Yeshivat Frisch Torah Journal 2022 by The Frisch School

2022 - 5782

Table of Contents Editor’s Note

Ramban Does Not Know Rabbi Yaakov Blau

The Parshanut of Targum Yonatan Rabbi Yaakov Blau

Special Needs in Halacha: Part 2 Defining the term “Cheresh” Caleb Breda

Kavana vs Kedusha Susie Blum and Sarah Wurzburger

The Frisch Eruv Rabbi Asher Bush

How to Make it Count: The Ephemerality of Human Life Naomi Elkin

Water and Oil Shayna Lifschitz

Hazkaras Geshamim: Request or Recognition Eli Nat

Editor’s Note It is with great pride that I present the fourth volume of the renewed Yeshivat Frisch torah journal. The authors once again are both current talmidim and talmidot, as well as alumni. Several Rabbeim contributed as well. The topics range from gemara to halacha to tanach. Please note that the first three articles are, in many ways, continuations of the same authors’ articles in last year’s journal and are therefore placed first. I hope that the journal will continue to serve as a model for sophisticated talmud torah, for the full breadth of what can be included in that, in our yeshiva. Yaakov Blau

Rabbi Yaakov Blau Ramban Does Not Know Rabbi Yaakov Blau The Ramban’s commentary on Chumash is widely considered as an indispensable part of any serious discussion of Chumash. Rav Aharon Lichtenstein Z”L once said that “had the Ramban’s commentary on the Torah had been lost, that would have been catastrophic (for the Jewish people).1” The commentary deals with so many aspects of parshanut, peshat, midrash, halacha, kabbala etc. that many of its components deserve their own analysis. I would like to focus on just one and that is his willingness to say “I do not know.” Rashi is famous for being willing to say that often2, but the Ramban also uses a variation of ‫ לא הבינותי‬,‫לא ידעתי‬ and ‫ לא נתברר‬dozens of times3. While any attempt to categorize how he uses it will ignore a degree of nuance, I believe that he basically uses this expression to express four kinds of ideas. 1] Where he means that he is not completely confident as to what the passuk means, but nevertheless he then suggests an approach 2] Where he is questioning a midrash, rather

Seeking His Presence p.50. See the Frisch Torah Journal Volume 3 pp.3-13 3 One could reasonably argue that each expression has its own meaning, but this article will deal with them as if they are all the same. He also uses ‫ אינו יודע‬a few times (Shemot 40:2 and Bamidbar 4:32) as well as ‫( לא מצאו‬Bereshit 30:20 and Bamidbar 24:3). He uses variations of these expressions several times in his commentary of Shas as well, but that is beyond the scope of this article. He also occasionally uses ‫ לא נתפרש‬in his commentary on Chumash, but I thought that was different enough to not be included. 2

Torat Yeshivat Frisch than what the passuk means 3] He is questioning or attacking an earlier commentator 4] He knows what the passuk means, but is questioning a detail which does not impact the overall understanding of the passuk. Now, these categories do not break down so neatly. For someone like the Ramban, who would only explain the halachic pars of Chumash based on the torah sh’beal peah, one could argue that he viewed the midrashim as if they were part of the passuk, so really the first and second category should not be distinct for those kinds of midrashei halacha. Also, when the Ramban questions Rashi, he often is really questioning the midrash that Rashi is based on, so perhaps for those occasions the second and third category are not really distinct. Nevertheless, because of the subjective nature of how to understand when he questions Rashi, we will put any questioning of Rashi in the third category. The questioning category is also somewhat tricky to evaluate, because it is often unclear if he really questioning or rather attacking in a more polite fashion. When he uses it in regard to the Ibn Ezra (like Bereshit 23:19) or the Rambam (like Bereshit 18:1), it is fairly clear that it is meant as an attack. Given the high regard which all of the mefarshim held for Onkelos, he most likely always meant those as questioning4. He uses it for Rashi

For a few examples, see Bereshit 14:7, Shemot 15:18, and Vayikra 16:4.

Rabbi Yaakov Blau many, many times and it is often hard to say which way he means it. The Ramban’s respect for Rashi is very clear5 and often Rashi is based on a midrash, however at times the Ramban questions if Rashi’s understanding of the midrash is correct and it would then be more of an attack than a question. It also unclear when the Ramban feels the need to use any sort of expression of “I do not know” at all. He often uses expressions that convey that any idea is his own, such as ‫ אולי‬,‫ יתכן‬and ‫ והקרוב‬without the need to express any kind of doubt. Perhaps at times he felt less confident about his approach or perhaps he was influenced by how often his predecessors used a similar expression6. Let us examine examples of each category. Not confident, but suggests an approach On Bereshit 12:11, The Ramban wonders why Avraham was suddenly concerned about Sarah’s beauty when they went down to Egypt, as opposed to all of their previous travels. He questions why Aharon is specified when any Kohen can do what is described in Shemot 30:7. On

See the Ramban’s introduction to his commentary and Bamidbar 32:42. Rashi uses it dozens of times, as does the Radak (for example Bereshit 1:29 and Zecharya 6:3) and even occasionally the Ibn Ezra) Shemot Perush Haruch 12:40 and Nachum 1:1) and Bechor Shor (Bereshit 49:13 and Bamidbar 29:13). 6

Torat Yeshivat Frisch Vayikra 5:15, he does not know why an Asham and Chatat are different types of korbanot, if each atone for a sin. He is perplexed on Bamidbar 14:17, why the attributes of Rachum V’chanun are left out when, after the sin of the meraklim, Moshe quotes the Divine attributes of mercy7. On Devarim 11:4 he is puzzled as to why the passuk specifies that the armies of Egypt at the Yam Suf were destroyed until this day. In each case, the Ramban then gives a suggestion to resolve the issue that he raised. Midrash When the three angels visited Avraham, the midrash says that he asked Sarah to make three seahs for each one. The Ramban (Bereshit 18:6) wonders why so much bread was necessary. On Shemot 21:3, he quotes the midrash that the master of an eved ivri is responsible to supply food for the eved’s family. The Ramban is unsure if the master is entitled to the earnings of the eved’s wife and children during this time8. He quotes a Michilta on Vayikra 23:7 that suggests that one might have thought that some work for food preparation should override Shabbat, but he is unclear

Other examples include: Bereshit 20:12, 30:9, 35:1 and 8 and 47:9, Shemot 4:3, 9:31, 23:16, and 31:10, Vayikra 8:30 and 14:18, Bamidbar 1:45,14:17, 17:10, 22:4, 24:3, 26:57 and 30:1, Devarim 2:7. 8 There are several instances where the Ramban questions what the halacha is and what is the exact nature of a mitzva. One could reasonably consider all of these to be a separate category. However, since the Ramban treats the story sections of Chumash and the halachic sections equally, I incorporated any such query based on midrash in the midrash category and those was based on the passukim in the detail category.

Rabbi Yaakov Blau as to what is meant by that. On Bamidbar 14:1, he quotes the famous midrash that the Jews cried for nothing with the meraglim, so that night (Tisha B’av) will be a time of crying in the future and wonders what the textual source for the midrash is. When Devarim 21:14 says that if one does not marry a yefat toar, she must be sent to be on her own, the Sifrei adds “but not to her father’s house.” The Ramban is uncertain as what those parameters are exactly9. Questioning/Attacking On Bereshit 18:1, the Rambam feels that the angels did not actually visit Avraham, as angels cannot be perceived in the physical world, but rather the entire story was a prophetic vision. The Ramban states that following that line of reasoning also led the Rambam to the conclusion that Yaakov did not fight with an angel either. The Ramban says that he does not know why then would Yaakov be limping when he woke up? The Targum on Shemot 21:29, when the passuk says that if an animal kills a person, the animal is stoned and the owner is killed, translates “killed’ for the owner in a way that implies that beit din executes him. The Ramban says he does not know why the Targum does this, since the passuk means death by the hands of Hashem. He then suggests a few explanations for the Targum.

Other examples include: Shemot 9:12, 21:16 and 40:2, Vayikra 1:4, and 23:15 and 24, Bamidbar 31:6.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch Vayikra 26:11 states that Hashem will put his mishkan among us and not reject us. Rashi explains that Hashem’s spirit will not be repulsed by us, but the Ramban says that he does not understand the reasoning that we should serve Hashem just so that He will not be repulsed? He then gives a kabbalistic interpretation. When Moshe complains about needing to provide meat for all the people on Bamidbar 11:15, he says “if You will do this to me,” using the feminine ‫ את‬for You. Rashi explains that Moshe became weakened, but the Ramban says that he does not understand this, since the feminine word refers to Hashem in the passuk. Instead, he offers a kabbalistic understanding. Devarim 16:22 commands us not to make a matzava. Rashi says that it was loved originally, but then become an idolatrous practice. The Ramban says that he does not know why this should be true about a matzava, but not a mizbeach. He suggests an answer before offering a different approach10. Detail When discussing the rate of the waters of the Mabul receding (Bereshit 8:5), The Ramban concedes that we do not know exactly how much they

Other examples include: Bereshit 14:7, 23:19, 30:20, 32:11, 34:7, 35:18, 36:43,38:5 and11, 42:1, 46:29 and 48:7, Shemot 12:16 and 45, 16:18 and 27, 19:1, 21:16, 24:5, 25:9,12 and 29, 26:24, 28:31 and 41, 30:34, 38:8 and 40:27, Vayikra 6:4, 7:16, 12:2, 16:4, 18:17, 19:27, 22:16, Bamidbar 1:3, 4:32, 8:2 and 24, 15:38, 17:2, 18:10, 21:9, and 25:5 and Devarim 1:4 and 12, 16:18,22:22 and 26:3 and 14.

Rabbi Yaakov Blau went down each day. This does not have a meaningful impact on understanding the passukim. Similarly, on 38:8, he says that we do not know if the practice of someone in the family marrying a widow (expanded yibum) preceded Yehuda or if he initiated it with Tamar. Vayikra 8:30 says that Moshe took oil and blood and sprinkled it, but the Ramban says that he does not know if they were mixed together or not. When discussing, in Devarim 2:23, how the Avim were exiled and returned to their land, the Ramban says that we do not know when that happened11. The ability of someone of the Ramban’s stature to be able to admit that he does not know something is a lesson for all of us to strive to emulate. Being willing to admit when we do not know is not a sign of weakness, rather it is a sign of strength.

Other examples include: Shemot 29:31, Bamidbar 4:16 and Devarim 16:11.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch The Parshanut of Targum Yonatan Rabbi Yaakov Blau Targum Yonatan is an invaluable resource for understanding Navi. The Rishonim quote him extensively and held him in high esteem1. I would like to touch on first his relationship to Targum Onkelos on Chumash and then on how his translation can also serve as a form of commentary. For how Targum Yonatan and Onkelos are similar, clearly many words are translated in the same way in both translations, because that is how to say the word in Aramaic. The chidush is when they have the same nonliteral

translation.

well

known

that

they

both

avoid

anthropomorphism.2 In a similar fashion, both translate hester panim (Hashem “covering His face”) as removing the shechinah (Devarim 31:18, Yishayahu 53:3, Yechezkiel 39:23, and Micha 3:43). As well, Levanon is translated as the Beit Hamikdash (Radak Yirmiyahu 22:20) and V’chay Baham means Olam Haba (Radak Yechezkiel 20:11).

