Korea Social Sciences Review Vol.2 no.2

Vol. 2(no.1), 2012

Korean Social Sciences Review Contents

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformation: Decomposing the Size-Wage Gap, 1982~2004 - Kim, Young Mi and Han, Joon Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA - Cheong, In Kyo ‘The Candle-lit Demonstration’ as a Social Drama: The Dynamics of Civil Disobedience in Korea - Joe, Il Dong Are Chinese and Korean Families Confucian?: An Interpretive Analysis of Representation in Chinese and Korean Dramas - Kang, Myung Koo and Kim, Soo Ah Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments - Hong, Kyung Zoon The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers in Seoul, Korea - Park, Sam Ock, Jin, Jong Heon, and Koo, Yangmi The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices in Korea - Shin, Myung Ho Pathways from International Society to National Legislature: Introduction and Co-Sponsorship of the Anti-Landmine Norm in the Korean National Assembly - Namkung, Gon and Jo, Dong-Joon

The Center for Social Sciences, Seoul National University Center for Korea Studies, University of Washington

Korean Social Sciences Review

Korean Social Sciences Review (KSSR) contains scholarly papers on Korean society from the various disciplines of social sciences, which were originally written in Korean and recently published in academic journals in Korea, and are translated into English specifically for this edition. The basic objective of Korean Social Sciences Review is to provide opportunity for non-Korean speakers to get access to Korean materials on contemporary Korean society written by Korean social scientists. The selection and translation of the papers contained in this edition has been processed by the collaboration between the Center for Social Sciences of Seoul National University, the Center for Korean Studies of UCLA and the Center for Korea Studies, University of Washington.

This publication is funded by the grant from the Korea Foundation.

Editorial Board Oh, Myung Seok (Chief Editor, SNU, Anthropology) Chang, Duk Jin (SNU, Sociology) Ku, In Hoe (SNU, Social Welfare) Kweon, Sug In (SNU, Anthropology) Kwon, Hyeong Ki (SNU, Politics) Lee, Chul Hee (SNU, Economics) Lee, Hoon Jin (SNU, Psychology) Lee, Jae Hyun (SNU, Mass Communication) Sohn, Jung Yul (SNU, Geography) Yi, Ok Yeon (SNU, Politics)

Copyright Š 2012 by The Center for Social Sciences, Seoul National University (SNU) First Seoul National University Press E-Journal Edition: April 30, 2012

ISSN 2234-4039

Korean Social Sciences Review Vol. 2, No. 1 | 2012

Contents The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformation: Decomposing the Size-Wage Gap, 1982~2004 Kim, Young Mi and Han, Joon

1

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA Cheong, In Kyo

33

‘The Candle-lit Demonstration’ as a Social Drama: The Dynamics of Civil Disobedience in Korea Joe, Il Dong

95

Are Chinese and Korean Families Confucian?: An Interpretive Analysis of Representation in Chinese and Korean Dramas Kang, Myung Koo and Kim, Soo Ah 131 Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments Hong, Kyung Zoon

151

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers in Seoul, Korea Park, Sam Ock, Jin, Jong Heon, and Koo, Yangmi

181

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices in Korea Shin, Myung Ho

221

Pathways from International Society to National Legislature: Introduction and Co-Sponsorship of the Anti-Landmine Norm in the Korean National Assembly Namkung, Gon and Jo, Dong-Joon

255

Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012: 1-32

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformation: Decomposing the Size-Wage Gap, 1982~2004* Kim, Young Mi** and Han, Joon*** This study aims to understand the nature of the structural change in the Korean labor market by analyzing the wage gap between large firms and small to medium-sized firms between 1982 and 2004. The result reveals that Korea experienced two historical moments in which the size-wage gap surged: one in 1987, the year of mass labor strikes spurred by the democratization movement, and the other in 1997, the year the Asian financial crisis began.

Whereas the first moment was a temporary phenomenon lasting only until the early 1990s, the second moment led to a continuous wage-gap increase. The result of an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the wage gap shows that the factors contributing to the widening of the wage gap since the economic crisis were different between the manual sector and the nonmanual sector. For manual workers, the increase of the size-wage gap was mostly induced by compositional effects, specifically the increased share of long-tenured workers in large firms. For non-manual workers, however, it was a price effect. In light of the current debate on the transformation of the internal labor market, we conclude that a corporate internal labor market exists persistently, although reduced in size, in the manual sector, whereas the corporate boundary is significantly weakened in the non-manual sector. This dual process of labor market transformation, however, results in an increased size-wage gap in both sectors, although for differing reasons.

Keywords: Internal Labor Market, Size-Wage Gap, Oaxaca-Blinder Wage Decomposition, Labor Market Segmentation, Boundary-Less Career, Meritocracy, Korea

Translated from an article published in the Korean Journal of Sociology 42(7): 111145, 2008 with permission from The Korean Sociological Association. ** Professor, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Pohang University of Science and Technology *** Professor, Department of Sociology, Yonsei University *

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I. Introduction The internal labor market is a distinctive employment system in which employees are protected from the external market competition through organizational institutions such as the internal promotion ladder and the seniority wage system. Although the internal labor market may be a mutually beneficial system for both employers and employees in gaining employees’ commitment and loyalty for the former and in ensuring security of employment and wages for the latter, it also contributes to creating a gap and inequality between those who are inside the system and those who are not.

Despite differing opinions about the Korean internal labor market, there is a general consensus that watershed moments in the structural transformation of the labor market occurred in 1987 and 1997.1 1987, the year of the first national general strike, is most commonly recognized as the year when the labor market segmentation started to develop in Korea, as argued by Song (1994) and supported by numerous studies to evidence the development of the internal labor market in large companies and the core-periphery segmentation (Lee 2001; Nahm 1995). On the other hand, after the economic crisis in 1997, there have been growing arguments claiming that the Korean internal labor market had been dissipated by the neo-liberal structural changes triggered by the economic crisis (Roh 2008). Massive layoffs and restructuring done in almost all chaebol companies immediately after the economic crisis were interpreted as signs of the dismantling of the internal labor market even in large enterprises.

However, despite changes in the hiring processes and changes in the personnel management practices of large firms during the late 1990s, there remains no systematic understanding of how the labor market changed as a whole. In addition, the wage gap between large firms and small to mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) has continually increased since the economic crisis (Jung and Cheon 2001) and a significant portion of the wage disparity that 1

Refer to Hwang (2007) for an opposing view. Hwang asserted that the internal labor market experienced a structural change to temporary workers during the mid-1980s through his analysis of the trends of temporary workers from 1970 to 2005.

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformation 3

has surged since 1997 can be attributed to the pay difference between large firms and SMEs (Jung 2002; Kim and Han 2007). Such reports illustrate the difficulty in answering the simple question: “Are Korean internal labor markets weakening?” If large conglomerates’ internal labor markets were weakened after the economic crisis and this led to an organized shutdown of wage premiums, then why has the size-wage gaps been increasing? This contradiction provides us with the starting point of conjecture on how the Korean labor market changed after the economic crisis.

Since the late 1990s, two main points of view have emerged concerning the structural change of the labor markets. First, there is the opinion that the internal labor market retained its original identity but was simply reduced in size. The second view asserts that the labor market itself has dissolved.

The former assessment may be found in research by Hwang (2003). Hwang utilized the 1998-2003 data from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) to analyze the standard for wage determination for insiders (large firms, permanent employees, and union members) as well as outsiders (small to medium-sized firms, temporary workers and non-union workers). She found a significant difference in wage determination between the insiders and the outsiders; personal attributes such as education and tenure being more important to insiders and job attributes such as industry or occupationbeing more significant to outsiders., and argued thateven after the economic crisis, the divide in the labor market continued to exist. She further argues that the large conglomerate companies of Korea responded to the economic crisis not by functional flexibilization strategy but by quantitative flexibilization strategy, outsourcing workers at the lowest levels of the organization of production. As a consequence, the labor market was in a way reduced, but Hwang believes that the essence of the market remained.2 Ryoo (2002), who used the same data as Hwang, asserts that the internal labor market is weakening, as demonstrated by the sharp erosion of the male 2

This assertion also matches Eom(2006)’s analysis of a large firm’s personnel documents. He analyzed the 1996-2000 personnel documents of a large firm that had adopted a performance-based pay system in 1998 and found that controlling for age, the effect of firm tenure had rather increased after the company adopted the performance-based pay. Based on this case study, he argues, it is hard to conclude that the adoption of performance pay system weakens the seniority effect.

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employees’ seniority pay. In addition, Ryoo and Park (2003) utilizing“Wage Structure Survey” to analyze the wage determining mechanisms of male workers between 1980 and 1999, found that the importance of seniority pay, which rewards firm-specific skills has lost its dominance in overall wage determination process after the early 1990s , whereas the influence of the pay for work experience (not firm tenure), which signals the reward for general skills universally applicable across firm boundaries has continued to increase since the early 1990s.

Reflecting such different opinions, Jung and Cheon (2001) recognized the existence of two macro trends sending contradictory signals with respect to the fate of the Korean internal labor market: the growing size-wage gap implicating the strengthening of the internal labor market and the waning of seniority wage, and concluded that the corporate internal labor markets “still persists protecting its incumbents from the market competition, yet at the same time pushing them into severe internal competition.”

These studies, both recognized for their validity, reached such different conclusions mainly due to the data used, the scope conditions, and the methods of analyses, though other factors were involved as well. In particular, the manner of composing the target analysis groups differentiates the conclusions of these studies. If the ways in which the internal labor market changed had been different across sub-groups , then analyzing the whole group without recognizing the internal variation would create an error close to an omitted variable bias. In particular, considering that a company’s employment restructuring strategies are adjustable in accordance with production skills and bargaining power of unions it is a grave mistake to analyze changes in the internal labor markets without differentiating between two inherently different groups, that is the manual group in which firmspecific skills are still important and the union membership is relatively high and the nonmanual group in which specificity of skills is low and the union rate is low.

This essay aims to analyze the size-wage gap between large and small to medium-sized Korean firms between 1982 and 2004 and within the context of change in the internal labor market structure. Through the process of analyzing the mechanisms that created the disparity, we hope to understand the changing form of the Korean labor market. The result of our study reveals

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformation 5

that the wage gap between large firms and SMEs surged once in 1987 and again in 1997. The first instance was a temporary phenomenon but the second instance instigated a continuing wage-gap increase. The result of an OaxacaBlinder decomposition of the wage gap shows that the factors contributing to the widening of the wage gap since the economic crisis differ between the manual sector and the non-manual sector. Possibly, it is these differences that created the inconsistent conclusions in the previous studies related to the changes in the internal labor market.

II. Difference in Composition or Compensation: The source of the Size-Wage Gap The internal labor market is commonly defined as a closed employment system protected from market competition, but there is a certain variation in the heuristic tools that researchers use to identify the existence of the internal labor market. For example, Althauser and Kalleberg (1981), influenced by neo-institutional economics arguing that organizations are created in order to minimize transaction costs in the process of production distinguish the restriction of entry to the organization, the job ladder, and the internal promotions as defining characteristics of the internal labor market. Thus, workers’ wage growth through internal upward movement is seen as the main indicator of the internal labor market. On the other hand, for the Korean labor market, in which the system of wages based on job titles is underdeveloped, Jung (1992; 2001) and Nahm (1995) define the internal labor market in the broad sense as workplace customs in which “practices differentiated from external markets” exist and adopted the comparatively high wage and job security as its indicators (for further information, refer to Jung and Cheon 2001: 157-163).

In this case, where is the Korean internal labor market located and in what form? It is known that factors such as the industry, the size of the firm, and the type of occupation have been suggested as the basis of the division of the labor market at theoretically and empirically. Given that the outcome of the debate depends upon how the internal labor market is defined, the dispute is expected to continue. However, if relatively higher wage and employment

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security are commonly used to defines internal labor market, we can use the size difference between large and small-to-medium firms as proxy variable demarcating the boundary of labor market segmentation Research based on an analysis of micro-data asserts that, in Korea, internal corporate labor markets form around large firms. This research cites the presence of a sizewage gap, difference in wage determination, seniority wages in large firms, and the limited relationship between large firms and small to medium-sized firms as evidence (Yee 2003; Hwang 2003). In this study, we will follow Jung and Cheon (2001) and use the size of the firm as the proxy variable of the internal labor market divide, but we will also analyze how the causes of the size-wage gap changed and focus on the changing aspects of the macro labor market.3 The phenomenon of large firm workers earning higher wages than their counterparts at small to medium-sized firms can be found in many countries.

Studies have observed companies with more than 500 workers and companies with less than 100 workers and compared their respective wage disparities, finding a gap of 17% (Main and Reily 1993) in Great Britain and 19% in the United States (Idson and Feaster 1990). When the company size was increased to more than 1000 workers and decreased to less than 30 workers, the disparity grew to 54% in the United States and 49% in Japan (Oi 1990: S127-S128).

Owing to the tendency of average wages to be greater at large firms than at small to medium-sized firms, it appears rational to accept such a difference as a self-evident truth. However, there are many reasons and explanations about why such differences occur. As discussed by Brown and Medoff (1989), the size-wage gap could be established from the personnel structures of the respective firms or could exist even after accounting for the personnel 3

Because the discussion about the internal labor market is intensive and broad, it is important in this study to define the internal labor market as the internal corporate labor market. Therefore, the findings of this study cannot be applied to other forms of the internal labor market. The defining characteristics of this sort of market are high wages, restriction of entry, promotion ladders and organizational isolation. For the purposes of this study, the focus will be upon economic compensation. Also, it is important to stress that in order to infer the internal corporate labor market’s changing form, consistent reservations need to be taken into account.

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformation  7

structures.

The size-wage gap could arise from both compositional differences and price differences. As for the former, there are several reasons to believe that the higher mean wage of the large firms is because of their compositional characteristics. First, large firms are comparatively more concentrated in manufacturing industries, while the small to medium-sized firms are primarily concentrated in service industries. Therefore, in this instance, it can be inferred that the wage disparity is due to the fact that medium firms have a high concentration of low paying service jobs. Second, there could be differences in the job distribution as well. Because large firms have a comparatively greater number of higher-paying corporate jobs, the average wage may be higher. Third, in the same context, in larger firms, workers with more education are distributed throughout, adding to the wage gap. Fourth, there are comparatively more workers with longergreater firm tenure in large firms thus increasing the difference in wages. In addition, workers with unobserved qualities that favorably increase wages may be more concentrated in larger firms and thus contribute to the higher average wages.

Apart from the compositional difference, large firms and SMEs may pay differently for the same human capital and this price difference may contribute to the size-wage gap. Groshen (1991) summarizes various theoretical explanations on why larger firms may pay more for the same personal attribute as follows.

1. workers in larger firms may have greater unobserved productivity 2. workers in large firms may have to endure more unfavorable working conditions such as inflexible working hours and harder disciplinary requirements, hence are more compensated.

3. The costs to monitor a person’s work may be higher in large firms hence managers may pay greater effective wages to induce more loyalty.

4. Both the ability of the employer to compensate workers and the workers’ ability to negotiate may be higher in large firms.

All of the explanations are grounded in theories that are somewhat contradictory to one another, but here we simply recognize that there are many different reasons as to why the price differential between larger firms

8 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

and smaller firms can arise.

If the wage gap between large firms and small to medium-sized firms increases, it could be a result of strengthened compositional differences between the two or a result of increased price differentials. When this logic is applied to the Korean internal corporate labor market, two scenarios emerge.

First, if Korean large firms clung to the internal labor market policies and responded to business fluctuations caused by the economic crisis by dismissing the peripheral workforce with short firm tenure while protecting the core long-tenured workforce, large firms would have experienced homogenization in workforce after the economic crisis particularly in terms of tenure distribution and the compositional difference between the large firms and SMEs would have increased. In this case, the increase of the size-wage gap after the economic crisis can be understood as a result of a reinforced selection of employees in large firms. That is, it can be understood as a result of the increased mean wage of large firms as the proportion of workers with long firm tenure increased.

On the other hand, had the collapse of seniority wage and employment system been predominant as a consequence of large firms renouncing the internal labor market policy, then the difference in personnel attributes between the large firms and SMEs would have been reduced. Particularly, long-tenured employees in large firms, who are more costly to maintain, would have been let go and forced retirement would have increased. Suppose that the compositional differences between the large firms and SMEs have been significantly reduced as a result of such change in large firms. If the size-wage gap had increased during the period in spite of the convergence of distributional characteristics, it will be hard to regard that the increase of the size-wage gap was induced by a compositional change.

III. Data and Method of Data Analysis This research utilized the 1982–2004 data sets from the “Basic Survey of Wage Structure” The “Basic Survey of Wage Structure” is data from the Ministry of Labor that tracks businesses with more than 10 employees, excluding public administrations, national organizations, and housework services. The

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformation 9

sampling scope is expanded to businesses with five or more employees since 1999, but to maintain the compatibility over time, samples are restricted to firms with ten or more workers throughout the whole period. Although there are differences every year, there are usually about 5,000 business organizations and over 300,000 workers included in the original data. Research from these data typically uses a sample of 5% or 10%. This study, however, utilized the entire sample. The extraction rate of the workers varied with the size of the company. Therefore, in order to account for differing extraction rates, the sampling weights are applied.

The “Basic Survey of Wage Structure” has an advantage of having a large survey pool. Moreover, it contains highly credible information. However, the “ten or more workers” criterion is not a trivial limitation hence should be taken into account when interpreting the results.

To identify and quantify the separate contributions of group differences in terms of measurable characteristics, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique was used (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973). The average wages between the two groups is different possibly because the personnel compositions are different or because the compensation for the same human attribute is different. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition a method to distinguish the effects of compositional difference and the price difference on the average wage differential between two groups. It relies on a counterfactual calculation of how much wage gap would be reduced had the distribution of human capital of the low-wage group been the same as that of the high-wage group or had the price for the same attribute is the same between two groups. Here, the proportion of compositional effect to account the total wage gap is called the explained proportion of the wage gap while the proportion of price effect to account the wage gap is called the unexplained proportion of the gap.4 Suppose there are two groups with different average wages. The wage equations for the higher-paying group (H) and lower-paying group (L) can 4

Consider a scenario in which the wage was wholly determined by education and where the average level of education for a high-wage organization was comparatively high. If after the calculation the effect of education is evident in both organizations, then the wage gap between the two organizations could be wholly explained by education. However, if the education effect only increases in the high wage organization, then one cannot explain the wage gap solely in terms of education.

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be expressed as below. Here, βH refers to the coefficient vector of the higher wage group including the Y-intercept, XH refers to the vector of human capital variables, and βL and XL refer to vectors of the lower wage group defined the same way.

YiH = βHXiH + εiH YiL = βLXiL + εiL In this case, the average wage difference between the two groups can be — — — expressed as ((Y H – Y L), when X H refers to the vector of mean personal — attributes of the higher wage group and X L is that of lower wage group.

—

—

—

—

Y H – Y L = βHX H – βLX L According to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, the average difference of wages between the groups can be separated into the difference in the average personnel attributes and the difference in average compensation coefficients. If we set the high-wage (H) group’s earning function as the reference, then the following equation holds: —

—

—

—

—

—

Y H – Y L = βH(X H – X L) + XL(βH – βL) + (βH – βL) (X H – X L) (D: Wage Differentials) = (E: structural effect) + (C: cost effect) + (CE: interaction effect)

— — The first term, βH(X H – X L), represents the difference in composition between the the two groups, called the endowment effect or the composition effect.

The second term, XL(βH – βL), represents the difference in the compensation coefficient, called the coefficient effect or the price effect as well. The last term, the combination (βH – βL)(XH – XL), represents the interaction effect.

The average wage differential of the two groups, labeled D, is the sum of the endowmentl effect (E), the cost effect (C) and the interaction effect (CE), hence the ratio of each item to D shows the relative contribution of each effect on the wage gap.

In this study, a large firm is defined as a corporation with more than 300 workers, and small to medium-sized firms are defined as companies with

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformation  11

fewer than 300 workers. The independent variables in wage determination are education, age, age-squared, firm tenure, firm tenure squared, marital status, industry, and occupation. The dependent variables are the logarithm of the hourly wage. The hourly wage is the real hourly wage adjusted for inflation using the Consumer price index (the reference year is 2000)provided by the Bank of Korea. To maintain compatibility over time, the industry was recoded following the fifth standard industry classification scheme and the occupation was recoded following the the third standard occupation classification scheme. The sample is limited to male workers. In order to understand the structural change of the internal labor market, it is important to note difference in genders; however, because this study is focused on wage disparity, it seemed best to restrict the subjects to male workers.

IV. The Trend of the Size-Wage Gap and Changes in the compositional difference between Large Firms and SMEs: 1982-2004 First, we investigate how the wage gap between large firms and SMEs has changed over the last 25 years. <Figure 1> shows the trend of the logged real hourly wage in large firms and SMEs from 1982 to 2004 by sex. The wage gap between large firms and SMEs appears to have experienced two historical surges. Among male workers, the size-wage gap increased sharply after 1987, then became stabilized until it encountered another surge right after 1997, the year of economic crisis. More specifically, in 1987, male workers at large firms earned, on average, 12% more than male workers at small to mediumsized firms, but the gap surged to 22% in the following year.

It appears that the increase in the size-wage gap in 1987 was due to the increased bargaining power of workers in large firms due to rapid organization of trade unions in large firms followed by mass labor strikes concentrated in the heavy manufacturing-chemical industry. However, the effect of 1987 was temporary and lasted only five years. Such alleviation of the size-wage gap can be a result of subsequent pay raises in SMEs trickled down from the remarkable pay increase in the larger firm. After the early 1990s, the wage gap was alleviated, but after the financial crisis of 1997, the gap widened

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Log of wage per hour and net pay difference

Male

Female

Figure 1. Trend in Wage Gap between Large Firms and Small to Medium-sized Firms.

significantly to the extent that in 2004, the average hourly wage of workers at large firms was 130% greater than workers at SMEs. The case was similar for females, but compared to males, the premiums for working at large firms were smaller and, therefore, the wage gaps in the two momentous years were not as defining as the wage gap for males.

If the temporary discrepancy of male workers after 1987 is ignored, then the continually increasing gap among male workers can be said to have started after the economic crisis of 1997. Accordingly, it appears as though the compositional characteristics of male workers in large firms and in SMEs became more and more heterogeneous. If the distributions of workers in large firms and SMEs had increased over the years, it will be reasonable to examine changes in compositional difference first for the cause of the increase of sizewage gap.

The Index of Dissimilarity is an index to measure the compositional difference between two groups. The index of dissimilarity can be interpreted as the percentage of group B that would have to move to group A in order to produce a completely even distribution, when 0 indicates perfect evenness

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformationâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 13

and 1 indicates perfect segregation. If large firms are labeled as A and SMEs are labeled as B and a qualification, such as level of education, is labeled as j, then N(A) refers to the number of workers of large firms and N(B) refers to the number of workers of small to medium-sized firms. N(Aj) refers to the workers pertaining to the j-characteristic in large firms and N(Bj) refers to the workers pertaining to the j-characteristic in SMEs. The level of dissimilarity between A and B can be calculated by the value of D in the following equation.

D=

1 j N ( A j ) N (B j ) â&#x2C6;&#x2019; â&#x2C6;&#x2018; 2 j =1 N ( A) N (B)

<Figure 2> shows how the heterogeneity between large firms and small to medium-sized firms has changed during the past 25 years for male workers.

To calculate the level of heterogeneity, the characteristics of the level of education, age, years of service, and occupation were used. The level of education was divided into four levels (graduation from elementary school, graduation from middle school, graduation from high school, and graduation from college); age was divided into five levels (under 25 years, 25-35, 35-45, 45-55, and over 55 years); years of service was grouped into six categories (less than 1 year, 1-2, 3-5, 5-7, 7-12, and more than 12 years); and occupation was designated into eight categories (manager, specialist, assistant specialist, clerical work, selling, technician, assembly, and manual labor).

As <Figure 2> indicates, there were no significant differences in education, age, or occupation in large firms and small to medium-sized firms and there was no distinct pattern noted regarding any change detected after 1982.

However, regarding the years of firm tenure, there was a major difference, especially after 1997. The index of dissimilarity for male workers was about 0.24 in 1887 but increased to 0.35 in 2004. In other words, it took 24% of workers in SMEs to move out of their tenure group in order to match the tenure distribution of the large firms in case of 1987, but it took 35% of workers to do so in 2004, indicating an increased compositional difference between the two groups during the period.

The real average years of tenure at large firms and small to medium-sized firms can be observed in <Figure 3>. For male workers at medium-sized

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Index of Dissimilarity education tenure

age occupation

Figure 2. Changes in Compositional Dissimilarity between Large Firms and Small to Medium-Sized Firms.

Average Tenure (Years) Males at Large Firm

Males at Small to Medium-Sized Firm

Figure 3. Change in the Average Tenure in Large Firms and Small to Medium-Sized Firms.

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformationâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 15

firms, there has been little change in the last 25 years. Workers in 1982 had worked an average of 3.7 years, and in 2004 workers at their companies had worked for an average of 5.75 years. Conversely, in large firms, the average years worked in 1982 was 4.39 years, but by 2004 the average rose to 10.38 years. The increase in years worked could possibly be a result of the aging working class, but the significant difference between the large firms and small to medium-sized firms indicates a phenomena independent of demographic changes. During the same time period, the average age of the workers at large firms increased from 32.11 to 38.99 while for small to medium-sized firms it increased from 33.1 to 40.46. Yet the change inthe index of dissimilarity for age distribution was miniscule (from 0.1 to 0.15) (refer to <Supplement 1>).

Over the last twenty years, large firms and SMEs have maintained similar make-ups in terms of the education, occupation, and age of their respective workers. However, the increasing gap in the average tenure is evident. In the case of male workers, the gap in employment stability between large firms and SMEs has continually widened. As a result, the two have become very different groups in terms of the proportion of long-tenured workers.

V. Decomposition of the Size-Wage Gap: An Endowment Effect or a Price effect? <Figure 4> shows the result of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the difference in the logged average real hourly wage between large firms and SMEs from 1983 to 2004, restricted to male workers.5 The <Figure 4> shows the absolute contributions of the endowment effect and the price effect on the size-wage gap presented in <Figure 1>. The relative contributions of the endowment effect and the price effect can be calculated by setting the wage gap of the particular year to 100, and are presented in <Supplement 2>.

The most striking finding in <Figure 4> is that it was the price effect that induced the short-term increase in the wage gap between large firms and SMEs after 1987. For example in 1986, the mean logged hourly wage of large 5

Presented is the result setting large firms as the reference group. We duplicated the result setting SMEs as the reference and no noteworthy difference was found.

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Size-Wage gap Price effect

Endowment effect Interaction effect

Figure 4. Results of Decomposition of Size-Wage Gap: 1983-2004.

firms was 8.204, as compared to the average wage of 8.055 at SMEs. In the wage gap of 0.149, 0.047 was due to the price effect. Three years later in 1989, the wage gap between large firms and small to medium-sized firms increased to 0.24, and of that 0.24, the price effect was an astounding 0.134. The price effect, a result of large firms paying more for the same human attributes accounted about 31% of the size-wage gap in 1987 but it grew to 56% in 1989.

Note that the increase of size-wage gap led by the price effect did not last for a long time. As the temporary surge of the price effect declined, the wage gap between large firms and SMEs in the early 1990s fell to the levels before 1987.

One may speculate that the falling price effect is a consequence of a process in which the salary increase first initiated in large firms in 1987 slowly trickled down to SMEs. On the other hand, the increase of the size-wage gap in 1997 seems to have been caused by a more complex effect. The endowment effect was maintained without great changes throughout the 1990s until it encountered with a sudden increase in 2000, while the price effect steadily increased after 1997. Considering an analysis of only <Figure 5>, it would appear that the wage disparity after the economic crisis was a combination of the structural and the cost effect, with the cost effect responsible immediately following the

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformationâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 17

White-Collar Worker

Size-Wage gap Price effect

Endowment effect

Blue-Collar Worker

Size-Wage gap Price effect Figure 5. Decomposition of the Size-Wage Gap by Occupation.

Endowment effect

18â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

economic crisis and the structural effect responsible afterwards. However, this interpretation is an erroneous one that can easily come about when the third variable is not properly controlled for. A different pattern is detected if blue-collar and white-collar workers are divided and the wage gap is then analyzed. <Figure 5> presents the result of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition applied to the manual and nonmanual male workers separately. First, in the case of non-manual workers, the wage gap between large firms and SMEs surged after 1987 but continually decreased; in 1996, the gap was measured at about 5%. However, after 1997, the gap increased at an alarming rate. The contribution of the endowment effect is on the low side. There are indications of an increasing trend, but not to the point that it is unsettling. Therefore, in the case of white-collar workers, there is not a significant difference in the qualifications of workers between large firms and SMEs. Correspondingly, the qualifications of workers do not contribute significantly to wage disparity. The increase of the size-wage gap among nonmanual workers has been mainly induced by the price effect, both the temporary surge after 1987 and after the economic crisis.

For blue-collar manual workers, the endowment effect overrides the price effect. Although the price effect seems to have contributed greatly to the temporary surge of the size-wage gap in 1987, it is the endowment effect that supersedes the price effect throughout the whole period in size and responsible solely for the increase in the wage gap after the late 1990s.

It is important to note that the increasing price effect led to a temporary surge of the wage gap in 1987 for both white- and blue-collar workers.

However, after 1997, the reason for the wage gap was notably different. After the economic crisis, the change in the compositional dissimilarity of whitecollar workers in large firms and SMEs was slow and it was particularly the different rates of compensation given to similar qualifications that contributed mostly to the wage gap. For blue-collar workers, the increase in the heterogeneity between workers in large firms and workers in SMEs was the leading cause of the increasing size-wage gap.

Why are there such great differences in patterns between blue-collar and white-collar workers? In the next section, these changes will be compared for the year immediately before the economic crisis, 1996, and in the latest year

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformation 19

for which we have data, 2004.

VI. The Size-Wage Gap Decomposition for Manual and Nonmanual Workers The previous trend analysis has shown that the economic crisis of 1997 increased the size-wage gap but in different way for manual workers and nonmanual workers. More specifically it was the endowment effect for manual workers and the price effect for nonmanual workers that led the increase of the wage gap since 1997. To further investigate the cause of such divergence, in this chapter, we apply an OLS regression analysis of the logged hourly wage in 1996 and 2004 and compare the results.

The wage equation used in this chapter is an expansion of the basic model used in the previous chapter (experience, tenure, education, marital status, and occupation), which also factors in personal traits that could affect economic compensation, such as rank, licenses/certificates, form of pay, and union membership.6 Experience was calculated as the period between the person’s last graduation and the present - 5 years (age – years of education – 5), rank was divided into eight categories (board member, head of department, deputy head of department, section chief, deputy section chief, head of team, group leader, and worker), license/certificates was applied to technicians and other skills provided by the state in which people with licenses were labeled 1 and workers without were labeled 0. Form of pay referred to hourly pay, weekly pay, monthly pay, yearly pay, or pay-by-job (hourly pay is the reference category). Finally, in terms of union membership, a 1 was given to workers who worked in companies with unions, while laborers working in places without unions were given a 0. <Table 1> presents the result of OLS regression on logged hourly wage for manual workers. The chart helps determine which traits are favorable for 6

This expanded model may be more desirable to estimate wage determination mechanisms but many of the variables are not provided in earlier data of Basic Survey of Wage Structure, making the longitudinal analysis in the previous chapter cannot but rely on the basic model.

20â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 1.

1996 Small to mediumsized Firm

2004 Large Firm

Small to mediumsized Firm

Large Firm

Coefficient Average Coefficient Average Coefficient Average Coefficient Average Education

0.01**

10.8

0.02**

11.36

0

11.72

0.02**

11.88

0.018**

22.48

0.018**

19.53

0.025**

25.35

0.011**

23.42

Job Experience

-0.00**

675.16

-0.00**

483.43

-0.00**

816.3

-0.00**

662.39

Tenure

0.02**

3.85

0.03**

8.6

0.02**

4.95

0.04**

10.47

0

33.33

-0.00**

115.73

-0.00**

49.17

-0.00**

169.47

Married

0.10**

0.73

0.05**

0.76

0.06**

0.73

0.03**

0.77

Technician

0.19**

0.3

0.16**

0.39

0.29**

0.26

0.26**

0.27

Assembly Worker

0.11**

0.55

0.15**

0.54

0.26**

0.52

0.23**

0.6

Board Member

0.12**

0.002

-0.23**

0.001

0.10**

0.007

0.16*

0

Head of Department

0.12**

0.003

0.16**

0.001

0.25**

0.019

0.53**

0.001

Deputy Department Head

0.24**

0.013

0.22**

0.008

0.39**

0.016

0.31**

0.004

Section Chief

0.12**

0.012

0.04**

0.006

0.27**

0.048

0.29**

0.019

Deputy Section Chief

0.15*

0

-0.09*

0.001

0.19**

0.082

0.17**

0.076

Team Lead

0.08**

0.012

-0.02**

0.019

0.09**

0.081

0.06**

0.09

Group Leader

0.10**

0.033

0.01*

0.033

0.04**

0.034

-0.02**

0.074

License

0.02**

0.36

0.03**

0.36

0.01

0.31

0.03**

0.31

Daily/Weekly Pay

-0.01

0.2

-0.07**

0.23

0

0.11

-0.06**

0.18

Monthly Pay

0.14**

0.6

0.07**

0.51

0.05**

0.62

0.06**

0.52

Yearly Pay

0.49**

0

0.19**

0

0.01

0

0.41**

0

Efficiency Pay

0.36**

0.01

0

0

0.21**

0.13

0.28**

0.09

Labor Union

-0.13**

0.33

-0.02**

0.84

0.04**

0.22

0.09**

0.79

Job Experience 2

Tenure

2

Constant

8.05**

7.98**

8.04**

7.87**

No. of Cases

65312

75466

49391

61032

0.23

0.43

0.39

0.56

2

R

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformationâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 21

wages, how each trait is distributed and how it is valued in large firms and in SMEs. For example, education acts favorably in determining wages in both large firms and SMEs, but the coefficient of education is greater in large firm and so is the mean level of education, leading to a conclusion that education is a factor to increase the size-wage gap through both the endowment effect and the price effect.

The most striking revelation of <Table 1> is that tenure is a positive trait for higher wages in both large firms and small to medium-sized firms. In 1996, if other qualifications were equal, one additional year of tenure would increase the wage by 2% for workers in SMEs and by 3% for workers in large firms. The effect of tenure was always greater in larger firms, but in 2004 the difference grew greater. Even in 1996, the average years of tenure at large firms was 8.6 years while it was 3.85 years at SMEs meaning a difference of 4.75 years. However, by 2004 the average time at a large firm was 10.47 years whereas it was only 4.95 years at a SME, resulting in a greater difference of 5.52 years. The relative increase in the proportion of the long-tenured workers in large firms helped widen the size-wage gap.

The rank, occupation, licenses/certificates, and form of pay factors between 1996 and 2004 appear to have remained steady in large firms and in SMEs in terms of distribution as well as compensation. There was no specific attribute, regardless of its direction of influence, disproportionately concentrated in large firms or SMEs. No significant change was found either between 1996 and 2004.

However, union membership yielded interesting results. In 1996, 33% of workers at SMEs worked at companies with unions, while 84% of workers from large firms worked at companies with unions. However, it appears the union membership actually affects wages negatively and that the unfavorable effects were greater in SMEs. Nonetheless, in 2004, the effect of union membership became favorable and the favorable effects were greater in large firms. Union membership actually decreased in large firms and in small to medium-sized firms, by 5% and 11%, respectively. In summary, although union membership showed a decrease, the effect of union membership became favorable. Thus, the structural effect and cost effect both contributed to the comparative average wage increase of large firms.

To summarize the result for manual workers, the main cause of the

22â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

increase in size-wage gap between 1996 and 2004 is the change in the tenure distribution between large firms and SMEs and the change in the union effect.

Not only did the years of tenure increase between 1996 and 2004, but also the amount of compensation increased greatly for large firms. Moreover, although the level of union membership decreased for all, the rate of decrease was slower in large firms widening the gap in union rate between the two groups.

Also, the union effect on wage was more favorable in large firms. Succeeding the conclusion from the previous chapter noting the greater contribution of the endowment effect for manual workers, the result shows that it was the tenure and the union membership to take the lion share of the endowment effect. The disproportionate increase in tenure as well as the increasing return to tenure in large firms illustrates that the internal labor market policies still thrives in large firms. In addition, the increasing gap in union rate as well as its effect between large firms and SMEs implicates that the presence of union is closely related with the workings of the internal labor market. <Table 2> shows the regression results on the logged real hourly wage of nonmanual workers in large firms and in small to medium-sized firms in 1996 and 2004. As with blue-collared workers, the tenure of white-collared workers in large firms increased at a faster rate (from 8.1 years to 10.34 years) compared to SMEs (from 5.77 years to 6.38 years), however, the return to the tenure has rather decreased in large firms. For white-collared workers, the return to the labor market experience was much greater and grew faster in large firms. In 1996, the return to experience and tenure were nearly identical for large firms and SMEs, but in 2004 , the return to experience decreased in SMEs whereas it was the return to tenure that decreased in large firms, together adding more to the price differentials between the two groups.

Another interesting finding is that the proportion of merit-based pay within the salary system increased significantly in both large firms and SMEs and so did its coefficient. The increase in merit-based pay among non-manual workers and the direction of its effect on the size-wage gap should be closely examined. Also the increased coefficient of the licenses/certificates should be considered in the same vein.

The effect of unions has changed with a similar pattern to that for manual laborers. The positive effect of unions on wages increased after the economic crisis, but union rate, especially in small to medium-sized firms, declined

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformationâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 23

Table 2.

1996 Small to mediumsized Firm

2004 Large Firm

Small to mediumsized Firm

Large Firm

Coefficient Average Coefficient Average Coefficient Average Coefficient Average Education

0.05**

13.97

0.06**

14.48

0.05**

14.31

0.06**

14.74 18.49

Job Experience

0.04**

17.57

0.04**

15.41

0.03**

19.86

0.04**

Job Experience2

-0.00**

412.29

-0.00**

307.76

-0.00**

500.74

-0.00** 411.22

Tenure

0.02**

5.77

0.02**

8.1

0.02**

6.38

0.01**

10.34

Tenure

-0.00**

70.34

-0.00**

111.97

-0.00**

78.54

0

164.49

Married

0.09**

0.75

0.04**

0.74

0.04**

0.73

0.05**

0.74

Administrative

0.22**

0.14

0.24**

0.05

0.41**

0.14

0.54**

0.06

Professional

0.10**

0.19

0.07**

0.24

0.24**

0.15

0.31**

0.15

Semi-Professional

0.09**

0.201

0.05**

0.249

0.26**

0.318

0.23**

0.342

Clerical

-0.06**

0.418

-0.03**

0.419

0.21**

0.34

0.20**

0.38

0.02

0.098

-0.09*

0.013

0.11**

0.152

0.11**

0.021

-0.18**

0.072

-0.02

0.038

0.03**

0.122

-0.06**

0.071

Deputy Department Head

0.03

0.123

-0.08**

0.134

0.01

0.085

0

0.098

Section Chief

0.01

0.034

-0.03**

0.029

-0.07**

0.161

-0.04**

0.197

Deputy Section Chief

0.16**

0.001

-0.04**

0.001

-0.05*

0.17

-0.04**

0.239

Team Lead

0.28**

0

0.26**

0

0.16**

0.03

0.24**

0.04

Group Leader

0.58**

0

0.47**

0

0.47**

0.02

0.11**

0.02

0.07

0.24

0.02

0.23

0.38**

0.3

0.48**

0.21

Daily/Weekly Pay

0.02**

0.01

-0.01**

0.01

0.07**

0.01

0.04**

0.01

Monthly Pay

0.23**

0.96

0.22**

0.96

0.21**

0.64

0.12**

0.63

Yearly Pay

0.16**

0.03

0.19**

0.02

0.30**

0

0.33**

0

Efficiency Pay

0.08**

0

0.11**

0

0.11**

0.35

0.16**

0.34

Labor Union

-0.02**

0.232

0.06**

0.722

0.08**

0.162

0.11**

0.714

2

Board Member Head of Department

License

Constant

7.35**

7.21**

7.44**

7.35**

No. of Cases

69864

96072

61965

99365

0.53

0.55

0.45

0.52

2

R

24 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

significantly. Such a pattern hints that the endowment effects of unions, after the economic crisis, contribute to increasing the average size-wage gap.

To sum up the result for nonmanual workers, it seems clear that the difference in compensation for work experience has led to the wage disparity between large firms and SMEs. The decrease of the return to firm tenure in large companies denotes the collapse of the internal promotion ladder, a core institution of the corporate internal labor market, and the emergence of a new form of career often called the “boundaryless career” trajectory in which workers move freely across the firm boundary to build up general skills rather than firm-specific skills. In addition, the increased return to certificates/licenses particularly in large firms and the increased proportion of merit-based pay in large firms, all are read as symptoms of the demise of the seniority-based organizational career trajectory and the rise of a new more individualized career.

The results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the size-wage gap for manual and nonmanual workers are shown in <Table 3> and <Table 4>, respectively.

In <Table 3> which is for manual workers, the first row demonstrates the degree to which the determinants of wage contribute to the total endowment effect summed at the end of the row. The (+) sign indicates the factor contribute to increasing the wage of large firms relative to SMEs thereby increasing the size-wage gap and the (–) sign indicates the opposite. If the effect is 0, this indicates that the factor does not explain the wage gap between large firms and SMEs. The second row shows the price effect, and the third row shows the interaction effect. The result for 2004 is presented alongside for comparison. Among manual workers, the average size-wage gap in 1996 was 16.7%, in which 3.5% was accounted for by the endowment effect. In addition, 3.3% was due to the price effect and 9.9% was due to an interaction effect. If the wage gap of 1996 is considered to be 100, 21% of the gap was due to personnel differences between large firms and small to medium-sized firms. In 2004, the endowment effect explained almost 62% of the size-wage gap. What could have influenced the endowment effect this significantly?

In 1996, it is the tenure that contributed the most to the endowment effect working in favor of large firms, however it is offset by the large (-) effect of unions, yielding the total endowment effect as small as +3.5%.

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformationâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 25

Table 3.

1996 Composition Effect Education Job Experience 2

Price Effect

2004 Interaction Composition Effect Effect

Price Effect

Interaction Effect

(E)

(C)

(CE)

(E)

(C)

(CE)

0.40%

10.00%

0.50%

0.00%

26.00%

0.40%

-5.50%

-1.80%

0.20%

-4.90%

-36.40%

2.80%

Job Experience

6.80%

2.10%

-0.60%

9.10%

22.90%

-4.30%

Tenure

8.60%

5.90%

7.30%

13.60%

9.50%

10.60%

Tenure2

-0.10%

-1.50%

-3.70%

-3.70%

-1.60%

-3.80%

Married

0.30%

-3.60%

-0.20%

0.20%

-2.40%

-0.10%

Technician

1.60%

-0.80%

-0.20%

0.10%

-0.90%

0.00%

Assembly Worker

-0.10%

2.20%

0.00%

1.80%

-1.30%

-0.20%

Board Member

0.00%

-0.10%

0.00%

-0.10%

0.00%

0.00%

Head of Department

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

-0.40%

0.50%

-0.50%

Deputy Department Head

-0.10%

0.00%

0.00%

-0.50%

-0.10%

0.10%

Section Chief

-0.10%

-0.10%

0.00%

-0.80%

0.10%

-0.10%

Deputy Section Chief

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

-0.10%

-0.20%

0.00%

Team Lead

0.10%

-0.10%

-0.10%

0.10%

-0.30%

0.00%

Group Leader

0.00%

-0.30%

0.00%

0.20%

-0.20%

-0.20%

License

0.00%

0.30%

0.00%

0.00%

0.70%

0.00%

Daily/Weekly Pay

0.00%

-1.30%

-0.10%

0.00%

-0.60%

-0.40%

Monthly Pay

-1.20%

-4.40%

0.70%

-0.50%

1.10%

-0.20%

Yearly Pay

-0.10%

-0.10%

0.10%

0.00%

0.20%

0.00%

Efficiency Pay

-0.20%

-0.20%

0.20%

-0.70%

0.90%

-0.30%

Labor Union

-6.80%

3.60%

5.70%

2.10%

1.20%

3.00%

Constant

0.00%

-6.60%

0.00%

0.00%

-16.50%

0.00%

Total

3.50%

3.30%

9.90%

15.50%

2.80%

6.70%

Large/Small & Medium Firms Wage Gap (T)=E+C+CE Wage difference between large and small-medium firms(T)

16.70%

25%

% Total (T=100)

100

100

% Explained (E/T)

21

62

% Unexplained ((C+CE)/T)

79

38

26â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 4.

1996 Composition Effect

Price Effect

2004 Interaction Composition Effect Effect

Price Effect

Interaction Effect

(E)

(C)

(CE)

(E)

(C)

(CE)

Education

2.70%

14.60%

0.50%

2.20%

7.80%

0.20%

Job Experience

-8.50%

8.30%

-1.00%

-4.20%

19.50%

-1.30%

Job Experience2

6.70%

0.90%

-0.20%

4.70%

-5.20%

0.90%

Tenure

3.90%

1.30%

0.50%

8.50%

-6.20%

-3.80%

Tenure2

-0.70%

-1.20%

-0.70%

-1.80%

1.60%

1.80%

Married

-0.10%

-4.10%

0.10%

0.00%

0.60%

0.00%

Administrative

-2.20%

-0.10%

0.10%

-1.70%

-1.20%

0.70%

Professional

0.80%

0.50%

0.10%

0.30%

0.40%

0.00%

Semi-Professional

0.40%

0.80%

0.20%

0.30%

1.70%

0.10%

Clerical

0.00%

3.30%

0.00%

0.30%

1.30%

0.20%

Board Member

-1.90%

0.20%

-0.20%

-5.30%

2.10%

-1.80%

Head of Department

-0.30%

-0.20%

0.10%

-1.30%

0.80%

-0.30%

Deputy Department Head

0.10%

-0.50%

0.00%

0.30%

-0.30%

0.00%

Section Chief

0.00%

0.10%

0.00%

0.80%

-0.20%

0.00%

Deputy Section Chief

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.70%

0.00%

0.00%

Team Lead

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

-0.30%

0.00%

Group Leader

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

License

0.00%

-0.80%

0.00%

0.70%

0.80%

-0.30%

Daily/Weekly Pay

0.00%

-0.20%

-0.10%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

Monthly Pay

0.00%

-2.10%

0.00%

-0.20%

4.90%

-0.10%

Yearly Pay

-0.70%

-0.30%

0.10%

0.00%

-0.10%

0.00%

Efficiency Pay

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

-0.30%

3.50%

-0.10%

Labor Union

1.00%

-0.60%

-1.30%

3.60%

-0.40%

-1.50%

Constant

0.00%

-14.60%

0.00%

0.00%

-9.60%

0.00%

Total

1.30%

5.10%

-1.80%

7.60%

21.50%

-5.40%

Large/Small & Medium Firms Wage Gap (T)=E+C+CE Wage difference between large and small-medium firms(T)

4.60%

23.70%

% Total (T=100)

100

100

% Explained (E/T)

28

32

% Unexplained ((C+CE)/T)

72

68

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformationâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 27

The total endowment effect surged in 2004, mainly due to the contribution of the tenure factor (+13.6% of the total endowment effect of 15.5%). The effect of a union was -6.8% in 1996, and this effect increased to +2.1% in 2004, contributing to increasing the composition effect. Compared to the endowment effect, the price effect, and the interaction effect do not account the size-wage gap to a considerable extent. These results show that manual workers at large firms gain relative benefits from longer tenure and higher union rate, implicating the persistence of the internal labor market policies in that group.

On the other hand, the result non-manual workers presented in <Table 4> illustrates drastically different outcomes. The average size-wage gap for white-collar workers was as low as 4.6% in 1996 but it swelled to 23.7% in 2004. In terms of relative contribution, 28% of the gap was accounted by the compositional difference between the two groups in that year. In 2004, the endowment effect accounted for 32% of the wage gap. That is, despite the surge in the size-wage gap, the proportion of endowment effect did not change much, contrary to the case of manual workers. Instead, the Price effect constituted high percentages in both 1996 and 2004.

It is important to note the change in the contribution of education and work experience to the price effect. Education was the most important factor to constitute the price effect in 1996 but not in 2004. Instead, the importance of work experience notably increased in 2004. For nonmanual workers, the tendency of large firms paying more for the same level of education explained a great part of the size-wage gap in 1996, but now it is the work experience that is more rewarded in large firms, thus contributes to increasing size-wage gap.

These changes can be compared with the recent finding of an increase in the number of experienced workers among white-collar workers at large firms. According to a job moving study by Kim et al. (2008), after the late 1990s, the percentage of workers following the occupational career path (workers whose years of work in the same occupation is longer than their firm tenure) has continued to increase among professional and semiprofessional workers, whereas in the manual labor field, the percentage is decreasing. Especially in large firms, the proportion of new recruits entering at the high-rank positions is increasing. This indicates that the internal labor

28â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

market, which was a hindrance to white-collar workers wanting to change jobs, is weakening. Granting that workersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; movement crossing the firm boundary becomes so common, what does it mean that the return to work experience (not firm tenure) increased more rapidly in large firms? And what does it mean that it became an important cause of increasing size-wage gap for white-collar workers? One possible answer, among many, may be that workers with high productivity are moved to and concentrated in large firms. If this is the case, one may argue that the increase of the size-wage gap is a consequence workers in large firms being paid more for the same years of experience compared to their counterparts in SMEs due to unobserved productivity gaps. This means that as the boundary of corporations are weakened and individualized merit-based compensation becomes widespread for white-collar workers, skilled individuals will flock to larger firms and contribute even more to the pay difference between large firms and SMEs. In summary, after the economic crisis, the internal labor market changed significantly, but the ways in which it changed differ greatly between the manual and non-manual fields. The results of this study are supportive of the hypothesis that while, for manual workers, the boundary of the internal labor market was reduced to the core group of long-tenured workers, for non-manual workers, the internal labor market has noticeably weakened. It is important to understand that these differing structural changes in the internal labor market all contributed to the widening of the wage gap between large firms and SMEs. And they did through different mechanisms for manual and nonmanual groups; through the increased proportion of long-tenured workers for the former and through the reshuffling of workers by ability for the latter.

VII. Summary and Implications This research analyzed the wage gap between large firms and SMEs and its trend over time since early 1980s. Two important points were noted. First, there were two historic moments that contributed greatly to the increase ofgap between large firms and SMEs in Korea, the 1987 general strike and the 1997 economic crisis, triggering different mechanisms. The size-wage

The Dual Process of Korean Labor Market Transformation 29

gap increase after 1987 was only a temporary phenomenon occurring during the process in which SMEs slowly caught up the pay increase initiated in large firms. On the other hand, the increase of the size-wage gap after 1997 is a consequence of more diverse factors implicating more or less structural changes of the labor market.

Another notable finding is that the cause of the size-wage gap after the economic crisis became quite different between manual and non-manual male workers. In the case of manual workers, the increasing compositional differences between large firms and SMEs contributed most to the increase in disparity, while non-manual workers affected more from the increase in price difference. If manual workers of large firms collect greater wages than their counterparts in SMEs due to their higher tenure, non-manual workers of large firms receive higher wages due to greater compensation for work experience.

The result for manual workers in large firms entails the persistence of the internal labor market characterized by higher wages secured through firm tenure, whereas the result for non-manual workers in large firms shows the increased importance of the return to the work experience (not the firm tenure) implicating a development of more individualized “boundaryless career.”

The research started with a question whether the internal labor market in Korea is being strengthened or dismantled. The answer is different depends on who we refer to. The corporate internal labor market still seems to be around in large firms for manual workers but not for nonmanual workers.

Not only has the seniority effect been weakened in large firms, the focus of hiring and wage determination has shifted to external work experience. What generated such different developments is a question that should be answered in future studies. What this study emphasizes is the limitation of those perspectives to view the change in the internal labor market as a uniform process, whether it be the selective preservation or the complete collapse, and the possibility of dual process in which different structural changes occur simultaneously in different sectors.

This study’s findings have implications for the recent increase in inequality in Korean society. According to previous studies by Kim and Han (2007), Korean society, since the economic crisis, has been experiencing greater within-class inequality than between-class inequality. Based on the result of

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this study, one may reckon that such within-class inequality is caused mainly by the advantages from belonging to internal labor market(organizational assets) in case of blue-collar workers, whereas in the case of white-collar workers, it is caused mainly by the expertise coming from formal educational and job experience(knowledge assets).

Finally, the findings of this study are limited by the limits of the data. The “Basic Survey of Wage Structure” used in this research focuses on regular employees. Therefore, the gap created by employment status could not be considered. However, in order to investigate the long-term size-wage gap, the “Basic Survey of Wage Structure” was an inevitable choice despite its restrictions. Thus, the limitations of these data should be resolved through comparison with other data. Also, this study is limited in that it only focuses on male workers. How the dual structural changes that occurred in manual and nonmanualsectors after the economic crisis affected the wage gap between male and female workers, as well as the inequality within female workers are questions that require further research, through which a greater understanding of the structural changes in the Korean internal labor market will be gained.

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Hwang, Sun Ong. 2007. “Structural Change in Employment Dynamics of Korean Temporary Workers.” Economic Analysis 13(4): 87-121 (“한국 임시일용직 고 용동학의 구조변화.” 『경제분석』 13(4): 87-121).

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Organizations: A Study of Wage Inequality in the 1990s in Korea.” Korean Journal of Sociology 36(6): 1-25 (“노동시장 불평등과 조직 내 불평등: 1990년대 임금 불평등 추세 연구.” 『한국사회학』 36(6): 1-25). . 2007. “Firm Size or Work Arrangement?—The Determinants of Labor Market Inequality in Korea.” Economy and Society 73: 332-355 (“기업규모인 가 고용형태인가: 노동시장 불평등의 요인분석.” 『경제와 사회』 73: 332-355).

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Jung, Ee Hwan and Cheon, Byung Yoo. 2001. “Changes in the Structure of Korean Wages in the 1990s: Is the Internal Labor Market Weakening.”

Economy and Society 52: 156-183 (“1990년대 한국임금구조의 변화: 내부노동 시장은 약화되고 있는가.” 『경제와 사회』 52: 156-183).

Kim, Hye Won · Kim, Sung Hoon and Choi, Min Sik. 2008. Analysis of the Effect of Job- Mobility on Labor Market. Korea Labor Institute (『직장이동의 노동시 장 효과 분석』).

Kim, Young Mi and Han, Joon. 2007. “Changes in Income Inequality After the Financial Crisis—Decomposition of Income Inquality.” Korean Journal of Sociology 41(5): 35-63 (“금융 위기 이후 한국 소득 불평등 구조의 변화.” 『한국사 회학』 41(5): 35-63).

Lee, Hyo Soo. 2001. “Changes in Labor Environment and their Impact on Structural Changes in the Labor Market.” Korean Economic Review 30(1): 243-274 (“노동시장 환경 변화와 노동 시장의 구조변동.” 『경제학연구』 30(1): 243-274).

Lee, Kun. 2001. “A Quatitative Approach to Dual Industrial Structures of the Korean Labor Market.” Korean Journal of Sociology 35(5): 147-172 (“제조업 노동시장이중구조의 계량화.” 『한국사회학』 35(5): 147-172).

Nahm, Choon Ho. 1995. “An Empirical Analysis of the Dual Labor Market in Manufacturing Industry.” Korean Journal of Sociology 29 (Winter): 789-824 (“제조업 노동시장의 이중구조에 대한 실증적 분석.” 『한국사회학』 29: 789-824).

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구』 50(2): 257-286).

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References in English

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Blinder, Alan. 1973. “Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates.” The Journal of Human Resources 8(4): 436-455.

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Main, Brian and Barry Reilly. 1993. “The Employer Size-Wage Gap: Evidence for Britain.” Economica, New Series 60(238): 125-142.

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Industrial Relations 30(3): 350-381.

Idson, Todd and Daniel Feaster. 1990. “A Selectivity Model of Employer-Size Wage Differentials.” Journal of Labor Economics 8(1): 99-122.

Main, Brian and Barry Reily. 1993. “The Employer Size-Wage Gap: Evidence for Britain.” Economica, New Series 60(238): 125-142.

Oaxaca, Ronald. 1973. “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets.” International Economic Review 14(3): 693-709.

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Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA* Cheong, In Kyo** Discussions about the KORUS FTA began in the mid-1980s; however, due to the immaturity of domestic motivation to push forward, full-scale talks didn’t begin until 2004. The KORUS FTA, the negotiations for which began in June of 2006, with additional negotiations in 2007, was officially signed in late June of 2007. The KORUS FTA is expected to have a major impact on the Korean economy relative to the other FTAs that have already been established.

It is also expected to have a significant impact on trade by Korea and on FTA policies as a whole.

Within the framework of the KORUS FTA, there are sensitive issues, but the general consensus is that it is considerably in agreement with Korea’s national interests through its coverage and its high level of market access. It is generally viewed that the agreement was improved in many aspects and that the risks of implementing the sensitive points were minimized by way of exceptions and added terms. However, based on differing perspectives on establishing an FTA with the US, some radical evaluations have begun to appear.

This paper aims to evaluate the KORUS FTA by analyzing the process involved, the main issues raised during the negotiations, and its economic impact. In the conclusion section, the author points out the need to strengthen the Korean trade policy system with the beef crisis as the stimulus for this, so as to foster the growth of communications between civic groups and interested parties and to solidify the convergence of opinions. Also discussed is the need for the early ratification and execution of a reasonable agreement to realize the gains expected from the KORUS FTA. Keywords: KOREA-US FTA, Market Access, FTA Roadmap, Trade Policy, CGE JEL Classification: F15, F55, F13, and F11, Korea

*

**

Translated from an article published in the Journal of Korean Economic Analysis 14(2): 213-283, 2008 with permission from the Korea Institute of Finance.

Professor, Division of Economics, Inha University 33

34 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

I. Introduction The Republic of Korea has signed Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with multiple nations. Thus far, Korea has signed treaties with Chile (effective as of April, 2004), Singapore (effective as of March, 2006), the European Free Trade Association (effective as of September, 2006), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN; effective as of June, 2007). Agreements with the European Union, India, Canada, and Mexico are underway. The FTA with the United States had been under examination since 2003, when Korea finalized the “FTA Propulsion Roadmap.” Some degree of examination was conducted intermittently before 2003; however, due to the unfavorable domestic and foreign situations at the time, progress was difficult. In 2004, Korea began to contact the US actively to establish bilateral discussions on the matter. In 2005, the US and Korea held working-level FTA discussions three times, and on the basis of these, both sides announced that official negotiations would be held in early 2006. The time taken for Korean-US free trade agreement (KORUS-FTA) negotiations was relatively brief compared to that needed for other FTAs and given that such a comprehensive FTA contained rather many sensitive issues.

Furthermore, many expect a considerable economic impact as a result of the KORUS-FTA; due to its exemplary form of market access designs along with its advanced trade policies, it is expected to have a great impact on Korea’s future FTA and trade policies. Establishing an FTA with the world’s largest market, the US, allows amplified possibilities for Korean businesses to advance into the American market, which can ultimately support Korean businesses as they attempt to advance into other foreign markets. In fact, the records of actual exports to American distributors are widely known to be used as references when consulting about exports with other nations.

The process of establishing the KORUS-FTA has been fraught with domestic resistance due to the sensitive topics it contains. Many opposing factions criticized the very nature of the FTA, the opening of markets, and the related deregulation plans. However, some opposed the KORUS-FTA regardless of the content of the agreement, simply because the policy partner was the US. Meanwhile, the authorities’ attempt to settle on the agreement

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 35

before the expiration of the American TPA (Trade Promotion Act) resulted in tense public hearings. In addition, the authorities’ leading the public to think that the processes were being rushed worked against the gaining of public support.

