2024-25
Mitra FAMILY GRANT Recipient
Manufacturing Amnesia: How Japanese Media and Wartime Correspondents Justified the Nanjing Massacre
Valerie Li
Manufacturing Amnesia:
How Japanese Media and Wartime Correspondents Justified the Nanjing Massacre
Valerie Li
2025 Mitra Family Scholar
Mentors: Ms. Bronwen Callahan, Mr. Byron Stevens, and Ms. Amy Pelman
April 14, 2025
On November 9, 1937, Japanese troops raced to Nanjing’s Chung Shan Gate, determined to break open the city’s gates and seize China’s capital. Led by the Head of the General Japanese Imperial Army, over 10,000 Japanese invaders marched from Shanghai toward Nanjing.1
Competing against fellow units, every Japanese unit fought to be the first to arrive in Nanjing, eager to proudly announce Nankin-jō ichiban nori! (First to arrive in Nanjing!). Traveling with the Ōba Unit, Tōnichi news correspondents followed closely as rivalry among Japanese media outlets intensified, each outlet striving to capture the most triumphant and immediate coverage of a historic moment in the Second Sino-Japanese War.2 As the Chung Shan Gate gave way, Japanese soldiers and media correspondents stormed into Nanjing as one.
While conventional narratives and history textbooks portray the Nanjing Massacre as a conflict between Japanese soldiers and Chinese civilians, third-party participants played pivotal roles in igniting and enabling the mass atrocities and destruction of Nanjing. Japanese war correspondents were no exception. From the build-up of the fall of Nanjing to the six weeks of civilian killings, looting, and widespread sexual violence, the media documented and covered up events of the Nanjing Massacre, serving as an essential bridge between Japanese citizens and soldiers. News stations such as Tōnichi Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun embedded reporters within military units to capture triumphant stories of conquest, shaping public perception while obscuring the horrors of the atrocities.3 Although political militarism and military management failures contributed to the atrocities of what became known as the Rape of Nanking, the Japanese
1 Alice Chen (speech, Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China, June 18, 2024)
2 Benjamin Uchiyama, Japan's Carnival War: Mass Culture on the Home Front, 1937-1945 (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 45, https://read.amazon.com/?asin=B07NZ5MPXX&ref_=kwl_kr_iv_rec_4
3 Chen.
media wielded substantial influence in justifying and perpetuating these crimes by desensitizing violence and fostering an environment that promoted dehumanization and human rights violations.
Failures and Mismanagement
The Japanese government’s inability to prevent the Nanjing Massacre has perpetuated a widespread belief that the atrocities were solely a political blunder. In “Justification and Opposition of Mass Killing: Black Sun The Nanking Massacre,” Hu Lung-Lung argues that Emperor Hirohito’s complicity and deliberate attempts to avoid committing Japan to international law were a direct cause of the Rape of Nanking. Since Japanese soldiers and civilians revered Hirohito as a Japanese deity, it is possible that he could have intervened to prevent such crimes but chose not to, reinforcing the culture of impunity within the military.4
During the adoption of the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Japan was one of the 47 countries to sign onto the international peace agreement. However, the Japanese government later chose not to ratify the treaty because it found its provisions for humanely treating prisoners-of-war (POWs) unnecessary.5 Consequently, Japan was not legally bound by these provisions during World War II, enabling the military’s unchecked brutality during the Nanjing Massacre. Likewise, although Japan did not have definitive policies such as Germany’s Nuremberg Laws that permitted the mass killings of a particular group, Japan’s Imperial Rescript the official ethics code for Japan became a tacit approval of the Nanjing Massacre. No provision in the Imperial Rescript defined the treatment of Chinese POWs or
4 Lung-Lung Hu, “Justification and Opposition of Mass Killing: Black Sun The Nanking Massacre,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 1449, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11196-020-09791-w.
5 Hu, 1447.
denoted any punishment for cruelty toward captured soldiers and civilians.6 The lack of clear restraints created a major loophole, which permitted the army to act without restraint.
Also known as the Tokyo Trial, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East only furthered this conception of the Rape of Nanking as a political error by condemning military and government leaders for the atrocities. General Matsui Iwane, who led Japanese forces into Nanjing, was among the seven convicted war criminals. However, his conviction was based on malpractice and negligence.7 Matsui was present in Nanjing only on the day of its fall before leaving for Suzhou and Shanghai due to asthma, seeking warmer air for his health. For six weeks, he failed to issue clear directives or intervene to stop the violence, later attributing his inaction to his health problems.8 Similarly, the tribunal played a key role in promoting the image of Prime Minister Tojo Hideki as a dictator and the person most responsible for Japan’s crimes. Tojo became the face of Japan’s wartime aggression, and this portrayal even extended to claims that Emperor Hirohito was unaware of the attack on Pearl Harbor until it had already occurred. American mass media popularized these narratives that centered on blaming political leaders such as Tojo, a framing that caused many Americans to direct blame onto the Japanese political leaders.9 This emphasis on political leaders pivoted the focus away from the brutalities themselves to the incompetence of the Japanese government, framing the Nanjing Massacre as a strategic blunder.
6 Hu, 1453.
7 Edo Naito, “Failures of Tokyo War Crimes Trial Hound Modern-Day Japan,” Japan Forward, last modified August 7, 2021, accessed November 15, 2024, https://japan-forward.com/bookmark-failures-of-tokyo-war-crimes-trialhound-modern-day-japan/
8 Chen.
9 Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the ‘Rape of Nanking’: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 73.
Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Political Rhetoric
After the First Sino-Japanese War ended in 1895, anti-Chinese sentiment in Japanese government discourse also intensified, another factor that many scholars claim proves the government’s responsibility in initiating the Nanjing Massacre. By the onset of the Second SinoJapanese War, Japan had already undergone the Second Industrial Revolution, while China remained largely an agrarian society (see Appendix A).10 Official rhetoric from political and social institutions increasingly portrayed China as weak and backward while Japan positioned itself as a rising modern power. The Japanese education system, for example, reinforced this notion as teachers were required to teach students that China was a “declining civilization.”11 Consequently, this notion of dominance also took root in the minds of Japanese soldiers, as they were taught that their status as subjects of the emperor made them inherently greater than the Chinese. As Shiro Azume, a former Japanese soldier, explained in a 1988 CNN interview, “We (Japanese) were taught that we were a superior race since we lived only for the sake fora human god our emperor. But the Chinese were not. So we held nothing but contempt for them.”12 Azume’s testimony reveals how the doctrine of emperor-worship established a deepseated foundation for extreme xenophobia and racial superiority. By framing their allegiance to the emperor as a divine calling, soldiers easily internalized the belief that their actions were sanctioned and even necessary to retaliate against the Chinese and assuage their hatred.
10 Chen.
11 Fogel, The Nanjing, 17.
12 Karen Cook, “The Rape of Nanking: Analyzing Events from a Sociological Perspective,” Stanford, accessed September 22, 2024, https://stanford.edu/~kcook/intro2.html.
Moreover, the Imperial Rescript further framed China as the disruptor of East Asian peace, portraying Japan’s military actions as a necessary response. By depicting China as the instigator, the rescript suggested that the suffering inflicted on Chinese people was a retaliatory consequence of China’s own actions. Simultaneously, the Imperial Rescript promoted the concept of Pan-Asianism, the idea that Japan had the responsibility to unify and strengthen Asia to fight against the West.13 Prior to its invasion of China in 1937, Japan suffered widespread economic instability due to the United States’s 1929 stock market crash. Due to Japan’s alliance with the Allies in World War I, foreign countries such as the United States halted imports of Japanese goods. These boycotts, combined with domestic economic collapse, caused unemployment to spike while countless businesses shut down.14 Thus, a pervasive belief that Japan had to expand its regional control emerged as many thought that gaining new territory would stabilize Japan and unlock Japan’s full potential as a powerful nation. In essence, as Iris Chang writes, the concept of “manifest destiny” formed, and colonizing China was Japan’s primary goal due to China’s vast land and abundance of resources.15 The combination of Japan’s perceived duty to dominate Asia and its belief in Chinese inferiority therefore created a political justification for its invasion into China, and many scholars believe that this justification independently provoked the events of the Nanjing Massacre. Although Japan intended to conquer the entirety of China within three months, its plans quickly failed after the Battle of Shanghai lasted over three months. The Chinese military’s prolonged resistance humiliated and
13 Hu, “Justification and Opposition,” 1455-56.
14 Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (Philadelphia, PA: Basic Books, 1997), 25.
15 Chang, 27.
enraged the Japanese, exposing that Japan was not as invincible as it believed itself to be.16 This determination to reassert dominance escalated Japan’s brutality as it advanced toward Nanjing.
The Limits of Government Influence
While placing the blame on Japan’s political system and military is indeed valid and perhaps necessary, this perspective does not paint a comprehensive picture of all the factors that perpetuated the Nanjing Massacre. Even if certain legal doctrines allowed the mass killings of Chinese soldiers and civilians, other institutional safeguards should have equally prevented Japanese soldiers from committing atrocities. For example, the Japanese Army Criminal Codes explicitly prohibited acts of plundering and rape.17 As a military force that supposedly upheld the nation’s laws, the incitement of widespread violence should subsequently never have occurred. Through constant lectures, Hideki Tojo also affirmed the notion of discipline within the Japanese Army. His Senjinkun lectures encouraged the Imperial Army to act honorably and compassionately by modeling the Emperor’s mercy and kindheartedness.18 Yet, during the Nanjing Massacre, the Japanese military killed over 300,000 Chinese civilians and soldiers and raped tens of thousands of Chinese women and girls.19 Soldiers gathered prisoners together in groups of fifty, killing them in an orderly fashion with machine guns.20 From a legal perspective, political blunders and faults are simply insufficient to instigate such a large-scale massacre and
16 H. H. Smith-Hutton, “Lessons Learned at Shanghai in 1932,” U.S. Naval Institute, last modified August 1938, accessed January 14, 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1938/august/lessons-learned-shanghai1932.