See Medieval Commentary in the Modern Era pp.75-83. See Radak Yirmiyahu 14:8. In a similar vein, Yonatan at times translates “Hashem’s place” as “place of His shechina”, such as in Yishayahu 26:21, Yechezkiel 3:12 and 36:20, Micha 1:3 and Chabakuk 2:20, among others. 2

One could argue that this is the same as the previous category, but there are many ways to translate that phrase non-literally.

Rabbi Yaakov Blau Beyond avoiding giving Hashem physical attributes, there is also an attempt to consistently denigrate avodah zara as well. There are four categories in which both Onkelos and Yonatan do this the same way, but Yonatan has an additional fifth one as well. 1] When elohim is with another word (elohim acharim, elohi zahav etc.) both translate it as mistake (Shemot 12:12, Yehoshua 24:2, and Yishayahu 31:74). 2] When the word by itself, it is dachla (Devarim 32:21, Melachim Aleph 18:27, Yishayahu 44:10 and 45:20, Yechezkiel 28:2, 6 and 9 and Hoshea 8:65). 3] The phrase “not a god” is translated as “has no purpose” (Devarim 32:176, Yirmiyahu 2:11, 16:20, Yechezkiel 28:2 and 9, Hoshea 8:6 and Chabakuk 2:18). 4] The passukim describing serving other gods really means serving idolaters who serve other gods (Devarim 4:28 and 28:36 and Yirmiyahu 16:13, but that might be because both believe that the Tanach should never be saying that one should serve avodah zara)

There are many examples of this, in general, none of the lists in this article are meant to be exhaustive. 5 This example is part of the next category as well. 6 Melachim Aleph 18:21and 24 is questionable.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch 5] When idols are punished, Yonatan says it is those who serve the idols, as in Yirmiyahu 51:44 and Yechezkiel 30:13, but Onkelos doesn’t say that on Shemot 12:12 (most of the mefarshim on Shemot assume that the Egyptian idols were destroyed, except the Ramban who has a mystical approach; interestingly the Radak on Yechezkiel seems to think that the Shemot example is also a parable for those who served the idols). Perhaps Yonatan thought that destroying idols does not deserve mention, only people getting punished7. However, a significant difference between the two Targumim is that Yonatan adds phrases much more freely than Onkelos does8. For some examples, on the first passuk in Nachum, he adds that the people of Ninveh had done teshuva at the time of Yonah, but then sinned again. When Malachai is first introduced in 1:1, Yonatan identifies him as being Ezra Hasofer. Micha 6:4 lists Moshe, Aharon and Miriam as having taken us out of Egypt. Yonatan adds the unique role that each one played. While Yishayahu 64:1 is somewhat cryptic, Yonatan adding Eliyahu is not the obvious meaning. Part of the reason why is that Yonatan is more midrashic. Perhaps the genre is a factor as well. Onkelos adds much more

Along the same lines as all these categories, the second passuk of V’etchanan seems to compare Hashem to other gods and the Targum makes it just about Hashem. 8

Adding a word for meaning is typical of translations, so, of course, both do. 16

Rabbi Yaakov Blau in the shirot, possibly Yonatan felt that much of Navi is poetical and warranted being elaborated on more9. Clearly, the most important way the Targum works as a commentary is when he adds words or when the passuk could be translated several ways and he picks one. When, however, he translates the same words differently in different contexts, it can give insight into how he understood each context. For a few examples: the word zopheh is often used in Shmuel and Melachim and is translated as ‫( סכואה‬as in Shmuel Bet perek 18 or Melachim Bet perek 9), which, I believe, means watchman. However, in Yechezkiel he translates it as” teacher” in 3:17 and “one who warns” in perek 33, each one makes sense in its context, as Hashem is telling Yechezkiel that it is his responsibility to warn the Jews on His behalf. Chayil usual means some kind of warrior (like in Shoftim 18:2), but the targum makes it “fearing sin” on Shmuel Bet 23:20, Melachim Aleph 1:42 and 52 and 2:2 (the passuk there just says “be a man”), which is a midrashic understanding, I believe. The first examples are describing

Another interesting example is when the targum on Yishayahu 28:21 inserts Uzziah into the passuk. He is possibly being influenced the midrashic idea that an earthquake was caused by Uzziah trying to bring ketoret and therefore getting tzaraat (as described in Divrei Hayamim). See Medieval Commentary in the Modern Era pp. 23-25 for a broader discussion.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch Binayahu and Yonatan and are saying that they were praiseworthy for their spiritual strength, rather than their physical. The last example is David exhorting Shlomo to be a worthy king10. Another example is a bit mystifying. Often Yonatan translates navi as navi when it is a true navi and “false prophet” when the navi is false, as in Yirmiyahu 8:1 and 29:811. Sometimes though, it is translated as scribe. Now several times that would seems to mean a navi in training, which seems to be the Radak’s approach12. Some examples are Shmuel Aleph 10:5, 11 and 12 (the first “is Shmuel among the neviim?” story, in passuk 11 he translates the word “prophesize” as “praise”), 19:20 (the second “is Shmuel among the neviim?” story, and he translates that Shaul got a “spirt of nevuah”), and 28:6 (neviim wouldn’t answer Shaul, the Radak says it means the students of Shmuel). Also, Melachim Bet 23:2, where neviim are in the crowd hearing the king read the sefer habrit (the Radak says the real neviim weren’t around), Yishayahu 3:2, which lists are the public figures that Hashem will remove (although it is unclear if it is positive or negative, kosem is in the same passuk, the Radak seems neutral that scribe is someone who warns the people) and Zecharya 7:3, where they ask if

In Shemot perek 18, men of valor are listed with fearing sin in the list that Yitro gives Moshe, so that gives the approach somewhat of a textual basis. 11 And, interestingly, to describe the “other” navi in Melachim Aleph perek 13. 12 He comments on almost every one of the following passukim, except the Yirmiyahu ones.

Rabbi Yaakov Blau they still need to do all the fasts (the Radak first says real neviim and then seems to contrast that with the Targum), However, Yirmiyahu 26:8, when Yirmiyahu is on trial, and 29:1, the neviim in exile, seem to be false neviim (although the latter is somewhat ambiguous), yet they are translated as scribes also? One does need to be cautious, the Radak comments that the targum is not always consistent in his translations of words. On Yehoshua 2:1 the Radak at first use how Yonatan translates zona to understand it as an innkeeper. He then says that that word might connotate prostitute as well and points out that the targum is inconsistent with which word he uses for that meaning. On Yechezkiel 8:5, the Radak tries to use how the targum translates mizbach as a proof (he generally uses a different word for an altar for hashem vs for avodah zara) that he understood the passuk as referring to the mizbach of the beit hamikdash (as opposed to the Radak understanding that it was for avodah zara) but says that he cannot prove anything, because the targum is not always consistent with how he translates it. Understanding Targum Yonatan greatly enhances one’s understanding of Navi. Hopefully, the study of Targum Yonatan will become more integrated into our communities’ limud of tanach.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch Special Needs in Halacha: Part 2 Defining the term “Cheresh” Caleb Breda ‘22 *While parts of this article reflect my own research, many sources and opinions were taken from Rabbi Bleich’s article “Status of the Deaf-Mute in Jewish Law”, especially some of the more obscure and lesser-known Sefarim and notes* Who is a Cheresh? And why are the exempt? The term “Cheresh” appears all over Mishna, Gemara, and Halachic literature. It is most commonly used in situations where an individual may be subject to exemption from a specific commandment or obligation in Halacha. However, the exact definition of the word is unclear, and requires further discussion before just anyone can be included in the conversation. The first time the word “Cheresh” is written in the Torah is during the conversation between Hashem and Moshe at the burning bush (Shemot 4:11). Moshe does not believe he is the right person to go down to Paroh as he is “not a man of words”. Hashem replies, in almost a harsh, yet comforting, manner: “Who do you [Moshe] think gives people their ability to speak? Who provides them with their gifts and challenges? Is it not I,

Caleb Breda Hashem?” He [Hashem] urges Moshe to go down to Egypt and not to worry about his speech impediment. He promises that He will guide him along the way and instruct him with what to say and do. Hashem first clarifies that He is the source of all speech - Moshe’s specific handicap/hindrance - and then zooms out to include other abilities in His analysis as well. From the straightforward translation of these Pesukim, one can extrapolate that a Cheresh is one who cannot hear, a deaf person. This is confirmed by the only other time the word Cheresh (written as ‫)חרש‬ appears in the Torah. In Parshat Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:14), the Torah warns “Do not curse the deaf (Cheresh), and do not place a stumbling block before the blind”. Here too, a Cheresh is mentioned as a deaf person. The first Mishna in Terumot (1:1) teaches that there are five people who should not separate Terumah (a portion that goes to the Kohen) from their produce. Among these five is a Cheresh. The next Mishna (Terumot 1:2) clarifies that every time Chazal says the term “Cheresh, '' they are referring to one who can neither speak nor hear. So in the Torah, a Cheresh is simply translated as a deaf person, yet in the Torah She’Baal Peh it refers to a person who is both deaf and mute. The Mishna in the very beginning of Chagiga (2a) teaches that all Jewish men, besides for the ones mentioned on the soon-to-follow list of

Torat Yeshivat Frisch exceptions, are obligated to “show their face” in the Beit HaMikdash three times during the year, during the Shalosh Regalim. (There is a Machloket whether the Gemara is strictly speaking of the Mitzvah of Re’iyah showing up and appearing in Beit HaMikdash, as it is simply written, or if the Gemara is also including the obligation of bringing a Korban Olat Re’iyah as well). Regardless, one of the exceptions listed in the Mishna is a Cheresh. As we learned from the Mishna in Terumot (1:2), this should be talking about a complete deaf-mute. There are no specifications, and there is no reason to think otherwise. Our Mishna (Chagigah 1:1) equates a Cheresh to a Shoteh in regards to these Mitzvot of going to the Beit HaMikdash, and rules that they are both completely exempt from the Mitzvah and all of its factors. Rashi (Rav Shlomo Yitzchaki, 1040-1105), confirms this ruling later on (3a), commenting that a Shoteh is exempt from all commandments and all punishments. This applies as well for a Cheresh, as Rashi himself says earlier (2b) that the Mishna is referring to a Cheresh that is similar to a Shoteh, placing them on the same level of obligation and Halachic status. So, for our case in Chagigah, the only means for exemption of appearing in the Beit HaMikdash are if a person is both deaf and mute. Then, they

Caleb Breda are considered similar to a Shoteh, a deranged person, and are exempt from this Mitzvah. It may be worthwhile to spend some time exploring why a Cheresh, one who is deaf-mute, is exempt from Mitzvot in the first place. While there is no direct scriptural reference that teaches this, there are some who attribute it to a simple comparison. Many times, a Cheresh is mentioned grouped together with a Shoteh and a Katan. Rashi explains (Chagigah 3a) that the connection exists to teach that just as a Katan is “Lav Bar Da’at”, meaning they don't possess the capability to understand and perform Mitzvot, and therefore are exempt, the same applies to a Cheresh and a Shoteh. Furthermore, all three of these people lack the basic skill of communication. A Katan, until they1 have matured, may not be able to listen or impart information clearly, and a Shoteh does not have the mental capability to hold a mature conversation. A Cheresh, while they harbor the maturity level, lacks the physical conversational tools. This should not be confused with a case of an “Oneis”. One who is an Oneis is incapable of doing a Mitzvah for reasons beyond their control. For example, one who cannot swallow is not obligated in the Mitzvah of eating Matzah. It is almost not fair to obligate one in something they