The principal goal of this paper is to examine the KORUS-FTA objectively while placing much emphasis on analyzing the overall process of the agreement. Most existing domestic papers focus on the macroeconomic aspects of the KORUS-FTA, while discussions of the historical aspects of the agreement are scarce. Because the KORUS-FTA is substantial relative to Korea’s other FTAs, for example with Chile or Singapore, it is impossible to examine every aspect of it in detail. Nonetheless, this paper is an attempt to analyze the KORUS-FTA quantitatively and qualitatively by historically examining it from the time of its negotiation to the time of its settlement.

II. Course of Promoting the KORUS-FTA 1. Background Today, FTAs perform a very important role at the center of the WTO’s multilateral trade system; it is no exaggeration to say that every member state of the WTO promotes FTAs. China is the latest nation to join the realm of FTAs, and as of June of 2008, it has already entered into seven FTAs. The trade authorities of countries such as those in the Middle East and Africa and even Mongolia are among the many that are also actively pushing to establish FTAs. Why do all of these nations want FTAs? Generally, nations promote FTAs for many reasons, but it can be interpreted that most promote FTAs to improve their economy by increasing exports, investments, and advancing trade policies. They also stress the importance of promoting FTAs because they don’t want to face losses by not riding the worldwide FTA wave.1 Generally, the economic gains made through the FTA depend on the size, structure, and the growth of the partnering nation’s economy. Usually, FTAs with nations with a high trade barrier and advanced trade policies will bring 1

As of August, 2008, there are total of 213 FTAs in the world.

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greater economic gain. A more inclusive agreement leads to a larger economic effect. The US is the world’s largest economy, accounting for 20% of the world’s gross domestic product. Generally, the US promotes an all-inclusive FTA; thus, one can expect a highly positive economic effect if one enters into an FTA with the US. However, it is true that actual economic gains can only be calculated once the agreed-upon framework of the FTA is analyzed.

In 2003, when Korea officials contacted the US to review the FTA, Americans viewed the Korea’s will to push for the FTA to be low and considered the Korea-Chile FTA to be an ordinary trade agreement. Furthermore, they considered the Korea’s trade policies to be overprotective. As such, they underestimated the economic gains made by the US through the FTA. Later, when Korea successfully entered into agreements with Singapore, EFTA, and ASEAN, and promoted FTAs with Canada, Mexico, and India, the US finally began to view the Korea’s will to be high. Meanwhile, the US most likely felt some degree of threat from the rise of China and the deterioration of Korea-US relations, meaning that the KORUS-FTA would fulfill the need to strengthen the strategic alliance between the two nations.

The US has entered into an FTA with only a few nations, mainly due to the fact that there are not many nations like the US that can promote such comprehensive trade agreements. In addition, it simply is not easy to find nations with the trade agreement experience and negotiating manpower of the US. The US has secured many experienced commerce professionals and specialists in the field, which the other nations lack. In addition, in the case of the US, the power to push for an FTA is held by the US Congress, which makes it difficult for the US to concede in negotiations; that is, the US Congress holds authority over trade policy, which is an authentic characteristic that only the US has. The US Congress, under special circumstances, is granted Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) by the executive branch. Therefore, the US has a very limited time frame for promoting any type of trade agreement, not only because it needs approval from Congress, but also because any negotiation can only begin once TPA is granted.

Let’s turn our attention to the Korea’s promotion of FTAs. Approximately ten years ago, when Korea was negotiating an FTA for the first time with Chile, there were not many experienced commerce professionals. Therefore, more time was spent on examining agreement drafts and analyzing

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 37

concessions. In turn, negotiations took longer than expected. Later, five to six FTAs were simultaneously promoted or examined, which pushed the Korean government to sharpen its focus, specifically on the trade and commerce field. More than 30 professionals were openly recruited at this point. For the KORUS-FTA, the Korean government employed more than 300 professionals. Along with indirect support from the Korean National Policy Research Institute and other private institutions, the total number of personnel involved in the affair exceeded 500. We cannot say with any confidence that we have secured a sufficient number of professionals, but we can at least say that we have sufficient manpower to carry out KORUS-FTA preparations and negotiations without major setbacks. In the real KORUSFTA negotiations, the American negotiating team publicly spoke highly of the Korean negotiation staff and their well-prepared content and attitudes at the table. The results of the actual negotiations support such compliments; after the negotiation, it is true that public support for the KORUS-FTA was greater than opposition; The Korean economists praised the KORUSFTA negotiations as one of the greatest outcomes of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. The KORUS-FTA was evaluated as a necessary policy, because both its content and its timeliness are expected to have a positive impact on the Korean economy.

For Korea, which has already entered into FTAs with numerous nations, there is a need to seek greater, higher-quality FTAs to increase economic gains. From 2000 to 2005, Korea experienced the world’s fastest FTA promotion rate, and the Korean government was called upon to take a more active role in promoting FTAs following reports on the negative economic effects of FTAs published by trade organizations such as KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency). Those who called on the Korean government were mainly financial institutions, and those institutions emphasized the need for Korea to enter into FTAs with larger economies, such as the US or the EU. Meanwhile, there was a need for Korea to improve the quality of FTAs. There were many voices advocating centering the Korean FTAs on the service industry, development, investment, and liberalized trade policies. These voices expected that by including these factors in the KORUS FTA, Korea would not only advance its economy but would also make it more transparent.

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During this time, the Roh administration set as its primary goal to raise the national per capita income to $20,000 through the KORUS FTA. The Roh administration realized that the goal was only realistically reachable with improvements to the service industry, which made up over 70% of the Korean economy. Thus, it is no exaggeration that the promotion of the KORUS FTA was possible owing to the Roh administration’s hope to advance the Korea’s service industry and its economic competitiveness. The service industry has many regulations by nature and maintains established business methods and practices which have sprung from those regulations while protecting the profits of interested parties. In other words, while the service industry is guaranteed to grow with countless regulations as its catalyst, despite changes in the trade environment, it cannot actually aid in the development of the economy. According to a study conducted by the World Bank in 2007 on changes in the business environments of 178 nations between April of 2006 and June of 2007, Korea placed 30th, a drop of seven places from the previous year’s rank.2 It is true that the Korean government has been improving the business environment; however, studies show that because other nations have been improving at a faster rate, the business environment of Korea has actually regressed. It was also found that the initial expenses of a typical Korean company were around 16.9% of the GNI per capita, which is approximately 5.1% higher than the OECD average. Korea placed 131st in employment (a one place drop from the previous year), and 64th in investor protection (a two place drop from the previous year). Due to the active promotion of the FTA, trade placed 13th, a significant 17-place jump from the previous year. Regardless, the Korea’s service industry ranks among the lowest internationally.

Today, the service industry of a nation impacts the productivity of the manufacturing industry. The service industry, especially in the fields of education, medicine, law, accounting, and design, shows parallel growth to that of the manufacturing industry. Thus, the service industry is important in 2

Meanwhile, according to the Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008 by the World Economic Forum, Korea’s national competitiveness jumped to 11th place from 23rd place last year. This sort of business environment improvement is credited with having impacted the signing of the KORUS FTA.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 39

the development of the manufacturing industry. Once the wall of regulations is lowered, more investors will enter the market, which in turn, develops the service industry. That means that the foreign impact is necessary for the development of the service industry; once foreign investors compete against domestic investors and corporations, domestic players are stimulated to elevate their competitiveness. The Korean government firmly believed that FTAs would contribute to the advancement of the service industry. Luckily, some sectors in the service industry, such as law and accounting, were included in the KORUS FTA, but very controversial sectors such as education and medicine were excluded. Due to such results, it was originally concluded that the opening of the service industry was insufficient. Later, the Korean government announced a plan to liberalize the service industry sectors, which were not included in the KORUS FTA, but generally, the plan is considered to be too unrealistic.

Some criticize the inexperience and the unpreparedness of the Korea’s rushed promotion of the KORUS FTA. It is certainly true that a couple more years of preparation would have brought better results, although, that does not speak to the excellent timeliness of the KORUS FTA. Considering the conditions of promoting the KORUS FTA from the Korea’s side, it was deemed to be more reasonable to promote the FTA with sympathy with the US as the background.

Some criticize the government for starting KORUS FTA negotiations without any plans for industries which are impacted negatively. It is true that “sufficient advance preparations” are difficult for any FTA. First, in accordance with the results of the negotiations, each party to the negotiation calculates and estimates the cost of countermeasures of any losses. Therefore, it is difficult to prepare a damage prevention plan in advance. In addition, advanced preparation to prevent losses would mean that the Korean industries would be equipped with greater international competitiveness, but any nation with this level of international competitiveness would not need to promote FTAs. In the first days of 2007, a National Assembly member released one of my own reports on FTAs, which received much attention from the press. This report was prepared in 2005, when the Korean government was actively promoting the KORUS FTA. It provided a model that converted the theoretical pressure from restructuring after concluding the FTA into

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unemployment numbers using economic models.3 Although it is undeniable that more jobs will be created by signing the KORUS FTA, this study was implemented to estimate the level of transitory unemployment (the pressure from restructuring) as a result of the shift of the employment of manpower from less competitive industries to developing industries and the cost of re-employing the manpower necessary to support the policy management activities pertaining to trade regulations. Actually, the Korean government referenced the results of this study when they enacted the Trade Regulation Support Policy for the first time in April of 2006. The Korean government had enacted regulations and policies to help the affected workers and businesses, and they had already secured a budget of approximately $110,000,000,000 for the agriculture industry. This budget was originally a countermeasure to the opening of the agricultural industry through agendas such as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). However, the Korean government, in an effort to ease the burden of losses due to the FTA in the agriculture industry smoothly, retouched the budget plan and decided the additional aid would be dispersed after the KORUS FTA was signed.

It is possible to argue that the proposition to subsidize the agriculture industry and the 2006 Trade Regulation Support Policy were insufficient to cover all losses and damage due to the KORUS FTA. Nevertheless, it is expected that when subsidizing the losses and damage caused by the opening of the market, the Korean government must apply the following three standards. First, it must reference the WTO’s Subsidy Agreement.

Unlike the situation in the past, today the WTO has set firm limits on how much a member state may receive in subsidies in times of need. It is also gradually decreasing these limits. As Korea requires more financial support to promote its trade agreements, it encounters the problem of having to reduce its financial support in other areas. Next, Korea must calculate the required subsidies based on statistics from past cases of other nations.

3

Cheong In Kyo (2005) “FTA Promotion and Trade Restructuring ”Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy sponsored, “Public Hearing on the Manufacture Industry and Trade Restructuring Support” Presentation Documents (August 31, The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry Conference Room)

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 41

Although American financial support is considered to be excellent, such support primarily focuses on secondary support to train and consult for the unemployed, instead of giving hard currency. Lastly, Korea must consider its own current economic status. One may agree with the idea of actively supporting the weak and vulnerable classes, but the size of such support must be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the current economic status of the nation. It is irrational to support these classes actively if that support endangers the economic status of the state.4

2. Progress5 a. Discussions, 1980-90s In the 1980s, the US began to show interest in establishing bilateral trade relations with Korea, as it was worried about the possible growth of the national deficit and the weakening of its international competitiveness.

Meanwhile, Korea responded to the US-led promotion of the FTA by organizing domestic research groups centered on professionals from the National Policy Institute.

In April of 1984, representatives from the USTR and GATT suggested a review of the KORUS FTA. At the time, the Uruguay Round negotiations were not as fruitful as was hoped; thus, the US not only pushed forward an FTA with Canada to counter the plan to unify the European markets, but they also reviewed the possibilities of establishing FTAs with major East Asian nations. According to a report by the USITC which examined AsianPacific FTAs in 1989, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan were considered to be the most appropriate countries with which to enter into a FTA. Later, the US determined that the Singaporean market was too small and would be unprofitable and that it would be inadequate to enter into an FTA with

4

For instance, Korea’s gross agricultural output in 2006 was approximately 26 trillion won, whereas the government subsidy for the agriculture industry was 16 trillion won.

In addition, considering Korea’s current economic status, the amount of the subsidy cannot be considered insufficient.

5 Based on the author’s contributing works (Cheong In Kyo 1998-2005) on the KORUS FTA.

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Taiwan.6 Among these three counties, it is true that Korea was considered ideal, but due to the strong anti-American sentiment in Korea, the actual push for an agreement was judged to be difficult.

Nevertheless, following the report, numerous studies were conducted on the potential for a KORUS FTA, resulting in the creation of the Korea International Trade Association and the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade. However, follow-up studies were seldom, if ever, conducted, which further impeded the trade authorities’ full understanding of the FTA. Moreover, discussions of FTAs were not able to continue due to domestic sentiments and the inclusion of the opening of the agriculture industry in the Uruguay Round. During the Kim Young-Sam era, there were times when trade professionals were called to review the potential of entering into an FTA with the US. In 1996, the Globalization Promotion Committee even studied FTAs and conducted a potential economic analysis of the KORUS FTA, which was revised and supplemented by Wang, Yun Jong and Cheong, In Kyo to be published in the Korea’s Current Economic Reviews and Outlook in 1998.7 In 1998, as Korean government reviewed the Korea-Chile FTA, there were talks about the KORUS FTA. However, because the Korean government lacked the knowledge and the experience in FTA negotiations, it concluded that it was wiser to enter into an FTA with a smaller economy; that is, the Korean government would promote FTAs, with Chile being its first FTA partner, and afterward review the potential of entering agreements with Japan, Thailand, New Zealand and others. Even as such studies and reviews were being conducted, the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea delivered letters urging the Clinton administration to enter into an FTA with Korea.

6

However, in 2000, the US agreed to promote a FTA with Singapore and began negotiations in 2001 that resulted in the signing of the agreement in 2002. It is presumed that the US entered into an FTA with Singapore to strengthen its service industry and gain more access to East Asian markets.

7 Wang Youn Jong, Cheong In Kyo, “Establishment of the Korea-US Free Trade Zone and its Economic Implications” Current Economic Reviews and Outlook, Volume 4, 2nd Edition, 1998, pp. 135-188.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 43

b. Discussions after 2000 In April of 2000, the Korean government announced the results of a joint study of a Korea-Japan FTA and began the negotiations of the Korea-Chile FTA. The discussions of the potential of a Korea-Japan FTA worried many American corporations. This, in turn, pushed the US to urge the early settlement of both the Korea-US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the KORUS FTA at the 14th Annual Korea-US Business Council meeting held in Hawaii in January of 2001. Meanwhile, the American agriculture industry, which was highly interested in exporting American agricultural goods and products, including beef, urged Senator Max Baucus to promote the KORUS FTA. As a result, in late 2000, Senator Baucus requested a feasibility study on the KORUS FTA from the USITC. As the US began its feasibility study on the agreement, Korea began to do the same. In 2001 and 2002, such studies were conducted independently by each nation; however, given the immature conditions, these studies were not able to develop into an official discussion of the agreement.

In the 2002 Korea presidential election the incumbent party maintained its majority, with Roh Moo-Hyun as its head, but the new administration’s transition committee did not put much priority on reviewing Roh’s FTA policies. Rather, it focused much of its attention on constructing a North East Asian economic sphere, which made discussions of FTAs more opaque than ever. Nonetheless, after four or five months in power, the Roh administration began to show a distinct interest in promoting FTAs and therefore started to put some effort into ratifying the Korea-Chile FTA. In September of 2003, the Roh administration made the “FTA Promotion Roadmap” one of its priorities.8 This roadmap included plans to promote FTAs with the US, EU, China, and other larger economies.

As a result, confirming the FTA Roadmap expedited the Korea-Japan FTA. Thus, in October of 2003 at the APEC Summit Meeting, Korea and Japan jointly announced the beginning of their FTA negotiations.9 The Korea-Japan 8

According to this roadmap, at the time, the Korea set FTAs with Singapore and Japan as a short-term goal and FTAs with the US, EU, China, and other larger economies as a long-term goal.

9 The Korea-Japan FTA forums were operated from May of 2001 to the early 2002.

Beginning in June of 2002, the Industrial, Governmental, an Academia Joint Research

44 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 1. Schedule of the KORUS FTA Date Stage of FTA 2003. 8. 30 Probes and 2004. 11.19 Preparations 2005.02.0304.29

Event Title Conclusion of the FTA road map

Venue Seoul

The KORUS trade ministerial meeting- Santiago Review and consensus of the KORUS FTA The 1st~3rd round of the KORUS FTA ex- Seoul & ploratory meeting Washington

2005.02-06.11 6 sessions of the KORUS trade ministerial Geneva, etc. meeting 2006.01.18

President Roh, Moo-hyun’s New Year’s Seoul Address (The KORUS FTA negotiations announced)

2006.02.02

Public hearing on the KORUS FTAResolution on external meeting of economic ministers

2006.03.07

Korean Government- Decision on screen Seoul quota reduction

2006.03-04

2 informal sessions of the KORUS FTA Washington preparatory negotiation & Seoul

Stage of FTA 2006.06.05Negotiations 12.08 2007.01.1503.12

1st~5th formal round of the KORUS FTA negotiation

Seoul

Washington, Seoul, etc

6th~8th formal round of the KORUS FTA Washington negotiation & Seoul

2007.03.26-4.1 Trade minister-level negotiation/ Summit Seoul telephone negotiation (March 30) 2007.03.26-4.1 Final agreement Signing

2007.06

Additional negotiation on new trade policy

2007.06.30

Official signing of the FTA document

Seoul Seoul

Stage of FTA 2007.09.07 Ratification

Government- Submission of the FTA ratifi- Seoul cation proposal to the National Assembly

2008.06.26

Notification of U.S. beef inspection and Seoul quarantine criteria

2008.08.06

KORUS summit talk- Consensus of joint Seoul actions for this year's congressional ratification

2008.08.19

Consensus of congressional leadership formation

Data: Prepared by author

Seoul

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 45

FTA negotiations began in December of 2003. However, they fell out of favor, largely due to the disagreement between the two countries on the opening of each other’s agriculture sector, eventually leading to the discontinuance of the negotiations after a year. From the perspective of Korea, the Korea-Japan FTA was meaningless if it did not include a section of the agreement guaranteeing economic benefits to Korea from the Japanese side.

Meanwhile, by the end of 2003, in the middle of the Korea-Japan negotiations, the Korea-Chile FTA seemed uncertain. This meant that Korea was in a situation to put forth the FTA Promotion Roadmap, which was finalized in September of 2003, and began its search of ways to promote multiple FTAs simultaneously. It was in this period that Korea began actively to look at the potential of the KORUS FTA. Although the results were unfruitful, representatives from each nation even held informal meetings on the issue. At this time, the US made it clear that the KORUS FTA could not be politically promoted while BIT negotiations were not progressing as a result of the disagreement about the screen quota. However, after May of 2004, the US began to hold rather optimistic views. In November of the same year, the US government even hosted a joint meeting to discuss the potential of the KORUS FTA during the Korea-US Commerce Summit Meeting held in Santiago.

In the early days of the KORUS FTA discussions, the discussants were comprised of mainly public workers, and the primary focus of the meetings was to communicate what each party hoped to gain through the negotiations.

Field-specific discussions mainly included tariffs, agriculture, textiles, government procurement, rules of origin, trade remedies, intellectual property, the financial sector, the service industry, investment, telecom, electronic trade, competition policies, labor, the environment, and other topics. Both parties analyzed the other’s stance on the contending issues and used the analysis to prepare a report to be used during the negotiations.

From 2004 to 2005, the roles of high ranking officials, including the commerce minister, congressmen, and economic organization presidents, were crucial in shaping the environment for the promotion of the KORUS Committee was organized to discuss the feasibility of and the directions for promoting the agreement.

46 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

FTA. This group specifically contacted several high-ranking American officials, including opinion leaders, members of Congress, and commerce department officials.10 Unlike other FTAs, representatives from the Federation of Korean Industries, the Korean International Trade Association, and the Chamber of Commerce and Industries met with their American counterparts and actively put some effort into promoting the KORUS FTA. Ultimately, by September of 2005, the US had to prioritize the promotion of the KORUS FTA. c. Promotion of KORUS FTA after 2006 Starting in 2006, promotion of the KORUS FTA began to accelerate. Once Korea decided on its policy negotiation terms, it broke the tradition of having a minister-level official announce the need for a KORUS FTA by having the president himself speak publicly to the people. At the end of 2005, the negotiation date was undecided, but in early 2006, both sides agreed to hold the first meeting in February of the same year. This resulted in a delay of many public hearings and minister-level economic conferences. Finally, on February 2nd, 2006, the first public hearing on the KORUS FTA promotion was held, and in the afternoon of the same day, during a minister-level economic conference, numerous ministers from various ministries confirmed their plan to promote the KORUS FTA. Once legal procedures to promote the KORUS FTA were taken by the Korean officials, on February 3rd, 2006, the US Senate announced the beginning of KORUS FTA deliberations.

In reality, the February public hearing, which was held to satisfy the negotiation terms with the US, worked against the plans of anti-FTA organizations. They argued that there was not enough time before the public hearings to raise questions at the hearings and that, although the hearing was called to order, it wasn’t actually held. Thus, the negotiation announcement

10

According to the former Trade Minister Hyun-Jong Kim (2006), “Some think that the US pressure to implement the KORUS FTA has already taken effect. … However, the establishment of the KORUS FTA is the fruit of our work of convincing the American administration, Congress and businesses towards reform and opening.” The Ministry of Finance and Economy Serial (http://mofe.news.go.kr) [A Special Project ‘KORUS FTA at the Start line’] March 14, 2006.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 47

itself should have been considered invalid, according to them.11 They also argued that because the “FTA Promotion Procedure Regulations” were a set of rules made with the promotion of KORUS FTA in mind, and considering that the public hearing broke down, the whole situation should be seen as a breach of contract. Criticisms of the government for not providing sufficient opportunities to collect opinions from the public ultimately led the Korean government to hold another public hearing on June 27th, 2006. However, this effort was not enough to calm the outbreak of the anti-FTA organizations and groups.

Due to the expiration of the TPA, the US suggested that negotiations start from the beginning of that year. However, Korea and the US later agreed to start in June, after Korea held a regional election that was planned for the last day of May. Nonetheless, the unofficial negotiations between FTA personnel from both sides led to the inspection of some items on the agenda, which eventually cut much time off of the official schedule.

The Korean officials were aware of the TPA expiration, yet they did not agree to any sort of negotiation time line. Nevertheless, it is true that the Korean officials admitted that it would be much easier to ratify the agreement if it were to be signed by both sides before the expiration of TPA. Therefore, both governments agreed to try their best to come to an agreement by the end of March of 2007 (the actual deadline was April 2, 2007). As a part of this small agreement, both sides also agreed to schedule a total of eight negotiation sessions and to utilize unofficial meetings to reduce the time as much as they possibly could. The number of scheduled negotiation sessions itself shows how much interest both governments had in the KORUS FTA; for past FTAs, Korea scheduled only up to four such sessions per year, but in the case of the KORUS FTA, there were negotiations almost every month. Furthermore, for every negotiation session, the officials set a fiveday structure, which doubled the days spent for negotiations in the past. In addition, many more people were involved in the KORUS FTA negotiations 11

According to the public hearing schedule, which generally lasts about two weeks, it seems that the government had a hard time trying to hold such a hearing. However, considering the sensitivity of the KORUS FTA and its importance, the government should have held the hearing even if it took the delaying of the announcement of the start of the negotiation.

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compared to those of other FTAs. Despite the eight negotiations held until March of 2007, both sides failed to close the gaps on a majority of the issues in the KORUS FTA. Mainly, these issues were related to automobiles, textiles, and agriculture. In attempts to reach an agreement, telephone negotiations were conducted between the heads of the two states in March, with multiple high-level-official negotiations thereafter. Thanks to these efforts, negotiations miraculously came to an end on April 2nd, 2007. However, the very next month, in May, the American administration and Congress agreed on a new trade policy, which eventually led to additional negotiations. The final agreement was reached in late June, and the agreement was thus signed by both parties on the 30th of June. Soon after, the Korean government drafted a new set of domestic implementation laws, and in September, a letter requesting KORUS FTA ratification was presented to Congress.

III. KORUS FTA: Main Contents The KORUS FTA is an all-inclusive, wide-open trade agreement. Thus, it is not easy to analyze every detail of it simply. To discuss the contents of the KORUS FTA in a more efficient manner, I have divided its contents into broad sections. The first of these is the removal of the tariff wall; the second is customs; the third, government procurement; fourth is trade remedies; fifth, patent rights/trade policy liberalization; and finally, service industry investment. In analyzing each section, I will discuss the main issues as well as the pros and cons of the issues from the perspective of Korea. Concerning the main issues, I will adjust the depth of the analysis based on the level of importance of each issue.

1. Tariffs Traditionally, tariffs have been the core of economic profit in any FTA. Thus, the economy usually takes the majority of the weight during the negotiations.

It is generally known that FTA negotiations are conducted with economic analysis at their core. Tariffs become a type of primary indicator to the

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 49

members of the FTA, not only because they can be analyzed quantitatively, but also because they are relatively easy for the participating nations to cross-correlate. Tariffs are so closely related to other areas of the FTA that they ultimately determine how inclusive or open it will be; thus, there is a tendency for the whole structure to be designed and built toward the end of the negotiation process.

The level of tariff reduction in the KORUS FTA is incomparable by both international and domestic standards. There are few international trade agreements that are as open as the KORUS FTA. It is true that there are some international agreements, such as the CER (Closer Economic Relations) of Australia and New Zealand and the US-Chile FTA, in which tariffs are completely removed, but with the exception of those agreements, it is rare to find international trade agreements that eliminate all tariffs. In the KORUS FTA, tariffs on textiles are completely eliminated. Tariffs on agricultural products, with the exception of rice, reached a 99.9% tariff reduction.

In the case of the KORUS FTA, Korea focused primarily on exceptions to the opening of its rice market, and the US focused primarily on entering the Korean market with its items of interest. Both nations agreed to eliminate Table 2. The Range of Tariff Reductions in Korean FTAs Section

Agreement Chile

(tariff concession of 99.8%: 100% for industrial products, 98.5% for agricultural products)

Singapore

2004 (tariff concession of 91.6%: 97.4% for industrial products, 66.6% for agricultural products)

Announcement EFTA

Conclusion

Remarks

2006 (tariff concession of 98.5%: 99.7% for industrial products, 34~58% for agricultural products)

9 ASEAN nations

2007 (tariff concession of 99.1%: 100% for industrial products, 93.2% for agricultural products)

4 AFTA nations

2006 (preferential tariff rate of 14~35.7%: import tariff rate of 6.1~52.7%)

U.S.

Tariff Concession of 99.9%: 100% for industrial products, 99.9% for agricultural products

Note: AFTA (formerly ‘Bangkok Agreement’) is subject to not tariff elimination but tariff reduction.

50â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

tariffs on almost all items, other than rice. For produce such as oranges, potatoes, grapes and other agricultural products, they agreed to apply a seasonal tariff so that the current tariffs would be maintained during specific circulation seasons and that tariffs would be eliminated during the seasons when the Korean market would not suffer any damage. With the exception of these items, it is true that tariffs on all agricultural products will be removed as a result of the KORUS FTA. Table 3. Classification of Items of Interest and their Concession Type Concession Type

Item

Concession Exempted

Rice

Current Tariff/Import Quota

Oranges, Soybeans, Potatoes, Skim and Whole Milk, Condensed Milk, Natural Honey

Seasonal Tariff

Grapes, Potato Chips

Long-term Elimination, Apples (Fuji 20 years, Others 10 years), Pears (Asian Pears 20 Tri-Interval-Elimination years, Others 10 years) Beef (15 Years), Pork (Frozen 10 Years), Chiles, Garlic, Onions Long-term Elimination, (15 Years), Ginseng (18 Years), Barley (15 Years), Beer Malt Safeguard and Malting Barley (15 Years), Starch (10~15 Years) 15 Years

Walnut, Chestnuts, Mandarins, Matsutake Mushrooms, Shitake Mushrooms, Filtered Tobacco

12 Years

Chicken (Frozen, Wings), Frozen Onions, Watermelons, Subsidiary Feed

10 Years

Peaches, Persimmons, Mandarin Juice, Tobacco Leaves, Plums

6~9 Years

Fresh Strawberries (9 Years), Beer, Ice Cream, Apricots, Popcorn Corn, Ice Cream (7 Years), Pork (2014.1.1, etc.)

Walnuts, High-Fructose Corn Syrup (6 Years)

Within 5 Years

Peas, Potatoes (Frozen), Tomato Juice, Orange Juice, Whiskey, Brandy (5 Years), Seafood (3 Years), Avocados, Lemons (2 Years)

Immediate Elimination

Orange Juice (Frozen), Living Animals, Flowers, Coffee, Wine, Mill, Field Corn, Soybeans for Oil, Almonds

Annotation: Numbers inside the parentheses represent the duration of the tariff elimination.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2007.

Economic Assessment of the KOREAâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;US FTAâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 51

In the case of the manufacturing industry, the majority of the products received 5 or more years to collect duty, whereas tariffs on the majority of agricultural products, which have a history of trade revenue, are subject to elimination systematically over five or more years. In addition, the manufacturing industry will face immediate tariff elimination on 84% of its products, and tariffs on the rest of the products will be eliminated within ten years of the implementation of the policy. The agricultural product concession negotiation was one of the most challenging points in the negotiation for both sides. Korea considered the sensitivity of the agriculture industry opening early on and therefore set the main goals of the concession negotiation as the following: first, secure as much exceptional treatment as possible; second, secure the longest possible policy implementation time frame for the agriculture industry. Approximately 10% of products, including rice, received an exceptional treatment or of at least 15 years of time before the complete elimination of the tariff (products with an average trade revenue of 25% or higher), but those that are relatively less sensitive were categorized for either immediate tariff elimination or for elimination over 10 years. However, most of the agricultural products assigned to the category of immediate tariff elimination were those that do not critically affect or have no effect on the domestic market. The contents of the agriculture negotiations agreement clearly show the compromises of the two nations. These compromises included import quota (TQR) management and agricultural product safeguard methods.

Rice or rice-related products were completely eliminated from the list of items subject to tariff liberalization. For some of the items, i.e., those with either large external price differences or tariffs high enough that the tariff elimination is expected to have a critical impact on the economy, tariffs were maintained at their current levels. However, in consideration of the American position in the agriculture industry, Korea decided to allow import quotas on some products. Examples of these products are soybeans, potatoes, powdered milk, natural honey, and oranges. Seasonal tariffs were only to be applied to those products with a high level of sensitivity and those products that have distinct seasons of harvesting and distribution. This is meant to protect domestic products. Examples of these products are grapes (May-October 15th), oranges (September-February), and potatoes for potato chips (May-

52â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

November).

Furthermore, the parties introduced a tri-elimination of tariffs (elimination of tariffs in three intervals) to minimize the impact of the FTA opening.

This is usually applied in cases in which the variety and use of the main products are specifically classified by the participating nations. When there were worries that American apples might replace Korean apples, the Korean government decided to eliminate tariffs on American Fuji apples within 20 years (a safeguard of 23 years). For products with a low level of import probability, the Korean government decided to eliminate tariffs within 10 years. In addition, American Asian pears or similar species were targeted for tariff elimination within 20 years, and tariffs on other species were to be eliminated within 10 years. Because potatoes and soybeans are highly competitive, the tariffs on edible potatoes and soybeans were to be maintained at their current levels, yet tariffs on potatoes and soybeans used for food processing were subject to immediate elimination to reflect the understanding between the producer and the consumer.

According to the main item-by-item concessions, tariffs on beef (40%) are to be eliminated within 15 years, while tariffs on pork (22.5~25%) are to be eliminated by 2014. However, for frozen pork, which has a very high expected level of future imports, the tariffs are subject to elimination within 10 years.

The tariffs for some items were kept at their current levels in exchange for import quotas. For instance, tariffs on natural honey (243%) were kept at their current levels, but an import quota (200 tons with a 3% annual increase) was set. Skim milk, dry whole milk (176%), and condensed milk (89%) are also to be increased by 3% annually from the initial 5,000 tons.

Given the nature of the American agriculture industry, there are few vegetable imports, but considering how much they contribute to agriculture income, Korea adopted conservative concessions. Among the vegetable and special produce items, sesame seeds, sesame oil (630%), chili peppers (270%), garlic (360%), onions (135%), ginger (377.3%), and peanuts (230.5%) were subject to tariff elimination within 15 years. To compete against American ginseng, fresh ginseng, white ginseng, red ginseng, and seven other items from the ginseng (222.8~754.3%) category, were subject to tariff elimination within 18 years. Among fruits, mandarin oranges (144%) and kiwis (45%) were subject to tariff elimination within 15 years, while peaches, sweet

Economic Assessment of the KOREAâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;US FTAâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 53

Table 4.

KOREA Immediate Automobiles (8), Auto Parts (3~8), Elimination Xylene (5), Fiber-Optic Cables (8), Jet Engines (3), Airbags (8), Back Mirrors (8), Digital Projection TVs (8), etc.

USA >3,000cc Automobiles (2.5), Auto Parts (1.3~10.2), LCD Monitors (5), Camcorders (2.1), Precious Metal Jewelry (5.5), Polystyrene (6.5), Color TVs (5), Shoes (8.5), Light bulbs (2.6), Electric Amplifiers (4.9)

3 Years

Element(6.5), Silicon Oil (6.5), DTVs (5), <3,000cc Automobiles Polyurethane (6.5), Toothpaste (8), (2.5), Color TVs (5), Golf Products Fragrances (8), Golf Clubs (8), etc. (4.9), Chandeliers (3.9), etc.

5 Years

Radio amplifiers (8), Aluminum Tires (4), Leatherwear(6), Polyether Boards (8), Safe Razors (8), Patient (6.5), Speakers (4.9), etc.

Monitors (8), Razors (8), Detergent (6.5), Hair Conditioner (8), Lobsters (20), etc.

10 Years

Basic Makeup (8), Phenol (5.5), Ultrasound Imaging Devices (8), Ball Bearings (13), Contact Lenses (8), etc.

10 Years, Non-linear

Particle Boards (8), Textile Boards C eramic Ti les (8.5/10), Ste el (8), Plywood (12), etc.

(4.3~6.2)

More than 10 Years

Microwaves (2), Washing Machines (1.4), Polyester Resin (6.5), Imitation Jewelry (11), Bearings (9), Textile Dryers (3.4), Trucks (25), etc.

Special Shoes (20~55.3)

Footnote: (#) represents the tariff %.

Source: The Korean Government (2007).

persimmons (45%), and persimmons (50%) were subject to tariff elimination within 10 years. Tariffs on barley, malting barley, and malt were to be eliminated within 15 years, and unhulled barley (324%), rye (299.7%), malt (269%), and malting barley (513%) were to be granted import quotas.

All tariffs on the manufacturing industry are to be eliminated immediately; items that make up approximately 94% of the standard amount of imports were set for early elimination (within 3 years). Owing to this, both nations have high hopes of increasing actual trade rates. According to documents from the Korean Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (2007), upon

54 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

the signing of the KORUS FTA, Korean-made products are expected to enter the overseas market. Some products that benefit the most from the shortterm tariff elimination and that are expected to increase in market share are Korean automobiles, LCD monitors, camcorders, TVs, cameras, audio amps, polystyrene, metal cutting manufacturing machinery, earphones, epoxy resin, and color TVs. Some items were subject to tariff eliminations over 5 years or more, and in case of the US, these items were tires (4), aluminum foil (5.8), glue (2.1), leather wear (6), silicon ferromanganese (3.9), polyether (6.5), polystyrene (6.5), safety glasses (4.9), speakers (4.9), bicycles (11), and others. Those items that were subject to tariff elimination within 10 years were microwaves (2), washing machines (1.4), polyester resin (6.5), bearings (9), ABS resin (6.5), vinyl tile covers (5.3), air conditioners (2.2), paint (6.6), textile dryers (3.4), dish washers (2.4), electric blenders (4.2), imitation jewelry (11), metal tableware (14), glass goods (5.0~38), and trucks (25).

Korea assigned the following items for tariff elimination within 5 years: radio amplifiers (8), aluminum boards (8), safety razors (8), patient monitoring systems (8), razors (8), detergents (6.5), < 3-ton forklifts (8), hair conditioner (8), and dental scalers (8). The items assigned for 10 years are acrylic nitrile (6.5), basic makeup (8), phenol (5.5), ultrasound imaging devices (8), MRI scanners (8), ball bearings (13), polyethylene (6.5), complex amplifiers (8), acetone (5.5), safety valves (8), endoscopes (8), and latex (8).

2. Trade System Areas a. Customs Clearance Procedures American non-tariff barriers are generally low. However, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the US implemented the CSI (Container Security Initiative), which slowed the customs process. It is true that similar initiatives may be implemented in the future, which could significantly slow the process of importing and exporting, ultimately inflating the distribution cost. Nonetheless, through the KORUS FTA, both parties have agreed to initiate a system oriented toward minimizing the distribution costs at all times. According to KOTRA’s (Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency) publication in early 2008, entitled “Present Conditions of the Major Export

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 55

Markets’ Non-Tariff Barriers,” the customs clearance process is by far the greatest obstacle that Korean firms face in exports.

To expedite and smooth the process of trade between the parties, each member state must either adopt or maintain an effective customs-clearance procedure. Also, they must consider a system that allows transport of goods within 48 hours of arrival. In the KORUS FTA, to expedite the transport of goods, all information about the goods is to be submitted and processed electronically. In addition, the KORUS FTA implements a system that allows exporters to transport goods out of the customs house before the authorities finalize the decisions on matters such as applicable tariffs and processing fees.12 To expedite and automate customs clearance procedures, the involved parties must develop a compatible electronic system and must adopt or maintain an automated risk management system. To smooth the trade system for both parties, each member state must improve its risk management techniques, smooth its international distribution net standards, simplify procedures for efficient and timely trade, improve employees’ techniques, and provide technical support and consultation to the participating party to improve or enhance the applied technology. A member state must issue a pre-evaluation within 90 days after its customs officials submit a request, and a requester must submit a copy of all information, including samples of the goods, requested by the member state. b. Government Procurement By 2005 standards, it is estimated that the size of the American procurement market totals approximately 1 trillion dollars. The South Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy determines that as a result of the KORUS FTA, US Federal government procurement will increase to 6 trillion won. Thus far, Korean firms’ participation in the American procurement market has been extremely limited. According to 2005 standards, Korean firms only acquired $9.4 billion dollars, which is only 0.25% of the total US federal government procurement. This is lower than the participation of Germany, England, 12

A member state may request sufficient collateral, a deposit or other means of guarantee regarding domestic tariffs or commission fees on imports.

56 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Japan, Canada, and others. Additionally, most of the 9.4 billion dollars came from distributions to the US Armed Forces in Korea. Explanations for this are Korean firms’ lack of information on procurement markets and the highly complicated procedures that are involved.

According to a 2007 report by South Korea’s Small & Medium Business Administration,13 General Service Administration (GSA) schedule submission and other complicated requirements and qualification standards, such as Multiple Award Supply (MAS), have been the barriers that have kept Korean firms from participating. The report revealed that Korean firms’ hardships in finding a prime contractor, local consultants, and agents, as well as details related to bids and paperwork were the greatest problems faced. Also, although it is true that defense procurement, by 2005 standards, totaled 70% of the US federal government procurement market, due to separate defense procurement agreements, evaluation programs and other complicated measures remained as the de facto barrier that prevented Korean firms from further participation.

Korea’s Small & Medium Business Administration estimates that because foreign procurement markets, including that of the US, are increasing, South Korean small- and medium-sized businesses can enter foreign markets much more easily through the KORUS FTA. In the actual words of the agreement, in chapter 17, which deals with government procurement, it states that first, member states have agreed to the expansion of the bilateral procurement market and have agreed on cooperation in other procurement-related international affairs with APEC and others. This portion (chapter 17) of the KORUS FTA must not be understood as a means of evading the WTO’s government procurement code, and it applies to all actions regarding eligible procurements.

Both Korea and the US have agreed to reduce their federal government products and service thresholds from 2 billion to 1 billion won for Korea, and for the US, from 200,000 dollars to 100,000 dollars. This definitely opened the procurement market more widely for both parties. The US decided to maintain the WTO government procurement code at the state 13

The Small and Medium Business Administration, “The Land of Opportunities for the Medium Size Industries, Aim for the Offshore Procurement Market,” Government Briefing, August 20, 2007.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 57

level; thus, to counter this, South Korea agreed to exclude not only local governments but also public enterprises. However, despite the exclusion of local governments and public enterprises in the KORUS FTA, according to the WTO government procurement code, in 37 American states and 6 public enterprises, the procurement market has already been opened. c. Trade Liberalization The trade liberalization part of the KORUS FTA is broadly divided into two parts, anti-dumping/countervailing duties and global safeguards/bilateral safeguards. In the anti-dumping/countervailing duty section, the parties agreed to the vitalization of prices and supply sums, advanced notices, and the procurement of other agreement duties. They also agreed to install a trade liberalization committee, as a means of mediating communication between the participants.

While presenting the need to promote the KORUS FTA, there was an overwhelming amount of discussion concerning the need to develop a plan to prevent abuse of anti-dumping lawsuits. Anti-dumping lawsuits are a WTO-recognized trade liberalization policy, and recently, more nations are paying closer attention to investigations of anti-dumping (4 nations (1980) → 18 nations (1995) → 24 nations (2003)). According to Korea’s Ministry of Knowledge Economy, previously the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, among these nations, the US has the most anti-dumping lawsuits, followed by China and South Korea, respectively.14 The effects of anti-dumping actions on trade have been verified in numerous studies, such as Prusa (1997, 2001) and Brenton (2001). According to Park (2006), Prusa (2001) focused on US-led anti-dumping efforts between 14

As shown in the chart below, Korea is sued more than it sues others.

Anti-Dumping Litigation Actions, Korea

’95

’96

’97

’98

’99

’00

’01

’02

’03

’04

Total

Sue

4

13

15

3

6

2

4

9

18

3

77

Sued

14

11

15

24

34

22

23

23

17

24

207

Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy Trade Committee, The Trade Environment in Recent Years and the Trade Remedy System, November, 2005.

58 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

1980 and 1994, specifically on its income, with the conclusion that after one year, the corresponding nations’ imports decreased by about 55% while that of the nations acquitted on charges decreased by 33%. Even if some arrangements are made, it is a common trend that the nation experiences a decline in imports by about 40% or more.15 On a closer examination of trade liberalization, one will find that once exporters or the home authorities offer a price or a quantity settlement, American authorities consider this to be an adequate opportunity for an agreement. Once the parties agree upon a price or quantity, the investigations of anti-dumping and of the countervailing duties are finalized.

Currently, the US is going through approximately 300 anti-dumping investigations. Of the 300 anti-dumping cases, the US has reached an agreement on only 6 of them, which shows that it rarely considers price or quantity settlement agreements as a means to reach a settlement. The KORUS FTA offers many more opportunities for such agreements between the US and Korea. Price increases are determined within the boundaries of the anti-dumping duties; thus, exporters can expect a price increase to be a gain for them. Furthermore, the Trade Liberalization Committee will oversee and inspect the agreement periodically to guarantee its effectiveness and rightfulness.

In the agreement, the possibility of granting exemptions to subjects of global safeguards has been reflected as well. Regarding the implementation of global safeguards, if the partnering nation isn’t experiencing overly burdensome damage to its exports, it will be exempt from global safeguards.

For example, if the imports coming into Korea are not significantly greater than that of NAFTA nations, or if Korean exports are inflicting minimal damages, it is expected that South Korea will be exempt from global safeguards.

As for Korea being exempt from the global safeguards, South Korea can expect to find itself on the higher end of export numbers. Foreign market 15

Meanwhile, Korea experienced quite an economic impact due to the Korea Trade Commission (2005) Anti-Dumping verdict. The Korea Trade Commission reports that due to the imposition of an anti-dumping tariff on Chinese and Japanese batteries in 2000, the corresponding domestic industry performed twice as well in the following three years.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 59

shares may also increase. However, if this is not the case, then the US has no obligation to take any action, which implies that the effectiveness will be highly variable.

Also, through the KORUS FTA, Korea gained a channel to counter problems from stages of prior notices or agreement obligations on antidumping investigations. Both parties, once an anti-dumping investigation is requested, must notify each other and provide simultaneous or similar opportunities for future agreements. The WTO agreement only states that parties be notified prior to the investigation; however, the KORUS FTA actually seeks to make it an obligation for the parties to take proper action.

In this case, the authorities can actively summon organizations or companies to counter effectively American corporations’ request for antidumping investigations and their initiation. It is important that anti-dumping investigations not begin immediately after a request, as the start of an antidumping investigation marks the decrease in sales for both suing and sued parties. That is, prior negotiations or agreements provide the suppression of indiscreet anti-dumping lawsuits and room for authorities to conduct a thorough analysis of the validity of the submitted documents for the lawsuits, which ultimately saves both time and money for Korean exporting companies. d. Intellectual Property It is undeniable that intangible assets such as technology and knowledge are increasingly becoming influential factors in determining a nation’s place in terms of international competition. An economic transformation to a knowledge-based economy is rapidly in progress, and many developed nations, such as the US and Japan, generate more than 50% of their total added value from knowledge. Just as futurologist Peter Drucker suggested, the 21st century will be made up of knowledge-based societies, in which knowledge and information have become the core essence of personal and national competitiveness. By 2006 standards, Korea is the fourth-largest industrial and intellectual property-rights nation, following China, the US, and Japan, respectively. However, the Korea’s quality of evaluation and judgment are relatively low compared to that of the other developed nations.

Also, the South Korean level of research products and its intellectual property

60 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

security and related practical application are very low. South Korea needs to upgrade its protection of intellectual property and to utilize developed technologies for economic profit generation by commercializing patent technology and technology trade. Intellectual property protection in a world of knowledge-based economies is the key infrastructure to maintaining national competitiveness and technical innovation; however, due to its failure to control counterfeit goods, Korea is experiencing difficulties in keeping a healthy sovereign credit rating.16 While it is true that the intellectual property part of the KORUS FTA may pressure the Korean economy to some degree, it is generally judged to strengthen Korean policy and enhance its intellectual property. First, the copyright protection period has been extended from 50 years to 70 years following the death of the owner, with the condition that a two-year grace period be provided. The parties agreed that patent registrations are unreasonably delayed, and they agreed to implement a legal compensatory damage policy for copyright and trademark rights violations, which sets a lower limit on compensation for damages ahead of time. In the KORUS FTA, the parties agreed to acknowledge ‘transient reproduction rights’, yet exemptions were to be placed for its application in the public interest, such as education and research with the stipulation of ‘access control technological restraint for protection’. They also agreed to extend the lifespan of patents that experience an unreasonable delay of their patent registration. This agenda generally reflects the US position. The agenda that reflected the Korean position was the item on non-violation complaints and its application to intellectual property, which was delayed until further WTO decisions are made.

The system that extends the lifespan of patents that were subjects of unreasonable delays can find its roots from the rule that sets the standard application period to the time after 4 years from the date of application or 3 years from the date of the appeal for a review. This system seeks to standardize the Korean patent evaluation process and registration period.

16

This is paraphrased from the Korean Intellectual Property Office’s “2007 White Paper on Intellectual Property,” pages 5-17.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 61

According to the Korean Intellectual Property Office (2007) 17 (the Patent and Trademark Office), The KORUS FTA industrial property rights negotiation process minimizes its effect on the South Korean economy while serving as a base that enhances its industrial property rights system.

Originally, many speculated that the field of industrial property rights or other intellectual property rights would reflect mainly the American position.

In fact, the US has thus far been proposing its version of standard templates in the previous FTAs into which it has entered, which shows the very onesided nature forced by the US. American brands were generally embraced concerning trademark rights as well. First, the parties agreed to eliminate the recordation demands on the American trademark exclusive right-to-use due to the criticism that the trademark users’ rights cannot be protected adequately when exclusive rights are nullified when an application for trademark exclusive use rights is not submitted to the Patent and Trademark Office. In addition, the recent trend of international usage rights and registration qualification issues, with its consideration of a trademark as property to be used freely at the will of the right holder, also facilitated the agreement.

A certification mark system was introduced. A certification mark is a mark used to certify the quality of the goods or service provided. It was introduced after considering the positive aspect of the system that seeks to strengthen quality certification functions. This is expected to vitalize the already inuse certification mark systems at various levels of government and private organizations, which will ultimately cut costs and spending.

Sound and scent trademarks were also accepted. International smell/ scent trademark protection trends and an increasing number of trademark protection subjects were all considered as positive before the introduction of such a system. South Korean trademark law limits trademarks to something that must be visible; thus, invisible trademarks such as sound and scent have not been subject to protection, which suggests changes in the Korean code in the future. According to the Korean Intellectual Property Office, sound and scent trademarks are already being accepted not only in the US, but also 17

The Korean Intellectual Property Office, “KORUS FTA, Industrial Intellectual Property Rights Negotiation Results,” Korean International Cooperation Team, 2007.

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in Europe and Australia. Therefore, South Korea also took the initiative to modify its code to accept invisible trademarks as well.

3. System Improvement Much of the KORUS FTA content pertains to how South Korea can enhance its economic system. The KORUS FTA will serve as a crucial cornerstone in implementing enhanced and developed systems, and modifications of law codes to accommodate them will not only make South Korean systems more transparent, but also more fair. Among the many areas in which the KORUS FTA is expected to have the greatest impact are automobiles, medical supplies, technological barriers, consent order systems, competition, intellectual properties, labor, and the environment. Strengthening competitiveness by opening these industries along with enhancing the current system will maximize the effects of the KORUS FTA. <Table 5> shows Korean laws that must be altered once the KORUS FTA is in effect. As shown in the table, two automobile laws must change, and the administrative procedure law must be altered to extend the legislation notification period. Once technological standardization occurs, more laws must be changed to increase public participation for transparency, fair trade, and to protect investors with the Investor-State Dispute (ISD) clause.

Such contents, in detail, show that in a situation in which a trading party submits a corrective measure which is in violation of the law to the FTC, especially regarding cases which take a rather long time for a decision to be reached, the FTC may take administrative actions without having to take additional measures in order to expedite the conclusion of the case, only if the case has a high degree of validity, i.e., a policy that acknowledges an arrangement between a state and the corresponding party or an individual.

A review of this system has been pending by the Korean FTC, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy since 2005. However, due to opposition from the Ministry of Justice, it has failed to make further progress. This system relieves pressure from corporationsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; it has already been adopted by the US, the EU, Germany, Japan, and other developed nations.

Procedural transparency related to telecommunications standards

Economic Assessment of the KOREAâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;US FTAâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 63

Table 5. Expected Changes in South Korean Law Following the Implementation of the KORUS FTA Department

Law Code Title

-Changing Contents

Ministry of Finance and Economy

Luxury Tax Law

-Automobile Tax System Related

Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs

Local Tax Law

-Automobile Tax Reduction

Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs

Administrative Procedure Law

-Legislation Notification Period Extension

Ministry of Culture and Tourism

Copyright Law

-Copyright Law Protection Period Extension - Acknowledgment of Transient Reproduction Right and Exemption Policy Development - Online Work Access Control and Technological Protection System Development

Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy

Laws on investigation on unfair trade - Trade Liberalization Committee Installment, acts and industrial Anti-Dumping Policy Strengthening damage relief

Ministry of Information and Communication

- Acknowledging Information Technology Telecommunications Certification by American Institutions Basic Law - Develop Grounds to Authorize Low-Rank Legislation of the Certification Institutions

Ministry of Health Pharmaceutical and Welfare Affairs Law

Fair Trade Commission

- Authorize Medicine and Medical Supplies Patent Liaison, New Medicine/ New Information Monopoly System

- Implement a system in which, in case an illegitimate party submits corrective measures in violation of the law, the FTC is not Monopoly Regulations and Fair obligated to take additional actions, such as corrections and victim liberalization actions, Trade Law but should immediately proceed to take administrative measures

64â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

selections was strengthened as well. During the negotiations, the Korean government placed emphasis on government-led technological standardization.

However, the US opposed this idea for the reason that such action is a non-market-like measure. Therefore, the two nations agreed to strengthen transparency once the technological standardization decisions are made. This was meant to improve technological efficiency; if there is a common goal to be accomplished by both governments, the government is to maintain the right to promote a technological standardization policy. In addition, as a means to improve telecommunication transparency, the two governments guaranteed equal participation for all players in the market in the area of frequency assignments and the distribution of public communication services.

To improve medical price transparency and fairness, the two governments agreed to publish medicine and medical supply-related policies. The parties must publish all laws or policies concerning medicine and medical supplyrelated wages and prices prior to making final decisions, and those parties concerned are granted more opportunities to express opinions. Additionally, the two nations decided to implement an independent appeals system to accommodate the need to raise faults and problems concerning prices and wages pertaining to medicine and medical supplies.

The two nations agreed to improve the business practices of the medicine and medical supply industry by making it illegal for them to provide unfair gifts. To accommodate this, they agreed to implement appropriate policies and rules. They also agreed to improve other business practices such as eliminating rebates related to purchasing medicine and medical supplies.

In the labor area, a Public Communication System was introduced. This system makes a member state file requests, opinions, and complaints in case a labor-related law is broken.18 Once a public opinion is submitted, the authorities must release information on the issue and on the investigation and results that come later. With this system introduced, the two nations have 18

Similar rules apply to violations of the environment. That is, a concerned person can request an investigation by the corresponding state on a case involving environmental law violations, and that state guarantees punishment procedures and relief for the concerned person.

Economic Assessment of the KOREAâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;US FTAâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 65

created an opportunity to cooperate with the public as well as other civic organizations and thus strengthen the transparency of all processes.

4. Service, Investment a. Service All services are subject to service agreements, except gambling services, financial services, air traffic services, government procurement actions, government supplements, and government provision services. The partnering service providers are charged with four general obligations, which are limited to National Treatment (NT), Most Favored Nation (MFN), Market Access (MA), and a Local Presence (LP) duty imposed ban. However, if one wishes to not conform to these obligations, the obligation may be deferred according to the Non-Conforming Measure clause.19 During deferments due to range-related negotiations, the problem of local government measures becomes important. The American state government incongruent system is posted currently as Annex I, in which the parties agreed to apply a ratchet mechanism. However, considering the technological hardship this would entail for the US, in return for listing all state government incongruent systems, a non-confining prefiguring list was applied. Moreover, in the case of a home investor or service provider entering the American market and thus facing a specific hardship concerning a state government incongruent system, a negotiation channel was established to exchange information and to discuss such matters further. Such channels are to be applied not only to the service industry, but also to non-service industries as well, such as the mining industry, manufacturing industry, and the agriculture and fisheries industry. Meanwhile, all of the local governments, including the Korean provincial governments and American county governments, were permitted to not abide by the four general obligations.

19

Methods to postpone this are as follows: Annex I (Immediate Postponement) and Annex II (Future Postponement). Annex I is a list of existing actions that do not coincide with negotiation duties. A ratchet mechanism is applied here. For example, if current limits put on foreign investments are 30% and if the limit is lowered to 20% or increased to 40%, it cannot return to 30% once adjusted. Annex II (Future Postponement) is a list of areas subject to change or to maintain.

66â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

In the case of the financial sector, considering that the South Korean financial service market was opened on a commercial basis, the KORUS FTA talks on the finance industry were mainly concerned with the bilateral opening of the service and of new financial industries. The two parties agreed to allow four types of insurance brokerages: reinsurance, flight insurance, export and import cargo insurance, and marine insurance. In the case of credit rating agencies, no bilateral trade was allowed, but in the case of a foreign firm entering a home market, the entering qualification standards were lowered. For new financial products, only case-by-case openings were allowed due to their highly risky nature; thus, those products with exceptionally high risk, such as retail finance products, were removed from the list allowed products. Additionally, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed to accommodate the expansion of bilateral trade and allow new financial service products. Korea defended the American request to end government support for national policy financial institutions (Korea Development Bank, Industry Bank, Korea Finance Corporation, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, and the Fisheries Cooperative Association). Also, the two parties agreed to acknowledge the distinct characteristics of the post office and other public institutions and yet strengthen their financial supervision to minimize any potential weakness which may arise in the future.

Furthermore, Korean professional services (legal, accounting, and tax) are to be gradually opened. Three stages were set for legal services, in which an American law practitioner with a valid bar license can provide legal consultation about American laws in Korea. In a similar manner, two stages were set for accounting and tax services.

Korean broadcast services will be partially opened as well. The approval system, foreigner share limits, and screen quotas on ground-wave, cable broadcast, and System Operators (SOs) were to be kept at the current standing.

However, some parts surrounding the Program Provider (PP) were partially liberalized. Foreign investment in home PP is to be kept at a maximum of 49%, whereas domestic corporations may hold anywhere from 50% to 100% of ownership (within three years of the agreement taking effect).

However, reports, coverage, general services, and home shopping categories were subjected to exemption. Concerning the screen quota, regulations on

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 67

those domestic programs that apply to PP and others were eased. Once the agreement takes effect, the movie sector will drop its quota from 25% to 20%, and for animations from 35% to 30%. Screen quotas on ground-wave broadcasts are to be kept at the current status. Single-country quotas are to be adjusted from 60% to 80%. The concept of a single-country quota refers to a policy that limits programs from a certain country from occupying a specific percentage of the total number of foreign programs in play. The easing of single-country quotas is also applied to ground-wave, cable, and SO. Other than these issues, resolutions of issues related to broadcast services were postponed (Appendix II). b. Investment Investment agreements are largely composed of 1) obligations of the state attracting foreign investments to protect foreign investors’ rights and obligation exemptions, and 2) Investor-State Disputes (ISDs). The investment part of the KORUS FTA does not apply to cases or activities that occurred before the agreement takes effect. It applies to central, local and provincial governments and to other NGOs that have been authorized by the state.

Concerning the issue of expropriation and compensation, the South Korean government allows this for the following: 1) for public purposes, 2) with non-discriminatory measures, and 3) for investors’ assets to be nationalized via legal routes, but only with accommodating rapid, appropriate, and effective compensation that reflects the fair market value.

Additionally, the policy sets a rule to compensate appropriately those damaged by indirect accommodation, which is equivalent to a violation of property rights. “Indirect accommodation” refers to a situation in which the value of an investment becomes equivalent to that of direct accommodation due to special government measures which prohibits an investor from actually conducting business. Generally, the issue of indirect accommodation is included not only in the KORUS FTA but in all of the other FTAs and other major investment agreements around the world.

ISD procedures state that in case an investor experiences a loss due to the investment-attracting state regulations or characteristics, the investor is granted power to file a lawsuit against the state. During this process, the investor may request international arbitration. International arbitration is

68â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

overseen by a three-person tribunal, and both the investor and the state may assign one person each and then appoint an arbitrator chairperson. If such a tribunal is not organized within 75 days of the lawsuit, the secretary general of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) may appoint a third party as the arbitrator chairperson, who must have a different nationality than both of the litigating parties. An investor cannot file a lawsuit three years after a loss incurred due to the state.

IV. Economic Effects of the KORUS FTA Many institutions and individuals have evaluated the KORUS FTA negotiations and, generally, they have returned positive analyses. Both Korean and American authorities used quantitative analysis to present an economic examination, and major Korean political parties, such as the Grand National Party and the Open Uri Party, published similar results. The majority of studies conducted on the economic effects of the KORUS FTA evaluate its economic effects very highly; however, the Democratic Labor Party of Korea, the Korean Alliance against the KORUS FTA, and other organizations gave a rather negative evaluation.

There are two distinct methods used to analyze the KORUS FTA: quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative method is widely used in recent FTA economic analyses in which macroeconomic tools, such as GDP, exports, and industrial production, are used. This method presents the main contents of the FTA in a quantitative manner; thus, it has the benefit of being able to emphasize the appropriateness of the agreement. However, only a small portion of the FTA is actually included in the quantitative analysis, giving rise to problems and lending validity to the criticism of underestimation.

