The Muzzled Media: Defining Russia's Modern Media System by Tanya Grover

The Muzzled Media: Defining Russia’s Modern Media System

Tanya Grover

Submitted towards the completion of GIST 699 – Capstone Honors Seminar April 27th, 2018

ABSTRACT In Russia, cultural norms deriving from the country’s history of highly centralized governments have contributed to Russian acceptance of an enduring authoritarian regulation of mass media. By analyzing how current President Vladimir Putin has monopolized the media by relying on Russian cultural mentality and modern authoritarian control methods since coming to power in 1999, this research aims to identify a theoretical media model defining Russia’s current media system. The evolving media structure in Russia and the government’s ensuing regulation strategies have been prominent research topics following the collapse of the USSR, as the media environment in a post-communist nation proposes an intriguing investigation. I plan to analyze the contemporary Russian media through the lens of the authoritarian theory of the press as a foundational media model, followed by the examination of more recent media system theories. Secondary academic research and news articles from online archival databases provided the data for analyzing the Russian media and the various media theories for subsequent application. The defining components of Russia’s media system emerged through content analysis, allowing for direct comparison to the included media models and ability to compartmentalize the dimensions of Russian media. Based on Putin’s effectual media control, the cultural role of Russians in media consumption, and the evolving medias realities of the 21st century, this project predicts Russia’s media system reflects a hybrid model rooted in authoritarianism and inclusive of contemporary mass media characteristics. Normatively defining the complex Russian media would further universal media communication theory as well as enhance a timely global understanding of Russia’s media scene.

Vodka. The Disney move Anastasia. The cold. Fur hats. “That James Bond movie about Russia…what’s it called?” (From Russia With Love). The Soviet Union. Big. Gymnastics. Putin. “Those dolls that you stack…” (Matryoshka nesting dolls). White Russians. Russian Roulette. Communism. This was the string of versatile objects and ideas my roommates sporadically blurted out one windy January night after I curiously asked them, “What are the first things that pop into your head when I say Russia?” Not mentioned but worthy of this list of defining characteristics: authoritarian media control. At first glance, Russia represents a beautiful, tragic paradox. The country’s impactful global contributions range from celebrated literature like Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace to Lenin’s revolutionary interpretation of Marxism creating the first Communist state to a crucial role in the Allies’ World War II victory. Russia’s tsarist and Communist political histories currently posit a warranted investigation about the evolvement of freedom of expression, media environment, and government control in the country today. The modern reality of Russian media accentuates Putin’s stark authoritarian approach to regulating mass media, stagnating natural growth expected in the 21st century, but developments in contemporary media markets and progressive techniques for media control also define the current Russian media system. With these entangled phenomena swirling in mind, a question emerges: how do you define such a complex, evolving system? Here is the answer. Russia’s history is unique, versatile, and essential to understand for a thorough examination of the modern country, with the tsarist era marking the first historical period relevant for the purpose of this project. Tsarism denotes the roots of Russia’s enduring autocracy and restriction of the press, with censorship of perceived opposing literature and explicit violence against liberal thinkers and reform seekers both common regulation practices. The tsarist era began in 1613 with the establishment of the Romanov dynasty and embodied the structure of

Russian politics, economics, and social life for the following three centuries, a highly-centralized government with a hereditary monarch of absolute authority over both state and religious affairs (Frazier, 2017). In February of 1917, the Bolshevik socialist group performed a coup against the last tsar of Russia, Nicholas II; that October in a violent revolution known as the Russian Revolution, Bolsheivk leader and Marxist revolutionary Vladimir Lenin established the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (Figes, 2017). Shortly before Lenin’s death in 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) emerged, followed by the leadership and eventual 30-year dictatorship of Joseph Stalin (“Russia Profile – Timeline,” 2017). These periods of Russian history entail chaotic and revolutionary transitions from the centuries-long tsarist autocracy to a brief independent yet still authoritarian state to the world’s first self-proclaimed socialist country; however, qualities of these highly-centralized governments are present in Putin’s Russia today. The similarities and differences in governmental policies and media environments across these historical regimes provide an ideological foundation for the development of Russia’s current media system and Putin’s approach to maintaining the modern Russian media structure. In addition to Russia’s deep history of a tsarist autocracy, the authoritarian nature of the Soviet Union fostered the country’s Communist roots contributing to the ideological foundation of government regulation of the Russian media today. The implications for the press and media freedom in a communist state include severe restriction of free expression and regulation of information. Lenin’s Communist system in Russia entailed the harsh division between the working class and elitists, limitation of private ownership and emphasis on collectivism, and a totalitarian style of government restricting citizen dissent and freedom of expression (Figes, 2017). The Soviet media environment embodied an atmosphere where “information was