While the terms Katan and Cheresh are singular, they are used to describe all Ketanim and Charashim, so they will be referred to in the plural.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch cannot physically perform. This, however, is not the same reasoning that a Cheresh would be exempt. A Cheresh, like a Shoteh and Katan, is not obligated in any Mitzvot at all, seemingly even ones that they have the capacity and capability to perform! However, before we assume this, one may note that there is not such a consistent definition! There are other ambiguous times in Shas where the term Cheresh is used not specifically defining a deaf-mute, but even someone who lives with just one of these challenges. This same Gemara in Chagigah teaches that in actuality, a complete exemption only applies to a Cheresh who is both deaf and mute; they are comparable to a Shoteh. However, in the case of one who is solely deaf, or solely mute, different rules apply. This Mishna does not specify which of these three possibilities it is speaking of, so we assume it is the deafmute (as we are told to by the Mishna Terumot 1:2). In other cases, where only one challenge is present, a Cheresh would only be exempt in part of the Mitzvah. In fact, if someone is just deaf or just mute, but not the other, they are still obligated in bringing the Korbanot of Shalmei Simcha, rejoicing, albeit exempt from Re’iyah and its Korbanot. (While this is already veering towards a different focus, Rashi points out that this Mitzvah of Shalmei Simcha is learned from later on in the Perek (9a) from the Pesukim that describe our rejoicing and festivities relating to these 24

Caleb Breda holidays.) So, although they don't have to bring the actual Korban, they are tasked to celebrate with everyone else. Another example of an exception to this rule appears in Masechet Megillah. The Mishna (19b) teaches that a Cheresh is not qualified to read the Megillah. While the Gemara does not enter into the discussion of how to define a Cheresh in this situation, as it does in Chagigah, it could really only be one option. If the Gemara is choosing to mention a Cheresh, it must be assuming that they can speak in the first place! Otherwise, there would be no possibility to say that they could read the Megillah, and would not even be worth mentioning. So here is another case where we are referring to only a part-Cheresh, someone who is only deaf. These cases demonstrate how the original rule is malleable, and while it remains the respected general referentation (meaning we usually translate Cheresh as a deaf-mute), there are certain circumstances that would lend themselves to different interpretations. Part-Cheresh: Able to Speak OR Hear, but not the other Before getting into the discussion of more specific cases, it is important to learn how the Halacha defines someone who is mute, yet has the full healthy ability to hear.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch When it comes to categorizing a classic Cheresh (deaf-mute), the Halacha was very quick to group them with minors and the deranged, Ketanim and Shotim, as people who lack the level of maturity and/or responsibility to be held accountable or to attain ownership of something. Similarly, they are grouped together as exempt from all Mitzvot. However, a mute person would not so quickly be grouped together with this group. One who is mute functions in society almost on a complete level. They are aware of all their surroundings and can gauge situations properly and maturely. The only thing they lack is the ability to communicate through speech. In fact, this handicap can be largely minimized, as, especially nowadays, there are countless other ways to communicate besides for a direct verbal conversation. Without even getting into the solution of writing or texting, we can examine an even lighter method of communication. While it is hard to define in one term exactly what this path of communication is, it is something we all know, and likely utilize, all the time. A person who cannot speak is not locked out of all conversations. In fact, many times they can be completely involved. They use methods such as hand or head gestures, as well as “reasoning” towards what they are trying to convey. (It is called “reasoning” because based on whatever

Caleb Breda action or motion is done, the other person can reason (imply) what the mute is trying to say.) The difference between speech and reasoning is strictly word of mouth. A person can reason towards someone and motion to them to catch their attention, and then hint and gesture towards what they are trying to express. While the end result may be the same, it does not parallel the same level of communication as speaking does. What is interesting to note, as Rabbi Bleich points out, is that while a Cheresh may not be able to communicate on a back and forth conversational level, they do possess the maturity to motion and indicate, i.e. to reason. This is comparable, on an analogy level, to a small child crying out and pointing towards a bottle to signify their thirst. While the baby never said in words that they are thirsty, a parent can clearly understand their message. The Rosh (Rabbeinu Asher ben Yechiel, 1250-1327) in Teshuvot HaRosh 85:13 and Rav Yosef Karo (1488-1575) in Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 235:19 explain that even if a person can only hear when people speak in above-average volume voices, as long as they do not need exterior artificial amplification, this still is enough to harbor a complete obligation

Torat Yeshivat Frisch in Halacha. Yes, this person is hard of hearing, but without any serious significant hearing loss they still maintain the same status. Furthermore, Rav Moshe Feinstein (1895-1986) in Iggerot Moshe Even HaEzer 3:33 teaches that the subject must be capable of hearing (even if only when extra loud) without any assistance. This seems to solidify that as long as one can hear on their own, even minimally, they are not considered a Cheresh. Rav Chaim Halberstam (1793-1876), in Divrei Chaim Even HaEzer 72, teaches that as a general rule, the ability to speak is dependent on the subject's ability to hear (on their own). So, if one can hear, they should have the ability to speak as well! Before we move on, it is important to note that while there are certain situations that may arise of a non-hearing related inability to speak (such as Apraxia, failure of muscles involved in speaking, as well as psychogenic mutism, a non-physical obstacle), the vast majority relate directly to an inability to hear from birth. We are focusing on the bulk of cases when it comes to someone who is mute, that physically they have the ability, yet their incapability of hearing restrains them from developing speech in the normal way.

Caleb Breda However, as we quoted before, Rabbi Chaim Halberstam noted that speech is strictly dependent on the ability to hear. How could this opinion fit in with modern reality? Rabbi Ben-Zion Uziel (1880-1953) in Mishpetei Uziel Even HaEzer 1:89:2 teaches: A person who has gained the ability to hear, even with the help of artificial amplification, should no longer be considered a Cheresh. And even further than that, Rabbi Shlomo Drimmer (1800-1872) in Beit Shlomo Orach Chaim 1:95 recognizes, with a slightly more modern knowledge basis, that it is possible to attain speech without ever maintaining the ability to hear. He focuses on someone who learned how to speak by way of lip-reading! Therefore, someone who can speak would not be considered a Cheresh, regardless of their hearing status. Interestingly enough, the Kesef Mishna (Rav Yosef Karo) in Hilchot Mechira 29:2, points out a specification in the Rambam that sheds light on this argument. The Rambam (Rav Moshe ben Maimon 1138-1204), when talking about how a Cheresh can act within a business deal, gives two options for what would be considered a Cheresh. 1) A complete deaf-mute, and 2) or a “‫ ”מדבר ואינו שומע כלום‬- someone who speaks, but cannot hear at all. The Kesef Mishna picks up on the specific language the Rambam uses, clarifying that this is about someone who can speak, yet has a

Torat Yeshivat Frisch complete inability to hear.2 So we see, it is possible to attain speech without the ability to hear. So far, we have established that.. 1) While the Mishna in Terumot clarifies a Cheresh as a complete deaf-mute, there is room for expansion in each circumstance. 2) Rav Moshe Feinstien and Rabbi Halberstam concluded that as long as there is no artificial amplification, anyone who can hear, even with challenges, is not considered a Cheresh. a) Also, anyone who can speak must have the ability to hear, as speech is directly dependent on hearing. 3) Rabbi Uziel, Rabbi Drimmer, and seemingly the Rambam (!) hold that it is possible for a person to learn how to speak without personal functional hearing. Whether it be with exterior assistance, or by way of reading-lips and trial and error, it is attainable.

While the Kesef Mishna and the Shulchan Aruch were both written by Rav Yosef Karo, one should not be wary of the seemingly opposing opinions he presents. The Shulchan Aruch was written as his Psak Halacha, while the Kesef Mishna is just a commentary on the Rambam. So, while they might contradict, he is only explaining why the Rambam made such a clarification, not taking a stance. He really holds, as he writes in the Shulchan Aruch, that hearing is valid without any external help, even if one only hears above-average speech.

Caleb Breda The major difference is why this person is not a Cheresh. According to Rav Moshe Feinstien and Rabbi Halberstam, anyone who can speak is automatically not a Cheresh! They hold that if they can speak, then they must be able to hear, even if just minimally, and this is enough to say not a real Cheresh. According to the second group of opinions, it is possible to just be able to speak, and this would allow remission from the status of a Cheresh - even just based on speech alone. Part 2 - Not From Birth What about a case of one who became deaf-mute as a result of injury or disease (after properly learning how to speak)? They were not born with these challenges/defects, yet they currently live with them. There are two major differences here. First, this person once had the complete ability to speak, and second, that they have matured normally, without any restraints. So now, all arguments that were based on one’s status being maintained from birth no longer apply! These people, although they lack the basic abilities now, matured normally and have in the past harbored the ability to speak and communicate to the highest level.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch Is this person still considered a Cheresh? One the one hand, they are deaf and mute, but maybe since they do not bear the same experiences and handicaps of a life-standing deaf-mute, it is a different story! There are three major camps regarding how to categorize a person like this: 1) This person is a full-fledged Cheresh Although one may be able to overcome certain challenges or even avoid them in the first place, being a deaf-mute secures a status of Cheresh and brings along with it all the qualifying rules. This opinion is seen in the Bach Yoreh Deah 1 (1561-1640, Rav Yoel Sirkis), Shach Yoreh Deah 1:22 (1621-1662, Rav Shabbtai ben-Meir HaKohen), and Divrei Chaim Even HaEzer 2:72 (Rav Chaim Halberstam). 2) This person is not a Cheresh They knew how to speak and properly communicate, and so this status should not apply to them! See: Rambam Peirush HaMishnayot and Bartenura (Rav Ovadia Bartenura, 1445-1515) on our original Mishna, Terumot 1:2, as well as Rabbi Ephraim Oshri (1914-2203) in his Sefer Shu’’t Mi’Mamakim 3:2.

Caleb Breda 3) We are unsure what status this person is - a Safek! While they exhibit a higher level of maturity and understanding, and once had the ability to function “normally”, they are still challenged currently by their inability to hear and speak. This is introduced by the Pri Megadim (Rav Yosef ben-Meir Teomim, 1727-1793) in his introduction to Orach Chaim, Chapter 2:5. Most later Achronim, prominently the Tzemach Tzedek (Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, 1789-1866)3, maintain that regardless of a person's previous abilities, they should be considered the same status as one who was born with these challenges. Hold on! Are we really going to say that all modern advancements in education and training that have helped these people really have no effect in Halacha? What about nowadays?

Good. Keep reading…

Not to be confused with Rabbi Menachem Mendel Kromchal of Nikolsburg, 1600-1661, who will be mentioned later. He also wrote a Sefer titled “Tzemach Tzedek.”

