mixture of hope and fear is what an underfunded transformation looks like. It moves organisations into a reactive posture, where strategic thinking
gradually gives way to operational survival. Instead of imagining what public service media could become, people fight to preserve what remains.
Yet, I have also seen how quickly these dynamic changes occur when funding is stable. With financial breathing room, organisations shift from linear distribution thinking to ecosystem thinking. They establish innovation labs where experimentation is not punished. They invest in transformation literacy, enabling people to understand the strategy behind change and to see themselves as agents within it. When stability enters the system, courage returns to the people. And courage, once restored, becomes a renewable resource that multiplies public value.
The human and educational cost: a professor’s perspective
As a lecturer at the Faculty of Journalism and Communication Sciences, Moldova State University, I meet the generation that will either rescue public discourse or inherit its ruins. They consume media differently, but they care deeply about truth, representation, and fairness. What they lack is a structured information environment that supports these instincts. When public service journalism weakens, my students lose a democratic tutor.
This became painfully clear after a lecture on misinformation, when one of my students stayed behind. She told me, “I want to become a journalist, but I don’t know if a society that underfunds truth still needs us.” Her worry was anchored in what she sees every day: a chaotic information ecosystem where volume displaces verification, where emotions outrun facts, where quality feels optional. Her question revealed what cuts do to young people: they introduce doubt into professions that depend on confidence and purpose.
These doubts grow in an environment where fragmented information overwhelms structured understanding. When the strength of public service journalism diminishes, students have fewer opportunities to observe how evidencebased narratives are built, how complexity can be explained, and how media can hold power accountable. They lose access to the scaffolding that once helped young journalists learn not only what to report, but how to think. Cuts also limit PSM‘s educational mission: fewer explainers, fewer documentaries, fewer youth-focused initiatives, fewer collaborations with universities, and fewer for-
mats that cultivate media literacy. With every reduction, the bridge between public service media and the next generation becomes thinner. And when that bridge weakens, society loses more than content, as it loses continuity.
If PSM were adequately funded, what would a sustainable future look like Imagine a public service media ecosystem where financial sustainability is not an annual negotiation but a stable guarantee. In such a system, long-term journalism could flourish again. With secure investment, PSM could develop strong digital products that meet citizens where they live their daily information lives. Regional reporting could regain prominence, ensuring that no community becomes invisible simply because it is small or distant.
Sustainable funding also creates space for growth rather than retreat. It allows organisations to strengthen cultural programming, expand educational partnerships, and build youth initiatives that nurture the next generation’s media literacy. It offers stability to teams, making room for learning, skill-building, and professional development rather than perpetual crisis management.
Crucially, proper funding allows public service media to articulate their purpose with clarity. Without the constant noise of survival, they can focus on their remit: informing, educating, fostering cohesion, and sustaining a shared narrative space in increasingly fragmented societies. In this kind of environment, courage becomes part of the institution’s daily rhythm.
A call to courage and responsibility
Cuts may appear technical, but their consequences are profoundly human. They change how journalists work, how citizens learn, how societies hold power accountable, and how future generations understand the world. Sustainable funding of PSM is about protecting the public’s right to knowledge, dialogue, and dignity.
Public service media cannot afford timidity. Nor can policymakers. The future belongs to those who understand that democracy requires investment, not improvisation. The responsibility is collective, but the courage must begin with us.
PSM UNDER UNPRECEDENTED ATTACK
RENATE SCHROEDER
DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF JOURNALISTS
This week on 26 January, the European Federation of Journalists had its Broadcasting Expert Group Meeting in Brussels with 10 participants from different European countries. The announced or real cuts on the budget of Public Service Media (PSM) in European countries are unprecedented and frightening and go from Finland to Italy, from Poland to Germany, from France to Slovakia, from Croatia to Lithuania, you name it.
Everywhere it is the same rhetoric influenced in the first place by populist and far right parties who claim that PSM are left-wing, too big and no longer relevant to a general public, which is overfed by toxic news and disinformation through social media platforms. Budget cuts, huge dismissals, with impact on staff, freelancers but also independent production companies is the new normal. It is the typical autocrat’s playbook: get rid of the media that may criticise you and build your own propaganda machines. Public Service Media is always one of the first “victims”.
In France, the huge budget cuts, esp in France Television, together with the growing media empire by tycoon Vincent Bolloré only leaves niches of independent media. It reduces the access to information to a worrying level. Vincent Bolloré has profoundly reshaped the French media landscape by consolidating a massive, right-wing media empire under the Vivendi group, including CNews, Europe 1, and the Canal+ group. His strategy has led to a significant shift towards opinion-driven, conservative, and often far-right editorial lines, raising concerns regarding media pluralism, editorial independence, and the sanitization of controversial topics. The weakening of France’s public service media is the wrong answer to this development, and will certainly have an impact on upcoming elections in France, which will endanger the European project.
Public media has long faced criticism from private publishers (who argued it was not needed in a robust media market and distorts the free market), from
the far left (who said that it was pro-establishment), from the free market right (who wanted it gone like other state-owned enterprises), but also from younger people who do not find it relevant to their lives or who are not even aware of their PSM consumption on digital platforms. According to data from the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), total funding for public service media in the 27 EU member states decreased by 7.4 percent over the last decade, when adjusted for inflation, to €29.17 billion in 2024.
Within the framework of an information eco-system dominated by a few digital monopolies who have strong ties to a rising autocrat of the Western hemisphere, and who are (co) responsible for the weakening of journalism and journalists, the survival or rather strengthened role of PSM must be very high on any democratic leaders’ political agenda. It should be very high on every citizen’s agenda as it is the a medium that depends on its public remit and not on clickbait, commercial pressure, propaganda or attention economy. Independent public service media are needed more than ever in today‘s social media-driven world, where disinformation is rife and critical journalism a rare commodity. Public Service Media along with independent private media is and must remain the anti-dote to disinformation, propaganda and polarising and conspiratorial content. This is also why the European Union has adopted a law, the European Media Freedom Act, that includes an article regarding the independence and financial sustainability of PSM.
If we lose access to public service media, we will lose access to independent news in many EU countries, we will lose access to cultural and sports events and entertainment. We will also lose online content available on social media platforms that is free and trustworthy. We will lose media literacy programs for kids, children news channels, children programs. We will lose news and entertainment for the elderly. We will lose media pluralism, access to editorial content that allows us to scrutinise politicians and other major stakeholders, that puts in context difficult global tendencies as much as local realities. We will lose traditional fact-checking and institutional accountability. And we will lose a shared reality so important for our multicultural democracies. Given the tendency to cut the budget and to criticize the content as left, woke or oldfashioned and boring, PSM works in very difficult circumstances. If it gained financial sustainability along political independence, it could and would have
to explore how to improve its digital appearance, how to engage with different audiences in a more innovative way, how to be more relevant to our ever more polarised and multi-cultural societies and how to use technical/AI own tools to guarantee verification and editorial control. It could engage in collaborative projects at local level with local media, offer more media and digital literacy and rediscover investigative documentaries which are expensive but attractive also to younger audiences. It would create the space to systematically strengthen high-quality, professional journalism that can truly serve at its core as a public service to citizens, grounded in ethics and editorial autonomy and enable a revival of investigative journalism.
And last but not least, it would be an even more indispensable part of critical infrastructure in more turbulent times, where correct information and context can save lives. PSM in Europe needs to get serious with reforms to be or remain relevant to changing news behaviours and hostile political environments, to be fully transparent and accountable to its public and resistant to political attacks. But if we lose it, we may follow the American path, where information integrity is lost and where its current President together with BigTech alliance created a so-called “deconstruction model” fragmenting shared reality so completely that majority opposition could not prevent – nor hold anyone accountable – for illegal actions of its democratically elected President; see Maria Ressa, https:// thenerve.co/story/report-donald-trump-narrative-warfare-breakdown-reality.
Some people, we hear, are not interested in democratic systems anymore, probably also influenced by social media, political influencers, trolls and far right rhetoric. The advantages of sometimes complicated and long procedures that all our democracies entail, must be highlighted through action and through analysis and through journalistic reporting. Why do so many people want to live in Europe? It‘s not only for economic reasons, it is still for the attractive words freedom and democracy. Pluralistic, inclusive and financially sustainable PSM must survive and thrive along a healthy private media within a healthy digital infrastructure based on transparency, accountability and relevant regulation. This must be a major part of the democrats playbook! Let’s not leave the information discourse to the nationalists, autocrats and religious fanatics, who work quite efficiently to render traditional accountability, so crucial for our democratic systems based on checks and balances but also on trust, obsolete.
INFORMATION AS A RIGHT, RESOURCE, AND PUBLIC GOOD
CLAUDIA ISEP
AUSTRIAN UNESCO COMMISSION
“The very existence of public broadcasting is an institutional recognition of journalism as a public good, even as other forms of journalism serve the same role in society” (UNESCO 2021a: 21). With this sentence, UNESCO encapsulates a central principle of its perspective on the design of media ecosystems: Public broadcasting is not merely one organizational form among many but an expression of a democratic principle. In public broadcasting, an approach manifests that acknowledges journalism as a public good (UNESCO 2021a) – something that belongs to all members of society and should not be solely subjected to the laws of the market. Public media are thus much more than providers of programs; they are the material infrastructure of a democratic promise: Information belongs to everyone, and all people not only have the right to information but also the right for their perspectives to be visible in the provided content. This perspective has shaped UNESCO‘s work for decades, as the UN special organization for education, science, and culture. As the only UN organization with an explicit mandate in the field of press and freedom of expression, UNESCO is globally engaged in the “Communication & Information” program sector to strengthen independent media and access to reliable information. Media freedom and pluralism are considered indispensable prerequisites for achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly for building peaceful and inclusive societies and protecting freedom of expression and access to information (UNESCO 2025).
Central to this approach is an expanded understanding of “information.” UNESCO defines information simultaneously as a right, a societal resource, and a public good (UNESCO 2021b). Information as a right means that access to reliable, plural, and comprehensible information is not a voluntary service of commercial media providers for viable or willing-to-pay users but rather part of fundamental cultural and societal rights. Where this access is restricted, human rights are pressured: the right to be informed, to form one‘s own opinion, and to actively participate in debates.
Information as a societal resource enables individual agency and strengthens social cohesion. At the same time, it structures how people perceive reality, what possibilities they recognize, and which voices they acknowledge as legitimate. Finally, UNESCO views not only journalism but also information in a broader sense as a public good (UNESCO 2021b), comparable to education, healthcare, or cultural basic supply. This results in UNESCO‘s commitment to global access to information technologies and their as democratic organization as possible. It also leads to the consistent emphasis on the role of free, independent journalism in the public interest.
In this context, UNESCO highlights the central importance of public media and nonprofit, non-commercial, and community media. They significantly contribute to ensuring that information is not primarily organized according to market logics – logics that can create and amplify systematic distortions and societal inequalities. Public and nonprofit media secure spaces where diversity, minoritized and marginalized perspectives, as well as non-commercial content remain visible. They create a counterbalance to concentration trends, platform economies, and economic pressure.
Against this background, the question of financing independent journalism and public and non-commercial media is not a purely technical budget issue. It touches fundamental democratic principles: Who has access to reliable information? Whose voices are heard? And which perspectives are acknowledged as socially relevant? From UNESCO‘s perspective, media policy and economic decisions are always decisions about cultural rights, democratic participation, and the future of public communication.
Public media particularly embody the principle that information is a public good. This principle explicitly includes those perspectives that are often marginalized in the commercial media market: voices of people affected by racism, people affected by poverty, people with disabilities, migrant communities, as well as diverse cultural expressions. Diversity is not a decorative “extra” of the program but a matter of power distribution: Who gets to speak? Who is considered an expert? And who decides what is considered socially relevant? In the absence of stable and reliable financing foundations, not only editorial independence is weakened but primarily the diversity of perspectives. Margi-
nalized voices are usually the first to disappear because they are less easily commercially exploited, less audience-effective, and often associated with higher research and production efforts. For society, this means less critical and investigative journalism and weakened public control of power. For individuals, it reduces the chances of access to reliable, independent information and thus to informed social and political participation. This development is further exacerbated by market and platform logics. “The liberalization of media markets and multiplication of channels available to the public have inevitably eroded the audience share of public service media and consequently led to questions about the necessity of state subsidies funded by taxpayers” (UNESCO 2021a: 31). At the same time, the shift of information consumption to social media fundamentally changes media usage, especially among young people.
The result is a growing gap between well-informed, privileged groups and those systematically underserved (UNESCO 2022: 2). Those who are not paymentcapable or lack access to digital platforms remain invisible; their perspectives are hardly heard, their information needs remain unmet. The emerging gaps in pluralistic and accessible journalism create a knowledge gap that weakens society as a whole: “This harms society as a whole … in which uncontested disinformation and conspiracy content can ‘flood the zone’ without professional challenge.” (Ibid.: 3)
Conversely, sustainable and sufficient financing of public and nonprofit, noncommercial media allows them to comprehensively fulfill their democratic and normative tasks. Stable budgets secure editorial independence, strengthen diverse perspectives, promote diversity and pluralism, and enable journalistic education, innovation, and experimental formats. For society, this means a resilient public sphere that depicts complexity, makes conflicts visible, and understands cultural diversity as strength. For individuals, it means access to reliable information, cultural participation, visibility of their life realities, and protection against disinformation.