17 Hu, “Justification and Opposition,” 1450.
18 Hu, 1451.
19 Chang, The Rape, 6.
20 Joshua A. Fogel, The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 15.
barbarity. The sheer scale of the massacre 300,000 deaths can not be attributed solely to missteps in political decision-making. Rather than a simple result of political miscalculation, the widespread nature of barbarities suggests a deeper, more pervasive cause of the breakdown of ethical norms. Correspondingly, the anti-Chinese sentiment perpetuated by the Japanese government remains inadequate as a means to account for the Sinophobia that was firmly entrenched in Japanese society. The Imperial Rescript alone could not have changed the deeply ingrained belief instilled since childhood through Japan’s education system, home life, and workplace that the Chinese were an enemy and a threat.21 Therefore, another mechanism besides the government must have existed to propagate the Nanjing Massacre and that mechanism was the Japanese media.
Developing the Media
During the Meiji Restoration era and the years before the Second Sino-Japanese War, the news media was a rapidly booming industry in Japanese society. The newspaper’s majorly successful market can be attributed to Japan’s highly literate society. In the 1870s, Japan adopted a law that required compulsory education for all citizens regardless of status or wealth. This new policy dramatically raised literacy rates throughout Japan; according to surveys of Tokyo slums, which consisted primarily of male laborers, around 92 percent of single residents could read and write. Even though reading the news was traditionally an action taken by middle and upper classes, this shift caused the lower classes to also join the consumer base for newspapers.22 Regardless of whether an individual resided in an urban or rural area, reading the newspaper
21 Cook, “The Rape,” Stanford.
22 Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 62, ProQuest Ebook Central.
became an essential task, and newspapers became widely available and easily accessible. In a survey of 659 working families in the neighborhood of Tsukishima, which is located in Tokyo, around 80 percent of households subscribed to some form of newspaper.23
As the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out and the Rape of Nanking occurred, mass media became increasingly important for documenting events. In 1918, only 3,213 newspapers and journals existed in Japan, yet by 1932 the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War the number of newspapers and journals tripled and rose to 11,118.24 Subsequently, the news media market grew even more fierce, causing a rise in technological advancements and innovation for newspaper production and communication channels. The four biggest newspapers the Tōkyō Asahi, Osaka Asahi, Osaka Mainichi, and Tōkyō Nichi Nichi capitalized on the improvements in printing and distributing papers, transitioning to using photo telegraphic machinery to increase the efficiency of their work. The Osaka Asahi tested the use of airplanes in shortening delivery times and disseminating news reports.25 Furthermore, radios became a new common medium for receiving news in addition to existing newspapers.26 The onslaught of media sources and reporters enabled news dissemination to be more rapid and abundant, a change that foreshadowed the media’s powerful role in crafting wartime narratives and justifying the Imperial Army’s actions.
23 Young, 62.
24 Young, 62
25 Young, 62.
26 Young, 58-59.
Embodying Wartime Ideology
If the government was the architect designing the narrative of the Sino-Japanese War, the media served as the loudspeaker, amplifying the government’s message to the masses. Just as the government constructed false portrayals of China as the instigator of war, the media reinforced these accounts to the public. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in which Japanese soldiers fired at the Chinese military after the Chinese refused Japanese entry into the city of Wanping, the media altered their narrative. They cited Chinese soldiers killing innocent Japanese civilians as the cause for escalation rather than reporting the truth.27 In an article from the Tōkyō Asahi Shimbun regarding Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s decision to send reinforcement troops to Northern China, the journalists bolded sentences to legitimize Japan’s military actions. The bolded sentences included “this incident was no doubt an anti-Japanese armed conflict that was carefully planned by China” and “[the Japanese government] sincerely hopes that the Chinese side will reflect on its attitude.”28 The bolded sentences in the Tōkyō Asahi Shimbun article not only highlight a specific narrative but also subtly manipulate the reader’s understanding of the situation. By labeling the conflict as constructed by China, the article crafts an image of China as the aggressor, framing Japan’s military response as justified. Meanwhile, by requesting that the Chinese reflect on their actions, the Tōkyō Asahi suggests a tone of diplomacy and moral superiority by portraying Japan as a rational and peace-seeking actor. Furthermore, popular newspapers geared most of the blame on Chiang Kaishek, specifically his alleged anti-Japanese actions.29 Many journals also articulated that the well-being of citizens within a state relied on
27 Chen.
28 Yoshida, The Making, 12.
29 Yoshida, 18.
the leaders of that state, arguing that Chiang Kaishek’s inability to protect the Chinese citizens led to the atrocities of the Nanjing Massacre.30 The media’s complicity in reinforcing government-sanctioned perspectives played a crucial role in shaping public perception and justifying the violence that followed.
Following the government’s example, the media also propagated anti-Chinese racism and reinforced feelings of Japanese dominance in news reports. Widely circulated journals and newspapers often disparaged and belittled Chinese people as morally corrupt and vengeful in Japanese news.31 News stations wrote articles that described the Chinese destruction of Japanese communities, falsely claiming that Chinese soldiers stabbed and killed innocent Japanese women. A report by the Asahi Shimbun shared an unconfirmed story of how Chinese peace preservation forces arbitrarily killed Oyama Isao, the Lieutenant of the Imperial Navy, provoking the Japanese Army to burn down Chinese farmers’ houses in retaliation.32 This narrative served to both demonize the Chinese and legitimize Japan's retaliatory violence as a response to imagined provocations, feeding into the justification for the massacre. The lack of credible evidence behind these claims further exposed the press’s role in shaping a warped version of reality that aligned with Japan’s militaristic agenda. Simultaneous to the Sinophobia in the media, the Japanese government encouraged the press to promote Japan as a divine land protected by God. As a result, the media cultivated a nationalistic ideology that permeated society, bridging the Japanese government’s militarism and xenophobia with public sentiment.
30 Yoshida, 18.
31 Uchiyama, Japan's Carnival, 23.
32 Yoshida, The Making, 12.
In essence, the media served as a mediator between the government and the public, aiding in the promotion of militarism and imperialism. This wartime ideology that saturated the media can be divided into two concepts. First, Nipponshugi (Japanism) the nationalist doctrine emphasizing Japan’s unique, militarist political and spiritual identity swept through public discourse. Second, the belief that every individual, whether civilian or soldier, must participate in wartime activities became pervasive.33 Independently, censorship and profit incentives also helped unify media sentiment during the Sino-Japanese War. Special enforcements, such as the Japanese Higher Police, surveilled potential anti-government reporters and community groups. In 1937, under Japan’s Peace Preservation Law, which allowed easy suppression of anyone deemed dangerous, the Japanese Higher Police allegedly arrested 529 liberals and prosecuted 107 individuals for creating rumors harmful to society. By devoting substantial resources to censorship, the government and the Japanese Army successfully created a narrative for war based on nationalism.34 Since many newspapers sought to maximize their earnings by providing up-to-date reports of the war, the media often crafted stories to suit the public’s ears.
35 Consequently, newspapers frequently reinforced the popular wartime culture, thus limiting any criticism toward political decisions. Through a combination of censorship, popular beliefs, and profit-driven incentives, the media became both a tool of the government and a reflection of public sentiment, ensuring that militarism and nationalism remained ingrained in Japanese society.
33 Uchiyama, Japan's Carnival, 10-11.
34 Yoshida, The Making, 18-19.
35 Young, Japan’s Total, 79
Wartime Propaganda
Along with other tactics implemented by the government, propaganda acted as a powerful tool in shaping Japanese wartime beliefs. The media disseminated government-induced propaganda and actively participated in propaganda campaigns. While the press often published propaganda in newspapers and magazines, the media also shared patriotic posters and leaflets in shops, public spaces, and schools. Specifically, mass media propagandists initiated the kokubō shisō fukyū undō (campaign to spread the idea of national defense). This strategy enabled the government to target not just the upper classes but also the middle and lower classes. The Imperial Army capitalized on the media’s wave of new communication and digital technology, spreading enthusiasm for the war across Japan and into the countries that it invaded.
36
Additionally, the media began sponsoring kokubō (national defense) events, further promoting nationalist ideologies alongside its propaganda campaign. For example, in the Gifu Prefecture, the local news station hosted a kokubō rally, where they promised to station two reporters in Manchuria to support Japanese troops and provide updated reports on the warfront.37 By combining the mass diffusion of propaganda with events to promote the wartime efforts, the press worked to solidify support for Japanese efforts in China.