Criticism following the negotiations targets the methods used to estimate the economic impact of the KORUS FTA, but such criticism can be explained simply as the contradicting views of different perspectives. Meanwhile, the qualitative method has the downside of not containing quantitative estimations, but it does have the benefit of being able to analyze the overall content of the agreement and its characteristics from the perspectives of specific industries or citizen groups.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 69

1. CGE Quantitative Analysis The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, which is widely used to assess the economic impacts of FTAs, can take a variety of forms depending on the purpose of the researcher. However, the model used most commonly at present is the GTAP model, produced and developed by Purdue University.20 The Purdue GTAP secretariat developed the ordinary general equilibrium model, and expanded it to the world trade level; thus, the GTAP model allows production, consumption, price and other major economic factors to interact which each other, which ultimately determines the final balance.

Generally, the CGE models function to assess the neoclassical school’s economic principles of producer’s cost minimization and consumer’s utility maximization. It generally assumes perfect competition. It is, however, true that the models ease the market clearing conditions and allow imperfect competition depending on the purpose of the researchers.

Studies that assessed the economic impact of the KORUS FTA include those from KIEP (2006, 2007), USITC (2007), the Democratic Labor Party of Korea (DLP), Cheong (2006), Ko (2007) and others. This paper analyzes the controversial studies conducted by KIEP and the DLP. Also, this paper will present the results of the USITC study as a reference. The results of the KIEP and the DLP studies vary greatly, however, and depending on the range of the assessment, both results can be estimated.21 a. KIEP Estimates The KIEP study, which used the CGE model, was presented in seminars held in March of 2006 and April of 2006. Published in 2007, it based its study on the actual contents of the KORUS FTA negotiations. Hence, the study assumed the complete elimination of the manufacturing industry (with the exception of the chemical industry at 97% tax elimination), grains at 94%, 20

Refer to http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/about the GTAP Model.

Some groups claimed that KIEP’s KORUS FTA Economic Impact final figures were fixed; however, if one uses the KIEP methods and procedures, s/he can see identical results. In fact, Korea Congress-led economic analysis conducted on October 29, 2007, has been validated by academia.

21

70â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

vegetables and fruits at 39%, and meat and dairy at 46%. Also, this study calculated the deregulation of the service sector as its tariff equivalent.

KIEP used three methods to derive their results. First, it used the standing basic GTAP model (referred to as the short-term stationary effect in Table 6). Second, it supplemented the accumulation of capital onto the basic model. Third, it supplemented the growth of production assumptions onto the accumulation of capital model. Generally, the first model is used to derive the effects of tariff elimination, and the growth of production factor was used to estimate a variety of other economic effects of the FTA apart from tariff eliminations. The DLP and the Korean Alliance against the KORUS FTA have continuously raised issues about the model that used the growth of production factor. The two argue that KIEP, in order to exaggerate the economic impact, externally reflected manufacturing production assumptions, which ultimately resulted in an estimation of a 7.75% increase in GDP.22 In 2006, before the negotiations, the KIEP studies reveal that the economic impact of the KORUS FTA with a short-term stationary effect at 0.42%, with the accumulation of capital estimated at 1.99%, and with both Table 6. Economic Impacts of the KORUS FTA: National Policy Research Institute KIEP 2006/1/18, 2006/3/3 Classification

Real GDP

ShortTerm Stationary Effect

Accumulation of Capital Model

KIEP 2006/3/23

KIEP and 10 Additional Institutes 2007/4/30

Accumulation of Capital Model

Accumulation of Capital ShortModel Term Stationary ProducProducProducProducProductivity Effect tivity Not tivity tivity Not tivity Considered Considered Considered Considered Considered

0.42% ($2.9 B.)

1.99% ($13.5 B.)

7.75% ($35.2 B.)

7.21% ($32.6 B.)

0.32%

1.28%

5.97%

Welfare/ 0.61% Benefit Level ($2.4 B.)

1.73% ($6.8 B.)

6.99% ($28.1 B.)

6.61% ($26.3 B.)

0.43% ($1.7 B.)

1.00% ($4 B.)

5.23% ($20.9 B.)

22

The KIEP research team assumed that the KORUS FTA will improve the industrial production rate by 1.0-1.2%.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 71

the accumulation of capital and productivity estimated at 7.75%. However, in their 2007 report, the results were readjusted to show that the GDP increased, in the short term, by 0.32%. With productivity considered, the Korea GDP ultimately increased by 5.97%. The 2007 results were lowered because the KIEP study considered the negotiation factors in their studies. b. DLP Estimation Figures from the Democratic Labor Party’s (DLP) “Assessment of the KORUS FTA’s Impact on Economy and Legal Systems,” which was composed after the settlement of the KORUS FTA, are based on the industrial tariff reductions discussed and settled during the negotiations.23 That is, in scenario 1, it was assumed that tariffs on agriculture products, with the exception of rice, would be reduced between 60-80% and that rice was exempt from tariff liberalization policies. Manufacturing and industrial tariffs were assumed to be eliminated, but textile tariffs were assumed to be reduced by only 20%, considering the application of the yarn-forward standards. In scenario 2, tariffs on all agricultural products, with the exception of rice, were assumed to be eliminated.

The GTAP basic model and the accumulation of capital model were used in the DLP assessment. Unlike the KIEP assessment, the DLP assessment did not assume a productivity increase. In its version of scenario 1, with the basic model, the Korea GDP showed a 0.22% increase; with the accumulation of capital model, the GDP showed a 0.71% increase. In scenario 2, which rice excluded, similar increases in GDP were shown. However, the figures showed Table 7. Economic Effects of the KORUS FTA in the Democratic Labor Party’s Study Scenario 1 Section (on an incremental basis)

Real GDP

23

Scenario 2

Static Model

Capital Accumulation Model

Static Model

Capital Accumulation Model

0.22% (KRW 1.0 trillion)

0.71%

0.28% (KRW 1.2 trillion)

0.87%

The DLP Study was headed by Bum-Cheol Shin, a Kyunggi University professor, and others.

72 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

a partial increase from that of scenario 1, which was 0.28% with the basic model and 0.87% with the accumulation of capital model. c. USITC Report On September 20, 2007, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) released its “Review of the KORUS FTA.”24 According to its Trade Act of 2002, Section 2104(f), the US President must provide the detailed contents of the USITC negotiations within 90 days of signing the trade agreement, and the USITC, within 90 days of signing, must report an economic review of the agreement to the President and the Congress. The USITC report assumed the complete liberalization of tariffs in all industries, including the agriculture industry, and its figures showed an approximate increase of 0.1% of GDP, which would be the equivalent of 10.1-11.9 billion dollars.

The USITC report also expects $9.7-$10.9 billion dollars in increased trade with South Korea, also expecting that Korean income will increase by 6.4-6.9 billion dollars, which will improve the Korean trade balance by 3.34.0 billion dollars. The USITC expects American exports of dairy, meat, and clothing products to increase and expects extra exports of machinery, chemical, rubber, plastic, beef, and other foodstuffs will be more profitable.

If the KORUS FTA is to go in effect, the USITC expects an increased imports of textiles, clothing, leather goods, and shoes from Korea, with a steady increase in electronic goods and automobile imports.

Effects of the KORUS FTA on the US agriculture industry are expected generally to increase due to reductions or eliminations of the Korea’s high tariffs and trade-rate quotas. The USITC expects increased exports of grain, livestock feeds, fruits, dairy products, processed foods, meat, and seafood.

However, it only expects limited effects on agriculture industry employment and production considering the Korea’s small market. Nonetheless, trade in electronics, machinery, transportation equipment, automobiles and auto parts, despite the slight tariff reduction, are expected to increase due to each country’s heavy reliance on these products. Exports of medical supplies, 24

USITC, U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide and Selected Sectoral Effects, Investigation No.TA-2104-24, September 2007.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 73

medical equipment, and other high-tech products are also expected to increase considering the policy improvements from the KORUS FTA. The USITC predicts that the US will experience an increase of Korean imports, especially textiles, clothing, shoes, machinery, electronics, automobiles, and auto parts. However, even if the US increases Korean imports, due to the income diversion effects and for other reasons, the negative effects on US domestic employment and production will be less than 1%. In the case of automobiles, the USITC concludes that despite Korea’s automobile exports to the US, the KORUS FTA effects on American automobile industry employment and production will be limited due to the income diversion effect. d. Evaluation On Economic Effects Figures The USITC report mostly analyzes the KORUS FTA effects on the American economy, and although there may be different views on the figures, generally the figures are very similar to those in the studies conducted in Korea. Many evaluate the economic effects of the KORUS FTA negatively and point out its inequity. Tae In Jung (2007) stated that “something that shouldn’t have started in the first place got started and ultimately settled. But it is still rational to stop it. One fundamental of economics is that being regretful of locked expenses and insisting on incorrect decisions will incur bigger losses.

Thus, what is the best way to straighten things out? The answer is rather simple: stop the KORUS FTA, like the Korea-Japan FTA. Congress cannot present an agreement, postpone it indefinitely, or reject the ratification of the agreement.”25 The part that needs the most discussion in terms of its economic analysis figures is the part concerning the relationship between FTA openings and industrial productivity. In the early stages of industrialization, an infancy stage of industrialization may seem to be beneficial; however, in the middle stages of industrialization, one can expect an increase of productivity or other economic effects due to openings. In case of Korea, a nation that climbed the ladder to become one of the world’s top-10 economies, it is apparent that 25

Chung, Tae In “KORUS FTA, What to Do Now?” Incheon Councilor’s Members Association Seminar Presentation Documents, 2007.

74 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 8. Productivity Growth Channel via Market Opening Means through Productivity Growth Channel

Main Trading Types

Trading Partner

Fulfillment of economies of scale

Export

Advanced & underdeveloped countries

Mounting Declining inefficiency competitive pressure Growing attraction of technology investment

Import & direct in- Advanced & underdevelvestment oped countries Import & direct in- Advanced & underdevelvestment oped countries

Intra- and Inter-Industry Import & direct Flow of Production Factors investment

Advanced & underdeveloped countries

R&D effects Rise in international tech- Import & direct in- Advanced nation nology transfer vestment Price reduction in import- Import ed capital goods

Advanced nation

Data: Lee, Si-Wook (2007).

further openings will increase its productivity and competiveness. There are number of studies that support such an argument. The most renowned studies include Lawrence and Weinstein (1999), Pavcnik (2002), Baggs et al. (2002), Woo et al. (2003), the World Bank (2005), Fernandes (2006), and Lee (2007). The Lawrence and Weinstein (1999) study shows that Japan and Korea’s productivity increase is largely due to the stimulation of competition through import expansions and technology investment expansions. Also, Si Wook Lee’s (2007) study shows that with a 1% import tariff rate decrease in Korea, productivity at individual businesses increases on average by 1.5%.

As shown in Table 8, market openings increase industrial productivity in dynamic ways. Trade liberalization increases the pressure of competition, but the increased competition pressure decreases corporate production and management ineffectiveness, cultivates innovative capabilities, increases international technology transfers, lowers import capital good costs, and extends research and development (R&D). “Considering that Korean manufacturing industry’s standard tariff rates are within 4-6%, the productivity boost from the KORUS FTA is expected to increase by at least 0.9-1.4% (Lee, S. 2007).”

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 75

Table 9. The Democratic Labor Party’s Assessment of Economic Effects of the KORUS FTA Section Production Real GDP¹

Income

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Up 0.22% Up 0.28% (Addition of KRW (Addition of KRW 956.4 billion) 1.186.9 billion)

Extension of pharmaceutical pat- Reduction of KRW Reduction of KRW ents 5,881.1 billion 5,881.1 billion Extension of copyrights

Reduction of KRW Reduction of KRW 211.1 billion 211.1 billion

Nullification of ‘Drug Expenditure Reduction of KRW Reduction of KRW Rationalization Plan’ 5,764.6 billion 5,764.6 billion Trade adjustment costs Rise or fall of personal disposable income

Reduction of KRW Reduction of KRW 1,226.8 billion 1,283.7 billion Reduction of KRW Reduction of KRW 12.127.2 billion 11.953.6 billion

Data: Democratic Labor Party, “Assessment of the KORUS FTA’s Impact on Economy and Legal Systems,” 2007.

Therefore, estimating only the direct effects of the tariff reduction on trade is underestimating the full economic effects of the KORUS FTA. Such narrow approaches are the main reasons behind the differences between the KIEP and the DLP studies. Specifically, the KIEP study includes investment and services liberalization, which show a positive improvement to the Korean economy; in contrast, the DLP study shows that most effects of KORUS FTA are rather harmful to the Korean economy. As a result, despite the optimistic estimation of the tariff elimination, the DLP plays up the negative effects of the policy improvement, which has become their main point of contention for rejecting the KORUS FTA. The DLP forecasts that the total damages from the pharmaceutical patent extensions, copyright extensions, neutralization of drug cost rationalization measures, and trade adjustment costs, among other issues, are between 10.77 trillion won and 11.17 trillion won. The DLP only calculates the part that considers the possible short-term damage and neglects the long-term benefits.

For example, the pharmaceutical patent extension ultimately increases Korea

76 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

business’ patent development incentives. Also, according to the patent-license connections and information protections, domestic firms that depend on generic pharmaceutical products may experience product launch delays.

According to estimations by the Korea Health Industry Development Institute (KHIDI), strengthening of intellectual property rights and tariff eliminations reduce the anticipated sales of domestic pharmaceutical companies by 57100 billion won (for five years, approximately 280-500 billion won). However, the DLP study argues that the amount of damage is ten times more than that noted by the KHIDI. Today, it is widely known that the inclusive economic effects of FTAs arise mostly from economic policy improvements and not necessarily from tariff eliminations. Specifically, for developing countries, the effects of policy improvements and deregulations appear to be more prominent. Ultimately, the problems pointed out by the DLP on KIEP studies can be a result of the DLP’s biased perspectives on deregulations and the policy improvement aspects of the KORUS FTA. Cheong (2006), Ko (2007), and others view the policy improvements of the KORUS FTA to be rather optimistic.26 It is also true that there is a need to improve the methods that reflect the productivity improvements of the analysis model, as the DLP points out. However, it is in fact not easy to reflect the numerous factors related to productivity in the FTA agreement. It is possible to reflect a couple of specific policy improvement factors in the models. Thus, the KIEP study reflects general productivity improvements externally in its model. The DLP views the external nature of the KIEP’s decision to reflect productivity improvements to be arbitrary; externalities are more straightforward in the estimation process, but the productivity of production factors, along with externalizing models, can become an issue. As such, there is a need to develop an estimation method that does not use the externalization factor or 26

According to Jong-Hwan Ko’s analysis (2007), the KORUS FTA will raise the South Korean GDP by 1.2% within a year, increasing it to 4% within 10 years. The effects of the tariff elimination are 0.4% within a year and 0.8% within 10 years, which shows generally productive effects. This study referenced the KIET research results that showed an increase of total factor productivity (TFP) by 0.5% for every 1% increase in imports. Ko’s study also used an annual increase rate of American imports of 0.1% as the productivity improvement index.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 77

productivity increase assumptions. An alternative may be to change the basis of the model to include the internalization of the change in productivity or a more elastic supply of production factors. An analysis of the latter case is a bit easier than that of the case before it. Both the KIEP and the DLP studies’ production factors are assumed as inelastic, with full employment as their caveat. This paper uses a CGE model that assumes the inelasticity of the production factors to estimate the economic effects of the KORUS FTA.27 Both the KIEP and the DLP use the industrial tariff reduction rates to estimate the economic effects of the KORUS FTA. KIEP researched the actual negotiation results, item by item, to assume the complete tariff reduction of the manufacturing industry, with the exception of the chemical industry and in the agriculture industry, with grains at 94%, fruits and vegetables at 39%, and meat at 46%. In addition, it includes in the estimation process the productivity improvement of the manufacturing and service industries stemming from policy improvements. The DLP set up two different scenarios; under scenario 1, it was assumed that tariffs on agriculture products were reduced by 60-80% (rice was exempt) and tariffs on textiles with a strict product specific rule attached were only reduced by 20% out of the total implement tariff. In scenario 2, it was assumed that tariffs on all goods, with the exception of rice, were eliminated.

This study references both the KIEP and the DLP studies to set up two analysis models and six economic effect assumption scenarios, combining a total of three tariff reduction assumptions. First, the analysis models use the traditional GTAP, which was used by the DLP, an inelastic supply of productivity factors CGE model (basic/standard) and an elastic productivity factor CGE model (elastic model) to analyze the economic effects of the KORUS FTA. Also, this study introduced three tariff reduction assumptions used by the two institutions. As in the KIEP study, this study agrees with the argument that many parts of the FTA economic effects stem from service industry improvements, but because the DLP study did not include the service industry, this study did not consider the service industry.

27

Like Itakura, Hertel, and Reimer (2003), this study introduced factor productivity endogenization. This research uses the method in which productivity is not influenced; rather, productivity factor supplies are endogenized.

78 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 10. Assumption of Tariff Reduction KIEP Details of Tariff Reduction

Democratic Labor Party

Full Liberalization

- Agriculture: 50% - Agriculture: 70% - Agriculture: 100% - Manufacturing: 100% - Textile & Clothing: 20% - Manufacturing: 100% - Manufacturing: 100%

Data: Combined assumptions sourced from the KIEP (2007) and the Democratic Labor Party’s study (2007).

<Table 11> suggests an FTA economic effect that was derived from the two models (basic/standard and elastic) and the tariff reduction assumptions (<Table 10>). According to the GTAP model, which is very similar to the model used by the DLP, the Korea GDP is expected to increase by 0.33-0.46%, whereas, according to the elastic production factor model, which was used as an alternative to the KIEP model, the Korea GDP is estimated to increase by 2.12-2.98%, showing large differences in the economic effects of the KORUS FTA depending on the model. The DLP study assumes a small textile opening range while also assuming wide agriculture liberalization, which estimates a much larger economic effect than the KIEP study regardless of the model it uses.

Table 11. Estimated Results of the KORUS FTA’s Effects on Korean GDP Growth Assumption of tariff reduction

Assumption of supply Standard Model of production factors Flexible Model

KIEP

Democratic Labor Party

Full Liberalization

0.33

0.41

0.46

2.12

2.48

2.98

If one looks only at the economic effects of tariff eliminations, <Table 11> the estimations are not much different from that of the KIEP and the DLP studies.28 The DLP report states that “the KIEP reports that the real GDP, 28

For this, the reader is invited to compare the figures shown in <Table 11> and the figures in the table below.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 79

according to the basic model, is expected to increase by 0.42% and that the real GDP, according to the accumulation of wealth model, is expected to increase by 1.99%, which shows a large gap,” but the current study, which used an elastic model and the complete liberalization of tariff assumption, shows that the real GDP can increase to 2.98%, suggesting that the KIEP figures are actually underestimated. However, the 2.98% increase suggested in this study, which is approximately half of KIEP’s 5.97% maximum increase, arises because the study does not include service sector productivity improvement assumptions. Therefore, according to the analysis by the author of this article, there are no significant differences between the KIEP and the DLP studies.

It seems that because the DLP study compartmentalized the 57 industries in the GTAP model used, the economic effects were underestimated. The usual CGE model study compartmentalizes one nation’s economy into 1215 industries. There hasn’t been a single CGE study conducted thus far that compartmentalizes GTAP 57 industries.

2. Qualitative Evaluation of the KORUS FTA The pros and cons of the KORUS FTA have been suggested numerous times through the press and in many articles. However, the Korea’s domestic qualitative evaluations of the KORUS FTA have been rather radical in comparison to the American perspective on it. The most prominent proKORUS FTA publications include “KORUS FTA, the Right Choice for the Future,” published by the KORUS FTA Civil Measures Committee (2007); “KORUS FTA, Industrial Evaluations of Negotiation Results and its

The Impact of the KORUS FTA’s Tariff Elimination Envisaged by the KIEP and the Democratic Labor Party (Unit: % Change vs. GDP) Section Democratic Labor Party’s Scenario Democratic Labor Party’s Scenario KIEP’s Analysis

Standard Model Capital Accumulation Model 0.22 0.28 0.42

0.71 0.87 1.99

Data: Democratic Labor Party, “Assessment of the KORUS FTA’s Impact on Economy and Legal Systems”, 2007.

80 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Implications for Korean Businesses,” by Cheong, I. et al. (2007); and “KORUS FTA, Korea Report,” by Sung-Lin Na (2006, Compiled) and others. The most prominent anti-KORUS FTA publications include “KORUS FTA, Citizens’ Report,” published by the Korean Alliance against the KORUS FTA (2006); and “Unfamiliar Colony, KORUS FTA,” by Lee, H. (2006) and others.

The publications from the anti-KORUS FTA groups do include logically explained negative aspects of the KORUS FTA, but it is true that most of these groups are fundamentally against neo-liberalism, understand the FTA as a representation of neo-liberalism, and therefore oppose the FTA itself.

Thus, I would like to suggest an American scholar’s qualitative review of the KORUS FTA and my own evaluation of it to attempt a qualitative analysis of the KORUS FTA. a. Schott’s Evaluation Jeffrey Schott is a world-renowned FTA analyst and a FTA scholar, and the institution that he belongs to, the Peterson Institute for International Economics, is the most highly reputable institution that researches and advises the US government with its trade policies.

According to “The Korea-US Free Trade Agreement: A Summary Assessment,” by Jeffrey Schott (2007), the KORUS FTA, which limits certain parts due to political reasons and minimizes openings, is not the ‘best agreement,’ but Schott evaluates it as an agreement that can bring considerable mutual economic benefits and increased welfare to both nations.

The KORUS FTA is by far the most inclusive trade agreement since NAFTA, as it will bring the two nations closer economically.

Schott argues that the KORUS FTA also has security implications and other non-economic implications, which will enhance the Korea’s status in East Asia while bringing stability to the Korean peninsula, while also setting the direction for economic cooperation within East Asia. Schott ultimately suggests that the KORUS FTA can serve as a milestone for the US to improve its understanding of the politics surrounding the Korean peninsula. Schott also states that East Asia is by far the most active “hotbed” where economic cooperation is most vigorous and that although the US has yet to secure a channel to get directly involved with the East Asian economic cooperation, the KORUS FTA can lead the US to become more involved in East Asian

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 81

politics and in other relations.

Schott agrees that the most important part of the KORUS FTA is definitely the automobiles part. In 2006, automobile trades between the two nations totaled $11.6 billion dollars, and automobile trade (15%) clearly is of great importance as regards trade between the two countries. In the case of the total traded goods of the US, automobile imports from Korea stand at 24%, which is overwhelmingly high. Between 2001 and 2005, Korean automobile production increased from 2.95 million to 3.70 million, with 70% of them being exported. Within the same timeframe, American automobile production decreased, and due to foreign companies’ increased construction and use of US-based factories, total production was maintained at about 12.00 million automobiles. Automobile industry laborers account for 9% out of the total employment (Korea: 0.25 million, US: 1.10 million 29), and both nations’ automobile labor unions are very critical of the KORUS FTA. The Korean automobile labor union takes on more of a political struggle characteristic. Its counterpart, the American automobile labor union, clearly takes a protectionist stance, being fearful of the fall of general manufacturing employment and the steady decline of employment in the automobile industry. Also, due to foreign automobiles entering the American market, the Big 3 market share has shrunk, and foreign companies tend to have a lower labor union membership rate, which has ultimately reduced the unionized wage premium. Labor unions, especially those from Ford and Chrysler, are exceptionally against the KORUS FTA, whereas GM, which bought Daewoo, is rather hopeful. Generally, the American labor unions are concerned mostly about the opening of the market itself.

In the case of automobiles, the current structure is rather unilateral, favoring Korean exports, which has been a growing issue that is continuously pointed out by the American Democratic Party; although the Korean government eliminated tariffs early on and reorganized the automobile tariff, there is a chance that Korean automobile exports may destabilize the current trade balance. Ford and Chrysler argue that Korean policies and tariffs are unfair when it comes to exports of larger automobile, but Schott evaluates 29

In the case of the US, jobs in the assembly, body, and parts industries number 0.25 million, 0.18 million, and 67 million, respectively.

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that such an argument is not appropriate because American domestic sales of larger automobiles accounts for 40% of all automobile sales.

Agriculture accounts for 3% of all trades between the two nations, but it was the most sensitive issue during the negotiation. The Korea government set the rice market exception as its foundation during the negotiations, and the US government ultimately decided to accept the Korean demands for political benefits and because the economic profit in the rice market was rather small. The US government set beef exports as one of its major demands during the negotiations, and the two nations sought to resolve the beef export quarantine problem, though these efforts were halted during the negotiations due to the mad-cow disease outbreak. Schott sees that partial liberalization of the agriculture industry was settled due to the agriculture protectionist stance that the Korea decided to maintain, but negotiations ultimately allowed American agriculture products to enter the Korean market.

Schott optimistically evaluates the base preparation for the US to enter the Korean market with its financial, consignment and professional services (e.g., legal, accounting) and its other service industries. He also similarly evaluates the communication, film, and broadcasting deregulations and increased investment shares. Schott forecasts that the aforementioned service and investment industry improvements may benefit US companies but ultimately feels that the Korean employees and laborers in those industries will benefit the most. Recognition problems associated with Kaesong Industrial Complex products were settled by allowing an OPZ, and the two nations are expected to solve further problems later through working-level talks. Both nations understood that the Kaesong Industrial Complex could contribute to East Asian cooperation and stability, and also positively to American North Korean policies.

Schott sees the KORUS FTA as having a considerable effect on not only the economic benefits of both nations but also on the economies of other Asia-Pacific nations. The KORUS FTA can stimulate FTAs between various nations, the most prominent example of this being the Korea-EU FTA. East Asia-EU trade has become more active within the last few years, but the danger of a decrease in trade has been the key potential threat due to the number of FTAs that the EU is not a part of. Such a potential threat propelled the US to promote the KORUS FTA more actively, which stimulated the EU

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 83

to push forward an FTA with Korea as its first FTA partner. Additionally, the EU is looking into the possibility of establishing an FTA with the ASEAN countries and India, and China is requesting to establish an FTA with Korea.

In September of 2007, China announced the beginning of China-India FTA negotiations.

Schott foresees a considerable effect of the KORUS FTA on Japan as well.

The KORUS FTA can serve as a factor that will expedite Japanese agricultural reform. In the case of the Korea-EU FTA settlement, the Japanese government may resume the indefinitely postponed Korea-Japan FTA talks. Japan has been reviewing the possibility of entering into an FTA with the US for many years now, but the limits put on Japanese agricultural reform and the lack of a will to promote this measure have been the main causes of the stagnation.

In April of 2007, the Abe-Bush summit talks postponed the possibility of the Japan-US FTA indefinitely.

The KORUS FTA is expected to have positive effects on the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), but its short-term effects are expected to be weak. However, the status of the ASEAN, which has functioned as the main hub among the large FTAs, including the ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and FTAAP, is expected to decline. The ASEAN lacks internal cooperation, and each member state’s dynamic economic structure, as well as its lack of central force, will limit its role as the hub of an enormous FTA. b. The Author’s Evaluation The KORUS FTA negotiation, which began in June 2006, did not make much progress, even until late 2006, due to the differences in opinion between the two nations and due to the political pressure coming from the wide market-opening nature of the agreement. Also, the growth of KORUS FTA opposition in Korea, along with the mad-cow disease outbreak, did not help either. However, starting in 2007, representatives from both countries decided to accommodate each other’s demands to a bearable degree, which aided in settling many disputes by the end of March of 2008 (actually April 2, 2008), as planned. Meanwhile, the American Democratic Party, which won an overwhelming victory in the midterm elections, proposed a new trade act to the Republican administration, requesting the new trade act to be reflected in the agreement that was already settled. The government of the Korea decided

84 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

to accommodate the American demands after determining that the new trade act, composed of environmental and labor contents, does not change the standing agreement significantly.

I expect the KORUS FTA effects to be dynamic in various aspects, which will ultimately have an extensive economic effect, as the US is one of the Korea’s largest trading partners, and because mutual trade between the two countries has been complementary. According to Woo, C. et al. (2003), KoreaUS trade is mainly “a trade of goods with different qualities.” Furthermore, Oh, S. (2006) states that the Korea-US trade already includes an extensive volume of high-technology goods, and the complementary division of labor characteristics of trade is so evident that the increase in trade is expected to have high level of benefits with minimal damage.

Even the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) finds that the “Korea-US trade, in all industrial aspects, has a high win-win, 2006 possibility of producing an international division of labor structure with minimal competition among industries.” As noted in Table 12, the US tends to have comparative advantages in IT, BT, other new-technology industries, and the high-tech parts and materials industries, whereas the Korea has Table 12. Comparative Advantages in Korea-US Manufacturing Industries Industry

Korean Comparative Advantages

American Comparative Advantages

Wooden Furniture Low- & Mid-Priced Furniture

Lumber, Raw Material

Petrochemistry

General Purpose Goods

High Value Products

Textile

Low- & Mid-Priced General Purpose Goods

Industrial Textile

Steel

General Purpose Goods

Scrap

Communication Device

Mobile Devices

Major Parts, Communications

Semiconductor

Memory

Non-Memory

Automobile

Small & Mid-Sized Vehicles, Parts Large Luxury Vehicles

Planes

Plane Parts

Complete Planes

Shipbuilding

Merchant Vessels

Leisure Boats

Source: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade (2006).

Economic Assessment of the KOREAâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;US FTAâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 85

comparative advantages in textiles, steel, electronics, shipbuilding, and other traditional industries. Generally, Korea-US trade is complementary.

In 2006, total US imports were the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s largest, at $1.86 trillion dollars, and its market in 2006 currency standards is 16 times that of Korea, at 14 trillion dollars. It is true that BRICs and other new markets are important, but the Korea should put more weight on maintaining its current status in the US market and furthermore should assume leadership in trade in order to secure a world-renowned reputation. From such a standpoint, the Korean automobile industry and textile industry finalized a considerable amount of the negotiation results.

The primary economic effect of the KORUS FTA on Korea will be generated from the increase in exports to the US. The two nations have agreed to eliminate tariffs on 100% of traded goods. Tariffs on 94% of traded goods were set to be eliminated early (within 3 years) by agreement. Once the KORUS FTA takes full effect and eliminates the 4.9% of the tariff pressure, Korea will gain an opportunity to improve the current situation, in which it lags behind products from China and other developing countries. In addition, an additional US government procurement market was opened due to the agreement to reduce the current 0.2 million dollar federal government service bounded lower limit to 0.1 million dollars. As the KORUS FTA is expected to help Korea gain recognition in the auction participation process in the US, the US procurement market barrier should be lowered. It is generally known that the US procurement market is extremely difficult to enter. However, because the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) and other export promoting institutions are promoting measures to enter the US procurement market, the situation appears hopeful for anxious Korean businesses.

Opening of the service and the investment industries was limited and centered around industries that exert less pressure on Korea industries. All of the regulation authority of the government on education, medical and other social and public services was inclusively deferred to disallow additional openings. In the case of broadcasting services, foreign investment admittance on ground-wave, satellite broadcasting, cable, and program providers (PP) was kept at the current level. Regulations on direct investment by program providers were to be eliminated within three years. Foreign investment

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in telecommunication carriers was to be kept at the current share limit of 49%, but for carriers besides KT and SKT, 100% of foreign investment was allowed two years after the agreement goes into effect. Considering the highly saturated Korean domestic telecom market, the Korean industry needs to aim to enter the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s largest market, the American telecom market, instead of settling domestically. Furthermore, American program providers entering the Korean market will most likely make it possible for Korean program providers to export Korean program contents to the US. The recently discussed FTA focuses quite heavily on the enhancement of economic regulations. Most nations face problems regarding policy reforms and how they slow the overall progress of reform. However, one of the FTAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s greatest advantages is that it includes reform assignments as a part of the agreement, which then expedites the reform process. Apart from this, the KORUS FTA is helpful for Korea because it strengthens the transparency of the economy, boosts efficiency, improves legal procedures, and improves other systems in dynamic ways.

Regulation improvements, in the long term, help the Korean economy, whereas in the short term they may burden Korean industries. Traditionally, the agriculture industry is most vulnerable to opening. It was forecasted before, during negotiations, that the full opening of the agriculture industry was inevitable, but the negotiated agreement maintained the standing hightariff structure through quotas, seasonal tariffs and other means. Nonetheless, the direct damage expected to be incurred owing to beef, pork and other meat imports is a concern.

In the case of intellectual property, the fact that the copyright protection period was extended from 50 years to 70 years after the death of the author does seem to have reflected the American demands, but rationalized patent examinations, trademark protection, and other intellectual property related policies are ways to strengthen Korean competiveness in the global market.

This will expand the added value of Korean intellectual property rights, as created by the Korean wave and other factors. It has also established the grounds for Korea to request intellectual property rights protection from China and other Southeast Asian nations that increasingly violate Korean intellectual property rights.

For the labor and environmental areas of the KORUS FTA, the two nations

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 87

agreed to check and efficiently carry out their duties to uphold internationally acknowledged labor and environmental rights. Negotiation results concerning the labor and environment areas were set at the level of checking domestic practices and regulations but not nearly at the level at which domestic firms bear heavy burdens.

Such regulation improvements usually do not show benefits immediately, but rather, the benefits appear in practice in the forms of eliminated unnecessary policies in business management, reduced uncertainty, and eliminated unnecessary costs. For foreign investors, such characteristics are especially attractive, as they simplify their decision-making process.

Meanwhile, those opposing the KORUS FTA have their reasons. Many simply take it for granted that opposition arises from the economic loss aspect of the FTA, but there are a handful of organizations that oppose entering into an FTA with the US from an ideological standpoint. In fact, simply speaking, the labor unions that foster the strengthening of labor rights and standards have no reason to oppose the KORUS FTA, which fulfills their desires, but they oppose it anyway, with temporary employment as their main argument against the agreement. In addition, for the opposing party, the investorstate dispute issue is one of the most toxic provisions, which ultimately fuels their strong argument that the KORUS FTA is an American attempt to spread neoliberal policies around the globe. However, according to many professionals in the field of international investment, previous FTAs in which Korea is a party, such as the Korea-Chile FTA, the Korea-Singapore FTA, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), contained all of the “toxic” elements that fuel the opposing arguments. Furthermore, the so-called “toxic” provisions and elements showed up in over 4,000 investment agreements, showing that such provisions and elements are indeed not as harmful as the opposing arguments present them, or are not harmful at all. According to the actual contents of the investment, the government allows ISD provisions to take effect only in cases of severely unfair domestic policies greatly damaging a foreign company. In the ten years since NAFTA went into effect, there was only one such case, which shows that the opposing arguments fueled by the negative effects of ISD are exaggerated. Nonetheless, it is important to realize that the ISD provisions prevent a government from arbitrarily introducing a policy.

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The implementation of the KORUS FTA may bring some degree of hardship to less competitive industries and businesses. Once the agreement takes full effect, those industries with relatively strong competitiveness will react with joy, while others will do so with disappointment. Also, during the industrial restructuring process, some may experience shortterm unemployment and stagnation. To accommodate such damages, social conflicts and confrontations must be rationally arbitrated. In order to minimize the implementation of the FTA and maximize its effects, the lesscompetitive industries must be accommodated with rational compensation for their loss.

Especially in the agriculture industry, damages may occur in one area or another; however, it is generally expected that the standing agricultural infrastructure will not collapse. The areas expected to suffer the most are beef, pork, and tangerines. Demands for imported beef may increase in Korea due to the beef tariff elimination; it is expected that US beef will replace the current Australian beef imported into Korea. In the case of pork, approximately Âź of all pork consumption in Korea is said to rely on imports.

In particular, pork belly imports are distributed most commonly in Korea.

Due to the tariff elimination on pork, American pork imports may increase, and it is likely that American pork will replace imports from third-world countries. Overall, net income will increase to a certain degree and will incur some damage, but the damage will not be severe enough to collapse Korean production. Nonetheless, Korean government should take the potential damage of this agreement into consideration and set complementary measures with Congress.

V. Conclusion Korean government, in its 17 th Congress, announced the intention to ratify the KORUS FTA but failed to do so due to the April 18th controversy surrounding the beef quarantine standards negotiation results. As a result, the 18th Congress inherited the burden to ratify the agreement, and in accordance with the normalization of Congress on August 19th of this year, the KORUS FTA deliberation process will take place.

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 89

In early 2008, the United Democratic Party leadership that succeeded the (old) Uri Party openly suggested that the KORUS FTA should be ratified.

However, due to the linking of the beef controversy and the agreement ratification, ratification has not been and will not be an easy task. In accordance with the June 26th standards, US beef is being distributed in Korea, which makes it difficult to understand how the beef issue is delaying the KORUS FTA ratification.

The beef quarantine standard controversy has, however, led many Koreans to put more emphasis on domestic negotiations regarding international trade negotiations. FTAs, beef, and other sensitive international trade negotiations require a gathering of opinions and a sharing of information between all of those concerned, including civil society and other interested parties. This year, the importance of government-to-people communications is being mentioned, but a plan to mediate such communication effectively has yet to rise to the surface. It is not easy to hope for harmonious communication between the government and the people simply by strengthening Blue House press functions, and Korean government must implement a plan systematically to collect public opinions on the KORUS FTA from the stage of the founding of the agreement to the stage of its settlement.

The delaying of the ratification of the KORUS FTA will also delay the benefits that come from it.30 Not only is the content of the FTA important, but also its implementation timeframe is important as it is connected to the maximum economic results. The current political situation will most likely not allow the 18 th Congress to ratify the agreement easily, but the US administration is showing a strong desire to use its lame-duck session between November, after the presidential elections, and the end of the year to ratify the KORUS FTA. Thus, the Korea Congress should ratify the agreement before the US and pressure the US to do the same. Furthermore, there is a need to develop logical complimentary measures for one government to 30

Most of our prominent corporations are for the KORUS FTA. In addition, approximately 71% of the small and medium size businesses answered optimistic or neutral about the KORUS FTA. (’06.3, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade). The small and medium size businesses answered that the most optimistic effects of the KORUS FTA are, increase in exports to the US (67.6%), high quality raw materials imports at a reduced costs (15.9%), and promotion of Korea-US joint venture (6.4%).

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convince its Congress, and the Korea administration must request that the US administration take a more active role in attempting an early ratification of the KORUS FTA. The Korea Congress should also stop relying on nearsighted domestic politics and instead increase international exchanges, riding the globalization current to affirm its national interests.

BIBLIOGRAPHY References in Korean

Cheong, In Kyo. 1998. “Feasibility and Economic Effects of KORUS FTA.” Bimonthly American Economy. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (“한·미 자유무역지대(FTA)의 타당성과 경제적 효과”. 「격월간 미주경 제」). . 2001a. “American Corporations’ Position on the KORUS FTA and Policy Implications.” KIEP News Bulletin (“한·미 FTA에 대한 미국 기업의 입장과 정책시사점”. 「KIEP 동향속보」, 2001.5.25). . 2001b. “USITC: The Main Contents and Evaluation of KORUS FTA Report.” KIEP World Economy 01-44 (“USITC 한·미 FTA 보고서의 주요 내 용과 평가”. 「KIEP 오늘의 세계경제」 01-44, 2001.10.15). . 2005a. “The Economic Effects of the KORUS FTA.” KORUS FTA Seminar. The Korea International Trade Association (“한·미 FTA의 경제효 과”. 무역협회 주최 「한·미 FTA 세미나」 발표자료). . 2005b. “FTA Promotion and Trade Restructuring.” Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy sponsored, Public Hearing on the Manufacture Industry and Trade Restructuring Support. Presentation Documents (August 31, The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry Conference Room) (“FTA 추진과 무역구조조정”. 「제조업 등 무역조정지원에 관 한 법률 제정안 공청회」. 발표자료 8월 31일). . 2006. The Controversy over the KORUS FTA, What is the Truth? Hanam Publishing Co (『한·미 FTA의 논쟁, 그 진실은?』).

Cheong, In Kyo and Noh, Jae Bong. 2005. FTA Strategy in the Global Era. Seoul: Haenam Publishing Co (『글로벌 시대의 FTA 전략』).

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Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 91

Cheong, In Kyo, Kwan Ho Kim, Won Mog Choi, Duk Geun Ahn, Jun Sok Yang, and Byung Il Choi. 2007. An Evaluation of the Results of Negotiations on the KORUS FTA per Area and Their Implications for Our Corporations (『한·미 FTA 분야별 협상 결과 평가 및 우리 기업에 주는 시사점』. 한국경제연구 원).

Choi, Won Mog. 2007. “KORUS FTA: What Is the Truly Desirable Direction of Resolution?” Presentation at a session of the FTA Research Center (「한·미 FTA - 무엇이 진정으로 바람직한 타결 방향인가?」. FTA교수연구회발표자료).

Chung, Tae In. 2007. “KORUS FTA, What to Do Now?” Incheon Councilor’s Members Association Seminar Presentation Documents (「한·미 FTA, 이제 무엇을 할 것인가?」. 인천의정회 세미나 발표자료).

Democratic Labor Party. 2007. Assessment of the KORUS FTA’s Impact on Economy and Legal Systems (「한·미 FTA 경제·법제도 영향 평가」).

Free Trade Agreement. 2007. We give you the correct information on the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement: 86 selected major points of contention raised since the disclosure of the text of the Agreement (『한·미 자유무역협정 바로 알려드립니 다』. 정부관계부처합동자료).

FTA Industry Alliance. 2007. KORUS FTA, The Choice for the Future (『한·미 FTA, 미래를 위한 선택』).

Korea Alliance Against KORUS FTA. 2006. KORUS National Report (『한·미 FTA 국민보고서』).

Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade. 2006. “A Mutually Complementary Relationship, ‘Win-Win’, Possible.” KORUS FTA Special Project (http://www.kiet.re.kr/kiet/main_news/brief0097.jsp) (“서로 보완 적 관계, ‘윈 - 윈’ 가능해”. 「한·미 FTA 특별기획」, http://www.kiet.re.kr/kiet/ main_news/brief0097.jsp).

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. 2006a. “Necessity and Economic Effects of Korea-U.S. FTA.” KIEP World Economy vol. 06-01 (“한·미 FTA의 필요성과 경제적 효과”. 『KIEP 오늘의 세계경제』 제06-01호). . 2006b. “The Analysis of Economic Effects of KORUS FTA: Review of Productivity Growth.” Proceeding of Seminar on 3rd March (「한·미 FTA의 경제적 효과 분석: 생산성 증대 효과 검토」. 3월 3일자 세미나 자료). . 2006c. Explanation of Economic Effects of KORUS FTA (「한·미 FTA의 경 제적 효과 해설」. 2006년 3월 23일자 한·미 FTA 설명자료). . 2007a. An Analysis of Economic Effects of KORUS FTA. Jointly by 11 Government Research Centers (「한·미 FTA의 경제적 효과 분석」. 11개 국책 연구기관합동, 2007.4.30).

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. 2007b. An Analysis of Economic Effects of KORUS FTA. Report of KoreaUS FTA Special Committee (「한·미 FTA의 경제적 효과 분석」. 국회 FTA특위 보고자료, 2007.4.30).

Lee, Hae Young. 2006. Unfamiliar Colony. KORUS FTA, MAYDAY (『낯선 식민지, 한·미 FTA』).

Lee, Si Wook . 2006 “The Economic Growth and Export Effects.” Chung In Kyo ed. The controversy over the KORUS FTA, What is the Truth? (「경제성장 및 수출 효과」. 『한·미 FTA의 논쟁, 진실은?』). . 2007a. “Tariff Reduction and Within-Plant Productivity: Micro-evidence from Korean Manufacturing.” KDI Journal of Economic Policy 29(3) (“수입 관세 인하가 기업 생산성에 미치는 효과 분석”. 『한국개발연구』 29(3)). . 2007b. “The Effect of an Open Market on Corporate Productivity: With a Focus on the Effect of a Decrease in Import Duties.” KDI Policy Forum Vol. 184 (“시장개방이 기업 생산성에 미치는 영향 - 수입관세 인하효과를 중심으 로”. 『KDI 정책포럼』 제184호, 2007.12).

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 2007. The Results of and Plans for Responses to Negotiations on Agriculture in the KORUS FTA (농림부. 「한·미 FTA 농업 부문 협상결과와 대응방안」).

Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, Trade Committee. 2005. The Trade Environment in Recent Years and the Trade Remedy System (「최근의 통상환 경 및 무역구제제도」).

Na, Seong Lin ed. 2007. The Korean Report of KORUS FTA. Dongheng Publishing Co (『한·미 FTA 대한민국 보고서』).

Oh, Sang Bong. 2006. “The Effect of the KORUS FTA on the Major Industries.”

Presentation at a session of the National Conference of Trade Researchers (「한·미 FTA가 주요산업에 미치는 영향」. ‘2006 무역학자 전국대회’ 발표자료).

Park, Soon Chan. 2006. “The Impact of Granting Market Economy Status to China on Antidumping Duties and Imports: The Case of Korea.” Journal of International Economic Studies 10(2) (“중국에 대한 시장경제지위 인정이 반덤 핑관세율 및 수입에 미치는 영향: 한국 반덤핑의 경우”. 『대외경제정책연구』 10(2)).

The Government of the Republic of Korea. 2007. “An Explanation of the Economic Effect of the KORUS FTA.” Joint Fact Sheet (「한·미 FTA 상세 설 명자료」. 정부부처합동설명자료).

The Korean Intellectual Property Office. 2007. “KORUS FTA, Industrial Intellectual Property Rights Negotiation Results.” Korean International Cooperation Team (「한·미 FTA 산업재산권 분야 협상결과」). . 2007. 2007 White Paper on Intellectual Property (『2007 지식재산백서』).

Economic Assessment of the KOREA–US FTA 93

The Small and Medium Business Administration. “The Land of Opportunities for the Medium Size Industries, Aim for the Offshore Procurement Market.”

Government Briefing, 2007.8.20 (「중기 기회의 땅, 해외 조달시장을 노려라」. 국 정브리핑, 2007.8.20).

Wang Youn Jong and Cheong In Kyo. 1998. “Establishment of the Korea-US Free Trade Zone and its Economic Implications.” Current Economic Reviews and Outlook Vol. 4, 2nd Edition, pp. 135-188 (「한·미 자유무역지대 설립의 경 제적 효과」. 『한국경제의 분석과 전망』 제4권 2호, pp. 135-188).

Wu Chun Sik et al. 2003. “Trade Performance Analysis.” Comprehensive Study on Industrial Competitiveness of Korea, pp. 179-218 (「무역성과 분석」. 『한국의 산 업경쟁력 종합연구』, pp. 179-218).

References in English

Baggs, J., K. Head and J. Ries. 2002. “Free Trade, Firm Heterogeneity and Canadian Productivity.” Mimeo.

Baldwin, R. E. and A. Venables. 1995. Regional Economic Integration in Grossmand and Rogoff eds. Handbook of International Economics.

Amsterdam: North Holland.

Choi, I and J. Schott. 2001. Free Trade Between Korea and the United States?

Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

Destler, I. M. 1995. American Trade Policies. 3rd edition, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

Fernandes, A.M. “Trade Policy, Trade Volume and Plant-level Productivity in Columbian Manufacturing Industries.” Journal of International Economics 71(1): 52-71.

Itakura, K., T. Hertel and J. Reimer. 2003. “The Contribution of Productivity Linkages to the General Equilibrium Analysis of Free Trade Agreements.”

GTAP Technical Paper No. 23.

Ko, Jong Hwan. 2007. An Analysis of Economic Effects of the Korea-US FTA Using a Dynamic CGE Model. The Conference of Korea International Economics Association, Kyungpook National University.

Lawrence, R.Z. and D.E. Weinstein. 1999. “Trade and Growth: Import-Led or Export-Led? Evidence from Japan and Korea.” NBER Working Paper No. 7264.

MacDonald, J. 1994. “Does Import Competition Force Efficient Productivity?”

Review of Economics and Statistics 76: 721-727.

Pavcnik, N. 2002. “Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvement:

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Evidence from Chilean Plants.” Review of Economic Studies 69: 245-276.

Schott, J. 1989a. Free Trade Areas and U.S. Trade Policy. Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. . 1989b. More Free Trade Areas?, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. .2007. “The Korea-US Free Trade Agreement: A Summary Assessment.”

Policy Brief PB07-7, Peterson Institute for International Economics, August.

Urata, S. and K. Kiyota. 2003. “The Impact of an East Asia FTA on Foreign Trade in East Asia.” NBER Working Paper No. 10173.

Council of Economic Advisors.1995. Economic Report of the President.

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

USITC. 1989. The Pros and Cons of Entering into Negotiations on Free Trade Area Agreements with Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and ASEAN, or the Pacific Rim Region in General, Washington D.C. . 2001. U.S.-Korea FTA: The Economic Impact of Establishing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Washington D.C. . 2007. U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide and Selected Sectoral Effects. Investigation No. TA-2104-24.

USTR. 1997. Recommendations on Future Free Trade Area Negotiations.

Washington D.C., Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

World Economic Forum. 2007. Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008. www. weforum.org.

World Bank. 2005. Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform. Washington, D.C. . 2008. Doing Business. Washington D.C.: Worldbank.

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‘The Candle-lit Demonstration’ as a Social Drama: The Dynamics of Civil Disobedience in Korea* Joe, Il Dong** This paper is an analysis of the candlelight demonstrations of 2008 in South Korea as a ‘social drama’. The demonstration participants each have different, individual reasons for joining the cause, yet those reasons can all be attributed to the unrestrained competition imposed by a capitalist society. The South Korean government’s decision to import American beef became an event through which the participants expressed their discontent. Prior to participating in these demonstrations, many people did not feel the need for solidarity with others to any great extent. However, with new boundaries forming between people and societal discord simultaneously resulting from greatly increased pressure, people became concerned with the meaning and possibility of solidarity.

The collapse of these borders started with questions about in the state of science, heretofore assumed to be precise and neutral. This is because scientific reasoning was the foundation for the government’s argument that the importation of American beef was for the public good. In the many debates surrounding the issue of the importation of American beef, both sides used scientific figures to prove their cases. In order words, this demonstration case illustrates how scientific arguments can be analyzed, interpreted, and provided different arguments by individuals whose political ideologies are different.

As the demonstrations grew, the police began to use a violent measure to suppression them. Confronting the violence, people ridiculed the authority with wit and humor. This was made possible by the mutual sympathy and like-mindedness of the participants, who in ‘separation between street and side-walk’ determined by established society, crossed various social, gender, and age-related boundaries together. In reality though, the forces tying the protestors were always in flux. In a few situations, the line between the conservative and the progressive became unclear, and that between violence and non-violence also changed. At that stage, a rough internal order was created. The birth of that order represented a return to the usual unity.

*

**

Translated From the published article in the Korean Cultural Anthropology 42(1): 179-220, 2009 with permission from Korean Society for Cultural Anthropology.

Ph.D. candidate, Department of Cultural Anthropology, Hanyang University

95

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New possibilities emerged as these people, who while opposing to the government, crossed barriers together, began to return to ‘normalcy’ through their own individual capacities.

The people realized that the authority they had trusted, and which in the past had protected them in the public arena was by no means a guaranteed thing. Also understanding that they themselves could be victims of this power regime, the peoples’ response manifested itself within their neighborhoods in a variety of different forms. Efforts to return to normal, and routine daily life were started, as well as those to foster new regional solidarity and new consumer rights movements. A ‘conscious momentum’ was formed whereby politicians seeking solidarity among neighbor citizens saw an ideal in how large-scale politics utilized mass media.

The final results of the social drama are not important. What is matter is the process by which individuals, through the experiences of the collective actions, realize their individual identity and meaning of life. Therefore, the experience of participating in the 2008 candlelight demonstrations, which had no organized leadership, set the groundwork for calling into question the division between everyday life and politics in Korean society.

Keywords: ‘the candle-lit demonstration’, social drama, civil society, solidarity, the safety issue of U.S. beef imports, public benefit, science discourse, humor, Korea

I. Introduction: Getting Into It Following the news of the American beef importation agreement in April 2008, insofar as the vast majority of Korean society had a lot to say on the issue, the entire country was in a stir with the problem. From individuals’ private conversations, to television, the Internet and newspapers, Korea was inundated with dialogues regarding the importation of American beef.

Within a month, people started to march in Seoul’s Ch’eongkye Square against the government decision to import American beef and the candlelight demonstration began. As the people began to experience violent pressure from the police they had believed would protect them, their perspectives gradually changed. The movement started creating new groups, which would meet in their respective communities in every evening, or the weekends. In the summer of 2008, these candlelight demonstrations were the greatest and most hotly debated topic of conversation in Korean society.

In the myriad of discussions about the demonstrations, the most hotly debated aspect was whether or not ‘a leadership group’ within the movement

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existed, and what its existence might mean. 1 Since the beginning of President Lee Myung-Bak’s administration in 2008, there were groups that continually called for his resignation, like Internet cafes that posted notices opposing the importation of American beef, and the Citizen’s Committee for Countermeasures on Mad-Cow Disease (광우병 국민대책위원회). However this Committee, which has put itself forth as representative of the leadership of the movement, was hastily created among people from various citizens’ groups in order to lend support to the ongoing candlelight demonstrations. Unlike the previous demonstrations and meetings, the formation of this committee can be portrayed as something that grew out of the candlelight demonstrations, not necessarily under specific leadership or organization. In addition the sheer fact that there were debates on the existence of leadership in the candlelight demonstration between the pro and con of the demonstration show that the 2008 candlelight demonstration was fundamentally different from the prior demonstrations. Many attempts were made to analyze the “fundamental difference” of the candlelight demonstrations; some of the most popular analysis varied from mentioning G. Deleuze and the desire of individuals to free them from the ruling power, to analysis borrowing A. Negri’s autonomia to depict individuals’ networked resistances. In response to the social reactions shown on the Internet, many new concepts and ideas, such as “multiplex,” “collective intelligence,” and “Web 2.0,” sprouted. Severe evaluations on the demonstration were more prevalent online, fueled by analysis on analysis, new concepts, and various criticisms.

I visited Ch’eongkye Square on the night of May 17 2008 for the first time; by the time, the candlelight demonstrations were coming to an end for the day.

After seeing and meeting many people there, the candlelight demonstration became a ‘must-be-at scene’ for me, a part of my daily routine, for the next 1

Debates on whether there was a leadership or not were present not only on Daum Agora, but also on TV debate shows (such as MBC’s 100 Minutes Debates of June 26 and July 3 2008). The argument for the existence of leadership of the candlelight demonstration is in parallel to the government’s argument; the evidence that supports this claim is the fact that the government posted some key people of the demonstration as the “most wanted.” This paper seeks to focus on how the participants of the demonstration interacted with each other, not much so on the issue of the existence of leadership.

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four months. The demonstration has become more of a personal experience and fights, as well as a subject of analysis. Until August, I communicated and shouted with the people, holding out picket signs, marching with people from all over Seoul. As time went by, the variability of the gravity of candlelight demonstration transformed into something more than just a political experience. My conviction to record other demonstrations, visages of people, organization and execution of demonstrations, only grew as my experiences became more enriched. Experience at the scene is clearly a different task from recording the scene; recording is a work of saving the scene in my space.

Recording and analyzing2 are tasks, which entail a high possibility of being distant from the concerned participants of the demonstration who change over the course of the demonstration. This writing, as well, may solidify the dynamic and multiplicity of the scene. Nevertheless, I write because I believe in the potential of the written language.3 Written experiences of the scene came from my own experiences, and the interviews were conducted via appointments with demonstrators after the demonstrations. This was beyond ordinary information collection; rather, it was a task that combined the evaluation and self-reflections of the participants and my experiences of the demonstration.

This article intends to understand candlelight demonstration within the boundaries of Victor Turner’s social drama.4 The details of the reasons behind the application of social drama theory in analyzing the demonstration will be addressed in detail in the main body of the paper, but to briefly mention here, one must realize that the experiences of candlelight demonstration 2

“Candlelight: Records of 65 Days,” by Taskforce team for Candle-lit Demonstration in Kyunghyang Newspaper, which compiled newspaper articles, and the “Republic of Korea Common Sense Encyclopedia, Agora,” which compiled countless posts on the internet and magazines, were published. “Candlelight is Democracy,” which was a compilation of intelligentsia writings on candlelight demonstration was published in August, while the candlelight was still bright. In September, the 55th edition of the “Literature Science” was published also.

3 Acted speech or experiences and recorded words can generate new ideas as they are read by different individuals. I am sure that those who read this paper will broaden their perspectives on the candlelight demonstrations. My thoughts borrow much from Walter J. Ong’s “Orality and Literacy.”

4 Social Drama will be explained later with stories from the scenes of the demonstrations.

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originates from different desires of each individual participants. Legitimizing and putting meanings to the demonstration is also very personal. There is no way that the demonstrators are conscientized and collectivized from the first place. However, over time, participants come to worry over the groupsocial identity. Such identity develops as boundaries form and become firm, and this includes concerning over either arbitrariness or uncertainty of the boundaries.5 A candlelight demonstration is a collectivized movement that cannot be individually revivified as a fragmentized movement, or as a group action with a specific aim. Experiences in which individuals suddenly feel the purpose of the group and returning to their daily lives can be taken as a social drama, and from there many things can be explained. In this paper, I try not to discuss neoliberalism or other major theories as much as possible, because of the belief that there lies a gap between the participants’ feelings and the logics of science.6 The Purpose of this paper is to engage in thinking about the meaning of the candlelight demonstrations of 2008 in South Korea as the fierceness of the experience of, rather than to seek for a logic behind that.

5

It is important to note that the people who chose the ‘1+5 Agenda’ also show the social dynamic of boundaries. The ‘1+5 Agenda’ refers to the direction of the candlelight demonstrations since their beginning, as discussed on the internet and also among the civil societies. It is the direction that centers around the issue of beef to also oppose education liberalization, the Great Canal Construction, privatization of public companies, privatization of the capital, and amendment of broadcasting laws. There was a big controversy surrounding the issue of extending the agenda. However, in reality, there were already picket signs opposing education liberalization and mad cow imports, starting on May 2.

6 Kang, Nae-Hee (2008: 75) also mentions the disparity between ‘against neoliberalism’ slogans and the actual demonstration site, however, his idea of disparity differs slightly from that of author’s. Kang believes that more people are prone to oppose neoliberalism after watching the demonstrations who accept the ‘1+5 Agenda,’ despite the fact that the people themselves do not have a clear understanding of what neoliberalism is. I do not think that the demonstrators fully acknowledge the ‘1+5 Agenda,’ however. This issue will be discussed further in the later part of the paper.

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II. Public Interest and Science Before a full discussion of the subject, it is necessary to address an important issue surrounding the candlelight demonstrations; it is the issue of the public interest. It is not easy to define the term in part because the word ‘public interest’ has been widely and confusingly used. Nonetheless, it is generally conceived that the public interest is an important issue for any social being.

Generally, most of policies drafted by the government aims to enhance the public interest, and often times, opposing arguments on such policies may rise. Sometimes, conflicts may inflict over the issue of policy and the public interest. It is also common to see instances in which both sides of the conflicts argue for the public interest. For example, frustration over economic gain through development and the environmental damages entailing it is a typical public interest debate. In such a debate, both sides propose scientific data and evidences to support their arguments. If that would be the case, is it not possible to think that science is not an absolute truth or good? Is it possible that science can carry completely different meanings depending on socio-cultural interpretations? The debate part of the demonstration is also linked to the issue of who contributes to the public interest through the demonstration. The imaginations and open perspectives on the public interest and determining standards for public good are very important issue for further discussions.

On April 18, 2008, there was an announcement that the Korea-US beef import negotiations were settled. Despite formation of an atmosphere against the contents of the negotiation, President Lee Myung-Bak told the press that “city workers can finally eat good-quality meat for cheaper price,” implying that the negotiation was for the public interest. The Lee Administration continued to tell the public that American beef is safe, with scientific evidences from the OIE (Office International des Epizooties), that beef, 30 months or younger has no possibility of carrying mad-cow-disease. The fact that OIE does not place the US as a mad-cow-disease epidemic region also became an important scientific evidence for the Lee Administration’s decision. It is an argument that, regardless of how old the cow is, importing American beef in which the SRM (Specific Risk Material) was elimintated was

‘The Candle-lit Demonstration’as a Social Drama 101

in the public interest, and public safety was guaranteed by scientific measures.

The Lee Administration’s argument generated many heated debates over the issue of American beef import.7 Interestingly, both sides of the debate backed their arguments with papers and data from numerous internationally renowned, major scholarly journals and various international organizations.