Public media, together with other nonprofit, non-commercial offerings, are one of the few places where information as a public good is practically realized: accessible, plural, independent, and relevant. Those who economize here reduce not only program content but also social participation, cultural diversity, and
a democracy‘s ability to deal with complexity and diversity and take marginalized perspectives seriously. Those who invest here strengthen democratic institutions, secure cultural expressions, and enable a public sphere where information belongs to everyone, and everyone is heard.
By membership, UNESCO member states – including Austria – expressly commit to these principles. If they take this commitment seriously, media freedom, media diversity, and access to information are not optional but central prerequisites for societal and cultural development. Ideally, this commitment is concretized through participation in UNESCO programs, reporting obligations, and referencing UNESCO standards in national policy-making processes. Public, nonprofit, and non-commercial media are to be recognized within this framework as institutional pillars of a democratic information order focused on inclusion, diversity, and participation. Such commitments become particularly binding through the ratification of international legal instruments, specifically, the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005). This convention explicitly obligates the member states to actively implement cultural and media policy measures to ensure diversity, including “measures aiming to increase media diversity, through public broadcasting,” as stated in Article 6 of the convention. Media diversity is explicitly understood as a prerequisite for the development of cultural expressions, which cannot exist without institutional support.
For national media policies, this means that systemic austerity measures limiting the ability of public media to fulfill their societal mandate contradict the international commitments assumed. The principles to which states commit on a multilateral level must also become effective in legislation, budget policy, and regulation: not as abstract values but as concrete political responsibility for a democratic, diverse, and inclusive public sphere.
References
UNESCO (2005), Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.
UNESCO (2021a), Journalism is a Public Good: World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development, Global Report 2021/2022. Paris: UNESCO.
UNESCO (2021b), Windhoek 30+ Declaration: Information as a Public Good.
UNESCO (2022), Finding the Funds for Journalism to Thrive: Policy Options to Support Media Viability. Paris: UNESCO. UNESCO (2025), Journalism: Shaping a World at Peace. World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development, Global Report 2022/2025. Paris: UNESCO.
DEFUNDING PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA: DEFUNDING CAPABILITIES?
MICHAEL LITSCHKA UAS ST. PÖLTEN
Democracies rarely die loudly, as Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) wrote a few years ago. Nor does their media. But defunding public service media would, whether quietly or loudly, certainly achieve three things:
Firstly: Public service media would become more market-like. Less differentiation, more mainstream; less depth, more speed. They would produce „reliable” goods that must not make mistakes but also bear little risk. They would deliver solid mediocrity – a program that doesn‘t hurt anyone but also doesn‘t really advance anyone. Economically, this tendency towards the middle (also concerning consumer preferences) was described by Harold Hotelling in the late 1920s. But do we want such a market outcome in the media sector? Media goods may be club goods, partly have the character of public goods, and in exceptional cases are even common goods—but they are almost never private goods. Why should we leave important decisions about these goods, especially those decisions that have societal impacts (as expected with media with a public mandate), to market mechanisms? At worst, we are left with thinned-out pseudo-public or quasi-private providers (see some digital platforms or online formats that serve as journalism imitations), which primarily pick us up where they earn the most: at our prejudices.
Secondly: We would continue the loss of trust in media and scientific knowledge that we have had to observe for some time. While various surveys show that this trust has reached a low point, especially in Austria, we had to find the following in a recent research project for RTR GmbH (see Litschka et al. 2025): Although classical channels like television and radio remain the most important sources of information, around 54% of respondents show rather low or no trust in Austrian news media. And even worse: People with rather low media trust use Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp disproportionately often for their news consumption. In this situation, do we see the chance to restore this trust in facts and science more with sustainably funded public broadcasting or with profit-oriented platforms and media reporting tendentiously or scandalously?
Thirdly: We would lose important capabilities in our society. Amartya Sen (1999, 2009) describes in his Capability Approach that freedom consists not only of resources but of the real opportunities („capabilities”) people have to lead a life
they value. Societies, according to Sen, can only be just if they create conditions that enable people to judge autonomously, act informed, and participate in collective life. Public service media are such a capability system. If they are financially weakened, individuals and society lose not only programs or content but concrete opportunities for realization. If they are sustainably funded, they significantly expand our common capability space. What capabilities do I mean? Democratic capabilities: fewer investigative research, international correspondent positions, or well-trained editorial teams (to name a few examples) systematically lead to „under-information” of citizens and the known phenomena of filter bubbles and echo chambers (Litschka 2022) with media consumption shifting to digital platforms.
• Epistemic capabilities: those competencies people need to understand complex societal contexts and make decisions, are lost without media depth. AI-generated news and the aforementioned (multiplied by AI) Hotelling‘s mass-produced goods could complete the rest and require the aforementioned counterbalance.
• Cultural and aesthetic capabilities: Cultural forms of expression, especially those without market logic, open individual and collective spaces for development. The equally decisive Capability Theorist Martha Nussbaum (2011) repeatedly emphasizes that market orientation neither ensures just development in a society nor can conceptually and substantively capture very central basic capabilities of people. Why should this be different in the media sector?
• Social and dialogical capabilities: Habermas‘s public sphere (Habermas 1991) as a place for the discursive negotiation of arguments by free and equal citizens is only possible with a functioning mass media system according to Amartya Sen and other philosophers. Defunding public broadcasting with its public value tasks leads to the disintegration of such places into algorithmically segmented partial publics, as we can see today in examples of hostility to science and political extremism.
Ultimately, in an enlightened society, it is about whether a country‘s media infrastructure ensures sufficient „Media Capabilities,” not only relying on the media competence of citizens but actively supporting the capability for media consumption, as I have argued in more detail elsewhere (Litschka 2019, 2025).
Public service media are such an infrastructure that carries normative responsibility but also conveys Media Capabilities in a comprehensive sense. As is often the case in the political and economic realm, the right institutions are
important, with which individual actors and companies can count and rely on. Capabilities are thus seen as a space of possibilities that starts at the meso- and macro-level of society and can relieve individual individuals (from ethical overload, lack of time and financial resources, educational disadvantages). Sustainable funding of public service media, but also other media connected to a well-understood public value, could achieve a lot:
• Slow News as a counter-model to acceleration: deeply researched dossiers, long-term series of topics, bold documentaries that may take months. The public service mandate would then not only be information but deceleration—a democratic breath in the madness of „flood the zone with shit.”
• Digital commons: instead of chasing after platforms, European public value providers should design infrastructure themselves, like open media libraries, transparent and curated algorithms, data-sovereign personalization models (see also Litschka et al. 2024). A digital public sphere that is not commercially optimized but democratically oriented.
• Cultural experiments: Where, if not in the public service space, could art and culture also be allowed to fail? Sustainable funding enables experiments that find no place elsewhere: hybrid formats between music, literature, and VR, stages for voices that otherwise remain unheard.
Public service media can be places of social resilience. They can contribute to media education for all age groups, are fact-checking services, provide a knowledge commons with open data, and can be digital forums with moderated debates—all this needs security and resources. Funding vs. Defunding is thus a decision about who we want to be in the future; not a dispute over numbers, but over self-understandings. A society that starves its public media actually shows that it no longer wants to tell a common story. Yet these media could counteract the loss of trust, the tendency towards qualitative mediocrity, and the decline of our capabilities.
References
Levitsky, S./Ziblatt, D. (2018): How Democracies Die: And What We Can Do About It. DVA.
Litschka, M. (2019): „The Political Economy of Media Capabilities: The Capability Approach in Media Policy,” in: Journal of Information Policy 9: 63–94. Litschka, M. (2022): „The Co-Regulation of Algorithm-Based Platform Companies as an Institutional Theoretical Question,” in: Marci-Boehncke, G./Rath, M./Delere, M./Höfer, H. (Eds.), Media – Democracy – Education: Normative Mediation Processes and Diversity in Mediated Societies, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 29-45.
Litschka, M. (2025): „AI Ethics and the Capability Approach,” in: Genealogy+Critique 11, no. 1/2025: pp. 1–16.
Litschka, M./Saurwein, F./Pellegrini, T. (2024): Open Data Governance and Digital Platforms. Ethical, Economic, and Regulatory Challenges and Perspectives. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Litschka, M./Pinzolits, R./Roither, M./Krone, J. (2025): AI and Media Trust. Media Use and Media Trust in Austria in the Tension Field of AI and Social Media. Study Series: Artificial Intelligence in the Media Industry, RTR GmbH Vienna. Nussbaum, Martha C. (2011): Creating Capabilities. Harvard University Press. Sen, A. (1999): Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press. Sen, A. (2009): The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane.
WHEN BUDGETS BECOME POLITICS: PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA AT A CROSSROADS
STEPHANIE SCHIEDERMAIR LEIPZIG UNIVERSITY
Public service media rarely disappear overnight. They fade. A regional newsroom closes, an investigative project is postponed indefinitely, a minority programme quietly vanishes from the schedule. None of this looks dramatic, none of it resembles censorship. And yet, something is being lost – not only within individual media organisations, but within European democracies themselves. Across Europe, funding cuts to public service media are often presented as technical adjustments: responses to budgetary pressure, changing consumption habits, or the demands of digital transformation. They are framed as neutral, temporary, and inevitable. But these decisions are neither neutral nor merely administrative. They shape what can be reported, who is heard, and how societies understand themselves. What is at stake is not simply the size of a budget, but the conditions under which democratic communication takes place. Defunding public service media functions as a form of silent regulation: it does not prohibit speech, but it might limit its reach, its depth, and its continuity. Over time, this erosion reshapes the public sphere just as profoundly as more visible forms of political interference. European media history offers numerous examples of how this process unfolds. Long before overt political control becomes visible, financial pressure begins to reshape editorial priorities. What starts as a budgetary measure gradually alters the ecology of public communication – often in ways that are difficult to reverse. The democratic risk lies precisely in this gradualism. Democracies rarely collapse because information is suddenly banned. They weaken when reliable information becomes scarce, when trust erodes, and when citizens no longer recognise themselves in the media meant to serve them.
This matters because public service media occupy a unique position within Europe’s fragmented media landscape. Unlike commercial platforms, they are not designed to maximise engagement or profit. In contrast to social media, they are not driven by algorithms optimised for outrage. Their mandate is neither speed nor scale, but to provide reliable information to all citizens, across re -
gions, generations, and social divides. This universality is not an abstract ideal. It is a structural condition for democratic life. Public service media are among the few institutions still capable of creating a shared communicative space in which political decisions, social conflicts and collective experiences can be discussed beyond partisan or algorithmic filters.
At the same time, public service media have to respond to profound structural changes. They are asked to innovate, to digitalise, to engage new audiences, and to compete within an increasingly platform-driven environment. These expectations are legitimate. What is less often acknowledged is the paradox they create when they are combined with sustained financial pressure. When these processes take place under permanent financial pressure, transformation risks becoming a euphemism for permanent crisis management. The idea that public service media can simply become more `efficient´ without consequences ignores the realities of journalistic work. Investigative reporting, regional coverage, and complex storytelling cannot be endlessly optimised without loss. At some point, efficiency turns into depletion – of personnel, of expertise, and of institutional memory. This matters because trust is built on continuity. Audiences do not develop confidence in institutions that appear permanently overstretched, constantly restructured, and increasingly unable to explain their own role. Financial insecurity undermines not only output, but credibility. Over time, the very legitimacy of public service media comes into question.
There is little reason to assume that this financial pressure will disappear any time soon. The media market has become more competitive, more fragmented, and more dominated by global players whose economic power far exceeds that of national public service media. At the same time, political signals across Europe point towards restraint rather than expansion as the funding disputes surrounding the BBC and other public broadcasters in different European countries show. Budget cuts are rarely framed as attacks on public service media. They are justified as modernisation, efficiency, or fiscal responsibility. Taken together, however, they indicate a broader political reluctance to invest in public communication as a public good.
Against this backdrop, public service media cannot afford to wait for more favourable conditions. If financial constraints are likely to remain the norm, they
must also be treated as a catalyst for strategic reorientation. Scarcity does not necessarily produce innovation – but it can force clarity about purpose. This reorientation is not primarily about doing more with less. It is about doing what only public service media can do and articulating this role more clearly to both audiences and policymakers. In an environment where media are increasingly perceived as interchangeable, public service media must insist on their distinct democratic function – not as market actors, but as civic institutions.