The central theme for Japanese propaganda centered on the concept of a “new Asian modernity.”38 Images and posters often promoted Japan as an example of a prosperous nonWestern country that other Asian nations should model. Since the government was focused on creating a cohesive societal culture centered on wartime mobilization, propaganda that framed
36 Young, 130.
37 Young, 135.
38 Tom Havens, “Review Section,” Journal of Japanese Studies 33, no. 1 (2007): 195, JSTOR.
Japan as highly developed and supreme proved essential to establishing this sense of unity and pride among the public. One such example of propaganda illustrates three children one from Japan, one from China, and one from Manchuria smiling joyfully alongside one another, each holding their country’s flag. Appearing largest in the image, the Japanese child stands in the center of the poster while the other two children cling to the child’s arms. The text of the image reads Rì huá mǎn xiézhù tiānxià tàipíng, which translates to “Japan, China, and Manchu helping one another allows the world to be in peace” (see Fig. 1).
Images like this one exemplify how the media propagated government-directed narratives that framed Japan’s expansion as a benevolent, unifying force under the guise of Pan-Asianism. Such depictions, widely distributed in newspapers, posters, and films, reinforced a nationalist ideology that portrayed Japan as the rightful leader of East Asia.
Furthermore, traditional Japanese values such as loyalty, honor, and compassion were strongly promoted within propaganda posters and illustrations.39 These ideals were not only used to justify the military’s actions abroad but also to shape the roles and expectations of civilians at home. To encourage people at home, specifically women, to endorse wartime activities, propaganda of female strength and sacrifice often circulated. Rather than the traditionally delicate and feminine portrayal of Japanese women, the media shifted toward framing women as resilient, driven, and formidable. For example, the Women’s Club Supplement and the Asahigraph respectively published images of women managing household finances or raising the Japanese flag with their child.40 The phrase “Warrior Wives” became a powerful symbol of patriotic duty, gaining widespread circulation. Propaganda posters frequently featured illustrations of the “Warrior Wife,” reinforcing her role in supporting the nation’s war efforts.
41
By doing so, the media, in conjunction with the government, sought to empower Japanese women to shoulder more responsibilities as many of the male figures in households left for war.
Besides motivating individuals on the homefront, the media utilized propaganda to encourage the Japanese Army’s continued efforts. As the war in China intensified, a growing 39 Chen.
40 David C. Earhart, Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media (England, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2007), 147-148.
41 Earhart, 147.
need for military personnel emerged, and the Japanese government resorted to implementing a draft to obtain sufficient soldiers. However, many young men opposed the new measure, and over 2,000 soldiers left the army each year, even though they knew they faced harsh consequences for this decision. The mental illness rates for young men spiked, and many even preferred losing their vision or a finger over serving in the military. Thus, the government relied on national defense propaganda to boost war morale, employing the media to aid in the distribution of government-sanctioned messaging.42 One propaganda poster produced by the Japanese government and reprinted by the press, displays a man yelling, “Rise, countrymen! Build our bright North China to block the evil communist red from spreading!” (see Fig. 2).
42 Young, 134.
The widespread influx of propaganda circulated by the media was exceedingly successful in boosting Japan’s military numbers. From 1937 to 1941, the total number of soldiers surged from 634,000 to 2.4 million men, resulting in almost a quadruple increase in army size.43
Propaganda evidently created an extremely positive perception of the war among people in Japan, and the impact of the media in creating successful propaganda campaigns is undeniable. The media’s role in spreading these carefully curated visuals and slogans ensured that nationalist sentiments remained deeply ingrained in the public consciousness, strengthening support for the war effort. Since the government could not reach certain parts of the population, especially rural or impoverished residents, the media bridged the gap by delivering statesanctioned messages through newspapers and magazines displaying propaganda. Without the media serving as a crucial link between the government and the public, propaganda would not have been nearly as effective during the war.
A Soldier’s Best Friend
Although the media served as the mouthpiece for the Japanese government, its role surpassed that of mere propaganda and complicity in the government’s actions. In fact, the media’s close relationship with Japanese soldiers extended beyond government directives as the media reinforced the Imperial Army’s actions on its own accord. Ōha Kusuo, a Japanese journalist, wrote in November 1937 that a new relationship between the press and the military had developed during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Whereas war reporters were viewed as burdens and outsiders during the Russo-Japanese War or the First Sino-Japanese War, the military now became receptive to the Japanese media, even welcoming them.44 Becoming the
43 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 107.
44 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 33.
government’s voice was simply the first step in creating an environment that justified the Nanjing Massacre. Establishing a newfound camaraderie with the military was the media’s true decisive role in normalizing and perpetuating the Nanjing atrocities.
Exploiting the inconsistencies in the government’s censorship system, which permitted any reports that did not portray Japan negatively, war correspondents carved out new avenues for bold, sensationalized war reporting. Consequently, newspapers fueled strong public enthusiasm for Japan’s full-scale conflict with China.45 Because of the laxity in the government’s laws, journalists who wanted to stay informed on the army’s operations often violated restrictions on their movements when following the military. To aid in the media’s coverage of war events, soldiers incinerated Chinese houses and establishments to signal to the press where the frontlines had moved.46 Thus, reporters often had front-row seats in viewing the Imperial Army’s operations and combat with Chinese troops. During the Landing Operation at Bai Maojiang near the Yangtze River, the military brought one reporter per newspaper station to join in witnessing the military’s preparation for an unfolding invasion.47 Additionally, when the Japanese troops bombed the 70-foot tall Zhonghua Gate on December 12, 1937, reporters stood within 150 feet of Yamada Detachment Engineer Corps’ activities, capturing the details of the event from its explosion to the Japanese Army placing a flag above the gate48 (see Fig. 3).
45 Uchiyama, 27.
46 Uchiyama, 48.
47 Ara Ken'ichi, The Nanjing Incident: Japanese Eyewitness Accounts - Testimony from 48 Japanese Who Were There, trans. Maya Grohn (Tokyo, Japan: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact, 2020), 15, https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Ara-Nanjing.pdf.
48 Earhart, Certain Victory, 84.
3. “Fall of Nanjing.” Image of the explosion at Zhonghua Gate in Nanjing on 12 December 1937. Published in the Asahigraph, by Special Correspondent Ueno.
Not surprisingly, rivalry between different media outlets thus emerged as each correspondent sought to develop even closer relations with the Japanese Army in hopes of capturing a historic, unprecedented moment during the war. “First to arrive” competitions became widely popular across Japanese newspapers. When a Yomiuri reporter received approval to board an army’s track plane during a bombing mission over Nanjing, the reporter joyfully declared that among all the reporters in Nanjing, he was the “first to arrive from the skies in
Nanjing.”49 Reporters wore such experiences as badges of honor, treating war coverage as a competition for prestige rather than a confrontation with its brutal realities.
The media’s desensitization fueled the glorification of soldiers and military actions in news reports and stories. As Chinese cities fell one after another during the Nanjing campaign, the media portrayed the triumphant soldiers as emblematic of agility and relentless force. They were depicted as being driven by an indomitable martial spirit, representing the ideal performance of hand-to-hand combat. Moreover, the media obsessively highlighted soldiers’ dramatic battlefield deaths through fearless close combat, celebrating those who perished in battle as heroic figures. Fallen Japanese troops were revered as gunshin military gods who had sacrificed themselves for the nation.50 An example of an alleged narrative is the Bakudan San’yūshi (Three Human Bombs). During the Battle of Shanghai, three Japanese soldiers carried a Bangalore torpedo a long tube filled with explosives designed to clear its surrounding areas into a region filled with barbed wire entanglements. Fully aware that the detonation would kill them, Kitagawa Susumu, Eshita Takeji, and Sakue Inosuke pressed forward, and their sacrifices enabled the Japanese Army to advance and capture an essential base in the Miaohang village. Overnight, the fallen soldiers became famous as their actions prompted statues, books, songs, and at least six movies created to honor them. Youth magazines created posters of the three brave soldiers in action, and nearly a million of these posters were sold to young boys.51 In reality, counter-narratives that prescribed the soldiers’ deaths to the commander cutting the fuse
49 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 45.
50 Uchiyama, 106-107.
51 Hanae Kurihara Kramer and Scott Kramer, “Three Heroes,” Asian Theatre Journal 35, no. 2 (2018): 273-274, JSTOR.
52
too short circulated too, but the media and the public turned a blind eye to these dissenting reports.
Thus, the soldier became a symbol of wartime culture and an inspiring model of devoted patriotism, humble sacrifice, and selfless courage. Narratives about soldiers centered on their noble willingness to persist through countless obstacles in order to serve and protect their family at home and the nation as a whole.53 By idolizing and romanticizing Japanese troops, the media implicitly encouraged the soldiers to embrace brutality without restraint. These reports and stories often played a crucial role in boosting the spirits and morale of the Japanese Army.54 Enjoying the glorification the media placed on them, many military personnel were motivated to inflict even more harm and damage on Chinese soldiers and innocent civilians. To display their own success, Japanese soldiers took photos of themselves standing next to undressed women or holding a sword above Chinese civilians’ throats and sent these photos to their families back in Japan.55 After the troops successfully bombed the Zhongshan Gates, military units entered Naning, taking photos one unit at a time in front of the gate while cheering banzai, a Japanese battle cry that translated to “long live the Emperor.”56 In other photos, Japanese soldiers lined up dead Chinese bodies in a row while they stood proudly behind them.57 The ones capturing these images were often the very reporters and correspondents who had helped perpetuate this cycle of
52 Young, Japan's Total, 77.
53 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 105.
54 Uchiyama, 31.
55 Fogel, The Nanjing, 16.
56 Ken'ichi, The Nanjing, 55.
57 Chang, The Rape, 143-145.
violence. The media held the power to shape the narrative of the war, transforming brutalities into celebratory moments for soldiers.