The problem was that every one of those papers and their respective showed different conclusions and arguments. The only item in common between the different sides’ evidence was that, some mutated prion, which differs from the regular ones in the brains of mammals, exists and that the mutated prion irregularly mutates the proteins around it to cause an incurable degenerative neurological disorder that ultimately leads to death.

Within the controversy surrounding the mutate prion, the rumor that Koreans are more vulnerable to the mutated prions because 95% of Koreans carry an MM gene, spread quickly. The combined rumor of mutated prions and the MM gene ultimately led to the creation of a major scenario utilized by the party against US beef imports. The scenario goes along the lines of, “because mutated prions on the tools used in the butchering process cannot be killed through usual processes of sterilization, it is transmitted from cattle to cattle during the butchering process. The people who consume the contaminated beef will live without knowing that they are sick, and continue to naturally transmit mutate prions to others as they interact with each other.

Also, mutated prions can be spread through various foods, processed foods, and even through cosmetic products. And because Korean people have MM genes, which are fatally vulnerable to mad-cow disease, in case they are transmitted with the mutate prions, 95% of the time, they will get sick.”8 This story spread quickly via the Internet and text messages. The conservative press argued that the story was a rumor by featuring articles and interviews 7

Since the end of April of 2008, an overload of discussions on the issues began to appear on the bulletin boards of many internet portal sites which in fact had no realistic connections to the issue; those internet portal sites mainly dealt with topics, such as, fashion, sports, music and women’s issues.

8 This borrows heavily from April and May posts from Daum Agora (http:// agora.media.daum.net/). The posts on Daum Agora were even compiled into an encyclopedia called “Republic of Korea Common Sense Encyclopedia, Agora.” This anecdote is the author’s paraphrasing of the posts on Daum Agora.

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of professionals against such an argument. However, it was found that the same presses had covered stories about the dangers of importing 20 months plus beef due to the MM genes, only a few months back. This was the work of concerned netizens who dug up the past articles of the conservative press. In reality, truth in this controversy cannot be simply ignored. It is important to observe how people face and contextualize danger or threats.

The context of the danger floating around the Internet can be revisited through the preface in a Korean version of “Purity and Danger” by Mary Douglas. Douglas discusses the generational changes that have taken place over the last 30 years. First, she argues that the period after 1950s, the period of which she began her studies for the book, was a period in which science analyzed and explained everything. That is, people from that time were confident that appropriate scientific tests and methods could recognize danger and threats. Therefore, she criticized those who rejected her work and recommendation, which urged people to rethink the principles of the scientific methods. Douglas claims that now, when at least 30 years have passed since the publication of her work, 9 is when people began to refer to “science and technology as the root of all dangers and threats,” or that “obscurity is always hidden.” This is why she points out “there are always ways to read evidence the correct way.” The question of which content that science decides to include or not is, of course, a problem of truth, but simultaneously, the decision is ultimately up to the community, made possible by science and technology (Douglas 1997: 12-16).”

Mary Douglas’ criticism provides a perspective when reviewing the scientific knowledge used as evidence in the public interest in the midst of the fierce 2008 disputes in Korea, as the application and explanation of science, said to be objective and neutral, are ultimately dependent on how one wishes to perceive one’s society. Depending on the individual’s context, scientific data or findings can be a lie while being the truth, or can be truth while being a lie.

Through the American beef import conflict, in which science was asserted as 9

Mary Douglas’ Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo was first published in 1996. Yu Je-Bun and Lee Hun-Sang translated it in 1997. In the translated copy, Douglas reminds the audience the meaning of her own theory in the context of the generation that changed from modern to post-modern.

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the key component of the conflict, the Korean people learned the lesson of variable interpretation – this not only includes the interpretation of science, but also philosophy, and history.

Other researchers (Kwon et al. 2008) attempted to view the candlelight demonstrations and the attitudes of the responding government as an indicator of democracy in Korea. Personally, however, I agree with Mary Douglas in the sense that, due to the variable interpretation of scientific data, opening the door for various interpretation of a single event is the true first step towards achieving democracy. It is natural for scientific data to triumph over its opponent. However, if the possibility arises of the opposing argument being completely denied, then it is an unscientific, anti-public interest idea that denies democracy.

III. C ontext of Danger and the Explosion of the Rage The rage on the internet after the US beef imports negotiation stemmed not only from the sheer fear of mad-cow disease, but also from the fact that the government treated the fear as if it was non-existent from their scientific data.

Despite the conflict between the various sets of scientific data, the common findings – that mad-cow disease has a long dormant period, and that it is impossible to cure – were transformed it into a serious threat for many people. That was because mad-cow disease is not a preventable disease; there are no vaccines for it, and paying close attention to personal hygiene is not going to prevent it. Also, studying it and preparing for it is not going to help people avoid the danger of the disease neither. Not consuming American beef may be a way to prevent it, but that scenario was unrealistic because no one could tell where the beef came from and how old was looking at a red piece of meat. The threat of mad-cow disease arising from importing the US beef was a completely new threat that the Korean people had never experienced before; in reality, this was a highly modernized societal threat that no one could realistically do anything about, no matter how much worrying is done.

For the people who felt the US beef imports as a threat, the government’s position at the negotiation table to import 30 months or younger beef, was

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viewed as giving up the last defense for its people. The scientific explanation provided by the government has its own complete logic, but that was seen by many people as an act of completely ignoring its own citizens’ emotions and daily safety. Moreover, the Lee Administration’s irresponsible statements such as, “just don’t eat it,” caused further rage among the people.

May 2, 2008 was the first day in which people who had been sharing their rage via online took to the streets. A public meeting held on that day, sponsored by online-based websites like “Anti Lee Myung-Bak Cafe,” “Mad Cow Dot Net,” and others, was not filled with the members of these websites.

Rather, the majority of the participants were housewives and female students in school uniforms.10 This group of people “did not view the threat the way that professionals did” (Douglas 1997: 17). Evidence supporting the differences in the perspectives of groups is also shown in the rhetoric used by the students and housewives. In the May 2nd demonstration, there were a variety of picket signs sayings “Oppose Mad Cow,” “Oppose Mad Education,” as well as some about environmental issues. This shows that the group viewed the conflict of the safety issue of US beef import as an opportunity to let out their general anger and frustration over a variety of issues that threatens their lives in general. Unlike professionals, who analyzes the threats based on scientific figures, students and housewives conceived the current threat as a personal and all-inclusive threat. All the issues addressed by the group, such as US beef imports, education, environmental, freedom of speech, standardized thoughts, public security, privatization of health insurance, and other public concerns consolidated into one – a threat to endanger my life.

Such responses from the people are rather common. That is because individual lives do not exist in a form of content section of a book; people’s lives cannot be separated into specific sections of the book. The safety issue of personal diet, the pressure of early morning class (the 0th hour starting 7 a.m.) at school, and unlimited competition at work are different issues in different stages of life. For an individual who has to live through multiple issues at a 10

It’s easy to find case studies of other cultures besides Korean culture in which females react more sensitively to issues about life. For example, Chapter 1 of Mies and Shiva (2000) refer to females against nuclear power plants, and Chapter 3 of June C. Nash (2007) talks about how females are more sensitive to the biased reality of the global market.

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time, however, life itself is felt under a compact and great threat.

There is also a similarity between the way in which people perceive danger and the nature of the Internet as a form of media. Numerous links to different web pages may not all be connected in reality, but as people gain information from various links and webpages, different stories consolidate into one giant story. It is not abnormal for an Internet user to have a news article about some a Hollywood scandal among numerous articles about scientific information. Despite the disconnection between Hollywood scandals and science issues, an individual might read understand them together as connected stories, however loosely, in daily. This is the reason why there are different varieties of social issues covered in blog spaces, which are meant for sports, entertainment or even humor. An Internet user desires to convey, the frustration he or she is faced on various websites with others and seek out those who are in similar shoes to share the rage. That is one of reasons why on websites various popular websites among teens, there were countless posts and reposts about mad-cow disease even though they, had nothing to do with the purpose of the website. According to Baumeister, Zhang and Vohs, “gossip is useful for conveyance of information to others, for social influence, and for entertainment” in peer group, even “saying that gossip is observational learning of a cultural kind”(Baumeister et al. 2004: 112). Through such acts, Korean teens made the safety issue of US beef import into a public narrative.

One female demonstrator who brought her cousins and their friends from Jinju to the demonstration in Seoul stated that she shared a common understanding with the other teens on the Internet: “Those kids must be frustrated out of their minds. My cousin is a senior in high school, and his generation is the one that has to deal with everything; they just cannot ignore some things and not others like we did. I completely understand why so many teens are frustrated. That is why if one of them hears of an issue, they share it among their friends in different mediums, like blogs and star fan pages.” (29 year-old female)

Initially, the US beef import negotiation issue was discussed on personal blogs or Daum Agora, which eventually grew into a frustration over education, the environment, the privatization of the media, and other issues. The fact that

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among the first websites to publish advertisements against US beef imports in the Hankyoreh Newspaper (May 17) and Kyunghyang Newspaper (May 19) were not political websites or organizations, but ‘the Soul Dresser,’ a fashion society, demonstrates very well, the public emotions provoked by the US beef import negotiation.

“That day (May 17) was the first time I ever participated in a protest. I went there to get inspired. People like me were told to shut up since the day Lee Myung-Bak was elected as the President, but ever since I heard that there were people meeting up, even little kids. I went to demonstrate out of concerns for their safety and also out of admiration for such courage. I mean the demonstration was not just for being anti-mad cow. You probably know after seeing them, but the kids on the streets are shouting all sorts of things from “What a waste to power Dong-Ah Newspaper [a conservative newspaper supporting the government side],” to “A Just and Through Re-investigation on Samsung Secret Funds.” Those kids know the issues, too. It’s not like they are doing this for fun. And I realized that these poor kids whom my generation forced into this mayhem are the same kids with the right perspectives on social issues. It’s like the old saying; kids who were spanked as a child think more of their parents than the kids who were not.” (47 year-old male)

The May 24th demonstration was the first protest that turned into a street march, as the people with candles from Ch’eongkye Square began marching through the streets. Of course, during the process, there were heated debates between group who wanted peaceful demonstration and others who argued, “nothing can be achieved if we stay like this.” Finally, a few people went for the streets, and others followed. At dawn, there were physical collisions between demonstrators and the police, and 37 demonstrators were arrested that day. It was the first time when the police force, always outnumbered the demonstrators and threatening them by stomping the ground with their shields shouting “harder,” turned into a violent measure.

Despite the government’s suppression, violently expressed by the police, the demonstration had become more satirical. Demonstrators in ‘Mad Cow’ costumes grew in numbers and picket signs with humorous slogans increased as more people came out to the streets, marching down the 6-lane roads at the center of the capital. People relaxing at bars after work, commuters stuck

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in traffic jams caused by the very demonstration, and passers-by all jointed the protest.

As the suppression by the police force got harsher and violent, the theme of the demonstration gradually switched from ‘beef re-negotiation’ to ‘Resign, Lee Myung-Bak.’ Although there were a few signs saying ‘MB [Myung-Bak] OUT’(note: Myung-Bak is likely in reference to the South Korean President, Lee Myung-bak), from the beginning, the theme had get more momentum by the end of May. A special bond of solidarity began to form among the demonstrators, and impromptu slogans were often made by the participants in street.

Demonstrators who occupied the street were people who got over the boundary diving the pedestrian and car sections set by the society. Societal norms and the hierarchy faded out and the idea of an egalitarian community was emerged; the idea of differentiating between sexes, educational levels, fashion styles, age, and others has become less significant. Sharing the same experience at the same time busted the individual bubble wrapped each demonstrator and compelled them to stand arms in arms, borrow candles and water bottles. Turner, who applied Arnold Van Gennep’s idea of the ‘rite of passage’ to the processes of societal changes, emphasized the notion of liminality,11 an idea explaining the mental state of people who have shared an experience of deviation and separation. Turner argues that the essence of liminality analyzes culture in many factors and it focuses on recombining those factors by all possible patterns, freely or playfully (Turner 1982: 28-29).

Liminality in the candlelight demonstration was that people from different backgrounds gathered in frustration over the safety issue of US beef imports.

Therefore, the direction of individual rage is also different. However, the collective experience of violating social rules together in the same physical space has formed a new joy through the process of readjustment and explosion on the issue.

11

The dictionary definition of liminality may only limit the meaning of the word to ‘limit,’ but Turner uses liminality as a word that describes one’s state of mind beyond a limit which has metastasized. He implies that the people who shares an experience in a liminal situation experiences a feeling of communitas. In the case of the 2008 candlelight demonstration, limits in which such communitas was experienced changed frequently. This will be covered in the later part of the paper.

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IV. The Social Drama of Humor and Wit 1. The Meaning of Smile Since the beginning of the candlelight demonstrations, the participants drew much attention for their interesting picket signs and attire. Without any conscious and collective intentions, the “candlelight grandmothers,” “candlelight strollers,” “candlelight animals,” “candlelight reserve soldiers,” “candlelight Korean beef advocates,” and even the “candlelight riot police” evolved into a candlelight family. A father dressed as a mad cow walked with a sign around his neck saying “Your Sight Drive Me Crazy” while holding a picket saying “Are You Mad, Mouse [connoting the president]?” His other hand held his son dressed as a mouse with a sign saying “Do I Make You Insane?” Signs reading, “Is the President Recallable?,” “the 1st Article of the Constitution [all power comes from people] is even on the College Scholastic Ability Test (note: Korea’s version of the Scholastic Ability Test college entrance exams),” “Let’s Catch the Mice,” “Our House’s Mouse is a Crazy Mouse,” “Please Don’t Do Anything at All” and “This is the First Time I’m Afraid You’ll Keep Your Campaign Promise,” among various others could be seen.

A majority of these pickets were hand-made by the demonstrators at their homes. The demonstrators also put stickers on the riot police vehicles that were surrounding the protesters. Those were citation stickers on the riot police buses reading “Illegal Parking, You Will Be Towed At Your Own Expense,” tickets for ‘Negligence Fines’, issued in the name of the Korean citizens. In the early morning hours of June 10, they hung a banner from one of the large barricades on Sejong Street, reading “Congratulations on the 2008 Opening of the Myung-Bak Castle Landmark – for Further Information, Dial 112: No Area Code Required.” Citizens would then dial 112 and demand that the police come and remove the illegal structure blocking Sejong Street.

The online humor and parodies were just as prevalent as those off-line.

Parody movie posters were a staple, with one stating “Two-Day Chicken Coop Tour,” parodying Cinderella and her pumpkin carriage, and various original songs were also posted. Materials once posted online would be widely

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copied and circulated, often new contents and pictures being added during the process. There were also those who would upload files, with writings and pictures they had made in the A4 size. The explosively popular flash animation “MB (Mouse Busters) Project” series, and “The Bone’s Ultimatum,” which took various scenes from the same titled American film and dubbed over them with Korean, were widely circulated via blogs and Internet cafes.

It was with the emergence of all these varied ideas both on- and off-line, directed towards the armed riot police, that water cannons were first used in an effort to break-up protests on May 31. Special Police Units, armed with clubs and shields, were mobilized against the unarmed peaceful protesters, and the bloody crack-downs began. Injuries among the protestors mounted as the water cannons were directed at their faces, impairing vision and sound.

One college student whom I interviewed that September showed me his blog, and had this to say about their experience that day: “It was the coldest time in my life. Those at the bus were scattering from the stream of the water cannon. One person was hit directly in the head by the water cannon and they lost consciousness in less than two seconds. I was right underneath the bus, so I picked them up and prayed, “Please, just don’t let me die.” (25 year-old male)

At first, the protestors had retreated from the barricades, and thus the police pressure had clearly achieved its goal. However, that did not break the spirits of all; there were those people who while being hit by the water cannons would yell things such as, “hot water,” “soap,” and “shampoo.” News of this was being broadcasted on cyberspace in real time. People at the site would transmit images of the police violence via their mobile phone or digital cameras. Multitudes of people who had either received text messages or phone calls or been observing the situation from the Internet soon converged on Sejong Street where the protest was happening. Starting early in the morning on Sunday, June 1st, people who had heard the news began to take to the streets and fill-up Seoul Square, the square in front of City Hall. Those who had newly arrived at the square took over the positions of the people who had been there over night and were taking a momentary rest. Dozens of individuals with Internet connections used their cameras to transmit

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recordings of the police brutality.

On the evening of Thursday, June 5 th , a 72-hour continuous relay demonstration was announced to begin. As videos and articles depicting female college students being mercilessly stomped on by the combat boots were relayed via the Internet and nearly all of the popular media on that day, the public opinion toward excessive police brutality exploded. Accordingly, the use of clubs and water cannons was momentarily halted for the duration of the 72-hour relay demonstration. Beginning on the afternoon of June 5, people carrying candles filled up the streets from the square in front of City Hall, to Sejong Street, and of course in front of the National Police Agency Headquarters and the Anguk District (안국동). Ridiculing the shields and clubs of the riot police, people carrying magic wands from the Japanese comic “Sailor Moon,” and shields made to resemble those carried by the ‘Gundam” robots from the comic could be seen.

Speaking freely from podiums, people continuously expressed their thoughts. People would shout things such as “Let’s go to the Blue House” (note: the residence of the President of the ROK), “The candlelit appearance is extremely impressive,” “The season of 20 years ago has come again,” until the veins on their necks stood out. And among all these outburst of frustrations, al story of a college student made people laugh. It was a story about his 27month-old nephew who lived with him. He was a kind of infant who if you told him not to touch anything dangerous, the minute you took your eyes off of him he would immediately touch it again. The entire family could not do their things at home because they worried if the boy was going to do something dangerous. He ended his story saying that although his nephew’s behavior could be understood with his young age, he could not understand how an adult living in the nicest house in Korea [Blue House] would do the same thing as the people asked not to do again and again.

What makes people not losing their wit and sense of humor even under the violence of the police against them such as verbal insults, taking pictures of the protestors for later criminal evidence, and using the brutal water cannons, clubs, and shields? And what role did this humor serve for the people? To answer these questions, we have to distinguish the different situations in which participating in the candlelight demonstrations found themselves.

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Those people participating in the candlelight demonstrations ranged from the owners of expensive buildings in Gangnam to the unemployed; from middle school students who took an express bus up from the countryside on a Saturday afternoon to grey-haired old man who held pickets to protest Yi Moon-Yul [a famous and conservative novelist]. However, all of these people had one thing in common. It was the fact that although these people have voiced their criticisms of the administration and its numerous other policies, the authorities would not listen to them and their voices had been completely ignored. The number of people voicing their opinions is unimportant to the people in power. The more people point out the contradictions that the Lee administration makes and upholds, the more strongly administration and the conservative media which blindly supports it, will distort the facts and ignore those people.12 Renato Rosaldo said that in difficult situations, when people are unable to make themselves heard in society or that their voices are completely ignored, humor and wit “becomes a tool for apprehending social incongruities and a weapon for use in social conflict.” (Rosaldo 1989: 195). Accordingly, time is important in social change. In this situation, ‘timing’ is probably better than ‘time’ because the thing which we call social change begins to start the moment something begins to deviate from what we would predict to normally occur. However, humor and wit too cause pleasant feelings contingent upon timing, based on our counterpart’s thoughts or actions. The essence of humor is what we say in that moment departs from our expectations.

“If you look at all of the riot police lined up forming a wall, they fight over there and we fight over here. At that time, you begin to feel the fighting 12

Henry Jenkins (2006: 209-219) introducing the campaign “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised” after the song title of Gil Scott Heron, spoke of the Internet as an alternative to mainstream media, which seeks to control information and portray political activity in a way that is beneficial to them. Additionally, he predicted that through blogs different opinions would be brought to light and that as they gain authority that even the mainstream media would take notice of these opinions. In Korea, in the summer of 2008, the mainstream media and the Internet alternative, which Jenkins spoke, represented through blogs and cafés were the most brilliant examples of this point. We will have to continue to monitor to see if the next step goes according to Jenkins’ predictions.

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becomes less intense, because we are thinking, “My brother was drafted in March, do they really want to be there doing this, let us be a little more gentle with each other, and the riot police too are thinking “My brother could be over there protesting.” We need everyone, even the reserve soldiers.” (25 yearold male)

It was not just various costume-play but unconventional usage of behavior, dresses, and language that strength the power of people’s humor and wit. For example, a group of young people wearing reserve soldier uniforms protected the protestor by standing between them and the riot police. Their actions and dress deviated from the situation. The laughter of those and the meaning for those who were there was strengthened through the experience of crossing over normal boundaries at the candlelight protests. The established social system and its mechanisms wanted to do something to put an end to these infringements on order, symbolized by the candlelight, because from the position of the system and authority, the reality was that these gatherings of people crossing boundaries represented serious violation to their status quo.

Accordingly, the authority did not hesitate to use violence and other tougher solutions for them. Through merciless material, mental, and violent pressure, the authorities wanted to overcome this crisis by instilling a powerful fear in those who would violate these boundaries. The humor and wit were the methods by which the protestors could use the energy of their solidarity to overcome the atmosphere of fear created by the violent pressure.

By employing wit at this touch-and-go moment when the authorities utilized the police force and violent pressure in an effort to instill fear and destroy the solidarity among the protectors – cheering “sing us a song” to the loudspeaker broadcasts by which the police told them to disperse, and “hot water” to the water cannons - the protestors were able to make a mockery of the mighty government authority. It revealed not only the contradictions created by the governmental organizations and the power structure which supposed to protect its citizens, but also reconfirmed the legitimacy of their protests which reclaim the power of people. Through laughter, they once again gave new strength and vision to their solidarity, and this intuition they gained became a weapon.

Of course, the effectiveness of humor and wit will be faded away if

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the demonstration continued a long time or the police violence became a routine because timing is a critical for humor. One male protestor said that the changing atmosphere of the demonstrations was very unfortunate. He suffered the water cannons and the shields on the morning of June 1 st and carried a 1.5 meter paper shield saying “shields are for blocking, not for hitting.” He said that he was too busy to get sick in June and July due to the candlelight protests. When I met him in October, he was still participating in smaller local demonstrations. He said that with spare time at work, he tried to make funny signs to bring joy to those protestors who seem to have lost their smile: “The funny signs have definitely disappeared. Everyone is serious. Even if it’s just me, I’m trying to create an atmosphere that we can smile and protest at the same time, because the police cracking down starts at 10 at night on the weekends, there’s no time to do anything. People don’t laugh any more and they cannot really laugh in this situation.” (31 year-old male)

2. Boundary Change and Flexibility One night I was riding the subway from Seokwan-dong to City Hall around 10 o’clock to meet my students for a reserved performance. I received a text message from one of my friends. ‘I got the news: the train was skipping the City Hall station now.’ So I had to get off at Chongkak station once before the City Hall. I had to push through in sweat the waves of people who were trying to board the train. I thought to myself, “What kind of situation is this that such many people are trying to get on the train? Well, it was past 11 o’clock so it was almost time for the last train. Having 10 million people in one place is not a easy task after all.” After getting out of the underground station, however I was very surprised by what I saw on the ground. There were a lot more people around the station than ones trying to board train in the ground. The area was filled with sounds of people shouting slogans, speeches delivered through loud speakers, and collective singing, all echoing the high-rise concrete forests at the center of Seoul. More impressively, the 8-lane boulevard between the Chongkak station and the Sejong Cultural Center was completely packed with people. Whatever a candles was burned-

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out, a protestor nearby would replace it with on that he or she carrying.

Some people were carrying banners and pickets and others were sitting in the middle of the road and chatting with their friends. Other people laid their tired bodies on temporary mats in the middle of the road. Some people brought guitars and sang songs together. People on the street were participating in the demonstration in their own ways – white color wearing suits, some youths wearing hip-hop style clothes, high school students in school uniforms gossiping continuosly with their friends, ladies in stylish mini-skirts and high heels, middle aged men wearing straw hats, and even people dressed up as cows and mice. Those people of various ages, dress and lifestyles gathered together in one place at the same time and walked, sang, and shouting on the street as the day approached to the midnight. Passing by the “Myung-Bak Castle,” a police barricade composed of about 60 large shipping containers, to the vicinity of Kyunghyang Newspaper building on fort, I still saw the street filled with people who did not seem to leave the area soon. Separated from a podium set up in front of the Myung-Bak Castle, a group of people had installed a lot of drums in front of the Dong-A Daily Newspaper building and they were performing with the passers-by. Another group were playing guitars and harmonicas on a mobile stage in front of the main entrance to the Kyobo Bookstore, singing with other groups of citizens.

There were groups of people who used to communicate on the Internet, carrying the flags of their online communities and shouting their slogans, with group names such as “Agora,” “Education Solidarity,” and “the Proper Spirit of Our People.” They were marching back and forth between MyungBak Castle and the area by the City Hall. There was also a group of middleaged men and women wearing suits, sitting under a flag that read, “Observers of Violations of the MINBYUN which is the Lawyers for a Democratic Society.” Walking along, I could see girls in “candle-girl” printed red t-shirts, probably college students, were distributing a warm cup of coffee to the protestors. Among friends, couples, and families sitting in the middle of the road, some were having a drink or two. Thinking that it was a good idea to have drinks with my friends later, I headed toward a convenience store by the Sejong Cultural Center. Walking made me realize how wide the Sejong Street intersection was, which you did not feel when you drove a car. After a not so short walk I arrived at a convenience store across the street, but I was told

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that all beer and soju was already sold out and there would not be restocked tonight because the delivery truck could not access to the store. Habitually I took my cell phone and found out there were several calls I missed due to a loud and noisy environment. Concerning about how to find my friends the crowd, I called one of them who arranged the appointment. After many rings, he finally picked up his phone. He said that they were all taking a break on a tiny grass patch between the Myung-Bak Castle and the Kyobo Bookstore.

While walking meet my friends in a hurry, I ran into the leader of a music band that performed on the May 17th Candlelit Cultural Event. As we were exchanging a greeting, my friends luckily spot me amongst the crowd and they came over. How released I was to see them! That was how the night of June 10th started for me.

The narrative above, reconstructed from thoughts and feelings recorded in my notebook between June 10th and June 11th, 2008, my first impression on that night. It reminded me of something that Turner said; “during social dramas, a group’s emotional climate is full of thunder and lightning and choppy air currents.” From Chongkak to Sejong Street, and all the way to Seoul City Hall, the activities of all the people who had filled the streets, holding candles and marching, singing and yelling had really reversed the convention about streets. This infringement could just be a momentary desire, or it could be “a political act designed to challenge the extant power structure” (Turner 1982: 10). It does not matter whether it was, as Turner said, a calculated action or totally uncalculated rage. The important fact is the individual motive of tens of thousands of people, and that they actively chose to gather in one place and at one time. The Korean-American Beef Agreement was one important cause among many, but from the first demonstration on May 2nd, the pickets carried by the participants indicated their different problems based on their individual thoughts and the paths of their lives. In the middle of those differences, they all gathered in public and carried out activities opposing the established society’s legal system together.

They believed that they shared some kinds of collective perspective made in the course of these individual actions. One of the important things to emerge from the 2008 candlelight demonstrations was that through the medium of the Internet, not only people who were there at the site of the protest, but also people in different regions and even those overseas could feel that they did

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experience the protests in real-time. When grading my students’ final papers in June, I could feel like being at Kwanghwamun where the protest happened through Internet broadcasts and the text messages from my co-workers, friends and colleagues. Through the Internet, an emotional community was created which could not be explained by the conventional theories.

The meaning of the candlelight demonstrations was not about ‘changing the system’. On the contrary, it was in reaction to how weak and easily the divisions and boundaries that people had believed in could be changed.

Many people were indignant upon seeing the Internet broadcast of the police pulling the hair of a woman in a wheelchair who had come to the candlelight demonstrations. However, it soon came to light that that woman was a fervent follower of a female leader in the conservative political party, and that she used to participate in many conservative rallies along with that leader.

This incident made both those who claimed left-wing conspiracy on the candlelight demonstrations and those who raised their candles saying they could not live with ‘conservative boneheads’ under the same sky to scratch their head. It is in part because her participating in the demonstration and protesting behavior against the police authority cannot be explained by any conventional views of dividing people into groups. The woman’s participation cannot be simplified either as a betrayal of the conservatives or, a cooperation with the progressive agenda. Even at that brutal moment, she had not given up the trust in the political leader she supported. Like other participants, she was acting out of concerns on various the social crisis. The candlelight demonstration, a social drama, provided a stage in which that woman could act crossing the established sociopolitical borders and measuring sticks. It opened the possibility that, “yesterday’s luminal becomes today’s stabilized, today’s periphery becomes tomorrow’s center” (Turner 1974: 16).

It is social drama and its power that make people able to ignore and change the borders dividing the left-wing and right-wing or good and evil.

Any groups or individuals who opposed to each other before the social drama can transform to take the same position through social drama or vice versa. This cannot be easily understood in an ordinary life in which life patterns are well regulated. However, social drama, a special situation with elevated emotions, can reveal the divisions among individuals and systems in an extreme fashion or negate and transform them with absolute easy.

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“In particular, the dramatic episodes where actors make strategic attempts to change definitions of the situation.” And the boundary [frame] becomes very soft and weaving. “Frame contestation and frame alignment are a key mechanism driving the progression of the situational drama” (McFarland 2004: 1250).

Let’s go back to the early morning of June 11. Even though it was past the midnight, it did not seem that the numbers of people gathered at Sejong Street had gone down. At about 1 o’clock in the morning, people began passing the styrofoam boxes in the square of the City Hall over each other’s heads and stacked them in front of the Myung-Bak Castle in an orderly fashion.

The styrofoam wall was almost as tall as the barriers themselves, which were over five meters height. Those who had climbed onto a platform on top of the styrofoam wall did not climb over the Myung-Bak Castle not because they could not, but because they asserted that they had already won. At this point the gathered people started to become restless. Lots of shouts such as, “Let’s go over,” “Put a flag on top of the containers,” “It’s dangerous so let’s just build one that’s the same height,” “We have to go forward non-violently,” “Going over (the containers) is dangerous,” could be heard. A promoter with a microphone and a human rights organization repeatedly asserted that climbing-over the barricade is not only dangerous, but also endanger their non-violence stance. Those who opposed burst out with profanity and abusive language here and there in the crowd. One could also hear voices shouting against the use of profanity in public. One young woman standing in front of me even started to cry because of the shouts and profanity. In the midst of all of this internal strife, at about 3 am, one man just barely managed to climb on top of the oil-covered container barricade. In one moment, people on either side of the barricade broke out in an uproar. Applause broke out amongst the crowd, and there was a jumble of people either cheering him, or shouting that it was dangerous so he should get down. Even on the backside of the container where the riot police were waiting, you could hear people shout “wake up” and the sound of the hustling movement. The tiresome quarreling had started at about 1 a.m. and found a temporary agreement of climbing on top of the container without going over it. Everyone said that the climax of that day’s demonstrations was when dozens of people climbed to the top of the Myung-Bak Castle and were waving their flags. Of course, after that

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happened, the police began to physically break up the crowd.

The boundaries between those with different perspectives can break apart and come back together at any time. This process is not resolved by the establishment’s system or discipline, but rather by the motivation created by the movement’s internal energy. Boundaries can become reorganized at any time. The mobility of boundaries has started to become even more varied, with foreigners living in Korea participating in the demonstrations, as the danger of the food safety is one that they too will have to face. One foreign female, who appeared on a panel on a public television broadcast, became a topic of conversation as she participated in the protests with her friends. At that time, you could meet Japanese students who said they planned on staying for a year and studying Korean.

“My friends who are in Japan keep talking about mad-cow disease, and telling me to come back to Japan, and I am just very upset [with the current issue in Korea]. My friend’s family is also staying and we went out to the candlelight demonstrations together. We were hit by the water cannons [by the police], and it really hurt.” (21 year-old male, Japanese international student)

Everyday until daybreak, there were groups that were raising their voices shouting, “Let’s go to the Blue House.” The most fervent among them was a group I was introduced to, which was an association formed among likeminded persons who wanted to properly fix the spirit of their people. There were about five or six of them, and they would take turns shouting their slogans, such as “Lee Myung-Bak, out! Pak Kun-Hye, out! Pak Jung-Hee, out! (they alternated between Park Jung-Hee, and his Japanese name Takaki Masao), Chosun Daily, out!,” until their sounds were hoarse, all while holding their Internet group’s flag. A special situation had arisen in which foreign residents in Korea including the Japanese would participate in the candlelight demonstrations together with those Koreans insisting that the Korea spirit had lost its way and needed to be revived.

The energy of social dramas is as powerful as to the extent in which the borders dividing people are totally obscured. However, the energy resulted from the separation from the normalcy cannot continue forever when the participants return to their daily life. The candlelight demonstrations were

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naturally changed into a different form.

3. The Giving Birth of Order If anyone stayed at the site of the candlelight demonstration until the early hours of the morning, one would be the recipient of a roll of kimbab or a cup of hot coffee, an act which has come to be called “Kimbab Tribute.” “Da-In’s Father,” a candlelight tea room owner who decided to provide a free cup of coffee to individuals at his establishment, was among those who participated in the ‘Occupy KBS Candlelight Gathering’. There always were serious and minor differences of opinion among the gatherings’ participants. However, in judging the situation that had evolved from the experience of almost two months of a series of protests, a means of cooperation started to take hold through a set of one principles and order. The fact that order, a long-term war mentality, and the creation of fixed apparatuses within the protest lines began to emerge from the candlelight demonstrations, which became a dynamic force infringing upon and causing discord amongst established institutions, showed that the candlelight demonstrations were moving towards a new aspect, a different step re-uniting (the demonstrations) with normal existence.

There are those who say that the candlelight demonstrations were unable to obtain visible, positive results, and that compared to the amount of effort that all of the people put into it, nothing has changed. However, science in which everything is as an absolute value or principle uses a completely different basis for each person. It is important that the people who identified themselves as a conservative or a progressive created what we call boundaries, but at the same time they were able to raise the agreed voice at the demonstrations and meet each other in person. In an experience like this, the body remembers the fact that the boundaries which divide society are in fact very vague and that depending on the situation, you could even meet people who were located on an extreme political opposition like the difference was nothing, and switch your positions with them. The body’s memories can be conscious, but it is definitely possible that things remain among the unconscious.

Of course, not everyone stood on the side of the candlelight demonstrations.

There were counter-demonstrations and self-proclaimed conservatives who

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opposed the demonstrations. However, just as the candlelight demonstrations had many voices, you cannot summarize those who opposed them all as one voice. On the contrary, the fact that conservative media and organizations’ positions went from one extreme to another in a matter of months was confirmed by netizens.13 Moreover, we also saw conservative organizations, who opposed the candlelight demonstrations, coming out and confronting the participants of the demonstrations.14 These experiences show us that one cannot conclude that there is only one truth between the conservatives and the progressives, or between science and conventional wisdom. Through the candlelight demonstrations the fact became dramatically known that the borders, which, in normal conditions carefully divide completely different political values and thoughts, are, in reality, all intertwined. Regarding this type of liminality exist for, Turner said, “chaos into cosmos, or disorder into order, than the creative interhuman or trans-human satisfaction and achievements” (Turner 1982: 46). The candlelight demonstrations were incapable of achieving material breakthroughs or results and different from that assertion. However, we can look at the entirety of this experience also considered the process through.

Turner (1974) regarded it as the “serious” genres of symbolic action among people who engage in various competitive relationships while living in the midst of an imperfect social, political, and religious system. It is worth that Turner emphasized social drama is not cyclical repetitive view of the human historical process. Many kinds of sequences of social action may be generated but which further specify what sequences must be excluded (Turner 1974: 13

Netizens pointed out that the same news organization featured articles both confirming and denying the danger surrounding the aforementioned MM gene.

14 On June 5th, members of the “Korean Special Forces Association” placed a plaque in Seoul Square, commemorating those who had died while conducting special secret missions against North Korea. A netizen named Professor Jin Jung-gwan wrote an article, “The North Korean Operations Participants’ Association’s Gag-show” (http:// www.cbs.co.kr/nocut/show.asp?idx=854555), regarding the day events and plaque.

The Korean Special Forces Association filed a civil lawsuit claiming that his article had perverted the memory of Korea’s fallen war heroes. For more information about this, refer to “Asia Economy” article, “Special Forces Associations’ 100 Million Won Civil Lawsuit Against Professor Jin Jung-gwan” (http://www.Asiaeconomy.co.kr/uhtml/ read.php?idxno=2008081416534320298)

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15-17). So we can say each particular case of social drama has its own unique causes and inspirations.

Of course it is dangerous to understand the liminality experienced during the candlelight demonstrations as a homogenous experience. It is also dangerous to contrast the summer of 2008 for Korean people to some historical fact or substituting the 2008 experience in some theoretical paradigm to conclude the processes, as an unimportant factor is an act of taxidermy, stuffing the experiences of people as if they were all experimental specimens. Criticizing the universality of something in terms of its procedure and the universal perspective of reality produces a very different depth of analysis. In the latter case, the candlelight demonstration appears as an appropriate reaction, which would define the candlelight demonstration as a usual phenomenon like a seasonal flu. However, in the earlier case, more value is put on the individual experiences of the candlelight demonstration than the result of the demonstration. People who participate in the candlelight demonstration physically experienced the explosion of the individual frustration of others on the Internet and at the actual location.

What is important is that people with different thoughts and backgrounds shared those experiences in the midst of serious anxiety. This experience was very meaningful, even after the demonstrators cleared the square. This is discussed in the next chapter.

V. Social Drama, the Next Scene 1. Experience of Uncertainty The basic social drama model is full of conflicts and controversies.

Sociocultural system is not as harmonious as logical system. Nevertheless, it is not to be mistaken that structural imbalance or norms are embedded in the sociocultural system. The confrontation of change and social norms need not be defined with objective language. That exists between all sort of uncertainty and certainty. What I mean by uncertainty is the subjunctive mood. That

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is, something that may exist, may have existed, or will exist.15 Candlelight represents a lump of frustrated energy, not a solution to some problem.

Therefore, it bears not a conclusive property in which the beginning and an end can be determined.

If one fails to understand the social drama-like characteristics of the candlelight demonstration, he may mistakenly conclude that candlelight demonstrations have come to an end when weekend demonstrations become less exciting or when there are less people gathered in Seoul Square. The fact that there are divided opinions and analysis after the candlelight has left the square signifies that the state of candle is at excess, explosion, anxiety, vain and even absence. Candlelight can be portrayed as an experience of possibility, a hidden potential. The candlelight demonstrations, especially, from the beginning, were organized with the principles of hypertextual logical-joints known as the Internet and the energy of chaos.

Hence, it is important to realize that Korean society has experienced an aura of uncertainty that it has never experienced before, as Korean people expressed the boundaries and conflicts within the society not only online but also off-line, overcoming the limits of time and space. The candlelight demonstration was a lesson for all, regardless of whether one participated, ignored or opposed it. It is proper to say that the candlelight demonstrations were dramatic opportunity that vividly showed the confrontation, accommodation and strengthening of individual ideas developed out of concerns for survival and maintenance of place. Other peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s thoughts and opinions which were often ignored in the daily lives were dramatically displayed via candlelight to form ultimately a collective struggle and solidarity. The experience in which the sociopolitical device, considered to protecting citizens, turns its back on them is an experience that shows how dangerous and incomplete the society in which we live. When we doubted the direction of the existing system and protested against it, we clearly felt the suppression in forms of violence. The established system such as political organizations and the powerful is trying to crush new attempts to bring about changes upon the society by squeezing them into a legal frame of the system

15

For a better understanding of this, refer to Chapter 2 of Turnerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s book (1982: 61-88).

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and covering it.16 Because the important role of the social drama is the role of dramatically experiencing the structural imbalance between the society and the hidden confrontations, the violent form of imbalance and confrontation arouse public conscience. Of course, saying that everyone’s conscious is awakened in the same image is also a lie. However, there are people who have experienced such awakening, finding structural imbalance and confrontations in different situations. If there are numerous results of awakening, there is a good chance that at least a few will be awaken. The fact that one can expect the potential making of such people represents the first footstep in understanding the scattered candlelight that once united in the square.

2. From the Square to the Neighborhoods On June 8, the day in which the 72-hour Seoul Square demonstration was at its peak, a new Internet webpage called “Gathering of Promoting the Summoning of Citizens (http://cafe.daum.net/sowhanje)” was created. The objective of this website was to pass a legislation that allows people to recall and resign the lawmakers who make incorrect choices even during the parliament is in session. The formation of this gathering shows that people have realized that the rage of the candlelight demonstration must turn to each neighborhood. Now, the people sought to make a measure in which they could continuously watch and be aware of social issues by bringing the candlelight back home.

Since May, candlelight demonstrations arose nationally, from every corner of Korea. The tide of the candlelight spread not only in the major cities of Busan, Gwangju, Daejeon, Daegu, Suwon, but also throughout medium-size cities of Bucheon, Ansan, Gwangmyeong, Goyang, Paju. Those demonstrations were not that large in its scale at the beginning. Unlike the Seoul demonstration, the response of the police in those regions was strictly restricted to negligence. One college student who participated in one of them in late May described how null the Busan demonstration was.

16

For a better understanding of this, refer to Chapter 2 of Turner’s book (1974: 60-97), which reveals the conflict between Henry II of England and Thomas Becket.

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“I thought there were more than a thousand people at the demonstration, but there were only four cops. Cops behaved like mad men on April 2008 during the general elections period, but not this time. It seemed like there were so many of them out in Seoul, but here, all they did was hanging a single string of yellow tape in front of us and told us, ‘Do not cross this line.’ That made me to run out of steam. It almost felt like being discriminated [by the government concerning more about the Capital].” (24 year-old male)

At first, it was true that the candlelight demonstrations seemed to be incapable of going beyond the vicinity of Seoul. Therefore, there were a lot of people who made a weekend trip to Seoul to participate in demonstrations.

When the demonstrations were extended and lasted for a long period of time, people actively sought to discuss the daily hardship at the demonstrations, which eventually scattered the candles to each neighborhood. In mid-July, violent suppression and restrictions made the mood in Seoul to die down as well.

The reason why regional candlelight demonstrations gained so much support stemmed from the unexpressed rage and helplessness of the demonstrators who eventually returned to their daily lives. That rage became clearer and sharper in different regions than they were at Seoul. Furthermore, people could no longer endure the violence and the negligence engaged by the government. Near the Gangnam station in Seoul, where many offices are clustered, there were small-scale demonstrations at 7:00 p.m. almost everyday.

“I am not feeling well, and you cannot even get to the City Hall because of the barricades that the cops put up. I live in Gwacheon, and this was the closest place from home that I found on the Internet where they are having demonstrations, so I came here for a little bit in the evening with my picket sign.” (30 year-old women) “This is my first time too, and I do not really know politics, but this is just insane. I have never participated in demonstrations before, but I cannot endure it anymore, I am really pissed. But since I am tired after work and Ch’eonkye Square is too far away, I came to the closest place at least to talk about the issue [with other people].” (Female in her 20’s)

The Internet providing information about regional candlelight demonstrations

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had varieties of functions; online gatherings of the countless regional candlelight demonstrations were organized and meetings were formed to inform the Korean candlelight demonstrations to the international community by translating news articles (http://www.globalcandles.org). In addition, reference links dedicated to sharing designs of picket signs, logos, and other publications were created as well. People uploaded their own designs and collected designs and ideas scattered around the country. Some online archives even received public spotlight for sharing effective designs. Many people voluntarily spent their own money to develop designs and distribute the protest pamphlets and flyers on the street. The webmaster of many online websites opened supporting bank accounts and used the collected fund to make and send a large volume of pockets and publications to the local members of the candlelight demonstration.

3. Solidarity Found in the Neighborhood: Meaning of the Space Next to Me The “Gathering for Promoting the Summoning of Citizens” Internet website shared information of individuals who wanted to bring candlelight demonstrations to their neighborhoods. In this website, there were varieties of information and people sharing advices, designs, funding ideas, and manpower.

Stories shared on the website included a wide-range of stories from physical conflicts with the police to the sharing of know-hows on how not to be arrested. Most of the regional candlelight demonstrations were held around major subway stations. Numerous methods of achieving solidarity were developed and the experienced demonstrators from one region helped pave the way for new demonstrations in other regions. There were many cases of people joining the cause after reading epilogues of demonstrations.

A male who had been attending the Seoul Square candlelight demonstration since the early stages of the demonstration also attended the Sungbuk-Gu regional candlelight demonstrations. He found a greater importance and meaning in the regional candlelight demonstrations; it had been more active off-line than online.

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“I’ve worked for an Internet website before, so I try not to bother with the online debates. I got upset just by hearing the name of the website. It is exploitation I tell you, exploitation! One day when I was getting off work, I saw a candle near my neighborhood (Near Sungshin Women’s University). I did not know how it got there since I tried staying off of the Internet as much as I can. Well, I went to go introduce myself and immediately joined forces.

I regret not participating earlier even though it was so close to me. I was also a bit ashamed because I have been telling myself that I’m an anarchist for some time now. After I joined the regional demonstration, I began to be more hopeful. Beef is what we eat, so it is very important, same as important problem of my town where I live also. To tell you the truth, when I first visited them, they asked me what my online ID was, they think I am the one of the website member in regional candlelight demonstrations. But what is the importance of that? What is important is that we experienced the water cannon shots together and…” (31 year-old Male)

The regional demonstration that the man above participated into was said to have received a lot of help from the organizers of the Songpa-Gu region demonstrators. This 31 year-old man also had experiences with regional demonstrations near his work. He said that the few months of participating in demonstrations had been meaningful to him because it gave him an opportunity to think differently than the square demonstrations. At the square, he was fighting against the Vietnam War veterans, particularly the victims of the Agent Orange (defoliant), who were against the demonstration.

Those veterans could have been his next-door neighbors back in the neighborhood. Personally, I also encountered many angry people at the demonstration shouting ‘commie’ to the demonstrators. However, trying to resolve regional demonstrations via violence or neglect cannot be a solution because regardless of whether one supports or opposes the demonstration, they are all neighbors. It is important that people communicate verbally in forming solidarity through the idea of membership in a specific community.

This is not much different from the issue of dividing sides with scientific data, which was discussed in the first chapter. If the experiences from the square meant that the liberal and conservative division was arbitrary, the regional actions are experiences in which people can realize that they are neighbors and affirm the membership in the community.

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VI. Concluding Remarks The creative energy from the candlelight demonstration was formed outside of the existing social frame. It was a chaotic vibe. Of course the boundary of chaos is very mobile and there are always situations of conflict and adjustment within that chaos. The adjustment process within is a work of violating, neglecting and even rejecting the existing society’s laws, idea, science and other boundaries. People’s experiences of the size of power in the midst of such an adjustment are extremely large. They are large enough to ignore individual contexts and even shake the very nature of it. Therefore, this experience becomes an opportunity to imagine a different order. The potential means not an immediate solution, but rather, planting a seed for future. The energy experienced from the square is embedded in the body.

That experiences and memories of the Candlelight protests become the leading factor of carrying on regional demonstrations later. This is why I think the regional demonstrations deserve far more attention than the square candlelight demonstrations of May, June and July. I have decided to use the drama theory because this experience of uncertainty speaks of power and the value of it.

The participants of the social drama readjusted the experience from the square in their own contexts; some joined an array of citizen campaign organizations, some shared friendships with regional demonstrators around subway stations, and some just simply returned to their ordinary lives.

However, “formulating the opinions or beliefs of oneself in any form not only means that he is not aware of the future changes, but also that itself is a small change already” (Lummis 2002: 148). Experiences from the candlelight demonstrations will transform into an act of direct expression of individual opinions on life – ultimately an act of power politics. Carter (2005) said through direct action, one may learn the political skills needed for making decisions, give speeches among people, handle the press, and lobby the decision makers (Carter 2005: 240-241). However, what is more important is that all of the opinions of the people from the square and the Internet, and those of people both supporting and opposing the demonstration, are not absolute truths. Rather, they are all part of the power process that must be

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confronted and adjusted continuously. The social boundary created at the candlelight demonstration is also not so determined, and it often changes.

With a blink of an eye, the same boundary used to united people can be used to divide them.

Therefore, I worry about the realistic meanings of my surroundings.

Despite being able to understand each other’s context of life as neighbors, there are clear lines of differences between each individual, and those differences are not something that is at fault, but, they are a motivating factor that makes rooms for debate in communal interests through adjustment and solidarity. If politics is simply a variety of conflicts and solidarity surrounding a daily decision, politics is not meant only for the existing politicians, but is a duty for every human being. Candlelight demonstrations have made room for political awareness to squeeze in between people who have been pressured by the logic of capitalistic competition. Candlelight, which penetrated through the neighborhoods of Korea, reminds us the meaning and the importance of politics. Of course, putting such meaning and importance into practice is a wholly different story, as social drama is always crude and its excitement can often evaporate quickly. However, the clues of awakening and the evidences of it remain in our body, which also remembers the solidarity, confrontation, and violence from the scene. For the summer of 2008, the social drama of Ch’eonkye Square passes through the open conclusion of the closing ground.

BIBLIOGRAPHY References in Korean

Agora users. 2008. Republic of Korea Common Sense Encyclopedia, Agora. Seoul, Korea: Yeowoo wah Dooroomi (『대한민국 상식사전 아고라』).

Douglas, M. 1997. “Preface for Korean version,” Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. Seoul: Hyundai Mihaksa (“한국어판 서문,” 『순수와 위험』).

Kang, Nae Hee. 2008. “Candle-lit Demonstration and Neo-liberalism: Duties and Tasks for the Korean Left Wing.” Literature Science 55: 66-89 (“촛불정국과 신자유주의-한국 좌파의 과제와 선택.” 『문화과학』 55: 66-89).

Kwon, Jee Hee et al. 2008. Candlelight is Democracy. Seoul, Korea: Happy Story

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(『촛불이 민주주의다』).

Lumis, C.D. 2002. If Doesn’t Economy Grow, Will not be Enriched Our Life?.

Daegu, Korea: Green Review (『경제성장이 안되면 우리는 풍요롭지 못할 것인 가』/Originally published in Japanese: 2000, 經濟成長がなければ私たちは豊か になれないのだろうか, 東京: 平凡社).

Taskforce Team for Candle-lit Demonstration in Kyunghyang Newspaper. 2008.

Candlelight: Records of 65 Days. Seoul, Korea: Kyunghyang Newspaper Publications (『촛불, 그 65일의 기록』).

References in Other Languages

Baumeister, Roy F., Zhang, L. and Vohs, Kathleen D. 2004. “Gossip as Cultural Learning.” Review of General Psychology 8(2): 111-121.

Beck, U. 1986. Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Carter, A. 2005. Direct Action and Democracy Today. Cambridge: Polity.

Jenkins, H. 2006. Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Collide. New York University Press.

Mies, M. and Shiva, V. 1993. Ecofeminism. London: Zed Books.

McFarland, Daniel A. 2004. “Resistance as a Social Drama: A Study of ChangeOriented Encounters.” American Journal of Sociology 109(6): 1249-1318.

Nash, June C. 2007. Practice Ethnography in a Globalizing World: An Anthropological Odyssey. New York: Altamira Press.

Ong, Walter. 1982. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. London: Routledge.

Rosaldo, R. 1989. Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Turner, V. 1974. Drama, Fields and Metaphors. Cornell University Press. . 1982. From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play. New York: Performing and Arts Journal Publications.

On-line Communities and On-line Newscasts

http://www.nocutnews.co.kr (No Cut News, June 16, 2008). http://www.asiae.co.kr/news (Asian Economy, August 15, 2008). http://www.imbc.com/broad/tv/culture/toron (MBC 100 Minutes Debates, May 8 and 15, June 26, July 3, 2008). http://cafe.daum.net/sowhanje http://www.globalcandles.org

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http://agora.media.daum.net http://cafe.daum.net/SoulDresser

Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012: 131-150

Are Chinese and Korean Families Confucian?:

An Interpretive Analysis of Representation in Chinese and Korean Dramas* Kang, Myung Koo** and Kim, Soo Ah*** The purpose of this study is to look into how television dramas represent family as cultural institution differently in East Asia where Confucian familial culture has, as it is assumed, been imbedded historically and culturally. This study is an attempt to contest Confucian family value hypotheses which presume that East Asian countries share common family cultures and value orientations. The pre-examination of the television drama in China and Korea demonstrates that television dramas in both countries represent in very different ways.

While Korean television drama personalize family conflicts, Chinese drama tend to put family conflicts in relations to social changes such as the Cultural Revolution or the Social Reform.

For example, Go-bu conflicts (mother-in-law and daughter-in-law) are the most popular theme of Korean drama. Even the class conflicts or gender issues happen in the context of personalized within-family relations. In such personalized within-family relations, drama characters are not independent subjects, but only members of family (wife and husband, mother or mother-in-law, etc.), In contrast, Chinese television represents drama characters as social actors who are connected to social changes. Major characters in Expectations which was the record-high watching rate drama after 1990s are deeply involved in historic events such as the Cultural Revolution and Social Reforms in China.

Two research questions were raised: First, what is the nature of family in television representations? Second, how have those qualities been formed culturally? The previous researches tried to answer the first question by analyzing drama texts. These studies simply assumed or interpreted that Korean drama kept the unchanged images of traditional or

*

Translated from an article published in the Journal of Broadcasting Research 65: 143-173, 2007 with permission from the Korean Association for Broadcasting & Telecommunication.

**

Professor, Department of Communication, Seoul National University

Instructor, Faculty of Liberal Education, Seoul National University

***

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Confucian family culture and relations with no comparative analyses with other Confucian cultures.The comparative analysis of this study shed some light on the different family cultures and different family relations, rather than assuming Confucian culture underlies East Asian societies.

Keywords: Representation, Family, Confucian Cultures, Television Drama, Korea, China

I. Introduction East Asian societies have been largely regarded as having a collective culture in contrast to the Western individualistic culture. While Western culture emphasizes an individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s right and autonomy to pursue his/her own identity, individual responsibility and accomplishment, the East focuses on an individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role within a group or organization. Many studies have shown that such groups exist as type of extended family, and even nation states are defined by this familism culture.

To define individual roles and identities as part of an extended family in East Asian culture, patriarchy and familism are important tools. This study intends to look into the changes in the system and culture in Chinese and Korean societies, which are categorized as collective cultures of familism.

Specifically, we will analyze the representations of families and family relations in Korean and Chinese TV drama programs to argue that the East Asian collective culture is not a uniform entity but a complex and dynamic one. In comparing the representations of families and family relations in Korean and Chinese TV dramas, we will focus on the meaning of such differences.

Considering the purpose of this study is to look into the cultural characteristics and changes of East Asian familism cultures, the family discourses in TV dramas needed to be compared with the actual changes of the real world. To do this, we must first discuss the epistemological problems of the relationship between social reality and media representation. An analysis of media language, text and discourse attempts to answer how a society constructs meaning around individuals and systems and what roles the discourses play. While semiotics focuses on the text itself and its linguistic

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meaning-building process, historical discourse analysis in the footsteps of Foucault focuses on discourse and power relations. Thus, the former is known as the “poetics of representation” while the latter refers to the “politics of representation.”

Among the two approaches, this study focuses on the politics of representation. As such, the politics of discourses on family and family relations do not substantially take interest in the validation of the truth of whether TV dramas directly mirror changes in reality. In spite of this, many existing studies on this subject have tended to assume a direct relationship between the constructed and the real (e.g., Lee, E. 1993; Yoo, S. & Lee, K. 2001; Kim, Y. 1996; Oh, M. 1991; Ha, J. 2001).

Hence, this study aims to view family representations in TV dramas as a discursive practice within a society that creates a ‘familism’ culture and related cultural practices. Dramas provide answers to questions such as what a family means to itself, how a ‘normal’ family is defined, and what fatherhood or motherhood means through representations. Such representations construct a “regime of truth” about the family and affect the behaviors and identities of both individuals and groups. With this approach, we analyze the representations and their cultural meanings of family relations in TV dramas in the following manner.

First, the study discusses how extended families are represented in the TV dramas of both countries. In addition, the study attempts to define a “normal” family — the most desirable form of family structure. By doing this, the study will shed light on the meaning of what the family means in each society. Also, views on parent-children relationships and rearing problems are discussed in a holistic approach.

With this framework of analysis, the study intends to look into the differences and similarities between the two cultures both horizontally and vertically — focusing on the historical changes in the societies.

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II. Changes in family systems 1. Historical Constructions of Family Structures Past studies have shown that the experience of colonization was crucial to the change of the traditional Korean family. Kim (Kim, H. 2006) argues that the traditional Korean family concept was created in the mid-Chosun period.

With enhanced familial laws in the 17th century, the concept of the family was extended to agnates in general in addition to immediate family members.

This provided that maintaining the bloodline was the most important role of the family. When the modern nuclear family was introduced in the 1920s, it seemed to imitate the Western model but evolved into a unique Korean pattern. A hybrid model between the colonial form and the traditional Confucian ideal gradually evolved.

After the colonial era, the agricultural production community experienced a division of family and labor, of the private and the public, and a change of the family economy into a consumer–oriented pattern. As a result, the previous family bonds and concepts were weakened (Lee, D. & Ham 1996; Ham 1999). However, within the family relations, patriarchal traditions in the customs and economy were still intact and such principles remained regardless of the actual changes in their structure.

A similar case is found in China. After the 1980s, China also experienced a rapid change in its nuclear families. Traditional Chinese families were either large families including immediate and secondary members or a commoner’s family comprising only immediate members. On the other hand, such fatherson-based traditional families were gradually changed to more spouse-based families with the modernization efforts which took place after the communist regime.

What caused the changes of the family system in China? The most important factor was the lowered authority of the patriarch due to the land reforms passed by the communist regime. Because land was not possessed by large families, more households became independent (Lee, K. 2005). Also, an extreme birth control measure had an influence on the new spouse-based family structure. Another factor to consider is the government’s pension

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policy, which changed the traditional family roles of caring for the elderly by a public commune.

2. Meaning of traditional families The traditional family structure in Korea is a multi-generational one centered on men’s immediate family members. The male members are the center of the household, whereas female members are largely excluded from the family concept, which is justified by proverbs such as ChoolGaOeIn, which means that a married daughter becomes a member of another family. Park (Park, H. 1981; 1988) argued that a primary goal of the traditional Korean family lies in “carrying on the lineage.” Households are maintained by links between ancestors and descendants. In this way, the father-oldest-son relationship was the most important tie of the family, and individual members has a little meaning in the traditional family. Each member is expected to sacrifice for the common good of the whole family and to help each other. Because the son’s success was important for the good of the family in this system, the position of the daughter or daughter-in-law was insignificant. Filial piety played a crucial function but it was only limited to the father-son relationship (see Choi 2006).

Traditional family ethics in China was also centered blood lines, ‘familism’ and hierarchy, similar to the ethics of Korean families. However, such traditional family ethics were heavily criticized after modernization. With the diversification of family structures, the socialization of family functions and the shift in power relationships, post-modernistic patterns have emerged (Letian 2000). It is widely accepted that traditional Chinese family relations have greatly changed since the communist revolution (Cohen 2005), with differences between those in urban and rural areas. While there are many nuclear families in urban areas, there is still the responsibility to take care of parents and the concept of the family as a production unit in rural areas (Kim, S. 1993; Pung, 2003; David & Harrell, 1993/2001).

With the experience of modernization, family systems have changed according to the social and historical contexts of each country. Within the larger frame of the Confucian family system, those differences should be examined in detail. This study intends to look at the family as represented

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in TV dramas in a social context. Specifically, the comparison of Korea and China will provide deeper insight to the Korean family system.

III. Methodology To look into the importance of families as subjects, the 10 programs with highest rating during 2004 and 2006 were chosen for each country. Because China did not have a uniform authority for viewer ratings, 10 to 20 dramas were considered. In 2004, 5 out of 20 dealt with family matters after modernization, and 7 out of 20 did so in 2005. In 2006, the number was 6 out of 20. In Korea, 2 out of 10 in 2004, 5 out of 10 in 2005 and 4 out of 10 in 2006 were on this subject.

