Terrorism Section of Hiding In Plain Sight Capstone - written by Ted Shull

Ted Shull

Capstone Report-Terrorism

February 23, 2017

The Viscous Cycle of Radicalization, Terrorism, and Government Overreaction: According to terrorism researchers “terrorist threats are constantly evolving, never static” (Crenshaw, LaFree. 2017) and the policies that nations adopt in the aftermath of attacks should give a realistic assessment of countering this complicated threat while not creating new terrorist grievances or alienating communities with our own borders. While politicians may act quickly to label an incident as an act of terrorism, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, nor is there a prototypical terrorist group which can complicate the search to identify the real culprits of terrorist acts. Crenshaw and LaFree note this difficulty in the first paragraph of their new book “Countering Terrorism”, “we find that scholars and policymakers face similar difficulties – the study of terrorism is often confused and contentious, and the study of counterterrorism can be even more frustrating” (Crenshaw, LaFree. 2017). Policies should be adopted in a rational and thoughtful fashion because the potential for inaccuracy and missteps at this stage can have devastating results. One common danger is the vast, seemingly knee jerk response that terrorism can incite by causing a broader retaliation than is needed to foil additional attacks. Many terrorist attacks have a secondary goal of forcing governments to overreact, which further alienates communities here or abroad, and feeds directly into the terrorist’s narrative helping to strengthen their ideology and to attract new recruits on the global stage.

It should be noted that for the purposes of this section we will be using the descriptor of terrorism and violent extremism interchangeably, and that terrorism is premised on the academic notion of a tactic or scheme of violence, which is not fixated on any specific political actor. The terms within this context are not intended to single out one ideology or group, and can be used to influence a wide variety of political causes and ambition. “The act of violence in itself

1

Ted Shull

Capstone Report-Terrorism

February 23, 2017

communicates a message to a watching audience” (Parker 2017). Terrorism is used to shock citizen and governments by specifically targeting unsuspecting victims who generally don’t have the capability of defending themselves, and often the method of attack is brutal and disturbing.

“Violent extremism is not caused by any single factor or grievance. It grows out of an intolerant world view in which violence is the primary medium of exchange and society is a means to an end” (Proctor and Green 2016). The use of terrorism also “usually implies a systematic campaign of violence” (Crenshaw and LaFree 2017) instead of simply isolated attacks, and it has been employed as a tactic by revolutionaries, insurgents, governments, and guerrillas since at least the French Revolution (depending on how you define the term).

In a survey of prominent academics in the field of terrorism, two scholars tallied 109 contrasting definitions to describe the phenomenon of terrorism as we know it today, and there is also no standard definition shared between the different branches of the U.S. government, various law enforcement agencies, and international bodies like the United Nations. This lack of consensus on how to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence is largely because “the meaning of the term remains contested and controversial” (Crenshaw and LaFree 2017) and this is especially true when classifying political violence from the far-right or far-left as terrorist acts. Most researchers rely on the Global Terrorism Database for collecting data, however by using its standards, it does not include typical criminal violence which may appear to be terrorist attacks (like mass shootings) or terrorist plots that were unsuccessful or foiled by authorities, which could be useful for studying future trends in the field. Furthermore, “the lack of a prototypical terrorist attack or group makes them difficult to study and predict, and, consequently, to prepare for and counter” (Bakker 2012) with effectively designed policies.

While some experts recognize the successes of military and law enforcement approach to