If public service media are to convince political decision-makers of their continued relevance, this conviction cannot be grounded in tradition alone. It must be demonstrated through a renewed focus on public value: on democracy, regional presence, and meaningful engagement with citizens. Democracy is not sustained by moments of attention, but by continuity. It depends on reliable information, on context, and on the ability to follow political processes over time. Public service media play a central role in this regard precisely because they are not bound to the rhythms of outrage, virality, or constant novelty. In this context sustainable funding provides something increasingly rare in contemporary media environments: time. Time to investigate rather than merely react. Time to explain complex policy choices instead of reducing them to soundbites. Time to connect current events with historical and social contexts. Without this temporal depth, democratic debate becomes shallow and reactive. Investigative journalism is one of the clearest expressions of public value, and one of the most resource-intensive. It requires legal expertise, editorial backing, and the willingness to pursue stories whose relevance may only become visible in the long term.
At their best, public service media do more than criticise those in power. They also provide orientation. By explaining institutions, procedures, and responsibilities, they enable citizens to understand how political decisions are made and how accountability operates. In times of growing distrust towards political systems, this orienting function is as important as critical scrutiny. This contribution to democratic resilience has a distinctly European dimension. In a continent marked by diverse political cultures and varying degrees of institutional trust, strong public service media help stabilise democratic expectations. They do not eliminate conflicts, but they provide a shared framework in which conflicts can be articulated and contested.
If public service media are to remain credible democratic institutions, their commitment to public value must also be visible where people experience politics most directly: in their regions, communities, and everyday lives. Political decisions are rarely experienced where they are made, but where their consequences are felt: in municipalities, schools, hospitals, and local economies. Regional journalism translates abstract policy into lived experience. It shows how national and European decisions intersect with everyday realities – and why they matter. Commercial media rarely provide this form of sustained regional coverage. From a market perspective, local reporting is expensive and offers limited scalability. As a result, entire regions risk becoming informational blind spots. Sustainable Public service media must counter this trend and ensure that democratic visibility does not depend on market attractiveness. Regional journalism does more than report from a particular place. It creates occasions for participation. When local controversies, policy decisions, or social conflicts are covered with continuity and care, citizens are invited into an ongoing conversation rather than a fleeting moment of attention. Recognition precedes participation: people engage when they feel that their concerns are taken seriously and made visible.
This stands in sharp contrast to the logic of digital platforms, where audiences are primarily addressed as users whose value lies in their data and attention. At first glance, platforms may seem to offer greater participation: comments, likes, shares, and direct feedback give the impression that everyone can take part. In reality, however, this participation is narrowly defined, tailored to engagement metrics, and designed to extract attention rather than cultivate civic presence. Public service media follow a different rationale. Their legitimacy does not depend on maximising clicks, but on enabling citizens to contribute perspectives, questions, and experiences that matter beyond the next trending topic. Across Europe, this combination of regional presence and participatory orientation strengthens social cohesion. It counters the perception of media as distant elites and repositions public service media as shared civic institutions. In doing so, they contribute not only to informed publics, but to publics that recognise themselves as such.
Funding pressure is a reality across Europe. While budgets are constrained, public service media retain the responsibility to safeguard democracy. Cuts do
not eliminate this role; they require clarity of purpose, strategic focus, and a commitment to the functions that only public service media can fulfil: investigative scrutiny, regional coverage, and meaningful civic participation. Public service media are a civic infrastructure, comparable in importance to courts, parliaments, or schools. They provide continuity, reliability, and orientation in an environment increasingly dominated by market-driven platforms and fragmented attention.
Across Europe, where media landscapes are diverse and political pressures vary, strong public service media act as a stabilising force. They bridge regions, generations, and communities; they offer citizens not only information, but a way to understand, question, and influence the societies they live in. By defining their public value clearly and demonstrating it consistently, public service media can transform financial constraint into a sharper sense of purpose and societal relevance. Scarcity can drive strategic innovation: it encourages media organisations to concentrate on what truly matters, experiment with formats that reinforce their societal functions that no other institutions can fulfil. By embracing their unique role, public service media can emerge from resource challenges stronger, more focused, and more essential than ever.
BEING BOLD TO BREAK THE MOLD: FROM PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA TO PUBLIC SERVICE INFRASTRUCTURE
MANUEL PUPPIS & SABRINA HEILAND UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG (SWITZERLAND)
It‘s a bit of a paradox: Public service offerings are heavily used by the population and enjoy high trust (Newman et al., 2025). A look at international research also shows that there is a positive correlation between strong public service and a healthy democracy (Neff & Pickard, 2024), political knowledge (Castro et al., 2022), social inclusion (Curran et al., 2009), and the quality of news offerings from private media (Humprecht & Esser, 2018).
Nevertheless, the media policy discussion in most countries mainly revolves around restrictions on online offerings and alleged savings potentials. In Switzerland, this culminated in two referendums due to the (semi-)direct democracy: In March 2018, the „No Billag” initiative, submitted by libertarian and right-wing populist circles (named after the organization then responsible for fee collection), was put to a vote, which sought to ban public funding of media in the constitution. However, the initiative was rejected by 71.6% of voters and all cantons (Tresch et al., 2018). However, a vote on the “200 francs is enough” initiative will take place in March 2026. This would reduce the household levy from the current 335 to 200 francs and exempt all companies from the levy, effectively halving the budget of the Swiss SRG SSR. Additionally, funding would be limited to radio and television programs; online news offerings would no longer be permissible. Prior to the vote, the Swiss government has already decided unilaterally to reduce the household levy to 300 francs and exempt even more companies from the levy than today (Federal Council, 2024). The SRG expects a revenue shortfall of CHF 270 million per year just from this reduction – which corresponds to 17% of its budget – and has therefore announced a restructuring of the organization and the reduction of 900 full-time positions (SRG SSR, 2025b).
If the halving initiative were accepted, the SRG SSR would have a significantly lower budget than public service providers in all neighboring countries, including Austria. This would mean that the current mandate to provide an equivalent
journalistic offering in three languages (and to consider the Romansh-speaking minority) could no longer be fulfilled. The budget cut could not be implemented by eliminating the program content most criticized by private competitors –purchased films and series and major sporting events – as these account for only 12% of expenditures (SRG SSR, 2025a). There would also have to be massive cuts in information, culture, education, and domestic fiction. Private providers would not be able to fill this gap, as these contents are not profitable. Media provision in a small, multilingual media system with large same-language neighboring states is expensive (Berg, 2011; Puppis, 2023) and domestic broadcasters face strong foreign competition in the audience and advertising market (Mediapulse, 2025; Swiss Advertising Statistics Foundation, 2025). Even in the online sector, private paid media would not benefit from a shutdown of SRG‘s online news offerings. Studies show that usage would rather shift to free offerings (Puppis et al., 2025; Udris et al., 2024). Thus, the media system would be deprived of massive funds, which is not a good prerequisite for providing the population with high-quality journalistic services.
Switzerland is not an isolated case. Across Europe, Public Service is under criticism. Right-wing populist parties and libertarian circles are calling for a strong restriction or even abolition of public funding for ideological reasons (HoltzBacha, 2021; Sehl et al., 2022). They receive support from newspaper publishers, who, devoid of any empirical evidence, claim displacement (Sehl et al., 2020). As a result, media policy discussions about public service primarily focus on its funding. It is certainly legitimate to discuss whether and how it can manage its resources more efficiently. But before deciding what funding is appropriate, a broad debate is needed about what requirements exist for public service in a digitized society.
Instead of discussions on cutbacks, bold visions are needed. This involves much more than just the question of whether public service is allowed to be active on the internet. If not, it has no future anyway. Of course, algorithmic recommendation systems for personalizing content should also be allowed; however, unlike the major platforms, these must be oriented towards democratic values and journalistic mandates rather than commercial goals (Sørensen & Hutchinson, 2018). But beyond the production and distribution of content, there should be a discussion on how democratic societies can respond to the current structural change in
the public sphere through platforms and AI agents and what role public service plays in this. In addition to regulating new intermediaries whose business model is based on commercially driven datafication, alternatives should also be considered (Mansell & Steinmueller, 2020). However, such considerations have so far played hardly any role in practical media policy.
In academia, however, there are visionary ideas for the further development of „Public Service Media” into a „Public Service Infrastructure.” This includes, for example, the concept of a „Public Open Space.” Dobusch (2019) refers to freely accessible digital discussion spaces that enable collective decision-making. Similarly, Dogruel et al. (2025) propose a „Digital Open Public Space” (DOPS) that should enable participation and function in a public welfare-oriented manner, with public service playing a key role. Based on the communicative needs of citizens in a hybrid intermediary public sphere, ideas for possible dialogue formats have also been developed (Puppis et al., 2026). Advisory bodies such as the Swiss Federal Media Commission also emphasize the need to understand public service as infrastructure (EMEK, 2025). And public service itself is also considering how its role could be expanded in the future. The „Public Spaces Incubator” is a project of several European public service providers to jointly develop solutions for more constructive online discussion spaces (Koban et al., 2024).
Bold visions and innovative ideas for alternatives to a public sphere dominated by platforms and AI agents, and thus for a new „dual system” for the digital age, are therefore available. These are also necessary to continually legitimize public service and generate support for its continuation and further development. While the media policy debate in Switzerland, due to its focus on funding issues, is not a model to follow, the organizational structure of the SRG SSR offers inspiration for legitimacy management: The SRG SSR is organized as a private association that any person living in Switzerland can join. This anchoring in society provides the opportunity to engage in dialogue with users, delegate responsibility to them, and shape the future of public service together with them. This model could also provide inspiration in other countries for how society could be more involved in the development of public service and media policy decisions.
References
Berg, C. E. (2011). Sizing up Size on TV Markets. Why David would Lose to Goliath. In G. F. Lowe & C. S. Nissen (Eds.), Small Among Giants. Television Broadcasting in Smaller Countries (pp. 57–89). Nordicom. Federal Council (2024, June 19). Press release: Federal Council rejects SRG initiative and instead proposes levy reduction to 300 francs. https:// www.news.admin.ch/de/nsb?id=101502
Castro, L., Strömbäck, J., Esser, F., Van Aelst, P., de Vreese, C., Aalberg, T., Cardenal, A. S., Corbu, N., Hopmann, D. N., Koc-Michalska, K., Matthes, J., Schemer, C., Sheafer, T., Splendore, S., Stanyer, J., Stępińska, A., Štětka, V., & Theocharis, Y. (2022). Navigating High-Choice European Political Information Environments: A Comparative Analysis of News User Profiles and Political Knowledge. The International Journal of Press/ Politics, 27(4), 827–859. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211012572
Curran, J., Iyengar, S., Brink Lund, A., & Salovaara-Moring, I. (2009). Media System, Public Knowledge and Democracy: A Comparative Study. European Journal of Communication, 24(1), 5–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323108098943
Dobusch, L. (2019). Public Open Spaces. From Broadcasters to Public Platforms. On the Economy of Public Welfare-Oriented Media: Mass Communication in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, 25-36. Dogruel, L., de la Durantaye K., Elmer, C., Gostomzyk, T., & Lobigs, F. (2025). Potential Analysis: Perspectives for Digital Public Value at ZDF. https://www.zdf.de/assets/potenzialanalyse-digitaler-public-value-im-zdf-102~original?cb=1765889083071
Swiss Federal Media Commission EMEK (2025). From „profit space” to „public space”. The Media Public Service as Infrastructure: Possible Roles, Activities, and Services. https://www.emek.admin.ch/de/service-public-uebersicht
Holtz-Bacha, C. (2021). The Kiss of Death. Public Service Media under Right-Wing Populist Attack. European Journal of Communication, 36(3), 221–237. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323121991334
Humprecht, E., & Esser, F. (2018). Diversity in Online News: On the importance of ownership types and media system types. Journalism Studies, 19(12), 1825–1847. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2017.1308229
Koban, K., Meerson, R., & Matthes, J. (2024). The Public Spaces Incubator: Transforming Dysfunctional Online Spaces into Functional Public Arenas. In Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (Ed.), Fast Forward. Digital Innovation of Public Service Media in Europe: Public Value Study (pp. 47–65). ORF. https://zukunft.orf.at/rte/upload/2025/veroeffentlichungen_nach_orf-g/24i0092.pdf
Mansell, R., & Steinmueller, W. E. (2020). Advanced introduction to platform economics. Edward Elgar Publishing. Mediapulse. (2025). Annual Report 2024. https://www.mediapulse.ch/daten/jahresdaten Neff, T., & Pickard, V. (2024). Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries. The International Journal of Press/ Politics, 29(3), 601–627. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211060255
Newman, N., Ross Arguedas, A., Robertson, C. T., Nielsen, R. K., & Fletcher, R. (2025). Reuters digital news report 2025. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2025-06/Digital_News-Report_2025.pdf
Puppis, M. (2023). Media Policy. Foundations for Science and Practice (3rd edition). UVK. https://doi.org/10.36198/9783838543789 Puppis, M., Blassnig, S., Erbrich, L., Zabel, C., & Lobigs, F. (2025). Impact of a Potential Shutdown of the Online News Offering SRF News. Why This is Not a Solution for the Media Crisis in Switzerland. Media Perspectives, 2025(14), 1–28. https://www.media-perspektiven.de/fileadmin/ user_upload/media-perspektiven/pdf/2025/MP_14_2025_Auswirkungen_einer_potenziellen_Abschaltung_des_Online-Nachrichtenangebots_SRF_News.pdf
Puppis, M., Schulz, W., & Stratmann, M. (2026). Results of the Future Workshop „Dialogue Function of Public Service Media/Public Broadcasting”. Agora Digital Transformation.