Suriru and Supiido
The media’s transformation of the Nanjing Massacre and the Second Sino-Japanese War into spectacles relied on two principles: suriru (thrills) and supiido (speed). Together, these concepts formed the basis of media reports and characterized a shift from previous war coverage.58 In the decades that preceded the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japanese media had adopted an enduring approach of promoting pacifism and conflict resolution. Many newspapers promoted the idea of diplomacy and good relations with China, even rejecting the Imperial Army’s narratives of events that transpired between Chinese and Japanese soldiers.59 Yet, as consumer culture and wartime mobilization intensified across Japan, the media adopted an approach of grotesque realism, which prioritized severely distorted and wildly overstated representations of wartime activities.60 This shift in media representation reflected a broader societal change, where the focus in articles was no longer on nuanced, factual depictions of war, but on sensationalized and often dehumanizing portrayals designed to captivate the public’s attention.
Because modern Japanese society emphasized consumerism and leisure culture, news outlets attempted to closely model this concept of suriru for their readers this notion of thrills combined feelings of amusement, exhilaration, and terror. As consumers picked up newspapers for the latest war updates, they anticipated an emotional rush experiencing the war not just as
58 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 30.
59 Young, Japan’s Total, 79.
60 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 46.
news but as a visceral and thrilling spectacle. Suriru contrasted all other facets of wartime culture; it was distinct from the patriotism that the public felt and from the serious geopolitical implications of the war.61 To achieve these thrills for readers, newspapers utilized a combination of travel memoirs, first-hand journal entries, and narrative prose, capitalizing on opportunities such as the Nanjing Massacre for their stories. The power of the Japanese Army in spearheading the Nanjing events, the death of many Chinese soldiers and civilians, and the image of Japanese dominance these elements made the Nanjing Massacre the perfect spectacle to create intense and gripping tales. By framing the atrocities as exhilarating spectacles rather than humanitarian crises, the media desensitized the public to the suffering of war victims. This shift not only justified violence but also reinforced a cultural detachment from the actual consequences of military aggression. Through adopting suriru, the media easily trivialized the horrors of war and the Nanjing brutality. As an increasing number of people sought pleasure from the war events, the media progressively turned war into entertainment for people to consume. In doing so, holding soldiers accountable for their actions became insignificant as newspapers deprioritized unbiased, factual reporting in favor of suriru. Hence, an environment emerged where committing mass killings and widespread sexual violence became acceptable, establishing the foundation for the Nanjing Massacre.
To complement the allure of suriru, the media also entrenched the concept of supiido, which emphasizes speed and rapidity. Since Japan had already undergone the Second Industrial Revolution by the onset of the war, Japanese society enjoyed new technological innovations that made communication instant, speeding up the pace of life.62 The media’s reporting style
61 Uchiyama, 40.
62 Uchiyama, 41.
reflected this shift in lifestyle. Dramatic accounts of the Imperial Army taking over China, city by city, in rapid fashion became widely popular. These stories provided immense pleasure to news consumers, instilling in them a feeling of excitement and power.63 Attempting to continuously provide quick information to the public that modeled this notion of speed, many newspapers often reported on war events before they actually occurred. In one example, as the Imperial Army still fought to take over Nanjing, news stations had already printed papers that reported on the fall of Nanjing but left the specific date of the victory blank (see Appendix B).64
In another example, correspondents reported on the fall of Wuxi, a city near Nanjing, three days prior to the actual event.65 This premature reporting not only reflected the media’s obsession with immediacy but also fostered an illusion of inevitable and uninterrupted Japanese triumph. By presenting victories as foregone conclusions, newspapers reinforced nationalistic fervor and desensitized readers to the brutal realities of warfare. Furthermore, the ichiban nori (first to arrive) competitions between war correspondents and soldiers also originated from this idea of supiido. In early November 1937, the Tonichi news station reported that the Okazaki Unit was the first military unit to arrive in Yuchi.66 Arriving first in Nanjing, the capital of China, became the most esteemed achievement, creating a motivating and driving force for reporters and soldiers alike.
This obsession with spectacle and speed actively shaped how war was both perceived and experienced. By presenting victories as guaranteed, the media stripped conflicts of their
63 Uchiyama, 44.
64 Chen.
65 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 30.
66 Uchiyama, 44.
complexity and reduced them to a series of conquests rather than moments of intense devastation. Consequently, this media approach dulled the public’s ability to evaluate the potentially harmful consequences of military expansion and directly contrasted the government’s seriousness in emphasizing militarism. Moreover, this glorification of speed extended beyond the newsroom. Rather, it became embedded within the military as soldiers were incentivized to push forward at reckless speed and disregard civilian suffering in pursuit of swift victories. In essence, the collaboration between the press and the military transformed the war into a form of entertainment for the public and a race one with deadly and destructive consequences.
Rhetoric in Media
As the media’s coverage became more dramatic and provocative, changes in the language employed by newspapers accompanied this shift. To display the concept of suriru to the greatest extent possible, the Japanese media established a new wartime rhetoric that framed the war as playful and thrilling. The gravity and solemnity that once defined wartime discourse disappeared, replaced with lighthearted, informal banter. This emerging vocabulary and reporting style mirrored the sense of fear and anticipation evoked by suspenseful cinema. In an effort to replicate these sensations for their readers, newspapers deliberately adapted their rhetoric to elicit similar emotional responses.67 Of the broader rhetorical transformations, two specific shifts emerged: the incorporation of humor and the use of hyperbolic language.
Sarcasm and humor served as core pillars of the new wartime rhetoric. Newspapers frequently employed puns and wordplay to engage readers and present the war in a more amusing manner. For example, in an article by the Tōnichi, after Japanese invaders stormed
67 Uchiyama, 36.
Nanjing, reporters used the headline “Tis the Season for Fall of Nanjing,” trivializing the invasion by likening it to a seasonal, celebratory event.68 In another series of illustrations published by Shōnen Kurabu, the magazine displayed illustrations of soldiers in battle, captioning each picture with humorous, lighthearted language. One image of Japanese marines fighting against a Chinese tank amid a pile of rubble had the accompanying text: “How exciting! Taking an enemy tank alive. Even the latest weapons are no match for the Japanese spirit!”69 By using repeated exclamation marks and words such as “exciting” and “spirit,” the Japanese media adeptly infused humor and sarcasm into wartime reporting, promoting war as more exhilarating than grim. Additionally, newspapers often intertwined themes of sexuality and romance with violence and death, falsely conflating certain pleasures of life with the deadliness of war. The addition of sarcasm into newspaper reports helped normalize the destruction of the Nanjing Massacre by associating the brutalities with excitement and even celebration. In doing so, humor proved an effective tool in maintaining hype and frenzy over wartime updates. Moreover, media reports heightened the dramatization and spectacle of wartime events by using exaggerated rhetoric, slogans, and wartime chants. Many Japanese news stations frequently incorporated popular rallying cries into their articles, including phrases like uchiteshi yamamu (“Continue to Shoot, Do Not Desist”).70 Newspapers hyper focused and amplified details of the war, describing to readers the noises of bombs dropping over Nanjing or exploding in buildings and the screams of Chinese civilians. The Tonichi newspaper called these
68 Uchiyama, 57.
69 Uchiyama, 107
70 Earhart, Certain Victory, 309.
descriptions the “moans of Nanjing’s annihilation.”
71 Similarly, the Shōnen Kurabu utilized images with hyperbolic descriptors to over exaggerate on wartime actions too. For example, one illustration displayed two military soldiers climbing up the walls of a Chinese city with fire and airplanes in the background with the caption titled “Ahh, the two bomb bullets! Such spirit pervades the imperial forces!”72 These overly dramatized portrayals of combat and war demonstrate how the media effectively captured public attention and popularity. Because of these grandiose descriptions and details, individuals could experience the war through the lens of soldiers and reporters by simply reading the newspaper.
Examining the rhetorical manipulation of Japanese media is crucial in understanding how language reflected the media’s perspective of the war. The dramatic and humor-infused articles evidently display the media’s implicit approval of wartime atrocities. Whether the overuse of exclamation marks in articles, the sensationalized and exaggerated diction, or the utilization of illustrations and images to accompany wartime stories, these shifts in discourse fostered a sense of detachment from the true horrors of war.
All Fun and Games
While it may appear as if newspapers served as a passive force that implicitly contributed to the escalation of the Nanjing Massacre through its rhetoric and sensationalism, in reality, they played an active role in directly promoting and legitimizing the war crimes. Specifically, the media created and publicized games and challenges among soldiers that directly caused greater brutalities. For example, the “First to arrive” competitions between soldiers originated from similar contests between reporters. These speed contests induced a sense of thrill and excitement
71 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 57.
72 Uchiyama, 107.
within the soldiers. Beyond these rivalries, the media, along with the military, orchestrated multiple killing contests in which different units and soldiers vied to execute the highest number of Chinese soldiers and civilians.73 The emphasis in these stories lay not in the strength and bravery of the Japanese soldier but rather in the fantastical and striking slaughters of Chinese people. Reporters from local and national news stations heavily covered these gruesome killing competitions. On November 17, 1937, the Fukushima min’yu, a provincial newspaper, published a story about a soldier who continued fighting in the battle despite lacking bullets against Chinese troops. The article used the phrase “sixty killed in one clean sweep.”74 This notion of “clean sweep,” analogous to slicing watermelons, became wildly popular, further contributing to the trivialization of mass killings.