considered a privilege rather than a right, while secrecy determined the general information climate” (De Smaele, 2007, p. 1299), explicitly negating the “classless” society of Marx’s utopian communism and further deepening the class divide dating back to tsarism. The government also limited the flow of information from foreign outlets by “jamming,” restricting, or prohibiting non-Russian radio stations, books, print news publications, and television programs, in addition to implementing conservative censorship measures on domestic information and media production within the country (De Smaele, 2007). Although the Russian Federation is not a communist country, but the idea of state media regulation and a lack of information transparency are media realities still evident in Russia’s media system today. Especially since the USSR collapsed less than three decades ago, an in-depth understanding of Soviet media control provides the necessary context for examining the contemporary Russian media and Putin’s media control tactics. Vladimir Putin’s augmenting path of political power over the past two decades and the autocrat’s techniques for maintaining power through media control and information regulation draw upon Russia’s tsarist and Soviet history. Putin’s Russia marks a third key era in the evolution of authoritarianism in Russia and the role highly-centralized governments play in Russian media control, eliciting a necessary overview of the leader’s political background. A former KGB (top security agency in the Soviet Union) officer, Putin first entered Russian politics in 1996 by joining the administration of the Russian Federation’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, whose presidency immediately followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Bohlen, 1999). In 1999, Yeltsin appointed Putin as Prime Minister and then abruptly stepped down as president that December, leaving Putin as Acting President while Yeltsin’s inner circle “worked behind the scenes to promote Putin as the next president” as the outgoing president’s self-

proclaimed “chosen successor” (Hoffman, 2000). In the March 2000 presidential election, Putin became the second President of the Russian Federation, the leader’s first presidency lasting two terms from 2000-2008, followed by again assuming the Prime Minister position from 2008-2012, while May 2012 marked the start of Putin’s second and current presidency (“Russia Profile – Timeline,” 2017). Putin’s involvement with the Soviet Union through the KGB and the unprecedented circumstances for acquiring presidency provide useful context in understanding the leader’s ideologies and current policies regarding media regulation. Knowledge of the autocrat’s political path is essential for exploring how Putin strategically maintains a current media structure to benefit the Kremlin. The structure of the contemporary Russian media includes a majority of Kremlin-owned outlets and a limited free media to constitute a mass media system with qualities both reflective of and distinct from the Soviet media. Russian media is comprised of government-owned and state-run media outlets, indirectly-owned media companies with strong ties to the Kremlin, and a limited semi-free media. In addition to the overwhelmingly Kremlin-owned media, Putin has further implemented restrictions on free expression and maintained media regulation through the redistribution of media property, assets, and employees, solidifying an implicit hold on media outlets lacking technical government ownership (Lipman, 2014). The smallest portion of Russian media is independent, however, the “reasonable degree of freedom of expression in smalleraudience media [is] politically irrelevant through tight controls on the political realm” (Lipman, 2014, p. 182). A flawed foundation of journalism further defines the modern media structure by the rejection of balance and objectivity, flaws in media law, self-censorship, government interference and harassment of media outlets, a lack of journalistic professionalism, and an atmosphere of violence for journalists (Oates, 2007). The current Russian media system allows