Sehl, A., Fletcher, R., & Picard, R. G. (2020). Crowding out: Is there evidence that public service media harm markets? A cross-national comparative analysis of commercial television and online news providers. European Journal of Communication, 35(4), 389–409. https://doi. org/10.1177/0267323120903688
Sehl, A., Simon, F. M., & Schroeder, R. (2022). The populist campaigns against European public service media: Hot air or existential threat? International Communication Gazette, 84(1), 3–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048520939868
Sørensen, J. K. & Hutchinson, J. (2018) Algorithms and public service media. In G. F. Lowe, H. Van den Bulck & K. Donders (Eds.), Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017 (pp. 91–106). Nordicom.
SRG SSR (2025a). Annual Report 2024. https://gb.srgssr.ch/fileadmin/dam/pdf/Download-Center/SRGSSR-GB2024-de.pdf
SRG SSR (2025b, November 24). Press release: SRG specifies transformation plans and planned job cuts. https://www.srgssr.ch/de/newsmedien/news/srg-konkretisiert-transformationsplaene-und-den-geplanten-stellenabbau
Swiss Advertising Statistics Foundation. (2025). Advertising Expenditure Switzerland 2025. https://werbestatistik.ch/de/publikation/ werbestatistik-2025/
Tresch, A., Lauener, L., & Scaperrotta, L. (2018). VOTO Study on the Swiss Federal Referendum of March 4, 2018. https://www.voto.swiss/ wp-content/uploads/2018/05/VOTO_Bericht_04.03.2018_DE.pdf
Udris, L., Fürst, S., & Eisenegger, M. (2024). Displacement of Private Information Media by Public Media News Offerings? Usage and Willingness to Pay in Switzerland. In fög (Ed.), Yearbook Quality of the Media 2024 (pp. 33–48). Schwabe. https://doi.org/10.24894/978-37965-5200-7
RACING TO THE TOP: PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA AS MARKET STRENGTHENER IN DIGI -
TAL ADVERTISING MARKETS
CHRISTIAN ZABEL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE
Germany’s State Minister for Culture, Wolfram Weimer, recently warned that global platforms are squeezing traditional media “out of the market.” His concern is not rhetorical. Google, Meta, and Amazon now capture almost half of all advertising spending in Germany. The structural shift they drive is hollowing out the domestic value chain that once financed journalism, broadcasting, and cultural production. In this situation, public service media (PSM) can serve as market strengtheners by indirectly supporting private media’s advertising activities. In this regard, limiting or even outright banning digital advertising activities not only undermines the refinancing of PSMs, but also risks destabilising the very infrastructure of public communication that underpins democracy.
For decades, Germany’s dual broadcasting system ensured a balance between public service and private competition. Commercial broadcasters were allowed to rely on advertising to fund entertainment and information, while public service media (PSM) like ARD and ZDF were financed mainly through license fees and heavily restricted advertising. Historically, this model linked competition in the commercial and public spheres. Advertising fuelled investment, competition improved quality, and audiences benefited from a richer media landscape. Digitalization dismantled this equilibrium. Since 2008, the share of total advertising going to German journalistic outlets has dropped from over 70 percent to around 45 (Sehl et al., 2020). Even though total ad spending has increased by more than €6 billion, domestic editorial media have lost roughly €2 billion in annual revenue. Adjusted for inflation (which comes in at almost 30 percent over the period), the real decline is far greater. This transformation is accelerating. Between 2019 and 2023, the German ad market grew a mere 3.4 percent. During this time span, traditional media lost €3 billion and digital platforms gained almost the same amount in advertising revenue. In 2024, German publishers captured less than eight percent of new digital ad spending, while legacy print and broadcast lost nearly half a billion euros more.
This platform dominance also reflects changing user behaviour. Advertisers follow eyeballs, and German audiences – especially younger ones – have shifted attention to global platforms. For Germans aged 14–29, an astounding 88% of video viewing is now on nonlinear, on-demand platforms (YouTube, streaming services, TikTok, etc.), versus just 12% on traditional live TV. YouTube alone accounts for 43 minutes of young adults’ daily video time – double the total time they spend watching all linear TV channels combined (Rühle, 2024; von Oehsen, 2024). These consumption trends foretell an ever-shrinking slice of the ad pie for domestic media if nothing changes.
At the same time, direct payments have not filled the gap. Many publishers hoped that digital subscriptions and paywalls could compensate for declining ad revenues. Unfortunately, that hope has proven largely illusory. Study after study – in Germany and internationally – shows that in the “high-choice” environment of online news, it is extremely difficult to get enough people to pay for content. Even as major news brands worldwide have pivoted to paid content, the majority of readers still won’t open their wallets, clinging to a longstanding “free news” mindset. In practice, digital subscriptions have only added a trickle of revenue for most publishers. By 2024, digital subscriptions accounted for less than five percent of German newspapers’ revenues. Even RTL+, Germany’s most successful domestic streaming service, generated only €403 million—about 13 percent of RTL Group’s advertising turnover (and this number includes digital advertising revenues, too).
The redistribution of advertising budgets is not only a problem for private media companies. It leads to a loss of national value creation and is detrimental for the economy as a whole. In the pre-digital economy, even non-media ad spending (e.g. outdoor or postal advertising) remained within the domestic ecosystem. Today, most of the “non-publisher” advertising spend flows directly to multinational platforms. Increasingly, once powerful broadcasters and publishers now lack the scale and data infrastructure to compete with these international platforms. As the latter consolidate ad inventories, they gain control over pricing and audience access. Local (i.e. national) players respond by cutting costs, reducing investment, and shedding creative capacity. For example, in the private TV sector, original fiction productions and co-productions have almost disappeared from prime time (Maurer, 2025; Maurer et al., 2020). As domestic networks shrink, marketing decisions migrate abroad, and the associated value creation follows. What
is lost is not only ad money but also the institutional capacity to produce, distribute, and monetize public communication domestically. The result is a slow but steady erosion of cultural and economic sovereignty in communication markets.
Here, PSM can act as stabilizers of national media ecosystems through their advertising activities. When they are weakened or even prohibited the loss of value accelerates. Austria offers a cautionary example: analyses show that removing advertising from the ORF would wipe out more than €100 million in domestic media value each year, with little to no benefit for private competitors. The result would be a net transfer of advertising budgets abroad, further hollowing out the local market (Zabel & Lobigs, 2022).
Contrary to long-standing fears, evidence from across Europe shows that public service media do not crowd out private media. They crowd in. Studies from the BBC, the European Broadcasting Union (Oliver Ohlbaum Associates, 2025), and comparative research by Sehl, Schrøder, and others demonstrate that strong public broadcasters correlate with stronger private sectors (Sehl et al., 2020). When public media are well-funded, private media also perform better. In economic terms, public broadcasters generate positive externalities—stimulating production, maintaining audience engagement, and sustaining advertising relevance. The BBC’s own impact studies by KPMG and PwC found that every pound spent by the public broadcaster added value across the creative industries. Rather than fragmenting the market, public broadcasters create a “race to the top.”
Advertisers themselves understand this. Germany’s organisation of brand advertisers (OWM) has long argued that public service outlets extend audience reach into segments commercial media cannot serve alone. In radio, for instance, ARD’s wide reach ensures that the entire medium remains viable as a marketing category. Without public broadcasters, many brands would abandon radio altogether, harming private stations as well. The same now might be said of digital media outlets, where PSM’s outlets could help to keep this category of national offerings relevant in the long term.
The policy implication is clear. In the face of platform dominance, national media markets need internal cooperation, not further segmentation. Allowing limited digital advertising in public service environments—such as ARD and ZDF’s
online platforms—could enable joint marketing ventures with private media, creating scale and relevance for advertisers. Media agencies have already proposed integrated video advertising alliances that would combine public and private inventory into a single domestic platform (Schulz et al., 2023).
Different cooperation models are conceivable: shared ad sales for selected PSM content, or a joint national digital marketing entity co-owned by public and private players. Pooling data, technology, and infrastructure would reduce costs, increase efficiency, and strengthen the local market. Since public broadcasters are non-profit, surplus revenues could be reinvested into journalism or shared with private partners. The aim is not to commercialize PSM but to stabilize the ecosystem that sustains public value. Such initiatives could reclaim part of the national value chain now captured abroad – or at least prevent a further erosion of the national advertising ecosystem.
The added value at stake is thus not limited to PSM and their activities, but to the entire media and advertising ecosystem. In Germany, the choice is political. Whereas policy makers increasingly underscore the need for cooperation between private media and PSM, this – until today – explicitly does not cover advertising activities. Given the speed with which digital platforms increasingly monopolise these markets, it is paramount that national players are enabled to coordinate public and private capacities to preserve their communication sovereignty.
References
Maurer, T. (2025). Programmprofile von Das Erste, ZDF, rtl, voX, Sat.1 und ProSieben. Media Perspektiven, 19, 1–20. Maurer, T., Beier, A., & Weiß, H.-J. (2020). Programmprofile von Das Erste, ZDF, RTL, VOX, Sat.1 und ProSieben. Media Perspektiven, 5, 246–263.
Oliver Ohlbaum Associates. (2025). Economic study on the impact of publicly funded PSM activities on commercial online news publishers. https://www.ebu.ch/Publications/Reports/open/EBU_Study-debunking-crowding-out-Full-report.pdf Rühle, A. (2024). Zeitsouveräne Mediennutzung auf dem Vormarsch? Entwicklung der linearen und non-linearen Nutzung. Media Perspektiven, 29(9), 1–6. Schulz, K.-P., Krapf, M., & Belz, D. (2023). Das Duale System neu denken. Stärkung des Medienstandorts Deutschland. die medaagenturen. https://diemediaagenturen.de/top-themen/das-duale-system-neu-denken/ Sehl, A., Fletcher, R., & Picard, R. G. (2020). Crowding out: Is there evidence that public service media harm markets? A cross-national comparative analysis of commercial television and online news providers. European Journal of Communication, 35(4), 389–409. https://doi. org/10.1177/0267323120903688 von Oehsen, D. (2024). Negativtrend der linearen Mediennutzung setzt sich fort. Media Perspektiven, 29, 1–9. Zabel, C., & Lobigs, F. (2022). Crowding-in-Effekte der öffentlich-rechtlichen Werbevermarktung. Eine Analyse am Beispiel des österreichischen Werbemarktes und Medienstandortes. Media Perspektiven, 5, 206–220.
(UN-) BEAUTIFUL NEW WORLD? EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL CUTS ON PUBLIC BROADCASTING
MATTHIAS KÜNZLER, KARL LARSSON UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN
Public broadcasting in most European countries is committed to essential services for democracy and society; among other things, it is supposed to inform, educate, entertain the entire population, maintain the highest quality standards, and promote the cultural and creative industry through in-house productions (cf. Künzler 2013, 110f.). These diverse tasks cost money, which is becoming increasingly scarce for most public broadcasting organizations: Considering inflation, European public broadcasting organizations had to accept an 11% decline in their fee revenues between 2014-2023 (EBU Media Intelligence Service 2025), and advertising revenues also shrank. The result is austerity measures and service cuts. Lessons from such cuts can exemplarily show what services public broadcasting could provide in the digital world if media policy granted it the necessary financial resources.
In Germany, with the enactment of the state treaty to reform public broadcasting, among other things, a shift from linear radio and television to digital ondemand and streaming alternatives is planned. The number of radio and TV niche channels is to be reduced by switching to online streaming. There is excitement that the children‘s channel KiKa will only be available via online stream from 2033. Germany is thus following the long-established trend of providing children‘s and youth channels exclusively online, hoping this will happen without significant losses in viewership. The young audience allegedly consumes media predominantly on the internet. However, appearances are deceiving: Such “modernization measures” conceal performance losses, as is clearly shown in the Netherlands. The shift of children‘s/youth television to the online sector was accompanied by a reduction of about 80 full-time positions. The experiences of the British BBC could have been learned from: About ten years ago, it took the entertainment channel BBC Three out of the linear program, hoping to reach the young target group more effectively and cost-efficiently online. But the measure did not achieve the hoped-for result, as a study by Prof. Dr. Neil Thurman from
2020 shows, because after the switch, there was primarily a decline in the young and not the older audience (cf. Thurman 2020, 299f.). The BBC responded by bringing the channel back into the linear program part-time from February 2022. The cost-benefit calculation of the broadcaster was now significantly more positive. In addition to the shift of channels to the internet, a second trend can be identified, namely the reduction and elimination of niche channels from the program. A frequently presented argument here is that such channels with their specific target groups do not belong to the public broadcasting offering and that this audience segment could be covered by private broadcasters. Again, it is worth looking at other countries. The Netherlands, as part of their cuts, have completely removed the radio stations NPO Jazz & Soul and NPO Campus Radio from the program, while in Denmark, the television channel for culture and history was discontinued. In Norway, the entertainment division of the public NRK must bear the cuts. What unites supporters of the cuts everywhere is the argument that public broadcasting should instead focus on news programs and reporting.