Torat Yeshivat Frisch Part 3 - Nowadays There have been incredible advancements in education and support for children born with disabilities and handicaps to learn how to function in this world. There are two aspects to this. First, they are taught basic life and social skills, and how to function within society. This helps them develop into mature individuals who can be active and productive citizens. This is the standard accomplishment of a deaf-mute child, and allows them to grow and function to live a more independent life. However, there is an even greater achievement that has evolved with improvements in education. A deaf-mute child can be taught to speak, and can basically terminate their speech restriction. This leaves them as no longer mute, yet still with an inability to hear. They did not learn to speak as the rest of growing children do, but are taught through trial and error to formulate sounds and create words, even without ever hearing speech themselves. There is no exterior product assisting their speech, rather it is their constant effort and persistence that powers this accomplishment. In fact, with a specialized speech pathologist, it is not uncommon for a deaf-mute child to learn how to speak through constant effort. So, in this case, a child who has never had the ability to hear, can speak! From a 34

Caleb Breda logical standpoint, this should exclude them from being a Cheresh, as they are no longer a full-fledged deaf-mute! Let’s examine the first point: Maturity and Responsibility Here is the big question: If a deaf-mute is able to overcome their expected limitations, and can function regardless of their inability to hear or speak, how are they viewed in Halacha? Does their unforeseen ability to communicate and understand dissipate them from the restrictions and exemptions previously applied to them as a Cheresh, or does their categorical nature of being a natural deaf-mute cause their status to remain unchanged despite any breakthroughs or advancements? Basically - does their status change if they can function in society and seemingly do Mitzvot! Maybe despite their original challenges, they have improved and are now almost a full-fledged member of society! It would be unbecoming to continue to exempt them from Mitzvot. Rabbi Avraham Shmuel Binyamin Sofer (1815-1871), The Ketav Sofer, once visited a special education school that focused on deaf and mute students. His son, Rav Simcha Bunim Sofer (1842-1906), writes in Shevet Sofer Even HaEzer 21 that his father was blown away by the enhancements in education and accomplishments of these students. He 35

Torat Yeshivat Frisch notes that his father was unsure whether these advancements would change their status in Halacha, especially being trained in the untraditional and enhanced way that they were. Furthermore, Rav Simcha Bunim writes that he believes his father even asked that they be provided with Tefillin, implying that he had some confidence they should be doing Mitzvot! (See also Teshuvot Mahari Shteif 239 - Rabbi Yonasan Shteif, 1877-1958) However, regardless of all this newfound education and information, many poskim are irresolute to make a conclusion. Rabbi Bleich quotes Rabbanim and Poskim, (including: Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Rav Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg, Rav Yitzchak HaLevi Herzog, and Rav Yaakov Chagiz), who all express almost identical analysis as the Ketav Sofer, yet themselves are hesitant to make a ruling. But what is holding them back? Is it not logical that if they have overcome these challenges they should be included? The hesitation can be explained, as Rav Yaakov Hagiz (1620-1674) writes in Halachot Ketanot 2:38, that although in practice these cases should no longer be considered a Cheresh, it is very possible that Chazal only stated these Halachot categorically. This means that they have no room for conditions or adaptability. If a person was born as a deaf-mute, even if 36

Caleb Breda they are able to overcome their challenges, whether it be using exterior/artificial help or just by trial-and-error, they still maintain their original status. There may be no flexibility for exception, even if it completely changes the case. Is this really a serious worry? Why would they think there is no room for exception? The Gemara on Gittin 71a teaches that a deaf-mute is considered Halachikly unable to give a Get (divorce document) to his wife as long as he occupies the status of a Cheresh. Even if they, as we have noted before, are completely able to communicate in all ways except verbal conversation, and they hold mental maturity and understanding, this still is not enough. (Rashi there explains how this Get actually can be given in practice through ways of a Shaliach, and that the wife is not “trapped”; see there for further explanation.) The Gemara suggests that a person who is capable of writing is clearly smart enough to be held accountable, yet their status as a deaf-mute still binds them in their exemption from Mitzvot. Based on this Gemara in Gittin, the Tzemach Tzedek no. 77 (Rabbi Menachem Mendel Kromchal of Nikolsburg, 1600-1661)4 concludes that

Rabbi Bleich points out that this is not to be confused with Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, 1789-1866, who also wrote a Sefer titled “Tzemach Tzedek” which we quoted earlier.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch just as in this case the husband who is a deaf-mute, albeit able to communicate and function in all other ways, is still considered a Cheresh in respect to Halacha, so too this extends to all cases of a deaf-mute. Even when they are clever and mentally-able, the status is maintained regardless of any improvement. But why are no exceptions allowed? Is this really fair? Throughout Shas, a Cheresh is grouped with a Shoteh and a Katan. What they all have in common is that they are born as a “Lav Bar Dat”. This means that they were born as someone who is unable to be held accountable for Mitzvot. We are all born like that; as under Bar/BatMitzvah age we are not expected to do all Mitzvot. The difference between a Katan vs. a standard Shoteh and/or Cheresh is that a Katan one day is expected to do these Mitzvot. They “grow out” of their exemption as they mature. So why can’t a Shoteh or Cheresh improve and “grow out” of their status as well? Well, as a matter of fact, no one is strictly saying they can’t! If it were to happen that a Cheresh gained the ability to hear or speak, they will now be obligated in more Mitzvot. As we know, one who can speak, even if they can’t hear, is completely obligated in Mitzvot! Yes, there are some exceptions; these include Kriat Megillah, Shma, and Tekiat Shofar.

Caleb Breda Although they are capable of performing the action of the Mitzvah, there exists a prerequisite/requirement for these Mitzvot to be heard, and so they are exempt. They are encouraged to participate and perform these Mitzvot, yet are not held to the same level of accountability. But besides these, they are completely obligated!! The Rambam in Hilchot Chametz U’Matzah (6:3) teaches: If one has a seizure and eats a K’zayit of Matzah (while in that state), they still need to eat again after the seizure has subsided. This is because at the time they ate the first K’zayit, they were exempt from all Mitzvot by the parameters of mental incompetence. So, at this time, they were a Shoteh (and completely exempt from Mitzvot). When they are “healed” and no longer a Shoteh, as long as the time of the obligation is still present, they are 100% obligated to eat again. However, for someone who was deaf their whole-life, and at some point gained the ability to speak, it is unclear that this is considered real speech! Ne’ot Deah 132 writes that this type of irregular guttural speech would not suffice for real speech. He argues that this is on no higher level of communication than writing. The Maharm Schik (Rabbi Moshe Schik, 1807-1879) expresses that he is unsure in this situation.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch These opinions are actually in the minority. Seemingly the more logical side of the argument is that, regardless of how it was achieved, speech is most definitely present. They hold that the ability to speak is above writing in showing one's ability to communicate and function. This is the opinion presented in Teshuvot Maharsham 2:140 (R Shalom Mordechai Schwadron, 1835-1911). In this Teshuva he allowed a Cheresh who could speak to perform Chalitzah, even though the speech was not so clear. This position, that speech counts, even if it is not so clear, is supported by Rav Chaim Halberstam (Divrei Chaim Even HaEzer 2:72) and Rav Shlomo Drimmer (Beit Shlomo Orach Chaim 94). Even with difficulty, if one's speaking can be basically understood, it most definitely counts. Rav Ezriel Hildesheimer (1820-1899, Teshuvot R’ Ezriel Even HaEzer 58) says that as long as the Cheresh can A) speak and B) manifest normal understanding and competence, they are held responsible for all Mitzvot (that they are capable of - to the exclusion of the ones mentioned above that require hearing.) Rabbi Yaakov Emden (1697-1776, Commentary on the Siddur - Hilchot Kriat HaTorah 20) states that such a person (deaf but can speak and is knowledgeable) can be called up for an Aliyah in the Torah! Sidenote: this opinion is challenged. The Bracha here is made on behalf of the entire congregation. Since this person does not have the best speech capability 40

Caleb Breda and will not pronounce the words correctly, many Rebbeim, including Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, argue that they should not say this Bracha. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe Even HaEzer 3:33) teaches that no matter one's hearing status, if they possess the capability to speak, they are fully obligated (and not considered a Cheresh). This is agreed upon by Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Rav Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg, and Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv. To sum up, the majority of Poskim (and is our Halacha) hold that anyone who maintains either minimal hearing and/or the ability to speak (at an intelligible level) is not subject to any restrictions mentioned for a Cheresh. There is even room to say that unintelligible speech allows less restrictions and increases one's ability to perform Mitzvot. Rabbi Bleich ends his article teaching that while we have spent much time and effort examining who is and is not considered a Cheresh, this all needs to be taken with an open mind. A deaf-mute living nowadays is most definitely more advanced than the Cheresh referred to in the time of the Mishna. Many of them can read, write, and comprehend social situations at regular standards. Rabbi Bleich suggests that in light of this, they should be encouraged to participate in all Mitzvot they can, and specifically

Torat Yeshivat Frisch Talmud Torah, as many do have that capability, even if not to the fullest extent. Rav Asher Weiss, in a Shiur given at the 28th CER (Conference of European Rabbis) Convention in 2013, noted that it is in fact a Mitzvah from the Torah (!!) to teach and assist a Cheresh, as well as a Shoteh, in the way that they can serve Hashem. Regardless of whether they are obligated in all aspects, some aspects, or even none at all, it is our responsibility to support them in their Avodat Hashem. While it may not be an outright commandment, Rav Weiss teaches: If Hashem gave them the ability to serve Him in whatever way they are capable, this is their special path and mission. While this article just scratches the surface of “Disabilities and Handicaps in Halacha”, it hopefully sets solid groundwork, defining the term “Cheresh” and explaining how this may affect one’s obligation in Mitzvot.

Caleb Breda R’ Bleich “Status of the Deaf-Mute in Jewish Law” R’ Moshe Taub “Deafness In Halacha: A Reappraisal” (RJJ Journal of Halacha - https://www.bvkkosher.com/deafness-inhalacha) R’ Asher Weiss - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TwPnq-Zjxt4 R’ Shay Schachter https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/866732/rabbi-shayschachter/defining-a-cheresh,-his-limitations-and-obligations-in-halacha/

Torat Yeshivat Frisch Kavana vs Kedusha Sarah Wurzburger ’22 and Susie Blum ‘22 Main Question: One of the holiest points in Davening is Kedusha, which is found in Shemoneh Esrei. Many questions arise on Kedusha and what to do if you're in the middle of your personal Shemoneh Esrei when the tzibur starts to begin Kedusha in Chazaras Hashatz? The basic answer to this question is learned from the concept of ‫עוסק במצוה‬ ‫( פטור מן המצוה‬Sukka 25a), which states that a person is exempt from a Mitzvah because they are involved in another Mitzvah. This tells us that you are exempt from davening Kedusha with the Tzibur because you are already in the middle of your silent Shemoneh Esrei. Therefore, the proper conduct is stopping your own Shemoneh Esrei and standing quietly with kavana to listen to the Chazan while Kedusha is being said, and then you continue on with your own Shemoneh Esrei. This way, even though you are exempt, you are still fulfilling Kedusha to your best ability. But how does this work!?!? How do you accomplish this Kedusha (Betizbor) if you can't answer out loud to the Kedusha yourself? There is a concept of ‫שומע‬ ‫( כעונה‬Tosafot Brachot 21b) -- that hearing something with Kavana is the equivalent of saying it. So by listening to Kedusha with kavana you can