for greater free expression than historic authoritarian governments but nonetheless reflects political ideologies of Russia’s past media environments. An in-depth understanding of Russian median structure today provides the necessary foundation for uncovering connections between this modern media system, the authoritarian media model, and alternative media theories. While drawing upon historical precedents in the context of a contemporary case study, the objective of this research paper is to propose a mass media model defining the modern Russian media system. The enduring characteristics of authoritarianism combined with Putin’s modern control strategies and the evolving contemporary mass media create a complex media structure currently universally undefined. Data about Russia’s current media environment reveals the Kremlin’s media monopoly through majority state ownership, exploitation of the television market, increased online media control, volatile journalistic environment, and submissive consumer culture. Analysis of the foundational authoritarian media model in addition to a series of modern media theories provides the framework for the intended application of these models to the Russian case. Successfully identifying a normative theory for Russia’s media system could enhance global understanding of the Russian media and Putin’s authority, potentially beneficial due to country’s influence on the current international political climate. Further, conclusions based on the analysis of Russia’s specific media system could expand the modern reach of media communication theory by offering a contemporary hybrid model. The research reveals Russia’s media system reflects a hybrid media theory based on the examined models and determined dimensions of the Russian media analysis. This hybrid model combines paralleled components of the previous theories and introduces new defining factors based on the modern Russian media to propose five central dimensions for defining national media systems. The paper will first analyze existing literature debating trends among

contemporary autocrats and media control, explaining the authoritarian theory of the press as a foundational lens for Russian media analysis, and introducing alternative media models for media system classification. The following methods section describes the process of thematic coding and content analysis for analyzing academic journals and news articles. The analysis section then describes the modern Russian media through the established dimensions of national media systems, highlighting Putin’s media monopoly and the country’s obstinate authoritarianism. Finally, the discussion section applies the Russian media to each of the media theories presented in the literature review and asserts the extent of an accurate representation, ultimately proposing a hybrid theory with five normative media dimensions in conclusion. LITERATURE REVIEW Contemporary Autocrats and Media Control Based on research by media theorists, authoritarian leaders throughout the world are using increasingly subtle techniques for gaining and maintaining media control. Modern autocrats are shifting away from previous strategies of overt censorship and physical intimidation or violence in order to maintain a more feasible regulation of mass media in the 21st century. Contemporary autocratic leaders rely on relocations of media ownership, selecting and funding media outlet owners in support of the party in power, and a façade of a free press by allowing the existence of private media outlets so long as the reach and audiences are limited (Simon, 2006). Rather than turning to direct confrontation and violence like former autocrats, today leaders tend to use legal harassment and financial manipulation of media owners, preventing the development of “press freedom martyrs” among the public as a result of more aggressive or violent approaches, occurring commonly in the past (Simon, 2006, p. 51). For example, the Kremlin can shut down private Russian media outlets when necessary by targeting the financial integrity of

media owners, often condemning companies for deals made in the chaos of the Soviet collapse or even citing false accusations (Lipman, 2014). By initiating an in-depth investigation about Putin’s under-the-table manipulation of media owners and other inconspicuous media control tactics, scholars can better understand how modern autocrats are tailoring media regulation approaches to 21st century realities. Researchers should explore the growing evolution of contemporary global autocrats’ methods for media control in order to determine how these methods influence a country’s media system and can help define a modern media theory. The digital era of the media has introduced new methods for authority figures to maintain power and control public opinion, according to media researchers today. Individuals seeking power can gain and uphold authority with more speed and convenience in the contemporary media era. Public opinion generates and sustains authority and often derives from the media, which “bestows prestige and enhances” an individual’s authority through recognition across various channels, thus “legitimizing their status [as authorities]” (Herbst, 2003, p. 488). The public comes to understand authority based on media depictions, frequency of media presence, and exposure to specific media content (Herbst, 2003). In addition, authority figures with a strong media presence can often control content and audience reach, further exemplifying how autocrats can more easily exploit the media and thus enhance authority in the digital age (Rowbottom, 2006). The role of the media in establishing the relationship between public opinion and the political dominance of autocrats is evolving in the 21st century. Because modern autocrats recognize an increased opportunity for manipulating public opinion as mass media continues to develop, investigating the current role of mass media in aiding Putin’s persisting authority will assist scholars in a theoretical examination of the Russian media system.