The fact that citizens have to resort to private streaming services and the reception of audiovisual entertainment increasingly becomes a socio-economic question is just one of the feared side effects of such reforms. It also raises the question of whether private providers will actually take over the lost entertainment and information offerings in the field of culture and history, as special-interest channels were generally not considered profitable even before the massive shifts of advertising funds from TV and press to the online sector. The discussion also overlooks that unprofitable entertainment channels can fulfill a societal function.
Where the reduction of public broadcasting to a mere information service provider can lead is shown by the USA, where the political channel C-SPAN is far from reaching a majority of the population. Instead, private media houses enjoy market dominance in both the information and entertainment sectors. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) is strongly represented at the local level and is often the only media source in „news deserts,” where private media have already withdrawn from the media supply of rural regions. With the cuts decided in the summer, this essential service is precisely being questioned. Although the USA certainly represents an example of a more extreme nature, it warns against losing sight of the societal functions that entertainment formats can fulfill.
Last but not least, public broadcasting can offer an important service for integration and cultural understanding in increasingly diverse societies with its foreign broadcasting channels in various languages. For example, in Switzerland, many foreigners living in the country use the swissinfo offering, which reports in seven languages on the political processes in the country and often explains the institutional foundations. Although this offering is attested to be of extremely high quality and is produced cost-effectively, it is threatened with disappearance due to austerity measures.
What can be learned from these experiences? Target group-oriented preparation and distribution cost money. If public broadcasting has the resources for this, it can reach relevant target groups such as children and young people or migrants, for whom otherwise hardly any domestic media offering is available in their language. This can contribute to socialization with responsible content, media literacy, and societal understanding. Offering niche channels, especially in the cultural sector, can help network corresponding scenes, provide broad visibility, and become part of the cultural scene through productions. Last but not least, well-funded public broadcasting can help prevent media supply gaps where private media have to withdraw from the market due to increasingly difficult financing situations.
However, money is not everything. Both media policy and public broadcasting need the awareness that these public financial resources are to be used for fulfilling certain societal services that are not provided according to private-commercial logic. This can be illustrated by the example of foreign reporting. A recent study of this reporting by Ladislaus Ludescher shows that the main news programs of the public broadcasting organizations in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland mainly report on the same locations in the western world as the private (print) media. The Global South, on the other hand, is massively neglected (cf. Ludescher 2025). This is despite the fact that the German public broadcasting organizations still have the financial means to afford a well-developed correspondent network. However, the existing finances are not specifically used to take a complementary, independent perspective on the world - rather, there is an orientation towards traditional and presumably unquestioned concepts of „relevance.” Thus, public broadcasting misses a great opportunity to legitimize its special public financing form through a visibly and audibly independent service.
Conclusion: Well-funded public broadcasting can provide highly relevant societal services - especially as private providers increasingly struggle to provide such services due to the decline of the traditional business model consisting of advertising and subscriptions. However, it requires awareness of the public mandate and the courage to depart from traditional routines on the part of media management and media creators. This opens up new opportunities: through a distinctive program offering, the special service of public broadcasting becomes tangible in the everyday lives of media users, increasing understanding for its specific financing and organizational form and thus its legitimacy.
References
EBU Media Intelligence Service (2025): Funding of Public Service Media. Public Service Media Needs Adequate Funding. European Broadcasting Union. Available online at https://www.ebu.ch/publications/research/membersonly/report/funding-of-public-service-media. Künzler, Matthias (2013): Media System Switzerland. Konstanz: UVK Publishing Company. Ludescher, Ladislaus (2025): „The Greatest Solvable Problem in the World”: The Media Neglect of Global Hunger. Heidelberg: heiBOOKS. Thurman, Neil (2020): When a TV channel reinvents itself online: Post-broadcast consumption and content change at BBC Three. In: Convergence 27 (2), pp. 291–312.
Author Description: Matthias Künzler, Prof. Dr., Communication Policy & Media Economics Department, Free University of Berlin; engaged in research and teaching on innovations in public broadcasting and local communication. Karl Larsson, BA in History / Journalism and Communication Studies and student assistant at the Communication Policy & Media Economics Department, Free University of Berlin.
ON THE FINANCING OF ORF AS AN INDISPENSABLE INVESTMENT IN A RESILIENT DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.
CORNELIA WALLNER UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA
The current media landscape is characterized by a series of significant upheavals and problems that fundamentally threaten the democratic public. A key factor is the spread of disinformation with the deliberate intent to deceive and thereby gain advantages (Broda & Strömbäck, 2024), especially through social media. Targeted polarization through the promotion of extreme opinions is also part of this, as is the manipulation of content up to deepfakes. This fosters existing tendencies towards the polarization of political discourse, where opinions differing from one‘s own are emotionally rejected and their representatives are no longer accepted as legitimate discussion partners (McCoy, Rahman, & Somer, 2018). Empirically, there is a negative correlation between the perceived coarsening of public discourse and citizens‘ trust in media and politics (Fawzi et al., 2025). All of this can endanger the cohesion of democratic societies.
Furthermore, the global spread of a few powerful digital platforms, which largely evade national media policies, represents a disruptive change in media systems and the democratic media public as we knew it (Fischer & Jarren, 2023). This is accompanied not only by new forms of media communication but also by significant financial challenges for journalistic media companies.
These substantial challenges for democratic societies must be considered when media policy decisions and especially the financing of public service media are discussed. To further assess the need for financing, the role of media in our society today must first be outlined.
A vital public sphere is an essential component of societal self-understanding processes in democratic societies and a constitutive element of social cohesion. In the public sphere, topics are negotiated and common orientations are developed (Klaus, 2017). Diversity of opinion and different perspectives are prerequisites for citizens to inform themselves, weigh political positions, and make delibe -
rative decisions – through argumentative engagement with different perspectives – that consider not only individual interests but also the common good from a citizen‘s perspective (Habermas, 2022). This is the basis of the mandate of public service media: to promote democracy by ensuring access to diverse and unbiased information and thereby, in conjunction with other media, creating the foundation for public discourse (Donders, 2021; Campos-Rueda & Goyanes, 2022). The notion of high-quality information as a merit good, whose provision should not be left solely to the market, is also fundamental (Larson, 2014). Public service media create spaces for deliberative processes by illuminating complex societal issues from multiple perspectives in news, documentaries, discussion formats, and background reports.
From this understanding, public service media are already part of the solution for how we as a democratic society can competently respond to current challenges (Moore, 2024). Public service media provide high-quality, diverse, and independent information to society according to generally accepted norms of journalistic conduct. They serve as a reference point for citizens regarding journalistic standards and are multipliers for the development of critical media reception. However, for public service media to be part of the solution, they must also perform services beyond their original mandate. These include, for example, monitoring social media and validating external information (Sehl, 2024). The sheer abundance of information in the digitalized world must be reliably selected, verified, and processed according to professional journalistic standards for citizens to continue to inform themselves reliably. In terms of content, it is important to address both the generations of digital natives and other generations. Public service media can only fulfil their mandate in a digitalized media world if they are active across different media-technical channels and on various digital platforms. This implies presenting journalistic content differently depending on the platform. The digital transformation thus brings additional financial needs. In addition to classic linear offerings, media libraries, podcasts, social media channels must be served, innovative formats developed, journalistic resources for the increasing number of necessary fact-checks provided, the underlying technical infrastructure operated, and own developments advanced, such as translating public service values into algorithmic systems or designing recommendation algorithms to reflect diversity rather than commercial success criteria (Sørensen, 2022). These essential services of public service media for democracy are only possible with adequate funding.
What does this mean specifically for the future financing of ORF? First, the relevance of ORF in the Austrian media landscape must be addressed. The fact that ORF is perceived by Austrian society as a reliable journalistic source in the current media environment is evident in the highest level of trust placed in ORF news compared to other news brands (Gadringer et al., 2025). From this position, it is important to secure the political independence of ORF and establish it economically sustainably. Declining advertising revenues have been challenging previously functioning business models in the media sector for years and lead to economic challenges for all media companies in Austria—including ORF, which is significantly financed by advertising revenues and is repeatedly subject to discussions about further savings.
Critics may argue that ORF is too expensive, and substantial savings could be realized. This perspective is too short-term. The importance of public service media is not only normatively and democratically justifiable but also empirically verifiable. A comprehensive quantitative study comparing 33 countries clearly shows a positive correlation between a well-financed, politically and economically independent public service medium in a country and a healthy democracy. The data further demonstrate that in countries with a strong public service medium, participation in the political process is promoted (Neff & Pickard, 2021). Investing in a strong ORF is thus not an option but a societal and democratic necessity. What kind of ORF does Austria want to afford? Considering the outlined threats to democratic societies and the services of public service media, the answer is clear: ORF must be financially strong and sustainably equipped. It must be ensured that ORF can position and assert itself as an independent information authority committed to the highest journalistic quality standards for all members of society amidst the major challenges of a platformized and algorithmized media world, providing reliable orientation in an increasingly fragmented media landscape. This is part of the solution for how we can deal with current disruptions of the public sphere and at the same time an investment in the future of our democratic society.
References
Broda, E. & Strömbäck, J. (2024). Misinformation, Disinformation, and Fake News: Lessons from an Interdisciplinary, Systematic Literature Review. Annals of the International Communication Association, 48(2), 139–166. https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2024.2323736
Campos-Rueda, M., & Goyanes, M. (2022). Public service media for better democracies: Testing the role of perceptual and structural variables in shaping citizens’ evaluations of public television. Journalism, 24(11), 2493-2513. https://doi.org/10.1177/14648849221114948
Donders, K. (2021). Public Service Media in Europe: Law, Theory and Practice. London: Routledge. https://doi-org/10.4324/9781351105569
Fawzi, N., Ziegele, M., Schultz, T., Jackob, N., Jakobs, I., Viehmann, C., Quiring, O., Schemer C., & Stegmann, D. (2025). Stabiles Medienvertrauen auch in Zeiten politischer Umbrüche. Mainzer Langzeitstudie Medienvertrauen 2024. Media Perspektiven 13/2025, 1-20. https://www. media-perspektiven.de/publikationsarchiv/2025/detailseite-2025/stabiles-medienvertrauen-auch-in-zeiten-politischer-umbrueche
Fischer, R., & Jarren, O. (2023). The platformization of the public sphere and its challenge to democracy. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 50(1), 200-215. https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537231203535
Gadringer, S., Sparviero, S., Trappel, J., & Holzapfel, M. (2025). Digital News Report Austria 2025. Detailergebnisse für Österreich. Fachbereich Kommunikationswissenschaft, Universität Salzburg. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15675025
Habermas, J. (2022). Ein neuer Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit und die deliberative Politik. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Klaus, E. (2017). Öffentlichkeit als gesellschaftlicher Selbstverständigungsprozess und das Drei-Ebenen-Modell von Öffentlichkeit. Rückblick und Ausblick. In E. Klaus & R. Drüeke (Ed.), Öffentlichkeiten und gesellschaftliche Aushandlungsprozesse: Theoretische Perspektiven und empirische Befunde (pp. 17-38). Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839430491-003
Larson, H. (2014). The Legitimacy of Public Service Broadcasting in the 21st Century. The Case of Scandinavia. Nordicom Review 35(2), 65-76. https://doi.org/10.2478/nor-2014-0015
McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(1), 16-42. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218759576
Moore, M. (2024). Keeping Democracies Alive: The Role of Public Service Media. The Political Quarterly, 95: 108-112. https://doiorg/10.1111/1467-923X.13359
Neff, T., & Pickard, V. (2021). Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries. The International Journal of Press/ Politics, 29(3), 601-627. https://doi-org/10.1177/19401612211060255
Sehl, A. (2024). Public service media as pivotal in combating misinformation and disinformation: prerequisites and approaches. European Journal of Communication, 39(6), 582-594. https://doi-org/10.1177/02673231241294185
Sørensen, J.K. (2022). The Shortcomings of the Diversity Diet: Public Service Media, Algorithms and the Multiple Dimensions of Diversity. In: Meese, J., Bannerman, S. (eds) The Algorithmic Distribution of News. Palgrave Global Media Policy and Business. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87086-7_15
DIALOGUE AS AN INVESTMENT: MEASURES FOR THE MEDIA OF THE FUTURE
TOBIAS EBERWEIN, MARIE RATHMANN AUSTRIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
The media and journalism of the future will need to be more open to dialogue if they want to continue to take their central social role seriously. This is all the more true in times like these, when political populism is exacerbating social divisions and the use of new technologies and artificial intelligence is causing uncertainty among many citizens. Public media in particular are well positioned to respond to these challenges. As institutions serving the common good, their commitment to integration and exchange is virtually written into their DNA. At the same time, it is clear that dialogue does not emerge automatically. It requires time, professional expertise, and sufficient resources. Dialogue is not a byproduct of journalistic work, but a task that must be consciously embraced and cultivated over the long term.