2

Ted Shull

Capstone Report-Terrorism

February 23, 2017

counterterrorism by pointing to the increasing rarity of large-scale attacks (Jenkins 2016), they recognize the pervasiveness of extremist ideology as a generational threat to young people worldwide. In the face of intense security measures in the West, some theorize that groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have shifted their focus to holding and governing territory, while promoting their global “brand” and inspiring others to commit atrocities in their name. As ISIS racked up several political accomplishments in June 2014 (by capturing Mosul and declaring the State of the Islamic Caliphate), this timeframe also “marked a key milestone in the evolution of ISIS propaganda” as the group formed its Al-Hayat Media Center (HMC) in Syria, which would specialize in catering to non-Arabic audiences with the release of “the first issue of Dabiq in June 2014, in Arabic, English, Russian, French and German by the HMC” (Fernandez, Alberto Vice President of MEMRI 2016). Fernandez recalls “the sense of being heavily outgunned and outnumbered was palpable, both in terms of our own resources and in what everyone else was doing against this adversary worldwide”. According to his account, this was a surprise to “official Washington” which had suspected that the “global Salafi-jihadi threat was ebbing…that al-Qaeda and its franchises (which at the time would have included the Islamic State of Iraq) were contained and on a downward trend” (Fernandez, Alberto - Vice President of MEMRI 2016).

Current Efforts and the War of Ideas A growing number of practitioners and scholars point out that current counterterrorism efforts are woefully insufficient to combat the social, political, and technological challenges posed by violent extremist ideology. “We urgently need a new paradigm – one that recognizes violent extremism as the global, generational challenge that it is and leverages all tools available to defeat it in this fight. We will need to take terrorists off the battlefield, disrupt plots, and

3

Ted Shull

Capstone Report-Terrorism

February 23, 2017

safeguard our borders. But we will never eradicate the violence caused by these groups until we defeat their ideologies” (Proctor and Green 2016). Experts have identified a variety of forces that can lead to the radicalization process, including political perceptions of injustice, social marginalization, and personal grievances that might “push” individuals to extremist organizations; and individual characteristics like impulsiveness, recklessness, and thrill seeking that skilled recruiters use to “pull” recruits into their causes. Nevertheless, many Muslim millennials across the globe “suffer from a profound identity crisis. From Boston to Paris, Nairobi to Dhaka, young Muslims are struggling to find purpose” (Proctor and Green 2016) and questioning how their Muslim faith fits into a globalized, connected world.

Efforts and Stumbling Blocks in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE Programs Countering Violent Extremism is a broad term that can encompass a whole range of programs to address the radicalization process and attempt to de-radicalize those who are at risk of committing violent extremist acts. According to a Homeland Security Advisory Council Report, the term was formed to describe a range of “soft power” mechanisms focused on countering extremist ideology and its appeal to American youth by incorporating “technology, health, education, communications, cultural, philanthropic, financial and non-government sectors” (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2016) through community engagement and various areas of expertise Humera Khan defines it as “the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation, or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism in furtherance of political objectives” (Romaniuk 2015), or simply to dissuade potential terrorists from using violence by non-coercive means. The first manifestations of CVE policy in the U.S. government appeared in the 2006 National Security Strategy from the White House, and was articulated as 4

Ted Shull

Capstone Report-Terrorism

February 23, 2017

part of the long strategy of “winning the battle of ideas by undermining the appeal of extremist ideologies and narratives and stemming recruitment or mobilization to terrorism” (Proctor and Green 2016).

Findings It was hoped that CVE programs would build more resilient communities, foster more partnerships between minority communities, protect those most at risk, and help to reintegrate and rehabilitate those who had been radicalized by any extremist ideology back into their larger communities. Following some initial missteps in implementation, and the realization that “community engagement on CVE can yield negative unintended consequences” (for instance further radicalizing some individuals) (Romaniuk 2015), government agencies and private partners our now rebooting their CVE efforts for a more precise and targeted approach instead of “the one size fits all” solution (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2016). While the term CVE is considered by some in the business to have become a “tainted brand”, over suspicions of it being used exclusively as a law enforcement tool to surveil and report on the Muslim community, and its singular focus on Islamic extremism, scholars still assert that “CVE programs are the most important development in the counterterrorism field in the last decade” (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2016).