Susie Blum and Sarah Wurzburger still accomplish the mitzvah of answering to Kedusha to the best of your ability. Attack question: So, if a person constantly is using this method of Shomea KeOneh for Kedusha, as they have a longer Shemoneh Esreh, why doesn’t one just start Shemoneh Esrei early? This way they can be finished with their personal Shemoneh Esrei and can therefore answer to the Kedusha of the Tzibur with everybody. In the Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 90:10, it teaches that a person is forbidden to start their Shmoneh Esreh before the rest of the congregation. Therefore, someone cannot start Shemoneh Esrei early in order to answer Kedusha. However, Rav Herschel Schachter, a world-renowned Talmid Chacham who with no doubt knows this Halacha, actually does start his Shemoneh Esrei early in order to be able to answer to the Kedusha of the tzibur. Since it is unfathomable that Rav Herschel Schachter would act in any way unrooted in Halacha, it must be that there are more facets to the answer than what is suggested in this Shulchan Aruch. Rav Ovadya Yosef ZT”L gives a Tshuva in Yabia Omer Chelek 2, 7 on this exact point. He quotes a Gemara in Brachot 21b that says that one should start Shemoneh Esrei early in order for one to say Kedusha with the Tzibur. He also quotes the Aruch Hashulchan (Orach Chaim 90:14)

Torat Yeshivat Frisch who says that one might come off as disrespectful to the congregation if you start early. However, this is only the case if one occasionally davens a long Shemoneh Esrei and starts before everyone else. If you are known in the shul as the one who always davens a long Shemoneh Esrei and the congregation knows this, you are able to start early, as this will not offend anyone. However, if one comes to davening late and wants to catch up to the Tzibur in order to say Kedusha on time, he will end up rushing his davening and not daven with Kavana so his Tfila becomes meaningless. Rav Ovadya Yosef points out that in this case, one who is starting Shemoneh Esrei early, as they are doing so to be able to say Kedusha with the minyan, still accomplishes tefillah bitzibur. Although they are not starting at the same time, the majority of the Tfila will overlap. However, another Gemara in Brachot 28a states that a person should not start Shemoneh Esrei early and instead start Shemoneh Esrei Bitzibur and listen to Kedusha with Kavana. Rav Ovadya Yosef accepts this Gemara as well but the Gemara in Brachot 21b is the preferable answer. Some other questions asked on this topic: In order to be able to fulfill ‫ שומע כעונה‬with Kedusha, you must have Kavana. So what is Kavana and how do we accomplish it?

Susie Blum and Sarah Wurzburger In Hilchot Tefillah 4:15 the Ramban says that only something with Kavana is Tfila. So if you don't have Kavana you have to daven again. Kavana is when you blackout everything around you and imagine that you're standing in front of Hashem’s Schina. The Mishnah in Brachot 5:1 tells the story about early Chasidim who used to come to davening an hour early to meditate in order to get in the right headspace to have Kavana to daven. In Masechet Brachot 32b the Talmud mentions four things a person needs to reach Kavana which are 1) Torah 2) Maasim Tovim 3) Tefilah 4) Derech Eretz. When you do these things, you will get closer to Hashem and will therefore have Kavana and fulfill the ultimate Tefilah. If a person wants to end their Shemoneh Esrei early in order to catch Kedusha with everyone, they are permitted to. However, what can/should one skip or change in order to shorten their Shemoneh Esrei? Tefila itself can’t be skipped or shortened but in Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 122:1, it says that a person can skip the Bracha of Elokai Netzor in Shemoneh Esrei if they have already said the ‫יהיו לרצון‬. They will be able to answer to some parts of Kedusha with the minyan. Elokai Netzor was added after the rest of Shemoneh Esrei was compiled and therefore does

Torat Yeshivat Frisch not hold the same weight as the other Brachot and can be skipped in this case. Why would one’s Tefillah be longer? A person can add personal prayers into the middle of each Bracha in Shemoneh Esrei, as long as it is related to the overall theme of the Bracha. For example, in Refeianu a person can pray for the Refuah Shelemah for a specific person. Or in Barech Aleinu, one can pray for livelihood. Any personal prayer that one wants to add that is not specifically related to any Bracha can be added in Shema Koleinu before Ki Ata Shomeah. Another place for individual prayers is before you say the last Yehee Ratzon at the end of Shemoneh Esrei. When one is davening with a minyan, a person should add their private prayers at the end of Shemoneh Esrei as opposed to in Shema Koleinu so that they will be able to answer to Kaddish or Kedusha when the tzibur gets up to it. (Mishna Brurah 122:8) We hope these were some interesting questions and answers about Tfila and more specifically Tfila BTzibur. When one davens, they must have Kavana in order to elevate their Tfila in the highest way. The Sefat Emet Va’Etchanan 2:2 teaches that Tfila without Kavana is not Tfila at all. Some may suggest that without the “noisiness” and busy atmosphere of the Tzibur, when davening alone at home they are able to focus and harbor

Susie Blum and Sarah Wurzburger more Kavana. This is not surprising, as many people are able to concentrate better in silence and without a “time limit”. However, regardless of all these valid points, davening together with the Tzibur is essential to the experience. In fact, even if one is confident that their Kavana will be greatly enhanced with a personal davening, they are still encouraged / required to go to Shul. Davening with a minyan is also important because Hashem answers to Tfilot of groups of Am Yisrael more than individual prayers. The Mishna Brurah (90:28) teaches that Hashem doesn't reject communal prayers, even if among the congregation there are sinners and unworthy people. Also, when davening without a minyan, a person cannot say specific prayers. They lose out on many opportunities for Tfila as well as reading from the Torah. The goal of shul is to be able to bring everyone together and foster an environment where a person can daven with Kavana. This is the most ideal way a person can daven. They can infuse the enhancement of davening with everyone with their personal Kavana for the best-result Tfila. With Hashem's help we should all strive to always improve in our Tfila and Kavana!

Torat Yeshivat Frisch The Frisch Eruv Rabbi Asher Bush Introductory note: While the following is primarily designed to be a halachic description, it is written in an anecdotal manner, describing the process and details of the construction followed and how they met the various halachic requirements, and how various steps were taken to best inform the participants in the Shabbaton of its boundaries and to maintain them. Is there really a Frisch Eruv? While there is an Eruv around the community of Paramus, it is only on the eastern side of Route 17, and while Frisch is close to the border of Fair Lawn, its community Eruv also does not extend to the area near Frisch. This has never been an issue as the area around the school is generally professional buildings and schools, and there are no observant Jews living in the nearby houses, hence there has been no need to incorporate this area into the larger community Eruvin of Paramus or Fair Lawn. All of this changed in the spring of 2022 when the graduating class would have a final Shabbat together, this time not in a hotel or vacation spot, but in our home away from home, Yeshivat Frisch. In order for this to be the kind of

Rabbi Asher Bush Shabbat it should be, it was a given that we would need an Eruv for the campus. What is an Eruv and how much of it applies to Frisch? While the term “Eruv” is commonly used, the technical terms “eruv” actually refers to something which we did not need to have, as this term actually refers to the bread (generally matzah is used) that connects each of the Jewish residents into one large symbolic meal. In our case this is not necessary for several reasons, the most basic being that we are in fact eating all meals together from one joint kitchen, so there is no need to artificially link us together when we are in fact having joint meals. In this way the Frisch Eruv is like that of a summer camp where all meals come from one joint kitchen (even if meals are eaten in separate dining rooms or shifts). Additionally, every community Eruv includes areas that do not belong to members of the Jewish community, this includes government property (roads, parks) and businesses and homes belonging to Gentile neighbors. In order to include all of these areas a lease arrangement is made with the relevant governmental authority (sometimes a mayor, police chief or fire marshal). For our Eruv around Frisch this too was not necessary as the entire property belongs to the school. In a related manner, no permission

Torat Yeshivat Frisch was needed to do any of the work since all work was done on Frisch property, not using utility poles or other structures that belong to others. The structure of an Eruv: As commonly understood, the Eruv refers to the physical partitions that enclose the area. Not surprisingly, the best partitions for an Eruv are actual walls, fences or cliffs and steep hills. These walls or fences do not need to be very tall, as the halacha defines a wall for Shabbat purposes as being 10 tefachim high (approximately three feet). Walls and fences are so effective that when they (fully) surrounded an area, they can permit carrying even in the busiest streets of major cities. However, not every area has such walls, nor are they always needed, as less busy areas, such as suburban communities and less busy roads, can even be enclosed with what the Gemara refers to as a Tzurat HaPetach, literally meaning the form or frame of a doorway. The definition of this “door frame” consists of a vertical post on the left and on the right, with a horizonal post directly above them, thus forming a door frame shape. This Tzurat HaPetach can be made of almost any material, wood, metal, plastic, and even wire. A typical community Eruv will include large sections of telephone/utility poles which have wires going directly above them.

Rabbi Asher Bush While the Rambam rules that the width of these door frames cannot exceed 10 Amot (about 18 feet), the accepted ruling is that there is no maximum size, as long as it holds up and does not sag in a significant way. It really would not be possible to construct a community Eruv following this stricter ruling of the Rambam, it is only on private property like a home or summer camp that it would be possible. The existing structures that were used, structures that needed to be added and how it was done: Fortunately for us at Frisch, the entire right side of the campus (when facing the campus from the street) has a full fence that is six feet high. This fence extends all the way to the back of the campus, where it connects to another fence running along the entire back of the property, separating the campus from the houses that are behind the school. While there was no need to include the front of the campus, this still necessitated closing off the area from the fence of the right hand side of the campus to the school building itself. We actually considered using the large orange barricades that close off the great lawn, as they are tall enough and solid, but there were not enough of them to close of the area in question. Instead, we needed to do our own construction, building a Tzurat HaPetach. This consists of two vertical posts, with another, horizontal one that runs directly over them. Aside from walls and fences, this is the most common 53

Torat Yeshivat Frisch way to make an Eruv. As mentioned above the Rambam limits the distance from one post to the next at 10 Amot, something that would be nice to include as part of an Eruv around our own campus but given that the areas that we needed to traverse were over larger paved areas it was not feasible to accommodate this stringency, so we followed the standard protocol used in (almost) every community Eruv. Even on our own private campus, there is always the concern that our wires might be knocked down either by pedestrians or vehicles, especially school buses which are very high. To best accomplish this, we used eight foot posts (8’x1”x2”) called a Lechi, to serve as the vertical posts of our door frames. In order that they should stand securely they were attached to the fences and signposts using cable ties (zip ties) along the route which we were closing off. Before connecting each Lechi to their locations an eyehook was screwed into the top of each one. This was done so that the wire will be attached to each Lechi in way that guarantees that it will pass directly over the vertical posts. Since we could not block the signs (which are generally “Fire Zone” or “Handicap Parking”), the each Lechi was placed on the back of the signs, which in some cases required making the Lechi somewhat higher than eight feet so the wire could pass directly over it towards both the post before it and one after it. In theory we could have raised the Lechi up to 54