This is one of the central conclusions of the EU-funded research project DIACOMET (short for: Dialogic Communication Ethics and Accountability). Over a period of three years, researchers and communication practitioners from eight European countries – including staff from the Austrian Academy of Sciences –investigated the conditions under which public dialogue processes can succeed. It turns out that Austria is not the only country with a lot of catching up to do. Yet a great deal could already be achieved with a few relatively straightforward measures (and manageable investments).
The promises and pitfalls of media transformation
The transformation of the media has always been accompanied by far-reaching expectations. The emergence of new forms of media has repeatedly been associated with the hope that they would facilitate social participation and give more people a voice in the public sphere. Radio provides an early example: as early as the 1930s, Bertolt Brecht argued that radio should not be understood merely as a distribution channel, but as a means of communication – one that not only
reaches listeners but actively involves them. At the time, this vision of a dialogic medium was highly utopian.
With digitalization and the rise of the internet, these expectations seemed to be fulfilled on a large scale for the first time. Since the turn of the millennium at the latest, barriers to public communication have fallen dramatically: publishing content has become easier than ever, and media users have increasingly taken on the role of content produsers themselves. Journalism is no longer a one-way street. Suddenly, there is a real possibility for direct exchange between the media and their audiences – and a new quality of public dialogue.
So much for wishful thinking. Practical experience with user-driven participation paints a much more ambivalent picture. Numerous scientific studies now show that greater participation does not automatically lead to higher quality in public debates. On the contrary: the comment sections and forums of many news websites are usually dominated by a harsh tone, with insults and hate speech being no exception. At the same time, in the age of “alternative facts,” it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between truth and lies. Participation, it seems, is thus becoming a problem of media ethics in itself. It is clearly only of limited use as a miracle cure in the fight against social polarization.
Public value as a breeding ground for dialogue?
Newsrooms and media policymakers have so far struggled to find effective ways of dealing with such dysfunctional forms of journalistic follow-up communication. Many media organizations now have guidelines for user comments and other forms of user-generated content. However, a comprehensive, strategically anchored dialogue concept remains the exception rather than the rule in European media houses. Behind closed doors, journalists often point to a lack of time for meaningful exchanges with audiences. In view of the growing workload and increasing demands in the media profession, actively responding to feedback from the audience all too often falls by the wayside.
This is unfortunate, because dialogue on equal terms would be a powerful means to strengthen trust in journalistic institutions – a resource that has become increasingly fragile. Public media in particular have a special responsibility in
this regard. If they take their public mandate seriously, the central principles of dialogic communication must consistently guide their journalistic activities.
The Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) offers an instructive example of how the concept of public value can actually serve as a breeding ground for constructive dialogue and successful participation. The ORF defines public value through five central quality dimensions: individual value, social value, Austrian value, international value, and corporate value. Many of the associated performance criteria can be understood as an explicit invitation to exchange between media actors and their audiences. Terms such as “diversity,” “integration,” and “proximity to citizens” are just as central as demands for comprehensibility, responsibility, transparency, and international networking – all of which are fundamental prerequisites for functioning participation at various levels. The ORF’s programming addresses these goals in a variety of ways. Yet a crucial question remains: do Austrian audiences actually perceive these principles as signals that encourage dialogue on an equal footing?
Insights from the DIACOMET study
The research conducted as part of the DIACOMET study allows for different conclusions. Among other things, international project partners systematically evaluated more than 400 European codes of ethics and other guidelines on public communication for the first time to examine the importance of dialogical communication practices in them. The analysis covered not only documents from the media and journalism, but also from politics, business, and civil society. While more than four-fifths of the texts referenced dialogic communication at least once, only a small number treated it as a genuine guiding principle. A positive example is the forum rules of debatte.ORF.at, which offer users and moderators concrete guidance for good communication practice. However, even here, a coherent foundation in communication ethics is lacking, as it is in the other documents in the sample.
To better understand the specific expectations and needs of media users, DIACOMET researchers conducted nearly 90 focus group discussions with a total of more than 500 participants in the countries involved in the project. The results
are sobering for Austria as well: many citizens feel that their perspectives and concerns are inadequately represented in media discourse. Visibility in established media is perceived as a scarce and contested commodity that is difficult to attain without significant social or cultural capital. Numerous study participants explicitly want more opportunities to participate in public debates, but at the same time fear the negative consequences – such as insults or open hatred.
Measures for the future
However, DIACOMET does not stop at diagnosing problems. The project also advances concrete approaches aimed at strengthening dialogue and participation as fundamental principles of modern media organizations. Drawing on a Delphi survey with international experts from media practice and research, project partners outline a set of recommended measures.
Central to these efforts is the collaborative development of ethically grounded guidelines for good communication practice, involving all relevant stakeholders. These guidelines are intended for use not only in journalistic newsrooms, but across a wide range of public communication contexts. In addition, under the guidance of media education experts, a so-called “dilemma game” is being created to enable participants of all ages to playfully engage with typical challenges in communication ethics and discuss possible solutions together. An online forum, designed specifically for the project, provides the appropriate framework. Moreover, a diverse network of NGOs has formed in the course of the project, which will continue to promote these and other ideas from DIACOMET beyond its completion in May 2026.
Whether and to what extent established media organizations will adopt such dialogic measures remains an open question. Doing so requires not only editorial openness, but also, and not least, a willingness to provide the necessary resources. In any case, the results of DIACOMET’s research suggest that this would be a worthwhile investment – especially for public service media.
Further information on the DIACOMET project and its outputs is available at: https://diacomet.eu
BETWEEN INDEPENDENCE AND ADAPTATION
BORIS BERGANT
EUROPEAN BROADCASTING UNION
Younger colleagues from the world of (electronic) media—who at the time were not even born (and who today already constitute the clear majority)—are hardly aware of the tectonic shifts that the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s of the previous century brought into our professional environment.
This period promisingly revitalised the political framework in Europe, and with the fall of the Berlin Wall it also triggered unforeseen political and media processes. The media world, which for more than 30 years had been divided by the then-obsolete (and symbolically far-reaching) wall into an almost hermetically sealed Eastern and Western part of the continent—with two entirely different and antagonistic ideological and military, as well as technological, systems—was at that time confronted with new challenges.
These challenges were not only political. At the same time, a technological revolution—and with it an economic one—was smouldering. In the field of electronic media, until then Europe had known only so-called public media (in the West) and state media (in the East).
The former gradually transformed—from direct control and ownership by states, governments and political parties—into media under the direct supervision of the public; in the worst case, into a managerial combination of public and state institutions. They were meant to reflect the plurality of democratic societies and to provide content for both majorities and minorities.
The latter operated under vigilant supervision and exclusively in the interest of the state—shaped according to a single ideology embodied in the sole ruling party. On both sides, however, the technological foundation was limited, which affected broadcasting frequencies and also the number of content providers. In order to protect content, technical standards also differed, hindering cross-border flows. At the height of the Cold War, Eastern Europe even prohibited the reception of Western stations and systematically—also electronically—jammed their signals.
Technological progress, however, is unstoppable. Meanwhile, ever new technical inventions were emerging; satellites began to complement and replace the previously exclusive terrestrial links; film technology was replaced by electronic technology, and analogue by digital. Even if the collapse of regimes in the East had not occurred, it would have become increasingly difficult to maintain rigid restrictions.
At the same time, the privatisation and commercialisation of electronic content strongly marked the Western world. Because it gradually created a content—and later also a qualitative—alternative, and because it simultaneously unleashed the need and unprecedented opportunities for new jobs and revenues, it quickly became a new social reality. The absolute monopoly of states over this content and technical sphere collapsed.
This period also coincided with the emergence of new, then highly promising European perspectives. Instead of walls, bridges were to be built between East and West. This was expected to accelerate the democratisation of social structures and plurality in the East, as well as political and economic integration and unification of Europe.
One of the conditions was, of course, the structural adaptation of social superstructures and subsystems, as well as technological standardisation. However— such processes require, in addition to broad consensus, both time and money. Therefore, the period after the 1990s was referred to as the period of transition. It was difficult to predict its duration. Yet it was certainly hoped that the process would not last as long as we observe today, when we ask ourselves whether the transition has in fact failed—since politically, economically and technologically, increasingly strong deviations from the hopes, intentions and promises of almost 40 years ago are emerging. The goals were never fully achieved; mistakes tend to perpetuate and deepen. Legal frameworks may be refined, but they are not implemented or respected.
Public service media are under pressure not only in the transitional eastern part of the continent, but increasingly also in the western part—particularly with regard to their economic position, revenues and institutional independence. EU membership initially expanded, yet the idea of a unified and integrated Europe
remains an unrealised dream. Some Western Balkan states have been in the waiting room for more than 20 years, without tangible progress. There are certainly many objective as well as subjective reasons for this—but the facts are evident. Something that initially sounded like a joke has taken hold: instead of the Balkans being “Europeanised” through EU integration, so-called core Europe has in the meantime been “Balkanised”—and this can be interpreted in any way one chooses.
It should nevertheless be emphasised—again as a reminder to younger generations—that electronic media and their organisations initially played the most visible role in Europe’s social transition.
At the time of the defiant Berlin Wall, Europe was brutally divided. Public radio and television services—the only ones on the market—were split between two rather different programmatic-technological and interest-based associations. Less well known is the fact that in London in 1946 the pre-war unified broadcasting union, the IBU (International Broadcasting Union), originally founded in 1924, was re-established, bringing together all national radio organisations of both the West and the East. After the post-war political split, in 1950 the Western union (EBU, initially based in Brussels and later in Geneva) and the Eastern OIRT (based in Prague), which also included non-European members of the communist bloc, were established.
(Interestingly, Yugoslavia was among the founding members of the EBU and remained so—the only one with a specific socialist but politically non-aligned system. When Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1991, we EBU members from these newly established states, mainly Slovenia - due to our experience and understanding of both systems, significantly contributed to the process of accession of former OIRT members.)
The EBU was undoubtedly the first major European organisation that, after the “fall of the wall”, admitted Eastern Europe. Together with projects of content and technical synchronisation, this undoubtedly encouraged other similar processes of rapprochement. Programmes and their unrestricted accessibility motivated public opinion across Europe. The process of media transition, however, was and remains heavily dependent on politics. This is, alongside various subjective fac-
tors, the central reason why it has remained only partially realised.
The first political phase—the transformation from state broadcasters into public service media—unfolded in many Eastern countries in a contradictory manner, also due to long-standing differences in understanding and political culture.
Habits of political influence and control over the media change more slowly than public expectations. The dictate of the once sole ruling party—or ruling parties— was initially simply replaced by the dictate and interference of a larger number of “pluralistic” political parties. Patterns and methods have been repeated and continue to be repeated. Unfortunately, such habits are difficult to shed.
Public service media can fulfil their role only if they are credible and independent. This can be achieved solely through a clear and sufficiently sustainable definition of their functions and goals, and exclusively under public scrutiny. Politics is only one part of the public. For this, a coherent and unambiguous legal framework is essential. In addition to appropriate legislation, independence must also be ensured through stable and predictable financing. Transition over the past decades has not fully secured either.
Due to differing party interests and the slow adaptation to functional pluralistic democracy, the introduction of new legislation has proceeded too slowly and inadequately. Some political environments struggle to accept well-intentioned advice and, when comparing themselves with international best practices, often resort to excuses based on alleged specificities of customs and contexts.
Today it can be said that media legislation in transitional countries is more or less standardised—but there are major differences in its implementation and enforcement. The greatest gap remains in the legal definitions and establishment of regulatory bodies: their competences, composition, methods of appointment and the background of their members. Especially in countries where public media are financed from state budgets, it is difficult to reach consensus that such financing—which, due to its many implications, is the worst of the possible solutions—is not an act of goodwill but an obligation of the state, and that such revenues are merely a tool for carrying out legally defined functions, not a right of the donor to directly control content. The dual system of content provision
(commercial and public) everywhere generates dilemmas. The function of direct individual payments (licence fee, contribution, tax deduction) is repeatedly under attack—even among payers—particularly due to negative campaigns by competitors and political calculations. Some point, for example, to the incompatibility of advertising revenues with the obligation to pay a licence fee. Others argue that payment should be linked to actual viewership or listenership, following a consumer-purchase logic. Yet even the commercial sector does not operate such a system; there, too, services are paid for in packages. It is undisputed that public service media require certain investments for their operation, regardless of the size of a country or its population. Since the capacities of state budgets in smaller environments are limited, a dual financing system—depending on the case—still appears to be the most appropriate solution.