Out of the many competitions and games initiated by the Japanese media, the notorious Hundred-Man Killing Contest most evidently highlights the media’s active role. Two Japanese lieutenants vied to be the first to kill one hundred people with their swords. The Tōnichi and Ōsaka Mainichi newspapers served as the judges for the killing contest.75 The Japanese media closely documented the event as the contest persisted from late November into December. They published almost daily updates, framing the killings as an exciting rivalry between two soldiers.
On November 30, December 4, and December 6, the Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shimbun covered the progress of the killing contest, including which soldier was winning and how many Chinese individuals had died. On December 13, the Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shimbun reported that both
73 Uchiyama, 45.
74 Uchiyama, 45.
75 Uchiyama, 48.
lieutenants had passed the one hundred mark; one soldier killed 105 people while the other killed 106, so nobody could tell which person reached one hundred first76 (see Fig. 4).
Figure 4. “Hundred-man killing ‘super record’: Mukai 106 105 Noda: The two second lieutenants to continue the contest in overtime.” Image of the newspaper published on 13 December 1937. Published in the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun (Tokyo Daily Newspaper).
Because of the inability to differentiate who killed one hundred first, the soldiers decided to continue the killing race to 150 to determine a final winner.77 After the game had finally concluded, the soldiers donated the swords they used to carry out the executions to the two news stations that served as judges.
76 Yoshida, The Making, 15.
77 Cook, “The Rape,” Stanford.
By transforming war events into playful games and competitions, the media actively involved itself in wartime activities, proving how Japanese news reporters often played a greater role in the events in Nanjing than simply writing articles and providing updates. Because of their participation in such games, Japanese soldiers became accustomed and desensitized to the mass murders and horrific events of the war. As Iris Chang explained in The Rape of Nanking, “The Japanese soldier was not simply hardened for battle in China; he was hardened for the task of murdering Chinese combatants and noncombatants alike. Indeed, various games and exercises were set up…to numb its men to the human instinct against killing people who are not attacking.”78 This deliberate effort to normalize brutality through media-driven games illustrates how the press directly influenced soldier behavior. Hence, the perspective that the media played a passive role in the war is not entirely correct; rather, they consciously fueled and legitimized the violence, transforming mass murder into spectacular games.
Molding Public Perspectives
As most of the public consumed Japanese media and newspapers, the articles published by reporters at the homefront undeniably shaped how Japanese society viewed and reacted to the war. After information about the fall of Nanjing spread to the public, widespread celebrations erupted across Japan. On December 10, around 9 P M , three days before Nanjing’s actual fall, the Asahi Shimbun published an extra edition of the newspaper announcing news of Japanese soldiers taking over all of Nanjing’s gates. These papers were then distributed among crowds, such as at a dance hall in Akasaka. Consequently, word of this joyous news spurred uproar as massive parades broke out, and everyone from college students to Japanese prisoners cheered for 78 Chang, The Rape, 55.
the Japanese military.79 Shops in Tokyo sold “Fall of Nanjing” noodles, and the Japanese stock market experienced a surge in growth.80 The press became the primary conduit for war updates, delivering news far more swiftly than official government reports and serving as a crucial information channel for Japanese citizens.
The media’s glorification of soldiers and the war also directly influenced the public and popular culture, blurring the lines between journalism and mass entertainment. Because of the media’s positive portrayal of the military, children listened to stories of the Imperial Army from a young age, learning wartime phrases such as “Forward, forward, soldiers, forward” or “Flag of the rising sun.” Magazines and cartoon illustrations in the media encouraged young boys to dream of becoming generals and admirals within the army. The media’s narratives also extended into the entertainment industry, with shows reinforcing militaristic values and ideals. The popular cartoon show Stray Dog, Norakuro followed the journey of a homeless orphan dog who enlisted in the Regiment of Brave Dogs to battle other animals.81 Besides the impact on children, news reports from the warfront also affected the broader popular Japanese culture. Songwriters, playwrights, and dramatists directly incorporated stories and experiences recounted in newspapers into their works, leading to a surge in new wartime productions. The distinction between fact and fiction became increasingly distorted as news media seeped into entertainment. Seeking to emulate the journalists’ accounts of the war, film crews sent actors and directors into Manchuria and parts of China to shoot scenes. The war heroes who appeared in newspapers soon emerged as celebrated figures in films as well, further fueling the romanticization of war and the
79 Yoshida, The Making, 16.
80 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 58.
81 Yoshida, The Making, 14-15.
nation’s nationalistic fervor.82 Through the consumption of popular news stations and entertainment, which echoed the news stories, Japanese society increasingly adopted the attitudes promoted by the media accepting and celebrating the events of the war, reacting positively to propaganda and militarism, and embracing sensationalized reporting. This unwavering public support, shaped by exaggerated, distorted reporting and patriotic propaganda, ultimately emboldened soldiers on the frontlines to commit atrocities without fear of condemnation. The media’s powerful narrative not only masked the reality of the massacre but also created an environment domestically within Japan where violence was seen as both justified and celebrated in the name of national expansion. Therefore, as reporters on the warfront built an atmosphere that promoted the brutalities and the Imperial Army’s actions, a similar mindset was occurring simultaneously at home, where societal enthusiasm fueled the public’s acceptance of violence.
Connecting the Warfront to Home
Besides glorifying Japanese soldiers as brave and heroic, the press also carefully crafted another image of military personnel that portrayed them as kindhearted, benevolent people deserving of public sympathy. Two days after Nanjing fell to the hands of the Japanese Army, the Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shimbun published a journalist’s account of the historic day, noting how officers, soldiers, and reporters were all moved to tears as they watched the Japanese flag rise over Nanjing.83 This emotional narrative evoked national pride while masking the harsh realities of the invasion, effectively playing on public understanding and support. Assembling photos taken by reporters in China, the Shōnen Kurabu magazine published the compilation of images
82 Young, Japan’s Total, 74-75.
83 Yoshida, The Making, 16.
in November 1937 and titled the collection “Heroic Incident Picture Collection: This Is the Imperial Military.”84 Within the publication, images of soldiers resting, reading letters from family members, or decorating sandbags with flowers are interspersed with captions that idealize their conduct.85 Beneath an image of soldiers adorning sandbags with flowers circulated, the caption wrote “Only the Japanese soldier has the heart to love the beauty of nature even in the bloody warfront. How nimble and refreshing when compared to the trenches where Chinese soldiers roll around playing things like mahjong.”86 By carefully curating these sentimental portrayals of Japanese soldiers, the media effectively humanized the military and diverted attention away from the brutal truth of the war. The contrast between soldiers delicately decorating sandbags with flowers and the graphic violence they inflicted on Chinese civilians created a distorted narrative that softened the public’s perception of the war and the “thrills” aspect of wartime reporting. Another photo depicted Japanese soldiers bowing before the graves of Chinese officers who passed away in combat.87 Although such images were deeply ironic given that Japanese soldiers held killing contests and even sent photos home posing with the bodies of dead Chinese civilians they were remarkably effective in eliciting sympathy from the public.
Whereas the media’s perpetuation of propaganda was a way to connect the government with the public, these stories that played on Japanese society’s compassion and conscience united the public with the soldiers. This strong pity the public felt for the Imperial Army resulted in the
84 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 108.
85 Uchiyama, 108.
86 Uchiyama, 108.
87 Uchiyama, 108.
exchange of comfort packages between civilians at home and soldiers at the warfront. These packages were normally sent directly to a family member such as a son or husband or were shipped off in large amounts by women’s wartime organizations or newspaper stations. Items in these bundles included candy, canned food, towels, magazines, medicine, and imonga (comfort art), and for more personalized goods, packages included hand-written letters and cards.88 To exhibit their strong endorsement of the Japanese military and demonstrate citizens’ patriotism, many individuals in Japan capitalized on sending such packages to China. During the Nanjing Massacre, these comfort packages represented the height of homefront efforts, further fueling public enthusiasm for the war. Without knowing the full extent of atrocities, citizens continued sending increasingly extravagant and luxurious packages, blindly supporting the Japanese military’s actions 89 Through the dispatching of these gifts, a profound bond between soldiers and civilians emerged as this new wave of wartime endorsements intensified the Rape of Nanking.
Evidently, maximizing public sympathy became another tool the media employed to create an acceptable climate for the Nanjing Massacre. Even though these care packages and the public’s attention did not directly cause the Nanjing atrocities, these bundles provided comfort and signaled support to the soldiers, reinforcing the media’s notions that the Imperial Army’s actions were well-received and applauded by the public. As the volume of packages increased, nearing and during the Nanjing Massacre, the crimes and horrors committed by the Japanese military intensified and increased in number. While a direct cause-and-effect relationship cannot be drawn between these two phenomena, it is certain that the overwhelming public support,
88 Uchiyama, 122.
89 Uchiyama, 123.
amplified through the media and materialized in care packages, further emboldened the soldiers to commit acts of brutality without fear of facing backlash.