Global political scientists argue modern autocrats use varying forms of information regulation tools to control the media for political motives. Information regulation including varying forms of censorship allows the ruling party to manipulate media outlets into framing news content favorably for the government. The state can implement censorship as a component of media regulation with fluctuating severity, the most extreme control transpiring in mediablackouts ranging to lesser direct approaches like the manipulation of media owners and journalists to alter or exclude information (Boykoff, 2008). A media system containing these instances of government-censorship is historically characteristic of authoritarian governments and one-party states with centralized power structures, with contemporary autocrats tailoring this media control approach to more covert methods (Warf, 2011). Decisive for the viability of censorship in any given nation is the country’s level of Internet penetration, with some scholars arguing state regulation is more feasible in states with higher rates of Internet access while others assert more commonality in countries with lower Internet levels (Warf, 2011). In typically autocratic nations with lower levels of Internet penetration, citizens are not only fed a premeditated package of information funneled through government censorship, but at times have no access to information at all, perpetuating a resolute authoritarian media system. As the 21st century progresses and technology advances, contemporary autocrats face greater challenges in regulating information due to the growth of online media. By analyzing Russia’s rising levels of Internet access in tandem with Putin’s evolving media control strategies, researchers can study the relationship between a modern media model and government control through censorship. Authoritarian Theory of the Press Putin’s autocratic approach to media control in Russia today posits the authoritarian theory of the press as an initial theoretical lens for analyzing the modern Russian media. Serving

as the foundation for media communication theory, the 1956 landmark publication Four Theories of the Press suggests all media systems fall into the category of Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, or Soviet Communist. Dating back to the Renaissance, the authoritarian theory is the prototype for the newer three models and adheres to the historic concept of truth being the product of a small elite (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). In an authoritarian media model, explicit governmental control cultivates a press subservient to the state, in which “the press, as an institution, is controlled in its function and operations by organized society through another institution, the government” (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 10). The authoritarian theory further asserts the press is essentially an instrument of the ruling party, a structure in which the media works for the government rather than operating as a system of checks and balances (Oates, 2007, p. 1281). The ensuing analysis of Russia’s current media model will provide a tangible example of a modern media system with authoritarian characteristics, suggesting a connection between the theory and case study. However, by further exploring the ideological implications of the authoritarian theory in a contemporary context, reservations about the media model’s viability for application in the 21st century might emerge. The authoritarian theory of the press identifies four basic postulates about the relationship between media communication and society in authoritarian media models. In Four Theories of the Press, the three co-authors delineate the following assumptions about the nature of man, the nature of society and the state, the relation of man to the state, and the nature of knowledge and truth. First, the authoritarian theory asserts man has more value and potential to succeed as a member of society rather than an individual, exemplifying the emphasis on community in the community versus individual complex typical of authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the state, as the “highest expression of group organization,” is superior to man by fostering the individual’s

dependence on the state for societal participation. Lastly, the disproportion of potential knowledge for individuals to gain based on power and class divide suggests the “few wise men” with more knowledge should constitute the leadership of organized society, creating an institutional connection between knowledge and the state (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 11). The Russian media today exemplifies modern illustrations of these theoretical assumptions, suggesting Russia’s contemporary media structure may indeed adhere to the authoritarian theory of the press. Further analysis of these ideological phenomena in a modern setting, including the cultural tendency to prioritize society over the individual and the elitist connotation of information access, can provide a clear juxtaposition between the contemporary Russian media and the authoritarian model. International media scholars today criticize the nature of idealism surrounding the Four Theories as well as the inherent difficulty of using normative postulates to categorize an evolving, intersectional system. While media theorists widely accepted the four theories of the press for many decades, modern scholars have since declared room for interpretation regarding these foundational media models, questioning the practicability of true illustrations in media systems today. Some researchers argue defining media systems through detailed theories adheres too eagerly to the ideal, claiming the archetypal situations constituting the four press theories rarely reflect the real, complex media systems of the 21st century (Oates, 2007, p. 1280). This criticism of impracticality acknowledges the wide range of political and economic disparities between modern nations with similar government types, suggesting a country’s media structure depends on other institutional aspects of the state; for example, modern media systems with prototypal authoritarian press characteristics can exist in multiple types of regimes ranging from democracies to dictatorships (Ostini & Fung, 2002). Moreover, progressive media scholars argue