Experience from the transition clearly shows that financing remains one of the most sensitive issues determining the fate of public service media in “newer democracies”. A newer insight is that this challenge increasingly affects “older” democracies as well. Today, all are under growing pressure due to fierce domestic and international competition.
Unfortunately, public service media in transitional countries make insufficient efforts to educate the public about the crucial importance of public service media for pluralism and democratic societies. Meanwhile, an increasingly agile and interconnected commercial competition is acting with hostility, striving at all costs to curtail the operational space of public service media. The rise of populism in politics further facilitates this.
Budgets of public service media in most Eastern European countries have been incomparable with those of Western Europe since the very beginning of the transition. With the exception of Poland, they range from €18 to €380 million—often barely half of Western European budgets. From the outset, these amounts have been extremely unbalanced, with particular emphasis on the unpredictability and short-term nature of most Eastern European funding systems. They are subject to frequent changes and variables, which complicates long-term planning, including investments. Public service media in Eastern Europe have only belatedly embraced digitalisation and replaced outdated equipment and working environments. To enable faster participation in international exchanges and
co-productions, states should support them with more substantial development funds, as they do other service and economic activities. Unfortunately, such examples are rare.
In this context, the existence and more balanced development of public service media—especially for smaller states—remain the sole guarantee of independent information and the most important pillar for the national promotion of culture, science and quality entertainment. In today’s flood of general commercialisation and disinformation, they also assume responsibility for ensuring national security in modern societies—an irreplaceable mission.
Incidentally, alongside the transition of electronic media in Europe, an important codification process took place within the Council of Europe, where in the early 1990s the Convention on Transfrontier Television (T-TT) was adopted—a historic milestone. On the ruins of the informational and propaganda Cold War, it sought to guarantee the right to cross-border accessibility and exchangeability of programmes and to prevent abuses of restrictions as well as piracy. Despite numerous initial difficulties, the Convention did take root and particularly highlighted the role of public service media. Yet unfortunately, in light of new phenomena—abuses on numerous social media platforms (propaganda, disinformation and hate speech)—it has faded into oblivion without being replaced by appropriate upgrade …
JUST NO CHICKEN TV!
JOSEF TRAPPEL UNIVERSITY OF SALZBURG
At the beginning of his second term, US President Donald Trump portrayed himself as the strong man. However, his display of bravado and threats was noticeably damaged by the end of his first year in office. Contributing to this were attentive media that recognized early signs of this decline during his backwardlooking tariff battle. In a brilliant analysis, the Financial Times pinpointed this in May 2025. The erratic behavior of the US President was explained by the British economic newspaper with the TACO Theory. In a highly amusing wordplay even for connoisseurs of the English language, journalist Robert Armstrong observed: „Trump always chickens out.” This phrase describes a well-known – mostly male – behavioral pattern from business, politics, and private life, where a dramatically heightened dominance and threat display collapses as soon as sufficient resistance arises. Such a gorilla „chickens out,” tucks his tail (if he had one).
What this behavior has to do with public service media could be asked of Radio Yerevan. Or you could read this short text to the end, where – promised – no additional zoomorphism will distract from the essentials. Because the matter is too serious.
Basically, TACO is a desirable and pleasing behavioral pattern. Once understood, the bravado loses its terror, and the actor is exposed to ridicule. However, the underlying strategic mechanics should not be underestimated. On the one hand, intimidation immediately puts the opponent in a defensive position and limits their options to defensive ones. On the other hand, while intimidation does not necessarily achieve the loudly proclaimed positions, the effectiveness of this strategy often lies in accepting reputational damage to achieve smaller goals that otherwise could not be reached or only through lengthy negotiations. Trump‘s tariff bluster indeed did not achieve the maximum goal in most cases, but higher tariffs remained at the end of the process than before his smoke-and-mirrors maneuver.
Bravado and intimidation work best as negotiation tactics when the opposing side is perceived as weaker from the outset. However, if the opposing side proves to be resilient, the risks of this tactic increase. If the opposing side cannot be
sufficiently intimidated as expected, the tactic results in a confrontation that only allows one way out. If a serious escalation of the conflict is to be avoided, one of the two sides must chicken out. If this role falls to the aggressor, they face loss of face and reputation. On the opposing side, the reputational gain is all the greater. The first year of the second Trump administration provides textbook material, especially in the media sector. At the zenith of his political power, no opponent is too big for the US President. Early in 2025, ABC and CBS sought a way out by responding to Trump‘s threats with submission (and a costly settlement for them). Encouraged by this partial success, Trump then targeted the two print media New York Times and Wall Street Journal. To build his threat display, he used an instrument known in the media world as SLAPP, strategic lawsuits against public participation. Remarkable is the threat of a lawsuit against the Wall Street Journal, as it is owned by his kindred spirit, Rupert Murdoch. A billion US dollars in dispute value is a serious threat even for the elderly Australian-born media mogul. Before the end of the year, Trump then multiplied his stake and filed a defamation lawsuit for 10 billion US dollars (including interest and compensation) against the BBC. The subject is a documentary by the broadcaster about a Trump campaign event. The mere threat of the lawsuit had consequences: BBC Chief Tim Davies resigned, as did News Chief Deborah Turness, and the BBC apologized to Trump. This brings us to our dominance and chicken story with public service media. And to the question of how they can prepare themselves to avoid being forced to chicken out in the event of such a gorilla threat.
In Western-style democracies, media are considered, if not as the fourth (because unlike the other three, not democratically legitimized) power, then as a power factor in the political game of forces. Communication science research shows that not only size, i.e., reach, but also relevance is a decisive factor in building power. As media power builds, the desires of other stakeholders to influence these media increase. Journalists in the editorial offices know the usual suspects well. From the call from the party headquarters to the angry advertiser, a wide field spans. From desires to a threat display according to the described script, the path is not far.
As chicken TV would be those broadcasters who react to a threat display with chicken-out and thus not only acknowledge but solidify dominance. Recent Austrian contemporary history can report from that interregnum after the National
Council election in 2024, in which the FPÖ, in government negotiations, threatened those media with the withdrawal of subsidies that reported critically about this party. A chicken-out showdown between the FPÖ and the media ultimately did not occur. As is well known, the FPÖ returned the mandate to form a government unfulfilled.
For the media, especially public service media, mild forms of power confrontation are a daily occurrence. Escalation is the exception – among other things because the opposing side usually correctly assesses the power attributed to the media as unpredictable. If escalation occurs, the tactical-strategic challenge from the media‘s perspective is to escape the looming appropriation by forcing the opposing side into TACO behavior. Supporting in such a confrontation is solid backing from the population and reassurance at the editorial and ownership level, in the case of public service media, the management and supervisory body. The resources required for this are not to be underestimated but can be justified. Since such a chicken-out showdown necessarily takes place in public, the medium concerned builds its reputation as fearless and independent. As a positive external effect, a broad trust-building in the population can be expected.
Admitting one‘s editorial mistakes, as the BBC did in the case at hand without hesitation, is not chicken-out behavior but proof of decency and responsibility. And it can contribute to forcing the opposing side to chicken out and thus reaping the reputational dividend itself.
WHAT IS AT STAKE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA
HILDE VAN DEN BULCK UNIVERSITY OF PHILADELPHIA
Debates about cuts to public service media funding recur whenever media ecosystems change, audience habits shift or government budgets come under pressure. All too often, these discussions are framed in the language of necessity, invoking fiscal realism and budgetary constraint, as if funding decisions were merely technical adjustments rather than political choices. What makes the issue more urgent today is that governments are actively rearranging public budgets in response to geopolitical instability, economic insecurity and the growing influence of populist politics.
In this climate, the funding of public service media is discussed not only in relation to organizational efficiency, competition with commercial media and platforms or technological innovation. It is increasingly entangled with broader societal priorities and value choices. At stake are fundamental questions about what kind of public future is imaginable, which collective institutions are deemed worthy of protection, and which democratic, cultural and epistemic infrastructures societies are willing to sustain or allow to erode. From an epistemic welfare perspective, well-functioning public service media are not simply content providers. They form part of the conditions that enable citizens to exercise epistemic agency: the capacity to access reliable information, to make sense of complexity, to encounter plural perspectives and to participate meaningfully in the digital public sphere. Public service media support this role by offering shared reference points, editorial independence and long-term commitments to wide-ranging public knowledge that are difficult to sustain under purely market-driven or politically instrumental logics.
When public service media are defunded, something more than programming is lost. Conversely, when they are financed adequately and sustainably, something more than content becomes possible. At stake is not merely the survival of a certain type of media organization, but the conditions under which citizens can orient themselves, judge credibility and act as epistemic agents in an increasingly fragmented, accelerated and contested information and knowledge environment.
What is lost when public service media are defunded
Cutting funding for public service media rarely leads to immediate collapse, as repeated rounds across Europe and, more recently and visibly, in the United States have shown. Instead, defunding produces a slow erosion of institutional capacity. It translates into reduced ambition, growing risk aversion and increasingly narrow interpretations of what counts as ‘essential’. Over time, sustained budgetary pressure pushes public service media to behave like cautious market actors with little room to fail, compelled to prioritize retention, reach and shortterm metrics, while still being rhetorically expected to ‘do everything’ and ‘serve everyone’.
For citizens, the primary stakeholders of public service media, this gradual erosion undermines epistemic security. In fragmented media environments dominated by platforms, personalization and algorithmically curated feeds, public service media provide shared points of reference. They offer news and information that presuppose a common citizenry and are oriented toward truthfulness, explanation and contextualization; culture and entertainment that speak across social, ethnic and generational boundaries; and artistic innovation that allows for surprise, reflection and collective experience. Public service media have never fulfilled these roles perfectly. National priorities, tendencies toward homogenization, institutional routines and a certain competitive logic have often overshadowed more diverse representation and epistemic justice, which is precisely why continuous independent scrutiny, the refinement of public remits and the use of management contracts as corrective instruments remain necessary.
Yet when these core functions are weakened through sustained underfunding, citizens become increasingly dependent on commercial and platform-driven sources optimized for engagement rather than understanding, virality rather than truthfulness and polarization rather than shared ground. The outcome is not necessarily a surge in outright misinformation but a gradual thinning of the shared informational environment on which knowledge formation and democratic life depend. With it comes a weakening of citizens’ capacity to act as epistemic agents in the digital public sphere.
The societal consequences of this erosion extend well beyond the media sector itself. Periods of geopolitical tension and economic uncertainty place heighte -
ned demands on societies’ informational and knowledge infrastructures. In such contexts, citizens are confronted with competing narratives about security, risk, responsibility and belonging, often amplified and distorted through digital propaganda, coordinated disinformation and strategically polarized communication, exemplified by recurring concerns about digital foreign interference in national affairs. Public service media are among the few institutions structurally designed to provide continuity, credibility, and orientation in such moments, not by enforcing consensus but by sustaining shared frameworks of understanding. When public service media’s capacity is weakened through defunding, societies lose a critical stabilizing force at precisely the moment this is most needed.
This loss is cultural as much as political. Under sustained conditions of austerity, public service media become less able to take creative and editorial risks that boost pluralism, cultural memory and social imagination. Innovation and experimentation are deferred. Diverse and minority voices that do not promise sufficient scale, immediate relevance or algorithmic visibility are quietly sidelined. In short, under sustained financial pressure, public service media become thinner organizations.
What becomes possible with sustainable and adequate funding
If defunding narrows horizons, sustainable funding expands them. Adequate and stable financing is not about preservation for its own sake, but about capacity: the ability of public service media to fulfill their role under contemporary conditions of complexity, uncertainty and contestation. It enables public service media to act not merely as distributors of content but as organizations that actively shape the conditions under which public communication, knowledge and democratic orientation are produced.
One such condition is epistemic agency. In a media environment characterized by speed, volume and increasing opacity, citizens need more than access to truthful content in all its forms. They need support in navigating this content, understanding its production and judging its relevance and credibility. Public service media are uniquely positioned to embed explanation, contextualization and media literacy into everyday content, while respecting citizens’ agency in shaping their own knowledge environments. This is not a paternalistic project but is aimed at
enabling citizens to understand how information and knowledge are produced, circulated, contested and instrumentalized, particularly in environments affected by digital propaganda and strategic manipulation.
In the digital public sphere, public service media can operate as institutional curators of visibility, relevance and trust. As algorithmic systems mediate how content is selected, ordered and encountered, the public value of public service media lies in their capacity to align these systems with civic and epistemic principles rather than with purely commercial or political logics. Efforts by several public service media organizations to develop their own recommender systems, rather than relying on commercially developed black boxes, are a case in point. This role, however, is resource-intensive. Without adequate funding, public service media cannot sustain their distinctive position as epistemic authorities grounded in competence, integrity and benevolence, nor can they meaningfully counter the epistemic risks of fragmentation, opacity and the amplification of misleading or polarizing content that characterize platform-dominated information environments.