Chinese Women in Japanese Media
As Japanese troops looted and pillaged their way through Nanjing, eighteen-year-old Li Xiuyin sought refuge in an American mission school during the massacre. However, her hiding place was discovered when three Japanese soldiers stormed in to ransack the building. When Xiuyin resisted their attempts to abduct and assault her, the soldiers responded with brutal violence, striking her with a bayonet and stabbing her face, legs, and stomach. Seven months pregnant at the time, Xiuyin suffered the loss of her unborn child from the repeated blows to her belly, but under treatment from American doctor Robert Wilson, her life was preserved.90 In the six weeks of the Nanjing Massacre, rape and sexual violence became rampant. Within a singular month, between 20,000 to 80,000 instances of rape occurred solely in Nanjing.91 Japanese soldiers subjected women to horrific abuse, which involved stabbing, abduction, rape, and even murder. Many of these so-called women included young girls, whom troops did not spare, and they were given the nickname “convert women.”92 Over the totality of the war, it is estimated that over 200,000 Chinese women were subjected to kidnappings and sexual abuse.93
90 Associated Press, “Li Xiuying, 86; Survivor of Japanese Atrocities in Nanking Became an Advocate for Victims,” Los Angeles Times, last modified December 10, 2004, accessed July 16, 2024, https://www.latimes.com/archives/laxpm-2004-dec-10-me-li10-story.html.
91 Chang, The Rape, 6.
92 Julie McCarthy and Photos By Cheryl Diaz Meyer, “PHOTOS: Why These World War II Sex Slaves Are Still Demanding Justice,” December 4, 2020, in Goats and Soda, podcast, audio, 13:40, accessed February 12, 2025, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/12/04/940819094/photos-there-still-is-no-comfort-for-the-comfortwomen-of-the-philippines.
93 Peipei Qiu, Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan's Sex Slaves (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 38, ProQuest Ebook Central.
Yet, how did the media contribute to the normalization and proliferation of widespread sexual violence? Depictions of Chinese women were often distorted in Japanese newspapers. Countless articles and reports sexualized and dehumanized them, fueling rampant misogyny and justifying brutal acts of violence. The qipao, a traditional Chinese dress characterized by its high collar, form-fitting silhouette, and elegant silk fabric, became a symbol of indecency and moral corruption. 94 Its figure-accentuating form invited strong Japanese disapproval for being too seductive. An issue of Gendai magazine further reinforced stereotypes by categorizing Chinese women into distinct and demeaning roles. For example, Nanjing women were described as individuals who often dressed simply with little makeup yet were secretly extremely provocative and suggestive.95 The publication further asserted that most Shanghainese women were prostitutes, while Guangzhou, which was known as the “city of the bizarre,” even had blind prostitutes to suit the strange local preferences.96 Inōue Kōbai, a famous Japanese playwright and poet, portrayed Chinese women as opportunistic individuals who lured male patrons in restaurants and cafes to extract money from them.97 Given the power of the media in informing public opinion, these narratives of Chinese women spread rapidly throughout Japan. Consequently, a general consensus emerged within Japan that Chinese women were ill-mannered and scandalous, reinforcing harmful stereotypes and justifying their mistreatment. The idea that Chinese women were overly provocative became justification for Japanese soldiers’ acts of rape and assault, as their behavior was seen as inviting such violence.
94 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 49.
95 Uchiyama, 49.
96 Uchiyama, 49.
97 Uchiyama, 49.
The portrayal of Chinese women as immoral and deceitful in Japanese news outlets stemmed from a perceived fundamental difference between Chinese women and Japanese women. Because of the May Fourth movement in the late 1910s and early 1920s, where young Chinese intellectuals protested against the traditional Confucian values in favor of democracy and modernization, Chinese society experienced a shift away from the conventional view of a woman’s role as a wife and mother in favor of greater sexual equality.98 This new vision of a “modern woman” was heavily influenced by Western ideals and by the concept of individualism.99 In contrast, Japan maintained the conservative perspective that women should act modest and proper and center themselves around the domestic sphere.100 These diverging interpretations of a woman’s responsibilities in society led the Japanese to criticize and condemn Chinese women, whom they believed to be materialistic and prostitute-like. The phrase jinü shi de shenghuo, which refers to women whose lives revolved around providing pleasure to men, became a label used to degrade and dehumanize Chinese women.101 Japanese news outlets further reinforced this narrative through degrading imagery and stories. The Xin Manzhou, a Chinese language journal sponsored by the Japanese government, displayed an image of a pregnant Chinese woman with a Western outfit and hairstyle slowly consuming a bottle of sleeping pills to end her life102 (see Fig. 5).
98 Norman Smith, “Regulating Chinese Women's Sexuality during the Japanese Occupation of Manchuria,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 13, no. 1 (2004): 55, JSTOR.
99 Smith, 55.
100 Smith, 56.
101 Smith, 56.
102 Smith, 56.
Figure 5. The “Ershi shiji de guniang” (Twentieth-century woman). Published in Xin Manzhou, 1940.
By depicting her in Western attire, the image suggests that Westernization has led her astray from traditional Chinese values, implicitly blaming outside influence for her despair. Her suicide particularly during pregnancy, a time associated with new life and responsibilities as a mother adds a layer of hopelessness and moral decay, casting Chinese society as both corrupted and collapsing. Unsurprisingly, because Japan and China’s interpretations of women’s roles differed so strongly, Japan sought to “civilize” the Chinese woman and mold her into a more proper and demure figure.103 Colonial officials in China attempted to dominate and regulate
103 Smith, 57.
Chinese women’s sexuality, and captured Chinese women were instructed to renku nailao (endure hardship and persevere through labor).104 Following the role of a Japanese woman, Chinese women were also expected to shoulder their duties as people of the Japanese Empire.
Consequently, Japanese press articles and entertainment actively reinforced the idea that Chinese women were morally inferior and in need of guidance and reform. In fact, narratives depicting a Chinese woman falling in love with and being transformed by a Japanese soldier gained extensive popularity among the Japanese public.105 Shina no Yoru (China Nights), the most acclaimed Japanese film of 1940, reflects this dynamic, with its title specifically, the word Shina rooted in a derogatory term for China.
106 The plot traces the story of Kei Ran, a Chinese woman, and her romance with a Japanese officer, Tetsuo Hase. Because Kei Ran’s parents died during a Japanese bombing raid, Kei Ran harbored strong anti-Japanese sentiments, so when Tetsuo Hase attempted to win her affection, she strongly opposed his pursuit until he slapped her in the face.107 Crying and begging him to stop, Kei Ran finally admits that she loves him and apologizes for her anti-Japanese behavior. The film ends with the couple married and leading a joyful life together.108 The slap serves as a pivotal moment of clarity for Kei Ran, symbolizing her “awakening” to Japanese superiority and dominance. In doing so, the film not only reinforced the idea that Chinese women required discipline but also implicitly justified
104 Smith, 57.
105 Amane Kasai, “Desire Sung with a Lisp: Chinese Women Represented in Japanese Popular Songs During Wartime” (unpublished manuscript, Waseda Institute for Advanced Study, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan, February 23, 2021), 5, https://www.waseda.jp/inst/wias/assets/uploads/2021/03/3e101c76c18116ca8477f3e71d769c1d.pdf.
106 Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945 (Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series) (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 132-133.
107 Hotta, 132-133.
108 Hotta, 132-133.
violence against them as a means of achieving this transformation. Moreover, this romanticized narrative of Chinese women submitting to Japanese men occurred in many well-known songs during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The following are lyrics from the song “Shina Musume no Yume” (“A Chinese Girl’s Dream”):
Ri-san mo, (Mr. Li,)
Wan san mo, (Mr. Wang,)
minna Nihon ga daisuki yo. (everyone loves Japan.)
Watashi mo nihon ga daisuki yo. (I also love Japan.)
Oyome ni iku nara Nihon e. (If I were to marry, I want him to be Japanese.)
Dakedo watashi wa Chūgoku musume. (But I am a Chinese girl.)109
As displayed in the song, the veneration of Japan by Chinese women demonstrates how cultural subjugation was internalized during this era and how popular culture reinforced a Japandominated relationship. Through wartime entertainment and stories, the Japanese media posited a power structure that positioned Chinese women at the base of the social hierarchy while elevating soldiers and the broader Japanese population to a status of inherent superiority, and the Imperial Army actively upheld this ideology during interactions with Chinese women.
Especially during the Nanjing Massacre, derogatory language and dehumanizing stereotypes about Chinese women permeated the Japanese military. For example, the word pii was an offensive and disparaging term that soldiers often used to describe Chinese women who were abducted and raped.110 Additionally, soldiers often viewed and treated young Chinese girls as tools to satisfy the military’s desires. One soldier describes the treatment of women in
109 Kasai, “Desire Sung,” 10.
110 Qiu, Chinese Comfort, 36.
Nanjing: “When raping, women were considered objects for sexual gratification, when killing, they were considered nothing more than a pig.”111 The belief that the Imperial Army possessed Chinese women further motivated these mass instances of rape and sexual violence as many soldiers thought that raping virgins would enable them to become even more powerful in battle.112 As a result of this objectified perspective of Chinese women, Japanese soldiers pushed the boundaries to unspeakable bounds, conducting actions that would be unthinkable for many Japanese citizens.113 These acts of sexual violence became extremely trivialized and even playful within the Japanese military. Similar to the killing contests and “First to arrive” competitions promoted by the press, Japanese soldiers played similar games using Chinese women as their subjects. Azuma Shiro, a former Japanese soldier, explains in an interview for the documentary In the Name of the Emperor an example of how soldiers gamified rape: At first we used some kinky words like Pikankan. Pi means “hip,” kankan means “look.” Pikankan means, “Let’s see a woman open up her legs.” Chinese women didn’t wear underpants. Instead, they wore trousers tied with a string. There was no belt. As we pulled the string, the buttocks were exposed. We “pikankan.” We looked. After a while we would say something like, “It’s my day to take a bath,” and we took turns raping them. It would be all right if we only raped them. I shouldn’t say all right. But we always stabbed and killed them. Because dead bodies don’t talk.114
111 Cook, “The Rape,” Stanford.
112 Chang, The Rape, 49.
113 Qiu, Chinese Comfort, 72.
114 Chang, The Rape, 49.
The rhetoric and game tactics employed by the military while conducting widespread sexual violence directly mirrored the media’s portrayal of Chinese women. Because of the media’s constant sexualization and dehumanization of Chinese women, soldiers found rape and abuse morally permissible and justified. Soldiers embodied the assertion of Japanese superiority over the “indecent Chinese women” and the belief that only the Japanese could teach Chinese women how to behave properly. In other words, an environment conducive to sexual violence emerged as the media industry continued to enforce the hierarchy between soldiers and Chinese women. Combined with the glorification of the Imperial Army and the strong domestic support for the military, Japanese soldiers became emboldened in committing such horrific crimes.