Among the daily TV dramas which aired in each country after 2001, two programs were selected for a deeper analysis. They are Saving My Hubby ( 굳세어라 금순아) in Korea and The Age of New Marriage ( 新結婚時代) in China, which had a high rating and a family-centered theme. Other TV dramas on this subject were analyzed in terms of their synopses and character structures, focusing on specific episodes rather than the entire program (see the appendix).

For the analysis, both quantitative and qualitative approaches were applied by using a narrative analysis and statistics on household residences and income structures. Also, historical discourses on the family were closely examined.

IV. The extended family The husband-centered extended family is a common structure in Korean family dramas, in which a married couple lives with the husband’s parentsin-law. Because the extended families are centered on the matrilineal side, the main conflict of the drama occurs between the wife and a husband’s family.

If we look at the reality of modern Korea, extended families which more than three generations which live together account for less than 10% of all families. According to the national census in 2005, these accounted for only

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7%, compared to 8.4% in 2000. It is notable that Korean dramas are showing more husband-centered extended families than reality. Although maternally extended families, widowed, divorced or remarried families are gradually being portrayed more in dramas, today’s daily home dramas still heavily present husband-centered extended families.

In Saving My Hubby, the protagonist Geumsoon’s family was a husbandcentered one. As shown in Figure 1, in the appendix, Geumsoon was raised by her grandparents after her parents had died, and she lived in a large family with her grandparents, an uncle and an aunt. In her husband’s family, the oldest son’s family lives with their parents. In this large family structure, Geumsoon’s mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law Sungran often came into conflict involving the issue of dividing domestic labor and the fact that Sungran kept it secret that she had been married once. Geumsoon’s grandmother was also in conflict with her daughter-in-law due to their different personalities.

Such extended families can be found in many other dramas as well. In particular, mother-in-law/daughter-in-law conflicts are easily found when a difference in the social status exists between the two families. For example, the latter episodes of Lady Mermaid deal with the female protagonist and her husband’s parents’ process of getting used to each other after the former became an in-law despite the latter’s objections. Other high-ranked dramas such as Pretty Woman and Swan Lake also dealt with tension between a female protagonist and her parents-in-law due to the difference in their social economic status .

Another finding was that the position of the mother-in-law was predominant in the husband-centered extended family. Though the patriarch in the family was still the father-in-law, in real everyday practices, the motherin-law plays the most influential role in the drama. Most conflicts in the daily drama stem from the mother-in-law. In Saving My Hubby, Geumsoon’s mother-in-law Jungshim had the most power in the family. After her husband retired, she exerted decision-making authority in all family matters, including the love affairs of her son. Although there were also relationships with the maternal side of the extended family, those were only marginal or secondary factors, such as sources of conflict or sub-stories exemplifying support and caring rather than a crucial part of the drama’s main narrative. The female

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characters’ families (the wife’s side of the family) were described as the space of escape for troubled wives when they were in domestic conflicts. In Saving My Hubby, Geumsoon’s grandmother played this role. Whenever something happened to Geumsoon, she would not step forward as a problem-solver but could only worry and shed tears in her own room.

In the Chinese dramas, an extended family in which three generations live together rarely appeared. However, there were constant generational conflicts and reconciliations between the couples and their parents. In The Marriage, the protagonist couple He Jianguo and Gu Xiaoxi regularly got into fights with the husband’s parents, who lived in a rural area, and with the wife’s parents in an urban area. The main conflict rose from their different social backgrounds.

While the nuclear family is the most popular form in Chinese dramas, many conflicts arise among grandparents and couples.

When the couples had different class backgrounds, the conflicts tended to be severe. The wife’s side of the family was rarely a source of tension, whereas the family members on the husband’s side (especially the mothers-in-law) always intervened in the couples’ matters. Differing from Korean dramas, Chinese ones deal with the husband’s and wife’s sides of the families fairly equally. There were few occasions when the grandparents intervened in the couples’ domestic matters.

Another interesting finding is that the conflict between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law in the Chinese dramas was quite different from those in the Korean dramas. While the Korean mother-in-law possessed absolute power over her daughter-in-law, in Chinese dramas such conflicts were absent, as the two characters rarely lived together. Furthermore, the two were sometimes even depicted as being friendly to one another and understanding of each other, and sometimes the daughter-in-law even admonished her mother-in-law.

From the discussions above, the differences in the family structure can be summarized in the following. First, while Korean family dramas involve the extended families on the husband’s side, Chinese dramas focus more on the couple themselves. As a result, Chinese dramas show a protagonist couple at the center, solving or tending to expand conflicts in their domestic space.

On the other hand, in Korean dramas, family members on the husband’s side tend to intervene in domestic affairs including those of their offspring, also

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getting involved in marriages as well as divorces.

Second, these differences influence the interaction between the two types of extended families. In Korean dramas, the interactions among members occur mainly on the husband’s side, while involving few members from the wife’s side. Chinese dramas fairly often deal with family members on both sides. The couples themselves are independent from their parents, though they do show concern about them.

Third, because the conflict between the couple and the husband’s parents is important in Korean dramas, there was little focus on the wife’s parents.

The husbands’ family was more authoritative, while the wife’s parents were mostly respectful of the husband’s parents. In contrast, in Chinese dramas the son-in-law is usually accepted in his wife’s extended family, as The Age of New Marriage demonstrated well.

From a comparison between dramas of the two countries, it can be concluded that Korean dramas show a strong skewed bias toward the husband’s family-centered orientation, while Chinese dramas tend to represent relatively equal relations between the husbands’ and wives’ sides.

V. Differentiating a “normal” and an “abnormal” family Korean dramas have constantly attempted to define the boundaries and norms of the family by presenting ideal and problematic families as normal and abnormal, respectively. For example, divorced families in Korean dramas appeared significantly many more times than the actual figures in reality (Kim, W. 1991). The divorced families served as dramatic subjects in the dramas.

Dramatizing the fetters and bonds of divorce families, Korean dramas cunningly normalized the ‘normal’ family. The problem of a divorced family was mainly focused on the mother-child relationship (Kim, Y. 1998), and the tension rose from education and other rearing-related matters. Extramarital relationships and unwed mothers were both portrayed negatively. Because children born out of wedlock in TV dramas bear the secret of their births, such characters are useful to exacerbate and complicate conflicts.

In Saving My Hubby, Geumsoon’s sister-in-law is confronted with the

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fetters of divorce. In Korea, it is not common for a remarried woman bring her child to the new husband’s family. Although it is legally allowed, many conflicts can come out of it. Sungran’s decision was regarded as a bold challenge to the traditional norm. Though Sungran was accepted by the family members in the drama’s final narrative, she remained a controversial figure throughout the series. In terms of audiences’ responses to this female character, there were many attacks against her personality in Internet forums on this drama.

Geumsoon’s mother was also represented as part of an abnormal family.

Geumsoon grew up lonely, and her mother Youngok could not have any children for a long time after her remarriage, out of the guilt that she abandoned her child. In Youngok’s new family after she remarried, she had a severe conflict with Eunja, the daughter of her husband’s ex-wife.

Such examples can easily be found in other dramas as well. In Lady Mermaid, the female protagonist Ariyoung devoted her life to gaining revenge on her father, who abandoned her through a divorce. This drama showed that a divorce means that the couples give up their child-rearing responsibility. In the drama My Precious Child (KBS, 2004-5), a stereotypical stepmother was introduced. The drama described the stepmother (Young-sil) as a troublemaker who attempted to divide the father and the son (Jinkuk).

The remarried couple was portrayed as dysfunctional with its members going through psychological troubles. Beside You (KBS 2003) also dealt with a remarried couple. It was specifically about a mother who left her family due to trouble with her husband, later suffering guilt over having left her children. The dramas analyzed in this study did not show that a father felt guilty for leaving his children, and the children of such abnormal families regain happiness by becoming the member of a normal family. In Korean daily dramas, the ‘abnormal’ breaks down the ‘normal.’ Considering the high growth rate (28%) of single mothers and fathers (the National Census 2005), Korean dramas have strong predispositions to show that divorce means a broken home and a source of trouble for children and for all family members.

In contrast, out of the five Chinese dramas analyzed, only one showed grandparents which live with their offspring. Many divorced families in Chinese dramas were neither broken homes nor troublesome. In The Age of New Marriage (2006), the father remarried to a woman from the upper class.

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However, this decision did not lead to any trouble with the wife’s family. The drama Enthusiasm insinuated that divorce was due to differences in the class backgrounds as well as the ideologies between couples. The female character still maintained her own self-identity as a woman after her divorce, and the family was not illustrated as a broken home. In the Chinese Divorce, the female protagonist goes through a self-realization process and succeeds in her professional career after her divorce. It carried the message that marital status, whether married or divorced, does not interfere with a woman’s career or personal life. Divorce is a given option that men and women can take on their life paths.

VI. Maternity and paternity In Korean society, it is believed with certainty that child rearing is the mother’s responsibility. However, Korean dramas seldom deal with a childcaring mother. When a family is normal, the drama does not show any childrearing issues. If a divorce ensues, the mothers in the drama suffer as a result.

Many times a divorced mother is criticized as irresponsible for her failure to be a mother. Because the mother is the caretaker of the family members, many Korean dramas show that maternity scarcely coexists with a woman’s own search for a career. In such a matrilineal family structure, married women are integrated into the husband’s family. This in turn integrates women into the “ideal maternity model” (Cho, S. 1995). Maternity became a significant theme in Korean dramas. Daily dramas especially have tended to mystify motherhood. The traditional Confucian family model of “a strict father and an affective mother” has been idealized in TV dramas (Oh 1991).

The maternity issues in Saving My Hubby could easily be predicted to be represented in the relationship between the widowed Geumsoon and her son, but in fact they were not in the main storyline. The relationship between mother and son was normal as it was, but it became troublesome when Geumsoon decided to enter into a second marriage, deviating from the ‘normal’ family model. The real issue over child rearing here is not a question of how a divorced mother cares her child but that of a blood-line that can be kept after the parent’s divorce.

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In other Korean daily dramas, self-sacrificing maternity was prominent.

In Beside You and My Precious Child, the mother character was depicted as a traditional Korean woman who sacrifices everything for her children and aims to act directly all through their lives to solve any problems.

On the other hand, in one episode of the Chinese drama The Age of New Marriage, a self-sacrificing mother figure was not present. The female protagonist went to work even when her son was sick, and the son expressed his displeasure. Regarding the male lead character, his mother was rarely shown, while he was frequently engaged with his father, emphasizing filial piety. Concerning paternity, the urban father lost his authority while the rural father maintained his. Mostly, Chinese dramas depicted paternal authority as low rather than patriarchal.

Such characteristics were visible in other Chinese dramas as well, such as the Most Romantic Thing and Enthusiasm. The parents of the male character were not the center of the storyline. His mother passed away a long time ago and hence maternity issues were not depicted. Regarding the female protagonist, she sent off her children to her ex-husband’s home after her divorce. Thus, maternity conflicts were absent.

VII. Conclusion: the meaning of family representations in TV dramas The goal of this study was to compare and contrast so-called Confucian collectivist cultures by analyzing the family representations in Korean and Chinese TV dramas. The main purpose of the study was to look into how Korean and Chinese dramas represent family and family relations.

Despite difference in intensity, a bonding between family members was still represented as a strong value and was considered as a crucial theme.

However, some major differences could be found between the dramas in China and Korea. First, while Korean dramas dealt with mainly matrilineal extended families, their Chinese counterparts showed little difference between matrilineal and matrilineal extended families in terms of their roles.

Second, the dividing line between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ families cannot be fixed, as it is always changing in different historical formations of the

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family. In some Korean dramas after 2000, divorce and remarriage became acceptable, although they were depicted as abnormal. Other unconventional family forms such as same-sex marriages were still considered “unacceptable.”

They were depicted as something that deviates from the norm.

In the Chinese dramas, the most prominent difference was that divorce or extramarital affairs were not used as main themes. Though themes of divorce and remarriage were present in the stories of The Age of New Marriage and KongJingZi, they were not at the center of the conflict between the characters.

Third, in comparing the issues of maternity and the paternity, we achieved results that were largely similar to those of previous studies in Korea. Korean dramas represented motherhood as the utmost important value and the essence of an ideal woman. Although the Chinese dramas were similar in depicting a mother’s love for her children, they represented child rearing or domestic labor not as a natural part of a woman but rather as one of the duties to be shared between the spouses.

Thus, the representations showed more differences than similarities.

In categories such as spousal relationships, extended family relationships, normality and abnormality, and maternity and paternity, Korean dramas mainly showed traditional family relationships of the so-called Confucian matrilineal model. Chinese dramas differed greatly in this aspect, treating the husband’s side and the wife’s side in fairly balanced ways. Although the main storyline involves family conflict, grandparents’ and couples’ relationships were not the major sources of those conflicts. The family is a space for intimate relations showing the symptomatic changes of the family as a social institution.

In comparing the two, it could be concluded that Chinese dramas represent more equal views on gender roles and relationships. How can we make sense of this finding that Korea, with its broader economic development and Westernization levels, lags behind China in terms of equal gender roles in family relationships? Although Korea achieved economic modernization earlier than China, the Korean family culture shows a strong bias toward the traditional Confucian culture in terms of gender relations. This shows that modernization does not necessarily lead to equal family relationships or a weakening of patriarchy.

It would be out of the scope of this study to ask why the Korean society

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insists on more traditional values in family matters despite its advanced levels of economic modernization and Westernization. However, on a systematic level, we can make the assumption that the difference in this representation results from the different historical tracks the family and family relationships that have followed in the two societies. During the Korean modernization process, the family was regarded as the crucial social category that should be maintained and protected for the prosperity of the country and for the safe existence of people.

Though differing in research goals, a similar finding was presented in an earlier study by the authors, entitled “Citizen Mobilization by the State in the Modernization Process in Korea.” That study found that the family was a sublime object for everyone to protect and that it was chosen by the state as the main point of mobilization (Kang & Baek 2007). In Korea, the family acts as the social institution that takes care of education, child rearing, and the protection of the elderly and minors. The state, on the other hand, achieved modernization by enhancing and mobilizing the family. In this process, popular culture has played a major role in constructing the normality of family.

In China, the role of the family was quite different during the socialistic modernization process. To reform the agrarian Chinese society, the policy of the Chinese socialist government focused on the disintegration of earlier agricultural family systems by means such as restricting the possession of farming lands. Traditional familial ideologies were dissolved in the interest of the state. Foster care and the socialization of female workforces were mechanisms with which to mobilize the individual for the country, and ‘familism’ gradually faded in this process.

The family in both countries had different roles in the modernization process and took separate historical tracks under each strong state-led mobilization effort. The Korean family was considered as a social and cultural institution that supported the safe existence of people and the reproduction of the workforce during the rapid economic modernization process. The husband worked diligently as a breadwinner, while wife took care of domestic child-caring and home economics. The comfort of the family was the site of empathetic solidarity for workers during the modernization process.

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In contrast, in the Chinese modernization process, traditional patriarch families were dissolved and became a space for intimate relations between the husband and wife. Village or commune types of local communities took over the child care and education duties. In addition, the socialist state emphasized female employment as well. As a result, the husband-centered patriarchy was weakened. Although the family was a material and emotional resort for its members, the importance of the family as a social institution in protecting people at all costs was not high. Thus, it is likely that the relative gender equality shown in Chinese dramas compared to Korean ones resulted from the differences in the historical trajectories of the two types of families during their respective modernization processes.

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Ying Zhu. 2005. “Yongzheng Dynasty and Chinese Primetime Television Drama.”

Cinema Journal 44(4): 3-17.

Zhangling, W. 1985. “Chinese Family Problem: Research and Trends.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 45(4): 943-948.

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Appendix Table 1. Family Structures of Korean Home Dramas Family Structure Title

Station /Year

Nobody stop a love Barefooted youth Saving My Hubby Female Shaman: WangKKot Pretty Woman Swan Lake Lady Mermaid With you everyday Pure Heart of Nineteen Eccentric Man & Woman My Precious Child My sweet dear Beside you Yellow Ribbon Love is like this

MBC, 2006 MBC, 2005 MBC, 2005 MBC, 2004 MBC, 2003-2004 MBC, 2003 MBC, 2002-2003 MBC, 2001-2002 KBS, 2006 KBS, 2005-2006 KBS, 2004-2005 KBS, 2005 KBS, 2002-2003 KBS, 2003 KBS, 2001-2002

Extended Family Nuclear (paternal) Family 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2

2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 4 1

Livingalone 3 1 0 2 3 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0

Are Chinese and Korean Families Confucian? 149

a Kumsoon´s father - in- law OhMiJa: Mother

a Kumsoon´s mother - in- law

NohTaeWan

NohSuhWan

Heroine: Kumsoon

SungRan:Wife

Ex - husband

NohJungWan: Husband - death

Son: Hyueesuep

Unwed Mother

Pairs of love

KooJaeHee Cousin: KumAh

Son

Uncle JangBak

YoungOk: Natural Mother Stepmother

Aunt

Grandmother: Widow

Daughter

Figure 1. Family structure of the drama Saving My Hubby Synopsis: Basically, Saving My Hubby dealt with an exceptional problem in Korea society: the remarriage of a young widow who already has a son. Moreover, the entire family of her ex-husband all congratulate her on her remarriage. This is not entirely a common case. The heroine, NaKumSoon was brought up in a poor family with only her grandmother, and she was not well educated. She marries a young university student but he dies in a car accident shortly after their marriage, after which she has a son. After the birth, she lives with the family of her lost husband. She wants to be a beauty artist. In the process of working for her dream, she meets a doctor named KooJaeHee and falls in love with him.

Naturally, their love went through various hardships, as it is not common for a widow to remarry a bachelor, especially when the bachelor is a doctor. Moreover, as she had a son and did not want to part from her son, this is a complicated case in Korea. However, they overcame all obstacles eventually and she gets permission and even the blessing of her inlaws. This is the main story, and there are some sub-stories about her pervious home and her in-laws. Saving My Hubby is a typical home drama, as it has several family stories and deals with the theme of conflict and reconciliation within an enlarged family.

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ShaoSha

Housemaid Remarriage

Father

Father

Mother

Mother

Married couple

KooShaoHang Pairs of Love

KooShaoSi

HuhJienGwu

Elder Brother

Wife

Daughter

Friend

Daughter

JeeinJia Relatives of Huh

Figure 2. Family Structure of the drama The Marriage Synopsis: The Marriage is an excellent work which dealt with a very controversial problem in modern China. The hero, He Jianguo and the heroine Gu Xiaoxi marry for love.

However, they are from very different backgrounds, and this is a source of conflict between them. He Jianguo was from a rural community and his family is still ruled by tradition, but Gu Xiaoxi was from a urban community and she is a modernized woman. Gu Xiaoxi felt that the traditional norm of her husband’s family was unfair, and she considered it as a burden. Even worse, she had a miscarriage due to an accident in the way to her husband’s hometown, after which she was unable to have children. This is a very important source of conflict between the couple, as it is an essential duty for women to carry on the family line in China. As their conflict grew, they decided to divorce. The main theme was that the difference between urban life and rural life can become an irreconcilable difference in China. There were also some provocative themes presented in this drama. First, the drama broached the subject of love between an older woman and a younger man, which is not a common case in China. Second, it dealt with the remarriage problem, especially between older and young people. The Marriage showed an up-to date issue related to China families and depicted the problem of the rapidly changing Chinese family situation carefully.

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Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments* Hong, Kyung Zoon** This paper tries to provide empirical support for a formal model of social policy development, as presented in a former paper on this study. In a direct democracy, the median voterâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s social policy preference is critical because he is a Condorcet winner in pair-wise pure majority voting. However, in a more general setting, we should think of various political institutions as a collective choice of device. For this reason, I draw a formal model that formulates three contrasting types of political institutions that are distinguished by the developments of political democracy and the differences in electoral rules. Comparative patterns of key variables that measure political institutions, social policy developments, and social policy preferences provide support for arguments. My empirical results suggest that three political institutions are associated with very different policy outcomes. Compared to other institutions, a committee system entails more targeted subsidies and a less universal benefit.

In contrast, proportional elections produce a more universal benefit and fewer targeted subsidies.

Keywords: Social Policy Preferences, Social Policy Developments, Political Institutions, Democracy, Electoral Rule, Korea

I. Introduction This paper attempts to analyze at an empirical level the social policy preferences1 Translated from an article published in the Korean Journal of Social Welfare 62(3): 141-162, 2010 with permission from the Korean Academy of Social Welfare. ** Professor, Department of Social Welfare, Sungkyunkwan University 1 There are a number of terms similarly applied, such as public opinion, beliefs, attitudes, awareness, and others; however, in the area of social policy, these are used together with no major distinction. In this paper, I use the term â&#x20AC;&#x153;social policy *

151

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held by members of society and the effects of the basic political system collectively determining such preferences on the development of social policy.

Social policy is a concept that encompasses policies in a variety of domains, but here it is defined as a system that takes income from the market and redistributes it through national policy, thus creating public income transfers.

Typical public income transfer systems are income security systems that include social benefits and, of course, social insurance and public assistance.

Income security systems distribute taxes (or contributions) collected from members of a society according to a particular standard. Members of society who can increase their utility through such a system prefer the development of an income security system (that is, as social policy), whereas members of society who experience a decrease in utility would not prefer such a development. Of course, it can be said that the difference in social policy preference is linked to individual characteristics (e.g., such as socioeconomic status, position within the labor market, age, and risk aversion tendencies).

It has been noted that if a society’s social policy preferences can be expressed as a monotonic function of its members individual characteristics, then collective decisions from the principle of majority rule are possible, and their preferences have a single crossing property (Gans and Smart 1996). Also, in such a case, the result of collective decision coincides with the preference of the voter with the median characteristic.

However, although it has been stated that preference aggregation by pure majority rule is possible, the results of the social policy also depend on the institutions that govern how the preference aggregations are made. Bearing in mind the democratic political structure that is founded on collective decision-making according to voter preferences, it is clear that this can have a direct and powerful impact on development and changes of social policy.

However, political systems based on collective decisions are truly diverse.

Therefore, to discuss the relationship between voters’ social policy preferences and social policy development, a theoretical discussion of the effects of the concrete institutional form of collective decision-making is necessary.

This paper aims to verify empirically the theoretical model of former study, which states that diversity of welfare regime or difference in social policy preference” to refer to people’s awareness or attitudes of social policy.

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 153

development are related to differences in the mechanisms for converting voters’ social policy preferences to collective decision-making.2 Because the main goal of this paper is based on an empirical study, it will give the briefest possible introduction to the aforementioned theoretical model and will base its argument on an empirical analysis that utilizes a variety of evidences.

II. Theoretical Model In a preceding article related to this paper, a formal model concerning social policy preferences, political systems, and the development of social policy was proposed. The following will serve as a brief introduction to this model.3

1. Asset Model of Social Policy Preferences and its Limitations The asset model of social policy preferences (Iversen and Soskice, 2001) emphasizes the points where the skill constraints 4 involved in a particular production system have an effect on voters’ social policy preferences. Let α equal the proportion of people employed by businesses that use both general skills and specific skills, and let s ∙ g5 equal those workers’ hourly wages. Furthermore, let β equal the proportion of people employed by businesses that use only general skills, let g equal these worker’s hourly wages, and suppose that the social policy allowance R is allocated by means of a proportional income tax t (on market income). If the proportion of 2

This paper is the second part of a two-part paper. The first paper was published as “Explaining the development of Social Policy; social policy preferences and political institutions” in the Korean Journal of Social Welfare 61(4): 35-39. Here, the focus is on points explicated in that paper’s theoretical model. This paper focuses on empirically verifying the theoretical model derived in the prior paper. Therefore, for a more detailed look at the theoretical model, please refer to the respective paper.

3 The following description of the theoretical model refers to Hong (2009).

4 The degree to which a given skill is valued only at specific indusrties or companies is referred to as “skill specificity.” Specific skills are those that are valued only at specific industries or companies, whereas general skills are those that are valued at a variety of businesses and companies.

5 Therefore, in cases without specific skills (s = 1), the wage rate is g.

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unemployed workers γ = 1 – (α + β), and l(t)6 and w¯ are the labor supply (or hours applied to labor) and the average wage rate, respectively, then voters’ income before taxes, according to their employment and skill status, can be expressed as follows: Specific Skills Group: CS = (1 – t) ∙ l(t) ∙ sg + R = (1 – 2R/w¯) ∙ sg + R General Skills Group: CG = (1 – t) ∙ l(t) ∙ g + R = (1 – 2R/w¯) ∙ g + R Unemployed Group: CU = R

(1)

Here, α, β, and γ represent the probability that voters will belong to their respective groups; hence, they consider each of the three cases and attempt to maximize their own expected utility. If the discounting of future income is not taken into account, then the expected utility can be expressed as V = α ∙ u(CS) + β ∙ u(CG) + γ ∙ u(CU). If the expected wage rate y = α ∙ sg + β ∙ g and this value is fixed and if the change in R is evaluated according to the increase in s, then the following holds: When RRA (relative risk aversion) > 0, δR/δs > 0 Finally, if we assume that the expected wage rate is fixed and if voters’ risk aversion tendency is greater than zero, then the increase in s, that is, the increase in the proportion of specific skills with respect to general skills, causes an increase in social policy allowance R. More intuitively, this model can be organized as follows. First, because the skill specificity and their transferability in the labor market usually have an inverse relationship, members of a society with specific skills may potentially experience longer periods of unemployment or serious drops in income due to unemployment.

Second, as a result, members of a society with specific skills have more motivation than those with general skills to avoid such risks. In other words, a greater the degree of specificity in skills leads to a greater inclination toward risk aversion. Third, social policy is a powerful mean for dispersing the risks of unemployment and the drops in income that can occur in the labor market. Fourth, as a result, voters with a high degree of skill specificity have a 6

Accounting for the decreasing effect of taxation on the labor supply, l(t) = 1/(1 + t).

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 155

greater preference for social policy.

Based on the asset model of social policy preferences, production regime and welfare regime are complementary because voter preferences, shaped in the institutional constraint of the production regime, form the welfare regime. For example, Coordinated market economies (CMEs) had fostered a production regime which depends on the incremental innovation according to comparative advantages, the specific skills set of an average worker is one condition that makes incremental innovation possible. Therefore, the proportion of voters with a specific skill among all voters is high in CMEs. Finally, due to their preferences, the level of development of social policy in CMEs is high. This model has the advantage of being able to explain the complementarity between production regime and welfare regime by means of a voters’ policy preferences established by their skill specificity.

However, the point that is overlooked in this type of theoretical model is that some countries classified as CMEs—particularly Japan and South Korea, which are the focus of this paper—do not have a higher level of social policy development than countries with liberal market economies (LMEs). Examples such as Japan and South Korea7 show that even if voters prefer an apparatus that disperses the risk of unemployment or income losses in the labor market, actual social policy development may not occur. If this is the case, then are these examples exceptions beyond the range of application of a universal theory? Should they be regarded as special cases? The answer to both questions is no. The limits of an asset model of social policy preferences are related to the fact that research on social policy or welfare states has generally been based on some advanced capitalist countries of the West, which easily satisfy the conditions of a democratic political system and as a result operate on the basis of collective decision-making according to voter preferences.

Thus, to discuss the relationship between voters’ social policy preferences and the actual level of social policy development at a general level, an additional 7

Hall and Soskice (2001: 34), with the leading theory of institutional complementarities, divide CMEs into those adjusted at the industry level and those adjusted at the business level, placing South Korea and Japan in the latter category. Amable (2003: 107) also explains that capitalist Asian countries such as South Korea and Japan are just as reliant on specific skills as capitalist countries from continental Europe and countries with social-democratic economies.

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theoretical discussion of the effects that the concrete institutional form of collective decision-making has on social policy decisions is necessary.

2. Political Systems Based on Collective Decision-Making Based on common sense, it is clear that not all societies are based on collective decision-making according to voter preferences. Voter preferences are easily ignored in societies ruled by dictators. Even in the case of societies with democratic political systems, depending on the institutional form of the collective decision-making process, voter preferences are reflected in different degrees in the determination of actual resulting policy. There are a variety of ways to differentiate political systems, which have an effect on collective social policy decisions, but this paper divides them into three types according to the degree of the development of democratic politics and the characteristics of electoral rule.8 First, there are cases in which the development of democratic politics lags behind. In such societies, the decisions regarding social policy are entrusted to special groups or actors with the authority to make policy decisions. These policy decision-makers can be dictators, or they can be leaders of democratic system administrations or bureaucrats that formally claim to support democracy but are in reality deficient. In this paper, such political systems which are relatively behind in the development of democratic political systems are called committee systems. On the other hand, even in cases in which democratic political systems are developed, there are a variety of ways to gather preferences. In a proportional election system, the number of seats given to a given political party is based on the proportion of voters supporting that party among all voters, whereas in a majoritarian election system, this is determined based on the proportion of electoral districts supporting the party among all electoral districts.

Let all members of society, with income levels all set to a level of 1, belong to one of the three groups (J = 1, 2, 3), and let the size of each group be set to 1. Additionally, suppose that voters belonging to each of the three groups all have the same policy preferences. On the other hand, suppose that policy is multi-dimensional. In other words, in this society, there are not only income 8

This theoretical model is a reconfiguration of Persson and Tabellini (1998).

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 157

security allowances given universally to all groups as public goods, but also subsidies given exclusively to each group.9 If a tax (t) appropriated for this policy is imposed equally on all groups, the budget constraint condition can then be expressed as 3t = ΣJ = 1, 2, 3 gJ + R10 and the policy preferences of members of group J can be expressed as follows: wJ = U(cJ) + V(gJ) + H(R)

s.t. 3t = ΣJ = 1, 2, 3 gJ + R

(2)

Here, U( ∙ ), V( ∙ ), H( ∙ ) are all concave functions, assuming that they are normal utility functions, and cJ represents individual consumption of voters belonging to group J, gJ represents subsidies given exclusively to each group, and R represents universal income security allowances having the characteristics of public goods.

Now let’s compare the size of the vectors of the policy determined collectively in the three different political systems: committee systems, proportional election systems, and majoritarian election systems.11 First, assuming no distortion effect of taxation, taxes are collected on all incomereceiving members of society in all three political systems. In other words, tc = tp = tm.12 The next step is a comparison of the size of the subsidies returned to each group and the universal income security allowances returned to all groups. In order to do this, some assumptions about the preferences of policy decision-makers are necessary. First, there is the assumption that takes into account developmental welfare regime, for which, in a committee system, policy decision-makers are authority figures with developmental goals; in group 2 (J = 2), they are placed in the industry sector, which receives governmental support; and subsidies given to group 2 are paid as “contingent 9

This assumption reflects the reality that shadow welfare state programs such as subsidies, tax expenditures, and rents clearly exist in addition to social policies such as income security systems. Particularly in the case of countries such as South Korea and Japan, the proportion of such programs is relatively large. See Hong (2008).

10 In order to avoid complicating the analysis, distortion effects from taxation, such as a decrease in the labor supply, are ignored.

11 For more detail, see Hong (2009).

12 The policy vector is attached to the case of the committee system as superscript c, the proportional system as p, and the majoritarian system as m.

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rentâ&#x20AC;? for the purpose of industrial development (Hong 2008). Therefore, the objective function of policy decision-makers in a committee system can be expressed as that which provides the maximum contingent rent to the one possible group, group 2. Of course, here, the size of the contingent rent given to group 2 depends on the scope of the authority possessed by the policy decision-makers. If the policy decision-maker is a dictator who has monopolized all policy decision-making authority, then the situation can be depicted as an extreme type of developmental welfare regime in which not only universal income security payments, but also subsidies for groups 1 and 3 are completely nonexistent, that is, all available resources are utilized as contingent rent for the purpose of economic development. On the other hand, if we apply the condition of requiring majority consent in a committee for policy decisions, then a fixed amount of subsidies will be paid to group 1 or group 3 or even weaker groups.13 The case of proportional election systems and majoritarian election systems applies to most democratic systems; therefore, the political party that wins an election becomes the policy decision-maker. In this type of political system, political parties promise policies that reflect the preferences of voters, and voters give their support to the political party, putting forth policies that maximize their own utility functions. Therefore, the objective function of policy decision-makers is to maximize the probability of winning an election. However, the policies that competing political parties propose in order to increase the probability of winning an election cannot help but differ between proportional election systems and majoritarian election systems. The way a political party maximizes its probability of winning in a proportional election system is not only to offer universal income security allowances to all members of society but also to pay additional subsidies to groups with the greatest homogeneity of attitudes as well as to those with the most swing voters. This also occurs in majoritarian election systems, but it differs in that such subsidies are concentrated in electoral districts with many swing voters rather than on all swing voters. In other words, because the marginal utility of subsidies evaluated by political parties in majoritarian election systems is 13

This is because, since policy decision-makers benefit from the lower cost of building a winning coalition, members representing weaker groups are drawn into alliances.

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 159

greater than the marginal utility of subsidies evaluated by political parties in proportional election systems, the size of subsidies directed at special groups is larger in majoritarian election systems. As a result, subsidies returned to special groups adhere to gc > gm > gp, and universal allowances returned to all groups adhere to Rc < Rm < Rp. The above model shows that even if the preferences of members of society are identical, the level of development of social policy differs according to the political institution on which collective decisions are based. In other words, when other conditions are equal, social policy develops the least in committee systemsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;political systems with a relatively low development of democracyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; while in the case of democratic political systems, social policy develops more in proportional election systems than in majoritarian election systems.

III. social policy preferences, political institutions, and the comparative aspects of social policy development 1. Skill Specificity, Social Policy Preference, and the Comparative Aspects of Social Policy Development Is social policy more developed in societies in which members have a strong preference for social policy? It is appropriate to study the relationship between these two variables from a comparative perspective that allows controlling of multiple factors. A multi-variable analysis in which the independent variable is a social policy preference or the skill specificity that affects it and where the dependent variable is the level of development of social policy would be useful as a study of the empirical relationship between social policy preference and social policy development. However, it is not easy to procure the data required for this type of analysis. First, it is not easy to synthesize social policy preferences or skill specificity measured at the individual level into the national or macro-level. Analytical methods exist for solving various associated problems, including the difference in measurement levels, but in order to apply such analytical methods, a sample size large enough for multi-variable analysis must be procured. The problem is that in

160 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

this paper, measurements of the variables of social policy preference and skill specificity were collected in 2006, whereas measurements of the measurable variables of social policy development in the relevant countries were most recently collected in 2005. Including South Korea and Japan, which are the targets of this research, it is difficult in reality to procure data that satisfies time precedence, one of the conditions for establishing a causal relationship.

Due to this limitation, several proxy variables that measure skill specificity, preferences of social policy, political system, and social policy development are introduced below, and the method of studying the patterns of co-variation observed between these proxy variables is used.

The best means of measuring skill specificity is to look for elasticity of substitution between skills represented on a production possibility curve.

However, because it is extremely difficult to observe such elasticity of substitution empirically, there is no choice but to use a variety of proxy variables. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) surveyed and compared some of the most common measures of skill specificity applied in previous empirical researches: 1) job training, 2) job change and tenure, 3) the degree of interindustry labor mobility, 4) wage differentials, and 5) the occupational classification (Iversen-Soskice Index). This paper uses the occupational classification index because this index is designed to allow the direct measurement of skill specificity from micro data at the individual level.

The occupational classification index proposed by Iversen and Soskice (2001) was created with the aim of hierarchically structuralizing the ILO’s job classification index, ISCO-88’s two concepts of “skill” and “job.” In ISCO-88, skills are categorized according to the level and degree of skill specialization.

All of the jobs listed in ISCO-88 are divided first into ten job categories (level-one classifications) according to four skill levels. Next, these ten job categories are hierarchically divided into 28 middle classifications (level-two classifications), 116 sub-categories (level-three classifications), and finally 390 sub-sub-categories (level-four classifications), a process in which the degree of skill specialization is utilized. The index of skill specificity goes through this type of process and the jobs in the 390 sub-sub-categories are assumed to be homogenous in terms of skill. As a result, within the largest classification of job categories, the proportion comprised of a sub-sub-category can act as a proxy for that job’s skill specificity. For example, the sub-sub-category

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 161

jobs included in “Plant and Machine operators and assemblers” (level-one classification number 8) with 70 entries comprise about 17.95% of the total jobs in the sub-sub-category, but the sub-sub-category jobs included in “Clerks” (level-one classification number 3) with 23 entries comprise about 5.90% of the total jobs in the sub-sub-category. Therefore, the skill specificity of “Plant and Machine operators and assemblers” is greater than that of “Clerks.” One point to note here is the number of people who work in a given job, as ISCO-88 suggests a greater variety of sub-sub-categories in job categories with a large number of people working in them. For example, subsub-category jobs included in “specialists” (level-one classification number 2) comprise about 14.10% of all of the sub-sub-category jobs. This can be considered quite high in terms of skill specificity; however, this situation arises because the number of people working in the “specialists” category is large. To offset this type of scaling effect on the index of skill specificity, an inverse weighting is given according to how many people belong to a given job category. If the aim is to be able to measure the degree of skill specificity using the same method applied to sub-categories, then the degree of skill specificity can either be represented as these two measurements or as the average value of these two measurements. However, it is important to note that in the theoretical model we examined earlier, we defined skill specificity not as the absolute value of specific skills s but as the relative value of specific skills compared to general skills, s/g. Therefore, we can produce final measure of skill specificity which is based on dividing this index by proxy variables that measure general skills, that is, ISCO measure of the level of skills. This can be expressed in mathematical terms, as follows: Index1=

skill specificity skill level

Index 2=

skill specificity skill level

Index 3=

index1+index 2 2

162 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Here, skill specificity= Also,

sub-category specificity+sub-sub-category specificity 2 number of sub-category jobs belonging to the broad job category number of jobs in the sub-category total size of workforce × size of workforce in broad job category

sub-category specificity=

number of sub-sub-category jobs belonging to the broad job category number of jobs in the sub-sub-category total size of workforce × size of workforce in broad job category

sub-sub-category specificity=

On the other hand, according to Kim (2009), who critically reviewed previous researches on the social policy preferences, the preceding researches largely approached two methods with respect to the measurement of social policy preference. First, there is the general approach of looking at the degree of respondents’ social policy preferences by means of their preferences for social justice or equality or by means of the degree of government responsibility for social policy in general and understanding this through the method of using a single index or multiple indices in a simple aggregate. The other approach is a more program-specific approach of understanding individual members of society’s preferences toward each specific social policy program, such as medical, education, pension, unemployment benefits, and others. Kim (2009) emphasizes the fact that when one examines these critically, measurements of social policy preference exist on the basis of the multidimensionality of social policy arising from the target of the preference. If social policies can be divided into those that target the workforce and those that target the nonworkforce and if it is more useful to discern the changes and developments of the social policy than preceding approaches, then social policy preferences targeting the workforce and those targeting the non-workforce should also be distinguished. This suggestion is appropriate with respect to this paper’s theoretical model of social policy preferences and skill specificity. In the theoretical model suggested above, members of the society are assumed to have the ability to work and are assumed to receive social policy allowances universally regardless of employment or skill status. In other words, target of

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 163

the social policy preference in this study is the workforce.

It is not easy to find quantitative data set which contains social policy preferences from a comparative perspective. Moreover, data related to social policy preferences must ask questions of the same form to all societies chosen for comparison. This is because one cannot be sure of the reliability of measurements in cases where, a small difference in the content of the questions exists. The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) has an advantage on this point; it has devoted much effort ensuring that the questions about social policy preferences as used in this study have exactly the same meaning in all of the countries. Moreover, this data offers individuallevel measure on skill specificity. The social policy preferences in the ISSP data were surveyed a total of four times from the 1985 study to the present, but this paper will utilize the data from 2006, which includes South Korea as a survey population.14 The social policy preferences in the ISSP data consisted of a variety of questions, but this paper has chosen the six questions shown in Table 1 as the questions that ask about the social policy preferences targeted at the workforce.

Table 1. Survey Items for the ISSP Social Policy Preference Data Preference Target Workforce

Survey Item

Value

Financial supply for job creation projects Government spending on unemployment benefits Providing a job for everyone who wants one Support for unemployed people to live an appropriate lifestyle Government spending on healthcare Providing medical insurance for sick people

5 points 5 points 4 points 4 points 5 points 4 points

Source: ISSP. 2010. International Social Survey Programme. 2006.

On the other hand, Table 2 shows the ratio of public social expenditure to GDP in the 16 OECD countries. This measure is the proxy of the degree of social policy developments. The value shown is the average value from 2001 to 2005. As one may well know, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 14

This considers the point that the index of skill specificity explained above and the survey data can be used and found.

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and Development (OECD) totals the size of spending on social policy programs disbursed through government and private funds, terming it â&#x20AC;&#x153;social expenditure.â&#x20AC;? The social expenditure in this data are categorized into nine areas: 1) old age, 2) survivors, 3) incapacity related, 4) health, 5) family, 6) active labor market programs, 7) unemployment, 8) housing, and 9) other social policy areas and include both cash and in-kind payments. Because this paper is focused on social policies for which the target group is the workforce, it uses the size of social policy payments made in only four of the nine categories (health, family, active labor market programs, and unemployment) as a percentage of GDP as a proxy variable for the degree of social policy development. Among the four areas targeting the workforce, spending on healthcare was the largest, and averaged from 2001 to 2005, Germany had the highest spending with 7.74% of GDP, while South Korea had the lowest spending with 2.84% of GDP. The five-year average for spending on family programs was highest in Denmark at 3.38% of GDP, and South Korea was again the lowest at 0.14% of GDP. Conversely, in the policy areas of active labor market and unemployment, Denmark had the largest amount of spending, whereas the United States and South Korea were lowest in the two categories, respectively. Although these measures are ratio variables, Table 2 shows the country-by-country rank in spending as a percentage of GDP together with the Weibull plotting position calculated based on that ranking. In such a case, in a situation in which multivariate analysis is difficult, a non-parametric statistical method that uses an ordinal scale such as rankings may be more appropriate. Moreover, we may understand the aspects of social policy development using a plotting method that allows us to visualize immediately the sequenced variables alongside other variables.15 Now, we examine the relationship between social policy preferences and the degree of social policy development. Table 3 shows the result of examining the simple correlation between social policy preferences and skill specificity and the degree of social policy development. Here, social policy preferences 15

Actually, in many comparative studies, comparative aspects are understood by plotting the relationship between target variables. This is used as empirical evidence for a theoretical discussion.

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 165

Table 2. Social Policy Spending as a Percentage of GDP for the 16 OECD Countries1 Country

Total

Health

Family

Australia Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Japan South Korea Netherlands New Zealand Norway Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States Average

17.10 16.40 26.70 25.00 28.34 26.38 15.26 17.62 5.54 20.2 18.02 22.60 29.26 19.24 20.16 15.52 20.21

5.72 6.64 5.62 5.78 7.62 7.74 5.66 6.12 2.84 5.64 6.36 5.88 6.80 5.80 6.50 6.68 5.96

2.94 0.96 3.38 2.88 2.96 1.92 2.36 0.72 0.14 1.54 2.54 3.00 3.14 1.28 2.98 0.64 2.26

Labor UnemployRank Market ment 0.3 0.28 1.84 0.82 0.98 1.10 0.68 0.22 0.12 1.42 0.38 0.66 1.34 0.62 0.44 0.10 1.02

0.68 0.66 3.02 2.06 1.66 1.62 0.82 0.42 0.12 1.42 0.72 0.54 1.14 0.80 0.26 0.40 1.37

10 12 1 5 2 4 11 15 16 8 9 7 3 13 6 14

Weibull Plotting Position2 0.4188 0.2941 0.9412 0.7059 0.8824 0.7647 0.3529 0.1176 0.0588 0.5294 0.4706 0.5882 0.8235 0.2353 0.6471 0.1765 0.5000

Source: OECD. 2010. Social Expenditure Database.

Note: 1. Average public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP from 2001 to 2005.

2. The Weibull plotting position of an item with rank r in a list of n items is calculated as r/(n + 1).

and skill specificity are averaged for each country, and the degree of social policy development is measured by the total public social expenditure shown in Table 2 above and the public social expenditure targeted toward the workforce.

The point we can confirm through Table 3 is that the correlation between skill specificity and social policy preference is statistically significant,16 but on the other hand, the correlation between skill specificity and social policy development and the correlation between social policy preferences and social policy development is not only extremely weak, but it is also not statistically significant. What are the implications of this empirical evidence? It shows us 16

The effect of skill specificity on social policy preference can also be confirmed through a multiple regression analysis. See the appendix.

166 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

that attempts to establish a direct causal relationship between social policy preference and social policy development are not appropriate, as when one allows for the fact that social policy is produced according to a process of collective decision-making by all members of society, then of course social policy development will differ according to the concrete institutional form of that collective decision-making process.

Table 3. Simple Correlation of Skill Specificity, Social Policy Preference, and Social Policy Development (n = 16) Skill Social Policy Specificity1 Preference2

Social Policy Spending 13

Social Policy Spending 24

Social Policy Spending 35

Skill Specificity1

1.0000

Social Policy Preference2

0.3592*

1.0000

Social Policy Spending 13

0.1245

0.0350

1.0000

Social Policy Spending 24

0.1115

0.0861

0.9386*

1.0000

Social Policy Spending 35

0.1227

0.0871

0.9397*

0.9963*

1.0000

Social Policy Spending 46

0.1422

0.0799

0.9223*

0.9932*

0.9831*

* P < .1 Note: 1. Average value of Specificity Index 3 for the country. Data shown in Table 1.

2. Average value of Social Policy Preference Index for programs targeting the workforce in the country. Data shown in Table 1.

3. Average value of public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP from 20012005, from Table 2.

4. Average value of public social expenditures related to the workforce (healthcare, family, labor market, and unemployment) as a percentage of GDP from 20012005, from Table 2.

5. Average value of public social expenditures related to the workforce as a percentage of GDP in 2002 (data as in that of note 3).

6. Average value of public social expenditures related to the workforce as a percentage of GDP in 2005 (data as in that of note 3).

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 167

2. Comparing the Aspects of Political Systems: The Degree of Development of Democratic Politics and the Characteristics of Electoral Rules In the theoretical model suggested above, political systems were categorized as committee systems, proportional election systems, and majoritarian election systems according to the degree of the development of democratic politics and the differences of electoral rules. Also, using a mathematical model, with all other factors being equal it predicted that the level of social policy development would be highest in the proportional election system, while it would be lowest in the committee system, in which democratic development is relatively slow. Table 4 shows various measures on the degree Table 4. Characteristics of the Political Systems of the 16 OECD Countries Country Australia Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Japan South Korea Netherlands New Zealand Norway Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States

Political Politician Civil Politician Liberties Liberties PromiseCorruption3 1 1 2 Index Keeping Index 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.7857 1.7857 1.1429 2.0000 2.1429 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.7857 1.0000

1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.1429 1.9286 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000

3.2724 3.2473 2.9438 3.5116 3.6796 3.4575 3.3833 3.9825 3.8265 3.0914 3.2624 3.2926 3.4395 2.9675 3.3118 3.5683

2.6607 2.9515 1.7500 2.4844 3.3927 3.1286 2.9670 3.4173 3.9168 2.4375 2.4082 2.3180 2.6944 2.4937 2.9467 3.3046

Weibull plotting position4

Electoral Rules5

0.6176 0.6029 0.7794 0.5588 0.2868 0.3603 0.4338 0.1029 0.0735 0.7059 0.6912 0.6765 0.5441 0.6912 0.4485 0.4265

Majoritarian Majoritarian Proportional Proportional Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Proportional Mixed Proportional Proportional Mixed Majoritarian Majoritarian

Note: 1. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Averaging over 1991~2005. Freedom House (2010).

2. W hat degree the respondent would agree “MPs try to keep promises”. It start with 1-as strongly agree and end at 5 with strongly disagree. Shows the average value from each country from the ISSP survey data.

3. W hat degree the respondent would agree “politicians involved in corruption”. It start with 1-as strongly agree and end at 5 with strongly disagree. Shows the average value from each country from the ISSP survey data.

4. Weibull plotting position using these 4 measures.

5. Classification of electoral rules. MR means majoritarian, PR is proportional, and Mixed means mixed system. Interparliamentary Union (2010).

168 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

of development of democratic politics and the differences of electoral rules in the sixteen countries ECD. First, the average of measurements taken from 1991 through 2005 is shown, of the civil liberty index and political rights index is depicted, showing typical proxy variables expressing the degree of the development of democracy. This stems from the conclusion that it is more appropriate to understand the degree of the development of democracy from a mediumterm point of view than from one particular point in time.

Next, the 2006 ISSP also contains two questions that are closely related to the development of political democracy. One question asks to what degree the respondent would agree “MPs try to keep promises”. The other asks to what degree the respondent would agree “politicians involved in corruption” These two variables are measured on individual level, so they can represent subjective evaluation of each country’s political democracy. There are several reasons for inserting these two variables into the proxy index expressing the degree of development of democratic political systems. First, since implementation of electoral promises are essential factors in collective decision-making based on the preferences of members of a society, collectively this is judged to be an important index for expressing the development of democratic political systems. Also, because the institutionalization of competitive elections according to the development of democratic political systems naturally minimizes the possibility that politicians (policy makers) will acquire illegal rent payments, the subjective assessments of members of a society of corruption by politicians are seen as an index of the degree of the development of the democratic political system in a given society. In Table 4, the above four categories of variables are synthesized and ranked, and the Weibull plotting position calculated from these rankings is shown. If we examine the degree of development of democratic political systems based on the regional ranking, Denmark is positioned at the highest rank, with the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland coming next.

In the theoretical model suggested in this paper, the proportional system is described as a situation in which all of society consists of only one electoral district, whereas the majoritarian system is described as a single member electorate system in which one candidate is elected from each of many electoral districts. However, each country’s electoral rules are

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 169

extremely complicated and diverse; therefore, it is never easy to measure their characteristics with only a single tool. If we examine the related research, considering these limitations, it becomes clear that there are generally two methods used to classify electoral rules (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerote 2001). First, there is the method that uses information supplied by international organizations such as the IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union).

IPU classifies a given country’s electoral rules as proportional, majoritarian, or a mixed system. This method has a problem in that it assigns a simple classification to complicated electoral rules, but has the advantage of including a comparatively high number of countries and of being intuitive.

The other method measures the degree of proportionality using the sizes of the electoral districts and the electoral formula for choosing a winner. The greater this measure is, the more it resembles a proportional system. This method has a problem that it requires the collection of detailed information about each country’s election system; depending on the method used to compile the index, one country’s electoral rules may be classified differently.

This paper uses information supplied by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and classifies each country’s election regulations. However, in this case, the countries that have bicameral systems become problematics. If a country has majoritarian electoral rules for its lower house and proportional rules for its upper house, this introduces the question of how to classify it. This paper classifies such countries as having a mixed system. The results of classifying election systems using this method are shown in the last row of Table 4. In the case of European countries, the United Kingdom is the only country with a majoritarian election system, while Germany, France, Ireland, and Switzerland operate with systems that are a combination of proportional and majoritarian. The other countries all have proportional election systems.

Conversely, among countries belonging to East Asia, North America, and Oceania, none have adopted a proportional election system.

3. Overall Picture In this section, we examine the overall picture, with social policy preferences, political systems, and the development of social policy all taken into account.

First, we put the degree of the development of social policy and the degree

170â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

of the development of democratic political systems on the x and y axes, respectively. Figure 1 expresses the position of a given country based on the Weibull plotting position. Also, the countries belonging to a cluster resulting from the implementation of a hierarchical cluster analysis based on the skill specificity, social policy preference, and the development of democratic political systems as suggested above are grouped together in an ellipse.

Letâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s examine this concretely. The average value of skill specificity in Group 1, consisting of South Korea and Japan, at 0.3159, is not only higher than the average value for Group 2 at 0.3049 but also higher than that of Group 3 at 0.3128. Also, the average value of the preference for social policy in Group 1, at 4.42, is shown to be lower than the average value for Group 3 at 4.49 but higher than that for Group 2, at 4.38. Finally, if we only look at preferences for social policy and the degree of skill specificity, then Group 1 is comparable to Groups 2 and 3. However, Group 1, compared to Groups 2 and 3, is relatively slow in terms of the development of democratic political systems and is also lower than the other groups in terms of the development of social policy programs taking the workforce as their target group. The type of comparative aspect shown in Figure 1 shows the possibility that the lack of the development of democratic political systems based on a foundation of collective decision-making through the preferences of members of a society is related to the phenomenon of the formation of a gap between the social policy preferences of members of society and the actual social policy development of that society.

On the other hand, in the case of Groups 2 and 3, the difference in the development of democratic political systems is not large, whereas there is a difference in the degree of the development of social policy programs.

Group 2, which is composed of Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States, has a difference in the degree of the development of social policy from that of Group 3, which is composed of Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. What is the difference between these two groups?

First, the average value of skill specificity in Group 2 is 0.3049 and the average value of the degree of preference for social policy is 4.38, which are lower than the average value of skill specificity, 0.3128, and average value of the degree of preference for social policy, 4.49, in Group 3. Considering

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x192; 171

Figure 1. Comparative Aspects of Preferences and Political System, and the Development of Social Policy.

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Note: 1. Countries shown to belong to the same cluster resulting from the cluster analysis are grouped in an ellipse. â&#x20AC;&#x192;â&#x20AC;&#x192; â&#x20AC;&#x2030;2. The first numbers listed correspond to the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s average skill specificity; numbers shown in square brackets [ ] correspond to the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s average degree of social policy preference; numbers shown in brackets < > correspond to the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s average electoral district magnitude. â&#x20AC;&#x192;â&#x20AC;&#x192; â&#x20AC;&#x2030;3. District magnitude measure is computed as a weighted average of the various district sizes. The larger the district magnitude, the greater the degree of proportionality. See Johnson and Wallack (2007).

the fact that the degree of the development of democratic political systems is relatively high in Groups 2 and 3, the difference in the degrees of social policy development between the two groups can be seen as a reflection of the social policy preferences of the members of the society. However, there are many differences between the methods used in Groups 2 and 3 to gather the preferences of society members. This is a direct result of the fact that among the countries belonging to Group 2, there are none that have a proportional election system, whereas among the eight countries belonging to Group 3, five have a proportional election system, and two more have a system

172â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

combining proportional and majoritarian election systems.

For a clear understanding of this difference, we looked for the average value of the district magnitude, which is widely used as an index to measure the degree of the proportionality of the election system. The result is shown in that the average value of the proportionality of the countries belonging to Group 2 is 2.60 compared to that of the countries belonging to Group 3, at 17.45.17 Remembering that a larger proportionality value denotes a closer type to the ideal of a proportional election system, this result means that Groups 2 and 3 can be distinguished by their respective majoritarian and proportional election systems. Finally, the comparative picture shown in Figure 1, that is, the picture that the degree of social policy development is expressed more highly in Group 3 than in Group 2, and in Group 2 than in Group 1, shows that differences in the degree of social policy development or differences in the welfare state arise according to differences in social policy preferences and in the political system when collectively assessing the social policy preferences of members of a society.

IV. Conclusion This paper has attempted to demonstrate through a theoretical model and empirical data that there is a close relationship between the social policy preferences of members of a society and the political system used to gather those social policy preferences collectively and the development of social policy. The prediction of an asset theory of social policy is supported by the results of empirical research targeting western welfare states. This theory is receiving attention in that it explains the development of social policy, regional deviations in the development of such policies, the institutional complementarity of production regime and welfare regime, and other factors with a generalized causal model based on the rational preferences of members 17

The large difference between the two clusters is due to the method of measuring the degree of proportionality. Supposing there were a total of 200 seats and a country had a completely proportional election system, then the index of proportionality would be 200. Conversely, if this country had a completely majoritarian election system, then the index of proportionality would be 0.995.

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 173

of a society. Nevertheless, South Korea and Japan, despite being classified as CMEs and therefore having a comparatively high assessment of the skill specificity of the members of their societies, still lag behind compared to other countries in terms of the development of social policy. In other words, South Korea and Japan are considered outliers in asset theory, just as they are in most theories of social policy developed from western societies. However, there is no reason such examples must be considered as outliers exceeding the limits of application of a universal theory, or as special cases. In order for social policy preferences to guide the development of actual social policy, there is a necessary precondition that these preferences are fully reflected in the collective decision-making process. This precondition is true only in certain countries that have very developed democratic political systems. This is an extremely obvious point, but the application of labels such as “outlier” or “admixture” to East Asian welfare states such as South Korea and Japan is more of a problem with the theory applied than with the given example itself.

This is evidence of the necessity of focusing on the effects of the concrete institutional form of the collective decision-making process on social policy decisions.

A detailed multivariate analysis was not possible due to limitations in the data, but as a result of examining patterns of co-variation observed between political systems and social policy development, we noted that there is a close relationship between the political system and the social policy. First, if we only look at the preference of social policy and skill specificity, Japan and South Korea are comparable to other countries classified as CMEs. However, for Japan and South Korea, compared to other countries classified as either CMEs or LMEs, the degree of the development of democratic political systems is relatively low and the degree of the development of social policy programs targeting the workforce is also low. This comparative picture shows the possibility that this lag in the development of democratic political systems based on the collective decision-making of preferences of members of a society is related to the formation of a gap between the social policy preferences of members of a society and the actual development of social policy. On the other hand, between countries that have developed democratic political systems to some degree, there are differences to be found not only in the degree of social policy preferences by members of society or

174 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

skill specificity, but also in the aspects of their political system, that is, their electoral rules.

Finally, the comprehensive picture of the sixteen countries shows the existence of a close relationship between the social policy preferences of members of a society and the political system that collectively gathers these preferences, and the actual development of social policy. A political system creates a relationship—whether one of complementarity, discord, or outlier— that exists between the social policy preferences of members of a society and the actual development of social policy. This illustrates the necessity of paying attention to the problem of the participation of members of a society in the collective decision-making process and of the problem of the normative framework of a constitution and the institutional framework of a political system to that democracy may be advanced.

BIBLIOGRAPHY References in Korean

Hong, Kyung Zoon. 2009. “Explaining the Development of Social Policy; Social Policy Preferences and Political Institutions.” Korean Journal of Social Welfare 61(4): 35-39 (“선호와 정치제도를 중심으로 한 사회정책 발달이론의 모 색.” 『한국사회복지학』 61(4): 35-59).

Kim, Sa Hyun. 2009. “The Effect of Welfare State institution on Welfare Attitude: Focusing on the Welfare Attitude About Working People and NonWorking People.” Doctoral dissertation, Sungkyunkwan University (“복지 국가의 제도적 특성이 복지태도에 미치는 효과: 노동인구 및 비노동인구에 대한 복 지태도를 중심으로.” 성균관대학교 박사학위논문).

References in English

Alesina, A., E. Glaeser, and B. Sacerdote. 2001. “Why doesn’t the United States have a European-style welfare state?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Vol. 2001(2): 187-254.

Amable, B. 2003. The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Freedom House. 2010. Freedom in the World, published annually. [MRDF]. http://www.freedomhouse.org. Accessed 3/9/2010.

Hall, P. and D. Soskice. 2001. “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism.” P. Hall

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 175

and D. Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. New York: Oxford University Press: 1-68.

Hong, K. Z. 2008. “Neither Hybrid, Nor Unique: A Reinterpretation of the East Asian Welfare Regime.” Asian Social Work and Policy Review 2: 159-180.

Hainmueller, J. and M. Hiscox. 2007. “Being Specific: Measuring Asset Specificity for Political Economy.” mimeo. Harvard University.

Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2010. PARLINE database: Electoral system module. [MRDF]. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/mod-electoral.asp. Accessed 3/9/2010.

ISSP (International Social Survey Programme). 2010. International Social Survey Programme: Role of Government IV, 2006 [MRDF]. http://zacat.gesis.org.

Accessed 12/15/2009.

Iversen, T. and D. Soskice. 2001. “An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences.”

American Political Science Review 95: 875-93.

Johnson, W. and J. Wallack. 2007. Database of Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote. [MRDF]. http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jwjohnso/espv.htm. Accessed 3/10/2010.

Korpi, W. 1983. The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. OECD (Organizations for Economic Co-ordination and Development). 2010. OECD Social Expenditure Database [MRDF]. http:// stats.oecd.org/index.aspx. Accessed 3/9/2010.