Sustainable funding also enables public service media to function as democratic infrastructure. Platforms excel at personalization and scale but public service media can excel at continuity, memory and accountability. With adequate resources, they can invest in slower forms of journalism, in archives that preserve collective and cultural memory and in formats that prioritize understanding over immediacy. It allows them to operate without primarily being governed by algorithmic amplification or engagement metrics but by public value considerations and societal responsibility.
Perhaps most importantly, stable financing creates space for experimentation in the public interest: room to innovate and even to fail. Public service media can function as laboratories for new forms of storytelling, participation, and technological development that are not immediately monetizable but socially valuable. Risk-taking is not a threat to public value but a condition for sustaining it in rapidly changing and increasingly contested knowledge environments.
Funding as democratic foresight
The choice between cutting funding and sustainable financing is often presented as a matter of efficiency. In reality, it is a choice about power. Defunding public
service media reallocates influence to market actors and platforms with priorities that are structurally different priorities from those of democratic societies. Adequate public funding is not a privilege granted to media organizations but an investment in democratic foresight.
Public service media are among the few institutions explicitly designed to sustain the epistemic conditions of democracy: to support citizens’ capacity to make sense of complex realities, to maintain shared frames of reference and to counter epistemic insecurity. In times marked by geopolitical tension, economic uncertainty and the normalization of illiberal pressures, the question is therefore not simply whether democratic societies can still afford public service media. It is whether they are willing to imagine a public future in which epistemic welfare is treated as a collective responsibility and resourced accordingly.
WHY WE NEED A PUBLIC SERVICE INTERNET, NOT THE DEFUNDING OF PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA
CHRISTIAN FUCHS PADERBORN UNIVERSITY
Defunding Public Service Media (PSM)
In May 2025, Donald Trump signed an executive order to end the public funding of PBS and NPR. The policy claims that PBS and NPR are not “fair, accurate, unbiased, and nonpartisan“ and, in its title (“Ending Taxpayer Subsidization of Biased Media”), characterises the two US public service media as “biased media“ (The White House 2025). In 2024, 55.4% of the voters in a referendum opted for defunding Radio Liechtenstein, Liechtenstein’s public service medium. The referendum was initiated by Demokraten pro Liechtenstein (DpL), a right-wing populist party that argued the initiative’s goal was to “privatise Radio Liechtenstein“ (1FLTV 2024) because public funding would have provided “way too much money“ to PSM (Liechtensteiner Vaterland 2024, 17:34-17:36). In 2018, 71.8 percent of the votes in a popular initiative were cast against the suggestion to abolish the Swiss licence fee. Libertarian politicians and activists started the initiative. One key argument of the initiators was that “you shouldn’t have to pay for what you didn‘t order“ (No-Billag-Initiative 2018, 6). In the UK, Nigel Farage’s Reform Party states in its political programme: “The out-of-touch wasteful BBC is institutionally biased. The TV licence is taxation without representation. We will scrap it. In a world of on-demand TV People should be free to choose“ (Reform UK 2024, 22). The Alternative for Germany demands in its programme that PSM’s “compulsory financing must be abolished immediately and converted into pay TV“ (Alternative für Deutschland 2016, 48). In France, the National Rally demands to “privatise public broadcasting to eliminate the €138 license fee” (Rassemblement National 2022). In its 2024 parliamentary election programme, the French party justified the demand to “privatise public broadcasting” by saying that it wants to “rationalise public spending” and “streamline public agencies” (Rassemblement National 2024). The list of demands and initiatives to defund PSM could be continued for quite a while, but we have to stop here. These examples suffice to illustrate three circumstances. First, demands to defund PSM are often voiced and practised by far-right and
libertarian parties, initiatives, politicians, and activists. Second, the political argument that PSM are biased and politically controlled is often made. Third, the economic argument that the market should rule all media offers and that licence fees distort the free market is frequently utilised.
Defunding Democracy
No matter if the licence fee or PSM is abolished, the consequence is the same: the disappearance of public service media and the impoverishment of democracy and the public sphere. PSM are not able to survive by pure market-based funding. That it is not-for-profit and non-market-based is part and parcel of PSM’s existence. Such a public economy is a material foundation of PSM’s independence and democratic remit. Therefore, those who argue for the privatisation or marketisation of PSM actually make a demand for abolishing PSM. Why are they doing that? There are neoliberal and authoritarian justifications. Some of the actors favouring defunding PSM truly believe that the market is the best, only, feasible, or most viable means for organising society, including the media world. The neoliberals overlook that markets and commodities have negative features and that there are certain goods, including infrastructures, where the risk of market failures is very high. A purely market-based media system can easily result in a colonised public sphere where news-making and public opinion are dominated by the voices of the rich and powerful, including media barons, big corporations, and large advertisers and where tabloid entertainment dominates over news and education and turns news and education into spectacles. Other actors who want to defund PSM do so for political reasons. They want to actively silence or repress actors who ask critical questions about authoritarianism, racism, nationalism, and the far-right. PSM are just like universities, quality media, immigrants, liberals, socialists, trade unions, gender rights activists, human rights organisations, consumer protectionists, environmentalists, etc., part of the scapegoats and enemies the authoritarians construct. Authoritarians oppose the very ideas of justice, equality, solidarity, universal human rights, and, in the last instance, democracy. What they aim at is not so much a dark enlightenment (Land 2023) but rolling back all progressive aspects of enlightenment as such. They constitute an anti- and a counter-enlightenment movement. Besides neoliberal and authoritarian justifications, we also find the
combination of both in the form of neoliberal authoritarianism and authoritarian neoliberalism. Such actors favour the combination of corporate power and authoritarian political leadership, market radicalism and dictatorship, capitalism and fascism. Such forces oppose PSM by arguing that PSM are biased and a waste of money.
The Destruction of the (Digital) Public Sphere
What are the impacts of defunding PSM on society at large? First, there are economic impacts. The media economy becomes more centralised, commercialised, marketized, and commodified. Media capitalism colonises and absolutely dominates the media world. Economic centralisation and corporate monopolisation are the consequences. Second, there are political impacts on society. The media provides goods that are qualitatively different from other goods, such as cars, food, or fashion. They publish information that matters in the public sphere, public conversations, and the formation of public opinion. Abolishing PSM inevitably contributes to the privatisation of the public sphere. A privatised public sphere is dominated by private media owners, large corporations, advertisers, celebrities, and the powerful who control large lobbying and public relations budgets. Private owners of capital gain power over public voice, visibility, and attention. They can utilise economic capital for obtaining political influence and cultural reputation. The voices of less powerful groups and individuals are then simply not or hardly represented and heard. The consequence is the corporate colonisation of the public sphere. PSM do have problems. They are often too bureaucratic, boring, unappealing to young people, imitating the managerialism of big corporations, and out of touch with digital innovations. In addition, they often have governance structures that feature too much political influence and not enough influence of audience members and PSM employees, especially journalists. We do not have to and should not uncritically celebrate PSM but be constructively critical and critically supportive of them. But concluding from PSM’s problems that they should be abolished means throwing the baby out with the bathwater. By discarding PSM, we risk getting rid of the democratic public sphere and advancing a feudalised and colonised public ruled by autocrats and plutocrats, power and money, ideology and commerce. Despite all valid criticisms, PSM provide high-quality news, educational content, and entertainment. They are important for democracy. We
need to reform, not to abolish PSM. They are part of the media that have the material foundation for being largely independent from corporate, state, and ideological power. In the world of Internet platforms, we can observe where the dominance of capitalist power over public service and community orientation leads to. Internet and digital media culture is dominated by a small number of US and Chinese digital giants: Google/Alphabet, Facebook/Meta, ByteDance, Amazon, Netflix, Alibaba, Apple, Microsoft, X, and Tencent. Chinese and US digital corporations differ in that the US digital giants are based on the model of neoliberal digital capitalism and the Chinese digital giants on the model of digital state capitalism (see Fuchs 2024). They have in common that they operate for-profit, are manifestations of global digital capital, and influence information and communication in the public sphere. Specifically, they feature lots of misinformation, fake news, the spread of authoritarian ideology, post-truth culture, online hatred, digital acceleration that leaves no time for debate, echo chambers, privacy violations by digital surveillance, AI-generated algorithmic politics that downgrades human action, digital tabloid culture, the dominance of advertising and entertainment over news and education, and the centrality of influencers who sell advertising space in the form of audio-visual product placements (Fuchs 2024). In addition, many of these platforms, their owners, and managers at least tolerate or actively support spreading authoritarian politics. An authoritarian Internet is the result of the fusion of digital capitalism and digital dictatorship. The European media landscape is different from the US and the Chinese one. In it, PSM have long played an important role as a counterforce to corporate dominance. The European PSM model has been committed to not-for-profit broadcasting featuring high-quality journalism and content, and is committed to fostering the understanding of democracy and democratic public debate. It is precisely such a public service ethos and model that is largely absent in the world of the Internet. Defunding PSM risks turning broadcasting into another version of tabloid media dominated by reality TV, influencers, celebrities, scandals, soundbites, superficiality, and polarisation.
Towards a Public Service Internet:
The Reconstruction of the (Digital)
Public Sphere
We need exactly the opposite of defunding PSM and driving back the logic of PSM. Democracy requires not just strong PSM but the creation and material un-
derpinning of a public service Internet: “The Public Service Internet is based on Internet platforms operated by a variety of Public Service Media, taking the public service remit into the digital age in co-operation with civil society, individual media users, citizens, and the creative, cultural and educational sector. The Public Service Internet advances democracy. It enhances the public sphere. It supports active citizenship by providing comprehensive information and analysis, diversity of social representation and creative expression and extended opportunities for participation. Public Service Internet platforms can support new and young creatives who will build the cultural industries of tomorrow and foster social cohesion“(Fuchs and Unterberger 2021, 10-11). In the digital world, there are several projects, such as Wikipedia, Mastodon, platform cooperatives, the free software movement, Creative Commons, or diamond open access, that show that digital media beyond capitalist power is possible and feasible. PSM has not yet made it properly into the digital age. By extending the funding base of PSM, extending its reach into the world of digital platforms, and fostering public/commons partnerships of PSM and non-capitalist Internet projects, a democratic alternative to the authoritarian capitalism of the digital giants could be created. Doing so means not just questioning the defunding and abolition of PSM and other quality media but extending the logic of PSM to the digital world. Doing so requires public funding, institutional support, citizens’ and media workers’ involvement, new structures of self-management, a commitment to independence from capital, political power, and ideology, media reforms, the international networking of PSM in joint projects and platforms, and partnerships between PSM and digital commons projects (Fuchs 2024). Another Internet and another media world are urgently needed. We have to start creating new initiatives for democratic media now, before it is too late.
References
1FLTV. 2024. Interview mit Thomas Rehak. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1124363146112120 Alternative für Deutschland. 2016. Programm für Deutschland. Berlin: AfD. https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Programm_ AfD_Online_.pdf Fuchs, Christian. 2024. Social Media: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage. Fourth edition. Fuchs, Christian and Klaus Unterberger, eds. 2021. The Public Service Media and Public Service Internet Manifesto. London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: http://doi.org/10.16997/book60 Land, Nick. 2023. The Dark Enlightenment. Perth: Imperium Press. Liechtensteiner Vaterland. 2024. DpL-Präsident Thomas Rehak zur Abstimmung über die Privatisierung von Radio L- https://www.vaterland.li/ fotosvideos/videos/vaterlandtv/dpl-praesident-thomas-rehak-zur-abstimmung-ueber-die-privatisierung-von-radio-l-sts-2266 No-Billag-Initiative. 2018. Argumentarium Ja zur Abschaffung der Radio- und Fernsehgebühren (Billag-Gebühren). https://swissvotes.ch/attach ments/3b192024c5e9aeb2800096a0caea6a009778c5a13bff0d639f307e2fd49d8865
Rassemblement National. 2024. Bardella Premier Ministre. Un project, une méthode. https://rassemblementnational.fr/documents/202406programme.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Rassemblement National. 2022. 22 mesures pour 2022. https://rassemblementnational.fr/22-mesures?utm_source=chatgpt.com Reform UK. 2024. Our Contract With You. https://assets.nationbuilder.com/reformuk/pages/253/attachments/original/1718625371/Reform_ UK_Our_Contract_with_You.pdf?1718625371
The White House. 2025. Ending Taxpayer Subsidization of Biased Media. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/05/endingtaxpayer-subsidization-of-biased-media/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
THE COSTS OF COST CUTTING
Fake news, hate speech, surveillance and manipulation, generated by artificial intelligence endanger the basis of our societies: trust in news and information. Enormous revenues and profits enable digital giants to invest in new communication technologies; at the same time quality media are losing reach and relevance. Despite all confessions to protect the public sphere of democracy quality media, particularly public service media are facing a dramatic decline in financial resources. . Cost cutting of quality media could turn up to be an effective way to defund its future. 18 European media experts analyze the disastrous consequences of a global disruption in media economy and deliver perspectives how quality media may survive in the future.
“(De)funding the Future” is volume 8 of the series PUBLIC VALUE INTERNATIONAL of ORF, focusing on relevant challenges for public service media supporting democracy and citizenship.