Rabbi Asher Bush about 11 inches off the ground (3 Tefachim), since the halacha of Lavud teaches that gaps less than this distance are viewed as if they are closed off. The reason that we did not rely on this halacha L’Moshe M’Sinai is that without something supporting each Lechi from below it would still slip down to the ground below and not be taller than the sign, so halachic leniencies notwithstanding, we needed to place an additional small piece of wood below. In one place there was neither a signpost nor fence to attach the Lechi to, that was near the back of the building near the cafeteria exit. While mounting it directly into the ground is certainly a valid option, it was not realistic, as the Lechi would not be secure, likely being so shaky as to be invalid. Fortunately, we found an old metal frame that when placed flat on the ground was both heavy and secure; we attached a Lechi to one corner of this frame next to the back corner of the school building. After all the posts were secured, fifty pound fishing line was used, securing it in each of the eyehooks above each Lechi. We did not use one continuous wire, as that would leave the Eruv far more vulnerable to excessive damage since a break in one place would necessitate repairing the entire section going over many posts and not just one single section of wire. So, instead from each Lechi had its own wire going to the next Lechi.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch These wires passing directly over the Lechi on each side formed our doorframes. Similarly, in the back of the campus a Lechi was attached to the fence, then another one to what appeared to be a tetherball pole (thank you Moshava Ba’ir!), and then across the roadway to the backstop at the end of the ballfield. We then followed the backstop (a very tall fence), and affixed another Lechi at the end, with our shortest wire of approximately five feet connecting to another Lechi attached to the end of the four foot fence that separates between the ballfields and the track below (which is outside of the Eruv). That fence serves at the outer perimeter continuing all the way to the basketball courts, then following the outer fence of the basketball court to the sidewalk. At this point we needed to include the sidewalk, so a Lechi was attached to the corner of the basketball courts, crossing over the sidewalk to the signpost, and continuing along the sidewalk until near the end where it veers right towards the building, passing under the shade tree. This last Lechi was affixed to a parking sign which is right next to the building. This way not only were the doors near the gym included, but a wider area for congregating was created all within the Eruv. What was easy about this Eruv and what was particularly challenging: 56

Rabbi Asher Bush The “easiest” part of erecting this Eruv was simply that all of it is on the Frisch campus so whatever we needed to do was permitted. And to make it even better, as we walked around, more volunteers joined the project. At the same time there were some unique challenges due to the activities on our campus. The biggest challenge, well, are the big buses. Making an Eruv that would be taller than a school bus (which averages 10.5 feet high) would be far more difficult, so it was decided that the few portions that traversed the areas where buses drive would only be put up after dismissal on Friday afternoon. We actually checked with the school security to ensure that no large truck deliveries would be coming before Shabbat. [We had already found out a few days earlier when a truck tore down a wire minutes after we had put it up, that larger trucks do enter via the left side of the campus and make deliveries to the kitchen.] Marking off the Eruv: All of the hard work needed to build and secure the Eruv would be of little use if the community did not know where they could and could not carry. Aside from distributing a FAQ sheet which explained the perimeters, yellow ribbons were placed on the wires which were otherwise hard to see (even though we had deliberately bought colored fishing line, in the bright sun it can be missed). Additionally, we decided to put clear signs stating,

Torat Yeshivat Frisch “THE ERUV ENDS HERE, please do not carry anything past this point”. It was only after we had put up these signs that the rains began, and it became clear that these signs would likely not be seen in the morning after a heavy rain that was predicted. So, in addition to all of those signs affixed to each Lechi, we collected about a dozen traffic cones and put signs on them; these cones were taken inside until after the rain ended to prevent damage to the signs. Additionally, in the area by the gym doors, the plastic chain from the parking lot was placed on cones in a line directly below the Eruv to serve as a reminder in this smaller more confined area. If the Eruv comes down on Shabbat: One of the contingencies we had to prepare for was the possibility that something might happen to the Eruv to render it pasul (invalid). Unlike some other areas of halacha, even if an Eruv is valid at the start of Shabbat, if it comes down in the middle one may no longer carry; needless to say, this can create significant problems and confusion. Our primary concern was that the wires could be knocked down by an unexpected truck entering the campus, bad weather, or even if somebody accidentally touched it or threw a ball/frisbee that hit it. It is in this regard that the halacha makes a significant exception. Even though in general there is a full prohibition to ask a non-Jewish person to

Rabbi Asher Bush do any work on Shabbat that we may not do, the Shulchan Aruch has several significant exceptions. One of these notable exceptions is in a case when an Eruv becomes invalid; in such a case it is proper to ask, with full instructions given as needed. The reason for this exception is due to the fact that it is most likely that unless these repairs are made there will be significant violations of Shabbat. In order to prevent these large scale violations, the Eruv should be repaired. Accordingly, extra supplies were set aside in case this would be necessary. The future of the Frisch Eruv: It has already been asked, “will we be keeping the Eruv up?” Sad to say, by the time school opened on Monday, as expected, the buses had taken down several wires. Most of the rest remains in place, although it is likely that more of the other wires will come down in time. But the real question is whether there is and will be a need for this Eruv in the future. From all that we have heard, the answer is a clear yes, that the Shabbaton was a great success and others will follow. The wires will likely need to be replaced, most likely a Lechi or two might not make it, but most will last. But most importantly, we now know how and where to do it, what issues and challenges we will face next time, and most importantly, putting it up was a great learning experience for a number of our students who got to

Torat Yeshivat Frisch learn and apply an area of halacha that for so many seems like an abstraction, for them it is real, and it is alive

Naomi Elkin How to Make it Count: The Ephemerality of Human Life Naomi Elkin ‘23 While reading ‫ ונתנה תוקף‬this past ‫יום כיפור‬, I paused to read the translation and appreciate its poetic language. A hymn from the 11th century, the piece has made it into ‫ יום כיפור‬prayers not just by its writing but the story of its composition: a heartrending moment of Jewish persecution that took the life of Rabbi Amnon of Mainz, eventually finding Rabbi Kalonymus ben Meshullam in a dream and begging him to transcribe it into the ‫ימים‬ ‫ נוראים‬prayers. ‫ ונתנה תוקף‬discusses the theme of the transience of human life and its inconsequentiality compared to G-d. I focused on one handful of lines specifically when I began researching this topic: a series of 8 comparisons that are constructed to make man seem incredibly insignificant, but beautiful while he lasts: ‫ְונוַח ִל ְרצות ִכּי ל ֹא ַתְחפּץ ְבּמוֹת ַהֵמּת ִכּי ִאם ְבּשׁוּבו ִמַדּ ְרכּוֹ ְוָחָיה ְוַﬠד יוֹם מוֹתוֹ ְתַּחֶכּה לּוֹ ִאם‬ ‫ ָאָדם ְיסוֹדוֹ‬.‫ ֱאֶמת ִכּי ַאָתּה הוּא יוְֹצָרם ְו]ַאָתּה[ יוֵֹדַﬠ ִיְצָרם ִכּי ֵהם ָבָּשׂר ָוָדם‬.‫ָישׁוּב ִמַיּד ְתַּקְבּלוֹ‬ ‫ ְוסוֹפוֹ ֶלָﬠָפר ְבַּנְפשׁוֹ ָיִביא ַלְחמוֹ ָמשׁוּל ְכֶּחֶרס ַה ִנְּשָׁבּר ְכָּחִציר ָיֵבשׁ וְּכִציץ נוֵֹבל ְכֵּצל‬,‫ֵמָﬠָפר‬ .‫עוֵֹבר וְּכָﬠָנן ָכָּלה וְּכרוַּח נוָֹשֶׁבת וְּכָאָבק פּוֵֹרַח ְוַכֲחלוֹם ָיעוּף‬ "For Your Name signifies Your praise: hard to anger and easy to appease, for You do not wish the death of one deserving death, but that he repent from his way and live. Until the day of his death You await him; if he 61

Torat Yeshivat Frisch repents You will accept him immediately. It is true that You are their Creator and You know their inclination, for they are flesh and blood. A man's origin is from dust and his destiny is back to dust, at risk of his life he earns his bread; he is likened to a broken shard, withering grass, a fading flower, a passing shade, a dissipating cloud, a blowing wind, flying dust, and a fleeting dream." It is important to recognize, especially around the ‫עשרת ימי תשובה‬, where we stand in connection to our Creator and to understand just how little we are able to understand as limited—and flawed—creations. We are minute and almost irrelevant when standing before ‫ ׳ה‬as we beg for our lives this one time a year. He has existed, and will exist, forever; we live in the blink of an eye by comparison. I ask myself why we are made to feel so small during the biggest moment of the year, and I struggle with answering. It almost feels like our lives are not worth begging for if they are so fleeting, a depressing but pragmatic thought. I understood this could not be true: there must be something deeper, a way to connect to Hashem through the impossible chasm between Him and humankind. What is the significance of a human life? This question used to be easier to answer. In the times of ‫ גן עדן‬until the ‫מבול‬, lifespans lasted hundreds of 62

Naomi Elkin years. ‫ה‬:‫ בראשית ה‬says that ‫ אדם הראשון‬lived to be an astonishing 930 years old—that’s like living from the time of ‫ רש״י‬until the invention of the internet. The ‫ רד״ק‬comments on ‫ד‬:‫ בראשית ה‬that early people needed these lengthened lifespans in order to accumulate knowledge of the earth and establish it for future generations, something that a 70 year lifespan cannot accomplish in the same way. ‫ תהילים צ‬adds to this idea and says that 70 years is typically the end of a lifespan, most of our years sorrowful and “spent like a sigh.” ‫כה‬:‫ אבות ה‬says that by the age of 100 we “cease from the world” and are like dust. A human life nowadays is so short that perhaps it struggles to contribute to the world, or to enjoy all of ‫’׳ה‬s creations fully. It definitely struggles to be remembered. However, this only appears bleak because it seems to imply that human life only matters in its physicality. The reality is that we remember people who are dead: the ‫ תורה‬and extensive human history remembers people who left imprints on the collective human memory. This is the concept of legacy: immortality is on the condition of how you live out your mortal lifespan. If you live your life in a way that inspires others, forces you to grow and learn, and develop into the best version of yourself you can become, you leave a mark on people who knew you. You are remembered despite the fact that you are gone because of the legacy you leave behind

Torat Yeshivat Frisch in your place that refreshes the image of you and your values for an eternity afterwards. To understand mortality is the key to immortality. This is how ‫ פסיקתא זוטרתא‬on ‫ פרשת שמות‬describes ‫צדיקים‬: even in death we call them alive, because their legacies still live. When you cite the teachings of a ‫ תורה‬scholar, Sanhedrin 90b describes, “ ‫כל מי שנאמרה הלכה‬ ‫בשמו בעולם הזה שפתותיו דובבות בקבר‬.” Their lips move from the grave, almost as if they are joining the conversation to learn with you. It is this idea that the late Rabbi Sacks z”l builds on in a quote about ‫מסורה‬: “To be immortal all you need to do is engrave your values on the minds of your children.” You achieve immortality through understanding that your life is limited in order to make you value it as much as possible. This leads one to lead the greatest life that they possibly can and infuse their time with connecting to G-d, ‫תורה‬, and ‫מצוות‬: things that they no doubt will be remembered for long after they depart. I found it interesting that this is how late ‫ פרשנים‬described making life count by connecting it to ‫ תורה‬ideals. In Greek culture, remembered in Judaism for how much it directly opposed Jewish ideology, historical figures were immortalized for their glory in statues and monuments. These are things that pervade space and exist in the world whether people are around to see them or not. Who knows how many more statues and marble busts lay buried beneath the Parthenon? This idea is directly counteracted 64