Unfortunately, U.S. government officials and policymakers have consistently underrated the attraction of violent extremism, especially by failing to prevent or “recognize the global, generational struggle that it is today” (Proctor and Green 2016). The Office of Community Partnerships in DHS, which is charged with coordinating efforts with local partners, was allocated a mere “$10 million in FY 2016 for grant programs and roughly $3 million for staffing and other operational expenses. This in comparison to the $2 billion that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) received spent in 2016 on counterterrorism investigations alone or the $7.3 5

Ted Shull

Capstone Report-Terrorism

February 23, 2017

billion at the TSA’s disposal in FY2016. Several consecutive presidents have faltered in their duty and opportunity to exert leadership for the ideological aspects at the heart of this threat, and have missed chances to work together with partner nations by learning from others past mistakes.

Our government has faced constant challenges in how to “address an ideology that ‘hides within Islam’” (Proctor and Green 2016), while choosing to sidestep the issue of interpreting religious texts and disenfranchising communities. The government has also attempted to promote “moderate Islamic authorities to challenge extremist’s beliefs and narratives” (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2016) in Muslim-majority communities, at home and abroad, without having the expertise or insight of who these disparate groups would consider to be legitimate and credible religious authorities. Currently, CVE programs and practitioners “are not unified in their efforts” (Romaniuk 2015), and they lack general agreement on boundaries and the rules of the road for CVE efforts, including common definitions of both the problem and the solution.

Practitioners are also missing a common blueprint for coordinating initiatives among “military, intelligence, and law enforcement sectors in addition to a method for measuring success” (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2016). While the U.S. government has attempted to separate CVE efforts in the domestic realm from those at the international level, despite clear indications that ideology is exported to the global community, arousing complaints about the Muslim community in the U.S. being singled out based on their religion. Perhaps, most importantly they lack a powerful and alluring counter narrative to offer those prone to radicalization as a fulfilling alternative (Fernandez, Alberto - Vice President of MEMRI 2016).

Bibliography

6

Ted Shull

Capstone Report-Terrorism

February 23, 2017

1. Bakker, Edwin. 2012. "Forecasting Terrorism: The Need for a More Systematic Approach." Journal of Strategic Security (Henley-Putnam University Press) 5 (4): 69-84.

2. Crenshaw, Martha, and Gary LaFree. 2017. "Ch. 1: Introduction - The Context for Analyzing Counterterrorism Difficulties - Current Threats & Academic Research." In Countering Terrorism, by Martha Crenshaw and Gary LaFree, 1-32. D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

3. Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. 2016. "Countering Violent Extremism with Governance Networks." Perspectives On Terrorism (Terrorism Research Initiative ) 10 (6): 135-146.

4. Fernandez, Alberto - Vice President of MEMRI. 2016. "MEMRI Vice President Alberto Fernandez's testimony to Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs." Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). Middle East Media Research Institute. July 6. https://www.memri.org/reports/memri-vice-president-albertofernandez-testimony-senate-committee-homeland-security.

5. Gilsinan, Kathy. 2015. "Today's Terrorists Want to Inspire." The Atlantic , September 14.

6. Homeland Security Advisory Council . 2016. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee. Interim Report & Recommendations, Office for Community Partnerships, U.S Department of Homeland Security , D.C.: DHS, 3-7.

7. Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2016. "U.S. More Able than Ever To Combat Terrorism." RAND Blog, September 26.

8. Parker, Clifton B. 2017. "Terrorism Policies Most Effective When Reasonable, Balanced."

Stanford University - Center for International Security and Cooperation. Center for International Security and Cooperation. January 20. Accessed February 21, 2017. http://fsi.stanford.edu/news/counterterrorism-policy-should-be-reasonable-practicaland-balanced-stanford-scholar-finds.

9. Proctor, Keith, and Shannon M. Green. 2016. Turning Points: A New Comprehensive Strategy For Countering Violent Extremism. Final, CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extremism, Center for Strategic and International Studies, D.C.: CSIS, 14-21.

10. Romaniuk, Peter. 2015. "Does CVE Work? Lessons Learned From the Global Effort to Counter Violent Extremism." Findings, Global Center on Cooperative Security.

7