Chinese Comfort Women
The first official comfort station opened in Nanjing in 1938, a few months after the rapid killing of Chinese civilians and the mass looting of homes and buildings subsided.115 Chinese women who lived and worked at these locations were known as comfort women, a term that describes the hundreds of thousands of women whom the Imperial Army subjected to sex work in military-work brothels.116 More often than not, these “women” were young girls who were underaged and unmarried. Because the Japanese military feared backlash from other countries such as the United States and Europe, they named these brothels “comfort homes” or “comfort stations.”117 These comfort stations were exclusive to the Japanese troops, serving as a reward for the military’s hard work and dedication on the battlefield, and generals and soldiers frequented them during their downtime to engage in sexual activities with Chinese women.118
115 Chang, 53.
116 Chang, 53.
117 Chang, 52.
118 Chang, 53.
Due to the widespread sexual violence that occurred on the streets of Nanjing, military authorities believed that establishing stations would provide order and control, yet these stations were nonetheless still sites of mass rape and abuse.119 Since around 70 to 80 percent of the Japanese Army was stationed in China, the military resorted to kidnapping Chinese women, a process named chōben, to maintain a sufficient number of women for the stations.120 As Chinese women became viewed as a “necessity” in the army’s war supplies, estimates highlight that the ratio between soldier to comfort women was 29 to 1, a figure that demonstrates the sheer amount of sexual violence that occurred.121 Rather than isolated instances of abductions, troops often conducted systematic drafts, entering into shelters or cities to capture as many women as possible. The Japanese military also enlisted the aid of local Chinese individuals in these kidnappings, mainly through its establishment of a puppet government in Nanjing filled with Chinese civilians. The puppet government forced the remaining civilians in Nanjing to apply for a “good citizen ID card” to provide the administration with an opportunity to analyze and select women and girls to later be abducted.122 These comfort stations resulted in devastating consequences for Chinese women as the unsanitary conditions caused many to contract sexually transmitted diseases that often led to death. Moreover, the comfort stations inflicted profound psychological trauma on the women. After enduring relentless abuse and losing all hopes of escape since the comfort stations were heavily guarded, many women also died by suicide.123
119 Qiu, Chinese Comfort, 29.
120 Qiu, 36.
121 Qiu, 37.
122 Qiu, 41-42.
123 Chang, The Rape, 53.
However, from the Japanese perspective and specifically the media’s viewpoint, comfort women were not an exclusive feature of the Japanese military. Rather, according to the Japanese press, comfort women originated within the Chinese military. In an October 1937 edition of Fuji magazine, Sayama Eitaro alleged that the Chinese military purposefully hired female soldiers into its troops in order to provide sexual favors to high-ranking officers.124 Eitaro additionally contended that these female soldiers often carried bags that contained odd sexual tools for the Chinese army.125 Similar claims emerged in popular entertainment, too. A comedy duo by Azabu Shin and Azabu Rabu published in the Yūben magazine asserted that Chinese troops had a special unit called the Thank You unit that was essentially a comfort station for soldiers:
AZABU SHIN: Do you know about the female army (jōshigun) in the Chinese military called the Thank You Unit (irōtai)?
AZABU RABU: What’s the Thank You Unit?
AZABU SHIN:As the name implies, it’s a “thank you” unit (irotai). In popular parlance, we would say it’s an erotic unit (erotai).
AZABU RABU: What do you mean by “erotic unit?”
AZABU SHIN: That is, they go to where the Chinese soldiers are on the frontlines and fully give their all (shikkari yatte chōdai yo). With that being said, they do various kinds of services (iroiro to sābisu).
AZABU RABU: Then what?
AZABU SHIN: Chinese soldiers love women. So their spirits are lifted when they hear the women’s seductive voices, and they rush out of the trenches. Then our military’s
124 Uchiyama, Japan’s Carnival, 50.
125 Uchiyama, 50.
machine guns go bang, bang, and shoot them down.
AZABU RABU: That’s a really weird battle tactic.
AZABU SHIN: In this war, there’s a lot of weird tactics.126 This depiction of women in the Chinese military enabled the Japanese media to develop their own narrative of sexual violence in the Second Sino-Japanese War, not only absolving Japanese soldiers of responsibility but also serving as a tool to rationalize their exploitation of Chinese women. The irony in the media’s actions is stark. While the Japanese military established its own extensive system of comfort stations throughout China and in other occupied countries, the media fabricated tales of Chinese women performing similar roles for the Chinese troops. This narrative both assuaged the Japanese military’s fear of moral corruption within its ranks and provided a perverse moral high ground to justify the Japanese military’s 200,000 Chinese comfort women. Hence, the Japanese press is inextricably linked to the perpetuation of sexual violence and the dehumanization of Chinese women.
Ink-Stained Illusions
Many scholars have raised the concern: if the military’s actions were truly so horrific, did no journalist attempt to prevent the Nanjing atrocities while traveling with the military? To this question, denial and complicity were a formidable barrier that obscured the truth from public view. A news correspondent for the literary magazine Bungei Shunjū, Kosaka Eiichi wrote extensively of his sightings when traveling from Shanghai to Nanjing in hopes of witnessing the fall of Nanjing.127 In a diaristic manner, Kosaka details the countless destroyed houses and buildings, bullet holes and trenches, and the corpses of Chinese soldiers across the road. Though
126 Uchiyama, 51-52.
127 Yoshida, The Making, 16.
Kosaka experienced a strong sense of embarrassment and guilt, he blanketed over his personal emotions in his writing, instead noting that he was confident the Japanese troops would return to bury the bodies in care.128 As military fervor consumed him, he further defended the Imperial Army’s actions by blaming the Chinese troops for its large numbers of mortalities if the Chinese military had surrendered earlier, fewer soldiers would have died.129 This response reflects a broader pattern of rationalization that allowed journalists to distance themselves from the horrors of war.
After the Japanese Army successfully overtook Nanjing, the journalists’ denial intensified, with countless war correspondents refuting the existence of any atrocities. Ara Ken’ichi, a Japanese researcher specializing in modern history, conducted interviews in the 1980s with 48 Japanese soldiers and news reporters who were present during the Nanjing Incident. These testimonies were compiled and published in his work, The Nanjing Incident: Japanese Eyewitness Accounts. 130 Many of these accounts reflect the journalists’ denial or minimization of the wartime events, highlighting the complexities and challenges in uncovering historical truths. Yamamoto Osamu, who was part of the Shanghai Branch of the Osaka Asahi Shimbun, dismissed the claims when asked about the Nanjing Massacre in an interview with Ken’ichi:
I think there was no such thing as the Incident. I didn’t see anything and no one within the Asahi raised it. And, considering the number of citizens and the movement of Chinese troops, such thing could not have possibly happened…And I’d like to mention something
128 Yoshida, 16.
129 Yoshida, 16.
130 Ken'ichi, The Nanjing, 2-3.
about the expression “massacre.” In a battlefield, an act which could be regarded as the worst possible thing under peacetime circumstances was regarded as the best of achievements. It is nonsense to define some act under normal circumstances, during peaceful conditions. I think they used standards under normal conditions and called it a “massacre.”131
Osamu demonstrates how the normalization of mass atrocities extended beyond the articles spread to the public. Rather, this belief that the actions of the Japanese military were justified was inherently ingrained in the mindset of journalists. His statement reveals the rhetorical strategies used to deny the massacre, such as appealing to supposed “battlefield logic” to dismiss moral condemnation. Osamu’s claim that no one within the Asahi discussed the military’s war crimes further reflects the extent of institutional silence, suggesting that the media, rather than merely being censored, actively participated in reinforcing revisionist perspectives. Moreover, these sentiments were often closely shared across different newspaper stations throughout China. In numerous interviews about the Nanjing Massacre, journalists including Minami Masayoshi of the Shin-Aichi Shimbun also argued that the reported death toll was exaggerated.132 Masayoshi insisted that he saw no more than twenty to thirty bodies far from the 200,000 deaths that were claimed.133 Even when confronted with photographs and contrasting narratives of the horrors in Nanjing, journalists persisted in their denial Sato Shinju, a photographer for the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, explained, “a photo alone does not mean
131 Ken'ichi, 17-18.
132 Ken’ichi, 124.
133 Ken’ichi, 124.
anything it’s all up to its explanation.”