Orloff, A. 1993. “Gender and Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States.” American Sociological Review 58: 303-28.

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 1998. “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians.” European Economic Review 43: 699-735.

Stephens, J. 1979. The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. London: Macmillan.

176â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Appendix The effects of skill specificity on social policy preferences are analyzed through general OLS regression model. However, because many different countries are included in the data analyzed, the possibility is high that the systematic characteristics of each country will have an effect on the estimation process of the regression coefficients. Therefore, the sixteen countries targeted by the analysis (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are inserted into the analytical model through country dummy variables. On the other hand, a variety of variables predicted to have an effect on the social policy preferences of members of a society must be inserted into the model as control variables.

These are explained below: 1) Income: In the ISSP data, pretax income variable was collected through a self-reporting method. In a given country, pretax income was measured in ordered categories, but the ISSP offers measurements of the median value in a given category. On the other hand, all income is measured according to the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s currency value. In this paper, these are converted into U.S. dollars according to purchasing power parity exchange rates at 2006 levels.

Depending on whether social policy is looked at as a means of redistribution or as a means of insurance, the effect of income on social policy preference can be different, but according to the asset model of social policy preferences presented in this paper, the higher the income level, the lower the preference for social policy.

2) Age: Older members of a society will have a greater preference for social policy than younger members of society. As age increases, retirement draws closer. In addition it becomes more difficult to find a new job. In the ISSP data, age data is collected through self-reporting.

3) Gender: According to a number of arguments (Orloff, 1993; Iversen and Soskice, 2001), in cases of equal status in the labor market, women will have a greater preference for the development of social policy than men. According to such arguments, it is predicted that women will show preferences for the development of social policy more than men.

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 177

4) Labor Market Status: This paper’s theoretical model starts from the assumption that individual positioning in the labor market is a major factor determining social policy preference. First, regular workers with a high degree of job security compared with those who do not have this security have less of a preference for the development of social policy as a mechanism for dispersing labor market risk. By the same token, the unemployed may have a greater preference for the development of social policy than those who are employed. The economically inactive population of people who are not engaged in economic activity is a very heterogeneous group consisting of people unable to work as well as those who cannot find jobs; thus, the direction of their social policy preferences cannot be easily predicted.

However, it has been concluded that the necessity of including it as a control variable is great. In the ISSP data, labor market status is divided into ten categories, from regular employment to inability to work. This paper inserts as a dummy variable whether or not one is a regular employee, whether or not one is unemployed, and whether or not one belongs to the economically inactive population.

5) Union Membership: According to theories of power resources (Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1983), the social policy preferences of those belonging to unions or supporting left-wing political parties can be predicted to be higher. In the ISSP data, the union membership variable is measured by three categories: 1) union membership, 2) currently withdrawn, but having the experience of being a union member, and 3) not a union member. This paper creates two dummy variables as the categories of union membership and uses them.

6) Party Preference: As with the union membership variables, party preference is input as a control variable based on theories of power resources.

In the ISSP data, the preferences of currently active political parties in the target country are normalized according to an ideological spectrum from left to right after they are gathered. Through this method, the normalized party preferences are reclassified in this paper as follows: 1) left-wing party supporter, 2) moderate party supporter, 3) right-wing party supporter, or 4) independent/undecided. Furthermore, in the analysis, three dummy variables created for “left-wing party supporter” as a mood category are inserted.

178â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Supplemental Table 1. Characteristics of the Input Variables in the Analysis Measured Variable

Operational Definition

Sample Average Standard Size (Ratio) Deviation

Preference of social policy aimed at the workforce

Points for six items normalized to 1 10,237 and combined

4.46

0.69

Specificity Index 1

(Ratio of a given job/Ratio of a given 11,644 workforce)/Skill level

0.42

0.35

Specificity Index 2

(Ratio of a given job/Ratio of a given 11,562 workforce)/Education level

0.20

0.19

Specificity Index 3

The average of Index 1 and Index 2

11,562

0.31

0.26

Income

Annual pre-tax income (in U.S. $)

11,644 33,759.7

Age

Age

11,644

Gender Men Women

11,644

Labor Market Position Regular Employment Regular Employment = 1, Not = 0 Unemployed Unemployed = 1, Not = 0 Economically Inactive Economically Inactive = 1, Not = 0

11,277

Union Membership Current member Has been a member

11,644

Never a member Party Preference Left-wing Moderate Right-wing Independent/ Undecided

Currently a union member Was a union member in the past, but not currently Never a union member Supports extreme left or left-leaning party Supports a moderate party Supports extreme right or Other or does not support a party

46.14

27320.1 15.42

0.49 0.51 0.57 0.02 0.24 0.32 0.21 0.47

11,644

0.34 0.17 0.30 0.19

Source: Same as Table 1 in body text.

Here we examine the effects of skill specificity on social policy preferences through the results of a regression analysis into which the above variables were inserted. The results of the regression analysis of the three models distinguished according to the index's manner of measuring skill specificity

Comparative Patterns of Political Institutions and Social Policy Developments 179

are shown in Table 2, while in Table 1, the characteristics of the above variables inserted into the analysis of the effects of skill specificity on social policy preferences are shown.

Supplemental Table 2. Effects of Skill Specificity on Social Policy Preference; Regression Analysis of the 16 OECD Countries Preference of Social Policy Targeting the Workforce1 Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Coefficient

SE

Coefficient

SE

Coefficient

Specificity Index 1

.075**

.020

--

--

--

Specificity Index 2

--

--

.154**

.038

--

--

--

--

.112**

Specificity Index 3 Income Age

SE

.027

-3.50e-06** 4.83e-07 -3.53e06** 4.82e-07 -3.49e-06** 4.82e-07 .033**

.0005

.003**

.0005

.003**

.0005

Gender

.068**

.015

.069**

.015

.071**

.015

Regular Employment

-.007

.021

-.005

.021

-.005

.021

Unemployed

.339**

.044

.340**

.044

.339**

.044

2

Economically Inactive

.027

.024

.025

.024

.026

.024

Has been a union member3

-.016

.019

-.016

.019

-.016

.019

Has never been a union member3

-.086**

.018

-.087**

.018

-.086**

.018

Moderate party supporter4

-.256**

.020

-.258**

.020

-.258**

.020

Right-wing party supporter4

-.415**

.017

-.416**

.017

-.416**

.017

Independent or Undecided4

-.163**

.021

-.164**

.021

-.163**

.021

Sample Size 2

R

F value

10,237

10,174

10,174

0.20

0.20

0.20

86.68**

86.28**

86.36**

** p < .001 Source: Same as Table 1 of the body text.

Note: 1. Th e sixteen countries are inserted into the analysis as dummy variables (omitted in the table).

2. The reference category is male.

3. The reference category is union membership.

4. The reference category is left-wing party supporter.

180â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 2 shows that in all the models, the proxy variables measuring skill specificity have a statistically significant effect on social policy preferences. In other words, the higher a member of societyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s skill specificity is, the higher his or her preference for social policy targeting the labor population will be.

Given that the institutional differences between the sixteen OECD countries are controlled through dummy variables in the analytical model, these results show that social policy preferences are reasonable within the institutional constraints. In the analysis, the effects of the inserted control variables are consistent with the predictions. First, it is shown that the higher the member of societyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s income level is, the less he/she will prefer social policy, which is consistent with the prediction of the asset model. It is shown that older members of a society will prefer social policy more and that women prefer social policy more than men. Additionally, the unemployed prefer social policy more than the employed. The analysis shows that the union membership and party preference variables inserted according to theories of power resources also have a statistically significant effect on social policy preferences. In other words, members of a society who have never been union members, compared to those who are currently union members, have a lower degree of preference for social policy. Also, members of a society who do not support left-wing political parties have lower social policy preferences than those who do support these parties.

Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012: 181-220

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers in Seoul, Korea* Park, Sam Ock,** Jin, Jong Heon*** and Koo, Yangmi**** This study examines the characteristics of population aging and the employment of aged workers in Seoul. Population indexes such as those on aged/children ratio and longevity degree are analyzed to identify the time-spatial changes and differentiation of population aging by gu (district). Employers, job seekers and employees related to the aged workers are also analyzed using data from the Center of Job Placement for the Aged in Seoul. The results indicate that population aging has progressed faster in Seoul than other regions in recent years. In addition, regional differences in tendency of population aging are obvious even within Seoul. The percentage of unskilled laborers is much higher in Seoul compared with other regions. There is also geographical differentiation in the employment of aged workers among regions within Seoul. Employment opportunities for the aged are relatively abundant in core economic areas of Seoul, while they are much scarcer in outer residential areas. This shows a geographical mismatch between employers and job seekers, which means that it is difficult for aged workers to secure jobs near their places of residence. Accordingly, governmental support and intervention is needed to address the lower level of mobility of aged workers.

Keywords: Population Aging, Employment of Aged Workers, Geographical Mismatch, Korea

Translated from an article published in the Journal of the Korean Geographical Society 43 (3): 337-357, 2008 with permission from The Korean Geographlcal Society. ** Chair Professor, Department of Public Administration, Gachon University and Professor Emeritus, Department of Geography, Seoul National University *** Assistant Professor, Kongju National University **** Assistant Professor, Department of Geography, Seoul National University *

181

182 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

I. Introduction Population aging is occurring rapidly. According to Paul Wallace (2001), <Agequake> is recognized as being symbolic of the huge change in the new millennium. The aging phenomenon is tied to the declining birth rate; thus, they must be looked at jointly to properly grasp the social implications.

However, it does not make sense to concentrate only on the negative aspects of aging and how it changes social structure in an unfavorable manner.

Rather, to accurately measure the impact of aging, it is important to also establish countermeasures.

On a more micro level, the aging issue will continue to bring about numerous changes to existing socio-political and cultural customs, institutions, and organizations. The power of the senior social class is evident in the politics of not just the United States and Japan, but South Korea as well (Kim, H. 2004). The purchasing power of the elderly social class is increasing rapidly and affecting the development of elderly-friendly businesses. Especially with the speed and quantitative expansion and development of the social security system, the purchasing power of the elderly population is likely to bring about greater social stratification in the foreseeable future.

South Korea, which has already entered into the category of an “aging society,” moves toward an “aged society” and a “super-aged society” at a faster rate than other nations. As such, if this matter is not dealt with appropriately in the next 20~30 years, a serious social crisis is likely. In this situation, the latest countermeasure to the issue of aging combines economic, social, cultural, and other such features; in addition, each relevant academic field is searching for a serious approach to the study of coping with aging of the population. However, many studies dealing with the aging of Korean society have failed to engage in a full discussion of the connections between the cities and communities where we live and the aging of the population. At the same time that the aging population is bringing about fundamental changes in our lifestyles, it is also accompanied by specific changes to the practical experiences of our daily lives in urban and regional communities. Thus, it is necessary to approach the social changes brought about by the aging population from a geographical perspective (Park, S. etc. 2005a; 2005b; 2007;

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~ 183

Song, K. etc. 2006; Jeong, E. etc. 2006).

This paper deals with the regional characteristics and spatial processes of working seniors in the Seoul area. The number of ‘working seniors’ has increased, meaning that the average life expectancy of the elderly has increased and the health and physical conditions of the elderly have improved. This, in turn, means they are able to perform daily labor. On the other hand, there is indication that many older people remain economically active and feel the need to earn an income. However, as yet, there is no foundation for older people seeking suitable jobs in various areas to receive adequate financial compensation. The problems of the quantity and quality of employment for elderly people in urban areas, as typified by Seoul, which has the most rapidly growing aging urban population in the region, is a pronounced phenomenon.

Drawing upon this background, this paper raises the following issues for discussion: First, what attributes are indicated by the progression of Seoul’s aging population? Second, as employment of the elderly in Seoul in some sectors has increased, what is the overall pattern of the employment structure?

Third, how many of the jobs offered to senior job seekers in Seoul meet their needs and well-being? Fourth, how can we differentiate the characteristics of the aging phenomenon and the employment of the elderly in Seoul?

II. Elderly Employment and Employment Research Trends Existing research on the employment and hiring of the elderly generally can be identified by a few trends. The types of research include actual analysis and proposals for policy of elderly employment, research on the level of access elderly have to guaranteed income, employment of the elderly as part of labor market policy issues, research on the employment of the elderly and elderly workforce, and the development of the elderly as human resources.

This research, which is broken down into three topics, utilizes the existing literature to briefly review the status and characteristics of employment of the elderly, elderly employment (promoting) policies, and the employment of the elderly in urban areas.

184 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

1. Elderly Employment Status and Characteristics The characteristics of the labor market for the elderly in Korea are defined

by Chang, J. (2004) as “high economic activity, low(poor) quality (of ) employment.” Many are in agreement with Chi, K. (2005) on this. Closer examination reveals that the rate of elderly participation in the labor force in South Korea is generally higher than other countries (Table 1). In 2000, the participation of individuals aged 50 to 64 in the labor market was 64.3% higher in Korea than it was in the EU and the OECD, yet still lower than it was in Japan or the United States. However, while the participation of women in the (Korean) labor market was low, if the participation of males alone is considered, then Korea had a higher rate than Japan. Meanwhile, if the participation of senior citizens aged 65 and older in the labor market is examined, Korea’s rate of participation of 39.5% was significantly higher than that of Japan or the United States. Then what does the high rate of participation by Koreans 65 and older in the competitive labor market compared to other countries mean? In order to answer this question we must examine the previous studies more closely.

The views of employees regarding this high labor market participation can be divided into two categories. Phang, H. and others (2004) consider the higher labor market participation of senior citizens “as one of the most positive indicators with respect to the progression of aging.” The biggest Table 1. The Rate of Participation regarding Age Groups in the Labor Force in South Korea and Major Countries (2000) Unit: % Male Korea Japan EU USA OECD

Female

Total

25~49

50~64

65~74

25~49

50~64

65~74

25~49

50~64

65~74

92.4 97.2 94.0 92.4 93.7

78.0 89.1 66.1 75.6 72.8

45.7 42.0 23.5 -

58.2 66.1 73.9 77.3 69.0

50.7 56.8 42.3 61.0 48.4

29.0 21.0 14.4 -

75.5 81.8

84.7 81.3

64.3 72.6 54.0 68.0 60.3

35.9 30.7 18.5 -

Source: OECD, Labor Force Statistics 2001; Phang et al. 2004.

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~â&#x20AC;&#x192; 185

problem for senior citizens in Western societies is the low participation of senior citizens in the labor market. This is due to the early retirement of older pensioners and an increase in beneficiary premiums, which have caused a reduction in the retirement income of contributors, resulting in a crisis of the pension system. On the other hand, the relatively high participation of a broad base of South Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economically active populace in the labor market has reduced the dependency ratio.

However, a significant portion of labor market participation comes from the agricultural sectorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s high rate of participation in economic activity. Yet when you consider that this is due to the abovementioned condition, it is not easy to view this perspective in a positive light. According to Chang, J. (2004), a higher proportion of the agricultural sector appears to consist of the higher age ranges, with the proportion of non-agricultural labor force participation dropping to 59.4% for those the late fifties and to a mere 18.2% for those 65 years and older. These figures are similar to those shown earlier of the United States labor force participation rate of 18.5% for elderly people aged 65 and over. Therefore, except for the agricultural sector, the labor force participation rate of South Korean senior citizens cannot be said to be particularly high. Additionally, major cities house only a tiny proportion of the agricultural sector, a fact which has significant implications. Nationally, among older workers 60 years or older, skilled workers in the agricultural and fishery industries are the most numerous. Poor financial compensation and the unreliability of general employment positions are most prevalent in metropolitan areas, including Seoul. Thus, a positive evaluation of the high economic activity participation rate cannot be given. The higher rate of participation by the elderly in the labor market is directly linked to the negative aspect of the low quality of employment and is a challenge that must be overcome. The poor quality of employment for the elderly is a result of the virtual collapse of the lifetime employment system in Korea and the markedly shorter average duration of employment of males in Korea when compared to the average duration of employment of males in other countries. Males in Japan, France and Germany aged 50-54 stay with their employers for an average of 18 to 22 years. In Korea, on the other hand, they stay for an average of only 11 years (Chang, J. 2005). Because of ageism, re-employed elderly workers aged 55 years and older experience a decline in economic status.

186 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

These workers often reenter the workplace in irregular positions, at lower wages, and with a high turnover rate.

Kim, S. (2005) defined the characteristics of the country’s aged workforce employment as a ‘senior agricultural village’. Employment of the elderly is primarily concentrated in rural, agricultural areas. Because of this, it is difficult to pinpoint the labor force participation rate of older people by itself or to grasp their actual work conditions. In the self-employed sector and agricultural sector, where the elderly are concentrated, there is no mandatory retirement age. Among workers aged 65 and over, more than half work in the agricultural and fishery sectors. In the ten years between 1993 and 2003, there was a 10% increase in the proportion of temporary workers aged 65 and older. One could argue that the instability in elderly employment has been enhanced. In other words, despite the higher rate of labor force participation of elderly people in Korea, and a relatively low unemployment rate, the quality of employment remains at a lower level than can be fixed (Chang, J. 2004: 103). Chi, K. in his research (2005), said that the main characteristics of the labor market are the large number of disadvantaged workers and the high rate of labor force participation. Also, on the grounds of the high labor force participation rate, he mentions the lack of living expenses of the retired people, noting the negative aspects.

In order to understand why so many elderly people participate in economic activities, it is necessary to understand the changes in income security for older people. According to Byeon, J. (1999; Rim, C. re-quoted in 2003: 59), Seoul’s workforce of those 65 and older reached 8.7%. In response to the question of motivation for employment, 69% of them cited economic necessity. In the past, elderly people over the age of 60 have primarily depended on the financial support of their children, but this informal social practice of private transfer continues to weaken. Thus, the income security issues of the elderly have become the responsibility of the government and the elderly. However, the social security system, including the national pension system, is not yet completed. Under such circumstances, because of this reduction in private transfers occurring within families, it is understandable that the elderly are eager to enter the labor market.

On the other hand, since the 1997 financial crisis, the labor force participation rate of elderly people has fallen from what it was in the past.

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~â&#x20AC;&#x192; 187

This decline reflects early retirement of the pre-and post-age 50 increases and is attributable to the increasing difficulty of the elderly in entering the new labor market. The early retirement of men, aged 40-50 has become a universal phenomenon in the labor market over the last 10 years and has created a difficult situation for the elderly needing to find new jobs. Early retirementaged seniors who re-enter the workforce are likely to wind up in lower status jobs and positions, with a high possibility of falling into the category of the working poor (Chi, K. 2005: 1824).

2. Elderly Employment Promotion Policy In recent years many studies on aging and employment of the elderly have focused on extending the employment of the elderly, as well as on policy options for improving the quality of their employment (Shin, D. and Yang, G. 2003; Ji, G. 2005; No, B. 2004; Seo, G. 2007). These studies can be divided into a macro-perspective of the policy on the elderly in the labor market and into research on the microscopic perspective of the promotion of elderly employment.

Chang, J. (2004), Chi, K. (2005), Shin, D. and Yang, G. (2003)â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s study focused on providing a macroeconomic policy alternative. As previously mentioned, Chi, K. (2005) viewed the high labor force participation rate of the elderly as being due to the lack of social security and early retirement for the middle-aged and the elderly. To overcome this situation, the followings are suggested: legislation to extend the retirement age, age discrimination prohibition legislation, subsidized employment through job creation, and social support. Chang, J. (2004) also suggested that social work jobs be made available to low-income seniors and older workers with the rationalization being the stabilization of the labor market. Shin, D. and Yang, G. (2003) suggest a clearer direction in which the government promotes basic flexicurity policies for elderly employment. This means that diversified forms of flexible employment, such as temporary work, contract work, part-time work and day labor are created, while actively creating institutional mechanisms such as policies for protecting the elderly from unfair treatment. In particular, the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s existing policies of offering incentives to companies and the extension of the mandatory retirement system can be difficult for companies

188 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

to comply with due to company concerns over perceived higher labor costs and the inadequacy of incentives. Therefore, it is recommended that public sector jobs be created and that employees’ age restrictions be eliminated in order to promote nondiscrimination. The existing rigid system, such as the mandatory retirement system, cannot meet companies’ demands for flexible utilization of the workforce. Nor does this toothless policy protect elderly workers from unstable employment conditions.

Many researchers deal with elderly employment at a macro level, whereas Rim, C. (2003) presents micro-dimensional alternatives on the elderly workforce. He reviews in detail the various laws for the promotion of employment of the elderly, and institutions and public programs for job placement of the elderly. Macroeconomic perspective studies approach elderly employment issues from the dimension of a labor market issue while Rim, C.’s (2003) emphasis is more on securing welfare for the elderly and their income security. In addition, from the perspective of human resource development, studies have been conducted on alternative elderly employment policies (Suh, K. 2007; Kang, S. 2005). As with other macroscopic alternative researchers, Suh, K. (2007) previously claimed that improvements in preventing age discrimination and modifying the mandatory retirement system need to occur. However, a systematic plan for the development of job skills for the elderly is also an important consideration. There needs to be pressure for the creation of micro-alternatives, the following in particular: the re-design of jobs suitable for the elderly through a systemization of the elderly, the creation of suitable work environments anda salary peak system.

Additionally, a detailed examination of the need for an alternative pay system for older workers is necessary. Rho, B. (2004) also studied a number of programs for the promotion of senior employment. He mentions the importance of empowerment programs for re-engaging elderly workers in overcoming their own prejudices and participating in the labor market. At the same time, to carry out the mandate, he proposes that it is important to change the employment promotion programs—not only social welfare institutions, but also non-corporate fixed social welfare services (elderly employment obligation, etc.).

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~â&#x20AC;&#x192; 189

3. Employment of the Elderly in Cities and Regions Up until now the overall majority of South Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s related research has dealt with elderly employment conditions, while research on the senior employee labor market of cities and regions has made very little progress. However, Lee, S. (2006) is exceptional in that he approaches the issues of senior employment and social security from the perspective of regional labor markets. He conducted a survey in the northern Gyeonggi region (Uijeongbu-si, Dongducheon-si, Yangju-si, Paju-si, Yeoncheon-gun) of 367 employees of 232 businesses and the leading figures who determine the reasons for and intentions behind hiring elderly employees. In addition, he researched the difficulties of using elderly manpower. He emphasized the importance of studying regional labor markets that provided elderly manpower for selling and buying activities in order to provide quality work for the elderly. This sort of research is necessary to establish employment security policy for elderly workers. In addition, Kim, S. (2005) pointed out that in the process of rapid urbanization, the economic activity participation of urban seniors was dealt with carelessly, and cited numerous programs of the manpower utilization policy on urban elderly populations.

Overall, we have examined elderly employment and employment relationship research trends. On a national level, studies on elderly employment and the labor market have made considerable accomplishments; however, at a regional level, research has made little headway. As it stands, little progress has been made on studies of elderly employment at the city and regional levels. The study of the employment structure of seniors in the Seoul area will help regional-level micro-operations in understanding job assistance, and also in preparing specific corresponding policy on senior workers.

III. Research Methods For this study, the major research method used was a statistical analysis of practices, corporate interviews, and an analysis of source material from the Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely.

190 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

First, we analyzed the data from the Population and Housing Census taken between 1975 and 2005 to determine changes in the aging of Seoul’s population and the characteristics of the census data. The research was based in Seoul’s administrative district and has remained largely unchanged since 1975. By calculating the aging index and longevity index, the two figures confirmed the time series change of the aging of the population and the regional differentiation in Seoul. In addition to this material on the elderly population ratio, each district of Seoul was divided into three levels. In addition the polarization and employment opportunities of elderly employment were utilized to analyze the statistics.

Second, information obtained from the Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely was used to specifically analyze companies that are hiring, job seekers, and those who were employed. Beginning in 1992, the Elderly Job Placement Center was commissioned by the city of Seoul to administer 12 private institutions (non-profit corporations). Currently it operates 16 elderly job placement centers in Seoul. In this study, employers that provided positions through job placement centers were utilized to analyze companies and the job-hunting activities of seniors. Accordingly, source material was gathered during a roughly one-year period in 2005 to conduct an analysis of employers, job seekers, and the employed. In addition, basic information on the elderly—their residence, education, occupation, and employers—was analyzed. Raw data for the statistical analysis of senior citizens of Seoul was obtained from one of the job placement centers. However, as there are a variety of job search routes used by seniors aside from just job placement centers, this data is of limited use in accurately reflecting the actual conditions of employment for the elderly. In particular, professionals and managerial workers tend to, at a high rate, take advantage of employment pathways other than job placement centers. There is a tendency to lean too heavily toward centers of employment as the means of finding work. These limitations notwithstanding, the amount of job offers for the elderly in Seoul and the accumulation of detailed job search material were not extensive enough and, therefore, the aforementioned material was utilized for the study.

Third, to identify more specifically the present status of elderly employment management, interviews were conducted at businesses located in Gangnamgu, Seocho-gu, Jongro-gu, and Jung-gu that employed the elderly. Targeted

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~ 191

interviews were conducted with representatives from six employers: K nurseries (education field), S delivery service company, N dental craftwork (delivery service), S safety systems (security firms), etc.

IV. Regional Characteristics of the Elderly Population in Seoul The elderly population is increasing at a rapid pace, but there is little research on the changes in aging in urban and individual provinces. If the 2005 elderly ratio for South Korea as a whole is closely examined, Seoul’s elderly ratio of 43.9% is not particularly high, whereas the elderly ratios of provinces such as Gyeonggi and Incheon, respectively at 33.8% and 35.1%, are notably low (Table 2). If you compare these figures to those from the period prior to the start of the aging issue, the age ratio in Seoul was lower than that of Gyeonggi/ Incheon provinces in 1980 and 1990. After 2000, however, it can be seen to rise. That is to say that from 1990 to 2000, Seoul rapidly changed from being a ‘young city’ to an ‘old city’. Unlike Seoul, in 1980, Gyeonggi province showed almost the same aging index as the standard national average and, in 2005, compared to the national average and Seoul, displayed a much lower figure.

Incheon, like Gyeonggi province, has also shown a similar trend in changes.

In order to find a way to differentiate the development of aging populations within various areas in Seoul, both the age index and longevity index were used. The ‘aging index’ represents the ratio of the elderly population aged 65 and over to the population under 15 years of age. The ‘longevity index’ is the ratio of the population over 85 years to the population aged 65 and over (Park, S. etc. 2005a). Compared to the overall ratio of the elderly population to the Table 2. Trends in Changes of Aged/Child Ratio Index in Metropolitan Areas Whole country Seoul Gyeonggi-do Incheon

1980

1990

2000

2005

11.2 8.0 11.5 9.2

20.0 13.8 16.2 14.3

34.3 29.3 24.2 23.8

48.6 43.9 33.8 35.1

Source: National Statistical Office, each year, the Population and Housing Census.

192 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

total population, the aging index helps to understand the overall and dynamic changes, and population supports, and is the most readily perceivable indexe of society’s assistance to the populace. The longevity index is able to identify more specific changes in the structure of the population within members of the population over the age of 65.

In order to examine the elderly population of the districts of Seoul through a time series, population data from 1975 and 2005 were used, and the aging index and longevity index of each district was compared (Table 3). There was little difference in the aging index and longevity index of the districts in Seoul in 1975. On the other hand, by 2005, definite differences had appeared.

Looking first at the 1975 aging index, Jongno-gu, Jung-gu and Mapo-gu were the highest. As one heads toward the periphery of Seoul, a declining trend becomes evident. In 2005, the state of regional differences was clear.

Yet looking at the standard deviation, from 1975’s 0.98 to 2005’s 11.22, the deveiation grew larger. In Seoul, regional distinctions of aging deepened; the aging index increased sevenfold from 6.57 to 47.03, while the standard deviation increased by more than elevenfold. The aging indexes for the districts in the central part of the city (Jongno-gu, Jung-gu and Yongsangu) represent 60 and over. As we move outward from the city center into the adjacent districts of Seodaemun-gu, Mapo-gu, Gangbuk-gu, Seongbuk-gu, Dongdaemun-gu, and Dongjak-gu, an aging indexes show 50-60. Moving out even further, in the 7 districts of Eunpyeong-gu, Dobong-gu, Jungnanggu, Seongdong-gu, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Gwanak-gu, and Seocho-gu, the aging indexes decrese to 40 to 50. In the districts located in the outskirts of the city: Gangseo-gu, Yangcheon-gu, Guro-gu, Geumcheon-gu, Nowongu, Gangdong-gu, Gwangjin-gu, Songpa-gu, etc., an aging index even more decrease to 30 to 40. In other words, as one gets closer to the city center, the elderly population—compared to the youth population—rises, creating an ‘older urban’ phenomenon. For the past 30 years, this has been the case because there has not been sufficient residential space in the city’s central districts for young adults and middle-aged people. It can be deduced that the low youth population is due to the lower percentage in the middleaged parenting generation. In the central area of the city, which is where many seniors reside, redevelopment has been poor. The elderly, who possess relatively low economic power, reside in underdeveloped residential areas

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~â&#x20AC;&#x192; 193

Table 3. Comparison of Aged/Child Ratio Index and Longevity Degree by Gu of Seoul 1975 Gu

2005

Aged/ Longevity Child Ratio Degree Index

Gu

Aged/ Elderly Longevity Child Ratio Population Degree Index Ratio

Jongno-gu

8.73

3.30

Jongno-gu

71.91

6.11

10.27

Jung-gu

7.59

2.85

Jung-gu

68.23

5.14

9.71

Yongsan-gu

6.90

2.46

Yongsan-gu

68.04

4.88

9.93

Seongdong-gu

5.63

2.63

Seongdong-gu Gwangjin-gu

46.98 37.19

4.83 5.08

7.72 6.14

Dongdaemun-gu

6.14

2.62

Dongdaemun-gu Jungnang-gu

56.41 41.68

4.53 5.16

8.50 7.11

Seongbuk-gu

6.99

2.94

Seongbuk-gu

53.09

4.75

8.54

Dobong-gu

5.98

2.44

Gangbuk-gu Dobong-gu Nowon-gu

54.40 42.35 37.27

4.99 5.14 5.40

8.79 7.57 7.18

Seodaemun-gu

6.59

2.87

Eunpyeong-gu Seodaemun-gu

48.28 58.46

5.11 4.53

8.30 9.08

Mapo-gu

7.19

2.73

Mapo-gu

51.40

4.77

8.12

30.56 37.79 38.55 38.95 46.51

5.32 5.88 5.05 5.04 4.82

5.94 6.57 6.53 6.68 7.52

Yeongdeungpo-gu

5.23

2.20

Yangcheon-gu Gangseo-gu Guro-gu Geumcheon-gu Yeongdeungpo-gu

Gwanak-gu

5.70

2.45

Dongjak-gu Gwanak-gu

50.29 45.29

5.23 4.83

7.63 6.48

40.45 39.55 33.33 33.88

6.83 7.35 6.06 5.97

6.25 5.69 5.75 5.85

Gangnam-gu

6.24

2.69

Seocho-gu Gangnam-gu Songpa-gu Gangdong-gu

Seoul

6.27

2.65

Seoul

43.90

5.29

7.24

Average

6.57

2.68

Average

47.03

5.31

7.51

Median

6.41

2.66

Median

46.51

5.11

7.98

Standard Deviation

0.98

0.29

Standard Deviation

11.22

0.69

1.36

Notes: Located data of gu in 1975 for matching gu system in 2005.

Criterion of Elderly population ratio is 65 years old and older.

Source: National Statistical Office, each year, the Population and Housing Census.

194â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

in which lower housing prices and rents have been maintained. In addition, the central areas of the city offer the easy accessibility compared to the outer districts. Because of this, the elderly, who are so reliant on public transportation to get around due to their poor mobility, did not migrate to the outer edges of the city. For the elderly with limited economic means, accessibility is an important factor.

Next, we will examine the geographical changes in longevity index in each of the districts. In 1975, there was not a significant difference between the regions, showing values of 2~3, except for Jongno-gu. However, in 2005, there is a distinct difference among the districts showing the standard deviation of the longevity index increased from 0.29 in 1975 to 0.69 by 2005, indicating a 2.38-fold increase. This increase is not as significant as that of the aging index, but longevity index provides a clear geographic differentiation. The districts with the highest degree of longevity index in 2005 are Gangnam-gu, Seochogu, and Songpa-gu. In addition, the longevity of Jongno-gu in the downtown area has also risen and so the city center and the Gangnam areas have been disticnt from the rest of the districts. The remaining districts: Gangseo-gu, Yangcheon-gu, Guro-gu, Geumcheon-gu, Dobong-gu, Nowon-gu, Jungnanggu, Gwangjin-gu, and Gangdong-gu, with longevity indexes of 5-6, seem to display a certain geographic pattern. Meanwhile, the 8 urban districts outlying those: Seodaemun-gu, Mapo-gu, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Yongsan-gu, Seongdonggu, Dongdaemun-gu, Seongbuk-gu, and Gangbuk-gu show a lower longevity level of 3-4. This means that except the downtown areas such as Jongno-gu and Jung-gu, the elderly population over 85 yearsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;show higher proportion in outlying areas.

In order to compare the geographical differential of the aging index and longevity index, maps based on data from 2005 were used (Figure 1). Jongnogu, as a representative of central areas, shows high levels in both the aging index and longevity index. Except in one area, it generally shows that the distribution of the aging index and longevity index are opposed. In other words, compared to nearby central areas (mid-area), the aging index of the outer districts was a bit lower, whereas the longevity index of outer districts was higher than that of mid-areas. The significance of this contrast is that the mid-area districts near the city center are not an appropriate living area for seniors 85 and older. In addition, the ratio of seniors 85 and older cohabiting

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~â&#x20AC;&#x192; 195

(a) Aged/Child Ratio Index

(b) Longevity Degree Figure 1. Aged/Child Ratio Index and Longevity Degree of Seoul by Gu (2005).

196 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

with adolescent generations is high. The ratio is even higher for the outskirts of the city’s residential districts. Therefore, there is no conflict in the low aging index and comparatively high longevity index found in the outer districts of Seoul.

The aging index, longevity, and elderly population ratios were based on averages (m) + 1 standard deviation (σ), with each sphere being classified into three levels: upper, middle, and lower (Table 4). As noted earlier, the aging index, longevity index, and elderly population ratio in Jongno-gu are among the highest. In the urban center districts of Jung-gu, Yongsan-gu, and Table 4. Classification of Gu of Seoul based on standard deviation of Aged/Child Ratio Index and Longevity Degree (2005) Criterion Aged/Child Ratio Index

Longevity Degree

Elderly Population Ratio

Jongno-gu, JungClass X≥m+1σ gu, Yongsan-gu, I Seodaemun-gu

Gangnam-gu, Seocho- Jongno-gu, Yongsangu, Jongno-gu, Songpa- gu, Jung-gu, gu Seodaemun-gu

Dongdaemun-gu, Gangbuk-gu, Seongbuk-gu, Mapo-gu, Dongjak-gu, Eunpyeong-gu, Seongdong-gu, Class m–1σ≤ Yeongdeungpo-gu, II X<m+1σ Gwanak-gu, Dobong-gu, Jungnang-gu, Seochogu, Gangnam-gu, Geumcheon-gu, Gurogu, Gangseo-gu, Nowongu, Gwangjin-gu

Gangdong-gu, Gangseo-gu, Nowongu, Yangcheon-gu, Dongjak-gu, Jungnanggu, Jung-gu, Dobonggu, Eunpyeong-gu, Gwangjin-gu, Gurogu, Geumcheon-gu, Gangbuk-gu, Yongsangu, Seongdonggu, Gwanak-gu, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Mapo-gu, Seongbuk-gu

Gangdong-gu, Songpa- Seodaemun-gu, Class X<m–1σ gu, Yangcheon-gu Dongdaemun-gu III Notes: “X” means Aged/Child Ratio Index of each gu. “m” means average and “σ” means standard deviation.

Sorted in descending order.

Gangbuk-gu, Seongbuk-gu, Dongdaemun-gu, Eunpyeong-gu, Mapo-gu, Seongdonggu, Dongjak-gu, Dobong-gu, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Nowon-gu, Jungnanggu, Geumcheon-gu, Gangseo-gu, Gurogu, Gwanak-gu, Seocho-gu Gwangjin-gu, Yangcheon-gu, Gangdong-gu, Songpa-gu, Gangnam-gu

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~ 197

Seodaemun-gu, the aging index and elderly population ratio are especially high (m + 1σ greater). As well as Jongno-gu, other regions with high rates of longevity (m + 1σ greater) are Gangnam-gu, Seocho-gu and Songpa-gu.

Lower aging index areas (m – 1σ lesser) are Seoul’s outer districts such as Gangdong-gu, Songpa-gu, and Yangcheon-gu. Meanwhile, sub-regions in the downtown area with lower longevity index(m – 1σ lesser) are Dongdaemungu and Seodaemun-gu.

We would like to discuss a mechanism based on distinctions between layers among the districts of Seoul that show strong regional characteristics in the aging index and longevity index. In Jongno-gu, Yongsan-gu, etc., the elderly population ratio is shown to be considerably advanced at over 9%.

Meanwhile Gangnam-gu, Seocho-gu and Songpa-gu, have not yet entered the stage of an ‘aging society’ as their elderly population ratios have yet to reach 7%. Representative elderly population ratios like those of [Jongno-gu/ Jung-gu/Yongsan-gu] and [Gangnam-gu/Seocho-gu] were studied by adding [Guro-gu/Geumcheon-gu] which are therepresentative industrial areas of Seoul. The aging index and longevity index of these three areas show a characteristic pattern. The elderly population ratio of the southeastern part of Seoul [Gangnam-gu/Seocho-gu] is lower than in any other district. However, in the aging index of the medium-level (Class II), the longevity index shows high level areas (Class I). In the central districts of Seoul, Jongno-gu/Jung-gu/ Yongsan-gu, there is a high percentage of the elderly population; yet while the aging index is high, the level of longevity is only moderate. The southwestern districts of Seoul [Guro-gu/Geumcheon-gu] all display a medium-level (Class II) in all three indexes. If the aging index and longevity index are standardized, the three regions show a clear geographic differentiation (Figure 2).

The aging index of [Jongno-gu/Jung-gu/Yongsan-gu] has risen sharply compared to what it was in 1975. In 2005, it was nearly twice the average.

Longevity index, however, showed little increase. In 1975, Jongno-gu, in particular, had the highest longevity level in Seoul; however, its longevity level was comparatively lower than that of [Gangnam-gu/Seocho-gu] in 2005. In addition, the tegion of high aging index has, over the past 30 years, excluded redevelopment of the downtown Seoul area, contributing to the relatively low influx of new middle-class families. Unlike in 1975, [Gangnam-gu/Seocho-

198 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Figure 2. Standardized Aged/Child Ratio Index and Longevity Degree of Major Regions in Seoul.

gu] in 2005 had the highest longevity in Seoul. On the other hand, we can see that there has been a continuous inflow of new populations and that the aging index has stayed average. From an economic perspective, the area’s high proportion of middle/upper class and the continuous influx of young people since the 1990s into the area have made it the new economic center of Seoul.

In 1975, [Guro-gu/Geumcheon-gu] was part of Yeongdeungpo-gu. It was also a young region, with the lowest aging index in Seoul. In 1980, however, Guro-gu was split from Yeongdeungpo-gu and established as a separate district. At this time the aging index was calculated at 5.95—the lowest level.

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~â&#x20AC;&#x192; 199

The industrial and employment structures with specializing in manufacturing in the Guro Industrial Park are attributed to the large population of young workers in the 1970-1980s. Since the 1990s, traditional labor-intensive industries have declined. In 2005, together with residential features, new industries began to be revived, with the aging index, longevity index, and elderly population ratio index of [Guro-gu/Geumcheon-gu] falling into the middle level (Class II). On the other hand, based on their aging indexes and their percentages of elderly population, Gangdong-gu, Songpa-gu and Yangcheon-gu have emerged as young (Class III) regions.

Thus far, the intensification of regional differentiation of agingtaking place in Seoul has been discussed. With the growing increase in population aging, the aging index and longevity index are also on the rise. However, even in Seoul, that aspect appears to differ depending on the area. This fact is an important consideration because the aging-related policies established by the city must approach each area of the issue differently, particularly with respect to the employment of the elderly.

V. The Regional Characteristics of Elderly Employment in Seoul 1. The Status of Elderly Employment In order to grasp the characteristics of the state of elderly employment in Seoul, we must first examine the changes in occupational distribution nationwide and in other metropolitan areas (Table 5). From 1980 through Table 5. Trends in Changes of Employment Ratio of the Elderly Over the Age of 60 Unit: % Year Whole country Seoul Incheon Gyeonggi-do

1980

1990

2000

2005

31.3 12.8 25.4

28.4 13.6 14.3 22.3

31.9 19.8 19.2 23.4

29.7 19.8 18.9 22.1

Source: National Statistical Office, each year, the Population and Housing Census.

200 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 6. Occupational Distribution of the Elderly Aged 65 and Older

Type

Unit: %

Agricultural, Professionals Service Sales Forestry Elementary and Workers Workers and Fishery Workers Managers Workers

Whole country

All Ages 65 and older

13.5 4.0

9.7 2.8

11.0 6.0

10.6 70.0

7.5 10.5

Seoul

All Ages 65 and older

18.0 16.3

10.4 6.9

13.7 14.6

0.3 1.7

7.8 32.4

Incheon

All Ages 65 and older

11.4 6.3

9.9 5.1

11.6 10.6

2.4 33.6

8.2 27.0

Gyeonggi- All Ages do 65 and older

14.5 7.2

9.3 3.6

10.5 6.6

4.5 48.5

7.4 21.5

Notes: All Ages means employees who are 15 years old and over.

Extracted 5 major classifications from general course classifications of occupations.

Source: National Statistical Office, 2007, 2005, the Population and Housing Census.

2005, the national employment ratio of the elderly over the age of 60 did not change significantly. On the other hand, Seoul experienced high growth in the number of ‘working elderly’, which is indicated by the increase in the ratio of 12.8% in 1980 to 19.8% in 2005. Compared to the Gyeonggi/Incheon regions, this ratio is high. It can be deduced that the reason why there was no significant change in the nation’s elderly employment ratio of 30% after 1980 was the relative reduction in the agricultural sector and the expansion of employment in other professions that helped to offset the effects. Therefore, the expansion of elderly employment in the Seoul region will be explained through the distribution of jobs.

If the occupational distribution of the elderly aged 65 and older in 2005 is examined, a relative polarization phenomena of employment in the Seoul area clearly emerges (Table 6). Compared to the rest of the nation, Seoul appears to have a polarized structure, with a much higher ratio of professional, managerial, and general employment positions. Considering that the distortion by the ratio of agricultural and fishery industries, Seoul has a higher proportion of managerial and general labor jobs than other city

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~ 201

areas. If the occupational distributions and comparisons of everyone aged 15 and older are examined, Seoul’s ratio of 18.0% of the population aged 15 and older working in the professional and managerial sectors is similar to the ratio of elderly people. That is to say, Seoul has specialized in professional and managerial jobs and that characteristic is also shown in senior citizens in Seoul. However, in the case of elementary worker, there is a large difference.

The ratio of the elementary worker of overall age group stands at 7.8% while that of elderly workers aged 65 and over makes up 32.4%. It can be said that this concentration of Seoul’s elderly employees in elementary worker is a characteristic of the elederly people in Seoul wich is different from the other age groups. Such a polarization of employees in the Seoul region cannot be said to be a phenomenon uniqueonly to elderly workers. An important phenomenon of elderly employment is that the distribution of positions held by the elderly is not spread across various occupations, but is biased toward particular sectors. These positions are particularly concentrated in elementary workers that have poor working conditions and low wages, which shows that job choices for the elderly are limited.

It is now time to examine the employment opportunities of Seoul’s senior workers. To this end, the unemployment age level (the unemployment ratio of the economically active population) could be used, but there is a problem in identifying the job opportunities for seniors. There is a method for calculating the unemployment ratio of the economically active population and of individuals not actively seeking work at the time of the investigation. In the case of the elderly who are treated as non- economically active members of the population, the ratio is high and, therefore, the unemployment ratio is identified as low and suggests the employment of the eldery is not a problem.

Because information on substantial employment opportunities for seniors is easily misplaced, this study utilizes all population census materials to derive the employment opportunities of the elderly. In Table 7, ‘the ratio of failure to find work’ of the many unemployed elderly attempting to find work, many are ultimately unable to secure employment.1 As they get older, the likelihood 1

The Population and Housing Census>gender/economic activity/age - elderly statistics - overall, elderly are divided into workers and the unemployed, cases of the unemployed looking for work again, and those not seeking reemployment.

202 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 7. Economic Activity Conditions of the Aged

Unit: thousand people

the Unemployed Ratio of Number Failure Finding Work (C) Not of Employees to Find Success to Failure to Finding Work People (B) Find Work Find Work Work (A) C-2/ (D) (C-1) (C-2) B+(C-2) Whole country

Seoul

All Ages 37,405 (15 and older)

19,277

877

1,402

15,840

6.8%

60~64

1,890

799

31

73

986

8.4%

65 and older

4,367

1,058

24

135

3,150

11.3%

All Ages (15 and older)

8,013

4,003

205

305

3,496

7.1%

60~64

402

135

8

18

241

11.6%

65 and older

711

85

7

26

593

23.4%

Source: National Statistical Office, 2007, 2005, the Population and Housing Census.

of elderly persons not finding work increases. Compared to the nation as a whole, the elderly in Seoul have a particularly high rate of failure in finding Those who looked for work but are not working are divided into two groups: those who can find a job and those who cannot find a job. In the housing census of the population, those who can and can’t work are marked as ‘Able to work’, and ‘Unable to work’. The former means that one could work, but chose to remain unemployed.

Because this is voluntary unemployment, these people are not included among the economically active population. Included among the latter group (Unable to work), the reason for being unable to work does not appear clearly, nor is it revealed how actively an individual continued to seek employment. As such, these individuals are highly likely to be treated as part of the non-economically active population in the official unemployment statistics. ‘Employment activity among the unemployed and those people unable to work’ and ‘Those who fail to find work ‘(unemployed)’ are assumed, the ratio of employment failure is to be ‘employment failures’ / ‘employed + employment failures’. The results of this ratio are referred to as employment failures.

In this case, the aggressiveness of the unemployed individual’s job search activity is strictly approximated and shows itself to be statistically higher. However, for practical and informed decisions about elderly employment conditions, determining the employment failure rate is a stronger method.

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~ 203

work. This is because when appropriate opportunities are afforded, there is a high volume of applicants in competition for “potential” economic activity.

This is especially true among Seoul’s population aged 65 and over. When compared to the populace of those aged 60-64, they are shown to have a much higher rate of failure in finding employment. Still, this finding does indicate that many older people are entering the labor market and looking for work.

2. An Analysis of Places that Employ the Elderly and Job Seekers First, in order to analyze the places that employ the elderly, raw data of 3,784 cases from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely was separated by occupation and analyzed (Table 8). Elementary worker job (involving household work, cleaning services, repair and maintenance tasks, delivery services, and grounds keeping duties, etc.), at 82.4%, accounted for the vast majority of the labor force. However, when considering that among Seoul’s elderly workers aged 65 and over, 32.4% were unemployed elementary workers, we see that the job activities of these employment centers are focused on employment in elementary work occupations. Professional and managerial positions are virtually nonexistent. This means that professional and managerial jobs are attained by the elderly by different means. Many educational jobs are nursery or performing arts instructors positions.

Occupations that require high educational level such as educators, survey researchers, or media-related occupations that involve older-aged models, etc., remain very limited in number. Looking at the distribution of distinct employment sites, more than 200 jobs are located in the Gangnam-gu, Dongdaemun-gu, Seocho-gu, Yangcheon-gu, Yoido, Jongno-gu, and Jung-gu regions. These areas are geared toward business/employment operations, or both, rather than being typical residential areas.

Jobs that hire a lot of elderly persons are those that are especially preferred by the elderly. Within the delivery and dental laboratory industries, elderly delivery jobs represent a typical case. Much of the employment activity occurs through elderly employment career centers. In the case of S Delivery Corporation, an elderly specialized delivery service in Jung-gu, the average employee is over the age of 65, with the oldest worker being 86. Its headquarter is located in

Elementary Workers

Unit: The Number of Job

0

0

Total

ratio(%)

4.1

155

6 6 5 67 0 19 0 0 2 0 4 0 2 3 7 5 5 0 1 1 0 6 6 0 3 7

8 6 7 68 1 20 0 0 2 1 5 0 2 5 7 6 6 1 4 1 0 7 7 0 3 15

0.7 4.8

27 182

2 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 8

0.5

19

1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 5 1 0 0 0 0 2.4

91

12 12 8 4 3 1 0 3 0 1 1 1 3 1 7 0 3 2 9 0 2 5 11 0 0 2 5.3

200

7 20 18 7 1 5 1 4 2 1 2 1 12 5 39 8 10 1 5 6 10 11 15 4 1 4 1.6

62

4 1 2 0 0 4 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 5 10 4 9 0 1 0 0 6 7 0 0 2 0

0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4

14

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 1 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.2

47

6 3 2 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 2 2 7 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 2 1 6.8

258

7 12 17 12 4 9 1 14 2 2 7 6 5 3 39 20 9 0 4 8 3 28 28 6 6 6

58 55 69 15 34 43 2 7 9 5 70 12 38 43 131 55 42 34 148 48 26 97 172 46 13 35

38 129 33 27 23 53 3 5 0 0 16 8 12 22 18 3 20 1 69 28 25 18 25 5 18 2

3 1 167 2 207 14 9 299 1 342 0 0 140 12 190 2 0 65 1 152 2 1 70 1 77 25 10 168 1 200 0 1 18 0 20 0 1 32 0 39 1 0 19 1 27 4 0 43 0 49 2 1 151 1 166 0 0 29 1 32 0 2 102 3 125 7 2 89 1 110 13 2 224 1 294 1 1 100 1 122 15 9 106 0 143 1 1 46 0 52 13 6 286 3 315 9 2 123 1 135 10 0 76 0 94 16 3 214 11 256 30 5 351 2 396 4 0 81 2 87 0 2 48 0 54 9 4 72 4 100

5.5 9.0 5.0 4.0 2.0 5.3 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.3 4.4 0.8 3.3 2.9 7.8 3.2 3.8 1.4 8.3 3.6 2.5 6.8 10.5 2.3 1.4 2.6 18.7 34.5 15.9 4.8 1.7 82.4 1.3 100

â&#x20AC;&#x192;

709 1,307 601 181 63 3,119 50 3,784 100

60 80 21 9 6 28 11 5 7 32 55 3 45 12 21 20 11 9 46 28 12 52 91 20 9 16

Note: This table represents the distribution of occupations in job offers by gu.

Specific jobs are transformed by general classifications of occupations.

Source: Complied and computed by authors based on internal source from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Elderly in 2005.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Agricultural, EquipProporManTechService Sales Forestry Craft Clerks ment HouseDeli- SweeSub- Etc. Total tion agers Educa- Etc. Sub- nician Workers Workers and Fishery Workers Workers hold Clean Guard verers pers Etc. total (%) tion total Workers Chores

Jongno-gu Jung-gu Yongsan-gu Seongdong-gu Gwangjin-gu Dongdaemun-gu Jungnang-gu Seongbuk-gu Gangbuk-gu Dobong-gu Nowon-gu Eunpyeong-gu Seodaemun-gu Mapo-gu Yangcheon-gu Gangseo-gu Guro-gu Geumcheon-gu Yeongdeungpo-gu Dongjak-gu Gwanak-gu Seocho-gu Gangnam-gu Songpa-gu Gangdong-gu Etc.

Occupational Category

Professionals

Table 8. Distribution of Jobs from Job Offerers by Gu and by Occupations

204â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~â&#x20AC;&#x192; 205

Jung-gu, Seoul, with offices in Gangnam, Jamsil, Yeongdeungpo, and Ilsan. It has a total of 100 elderly employees and is currently hiring elderly couriers.

The ratio of elderly men and women employed here is around 8:2 and their monthly income is generally 500,000~600,000 won, but in many cases, over one million won. The average worker has a high school diploma or higher, with many coming from educated and senior-level backgrounds and having held positions such as television directors, city administrators and army officers in the past. Elderly couriers make over five deliveries a day, with the company as a whole making anywhere from 200-300 deliveries. Deliveries mainly consist of small, lightweight items like flowers, gifts, documents, etc.

In the Jongno-gu and Jung-gu districts, there are 3-4 delivery offices. In the Seoul metropolitan area, there is an estimated elderly delivery staff of about 1,000 people.

The companyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s location provides it with a fertile market of elderly laborers and the attractive combination of numerous companies and customers, as well as easy traffic conditions. For the most part, the elderly who live with family are employed and are highly educated people who have previously worked hard in society. It is said they are diligent and adapt quickly. The elderly find out about these delivery jobs through job placement centers and such, and also through various media or directly from family members.

N Dental Laboratory was established in Gangnam-gu in 2005, and one in four of its workers are in their late 60s. While they are only temporary workers, their monthly salary is around 400,000-500,000 won, with an additional 100,000-200,000 won given as a separate travel stipend. Currently, public transportation for the elderly is free. The wages of the elderly are often only 600 to 700 thousand won per month, but can also be as much as 800,000 won. From the perspective of employers, the biggest reason for preferring to hire the elderly is their very low turnover rate; one current elderly employee has worked at the company for more than 10 years. Usually there are many elderly workers among the delivery personnel at dental laboratories. Among these, many are highly educated or have a great deal of business experience.

Many of these elderly live together with family, with a small proportion of them living alone. In the case of a large dental laboratory, there are around 11 to 12 employees, and on average 1 or 2 are senior citizens. Elderly job seekers were put to work through the Senior Workforce Development Center, which

206 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 9. Distribution of Job Seekers by Age Age

55~59

60~64

65~69

70~74

75~79

80 and older

Total

Number(Persons) Proportion (%)

854 18.0

1,510 31.7

1,632 34.3

619 13.0

114 2.4

27 0.6

4,756 100.0

Source: C omplied and computed by authors based on internal source from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely in 2005.

is associated with the City Office, and by receiving introductions from senior staff or from relatives of employees, and through social networks.

Next, analysis was conducted based on data from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely, with a total of 4,756 elderly job seekers being targeted.

The analysis of the work sites shows that 82.4% of the positions are in the category of elementary worker employment, compared to the 78.0% of job seekers who are hoping to find elementary worker employment. For job seekers, security management, cleaning, and laundry positions account for the majority of available positions. Except for these elementary worker employment options, there is little else. In some districts the proportion of jobs isn’t large, but in others, where there are professional-level job seekers, there are a handful of education and technical positions. If we look at the distribution of job seekers aged 60 to 69, they account for a large number, 66.0%, while job seekers aged 70 to 79 account for 15.4% (Table 9). An analysis of the distribution of education shows that more than half, 50.2%, of job seekers appear to have a high school education. Regarding regional differentiation, the elderly residing in the Gangnam region [Gangnam-gu/ Seocho-gu] appear to have significantly higher income and education levels, with over 30% of the region’s populace being college graduates, compared to the overall average for Seoul of 13.0% (Table 10). Excluding the Gangnam district, most of the spheres before and after indicate a 10% ratio of college graduates. However, as previously seen, the occupational composition of employment does little to alter the distinction. The overall elementary worker ratio of the Seoul metropolitan area stands at 82.4%, with Gangnam-gu at 88.6%, Seocho-gu at 83.6%, and Songpa-gu having a somewhat higher average of 93.1%. Therefore, jobs for the elderly are centered on elementary worker regardless of level of education, with a clear mismatch between the

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~ 207

Table 10. Distribution of Aged Job Seekers in Gangnam Region by Levels of Education Below High school Graduates

High school Graduates

Junior College Graduates and

University Graduates and Above

Number Propor- Number Propor- Number Propor- Number Propor(Persons) tion (%) (Persons) tion (%) (Persons) tion (%) (Persons) tion (%) Gangnam-gu Seocho-gu Songpa-gu Seoul

44 53 22 2,370

35.8 30.5 30.6 49.8

40 64 28 1,619

32.5 36.8 38.9 34.0

1 3 1 151

0.8 1.7 1.4 3.2

38 54 21 616

30.9 31.0 29.2 13.0

Total (Persons)

123 174 72 4,756

Source: C omplied and computed by authors based on internal source from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely in 2005.

demand and supply of manpower in the district being evident.

The job sites and job seekers looked at earlier were distinguished by comparing the distribution. The supply and demand of jobs was investigated geographically (Table 11). The districts with comparatively numerous job sites and job openings were Gangnam-gu, Seocho-gu, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Jung-gu, and Yangcheon-gu (the district which is more than 6% of the total percentage of the Seoul metropolitan area’s job sites). On the other hand, many job seekers come from densely populated low-income residential areas such as Nowon-gu, Gwanak-gu, Gangseo-gu, and Eunpyeong-gu (the district which is more than 6% of the total percentage of job seekers in the Seoul metropolitan area). In other words, in these areas, economic necessity drives a high proportion of the elderly population to seek out employment. The job search activities carried out through elderly employment placement centers are proactive when you consider that elderly people have greater difficulty finding jobs in those areas than in other regions.

When looking at the ratio of job opportunities and job seekers, there appears to be a conspicuous phenomenon of regional bias. According to the elderly employment placement centers analyzed in this research, the ratio of job seekers across Seoul is 1.26% of the population. Districts of an index of more than 5 are Gangbuk-gu, Seongbuk-gu, Eunpyeong-gu and Jungnanggu being the most residential districts in Seoul—offer little employment and are relatively poor income regions. When compared to the aging of the population seen in the prior regions of [Jongno-gu/Jung-gu/Yongsan-gu] and

208 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 11. Distribution of Job Seekers and Job Offerers by Gu Job Seekers

Job Offerers

Job Seekers/ Proportion in Job Offerers Proportion in Number Number Job Offerers of Job Seekers of Index (Persons) (Persons) Seoul (%) Seoul (%) Jongno-gu Jung-gu Yongsan-gu Seongdong-gu Gwangjin-gu Dongdaemun-gu Jungnang-gu Seongbuk-gu Gangbuk-gu Dobong-gu Nowon-gu Eunpyeong-gu Seodaemun-gu Mapo-gu Yangcheon-gu Gangseo-gu Guro-gu Geumcheon-gu Yeongdeungpo-gu Dongjak-gu Gwanak-gu Seocho-gu Gangnam-gu Songpa-gu Gangdong-gu Etc. Total

96 109 180 193 81 223 101 220 153 135 447 300 270 145 280 367 204 83 201 169 329 174 123 72 50 51

2.02 2.29 3.78 4.06 1.70 4.69 2.12 4.63 3.22 2.84 9.40 6.31 5.68 3.05 5.89 7.72 4.29 1.75 4.23 3.55 6.92 3.66 2.59 1.51 1.05 1.07

207 342 190 152 77 200 20 39 27 49 166 32 125 110 294 122 143 52 315 135 94 256 396 87 54 100

5.47 9.04 5.02 4.02 2.03 5.29 0.53 1.03 0.71 1.29 4.39 0.85 3.30 2.91 7.77 3.22 3.78 1.37 8.32 3.57 2.48 6.77 10.47 2.30 1.43 2.64

0.46 0.32 0.95 1.27 1.05 1.12 5.05 5.64 5.67 2.76 2.69 9.38 2.16 1.32 0.95 3.01 1.43 1.60 0.64 1.25 3.50 0.68 0.31 0.83 0.93 0.51

4,756

100

3,784

100

1.26

Source: C omplied and computed by authors based on internal source from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely in 2005

[Gangnam-gu/Seocho-gu], the index of job seekers/job sites is less than 1, while of [Guro-gu/Geumcheon-gu], the index is higher than 1 which belongs to the middle level. Despite the limitations of the data, the ‘job seekers/ job sites’ index shows geographically how the employment opportunities

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~â&#x20AC;&#x192; 209

Figure 3. Distribution of Ratio of Job Seekers to Job Offerers.

differentiate within Seoul as seen in (Figure 3).