Naomi Elkin by the Jewish attitude towards immortality: we remember people by ideals and ‫תורה‬, passed through time rather than space. We depend on a chain, a ‫מסורה‬, to pass down histories of people and keep their legacies alive. When we forget them, the world does: we have no statues—only memory, which has lasted the test of time just as well. Through this deeper understanding of human value, it seems much more possible to connect to G-d without feeling unimportant. Each person is made in the image of G-d, ‫בצלם אלקים‬, because Hashem loves every single individual. A manifestation of this godlike element is memory; we are like Hashem because our legacies can be infinite. Our lives are not just our own; our histories will belong to the world afterwards. ‫ ונתנה תוקף‬and the ‫ ימים נוראים‬inspire one not to feel disparaged, but to heighten our spiritual connection and aim at becoming the best version of ourselves that we can possibly be.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch Water and Oil Shayna Lifschitz ‘19 Throughout Tanach water is prevalent, in fact, according to Bar Ilan Online Responsa Project, which has a vast amount of Torah, there are 43476 results when searching the word ‫ מים‬across all of Tanach and commentaries. Water is an essential part of life. Without water one cannot survive. Water is often compared to Torah, as well as another element which I’ll get to a bit later. Torah provides one with the essentials and everything one yearns for. This is true for all of Torah, but especially for the first book, ‫בראשית‬. This book starts off with the ultimate introduction of water; creation. At creation water is mentioned as both the sky and the sea. There is no limit to what shape or place water can go. Water is next mentioned during the ‫ מבול‬story. In this story depending on who’s perspective one looks at water is either a positive or negative impact on people’s lives. If we look at it from, ‫ נח‬or his family’s perspective, they gained from the flood by getting rid of any negative influences. And for those who were sinning and therefore did not receive protection from the ‫תיבה‬, they had a negative impact. One of the next times that water is mentioned is when ‫ הגר‬and ‫ ישמעאל‬are kicked out of their home. The pasuk that says that Avraham gave bread and water to ‫ הגר‬before she left is followed by another pasuk that says “when the water was gone from 66

Shayna Lifschitz the skin, she left the child under one of the bushes”. This seems to be the possibility that water could be used for good, but as soon as it’s gone, there is nothing to do. Moving forward to ‫ספר שמות‬we see a lot of important water stories. The two that I’m going to focus on are ‫ משה‬being saved by the Nile and in turn not wanting to harm it during the ‫ מכות‬and also when we crossed the ‫ים סוף‬. Moshe being saved was a crucial moment of something happening that changed the Jewish nation and the ‫ ים סוף‬is also a great example of us becoming a nation. They’re kind of like bookmarks of the beginning possibilities of a nation and the actual beginnings of it. Now to connect this to ‫חנוכה‬. We all know that oil is very important during ‫ חנוכה‬time. In fact, it is not only just something that we put in all our food over that week, but it is also one of the two major miracles that occurred. The other was the war, but we’re going to focus on the oil lasting 8 days Or as some people say it lasted 7 days and the other day we celebrate is just the fact that we were able to find the oil at all in the debris of the Beit Hamikdash. I’m going to focus on the number 7 for a second. There are seven stems of the ‫ חנוכיה‬and there is a water story we didn’t mention that also has 7: The seven wells, ‫ באר שבע‬that both Avraham originally built and ‫ יצחק‬maintained later. The number 7 is very important is Judaism. There are 7 ‫ אבות‬and ‫אמהות‬, the 7th day of the week is Shabbas, the 67

Torat Yeshivat Frisch seventh year is ‫שמיטה‬. I once heard that 7 is the last level of nature and above it are just miracles from G-d. I think that we can take this idea and use it for the ‫ נס‬of the candles. The fact that the candles lasted for an extra 7 days was of course miraculous, but the true miracle was the number 8, which was that we found the oil in an impossible situation. The seven wells might seem like a normal thing to make, I mean everyone needs water to drink. But were they made once and then nothing else happened? No, they were destroyed and rebuilt and ‫ יצחק‬had to keep them in good condition. This was going beyond the 7 and moving into the miraculous as well. Now if you don’t like numbers, I have another connection between oil and water. I spoke about how water is the life force for humans, but oil is the life force for something too. It is the life force for fire which just as water can be used negatively or positively. Both fire and water are compared to ‫ תורה‬because ‫ תורה‬is not just one thing, it is everything and everywhere. One can use ‫ תורה‬to do good in their life or they can abandon or abuse the system. We can use this to learn that we have to take both the water and the fire in our personalities, while they may seem opposite, and use them to do good in the world.

Eli Nat Hazkaras Geshamim: Request or Recognition Eli Nat ‘22 ‫ ר׳ יהושע‬.‫מאימתי מזכירין גבורות גשמים? ר׳ אליעזר אומר ״מיום טוב הראשון של חג״‬ ‫ אמר לו ר׳ יהושע ״הואיל ואין הגשמים אלא סימן קללה‬.‫אומר ״מיום טוב האחרון של חג״‬ ‫בחג למה הוא מזכיר״? אמר לו ר׳ אליעזר ״אף אני לא אמרתי לשאול אלא להזכיר משיב‬ ‫ לעולם יהא מזכיר‬,‫הרוח ומוריד הגשם בעונתו״ אמר לו ר׳ יהושע ״אם כו‬ The first ‫ משנה‬of Ta’anis presents a troubling ‫ מחלוקת‬between R’ Yehoshua and R’ Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua states that because rain is a bad sign on ‫סוכות‬, we cannot be ‫ מזכיר‬rain. Rabbi Eliezer responds, “even I did not say to ask for rain rather to be ‫ מזכיר‬rain.” To which Rabbi Yehoshua says, “if so, then you should be ‫ מזכיר‬rain all year round!” How is Rabbi Eliezer’s response valid? Rabbi Yehoshua was also talking about being ‫ מזכיר‬rain! Furthermore, why did Rabbi Eliezer’s argument prompt Rabbi Yehoshua to say that according to that approach one should always be ‫?מזכיר‬ At first glance, there seems to be an argument between the ‫ תנאים‬on the basic meaning of ‫הזכרה‬. Rabbi Eliezer says that he is not suggesting to ask for rain, rather to be ‫ מזכיר‬rain. This implies that Rabbi Eliezer holds that if you were to ask for rain, then Rabbi Yehoshua’s assertion would be correct that it would be inappropriate because rain is a ‫סימן קללה‬. It is clear that Rabbi Eliezer distinguishes between a ‫ שאלה‬and a ‫הזכרה‬. We must now 69

Torat Yeshivat Frisch ask two questions. Does Rabbi Yehoshua also make a distinction? What is the distinction? The first question is answered explicitly on the bottom of 4a, at least according to Tosfos HaRid’s version of the Gemara. The Gemara says that Rabbi Yehoshua, from our Mishna, holds that ‫ שאלה‬and ‫ הזכרה‬are fundamentally the same thing. Whereas Rabbi Eliezer says ‫שאלה לחוד‬ ‫והזכרה לחוד‬. The second question requires more analysis. The Gemara starts by stating the source for the requirement to be ‫מזכיר גבורות גשמים‬. The Gemara in ‫ראש‬ ‫ השנה‬states “‫”בחג נידונין על המים‬. Our Gemara elaborates, once we have taught that we are judged for water over ‫סוכות‬, the next logical step is to teach when we start mentioning rain. However, the Gemara does not explain the inherent connection between the judgment of rain and the need to mention rain. For this, we must look at the ‫מפרשים‬. Rashi states that since we are being judged for water on ‫סוכות‬, we must mention ‫ מים‬as an appeasement towards Hashem so that the water will come as a ‫ברכה‬. The ‫ הזכרה‬is for the purpose of bringing rain. Tosfos, differing from Rashi, says that we need to mention rain because it is the common, appropriate practice to appease before making a formal request. The ‫ הזרכה‬sets the stage for the ‫שאלה‬.

Eli Nat With this in mind, Rabbi Yehoshua’s challenge, ‫הואיל ואין הגשמים אלא סימן ״‬ ‫״?קללה בחג למה הוא מזכיר‬, makes perfect sense. If the whole purpose of mentioning rain is just to ask for it, then why would we start preparing to ask for rain, during a ‫ ?סימן קללה‬However, if Rabbi Eliezer holds of the same ‫סברא‬, then his response requires clarification. Why is it permissible to prepare for a request that cannot be made due to the ‫?סימן קללה‬ Additionally, why would that approach prompt Rabbi Yehoshua to say that if it is true that rain is merely the first step in the ‫ שאלה‬process, then all year one should be ‫ מזכיר‬rain? Rather, it is plausible that Rabbi Eliezer has an additional, more primary, understanding of the nature of a ‫הזכרה‬. On 2b, the Gemara seeks to discover which ‫ מצווה דאורייתא‬does Rabbi Eliezer hold is the basis for the ‫ דינים‬of the ‫ הזכרה‬for rain, ‫ לולב‬or ‫?ניסוך המים‬ While the Gemara lists the Halachic application of this question, presumably there are ‫ נפקא מינות‬in ‫ סברא‬depending on this answer as well. Ultimately, ‫ רבי אבהו‬concludes that ‫ לולב‬is the ‫ דאורייתא‬which inspired the ‫ דינים‬of ‫הזכרת גשמים‬. With this in mind, perhaps we can suggest that the nature of the ‫ מצווה‬of ‫ לולב‬carries over to ‫הזכרת גשמים‬. The ‫ ספר החינוך‬in Mitzvah 324 writes that ‫ נטילת לולב‬is rooted in the fact that the days of ‫ סוכות‬are naturally a time of great ‫ שמחה‬because it is the time when we harvest our crops. Additionally, we have the added ‫ שמחה‬of it being a ‫חג‬. However, amongst this great ‫שמחה‬, we might, ‫חס ושלום‬, forget 71

Torat Yeshivat Frisch to have the proper '‫יראת ה‬. Therefore, Hashem gave us the ‫ מצווה‬of ‫ לולב‬to help us remember to direct our ‫ שמחה‬and appreciation towards Hashem. Perhaps, Rabbi Eliezer extends this ‫ שורש המצווה‬to ‫ הזכרת גשמים‬as well. The essence of the ‫ הזכרה‬is a reminder to be appreciative to Hashem and recognize His great ability to bring rain. Now, Rabbi Eliezer’s response begins to make sense. He is not saying to ask for rain, rather to recognize that all of the rain comes from Hashem, during the time when Hashem is judging us over rain. (Albeit there still is an additional motive to appease Hashem, so that He will bring the rain as a ‫ )ברכה‬In fact, Rabbi Eliezer holds that technically all year round you can recognize the ‫ גבורות‬of Hashem. However, it is only a ‫ חיוב‬to do so from the first day of ‫סוכות‬. This ‫ הסבר המחלוקת‬also explains Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer’s debate on 2b as to why we are ‫ מזכיר תחיית המתים‬all year round. Rabbi Eliezer holds that even though it is not always the time for ‫תחיית המתים‬, we can still recognize the fact that Hashem has the ability to, and will, be ‫מחיה‬ ‫מתים‬. On the other hand, Rabbi Yehoshua holds that we always want ‫תחיית‬ ‫ המתים‬to come. Therefore, we can ask for it all year round. Additionally, we see this ‫ הסבר המחלוקת‬brought down in the ‫מפרשים‬ regarding ‫ניסוך המים‬, the alternative option for the source for ‫הזכרת גשמים‬. The ‫תורה תמימה‬, commenting on Bamidbar 29:19, quotes the Gemara Rosh