134 This pervasive and genuine belief that Japanese soldiers bore no fault compelled journalists to produce even more extreme articles that vilified the Chinese and glorified Japan. In the same manner as Osamu’s dismissal, Hashimoto
Tomisaburo, the vice chief of the Asahi Shimbun’s Shanghai Branch, outright denied the Nanjing Massacre too, stating the following in an interview at eighty-one-years-old with Ken’ichi: The “Incident in Nanjing,” well, I have never heard of it. If there was one, reporters would have talked about it. Reporters raise a subject whatever it is, if it has news value even slightly that is their job. I have never even heard of it as a rumor. We at the Asahi held local meetings so if such a thing occurred, somebody would have brought it up talk might not have been direct, but, for example, “it didn’t feel good watching it,” or something like that. I think there was no massacre in Nanjing.
135 Through continuous, repeated rejection of the Rape of Nanking, the media constructed an alternate reality during the Nanjing Massacre in which the Nanjing Massacre simply did not exist. The denial of the Nanjing Massacre was not an isolated occurrence but rather a collective phenomenon rooted in both nationalist ideology and professional self-preservation. Japanese journalists embedded within military units were deeply influenced by the narrative that they crafted themselves the glorification of military victories and the demonization of Chinese resistance. Among the few journalists who did find fault in the Japanese Army’s actions, their voices were often silenced by the institutions above them, or the pervasive feelings of shame and guilt because of the military’s harm led them to withhold the truth from the public eye. Whether outright denial, embarrassment, or moral resignation, many journalists endured a period of strong
134 Ken’ichi, 45.
135 Ken’ichi, 28-29.
self-censorship and complicity in the overarching media’s narratives during the Nanjing Massacre.
In consequence, though many journalists were present during the six weeks of the Nanjing Massacre, reports on the brutalities that unfolded were largely missing in Japan’s media archives. Even when rare reports of the brutal realities emerged, censorship within press institutions and from government laws ensured they never reached the public eye. Hence, it is evident that the media not simply the journalists themselves but the overall institution carefully drew boundaries on what was and was not reported. All the new stories and sensationalized reporting leading up to the massacre the thrilling Hundred-Man Killing Contest, the heroic stories of Japanese soldiers, and the portrayals of incompetent, weak Chinese civilians and women transformed Nanjing into a suitable environment for the atrocities to occur, but the actual news about events such as the comfort stations or arbitrary murders of young Chinese children were practically nonexistent. Through such actions, media stations actively shaped a selective narrative on the Japanese military’s actions. By classifying the systematic killing of Chinese civilians as a function of wartime activities, the press easily and effectively absolved the Japanese military of its crimes and suppressed any counter-narratives that threatened the Imperial Army.
On an international level, the Japanese media constructed a similar facade that effectively concealed the Nanjing Massacre. While domestic reports sensationalized kill counts, glorified the destruction of Chinese cities, and celebrated the bombing of Nanjing’s city gates, these narratives were carefully withheld from international audiences.136 Instead, Japanese media stations painted Nanjing as a peaceful and orderly occupation, depicting stories of Japanese
136 Chang, The Rape, 149.
soldiers aiding Chinese civilians (see Appendix C).137 Furthermore, individual journalists within Japan were banned from openly publishing to Western countries. This duality not only allowed the Japanese military to justify its horrific actions to the domestic population but also enabled it to evade international scrutiny and maintain its moral facade on the world stage. In other words, the media created a double narrative, manipulating global perception to shield the Imperial Army from condemnation while celebrating brutalities within Japan. After reading Japan’s international reports on the situation in Nanjing, American missionary Minnie Vautrin known as the “Goddess of Mercy” for protecting Chinese civilians during the Nanjing Massacre noted in her journal that nineteen of a Japanese article’s twenty-five sentences were entirely false and contrived (see Appendix D).138 Indeed, the Japanese media’s efforts yielded effective results as the first reports of the Japanese invasion into Nanjing were published by the Chicago Daily News on December 15, five days after the Japanese press released its articles on the fall of Nanjing.139 These deliberate attempts to hide the massacre from the international community thus suggest an awareness to some degree of the moral reprehensibility of the military’s actions something many journalists within Nanjing refused to confront. In examining Japan’s careful construction of false narratives, it is apparent that the media’s role in shaping public perception was not accidental but rather a calculated and intentional effort to serve the interests of the Imperial Army.
137 Chen.
138 Chen.
139 Suping Lu, “The Nanjing Atrocities Reported in the U.S. Newspapers, 1937-38,” Readex, accessed January 6, 2025, https://www.readex.com/readex-report/issues/volume-7-issue-2/nanjing-atrocities-reported-us-newspapers1937-38.
What A Funny Spectacle!
To the average observer, it seems almost inconceivable how the Japanese media could maintain such blatant contradictions. How could soldiers participate in killing contests while simultaneously bowing before the graves of fallen Chinese soldiers? How could war correspondents insist that no massacre occurred when photographic evidence shows Japanese soldiers standing triumphantly behind piles of bodies and news reports describe the screams and terror of Chinese civilians? How could domestic news reports glorify the atrocities while international Japanese press stations claim that Nanjing was extremely peaceful? These glaring inconsistencies within the media’s narrative would naturally lead one to question its credibility. Yet, it was precisely through these contradictions that the Japanese press wielded its power by manipulating reality, distorting truth, and strategically controlling public perception to justify the actions of the military. Mass war fever, coupled with the relentless barrage of nationalistic and anti-Chinese news reports, allowed both journalists and civilians alike to abandon reason and embrace whatever version of reality best aligned with their beliefs. Thus, the notion that Japan would civilize and restore order in Nanjing while committing brutalities could be true simultaneously.
As Steven Pinker explains in his novel The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, two prerequisites must be fulfilled to form the conditions of genocide: demonization and dehumanization, and the Japanese press certainly achieved both of these components.140 Through countless news articles and propaganda that framed China as evil and in need of Japanese reform, the press effectively cultivated widespread animosity toward the
140 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York City, NY: Viking Books, 2011), 27.
Chinese population and justified military aggression. Similarly, by glorifying Japanese troops through exaggerated illustrations and narratives, the media not only solidified Japanese superiority but also portrayed the Chinese as subhuman, further reinforcing the racial hierarchy. Moreover, the utilization of dehumanization tactics was even more extreme in the Japanese media. The press’s emphasis on kill counts and grotesque descriptions of Chinese bodies demonstrates the extent to which dehumanization permeated public discourse. By depicting Chinese women as pigs and tools for pleasure, wartime correspondents laid the foundation for the systematic sexual violence and exploitation that followed in the form of comfort stations.
The Japanese media was never a secondary actor in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Likewise, news stations and the Japanese press were never simply a cultural tool of the government or an extension of the military. Instead, they operated as an independent reporting entity that played a pivotal role in shaping the public’s perception of the war and in encouraging the committing of mass violence. In essence, the media served as a bridge between the government, the Japanese public, and the Imperial Army and as the epicenter where these three forces converged. Without the media disseminating the government’s pro-war propaganda to the public, a culture of imperialism and xenophobia would never have emerged. If the media had never closely followed and glorified the military, public support for Nanjing’s destruction and the military’s violent crimes would not have been so fervently embraced by the Japanese public. Absent the media’s emphasis on sensationalism and thrills, it would have been extremely difficult for the Nanjing Massacre to have been normalized, denied, and justified on such a massive scale.
Therefore, the Japanese media’s role in the Rape of Nanking is undeniable and must be recognized not as a passive bystander, but as an active architect of violence and
dehumanization. By manipulating the truth and fueling fervor, the press not only justified the atrocities committed in Nanjing but also erased the humanity of its victims from public consciousness. Yet, more importantly, the media’s power to shape perception is not confined to history. Media and propaganda remain a powerful political tool, and the Japanese media’s distortion of reality during the Nanjing Massacre serves as a stark reminder of the destructive and horrific consequences when truth is sacrificed for ideology, glorification, and sensationalism.
Part of an exhibit in the Nanjing Memorial Hall. A side-by-side comparison of the military capabilities of China versus Japan prior to the onset of World War II. Japan’s weaponry and industrial output far outpace China’s output while China maintains a larger population than Japan. This image was taken during a visit to the Nanjing Memorial Hall in June 2024.
A special edition from the Osaka Morning News, a Japanese newspaper. The title of the article reads “Nanjing Captured.” On the right-hand side, the article cites the month December but leaves the specific date blank (as depicted by the empty gaps). This newspaper article is on display at the Nanjing Memorial Hall.
Photographs published by the China Frontline (Vol. 30, No. 3) on January 19, 1938. The title of the article depicting these photos reads “One Week after the Fall of Nanjing.” According to these photographs, the situation in Nanjing was extremely peaceful, and Chinese civilians embraced the Japanese military. The Japanese military also provided food to the Nanjing residents and interacted joyfully with Chinese children. These images are currently displayed in a collection in the Nanjing Memorial Hall.
A statue located in the Nanjing Memorial Hall of Minnie Vautrin, an American missionary aiding Chinese civilians in the Nanking Safety Zone. This statue is part of a larger exhibit dedicated to Minnie Vautrin and the Nanking Safety Zone in the Memorial Hall. Above the statue, a board describing Minnie Vautrin references her as the “Goddess of Mercy” for women and children.
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