3. Analysis of the Characteristics of Elderly Employment Material on 3,688 elderly people from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely was analyzed. This material is based on the percentage of employees to job seekers, with a 70% level appearing and the attainment of employment occurring smoothly with the assistance of the centers. The analysis of job sites and job seekers along with the characteristics of workers may account for the majority of elementary worker jobs. If the high-income areas and large-scale apartment complexes had more employees, a greater demand for building janitors and cleaning jobs would appear. However, the parking garages in Seocho-gu require a lot of senior manpower. In the case of building management and security services, apartment and security services account for the majority of jobs, with parking management service also contributing some positions. In the case of services, nannies, health care workers and restaurant workers make up the majority, with no significant difference between them and elementary worker positions. In the case of professionals, education related or non-education related, compared to job seekers overall, the number of employed individuals was particularly high. When the

210â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 12. Distribution of Job Seekers and Employees by Levels of Education Job Seekers

Employees

High school Junior College High school Junior College Graduates and Below Graduates and Above Graduates and Below Graduates and Above 3,989(persons) 83.9%

767(persons) 16.1%

2,902(persons) 78.7%

786(persons) 21.3%

Source: C omplied and computed by authors based on internal source from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely in 2005.

employed ratio is examined by the education level, the high employed ratio compared to job seekers for high educated people shows that workers with higher education have an easier time finding work (Table 12).

On the other hand, as seen earlier, job distribution will be discussed based on job sites, elderly workers and job seeker data (Table 13). Looking at the characteristics, there is a comparatively higher percentage of professional workers to job sites and job seekers. The ratio of professional workers was 14.9% to the low 2.8% ratio of job seekers, and 4.9% job sites (open positions).

Many positions are education-related, and there are many professional positions, but few are high-paying. Among the many professional jobs are education-related positions such as those in daycare centers, private institutes, preschools, etc. These job sites seek to hire the elderly. While the positions offered at these sites are relatively low paying, there is high job satisfaction as indicated by the low turnover rate. According to the interviews conducted during this study, education industry employers do not fill positions directly; instead, the elderly apply through intermediaries such as the government, or the Welfare Foundation, and are dispatched to fill positions. Unlike in private kindergartens, because of financial difficulties, daycare centers are under state support. If the situation of K Daycare Center in Jongno-gu is examined, there are two elderly employees, one of whom is a 74-year-old female (with a high school degree) who is responsible for teaching Chinese characters to students.

Twice each Wednesday for 30 minutes (1:30~2:30) she teaches Chinese characters. She is supported by the Samsung Welfare Foundation operated by the Jongno Foundation for Seniors Club. In addition to her work at K Day Care, she teaches elsewhere.

91

1.9

0

0

Number (persons)

155

4.3

0

0

0.7 4.9

27 182

0.9 2.8

42 133

5.3 14.9

197 552

0.5

19

1.1

52

0.5

19

2.4

91

2.0

96

3.3

120

5.3

200

6.6

313

5.8

215

1.6

62

1.1

52

3.1

114

0.0

0

0.0

1

0.0

0

0.4

14

0.7

32

0.7

25

1.2

47

2.5

117

0.7

27

6.8

258

4.8

228

5.6

206 26.5

976

42.4

18.7

34.5

709 1,307

16.4

780 2,016

13.8

510

15.9

601

10.1

480

16.4

605

Source: Complied and computed by authors based on internal source from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely in 2005.

Job Offerers Proportion (%)

Number (persons)

9.6

0

Proportion (%)

355

0

Job Seekers Proportion (%)

Employees

Number (persons)

Occupational Category

4.8

181

3.1

149

4.1

1.7 83.2 1.3 100

63 3,119 50 3,784

1.9 78.7 4.5 100

91 3,744 216 4,756

3.3 69.7 1.3 100

150 122 2,569 47 3,688

Elementary Workers Agricultural, EquipManTechService Sales Forestry Craft Clerks ment HouseDeli- SweeSub- Etc. Total agers Educa- Etc. Sub- nician Workers Workers and Fishery Workers hold Clean Guard Etc. Workers tion total verers pers total Workers Chores

Professionals

Table 13. Distribution of Employees, Job Seekers and Job Offerers by Occupational Category

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~â&#x20AC;&#x192; 211

212â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

On the other hand, in the case of elementary worker, job sites occupy 83.2%, job seekers 78.7% and the employed 69.7%. There is a significant difference in the ratio of elementary worker compared to the concentration of job sites (open positions) in which job seekers are interested. As a result, this means that the chance of employment is a low probability of finding those jobs compared to other work. Typical elementary worker positions are those in managerial and security services. 42.4% of job seekers typically prefer these occupations; however, only 26.5% of them are able to secure such employment as it is not that easy to become employed. Like with parking management and apartment complex security positions, managerial and maintenance jobs usually are not physically difficult. Thus, we see that competition for these jobs is high. On the other hand, the ratio of job seekers interested in delivery work stands at only 10.1%, while the ratio of those employed in such positions is 16.4%. While work as a delivery service employee is relatively easy to get and is work representative of the employed elderly,the work conditions are poor and the economic rewards not very good. From the perspective of job seekers, it is just easy to get such work.

Looking at a related case, S Safety Systems in Gangnam-gu hires elderly general laborers to perform cleaning and security work, with 80 to 90% of those hired being elderly. Most are fulltime employees who receive an 80~120 thousand won stipend including transportation costs. This companyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s reason for hiring elderly workers is their lower turnover rate, reduced costs, time and labor market flexibility and, biggest of all, the low wages they are able to pay them. If an elderly person is hired, they will generally work for 1-3 years. While their turnover rate is around 20~30%, this is still lower than the turnover rate for younger workers.

In order to determine where workers will find employment, we must look at the results of the O/D matrix analysis (Table 14). It is shown that overall, 40.2% commute to work within the district, while 54.4% commute to work from outside the district. Only 5.3% travel to work from outside the Seoul metropolitan area. Seven districts comprise the over 50% ratio of local commuters: Gangseo-gu, Nowon-gu, Seongdong-gu and Yangcheongu which are the residential areas of the outer region of Seoul, and those in the southwestern areas of Seoul such as Guro-gu, Yeongdeungpo-gu and Yongsan-gu. A distinctive characteristic of the aging of the population in

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~ 213

Table 14. Comparison of Intra-Gu, Inter-Gu and Intercity Commuters among Employees Intra-Gu Inter-Gu Intercity Workers Workers/ Commuters Commuters Commuters Residents (perResi(persons) sons) dents Number Propor- Number Propor- Number Propor(persons) tion (%) (persons) tion (%) (persons) tion (%) Jongno-gu Jung-gu Yongsan-gu Seongdong-gu Gwangjin-gu Dongdaemun-gu Jungnang-gu Seongbuk-gu Gangbuk-gu Dobong-gu Nowon-gu Eunpyeong-gu Seodaemun-gu Mapo-gu Yangcheon-gu Gangseo-gu Guro-gu Geumcheon-gu Yeongdeungpo-gu Dongjak-gu Gwanak-gu Seocho-gu Gangnam-gu Songpa-gu Gangdong-gu Seoul Metropolitan Area (Except Seoul) No Specific Place of Work Total

113 191 116 148 66 184 60 104 59 46 236 146 121 75 320 309 235 63 231 150 278 186 99 68 34 50

166 217 112 203 35 158 12 30 13 17 228 28 89 55 298 304 191 30 199 90 85 248 301 39 28 197

1.47 1.14 0.97 1.37 0.53 0.86 0.20 0.29 0.22 0.37 0.97 0.19 0.74 0.73 0.93 0.98 0.81 0.48 0.86 0.60 0.31 1.33 3.04 0.57 0.82 3.94

39 81 60 83 10 81 3 2 1 1 148 23 39 8 227 239 136 5 122 23 48 62 31 7 5

34.5 42.4 51.7 56.1 15.2 44.0 5.0 1.9 1.7 2.2 62.7 15.8 32.2 10.7 70.9 77.3 57.9 7.9 52.8 15.3 17.3 33.3 31.3 10.3 14.7 0.0

73 108 54 63 56 95 56 99 58 44 87 110 72 66 81 57 85 57 106 123 227 78 36 50 29 37

64.6 56.5 46.6 42.6 84.8 51.6 93.3 95.2 98.3 95.7 36.9 75.3 59.5 88.0 25.3 18.4 36.2 90.5 45.9 82.0 81.7 41.9 36.4 73.5 85.3 74.0

1 2 2 2 0 8 1 3 0 1 1 13 10 1 12 13 14 1 3 4 3 46 32 11 0 13

0.9 1.0 1.7 1.4 0.0 4.3 1.7 2.9 0.0 2.2 0.4 8.9 8.3 1.3 3.8 4.2 6.0 1.6 1.3 2.7 1.1 24.7 32.3 16.2 0.0 26.0

1,484

40.2

2,007

54.4

197

5.3

315 3,688

3,688

Source: C omplied and computed by authors based on internal source from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely in 2005.

[Gangnam-gu/Seocho-gu] that seems to be spreading into Songpa-gu and other regions is the significant rates of commuting occurring both within and between these local areas. For example, in the case of Gangnam-gu’s elderly,

214â&#x20AC;&#x192; Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Table 15. Classification of Regions by Employment Opportunities and by Commuting Conditions Employ- Rate of Rate of Rate of ment Intra- Inter-Gu Intercity ComOppor- Gu Com- Comtunities muting muting muting

Regions

Type I

High

Middle

Middle

Low

Gangnam-gu, Seocho-gu, Songpa-gu

Type II

High

Middle

Middle

Low

Jongno-gu, Jung-gu

Type III Middle

High

Low

Low

Gangseo-gu, Guro-gu, Nowongu, Seongdong-gu, Yangcheon-gu, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Yongsan-gu

Type IV

Low

High

Low

Gangdong-gu, Gangbuk-gu, Gwanakgu, Gwangjin-gu, Geumcheon-gu, Dongdaemun-gu, etc.

Low

the commuting ratio within Gangnam-gu stands at 31.3%. From Gangnamgu to Seocho-gu and Songpa-gu, the commuting percentage is high at 24.2%.

From Gangnam-gu to the outskirts of Seoul (beyond the Seoul within the Capital region), the percentage of commuters is a high 32.3%. Commuting rate to the outskirts of Seoul from Gangnam-gu is 32.3%, from Seocho-gu it is 24.7%, and from Songpa-gu it is 16.2%, while the commuting rate to the outskirts of Seoul for the rest of the districts standing at significantly less than 10%. Gangnam-gu, Seocho-gu and Songpa-gu alone show high commute ratios. [Gangnam-gu/Seocho-gu] each show short- and long-distance commuting by elderly groups. The short-distance commutes are due to the many employment opportunities in these two regions. Many of the elderly working far from home are able to do so because the capacity constraintson commuting are easy to overcome. On the other hand, workers commuting to Gangnam-gu are relatively evenly distributed across all of Seoul.

If the ratio of workers to residents in each district is examined,Gangnamgu, Seocho-gu and Seongdong-gu, Jongno-gu and Jung-gu districts show that the ratio is greater than 1 (resident < workers), representing that jobs in these districts appear relatively plentiful. On the other hand, Gangbuk-gu, Gwanak-gu, Geumcheon-gu, Dobong-gu, Seongbuk-gu, Eunpyeong-gu and Jungnang-gu show a ratio of less than 0.5%, revealing that jobs for the elderly

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~ 215

are relatively lacking in those districts.

Based on the results above, depending on the state of commuting in each district (Table 15), it was observed that each district of Seoul had characteristic job opportunities and traffic conditions. There is a wide range of job opportunities in the Gangnam area such as Gangnam-gu, Seochogu and Songpa-gu; and in the central city regions such as Jongno-gu and Jung-gu. According to the long-distance commuter ratios, the relatively high mobility of elderly workers in the Gangnam district has led to higher Type I long-distance commuting. However, in the areas where mobility is more limited, there is a lower rate of long-distance commuting, equivalent to Type II. Employment opportunities for middle-level Type III show a high rate of local commuting with low rates of commuting beyond the local district or out of the city for the elderly in Nowon-gu, Guro-gu, and Gangseo-gu. For Type IV, the employment opportunities are low and there are few jobs. Thus, the rate of the elderly commuting locally for work was lower, while those traveling outside of their district to work was higher. However, the analysis showed that the rate of long-distance commuting was low due to low mobility in the Type IV.

VI. Conclusion This research examines the characteristics of Seoul’s aging population and analyzes the structure and characteristics of the employment of the elderly.

A summary of the research’s findings follows. First, Seoul’s aging population phenomenon has progressed rapidly over the last 30 years. This is especially true when comparing the evidence of the rapid progress of the aging index of Seoul to that of Gyeonggi and Incheon. Currently, Seoul is in the process of becoming a relatively ‘elderly city’. Second, when looking at the aging index and longevity index for the last 30 years, distinctions between the districts of Seoul emerge. The result is that the aging index for the central city area is highest, while the longevity index is highest in the Gangnam district.

Seoul’s central districts [Jongno-gu/Jung-gu/Yongsan-gu] are areas where the characteristics of population aging and high elderly population ratio and aging index (Class I) can easily be seen. On the other hand, while the

216 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

elderly job seeker/job site indexes were low, their effect on the job availability of the central area of the city was to provide many employment positions.

Classifications were assigned according to employment opportunities and travel conditions, leading to a lot of Type II employment opportunities. The Gangnam district [Gangnam-gu/Seocho-gu] is part of a relatively young region with a low percentage (Class III) of the elderly population and a medium (Class II) aging index. On the other hand, it is the region with the highest (Class I) tier of longevity index. Similar to the central city area, the job seeker/job sites indexes of this region are low, which is interpreted to mean that there are also a relatively high number of job openings. A characteristic of the elderly in this area is that they appear to have a higher degree of mobility with a larger ratio (Type I) engaging in long-distance commutes. Third, the polarization in the employment distribution of Seoul’s elderly is evident. In Seoul, the general employment ratio of seniors 65 and over stands at 32.4% and is significantly higher than the national and Gyeonggi/Incheon averages. Fourth, the regional distinctions of employment in Seoul emerge clearly. Although employment opportunities are limited to certain occupations, job opportunities are concentrated away from the outlying residential districts. In this regard, the result of the analysis of data from elderly employment placement centers was that geographically, job sites and job seekers did not correspond. The lack of mobility of older workers contributes to their difficulty in obtaining employment far from home and is a condition that needs to be addressed.

Based on the findings of this research, there is a need for follow-up studies.

Such studies would allow better understanding of the aging phenomenon in urban areas and, more specifically, assist in the development of corresponding policies. In particular, aging has been mitigated by the influx of a younger population into Seoul. This rapid urban migration phenomena is well-known to result in the start of a region’s aging phenomena. If this is so, the aging trend of Seoul could be accelerated. Thus, follow-up studies are needed to determine the long-term prospects for the aging trend of Seoul, the trend of population movement, the industrial structure of Seoul and the changes in social structure. Second, studies are needed on the aging phenomenon within Seoul’s regional differentiation, and the phenomenon within Seoul of the formation of a particular employment center and, to confirm the close

The Characteristics of Population Aging and the Employment of Aged Workers~â&#x20AC;&#x192; 217

relationship of growth and decay to these processes. The development of this aging phenomenon and the characteristics of the districtâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s structural employment are generally based on establishing relationships. Incorporating aging and elderly employment policies into city and district policies will be an important part of this. Third, there has been much discussion about the aging of the population. However, as we can see, as a regional phenomenon, the approach to aging is only in its initial stages. The aging phenomenon is a geographical phenomenon. Consequently, it is well overdue that we think about using a traditional study of geography and closely related topics. As such, in the future, the importance of geography may dictate the influence that changes in the aging of community populations will have on accumulated research results, not only in terms of employment, but also with regard to the use of industry, welfare, housing, recreation, transportation, and various other socio-cultural components.

More specific details of policy implications are as follows: First, an effort should be made to grasp the realities of the aging phenomenon and elderly employment, and to establish measures for identifying and instituting a macro-micro policy as well as implementing related policies at the regional level. In particular, in the many cases of poor geographical mobility, policies must support distinguishing on a geographical scale the nature of elderly persons seeking employment close to home. Second, since there are relatively few employment opportunities, districts with low local commute ratios such as in Seoulâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s outer districts of Gangdong-gu, Gangbuk-gu, Gwanakgu, Gwangjin-gu, Geumcheon-gu, and Dobong-gu (Table 15, Type IV), the policies for job creation and job placement for the elderly may need further enhancement. Traditionally these districts have not been centers of significant employment and have the characteristics of residential areas. Job placement policies that only target private sector (private industry) job placement are limited. Thus, child care services and disability services within the scope of public works/services at the community level have to be combined with a more fundamental expansion of job sectors, such as job creation measures.

Third, elderly employment placement may need to diversify beyond the target occupations. There is much material and basic statistical data on elderly workers from Seoul Job Placement Center for the Eldely that indicate the restriction of elderly workers to the field of elementary worker, which is

218 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

concentrated in the areas of housework, delivery services, cleaning services, and security services. This means that except for limited employment opportunities, the majority of jobs for elderly people are found only in certain occupations. In addition, it is necessary to institutionalize the system to develop a variety of career paths for experienced elderly persons with professional skills.

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Population Aging and the Labor Market. Seoul, Korea: Korea Labor Instutie (『고령화시대의 노동시장변화와 노동정책의 과제』) Rim, Choon Seek. 2003. “A Study on a Policy to Utilize Senile Manpower in Aging Society.” Journal of Welfare for the Aged 22: 55-77 (“고령화 사회의 노 인인력 활용정책에 관한 연구”. 『노인복지연구』 22: 55-77) Roh, Byeong Il. 2004. “Proemployment Schemes for Older Workers.” Social Science Review 22(2): 173-194 (“노인근로자를 위한 고용친화적 제도”. 『사회과 학논문집』 22(2): 173-194).

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122).

Suh, Kyun Suk. 2007. “Employment Promotion Program for the Aged Preparing the Aging Society.” Journal of Human Resource Management Research 14(2): 61-76 (“고령사회를 대비한 고령자 고용촉진방안”. 『인적자원관리연구』 14(2): 61-76).

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Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012: 221-253

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices in Korea* Shin, Myung Ho** This study attempts, using qualitative research methods, to identify a series of complex processes and mechanisms that turn the differences in parents’ education level and occupational status into the gaps between their children’s academic achievements. Highly educated parents with high occupational status are obsessed with top universities while less educated parents with low occupational status tend to be less interested in educational capital. Highly educated upper-middle-class parents themselves have strong educational aspirations. They also try to inspire educational aspirations and academic enthusiasm in their children through their early and deep involvement in a long-term educational strategy.

They repeatedly teach their children to have aspirations toward higher professional status as well as a competitive attitude in academic performance. In contrast, the less educated working-class parents do not emphasize the importance of having a high level of education and ‘a good educational background’ to their children.

The differences in the educational aspirations and parenting practices between the two social classes primarily derive from their varying life experiences in the social structure.

The upper-middle-class interviewees said that their obsession with ‘a good educational background’ was closely related to their fear that their children could fall from the middle class. In contrast to the middle class interviewees, the working-class parents had no memories of painful experiences related to their lack of higher education. They claimed that they rarely ever felt inferior and that they rarely regretted their low level of education. In addition, they did not believe that their lives were more difficult due to their ‘low education’.

Keywords: Parents’ Socioeconomic Status (SES), Academic Performance, Educational Aspirations, Parenting Practices, Paradox of Perceived Value of Education, Korea

*

**

Translated from the published article in Korean Journal of Social Welfare Studies 41(2): 217-246, 2010 with permission from the Korea Association for Social Welfare Studies.

Executive Director, Social Economy Research Center

221

222 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

I. Introduction The proposition that children from affluent families tend to do better in their studies has become a fact that nobody can deny. Meanwhile, the fact that “the higher the parents’ social status, the better the children’s grades, and the lower the social status, the poorer the grades” has been confirmed time and again by all sorts of investigation and research (Ju, D. 1998; Kim, H. and Lee, B. 2005; Park, C. and Do, J. 2005; Byun, S. and Kim, K. 2008). Their results are in agreement with numerous foreign antecedent studies (Coleman 1990; De Graaf et al. 2000; Jencks and Tach 2006).

As for the reason that children’s grades change according to their parents’ socioeconomic status, public sentiment commonly points to the difference in their capacity to spend on private education. However, the fact is that there is a static correlation between parents’ income and the scale of their private education expenditures (Choi, Y. 1999; Nam, K. 2008), but studies analyzing the effect of private education on grade improvement run contrary to one another, concluding that that there is an effect (Park C. and Do, J. 2005; Choi, H. 2007), or conversely that there is either no effect or that the effect is insignificant (Han, D. et al. 2001; Ban, S. et al. 2005). Regardless, when we look closely at the well-known fact that the effect of education can be swayed significantly by a student’s attitude and enthusiasm, even if we say that private education has an influence rather than a direct effect on grades, we can surmise that it exhibits the power to influence bit by bit the variables that influence a child’s attitude toward their studies.1 If we combine the results of the precedent domestic and foreign research handling the relationship between family background and academic achievement, generally speaking, the variable that has the most distinct relationship with academic achievement is the father’s education level, followed by the parents’ employment and income levels (De Graaf and 1

Related to this, Kim, K. (2005), through multiple regression analysis, discovered the moment of insertion of variables that reflected a child’s interest in education, and the disappearance of the statistical significance of private education. He also is among those who take the stance that the power of private education expenses brings out a child’s interest in education.

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 223

Ganzeboom, 1993; Phang, H. and Kim, K. 2002; Park C. and Do, J. 2005; Chang, S. and Sohn, B. 2005). But in certain studies, there are cases in which the influence of income appears inconsistent or unclear (Yeo, E. et al. 2007; Kim, D. 2008), so normally it is presumed that income level does not have as strong an effect on academic achievement as parental education level.2 The meaning of all of this is that as a background factor influencing the level of academic achievement, economic capacity is not the number one variable, and cultural capital and other influential variables are more important than economic capacity in explaining the relationship between education level and background (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996: 21; Sewell et al., 2004: 28).

Regarding this point, parents’ “socioeconomic status” has been postulated as a concept that includes income, education level, professional status, etc., but there has been nothing to clearly illuminate the reason that such cultural resources as education level and professional status appear to be the major primary influences. These days, quantitative research showing parents’ socioeconomic status to be an independent variable and children’s total years of education, highest level of education, academic achievement, probability of entering higher education, etc., as dependent variables stress the importance of illuminating the influential power and relevance of all variables. Antecedent research successfully scrutinizes specific aspects of quantitative research methodologies, such as cause and effect relationships, and relevance and change, but there is nothing that illuminates the black box existing between that cause and effect, namely the specific processes and mechanisms that exert influence and by which relevant factors interplay (Lamont and Lareau, 1988: 154). Hence the objective of this research is to use qualitative research methods to find the series of complex mechanisms and processes that appear with changes in parents’ education level and professional status. If existing quantitative research illuminates the duality of the causal relationship among factors in educational achievement, this research, which has adopted 2

As an example that shows this, Beblo and Lauer (2004) found through an analysis of the relationship between 1990s Poland’s economic change and educational achievement, that parents’ financial resources, such as wealth and income, and unemployment, had very little to do with a child’s educational achievement; on the other hand, they came to the conclusion that parents’ educational level was a much more important factor in swaying a child’s academic achievement.

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qualitative methods, emphasizes the apprehension of answers to the question of why and how these conditions come about.

And so, the primary issue this paper deals with is how parents’ educational aspirations and child-rearing methods, as they pertain to education, differ between the lower and upper social strata, and moreover, by what causes and mechanisms those differences appear and persist. And the second research question is, when do the differing child-rearing traditions and strategies among different social strata produce predictable results? Outside of the decisive factors appearing in previous research, are there any other factors that influence academic scores?

II. Theoretical Background 1. Research on Factors that Hinder Academic Achievement Research regarding factors that influence academic achievement can be divided into that which deals with factors that hinder academic achievement versus that which deals with factors that promote academic achievement.

First, low income and poverty, the absence of one parent, and low parental education level and status stand out as hindrance factors.

Compared to children who have never or have only temporarily experienced poverty, children who continuously experience poverty score lower on intelligence tests. Also, it has been inferred that the reason for the deficient cognitive abilities of children of impoverished families is that they are subjected to stress during pregnancy or receive insufficient developmental stimulus from their families (McLoyd 1998: 198); accordingly it is not only the case that poverty hinders cognitive development in childhood, but also that it casts a negative influence over adolescent academic achievement as well (Conger et al. 1997: 308).

As for factors that influence impoverished children’s intellectual growth, it is known that a lack of appropriate educational resources (books, magazines, travel and field trip opportunities, etc.) to stimulate children’s cognitive development, in addition to family environment, parenting style, the child’s health, etc., have an effect (Guo and Harris 2000). At the same time, a

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 225

lack of economic resources also brings with it a lack of education-relevant cultural resources, skews a non-material resource—parental treatment of the children—and impedes the development of the child’s intelligence by negatively affecting that child’s health.

Even the absence of one parent because of divorce or death appears to have a negative influence on a child’s degree of educational achievement (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994: 45; Ku, I. 2003: 17). Compared to children of married parents, children of divorced parents experience more strife and have harsher experiences, and because of this the problem of adaptation arises (Grych and Fincham 1990).

As an alternate explanation of the influence of family structure, there is one interpretation that states that the absence of one parent brings about the loss of a role model, and carelessness in direction, teaching, and control (Thomson et al. 1992). As for research purporting that socialization within the family is carried out completely by the parents, according to Thomson and others (Thomson et al. 1992), when compared with two parents, single parents’ demands on children are lower, their degree of control is weaker, and the amount of time they spend with their children on homework, principles, reading, etc., is smaller.

As for this relationship, there is a connection between single-parent nurturing manners and insufficient income or poverty. Single parents, who cannot help but lack economic resources when compared to dual-parent families, experience psychological stress. This encourages a laissez-faire style of parenting, which eventually leads to the detriment of a child’s degree of academic achievement (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994; Conger et al. 1997).3 Parents of low educational and professional status cannot effectively support children’s schooling or intervene positively in their educational activities (Lareau 2003). In addition, there is a series of opinions stating that when compared with the middle class, the poor have relatively low aspirations 3

According to Cummings and others (Cummings et al. 1994), when parents fret or experience discord because of financial problems, their children, and in particular sons, are susceptible to that discord, and so become extremely angry with or engulfed in feelings of hostility towards them. However, in the case of single-parent families, compared with dual-parent families, because the probability of falling into hardship is higher, it is easier to fail at academic achievement by means of the same cause.

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for their children’s education because they are not as worried about their children’s downward social mobility (Boudon 1974; Erikson and Jonsson 1996). Between these two groupings of social status exists a difference in the system of values and deeds regarding a child’s education. In other words, as a result, the difference in the distribution of the class origins of students who go on to high levels of education is due to the difference in the degree, according to class distinction, that relative importance is placed on high-level education and the degree to which the possibility of attaining the resources for higher education is recognized (Edwards and Roberts 1980; Archer 2003: 9).

Not only parents lacking the experience of higher education are unable to give specific advice to their children regarding how to study or how to progress academically; they do not even have a helpful social network.

Relatively uneducated working-class or impoverished parents, even when the occasion calls for them to be involved in their children’s education, tend to lack the capacity or ability to do so, and as such “think educational issues are solely the teacher’s responsibility” (Lareau 2003: 239-43).

2. Research on Factors which Facilitate School Grades It can be inferred that there are two possible reasons that the children of parents of high socioeconomic standing take the lead in academic achievement: they are the recipients of genes for academic excellence, or they receive advantageous support that produces learned behaviors. Taking into account the results of related research in the field of sociology, one can imagine three cases illustrating the latter: “First, the inheritance of economic resources; second, the impartation of cultural resources; and third, the indoctrination of expectations and aspirations through role modeling” (Kalmijn 1994: 260).

1) Cultural Capital Cultural capital theory started taking the spotlight as “the proposition of a new point of view asking how a family’s social and cultural resources explicitly and implicitly raise academic achievement levels” (Lamont and Lareau 1988: 154). Since the 1980s, much research corroborating cultural capital theory has entered the picture. DiMaggio and Mohr (DiMaggio and

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 227

Mohr 1985) surveyed the attitudes and knowledge regarding culture and showed that cultural capital exerts influence even on high school grades.

Also, on the point of whether there is research stating that “even if we know that a family’s educational resources (newspapers, dictionaries, etc.) regulate family background, they also exert a constant influence on a child’s academic achievement, as upper-middle-class parents use their educational resources to create a domestic atmosphere that promotes academic capability, study activities, and attitudes” (Teachman 1987: 549-53). There is also the standpoint that “cultural capital such as the quality of language parents use and the educational atmosphere of the family have the greatest effect on a child’s academic achievement” (Bernstein 1973; Kim, S. 2009: 349).

On the one hand, Laureau (Lareau 1987; 2003), who has almost exclusively adopted qualitative methodologies in her research on educational stratification, takes the stance that middle-class parents have child-rearing practices distinct from those of working-class and poor parents. According to her research, upper-middle-class parents take great efforts to ensure that their children lead a structured life, and using systematic planning, they make their children participate in all sorts of private education (gymnastics, soccer, music, art, etc.), thus developing their children’s talents and regulating their behavior.

They teach their children to express themselves and maintain specific goals, and they monitor their children’s school life on an equal footing with teachers by cooperating positively but sometimes offering their criticisms.

Even in South Korea, there has recently been research and applied analysis of the concept of cultural capital. Chang, M. (2002) divided parents’ cultural capital into that of artistic tastes and that of cognitive abilities (study habits, computer literacy, English communication ability), analyzed the influence these factors have on children’s scholastic achievement, and as a result uncovered the fact that even taking into account parents’ education level, there is a static correlation between the volume of cultural capital and children’s grades. In addition, when compared with the cultural capital of the ‘artistic taste’ variety, the effect of the ‘cognitive ability’ variety on grades is somewhat larger.

Kim, K. and Byun, S. (2007), after measuring cultural capital as the frequency of attending movies, cultural performances, musical performances, and art museums, as well as reading preferences, analyzed its effect as a

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decisive factor in academic achievement. However, the effect of cultural capital on academic achievement either did not appear, or depending on the kind of measure used, the results were contrary or a clear conclusion was not possible.

Kim, H. and Lee, B. (2007) treated annual household expenditures for cultural activities and the degree to which families appreciated culture and arts together as cultural capital. However, time spent conversing with family along with the degree to which the family took an interest in the student, was treated as social capital. They then compared the influence of these variables of socioeconomic background. As a result, they showed through an independent model that after considering the variables of parents’ socioeconomic standing, cultural capital variables displayed either no correlation or negative correlation.

2) Social Capital and Parental Concern Because of the influence of Coleman and his concept of social capital, from the 1990s much corroborative research concerning the effects of diverse variables on academic achievement has appeared. Until the 21st century, research that usually measures a family’s social capital as the amount of conversation children have with their parents, the degree to which parents expect their children to complete university (or not), the level to which a child’s life is directed by parents (inspecting homework, TV viewing, amount of time spent alone), the degree to which parents participate in school, etc., had continuously appeared. This research links these variables with a child’s grades and home life in a causal relationship (Valenzuela and Dornbusch 1994; Wright et al. 2001; Dika and Singh 2002).

Finally, as for social capital related to educational achievement, after excluding elements like family structure, number of siblings, and ethnicity, the concept of ‘parental involvement’ has become categorized. The idea that “parents’ concern for their children’s studies is the parents’ injecting of resources into the domain of their children’s school life” (Grolnick and Slowiaczek 1994: 238) has something in common with Coleman’s concept that “the social capital of the family is the parent-child relationship” (Coleman 1988: 110).

But these existing studies have different conclusions: some say that

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 229

parental involvement improves academic achievement (Sui-Chu and Willms 1996), others conclude that it lowers academic achievement (Milne et al.

1986; McNeal 1999: 118), and still others take the stance that it has no particular influence (Domina 2005).

As far as Korean research is concerned, Ju, D. (1998) measured and analyzed ‘involvement acts’ as nine variables, including face-to-face time with homeroom teachers, conversations about school grades and career paths, participation in PTA meetings, etc., and found that while there were variables that exerted a positive influence on academic achievement, variables for regulation and supervision did not have an effect. Byun S. et al.

(2008) performed a factorial analysis on the results of measuring parental involvement variables as sixteen items, including parents’ membership and participation in PTA groups, homework supervision and discussions about school grades, reciprocal interaction with other students’ parents, and household rules. They weighed the effects, but found that the influence of the parental involvement variable was insignificant. Regarding results like these, which are at odds with expectations, Chang, S. and Sohn, B. (2005) show that even if you introduce variables such as parental involvement or familial emotional bonds, the effect of parents’ socioeconomic status (SES) on academic achievement does not change greatly. They take the stance that, rather than parental involvement, adopting an employment aspirations parameter is much more convincing.

If we combine preceding research and associated theories and schematize them, it looks like [Figure 1]. Preceding research contends that as for cultural capital theory, cultural capital can on the one hand be classified, like a fine artistic aroma, as a variable that acts as a go-between for parents’ socioeconomic status and their child’s academic achievement. On the other hand, social capital theory (though the relevance to parents’ class position is not clear), from parent-child relationships to parents’ involvement in education, is a parameter of family background. 4 If social capital theory 4

In this thesis, the concepts of family background and parental socioeconomic status are considered one in the same, but when referencing Coleman’s social capital theory, there can be a difference between the two. Coleman saw that, although it doesn’t pique all that much interest, with regard to parents’ socioeconomic standing, or in other words, their class level, social capital has a very intimate connection with individual

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ignores parents’ class status, solely mentioning the influence of parents’ educational aspirations and nurturing methods on children’s academic achievement, then cultural capital theory sees class culture, which is indistinguishable from parents’ class status, as passing down cultural resources and skills for success from within the educational system.

Consequently, existing social capital theory does not illuminate the relationship between educational aspirations and parents’ socioeconomic standing. While on the one hand it argues that the methods parents use and the extent to which they are involved in education have sway over a child’s academic achievement, cultural capital theory simply maintains that parents’ class culture itself already involves variables that are advantageous or disadvantageous to a child’s academic competitiveness, but does not take interest in the specific mechanisms. Hence, this research attempts to take a look at the items prior theories have treated carelessly, as well as elucidate the process of give and take of influence among all factors.

Domestic research that has applied these theories to Korean society has not come to consistent conclusions, but if the more valid theories are summarized approximately, they can be categorized as follows: in the case of cultural capital theory, cultural capital in the form of cognitive ability (study, hobbies, English speaking proficiency, etc.), to a certain degree, affects academic achievement more than cultural capital in the form of artistic tastes; in the case of social capital theory, anticipated level of education (educational aspirations), conversations about academic achievement, amount of support for studies, etc., of course have a positive influence. Findings like these in existing research suggest that via educational aspirations and nurturing customs, parental social status can have an influence on academic achievement. However, the reason that this research has not adopted the terminology of ‘cultural capital’ or ‘social capital’ is that these terms have been included so widely in concepts of such diverse form and character that now they have become far too abstract. If a concept’s breadth is extensive, family communities’ cultural traditions and religion, etc. For example, he saw that the academic fervor Asian families possess or Catholic school parents’ religious traditions positively influenced children’s academic achievement. As such, for Coleman, social capital has an unclear connection with socioeconomic status, but its connection with family cultural background is distinct.

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 231

health

cognitive ability

Family income (poverty) Parents’ educational level Parents prof. status Family structure

educational resources

child’s educational fervor (e.a)

parent-child relations

parents’ ed. asp.

Parents’ nurt. customs

school grades

Figure 1. synthesis of prior research on decisive factors in school grades.

it goes without saying that confusion and misunderstanding in scientific communication will follow, and this research focuses on specific techniques rooted in fact rather than abstract concepts.

As shown in [Figure 1], factors that influence adolescent school grades are numerous, and factors like innate intellectual capacity, which this paper is not concerned with, are excluded from the figure. This paper attempts to examine the forms in which “educational aspirations, reputed to be the core factor in the process of educational achievement”5 (Sewell et al. 1980; Teachman and 5

The term ‘educational aspiration’ used in this paper was decided upon due to its fulfillment of the following two requirements. First, not only is it one quantitative aspect of academic achievement, but also it means the qualitative objective reflecting discerning valuations. The more some people do not settle for high school graduation and aim to attend vocational schools or 4-year universities, the standard of educational aspirations increases. In other words, it can be defined as ‘the degree to which effort and resources are invested within the ranking system of value derived from educational capital, with the goal of relatively high educational institutions.’

Secondly, educational aspiration means, under the conditions (parental professional status and education level, income, child’s academic scores and academic fervor, etc.), the goal of academic achievement by which students determine they can succeed somehow, and means, far from being something they anticipate obscurely, a specific

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Paasch 1998) from 1960s educational stratification research until today, and parental participation in education appear and operate in Korean society, and what relation there is between parents’ educational level and professional class status.

III. Research Methods and Objectives Within the category of qualitative research, this research, through detailed and thorough collection of materials, uses a “bounded system,” or case study6 methodology (Creswell 2005: 87) of deeply exploring a case. In this research, the cases are Korean students who graduated from high school and their parents. There were times when a student and one parent (father or mother) were investigated together as one case, but this was for the purpose of determining differences in interpretation and experiential testimony relating to entering college. Because they were not separated in the investigation, they can be considered as a single case.

In this study, “in order to show all points of variation, the ‘maximum variation’7 strategy” (Creswell 2005: 151-2) has been employed. To accomplish this, diverse cases were collected and recorded to establish common patterns.

Toward this purpose, not just students with good grades from highly educated upper-middle-class families and students with poor grades from uneducated working-class families, but also students with poor grades from upper-middle-class families and high achievers from working-class families were included. goal into which they invest capital, effort, and time in order to succeed.

This research is an instrumental case study that utilizes cases simply as tools to illustrate the issue that is the main focus of the study, and is a collective case study with more than two cases. Accordingly, the important thing in this study is not the personality or characteristics of the cases, but rather the use of the cases as material to analyze the problem of differing levels of academic achievement among children of different social classes.

7 Regarding qualitative research’s strategy for intentional sampling, Miles and Huberman proposed 16 strategies. Refer to Miles and Huberman (1994) regarding these strategies.

6

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 233

This study’s purpose is to establish the mechanisms of the relationship between parents’ social standing and children’s academic achievement.

Therefore, I have divided the subjects according to factors of family background: first, upper-middle-class families with parents of high educational and professional levels, and conversely, working-class families and relatively poor families. Then, according to academic ability, I divided them into those who went on to prestigious universities and non-prestigious university attendees or non-university attendees. In this study, with the father’s education level used as the standard, those who had graduated from university were considered highly educated and those who had graduated from high school or lower were considered uneducated. Also, as for the father’s professional status, usually those in high management positions or those engaged in specialized jobs received a high professional status score, which in existing research (Yoo, H. and Kim, W. 2002) is calculated using one’s educational level and income;meanwhile, those engaged in unskilled labor, those with technical jobs, those employed in the service sector, and small business owners engaged in sales were classified at the lower level.

To be able to differentiate among children’s levels of academic achievement more clearly, I have divided high school students into a group of extremely high level achievers and another group of middle and low-level achievers.

In the case of the former, subjects were selected among students who had entered Seoul National University, Yonsei University, and Korea University.

The latter group is composed of those who scored in the middle or lower range on the college entrance examination and attended non-prestigious universities, or those who forewent university altogether. As for the university graduates, the choice to limit those in the former category to the three universities mentioned above reflects the Korean tendency to emphasize academic competition. In this study, the academic achievement of a family with an acceptance into a prestigious university is considered excellent, while that of a family with an acceptance into a non-prestigious university or lack of acceptance into university is seen as poor. The instances in which a child and the mother (or father) were interviewed together are considered a single case, so even though the total number of interviewees is 34, including 25 teenagers and 9 parents, because five of the parents’ children had already been interviewed, they were excluded and so this study utilizes only 29 cases.

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The results of the study of parental socioeconomic standing and children’s academic achievement among these 29 cases are as follows.

Parent’s SES

Superb Students

Low-Achieving Students

Total

Upper-middle-class

11 cases

2 cases

13

Working-class

5

11

16

Total

16

13

29

A list of the interviewed parents and students appears in appendices 1-4.

The subjects were interviewed in such a way that they could speak their minds about their parents’ thoughts and values regarding education, study habits and environment, amount and methods of parental involvement, and work. The subjects as a rule were interviewed once, and if there was an occasion for additional questions or confirmations, email and telephone were used. The interviews took approximately one hour each, but among a total of 34 interviews the shortest was 26 minutes and the longest 1 hour and 34 minutes, resulting in an average interview time of 58 minutes.

This study, rather than using “statistical normalization,” utilized the “analytical normalization” case study methodology attempted by Robert Yin. According to this methodology, statistical normalization is impossible in case studies, but analytical normalization that compares an already developed theory with evidential results from case studies is possible. Case study research lacks representativeness of its case studies, and so it fails at normalization because it attempts to normalize the investigated cases to different case studies. Thus, if one attempts to normalize research results with “theory” rather than different cases, analytical normalization becomes possible (Yin 2008: 73). This research groups cases into 2 × 2 = 4 categories according to parental socioeconomic status and children’s academic achievement and compares each of them using “actual reproducible research” so that we can see whether every case will show the same results; and under different conditions, this research uses “theoretically reproducible research” to predict contrary results.8 8

Yin, with the idea that multiple cases studies are like doing plural experiments, takes

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 235

IV. Components of Decisive Factors in Degree of Academic Achievement 1. Process of Consciousness-Raising of Educational Aspirations In the results of this study, differences appear between the highly educated middle class and uneducated working class in values and aspirations regarding the child’s education, methods for encouraging studying, and nurturing customs.

Educated upper-middle-class parents had a strong obsession regarding highly-ranked universities with high-value academic capital, and as such had strong competitive educational aspirations. These parents routinely expressed how highly they evaluated “good universities” and how passionately they wanted their children to go there whenever the chance arose.

In an interview with student Jung, Ji Yong regarding his choice of university, his father said in passing, “It would be great if you went to Seoul,” and the mother said on a similar occasion, “You at least need to get into XX University.” According to the mother’s criteria, she believes that her daughter must go to one of these six universities: Seoul, Yonsei, Korea, XX, YY, or ZZ. If [he] can’t get into any of those, [he’ll] just have to study one more year.”

Jiyong mentioned that he had to study one more year due to his mother’s view.

Another way that the students became aware of and benefited from their middle class parents’ aspirations for studying was their parents’ reaction to academic scores. Upper-middle-class parents thoroughly checked their the stance that one must follow the logic of replicated research. “If every case used gives the expected result, then you can support the proposed research hypothesis very strongly from the start. If you draw contradictory conclusions from each and every case, you must either modify the research hypothesis or re-examine with different cases. The important stages in this kind of replicated research procedure develop into a concrete theoretical framework. In the theoretical framework, conditions (effective replication study) under which particular phenomena are likely to be discovered, and conditions under which those phenomena will not likely be discovered (theoretical replicated research), must be included (Yin 2008: 87).

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children’s grades and abilities and worked hard to make their children improve upon their weak points. Whenever they received test scores, because the mothers would either compliment and encourage, or unleash reprimand and scold, the showing of grades was always an event that was a source of tension and emotional interaction between the parents and children.

Experiencing this kind of event regularly, children would, depending on the amount of study effort, repeatedly experience their parents’ gladness and hope or disappointment and frustration, and thus became trained in the importance of studying.

It was because of an uncertain dread. If I couldn’t [study] well, even at home, it was not good, and I also don’t like falling behind others. I didn’t have a roadmap for how to study for doing something in the future…. Since my parents took a thorough interest in my grades when they came out, if they said “It looks like you didn’t put your best effort into this,” I thought of my older brother being scolded a long time ago, and worried that I’d end up like him….

And I also have a bit of a high-strung personality, so if it was like that [if my grades were bad], I worried about what would happen, so I [studied] harder.

(Interview with Jaehong An, after he studied hard)

The “reasons you have to study hard” emphasized by upper-middle-class parents are very simplistic and similar. One student relayed his parent’s words: “Since we have no inheritance to pass down to you, if you want to have a comfortable life later, you must focus on studying so that you won’t have any regrets” (Jang In Bŏm). Accordingly, the admonition that “striving to study is a matter of course” suggests itself as the reason one has to study hard at all times.

My parents said that if I didn’t study hard I wouldn’t be treated well, and they said that since they don’t have a lot of money I have to study hard so I can live well later. They think there is no other way. It seems like they always talk that way. If you want to eat, you have to study. (Interview with Lee Kŏn Wu) Mother sometimes used to say, when she watched a drama (Korean soap opera), if a homeless or poor person appeared she would call me. Call me and say “If you don’t study this is what will happen.” (laughs) She wouldn’t let me watch dramas; only when that kind of scene appeared she would call me and

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 237

tell me I’d become like that if I didn’t study hard. (Interview with Ko Ŭn T’ae)

In this way, and also through grade checking, encouragement, and other repeated events, if the values of parents who emphasized the importance of and concentrated on study activities are injected into their children, the children’s thoughts gradually begin to resemble their parents’ high educational aspirations.

As part of the awareness-raising process, upper-middle-class parents also express their aspirations for their children to enter high-level professions.

From when they are young, children are made aware of their parents’ hopes for them to go into specialized white-collar professions such as law, diplomacy, or medicine, or to become high-level civil servants or professors.

In elementary school they have you write about your aspirations for the future.

I wrote “train conductor.” Mom had a meeting with my teacher, came home, and asked me why, of all the professions containing the Chinese character “士” (sa), I chose kikwan-sa (train conductor). Kŏm-sa (prosecutor), p’an-sa (judge), kyo-sa (teacher), ŭi-sa (doctor)—there are so many. Of all of them, why kikwan-sa? In elementary school, I didn’t know anything so I didn’t have a concept of this. At that time I thought freely riding around on a train sounded great so that’s what I wrote, but as I grew up my thinking changed and became more realistic. (Interview with Jang In Bŏm)

The awareness-raising strategy of upper-middle-class parents to implant the will and motivation to study in their child is not just a matter of taming the mind and spirit, but also of acting to train the body so that from an early age, study practices are secondnature. They regulate behavior so that the child automatically sits at his desk to study, and selectively restrict distracting elements such as computer use, television watching, exercise activities, and friends. They make it so that, to the extent possible, children do not take interest in things outside of what is helpful for study activities. However, because these kinds of fixed rules are not always followed according to the parents’ wishes, sometimes friction and discord arises regarding these lifestyle regulations. As a child grows up, if his desires to have diverse experiences and the expectations of his upper-middle-class parents who want him to focus only on studying come into conflict, all kinds of discord arise. However,

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upper-middle-class parents have a tendency to be deeply involved in their children’s lives and schooling, so even when discord arises, rather than avoiding it, in order to see their decisions and plans through to the end, they embrace this ‘labor of love’. …Anyway, if something gets in the way of studying, the parent-child relationship becomes tense. Even if there is no conflict, it gets rough. There’s absolutely no way parents will just sit idly by and say, “What are you going to do? It’s your business…” So the parents intervene and if they can send their kid to a better university, then 10 or 20 years later life will be different…. I [the mother] manage my kid’s scores but he just resists. He just thinks, “Whatever, it’s enough if I just keep studying like I am now.” But if I just thrust the numbers at him and show him how his grades have changed, and say, “Look at this and say something,” in that case, he has nothing to say. That’s because he knows he has to get into university through the regional quota system. If I do that, then there’s nothing he can say, is there? …I’m just saying he needs to study enough to achieve our goals, but he thinks I’m nagging him to study until he dies from exhaustion. (Interview with Yun Jŏng Lan)

On the other hand, in this study’s cases of working-class and low-income families, there were parents who were completely negligent and uninterested in their child’s studies, and parents who, while communicating with their child only slightly, occasionally scolded them and told them to study. Parents of the former type think that “one’s study is one’s own business” and that “which school [for their child] to attend and what job [for their child[ to choose” are not their concern but rather think “that’s [their] child’s problem to decide.” Also, these parents’ perspective is that “if [their] child studies hard on his own and is able to enter university, then as a parent [they] will support him, but if he is not interested in studying, [they] will not force him to do so.” The reason they do not take a special interest in or support their child’s studies is because of their attitude toward education, and also because they do not haveadequate intellectual experiences themselves. Hanna Jang’s parents did not even know how to interpret their daughter’s college entrance exam practice test scores. They never once expressed, even in a roundabout way, their hopes for which university she should go to.

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 239

On the contrary, since I’m so obsessed with studying, at home my dad would say, “Why don’t you stop studying?” That was the source of a lot of fights at home. I’m the kind of person who studies well at home, so I wanted it to be a bit of a quiet place. But Dad didn’t understand, and he would watch TV (with the volume turned up loud), and if I asked, “Dad, could you turn the TV down?” he would ignore me a few times and finally say, “Are you always going to be like this?” He’s even said, “Why don’t you go outside and play instead?”

(Interview with Jang Han Na) Conversations about studying? We never had them. They never pushed me to study or anything like that…. A long time ago, maybe in my second year of junior high, the [television news] showed a story of a student who had committed suicide after the college entrance exam. I wasn’t there at that time, but my dad said to my sister, while watching the TV, “Aren’t you glad I don’t make you all study?” (Interview with Kim Ji Ae)

In this type of family, there is no friction or tension regarding studies. Owing to the fact that, from the start, there is no anticipation of studying, the child who is lazy about studying is not especially vexed by or regretful about it.

Even when Jŏng Kyŏngmo’s and Oh Jŏnghŭi’s siblings consistently failed to study and their grades were low, their parents did not give it much thought.

The second type of parent, the communicative type, desires that their child attend an appropriate four-year university by way of a humanities high school, as opposed to a vocational high school. Unlike upper-middleclass parents, these parents do not have the mindset that going to a “good university” or “high-level university” is absolutely necessary. There are some parents who dropped out of middle school, like those of Yang T’aegyun, who believe that a high school diploma is the minimum level of education needed to function in society, and accordingly try to make their child study through high school no matter what; but ­generally parents know that these days a college diploma is necessary. Among parents of this type, there are some who optimistically supervise their child’s education with great interest, and those who occasionally scold and reprimand. As an example of the former, Mrs. Hyŏnsuk Lee, whose only son graduated from a vocational high school and is studying for the college entrance exam, restrained herself from scolding her son and waited for her son to become aware of the importance of studying by himself. Mrs. Choi, S. also never pushed her eldest son, who is in middle

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school, to study.

Researcher: Most parents nag and continuously scold their children into studying…

Lee Hyŏnsuk: I didn’t do that.

Researcher: Why not?

Lee Hyŏnsuk: Kids get stressed out. It’s not just because of that, though, that I didn’t nag him. People like me…whose parents worked really hard in the countryside, seeing that I felt sorry for them, so even if I didn’t study, I would at least pretend to study when they were around. Because of that we continue to work really hard, thinking our son will learn by watching, just as he wants… but we never pushed him to study. But if I look back now I kind of think I should have nagged him just a little bit.

Because lowly educated working-classparents, unlike the middle class, do not alternate between the extremes of joy and sorrow or constantly react strongly and sensitively, their reactions do not make their children nervous or feel pressure to study. Nagging or scolding to study is an event that very rarely or at most occasionally happens, and so there is not much opportunity for the child’s educational fervor or study time to increase. Unlike in the uppermiddle-class, the consciousness to internalize the motivation to study does not really arise in the working-class.

2. Reasons Educational Aspiration Differs Among the Social Hierarchy If this is the case, then why do differences arise in educational aspirations between the highly educated middle class and the lowly educated working class? Why are upper-middle-class parents so obsessed with high-level universities, and conversely, why do lowly educated working-class parents have no consciousness of academic cliques? To state the conclusion first, the former type of parent has a greater sense of the crisis of downward social mobility, and knows well the reality of the power that educational capital has with regard to maintaining or elevating social status. On the other hand, the latter type of parent has a weakened fear of social status degradation, and has a tendency to see the possibility of realizing upward social mobility by getting a diploma from a so-called “good university” as unclear. In fact, upper-

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 241

middle-class interviewees expressed the fact that their obsession with “good academic cliques” came from their sense of crisis regarding downward social mobility.

You’re living as number 5 of 10—think you can move up to number 4? No? A person should work hard to “level up”; it’s terrible to move downward. I would talk to him like that. “If you want to live like your father, study hard.” (Interview with Mun Kyuhyŏn’s mother) …Studying is the shortest way to reach a success. Poor people these days, well, aren’t they dancing in the streets? What are they called? Anyway celebrities…

Those poor people have nothing to lose. The parents and children. But we’re not like that. So we want to take the safe and comfortable way. I lived like that and so did my parents, because we had the same education, so if you look at it a certain way there is no development. We just keep going down the same old path. (Interview with Ch’a Kyŏngshin)

Compared to this, lowly educated working-class parents do not have a sense of crisis of downward social mobility with regard to their children having a harder or similarly not affluent life if they do not study hard. The five working-class and lower- class parents interviewed for this study all responded the same way in that they had never had any feelings of crisis of downward social mobility.

Researcher: If your children don’t study, they’ll have to continue being poor.

Have you ever had any feelings of crisis regarding this?

Lee Hyŏnsuk: No, I’ve never thought about that. If he just does his best, what could be difficult? He works hard. So what could he not do? Do your best and work hard.

Researcher: Mr. Lee, you didn’t graduate from university, but you’re doing fine.

Lee Hyŏnsuk: Yes, but I haven’t really felt that. If your family is peaceful and comfortable…and your mind and heart are rich, I think it’s fine.

Interviewees from the lowly educated working-class did not have an intense and poignant experience with regard to higher education. They said that they hardly felt any regret, nor had complexes about not having gone to university.

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In addition, they do not even consider the reason they have such hard lives to be their “low education level.” The following statement from Yang Sŏyŏn’s father, who was a middle-school dropout, clarifies this point.

As far as formal education, I didn’t even make it through high school and I don’t have any regrets or anything like that. I’ve been working hard living in my own way, and I’m still living my own life, thanks to our social structure. So if you think you want to live, even if you don’t make a lot of money, you can make a living, no matter what. (Interview with Yang Sŏyŏn) …I had no idea what kind of merit there was in going to college. Because I hadn’t had any experience. Well, I said I graduated from a vocational high school. I have a friend who graduated from XX University in Seoul. She makes her kids study extremely hard. She made them study so hard, to the extent you could say it was an obsession…. There was something she used to say.

Something she used to hammer into her kids. While I was listening right next to her, she would say, “If you come out of university, you can choose from an array of hundreds of jobs, but if you come out of high school, you can choose from an array of one or two. Which kind of life do you want to live?” …That was something I didn’t know. “If you graduate from university there are that many jobs you can choose from—whatever job you want!” I realized it then….

People like us, we’re fine if we just have our family, don’t starve, and lived contentedly with our neighbors, …outside of that we don’t really have any particular dreams. (Choi Sŭnghŭi)

It appears that these types of responses contradictour common sense notion that “people who were not able to receive much education must have deep resentment towards education because of the sorrow of not learning.”

However, this kind of common sense notion can be different from reality.

The inferiority complex that lowly educated people normally have could potentially exist to some extent, but the problem is determining how frequently and seriously it brings disadvantage in everyday life, and in particular the labor market. If the labor market for lowly educated workers required a high level of mental labor and were a place where competition is based on capacity for mental labor, then of course, the lowly educated would constantly endure discrimination and the pressures of getting fired.

However, the labor market in which highly educated people compete and the

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 243

labor market in which lowly educated peoplecompete exist separately. The labor market sectors for physical laborers and for only white-collar workers have formed separately. For the most part, the type of labor required by the labor market in which lowly educated people participate has no relation to education level. It is not important whether someone who is employed at a construction site as a casual worker, a bus driver, or a housekeeper graduated from middle school, high school, or a vocational college, so the instances in which they might lament their low education level and perceive disadvantages because of it could be unexpectedly few. Therefore, while on the one hand, lowly educated people actually experience less discrimination and feel less of the necessity of education in everyday life, on the other hand, we can say that the highly educated middle class urgently experiences and perceives both discrimination and the importance of education. Of course, the universality of this proposition has not been confirmed empirically. It is a hypothesis that was formed during the process of analyzing the results of this study’s interviews. This study refers to this as “the paradox of perceived educational value” and suggests it as one hypothesis.

3. Other Factors that Influence Educational Achievement Several of the interviewees were divided into three types of student according to their educational fervor and attitude. The first type of student studies on their own without any supervision. These students’ personalities are inherently competitive, so they hate losing to others and they have a tendency to have a strong will for victory. These students have a strong internal sense of educational direction, so even though their parents do not pressure them, they strive for education of their own accord because of their own ambition.

The second type is those who study to meet their parents’ requirements and expectations. More than because of a sense of satisfaction from achievement or interest in studying, they are the cases who study because of external influences and because their parents wish and require it. They are those who may not have had much enthusiasm for studying, but owing to their parents’ force and pressure, steadily increased their will to study. The final type is those whose parents’ pressure never changes their volition or attitude, and on the contrary, induces stress and antagonism. The personalities of this type

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of student include those who have a low capacity for studying, those who, opposite to the first type, have a weak sense of competition, and those who have an especially strong revulsion to being compared with others. If we add one more to this type, it would be those who grew up in a family environment distant from or barren of studying, and so lost interest in studying early on.

They include students such as Shim Misŏn, Shin Hyosun, Jŏn Bongjun, and Kim Jiae, whose mothers abandoned the family or whose parents divorced, so they did not receive proper attention from their parents.

Among the 29 cases with which this research deals, students of the first and second type belonged together among those who had highly educated upper-middle-class parents and who successfully entered prestigious universities. Students such as Han Ch’angsŏk, Kim Namju, and Jo Dongjun are close to the first type, while Mun Kyuhyŏn, Jang Inbŏm, Jŏng Jiyong, An Jaehong, and Yun Jŏngran can be said to be of the second type. In other words, among academic achievers of upper-middle-class families, sometimes children are discovered who already have an especially educationoriented personality, even before the influence of the strong awareness of the importance of educational background from their parents. In these cases, rather than the role of promoting motivation or desire to study, parents concentrate on providing educational resources and support.

Compared to this, among the lowly educated working-class and lowincome cases, those who had achieved high levels of academic achievement and gone to prestigious universities (Kang Taehyŏn, Park Sangkyun, Jŏng Kyŏngmo, Oh Jŏnghŭi, Jang Hanna) were all examples of the first type. Their parents had a tendency to have an attitude of not showing deep interest in their education or leaving all decisions regarding education up to their children. With regard to these students’ educational attitudes and educational aspirations being directly related to their academic grades, I could not discover any influence from their parents or their family environment.

Compared with siblings from the same parents and family environment, it was not as if there was some particular external stimulus or benefit exerting itself only on these students. When compared with siblings from the same family, one of the main reasons these students succeeded is clearly connected to their individual characteristics. There was not a single case, at least among the above five cases, in which other siblings of the same family did well

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 245

in school or went to prestigious universities. Also, among other siblings, personality characteristics like those found in the academic achievers were not discovered. (However, it may only be that they were not found among the cases dealt with in this study; there is always a probabilistic possibility that there could be two or more children with inherently education-oriented personalities under one set of parents.) In relation to the factors that led to successful entrance into prestigious universities, the above five unanimously pointed to their ambition, and said, “It seems like it’s something that was inherited.”

If this is the case, then the reason the highly educated upper-middle-class’s nurturing customs and strategies raise their children’s academic achievement is that they can mass-produce the second type of student successfully. We can assume that students who have inherent academic aptitude and educationoriented personalities exist in every social class, and it can be said that the third type of personality, which is unsuitable for competitive and controlling cramming-style education, is an inherited condition unrelated to social class. However, the type-two success cases do not just succeed because of an inherently compliant personality; on top of that type of characteristic, parents’ goal-oriented nurturing customs exert an influence and so educational enthusiasm comes half from the child’s and half from the parents’ will. Highly educated upper-middle-class parents’ customs and strategies are not only ways to accelerate and exert pressure for their children’s academic motivation, but also include choice strategies for the future, which based on intelligence, information, and economic ability, map out their children’s educational background and deduce the best decision at every turning point.