Eli Nat Hashana on 16a which states that the reason we do ‫ ניסוך המים‬is so that Hashem will bless the coming year’s water. The purpose of ‫ ניסוך המים‬is for us to appease Hashem so that He will bless the rains that they should come in their proper times as Hashem initially established in nature. On the other hand, Rabbi Richter offered a different understanding. Rabbi Richter explained that Rav Aharon Soloveitchik said that the essence of ‫ ניסוך המים‬is to remind ourselves that our most basic necessities are all in the hands of Hashem. Rabbi Richter elaborated on this idea saying that the ‫ ניסוך המים‬is brought with the ‫ ניסוך היין‬to demonstrate that man cannot create anything without the resources Hashem provides for him. The ‫ הסבר המחלוקת‬is the same as that of ‫הזכרת גשמים‬. The question that needs to be asked in both is, is the ‫ מצווה‬we are dealing with inherently a request or a recognition? When the Halachik dust settles, we are left with a fundamental ‫מחלוקת‬ between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua as to the nature of ‫הזכרת גשמים‬. Rabbi Yehoshua holds it is the preparation for a formal request. Rabbi Eliezer holds it is a reminder to recognize the greatness of Hashem. With this in mind, let us now discover the Halachik ramifications of this ‫מחלוקת‬. The Gemara relates three Halachos regarding ‫הזכרת טל ורוח‬. First, you are not obligated to mention ‫ מוריד הטל‬or ‫משיב הרוח‬, and if you do, you do not 73

Torat Yeshivat Frisch need to repeat ‫שמונה עשרה‬. Second, if you say ‫ מוריד הגשם‬in the summer or do not say it in the winter you need to repeat ‫שמונה עשרה‬. Third, if you say ‫מעביר הרוח ומפריח הטל‬, you do not need to repeat ‫שמונה עשרה‬. The reason the Gemara gives for these ‫ הלכות‬is that while rain stops, dew and wind never stop. The first two ‫ דינים‬are agreed upon by the Rif, Rosh, and Rambam. However, only the Rif holds of the third ‫דין‬. By paskining like the third ‫דין‬, the Rif makes it clear that a ‫ הזכרה‬for that which you do not need to ask for is completely useless. In fact, it is so useless that even if you say the exact opposite of what you want, it will not make a difference. Therefore, it cannot be that the Rif holds that ‫הזכרות‬ are rooted in a recognition of Hashem’s greatness, because how could you recognize Hashem by mentioning the exact opposite of what He does? Rather, I think, the Rif holds that ‫ הזכרות‬are just the customary way of starting a request. Additionally, a request for that which never stops is pointless. Therefore, a ‫ הזכרה‬for that which never stops is equally as pointless. This can most clearly be seen from the Ran’s challenge on the Rif. The Ran explains the Rif’s approach as, since dew and wind never stop, mentioning them does not accomplish anything. The Ran goes on to challenge the Rif’s ruling.

Eli Nat ‫על מה נהגו עכשיו להזכיר רוח בימות הגשמים ולשאול טל בין בימות החמה בין בימות‬ ?‫הגשמים מאחר שאין סמך להזכרתן כלל‬ For what reason do we mention wind in the rainy season and ask for rain all year round, if there is no purpose to mentioning rain? It must be, that the only function of a ‫ הזכרה‬according to the Rif is that it helps us set up a request. In other words, ‫ הזכרות‬are a preparation to request for something we need, not a recognition of the greatness of Hashem. In contrast, the Rosh seems to be of the opinion that ‫ הזכרות‬are rooted in recognition. The Rosh does not write the classic ‫ גירסא‬of ‫בטל וברוחות לא ״‬ ‫״חייבו חכמים להזכיר‬. Rather the Rosh switches ‫ חייבו‬with ‫החמירו‬. Meaning, the ‫ חכמים‬were not so stringent as to make you mention dew and wind. However, if you want to be ‫ מחמיר‬on yourself and mention dew and wind, there would be benefits in doing so. If the ‫ גמרא‬had to explicitly say that the ‫ חכמים‬are not so ‫מחמיר‬, the implication is that there is reason to be ‫מחמיר‬. What is the reason? Since we have already established that there are two prevalent opinions in the ‫ גמרא‬regarding the nature of ‫הזכרות‬, it makes sense that the Rosh would hold of one of these opinions. If he held like the ‫ סברא‬of Rabbi Yehoshua, then, like the Rif, the Rosh should say that there is no value in ‫ הזכרות‬for that which never stops. Rather, the Rosh must hold that ‫ הזכרות‬are rooted in appreciation.

Torat Yeshivat Frisch Additionally, while dew and wind, which never cease, do not require a special recognition, it would not be permissible or appropriate to mention the exact opposite of what Hashem does. The Rambam’s opinion takes somewhat of a synthetic approach to the Rif and Rosh. While he rules in accordance with the Rosh, the Rambam shares the Rif’s ‫סברא‬. In Hilchos Tefilla 10:8 the Rambam states that if you do not mention dew you do not need to repeat ‫ שמונה עשרה‬because ‫אין הטל‬ ‫נעצר ואין צריך בקשה‬. Dew never stops and does not require a ‫בקשה‬. This cannot be read as ‫ טל‬never stops and therefore does not require a ‫בקשה‬, because the Rambam is referring to being ‫מזכיר טל‬, not asking for it. Rather, the Rambam is saying that there are two reasons why you do not need to mention ‫טל‬. One, it never stops. Two, since ‫ טל‬does not require a ‫בקשה‬, it does not need the preemptive ‫לפני שאלה הזכרה‬. If it is true that the Rambam has the same ‫ סברא‬as the Rif, then why does the Rambam not also say that you would not need to repeat ‫ שמונה עשרה‬if you say ‫ ?מעביר הרוח ומפריח הטל‬I think, maybe, you could say that the Rambam would have a similar understanding of the ‫ סוגיא‬to the Ran. The Ran asks (quoted above), if it’s true that there really is no benefit to mentioning dew and wind, why do we do it nowadays? The Ran answers that the ‫ חכמים‬were only ‫ מחייב‬us to be ‫ מזכיר‬that which can be ‫נעצר לגמרי‬. However, dew and rain do not stop completely. Therefore, the ‫ חכמים‬did 76

Eli Nat not obligate us to be ‫ מזכיר‬them, but that does not mean that there is no value in mentioning them. Rather, we mention them so that Hashem will bring them in abundance and in their choicest time. One might think that this could also be an answer as to why the Rosh uses ‫ החמירו‬as opposed to ‫חייבו‬. In which case, the Rif, Rosh, and Rambam would all be approaching the nature of ‫ הזכרות‬the same way. However, this is not a strong way to resolve the Rosh as he does not imply that either the nature of ‫ הזכרות‬are ‫ בקשות‬or that he holds of the principle of ‫נעצר לגמרי‬. Ultimately, the Shulchan Aruch rules in accordance with the Rosh and Rambam and does not include the third ruling of the Rif. However, the Mishna Berura is of the opinion that the only nature of ‫ הזכרות‬is a request. The Mishna Berura notes the idea that a ‫ הזכרה‬is completely unnecessary for something like dew that never stops. However, mentioning wind in the winter is helpful because it helps crust the earth. This is similar to the Ran’s understanding. If it is true, that the Rosh holds that ‫ הזכרות‬are fundamentally recognitions, then what is the basis for the ‫ דין‬that if one mentions rain in the summer, he must repeat ‫ ?שמונה עשרה‬Rabbi Eliezer himself stated explicitly that one could be ‫ מזכיר גבורות גשמים‬all year round!

Torat Yeshivat Frisch To answer this question, we must look at the Gemara on 4b’s attempt to reconcile the contradiction between two ‫ משניות‬regarding Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion as to the time to be ‫גבורות גשמים מזכיר‬. The Mishna on 2a states that Rabbi Yehuda says that we start the ‫ הזכרה‬for rain from ‫ חזרת הש״ץ‬of ‫ מוסף‬on ‫ שמיני עצרת‬and stop saying it from ‫ חזרת הש״ץ‬of ‫ מוסף‬on the first day of Pesach. In contrast, the Mishna on 5a states that Rabbi Yehuda says that we stop the ‫ שאלה‬for rain when Pesach ends. How can Rabbi Yehuda say that we stop both on the first day and after Pesach? Rav Chisda attempts to reconcile the contradiction by suggesting that if Rabbi Yehuda holds that ‫ שאלה‬and ‫ הזכרה‬are different, then there would be no contradiction. You should stop mentioning rain on the first day of Pesach but continue asking until Pesach ends. Ulah rejects Rav Chisda’s conclusion. However, his premise, that Rabbi Yehuda holds ‫שאלה לחוד‬ ‫והזכרה לחוד‬, remains unobjected. Rabba suggests another way to reconcile this contradiction. If ‫ עד שיעבור הפסח‬refers to ‫ זמן שחיטת הפסח‬then you would stop asking for rain at ‫ מנחה‬on ‫ערב פסח‬, but continue mentioning rain until ‫ מוסף‬the next day. Abaye rejects this conclusion because it would not make sense to mention rain without a future ‫ שאלה‬because a ‫ הזכרה‬is ‫ריצוי נמי‬ ‫שאלה‬, also a ‫ריצוי שאלה‬. Ultimately, the reason we need to leave it as a ‫ תרי תנאי אליבא דרבי יהודה‬is because ‫ רבי יהודה‬holds that both ‫ טעמי המצווה‬are correct: ‫ הזכרה‬is on the 78

Eli Nat one hand separate from ‫ שאלה‬because it’s fundamentally a recognition, while on the other hand it also functions as a ‫ריצוי שאלה‬. Therefore, if one were to be ‫ מזכיר גשמים‬in the summer, they would need to repeat ‫שמונה‬ ‫עשרה‬, even according to those who hold that a ‫ הזכרה‬is rooted in appreciation.1

In a similar vein,the Gemara on Megillah 2b tells us that when Ester 9:28 says ‫ …והימים האלה נזכרים ונעשים‬the term ‫ נזכרים‬refers to ‫קריאת מגילה‬. The Megillah is a Hazkarah. Rabbi Wald gave a Mishmar regarding the dual nature of ‫מגילת אסתר‬. Gemara Megillah 4a says that Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi says that we are required to read ‫ מגילה‬at night and during the day because the Pasuk in Tehillim 22:3 writes ‫אלקי אקרא יומם ולא תענה ולילה ולא דומיה לי‬. In Contrast, Rabbi Chelbo says the same Halacha, says that the source for it is Tehillim 30:13 which says ‫לעולם אודך למען יזמרך כבוד ולא ידום ה׳ אלקי‬. Rabbi Wald explained that these two Psukim seem to point to different themes of Megillah. Tehillim 22:3 implies that the Megillah is us calling out to Hashem. However, Tehillim 30:13 implies that the nature of Megillah is to praise Hashem. Megillah is another example of a Hazkarah that has the dual nature of recognizing Hashem’s greatness as well as calling out to Hashem.

Yeshivat Frisch Torah Journal 2022

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Rabbi Yaakov Blau

Rabbi Yaakov Blau