On the one hand, previous academic scores exert influence on future academic scores and also on the student’s educational aspirations. A student with a previously poor academic record has wholly low educational aspirations, and because this does not bring about a heightened level of educational enthusiasm or attitude, the possibility becomes higher that the process will repeat in the future at a lower level. But since students’ educational aspirations are also influenced by parents’ educational aspirations, the low educational aspirations and nurturing customs of parents of low education and low professional status maintain their child’s educational achievement at a low level from the start, and as a result, influence their

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Community Culture

Parentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; educational level Parental education Parentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; level occupation

life experience

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V. Conclusion

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occurs.

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The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 247

on the relationship between parental class status and nurturing attitudes, the solution to educational inequality could be different.

The results of case study analyses show that highly educated uppermiddle-class parents have high educational aspirations that competitively prioritize entrance into a highly-ranked university with high academic capital value. These parents raise their child’s awareness and control their life through diverse methods in everyday life, and imbue aspirations for a highlevel white-collar job so that the child’s academic enthusiasm transforms to conform to these values of educational prestige. Compared with them, working-class parents of low professional status and without the experience of high-level education show no indication of practical behavior with the objective of sending their children to so-called “good universities.” One upper-middle-class parent who graduated from Seoul University and Kyunggi High School said, “[I] didn’t study very hard during high school and university, but I have the K-S mark and have made ends meet my whole life.”

And, while on the one hand, emphasizing the importance of studying to his son, one self-employed middle-school dropout said, “Even if you don’t learn, you’ll find a way somehow,” and, “The smallest amount of education needed for life in society is high school graduation; if my child doesn’t work hard on his own, I’m not going to force him to go to college.”

As with the above, differences in educational aspirations and nurturing customs between the highly educated upper-middle-class and lowly educated working-class appear because their life experiences are different.

The former have experienced firsthand the power of educational capital, and they know well from experience that prioritizing educational capital is the most powerful strategy for ensuring that their children’s generation can maintain their current class status. Compared to them, the latter have never endeavored fiercely toward acquiring a high level of education or educational background, and have not experienced discrimination or disadvantages in the labor market as a result of their low education level. They sometimes by chance advise their children, “If you don’t want to have a rough life like me, study hard,” but they are unable to show what a life of accomplishment through studying hard is like, and also have never experienced it.

Hereby this study identifies the existence of an intimate relationship between parents’ degree of interest and participation in their child’s education

248 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

and parental social class tendencies. The differences in parental educational level and professional status determine the differences in the degree and method of support and intervention in a child’s education, and the outcome of those differences is, in the end, an expression of “class instinct” that strives to maintain one’s current socioeconomic status. In other words, it can be said that parental nurturing methods, which influence a child’s educational aspirations and enthusiasm and their class status, are different aspects of each other, but cannot be separated and are essentially the same.

In the process of analysis, the discovery of an “inherently educationoriented personality” as a factor that influences academic achievement, because of qualitative research, was a possible outcome. Because case studies target numerous related variables and deal with all phenomena and circumstances (Yin 2008: 89), they are an appropriate approach for teasing out new factors that do not show up using quantitative methods.

However, this research has limitations, which are as follows.

First, it deals with only one of many decisive factors related to academic scores. Explanatory factors such as educational aspiration and nurturing methods are one aspect of a mechanism that is auxiliary to parental social status, and we cannot declare that this explains the whole mechanism by which the social class education gap is born.

Secondly, on the point of being a qualitative study based on a limited number of cases, it has the limitation of not being able to attain statistical normalization.

In addition, in the process of analyzing the interview materials, the difference among social classes in the degree to which the value of educational capital is physically perceived, along with our societal assumptions and the contradictory “paradox of perceived educational value,” as hypotheses formed by the author, are incomplete propositions that will need to be validated through further research.

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Kim, Shin Il. 2009. Sociology of Education (4th ed.). Paju, Korea: KyoyookKwahaksa (『교육사회학』).

Ku, In Hoe. 2003. “The Effect of Family Background on Adolescents’ Educational Attainments.” Korean Journal of Social Welfare Studies 22: 5-32 (“가족배경 이 청소년의 교육성취에 미치는 영향: 가족구조와 가족소득, 빈곤의 영향을 중심으 로”. 『사회복지연구』 22: 5-32).

Lee, Jong Gag and Kim, Kee Soo. 2003. “A Comparative Study on Conceptions of ‘Education Fever’.” Korean Journal of Educational Research 41(3): 191-214 (“교육열 개념의 비교와 재정의”. 『교육학연구』 41(3): 191-214).

Nam, Ki Gon. 2008. “Does the Rich Family Spend More Share of Expenditure to Private Tutoring?: The Relationship between Total Consumption Expenditure and the Share of Private Tutoring Cost.” Journal of Economic Development 14(1): 27-53 (“부유한 가정일수록 사교육비 비중이 높아지는가?가구의 총지출액과 사교육비 지출 비중의 관련성”. 『경제발전연구』 14(1): 27-53).

Park, Chang Nam and Do, Jong Soo. 2005. “The Effects of Parent’s SocioEconomic Status on Academic Achievement.” Social Welfare Policy 22: 281-303 (“부모의 사회경제적 지위가 학업성취에 미치는 영향”. 『사회복지정책』 22: 281-303).

The Academic Performance Gap between Social Classes and Parenting Practices~ 251

Phang, Hanam and Kim, Kihun. 2002. “Opportunity and Inequality: Educational Stratification in Korea” Korean Journal of Sociology 36(4): 193-222 (“고등교 육 기회에 있어서 사회계층 간 불평등 분석.” 『한국사회학』 36(4): 193-222).

Ryu, Bang Ran and Kim, Seong Sik. 2006. An Analysis of Educational Gap. Korean Educational Development Institute (『교육격차: 가정배경과 학교교육 의 영향력 분석』).

Yeo, Eugene et al. 2007. A Study on Educational Inequality and Transmission of Poverty. Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (『교육불평등과 빈곤의 대물림』).

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Yoo, Hong Joon and Kim, Woul Hwa. 2002. “A Study on the Vocational Status of Korean Society.” Vocational Competency Development Study 5(2): 35-66 (“한국 사회의 직업지위에 관한 연구.” 『직업능력개발연구』 5(2): 35-66).

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Pathways from International Society to National Legislature:

Introduction and Co-Sponsorship of the Anti-Landmine Norm in the Korean National Assembly*, ** Namkung, Gon*** and Jo, Dong-Joon**** This paper identifies the two paths where the Ottawa Treaty to prohibit the use of antipersonnel landmines has been introduced into the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea: constituency politics and progressive transnational advocacy. National Assemblymen who have minefield fields in their districts have been active in promoting the norm to clear landmines; those who have been involved in progressive transnational advocacy networks actively participate in the law-making process to provide assistances to landmine victims and clear anti-personnel landmines. In addition, this paper shows that National Assemblymenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ideological position has stronger impacts than their partisan identification in the cosponsorship of the two bills related with anti-personnel landmine issues at the National Assembly in South Korea.

Keywords: International Norms, Norm Diffusion, Anti-Landmine Norm, Korea Campaign To Ban Landmines (Kcbl), Co-Sponsoring, National Assembly, Korea

Translated from an article published in the Korean Political Science Review 44 (3): 27-52, 2010 with permission from the Korean Political Science Association. ** This project was funded by the Korean Institute of Legislative Studies in 2009. The authors thank Professor Kang, Won Taek at Seoul National University, Professor Lee, Hyeon-Woo at Sogang University and Professor Lim, Sung-hack at University of Seoul for providing a couple of survey datasets on Korean National Assemblymen. *** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ewha Womans University **** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University *

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I. Introduction The prohibition of anti-personnel landmines was a resultant of a transnational social movement coalition emphasizing human security more than national security. The social movement coalition behind the outlawing of antipersonnel landmines has challenged the usefulness of mines as an instrument for military defense and exposed landmines as a direct threat to human security. The coalition relays graphic images of landmine damage and continually updates statistics about mine-affected communities in order to help people understand that anti-personnel landmines incur humanitarian disasters. The coalition’s efforts have led landmines to be perceived as a threat to human security (Banerjee and Mugah 2002: 43-46; Parlow 1994; Rutherford 2000: 70-110; Taylor 2008: 41-45; Wexler 2003: 576-578).

While carrying out a variety of campaigns to raise the awareness of anti-personnel landmines as a threat to human security, the anti-landmine coalition has collaborated politicians to place the prohibition of antipersonnel landmines on the political agenda (Sigal 2006: 9-24). The coalition’s efforts ultimately resulted in the 1997 Ottawa Treaty.1 Some like-minded countries which played key roles in making the Ottawa Treaty coalesced into the Human Security Network in 1999, which comprises of ministers of foreign affairs from Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Mali, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand. The Human Security Network has labeled landmines as a cause of “human devastation” and approaches the campaign to ban landmines as a way to improve human security and eventually to realize “freedom from fear.”

There were two legislative campaigns to import some components of the Ottawa Treaty into the Republic of Korea in the 2000s: one for clearing landmines and providing compensations from landmine victims and the

1

It is the conventional name given to the ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction’. The Ottawa Treaty’s first draft was presented in Oslo, Norway on September 18, 1997 and it was open to signing in Ottawa, Canada on December 12, 1997. It entered into force on March 1, 1999, right after 40 countries ratified the treaty.

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other for providing humanitarian assistances for landmine victims.2 Although neither campaign succeeded, the anti-landmine norm has slowly diffused through the National Assembly’s public hearings and policy discussions.

Furthermore, the anti-landmine norm has indirectly challenged the military advantage of the landmines even in the demilitarized zone (DMZ).3 The National Assembly has become a venue for the anti-landmine norm to be internalized in the Republic of Korea.

This article examines the two campaigns to internalize the anti-landmine norm in two step: one to raise the awareness of landmines as a threat to human security and the other to legislate the norm. More specifically, this article focuses on the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) which has introduced the anti-landmine norm to Korea and has been involved in the two legislations.4 Also, this article explores the two pathways where antilandmine norm has diffused into the legislative process in Korea. Lastly, it assesses the relative power of assemblyman’s constituency interest, sociopolitical orientation, partisan affiliation, and committee participation in explain why legislators join the co-sponsorship of the two anti-landmine 2

“The Bill on the Clearance of Anti-Personnel Landmines and the Compensation to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-O” (draft bill # 162627, 09.05.2003): “The Special Bill on Assistances to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk” (draft bill # 174946, 09.18.2006). Assemblyman KIM’s draft bill was not discussed at any legislative step of the Standing Committee for National Defense, National Assembly and it was discarded because the 16th National Assembly ended its term on May 29, 2004. Assemblyman Park’s draft bill was reviewed by the Standing Committee for National Defense. The Standing Committee for National Defense decided not to pass it to the plenary of National Assembly, because the draft bill would be in conflict the compensation law. The Standing Committee for National Defense recommended the Ministry of National Defense review alternative methods such as an international trust fund and medical treatment for those affected by mines. (Secretariat of National Assembly 2007, 14-17).

3 Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo publicly advocated the removal of mines in the DMZ between the two Koreas for “the conservation of the DMZ’s ecosystem and its peaceful development” (Kim, J. 2009).

4 The KCBL has been the forerunner in the diffusion of the anti-landmine norms since 1998 in Korea. It participated in the legislation of the norm by drafting the second anti-landmine bill with Assmelbyman Park, Chan Suk from 2004 to 2007 and participated in congressional hearings (Jo 2008).

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bills.5

II. The Two Pathways in the Diffusion of the AntiLandmine Norm in the Legislative Process In February 1998, Jody Williams, the founding coordinator of The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, visited Korea. Her visit raised the awareness of landmine issues in Korea. She was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1997 for her contribution to the conclusion of the Ottawa Treaty and was invited by the KCBL. While staying in Korea, she met the politicians and members of social movement organizations who were involved in or sympathetic to the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines.6 National Assemblyman Kim, Sang-hyun, who was the leader of the Environmental Forum of the National Assembly and attended Jody Willams’ lecture, promised her that he would organize a congressional hearing on the issue. The first hearing, which was entitled as “The International Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines and Our Response,” was held at the Environmental Forum of National Assembly (Environmental Forum of National Assembly 1998: 668). Since then, the anti-landmine norm has become an agendum at the National Assembly. This section first reviews the diffusion of the international norms in general and then discusses the two diffusion pathways through which anti-landmine norms have permeated into the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

5

There is very limited empirical research on the co-sponsorship in the National Assembly. The presence of network among assemblymen in the co-sponsorship was reported (Shin, H. 2004; Chung, W. and Kwon, H. 2009) and the size of cosponsorship was positively associated with the chance of success in the legislative process (Youm, Y. 2007).

6 The KCBL dispatched two people to the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony to discuss Jody Williams’ visit to Korea. The KCBL organized several events where Jody Williams handed over prosthetic legs to landmine victims. Also, the NGO arranged meetings with politicians and activists to raise the awareness of landmine issues and internalize the anti-landmine norm (interview with Cho, J., the founding coordinator of the KCBL, 01.08.2007).

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1. The Diffusion of International Norms There are three phases in the life cycle of international norms: emergence, cascade, and internalization (Finnmore and Sikkink 1998: 894-96). At the emergence phase, activists and organizations who have strong feeling on certain issues work to get others embrace their beliefs. Activists frame certain issues to be consistent with their beliefs, while challenging the conventional framework (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2-3). They eventually present a set of alternative normative frameworks on certain issue. At the cascade phase, norm entrepreneurs muster supports enough to get their norm widely accepted at a political community. At this stage, some activists abroad, who are not involved the norm emergence, import the norm into their political communities (Koh 2004: 337-39). At the internalization phase, the imported norm is widely accepted to be taken for granted.

There are two schools on how international norms affect the behavior of state actors and non-state actors in two ways. The first school, liberalists, claim that international norms change conventional incentives and lead social forces and political activists to behave differently; thus, actors shift their behavior to make it consistent to the new payoff matrixes (Moravcsik 1995; Cortell and Davis 1996). According to liberalists, states get benefits by abiding by international norms and increase their national interests, while being restricted from doing what is not consistent with international norms.

International norms appear to regulate the behavior of states, as states are responsive to new incentives which international norms bring. In contrast, constructivists claim that the effect of international norms is much deeper.

Constructivists focus on the process where state actors shape their identity based on international norms and frame their national interests consistent with those norms. They emphasize international norms as a reference to national identity and interests (Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996).

The two schools are similarly interested in the effect of norm diffusion upon the behavior of states. More specifically, the two schools are interested in how international norms would bring changes in the behavior of states, if states comply to international norms. The two schools share the assumption that states are rational actors and examine the effect of international

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norms upon the behavior of states at the interstate or systemic level. The two schools do not pay attention to how international norms diffuse into domestic politics. In other words, the two schools are not interested in how international norms are domesticated into the legal system at the national level. The compliance of international norms is not identical to internalization (Checkel 1997: 473-74).

The genuine effect of international norms may be found in the process where norms diffuse into the domestic legal system or practices of individual states. It is state that eventually enforces international norms at the national level. The research on the diffusion of international norms is helpful in measuring whether and how international norms are internalized. The efficacy of international norms should be assessed in terms of whether states implement them at the national level. Therefore, domestic politics is a key factor in the diffusion of international norms (Cortell and Davis 2000: 66). Political activists who import international norms without much consideration of material incentives are conditioned by their domestic political contexts (Landolt 2004: 579-80).

The diffusion or internalization of international norms starts with norm empowerment, a process where prescriptions embodied in international norms become agenda in domestic political contexts (Schweller and Priess 1997: 3-11). Norm empowerment refers to legitimizing certain political behaviors which are consistent with norms. It, as a process of politicization, highlights early stages where international norms become prominent agenda in domestic politics. As it occurs through changes in discourse, norm empowerment is deeply involved in political debates and discourse competitions (Checkel 1997: 475-76).

Norm empowerment refers to a politicization of norms, while norm compliance means simply adopting norms. The diffusion of norms includes various political decisions. Once they are introduced into domestic political areas, international norms affect political actorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; behavior and their choice repeatedly. When they are routinely obeyed by actors, international norms become conventional at the national level and actors come to have a belief that certain norms should be followed. Norms provide legitimacy to certain behaviors at early phases and become later conventional references to how to behave in domestic political areas.

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Hence, the national legislature plays important roles in internalizing international norms into domestic political areas. Though various actors are involved in the diffusion of international norms, such as the United States Congress, officials in developing countries, lobbyists in Western democracies, members of global civil society, and national policy makers (Checkel 1997: 474), political elites play primary roles in the internalization of international norms, because the legislature decides whether to domesticate international norms at the national level (Cortell and Davis 2000: 70-71). The incorporation of international norms into domestic legal system is a later stage in the norm diffusion.

There are two pathways where legislators interact with international norms. First, legislator may bring international norms for their constituency interests. Though they do not internalize international norms into their beliefs and behavior, legislator may introduce international norms into domestic political issues in the ruse of global opinion or standard. Legislators are interested in taking care of their constituency interests for their reelection. Second, legislators who are exposed to international norms may redefine their interests. Transnational advocacy networks provide information consistent with international norms to legislators. Those who are sympathetic or attentive to international norms may assess their interests and political outcomes unconventionally. The cooperation between legislators and transnational advocacy networks may lead to new political contexts.

2. Pathway 1: Constituency Politics Constituency interests are identified in the diffusion of the anti-landmine norm into the Korean National Assembly. Some assemblymen whose districts include minefields have brought anti-landmine norms to politicize the presence of landmines in their districts. Korea’s minefields are generally grouped into two categories. One category has been named as “unconfirmed minefield,” an area where the exact locations of the mines are unknown.

These unconfirmed fields were formed in two ways. First, fighting forces in the Korean War failed to record the exact locations of the mines or they lost their records. As the warfront became volatile and chaotic, militants in both sides planted mines without having the time to create a detailed record

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or map, hence the Korean War has left a number of undocumented and unconfirmed minefields in Korea. Second, there are areas where misplaced landmines are believed to be laid down. When some mines were displaced by floods, landslides, and avalanches, areas near to the location of mines have been designated as “unconfirmed minefields”.7 For example, floods in North Korea in the mid-1990s led to displace landmines from North Korea and the DMZ into South Korea and have increased the risk of mines.

The other category is “confirmed minefield,” an area where mines have been precisely recorded. Three separate incidents are responsible for “confirmed minefields” in Korea. First, the Korean Military planted landmines in the DMZ and in the Military Control Zone (MCZ) contiguous to the DMZ to slow down the North Korea’s any possible attack. In addition, the Korean Military in the rear areas planted landmines to protect military facilities. Second, fearing of North Korea’s attack in collaboration with the former Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,8 the US forces in Korea planted landmines around U.S. military bases.9 Third, around the midto late 1980s, when the Asian Games and Olympics were hosted in South Korea, the Korean Military planted landmines around air defense units, which have been located near metropolises.10 The South Korean government in the 1980s was fearful of the possibility that North Korea might carry out preemptive strikes against air defense units first. The minefields around air 7

In 2003, Korea’s Ministry of National Defense reported that there were 112.5 km 2 minefields (90.7 km2 unconfirmed minefields, 23.8 km2 confirmed minefields). In contrast, the KCBL estimated that the size of minefields in Korea would be at least 300 km2.

8 During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy administration concluded that the Cuban missile was a trap. The Kennedy administration worried that the Soviet Union would attack Berlin, while attracting US attentions to Cuba (Allison and Zelikow 1999: 99-108). The trap hypothesis led US military forces in Korea to prepare North Korea’s attack.

9 The KCLB claims that the US military forces in Korea have been responsible for at least 26 civilian landmine casualties. 24 US military facilities have minefields for protection, though they have not been involved with any landmine accident (The KCBL 2003).

10 The KCBL claims that anti-personnel landmines were planted around 33 air defense facilities in the rear in the 1980s.

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defense units have given a serious threat to human security in South Korea, where air defense units are located near by large cities.

It is expected that any legislator whose district has minefields will take interest in eradicating mines and bringing relief to mine victims. Every elected legislator has a higher chance of re-election when s/he projects constituency interests into the legislative process. Electorates who face mine threats, such as those who live in the Military Control Zone or nearby minefields, are likely to support candidates who promise to get rid of landmines and provide aids to landmine victims. Also, electorates whose lands have mines or are located nearby minefields would develop their land more freely, if landmines were gotten rid of. Candidates from areas in and around minefields may bring the anti-landmine norm as a way to satisfy their district demands for their election.

So far there are two cases where assemblymen brought the anti-mine norm for their constituency interests. In 2000, Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-O, who represents Yeongdogu in Busan, initiated a legislative process to clear mines and provide relief to mine victims. Landmines were planted on Mt. Jungni, Yeongdogu to protect the US air defense base in the 1950s. A displaced mine claimed a fire fighter’s ankle, who put out a fire near the minefield on February 25, 1996 (KCBL 2003). The landmine incident led electorates in Yeongdogu to perceive the mine threats.

Cho, Jai-Kook, the founding coordinator of the KCLB and a co-worker with Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O, described the link between constituency interests and anti-landmine norm as follows: “Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O represents Yeongdogu, Busan. Mt. Jungni is located in Yeongdogu and many landmines were planted in that area. The landmine clearance was a major constituency interest in his district. In all honesty, I think that Assemblyman Kim independently initiated the legislative process and then proceeded with a collaborative research effort regarding landmines. … Assemblyman Kim’s office made the first move in asking the help from the KCBL. After the KCBL responded favorable to his move, he proposed collaboration.”

“I personally wanted the KCBL to focus on providing aids to landmine victims. I believed that it would be too difficult to pass the anti-landmine bill which dealt with both humanitarian assistance and mine clearance. I also

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believed that it would be difficult for the National Assembly to pass the bill to provide compensations for civilian landmine victims, as it was a retrospective measure. However, Assemblyman Kim and his office said that they could not leave out the mine clearance” (from an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).

Assemblyman Kim’s bill was not passed, but the constituency interest of his district was satisfied. The Joint Chief of Staff, the Korean Military decided to clear 36 mine-affected areas in the rear, and within them the clearance of landmines in Mt. Jungni area was the first project (Yu, H. 2001). The mines in the Mt. Jungni area were gotten rid of in 2003 (Park, H. 2003). After the mines in his district were cleared away, however, Assemblyman Kim became disinterested in the anti-landmine norm.11 Second, Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo, who represents P’och’eon and Yeonch’eon, Kyeonggido, has been preparing another bill on mine clearance in collaboration with the KCBL. The Military Control Zone includes some parts of P’och’eon and Yeonch’eon and has been mined since the armistice of the Korean War. Furthermore, displaced landmines which have been swept away from the North Korean side and the DMZ and ended up in the Hant’an River and Imjin River basin have posed a threat to electorates and visitors in P’och’eon and Yeonch’eon. Also, the presence of minefields adjacent to the DMZ has been a roadblock against development in his district. Therefore, the clearance of landmines is the primary constituency interest for Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo. Cho, Jai-Kook described the cooperation with Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo as follows: “Nobody at the KCBL knew Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo, before he was elected. After he was elected, I gave him a call to ask for his help in aiding landmine victims. At the time, he showed no interest in the matter. However, I heard later that he was interested in clearing landmines in the DMZ and aiding landmine victims in his district. When I called him again, he told me that he was preparing a bill on landmine clearance. He said that he came to know the KCBL, while preparing his bill. He wanted a collaboration with us” 11

In 2006, Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-O co-sponsored Assemblyman PARK’s bill.

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(from an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).

Both Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O and Kim, YoungWoo were more interested in clearing landmines in their districts rather than banning antipersonnel landmines and providing humanitarian assistances in general.

The anti-landmine norm has more ideological affinity to progressives than conservatives. Considering that the two Assemblymen are political conservatives, their enthusiasm toward the anti-landmine norm appears to reflect their constituency interest.12

3. Pathway 2: Progressive Transnational Advocacy Networks Considering that landmine issues are closely associated with human security, it is highly likely that progressive transnational advocacy networks work as an intermediary in the diffusion of anti-landmine norms. As transnational advocacy networks are interconnected based on their ideological orientations, those who have participated in progressive transnational advocacy networks and are elected into the National Assembly have an ideological affinity to the anti-landmine norm in general and are expected to bring the anti-landmine norm to the legislative process. A large number of young activists, who had been involved in various social movements, were recruited into the National Assembly since 1996. They were labeled as “young blood” and formed an influential group. Especially, the number of Assemblymen who had been involved in social movements was substantial in the 16th and 17th National Assemblies (2000 to 2004, 2004 to 2008) (Yoon, J. 2004; Chang, B. 2004). The National Assembly came to be favorable to the anti-landmine norm.

The legislative process of the draft bill entitled as “the Special Bill on Assistances to Landmine Victims” in 2006 shows that the ideological affinity between assemblymen who were involved in progressive transnational advocacy networks and the anti-landmine norm is positively associated with the diffusion of the anti-landmine norm. After witnessing that Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O 12

Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-O described himself a right-wing conservative while Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo declared himself a moderate conservative (Koh, J. and Chung, K. 2008; Kim, B. 2009).

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failed to get his bill ever reviewed at any level in 2003, the moderate wing in the KCBL shifted their focus to providing aid for landmine victims.13 While it was looking for someone to present a bill to help landmine victims, the KCBL was connected to Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon. Cho, Jai-Kook described the collaboration between the KCBL and Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon as follows: “There is an ecumenical forum among religious leaders called as Korean Conference of Peace for Peace (KCPP). The late pastor Kang, Weon Nyong is one of the founding members and also served as the president. I met the last pastor Kang in a KCPP meeting and asked his help to find assemblymen who would propose a bill to aid landmine victims. The last pastor Kang immediately introduced me to Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon, a leader in a peace movement based on Won-Buddhism in Korea to help war victims and orphans. Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon served as the secretary-general of the KCPP, when the late Pastor KANG served as the president of the KCPP. He was the majority leader of the National Defense Committee, National Assembly, when I met him first” (from an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).

“Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon approached the anti-landmine campaign as a peace movement. He was very interested in the KCBL’s anti-landmine initiative. He promised to sponsor a bill which the KCBL prepared to help landmine victims. He collaborated with us” (an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 13

Since its establishment, the KCBL was comprised of moderates who focused on humanitarian aid to mine victims and hardliners who shared anti-American and anti-governmental sentiments. Mr. Cho described the relationship between the two factions in the KCBL as followings:

“There were ideological differences among the early members of the KCBL. …

A portion of the participants approached the anti-personnel landmine issue as a continuation of anti-nuclear and anti-war movements where they were affiliated.

These people, who were relatively more militant, slowly phased out of the KCBL. The linkage between the KCBL and organizations where former KCBL hardliners were affiliated also weakened. After hardliners left the KCBL, the remaining members focused on directly helping landmine victims and began collaborating with governmental officials and law-makers” (from an interview with Cho, JaiKook, the founding coordinator of the KCBL, 2009.9.18).

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2007.8.1).

Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk sponsored the bill that the KCBL and Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon prepared. There were two reasons that Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk played the leading role on the surface, though he was not involved in the early stage of preparing the second anti-landmine bill. First, Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon was elected as the chairman of the National Defense Committee in the second half of the 17th National Assembly. He was reluctant to introducing the bill, since he was afraid that his initiative would pressure his committee colleagues. Instead, he asked Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk to sponsor the bill. Second, the KCBL had personal ties to a few staff in Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk’s office. Park, Hyeongyong, who was a staff for Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk and had been the student union leader at Kyungpook National University, has been friends with Ko, Jeongho, who was involved in the KCBL. Cho, Jai-Kook described the relationship among the KCBL and the two assemblymen in detail as follows: “The KCBL had five meetings with some officials from the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Justice at Assemblyman Kim, SungGon’s office. Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon played the intermediary role between us and the government officials. We came to find a common ground and agreed to introduce a draft bill to help landmine victims. While preparing the bill, Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon was elected as the chairman of the National Defense Committeee, National Assembly. Assemblyman Kim, SungGon said that he would make arrangements for Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk to sponsor the bill. Nobody at the KCBL had ever heard of Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk, but one of our members was a friend with an aide to Assemblyman Park. Expecting that the personal tie would lead to an efficient collaboration, we contacted Assemblyman Park and asked him to lead the legal process” (from an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).14 14

Mr. Cho, Jai-Kook revealed a negative opinion on the collaboration with Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk as follows:

“Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk had no interest in landmine issues. He did not make any efforts to pass the bill. … He took care more of his constituency

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III. Co-sponsorship for the Anti-Landmine Norm Co-sponsorship is a requirement for any draft bill that is introduced by assemblymen in the Korean National Assembly. The Article 79 of the National Assembly Law stipulates that any draft bill shall be sponsored by at least 10 assemblymen. Any assemblyman must gather at least nine supporters, when preparing to propose a bill. The law has led to a flood of co-sponsorships.15 This section reviews how the KCBL targeted assemblymen as potential co-sponsors. And then, it categorizes the factors to lead assemblymen to participate in co-sponsoring the two draft bills of the anti-landmine norm into constituency interests, ideological affinity, and partisan affiliation.

1. Initiatorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Interests The initiator of any draft bill tries to get co-sponsors whose participation highlights the public interest and political relevancy of the bill (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996: 555; Wilson and Young 1997: 29). There are two major factors in the co-sponsorship for the success of a draft bill. One is the size of cosponsorship, which signals the amount of support behind the legislation.

Even if legislators are not familiar with a draft bill, the sheer number of the co-sponsors for the bill gives an impression that the draft bill is consistent with public interest (Koger 2003: 228). Therefore, those who plan to sponsor any draft bill to the National Assembly attempt to increase the co-sponsorship size. The co-sponsorship size actually has a positive relationship with the probability of legislative success (Browne 1985: 483-88; Wilson and Young 1997: 34-37). This is called as the bandwagon model (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996: 556; Wilson and Young 1997: 28).

The other is the composition of co-sponsorship. When it is co-sponsored interests than attaining the goal of banning landmines. There was no minefield in his district. It was very hard to get him even understand landmine issues (from an interview with Cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).

15 The average number of draft bills which a legislator initiated was 10.2 and that of drat bill which a legislator co-sponsored bills was 142.5 in the Korean National Assembly in 2008 (Chung, W. and Kwon, H. 2009).

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by influential legislators in the majority party, committee chairs, or experts, a draft bill conveys its relevancy. Also, non-partisan co-sponsorship signals that the bill does not cater to partisan interests (Fenno 1991: 45-55; Koger 2003: 228-29; Wilson and Young 1997: 29). Empirical studies of the co-sponsorship in the US Congress attest to the signaling model (Koger 2003: 238-41; Krehbiel 1995: 910-12; Wilson and Young 1997: 34-37).

It seems that the KCBL tended to focus on the size rather than the composition of co-sponsorship. The KCBL’s targeting was based on the following criteria: First, the KCBL lobbies assemblymen who had personal ties with the network’s key members. Assemblymen who were already acquainted with KCBL leaders joined as co-sponsors, even though they were not familiar with the anti-landmine campaign in detail. Meanwhile, it took long to meet and explain landmine issues to those who did not have personal ties with the anti-landmine movement. Second, the KCBL lobbied assemblymen who were involved in progressive social movements or democratic movements.

“I was in charge of lobbying Assemblymen. When I was studying theology at Yonsei University in the late 1970s, I was involved in Christian social movements. I was affiliated with the Ecumenical Youth Council in Korea as a leader from the Methodist denomination and was later elected as the president of the council. At that time, the church was a safe heaven for the democratic movement. Christian social movements and the democratic movement were intermingled. I got to know young leaders who participated in social movements in the second half of the 1970s. Those who led social movements and the democratic movement eventually became government officials (in the 1990s and 2000s). I targeted assemblymen based on my personal connection” (from an interview with Cho, Jae-Kook, 2009.9.19).

Several hypotheses derive from the KCBL’s lobbying experience and previous empirical studies on co-sponsorship.16 16

There are difficulties at testing the two competing models of co-sponsorship in the diffusion of the anti-landmine norm in the Korean National Assembly. As there are only two cases of co-sponsoring and no committee chair participated as a co-sponsor, it is impossible to assess the effect of the co-sponsorship composition upon the legislative process. Also, though the two bills are different in terms of their emphasis: one for landmine clearance, the other for humanitarian assistance to mine victims, it

270 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

Hypothesis 1. Those who are not affiliated with initiators’ political parties are more likely to be lobbied and participate in the co-sponsorship.

Hypothesis 2. Members of the National Defense Committee are more likely to be lobbied and participate in the co-sponsorship.

Hypothesis 3. Those who were involved in progressive social movements and the democratic movement are more likely to be lobbied and participate in the co-sponsorship.

2. Potential Co-Sponsors’ Interests There are three factors in deciding whether to participate in the cosponsorship. One is the constituency interest. An assemblyman’s participation in the co-sponsorship may be viewed as a behavior to represent the constituency interests of his/her district (Arnold 1990; Bianco 1994; Mayhew 1974: 63). In other words, participating in the co-sponsorship is a way to outwardly display dedication toward constituency interests (Regens 1989: 502-12). However, if a legislator co-sponsors a bill that goes against his/ her district interests, the backlash from constituents weakens the chance of being re-elected. Therefore, it is likely that a legislator co-sponsors draft bills which are consistent with his/her district interests. Promotion of constituency interests is more important than participating in the co-sponsorship for promising draft bills (Mayhew 1974: 62 & 132).17 Another is the ideological orientations of legislators. Co-sponsoring reveals the socio-economic orientations of participants (Campbell 1982: 417). It is a signal friendly to actors who want to politicize certain issues. The findings that moderates tend to be late joiners to draft bills imply that cosponsoring is an action to convey political stances on certain issues (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996: 562). Furthermore, when faced with controversial draft bills, co-sponsoring is a preemptive move to avoid being pressured to choose is hard to control the effect of the difference between the two draft bills upon the cosponsoring process.

17 The constituency interest hypothesis does not explain the co-sponsorship for draft bills which are negative to district interests. Considering that legislators are not familiar to all draft bills in detail, the constituency interest hypothesis has a weakness in explaining the co-sponsorship (Campbell 1982: 416).

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a side (Koger 2003: 232-33).

The last is party affiliation. Party is an institutionalized human network.

Loose networks and groups based on personal ties exist in the legislature (Shin, H. 2004; Jeong, W. and Ahn, Y. 2004; Porter et al. 2005) and further there are co-sponsoring networks cross the partisan line (Kim, L. 2009; Yoo S. 2009). Partisan identification has relatively lost its influence in predicting the voting behavior in the Korean National Assembly (Lee, H. 2005). Yet, partisan identification is the most important factor in the co-sponsorship.

Whether a legislator is affiliated with the same political party the sponsor of a draft bill belongs to is still most powerful in predicting whether the potential co-sponsor to support the bill or not (Chung, W. and Kwon, H. 2009; Fowler 2006: 483-84; Krehbiel 1995: 910).

The above three factors in the co-sponsorship leads to the following three hypotheses.

Hypothesis 4. Those who have minefields in their districts are more likely to co-sponsor the anti-landmine bills.

Hypothesis 5. Progressive assemblymen are more likely to co-sponsor the anti-landmine bills.

Hypothesis 6. Those who are affiliated with the same political party the leading sponsors of the anti-landmine bills belong to are more likely to cosponsor the anti-landmine bills.

IV. Research Design, Findings, and Discussions Though previous studies identify several factors in explaining the cosponsorship at the Korean National Assembly, none of them assesses the relative explanatory power of each factor. This section presents a research design to assess how much each factor explains the co-sponsoring behavior at the Korean National Assembly.

1. Two Anti-Personnel Landmine Bills The Ottawa Treaty gives several duties to each member state. First, each

272 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

member state should not use anti-personnel landmines. More specifically, each member state should not use anti-personnel landmines in storage “under any condition,” should not produce or retain anti-personnel landmines, neither transfer anti-personnel landmines to anybody (Ottawa Treaty, Article 1, para.1).18 Second, each member state should destroy all antipersonnel landmines which it possesses or controls (Ottawa Treaty, Article 4).19 Furthermore, each member state should clear planted anti-personnel landmines under its jurisdiction or control within 10 years after the entry into force of the convention (Ottawa Treaty, Article 5, para.1 and 2). Third, each member state should provide assistance for landmine victims (Ottawa Treaty, Article 6).

Two draft bills which incorporated partially the duties of the Ottawa Treaty were introduced in the Korean National Assembly. On September 5, 2003, Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O presented a draft bill entitled as “the Bill on the Clearance of Anti-Personnel Landmines and the Compensation to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Hyong-O KIM” (draft bill # 162627).

The draft bill has several features. First, this draft bill defines anti-personnel landmines as “inhumane weapons that indiscriminately claim casualties.” This definition implies that landmines do not contribute to national security, but actually threaten human security. Second, this bill frames planting landmines as an act to destroy the land. Meanwhile, it describes clearing landmines as an act to “restore the land into a normal state.” Third, this draft bill emphasizes the need of governmental compensations for landmine victims who were unable to apply for indemnities, portraying the governmental compensation as a way to help landmine victims maintain “socially and economically stable life.”

Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk introduced the other draft bill entitled as “The Special Bill on Assistances to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk” (draft bill # 174946). The bill incorporates minimally the Ottawa Treaty. The bill does not mention the inhumane nature of anti-personnel 18

Transferring mines with the intent to educate those who are involved in mine clearances is exceptionally accepted (Ottawa Treaty, Article 3).

19 There is a 4-year grace period for the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel landmines after the entry into force of the convention for each member (Ottawa Treaty, Article 4).

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landmines; it does not refer to banning the use of and destruction of stockpiled landmines or the clearance of planted anti-personnel landmines.

Nonetheless, it proposes a special grace period for landmine “victims and their families” to apply for monetary compensations. In addition, it mentions the need of “minimum medical assistances” to landmine victims. Although the anti-landmine norm was gaining supports in Korea, landmine as an instrument of national security was too strong for Assemblyman Park’s bill to incorporate fully the Ottawa Treaty.

2. Research Design This article assesses the explanatory power of several factors in the cosponsorship for the anti-landmine bills in the Korean National Assembly. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of whether to participate in the legislative process for the anti-landmine norm as a co-sponsor. Independent variables include partisan identification, the membership to the National Defense Committee, involvement in progressive movements, ideological orientations, and the presence of minefield in a district. This article employs a series of cross-tabulation analyses and a logit analysis.

Dependent Variable. It is a dummy of whether a assemblyman to cosponsor the two anti-landmine bills in the Korean National Assembly: Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O’s bill on September 5, 2003 and Assemblyman Park, Chan Suk’s bill on September 18, 2006.” 30 people co-sponsored Assemblyman Kim’s; 20 46 people co-sponsored Assemblyman Park’s bill.21 Participants are coded “1” and others “0.”

20

The co-sponsors were Kwon, Ki-Sool, Kwon, Oh-Eul, Kim, Seong Ho, Kim, Young Whan, Kim, Yong Hak, Kim, Won Wung, Kim, Hee Sun, Namgoong, Seuk, Min, Bong-Gee, Park, Myung-hwan, Park, Chong-Ung, Park, Jin, Shim, Jae-Chul, Ahn, Sang Soo, Yang, Jung-Kyu, Eom, Ho Sung, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, Keun Jin, Lee, SungHun, Lee, Won Young, Lee, Yoon Sung, Lee, Jae-Oh, Lee, Joo-Young, Lee, Chang Bok, Chang, Sung-Won, Chung, Kab-Yoon, Choung, Byoung-Gug, and Hong, Moon-Jong.

21 The co-sponsors were Kang, Gi-Jung, Kang, Chang Il, Koak, Sung Moon, Kim, Duk Kyu, Kim, Sung-Gon, Kim, Jae Yun, Kim, Jae-Hong, Kim, Jong Yull, Kim, Tae Nyeon, Kim, Hyuk Kyu, Kim, Hyung-O, Kim, Hee Sun, Noh, Woong Rae, Park, Myung

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Independent Variables. Five independent variables and one control variable are incorporated. The first independent variable is a dummy variable of whether a legislator is affiliated with the same party where a leading sponsor is associated. Those who share a partisan identification with a leading sponsor are coded “1” and others “0.” The second is a dummy variable of whether a legislator is a member of the National Defense Committee. The members of the National Defense Committee are coded “1” and others “0.” The third is a dummy variable of whether a legislator was involved in progressive social movements. Those who were involved in progressive social movements are coded “1” and others “0.” 22 The fourth is a dummy variable of whether a Kwang, Park, Sei-hwan, Bahk, Jaewan, Song, Young-Sun, Shin, Kinam, Shin, Sang Jin, Sim, Jae Duck, Ahn, Myoung Ock, Ahn, Byong-Yub, Ahn, Sang Soo, Ahn, Young Keun, Eom, Ho Sung, Woo, Sang Ho, Woo, Won Shik, Lew, Seon Ho, You, SeungHee, Yoo, Jay Kun, Lee, Kyung Sook, Lee, Kwang-Jae, Lee, Kwang Chol, Lee, Keun-Sik, Rhee, Mok Hee, Lee, Si Jong, Lee, In Ki, Lee, In Young, Lee, Jae Oh, Im, Jong In, Jung, Chung Rae, Cho, Seong Rae, Cho, Il Hyun, Choe, Kyoo Sik, Choi, Jae Chun, and Han, Kwang Won. 22 We referenced Donga Ilbo’s Who Are in the 16th National Assembly? and Who Are in the 17 National Assembly? to code whether a given legislator was involved in progressive social movments (Donga Ilbo’s Editorial Deparment 2000; Donga Ilbo’s Editorial Deparment 2004). Also, we look at several other articles to code the involment in progressive social movements (Park, C. 2004; Baik, W. and Shin, C. 2004; Cho, S. 2003; Choi, J. 2004; Hue, M. 2003). We identified 44 assemblymen who had been involved in progressive social movements and were in active service in 2003: Kang, Samjae, Kim, Kyungjae, Kim, Geun Tae, Kim, Deog Ryong, Kim, Moon Soo, Kim, Boo-Kyum, Kim, Sung-Ho, Kim, Young-Choon, Kim, Won Ki, Kim, Won Wung, Kim, Tae Hong, Kim, Hong Shin, Kim, Hee Sun, Park, Kwan-Yong, Suh, Sang-Sup, Sul, Hoon, Song, Young Gil, Shin, Geh-Ryeun, Shim, Kew Cheol, Shim, Jae-Kwon, Shim, Jae-Chul, Ahn, Young Keun, Oh, Se-Hoon, Oh, Young-Sik, Won, Hee-Ryong, Rhyu, Simin, Lee, Mykyung, Lee, Bu-young, Lee, Sang Su, Lee, Sung Hun, Lee, Woo-Jae, Lee, Jae Oh, Lee, Jong Kul, Lee, Chang Bok, Lee, Hae Chan, Lee, Ho Wung, Im, Jong Seok, Lim, Chae Jung, Chang, Kwang Keun, Chang, Young Dal, Chung, Dong-Young, Choung, Byoung-gug, and Hong, Sa-Duk. Also, we identified 56 assemblymen who had been involved in progressive social movements and were in active in 2006: Kang, Ki Kab, Kang, Gi-Jung, Kang, Chang Il, Go, Jin Hwa, Kwon, Young Ghil, Kim, Geun Tae, Kim, Deog Ryong, Kim, Boo-Kyum, Kim, Young-Chun, Kim, Won Ki, Kim, Won Wung, Kim, Tae Nyeon, Kim, Tae Hong, Kim, Hyun Mee, Kim, Hee Sun, Noh, Young Min, Roh, Hoe-chan, Dan, Byung Ho, Moon, Hee Sang, Min, Byung Doo, Park, Kye Dong, Baek, Won Woo, Sun, Byung Ryul, Song, Young Gil, Shim, Sang Jeong, Shim,

Pathways from International Society to National Legislature 275

legislator has minefields in his/her district. Those who have minefields in their districts are coded “1” and others “0.” 23 The fifth is a composite index of ideological orientations which Joongang Ilbo and the Korean Association of Party Studies made based on the survey data entitled “Ideology and Policy Orientations of Elected Assemblymen” in 2002 and 2004. The composite index ranges from “0” (very progressive) to “10” (very conservative). Lastly, the gender is incorporated as a control variable. It is coded “1” for female assemblymen and “0” for males.24

3. Cross-Tabulation Analyses We carried out a series of cross-tabulation analyses to find out whether the six independent variables explain the co-sponsoring behavior in the Korean National Assembly. First, Table 1 presents the cross-tabulation analysis Jae-Chul, Ahn, Young-Keun, Woo, Sang Ho, Woo, Won-Shik, Won, Hye Young, Won, Hee-Ryong, Yoo, Ki Hong, You, Seung-Hee, Rhyu, Simin, Yoo, Ihn-Tae, Lee, KwangJae, Lee, Ki Woo, Lee, Mykyung, Lee, Young Soon, Lee, In Young, Lee, Jae Oh, Lee, Jong Kul, Lee, Hae Chan, Lee, Hwa-Young, Im, Jong Seok, Lim, Chae Jung, Chang, Young Dal, Choung, Byoung-gug, Chung, Bon Ju, Jung, Chung Rae, Chun, Youngse, Choi, Soon Young, Choi, Jae Sung, Han, Myeong-Sook, Han, Byung Do, and Hyun, Ae Ja. 23 We referenced the two reports published by the KCBL to identify assemblymen whose districts had minefields when the two anti-landmine bills were introduced (The KCBL 2001; The KCBL 2006). We identified 33 assemblymen whose districts had minefields in 2003: Kang, Bong Kyun, Kang, Sung-Goo, Kim, Deog Ryong, Kim, Young-il, Kim, Yong Hak, Kim, Yong Hwan, Kim, Hyung-O, Na, Oh-Yeon, Moon, Seok Ho, Park, Geun Hye, Park, Jong-Woo, Park, Joo Sun, Bae, Ki Yoon, Suh, Sang-Sup, Song, Hoon Suk, Ahn, Young Keun, Yoon, Doo-Hwan, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Rhee, Q-Taek, Lee, Sang Deuk, Lee, Yong-Sam, Lee, Jai Chang, Lee, Han Dong, Lee, Hae Goo, Chang, Sun Won, Choung, Byoung-gug, Chung, Woo-taik, Chung, Jang Sun, Choo, Chin-Woo, Choi, Don-Woong, Choi, Byung Gook, Han, Seung-Soo, Ham, Suk Jae, and Hwang, Woo-Yea. Also, we identified 16 assemblymen who had minefields in their districts in 2006: Ko, Jeou Heung, Kim, Yang Soo, Ryu, Keun Chan, Park, Sei-hwan, Shim, JaeYup, Ahn, Byong Yup, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, Kwang-Jae, Rhee, Q-Taek, Lee, Jai Chang, Chung, Moon-Hun, Choung, Byoung-gug, Chung, Jang Sun, Choi, Chul Kook, Han, Kwang Won, and Hwang, Woo-Yea. 24 Women have been reported to be more inclined to participate in humanitarian aid than men (Sapiro 2003).

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between partisan identification and co-sponsorship. It shows that when s/he was affiliated with the same political party where a leading sponsor was associated, a given legislator was more active in the co-sponsorship.

Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O’s draft bill was more co-sponsored by his colleagues in the Grand National Party; Assemblyman Chan-Suk’s was more supported by his colleagues in the Uri Party.

The comparison between the two cases clearly shows that partisan identification is associated with the co-sponsoring behavior. Only 4 legislators co-sponsored Assemblyman Park’s bill out of 13 assemblymen who had already been involved in introducing Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O’s bill in 2003 and were in active service in 2006: Kim, Hyung-O (the leading sponsor), Kim, Hee Sun (co-sponsor), Ahn, Sang Soo (co-sponsor), and Lee, Jae Oh (co-sponsor). Meanwhile, 9 legislators who had supported Assemblyman Kim’s and were in active service in 2006 did not support Assemblyman Park’s: Kwon, Oh-Eul, Kim, Won Wung, Park, Jin, Shim, Jae-Chul, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, Yoon Sung, Lee, Joo-Young, Chang, Sung-Won, Chung, Kab-Yoon, and Choung, Byoung-Gug. Eight legislators who had supported Assemblyman Kim’s in 2003 and did not support Assemblyman Park’s in 2006 were affiliated with the Grand National Party. The finding implies that the 8 legislators cosponsored Assemblyman Kim’s, simply because they were members of the Grand National Party, considering that Assemblyman Kim’s bill incorporated more elements of the Ottawa Treaty than Assemblyman Park’s.

Second, Table 2 present the cross-tabulation analysis between committee membership and co-sponsorship. It appears that the members of National Defense Committee participated in the co-sponsorship less than others.

The percentage of the committee members who co-sponsored the two antilandmine bills is 17.14%, while that of the non-committee members who supported the two bills is 13.16%. However, there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups.

The detailed comparison between the two cases unveils that the membership to the National Defense Committee was not related with the cosponsorship. Assemblyman Park, Sei-hwan and Chung, Dae-Chul, who were members of the National Defense Committee and studies landmine issues with Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O in 2001, did not co-sponsor Kim’s draft bill in 2003. Only Assemlyman Lee, Kyeong-Jae supported Kim’s bill out of 12

Pathways from International Society to National Legislature 277

Table 1. Cross-Tabulation Analysis between Party Identification and Co-Sponsorship Co-Sponsorship

Party Identification

Yes

No

Total

Same

57 19.72%

232 80.28%

289

Different

19 6.83%

259 93.17%

278

Total

76 13.40%

491 86.60%

567

Pearson’s Chi^2(1)

20.2790 (Pr. = 0.000)

Table 2. Cross-Tabulation Analysis between Committee Membership and Co-Sponsorship Co-Sponsorship

National Defense Committee Membership

Pearson’s Chi^2(1)

Yes

No

Total

Yes

6 17.14%

29 82.86%

35

No

70 13.16%

462 86.84%

532

Total

76 13.40%

491 86.60%

567

0.4493 (Pr. = 0.503)

members of the National Defense Committee in 2003: Kang, Samjae, Kang, Chang-Sung, Kang, Chang-hee, Kim, Ki-Jai, Kim, Jong-Pil, Park, Sei-hwan, Park, Yang-Soo, Suh, Chung-Won, Yoo, Han Yul, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, ManSup, and Lee, Sang Deuk. Only 5 members (Kim, Sung-Gon, Song, YoungSun, Ahn, Young Keun, Yoo, Jay Kun, and Lee, Keun-Sik) co-sponsored Assemblyman Park’s bill in 2006 out of 17 members of the National Defense Committee.

It seems that partisan identification is more powerful than committee membership in the co-sponsorship. Assemblyman Lee, Kyeong-Jae, the only co-sponsor of Assemblyman Kim’s bill in 2003 out of 13 members of the National Defense Committee, was affiliated with the Grand National Party

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Table 3. Cross-Tabulation Analysis between Involvement in Progressive Social Movements and Co-Sponsorship Co-Sponsorship

Progressive Social Movement Participation

Pearsonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Chi^2(1)

Yes

No

Total

Yes

22 22.00%

78 78.00%

100

No

54 11.56%

413 88.44%

467

Total

76 13.40%

491 86.60%

567

7.7293 (Pr. = 0.005)

where Assemblyman Kim was a member; four assemblymen who supported Assemblyman Parkâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s bill in 2006 and were members of the National Defense Committee were members to the Yuri Party where Assemblyman Park was associated. This finding implies that the effect of partisan identification is dominant over that of committee membership.

Third, Table 3 presents the cross-tabulation analysis between the involvement in progressive social movements and co-sponsorship. It shows that the percentage of those who had been involved in progressive social movements and co-sponsored the anti-landmine bills is 22%, while that of those who had not been involved in any progressive social movement but co-sponsored the bills is 11.56%. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant.

Fourth, Table 4 presents the cross-tabulation analysis between constituency interest and co-sponsorship. It appears that those whose districts had minefields were more active in the co-sponsorship than those whose districts were free from landmines. The percentage of those who had minefields in their districts and supported the two anti-landmine bills is 16.33%, while that of those who were free from landmines and supported the two bills is 13.13%. However, the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant. It implies that constituency interests were not strong in the co-sponsorship.

Fifth, Table 5 presents the cross-tabulation analysis between gender

Pathways from International Society to National Legislature 279

Table 4. Cross-Tabulation Analysis between Constituency Interest and Co-Sponsorship) Co-Sponsorship Yes

No

Total

Yes

8 16.33%

41 83.67%

49

No

68 13.13%

450 86.87%

518

Total

76 13.40%

491 86.60%

567

Minefields within Electoral District

Pearson’s Chi^2(1)

0.3947 (Pr. = 0.530)

Table 5. Cross-Tabulation Analysis between Gender and Co-Sponsorship Co-Sponsorship

Gender

Yes

No

Total

Female

6 10.71%

50 89.29%

56

Male

70 13.73%

440 86.27%

510

Total

76 13.40%

491 86.60%

567

Pearson’s Chi^2(1)

0.3936 (Pr. = 0.530)

and co-Sponsorship. It appears that female assemblymen were less active in co-sponsoring the two anti-landmine bills than male counterparts. The percentage of female assemblymen who were involved in the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm is 10.71%, while that of male assemblymen who supported the two bills is 13.73%. This finding is not consistent with reports that women are more active in peace movements. Considering that female assemblymen were over-represented at the National Defense Committee, this finding appears to be counter-intuitive to the conventional wisdom.

280 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012

4. Logit Analysis A logit analysis is employed to assess the relative explanatory power of the six factors at the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm in the Korean National Assembly. There are two notable finding in the table 6.

First, partisan identification and ideological orientations have statistically significant coefficients. This finding is consistent with the cross-tabulation analyses. This finding implies that the log-rolling is linked with partisan identification, if there is. Also, this finding implies that co-sponsorship reflect personal beliefs on social issues. The fact progressive legislators were more active in the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm is associated the linkage between anti-landmine norm and human security.

Second, committee membership, involvement in progressive social movements, gender and constituency interest do not have any statistically significant coefficient. This finding is consistent with the most of the crosstabulation analyses in the previous section except for the case of involvement in progressive social movements. This finding that the involvement in progressive movements is not associated with the co-sponsorship implies that there is a strong ideological bifurcation among those who had participated in social movements (Choi, S. 2009). Considering that the composite index of ideological orientations is weakly associated with the involvement in progressive social movement (Pearson’s correlation coefficient = -0.3506, p-value = 0.000), some of those who were involved in progressive social movement become conservative.

The far right column of Table 6 presents a series of relative risks which the method of recycled predictions generates.25 There are two notable findings in 25

The method of recycled predictions is helpful in assessing the substantive significance of independent variables in explaining the variance in dependent variable, partially overcoming the weakness of statistical significance tests. Three steps are taken to generate the right three columns in Table 6 for each independent variable.

First, after finishing maximum likelihood analyses on the relationship between independent variables and a limited (categorical) dependent variable, the minimum value for a given independent variable is incorporated to replace all real values for the independent variable and the average predicted probability (“minimum” in

Pathways from International Society to National Legislature 281

Table 6. Logit Analysis of Co-Sponsorship Dependent Variable = Co-sponsorship

Coeff.

S.E.

p-value

Independent Variables

Min.

1.2220 0.3575 Party Identification 0.4276 0.6736 Defense Com. Membership Progressive Social Movement 0.4562 0.3710 0.5204 0.5077 Minefields within District -0.3025 0.1157 Ideological Orientations -0.0703 0.5275 Gender -1.6174 0.5526 Constant Number of Observations Wald chi^2(6) Prob > chi^2

Predicted Probabilities

0.001 0.526 0.219 0.305 0.009 0.894 0.003

0.0582 0.1113 0.1033 0.1085 0.04405* 0.1142

Max.

Rel. Risk

0.1680 188.9% 0.1571 41.1% 0.1505 45.7% 0.1649 52.0% 0.2594* 488.8%* -5.7% 0.1077

414 20.63 0.0021

* “Min.” = most conservative; “Max.” = most progressive.

the relative risk analysis. First, the composite index of ideological orientations is the crucial factor in the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm. The probability of an extremely conservative assembly member participating in co-sponsorship is a meager 0.04405 in the 16th and 17th National Assemblies, while an extremely progressive assembly member’s probability jumps to 0.25940 (relative risk = 488.8%). The probability of the latter is approximately five times greater than that of the former.

Second, partisan identification is the second most influential factor in the co-sponsorship for the two anti-landmine bills. When a legislator is not affiliated with the same party where a leading sponsor is associated, the average predicted probability of co-sponsoring is 0.05815. In contrast, when a legislator and a leading sponsor are members to a same political party, the average predicted probability of co-sponsoring is 0.16799 (relative risk Table 6) is calculated. It is the reference probability. Second, the maximum value for the same independent variable is incorporated to replace all real values for the independent variable and the average predicted probability (“maximum” in Table 6) is calculated. Third, the relative risk is calculated. The relative risk’s formula is [(the average predicted probability of “maximum” – that of “minimum)/that of “minimun”] (STATACorp 2002).

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= 188.9%). The probability of the latter is almost twice as high as that of the former. Considering that the logit analysis controls the effect of the rest independent variables, this finding vindicates that political parties are strong networks in the co-sponsorship.

V. Conclusion The Korean National Assembly is a locus where the anti-landmine norm is being empowered. Some legislators play key roles in introducing alternative frames to the conventional perspective to anti-personnel landmine as an instrument of national defense and domesticating the anti-landmine norm into the domestic legal system. They have been collaborating with the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Korean chapter of International Campaign to Ban Landmines. They have been trying to legitimize policies consistent with the global anti-landmine norm. It is an act of norm empowerment.

This study analyzes two aspects of empowering the anti-landmine norm: introduction and legal sponsorship. This study provides several implications to the understanding of the Korean politics. First, ideological orientations are more important than partisan identification in explaining the co-sponsorship for controversial issues in the 16th and 17th National Assemblies.26 Landmine victims have not formed into a well-organized actor in empowering the anti-landmine norm in Korean politics, even though their welfare is directly related with it. Progressive NGOs, humanitarian assistance groups, progressive politicians have been active in importing the anti-landmine norm. The ideological fault-line is critical in the co-sponsorship for the 26

Table 6 shows that the impact of ideological orientations upon the average predicted probability of co-sponsoring is stronger than that of partisan identification by almost 3 times. This finding may reflect the partisan realignment from 2003 and 2007.

The Millennium Democratic Party, the ruling party from 2000 to 2003, was under disintegration, when Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-O sponsored the first anti-landmine bill in 2003; The Uri Party, the ruling party from 2003 to 2007, was plagued by the â&#x20AC;&#x153;lame duckâ&#x20AC;? phenomenon, when Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk introduced the second antilandmine bill in 2006. It is natural that partisan identification was not influential, when parties were realigned.

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anti-landmine norm. It is consistent with previous empirical studies on the voting behavior in the Korean National Assembly (Lee, H. 2005; Chung, W. and Hong, S. 2009). Second, this study implies that there may be a strong ideological bifurcation among assemblymen who had been involved in progressive social movement. Former activists in progressive movements were recruited into conservative parties as well as progressive ones. Some active assemblymen who had been involved in progressive movements may have become conservative. Their current ideological orientations have stronger than their previous activities in explaining the co-sponsorship.

This study has a couple of limitations for generalization. First, the antilandmine norm is ideologically biased. Considering that the anti-landmine norm has been associated with politically progressive coalitions, it is natural that the ideological fault-line is more influential than partisan identification.

Second, the number of cases is too small to identify an evolution in terms of NGO tactics. The KCBL targeted assemblymen whose districts had landmine fields in 2006, while it heavily lobbies assemblymen based on personal connections in 2003. Though the difference between the time points almost reaches the statistical significance level, it is hard to verify whether the KCBL’s targeting change paid off.

This study has a couple of further research topics. First, it does not explain why female assemblymen were less inactive in co-sponsoring the antilandmine bills. Though it is suspected that female assemblymen were not targeted by the KCBL or were isolated from military issues in general, this study does not provide a reliable answer yet. Second, the composition of cosponsorship might affect the co-sponsorship size. Assemblyman Kim, HyungO’s bill, which was co-sponsored by a committee member to the National Defense Committee, attracted 28 additional supporters; Assemblyman Park, Chan-Suk’s bill, which was co-sponsored by 5 committee members to the same committee, got 40 additional supporters. Though the composition of co-sponsorship appears to affect the size, the number of cases is too small.

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