media systems are not “homogenous” or “static” across media sectors, time, journalistic environment, and political climate, complicating and perhaps preventing attempts to classify media models based on theory and aggregate variables (Hallin & Mancini, 2017, p. 167). Academic explorations about universal theories of the press stemming from Siebert’s initial establishment of four media models have resulted in conclusions ranging from agreement to modified expansion to downright negation. Researchers should therefore acknowledge both the foundational prestige and weaknesses of the authoritarian theory of the press while also examining alternative media theories for contemporary analysis and application of Russia’s current media system. The historical context of the Four Theories publication and failure to thoroughly differentiate between non-Western media systems have also led researchers to explore the realistic accuracy behind these original media models. These academic critiques contribute further to the debate about classifying media systems in the 21st century using old-school media models like the authoritarian theory of the press. Not only has the evolving technological era introduced new defining aspects of modern media systems not applicable in 1950’s theory development, but the “original Four Theories model was constrained by the ideology and historical circumstances of its inception…namely those of Communism and the Cold War,” suggesting the progression of global politics limits application of these foundational theories today (Ostini & Fung, 2002, p. 45). The outdated establishment of these theories also resulted in a several-decade, global trend among media scholars in neglecting to distinguish media systems of countries without Western European historical and cultural similarities, namely because most previous research about national press theories emerged based on Western ideology (Flew & Waisbord, 2015, p. 624). As a nonWestern country with a distinct history and culture, analyzing

Russia’s media system would contribute to the discussion of Westerndominated media theory classification and shed light on media norms in nonWestern, historic authoritarian nations. While authoritarian theory of the press offers a sufficient foundation for the analysis of government-monopolized media systems of the 21st century, alternative media theories deriving from this initial model may more accurately describe Russia’s contemporary media. Alternative Media Models for Modern Application The Polarized Pluralist Model represents a more recent media theory as one component of a threefold typology proposed in Comparing Media Systems (2004). In this landmark work of modern media communication theory, media theorists Hallin and Mancini contend the Liberal, Democratic Corporatist, and Polarized Pluralist models define the media structures of 18 Western countries in the respective North Atlantic, North/Central European, and Mediterranean regions. These models differ based on disparities between four speculative dimensions of media systems: 1.) the development of media markets with a focus on the print press; 2.) degree of political parallelism, or how closely the media reflects a society’s political divisions; 3.) scope of journalistic professionalism; and 4.) the extent of state intervention in the media (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 21). The Polarized Pluralist Model implies “integration of the media into party politics, weaker historical development of commercial media, and a strong role of the state” as well as low newspaper circulation rates, lesser-developed journalistic professionalization, high levels of political parallelism, and extensive state intervention (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Kaya & Çakmur, 2010, p. 522). The scholars posit this model describes Mediterranean European countries historically and politically distinct from Russia, but because the listed qualitative postulates for the Polarized Pluralist Model align with the Russian media, this theory could help define Russia’s media system. Therefore, in order to determine if a Western-constructed media

theory can be expanded to alternative media systems, researchers should further analyze this landmark media theory and apply the model to Russia’s modern media. In a more recent publication focusing on media system analysis of non-Western nations, Hallin and Mancini introduced the Statist Commercialized Model as a modern media theory. This model describes a media system with authoritarian roots, similar to the scholars’ Polarized Pluralist Model, but also considers alternative factors within media environments that vary from the original Western threefold typology. The theorists speculated the Polarized Pluralist Model’s inception as a theory for Western application paired with Russia’s unique history and political climate elicited the need to develop a new theory, inciting their classification of Russia’s media system as statist commercialized. This model describes media systems with a growing trend of commercialization in the contemporary media market development, particularly in market economies with an authoritarian political climate. The clear subordination between state and citizen and the state’s regulatory role in media affairs constitutes the second factor for the Statist Commercialized Model (Hallin & Mancini, 2011). Because scholars established this media theory specifically to describe the Russian media, the relevance of the Statist Commercialized Model does not lie in the ability to accurately define Russia’s media system but contributes to the debate about the contested superiority of varying media models’ abilities to comprehensively characterize the Russian media. Researchers should compare this theory to other media models and examine Russia’s media structure within the boundaries of the Statist Commercialized Model characteristics to determine if this model most reflective of the all-encompassing contemporary Russian media. The Authoritarian-Conservative Model is one component of a fourfold media theory typology aiming to place a greater emphasis on individual journalistic practices within a media

structure’s political environment. The theory uses a two-dimension spectrum for the two defining factors of a media system, structural and professional. For analysis of structural implications, media systems are labeled authoritarian or democratic to represent the country’s government and “its economic, political, and cultural subsystems” as an interconnected institution of the media. The labels of conservative or liberal demonstrate a media system’s professional influencers, specifically “individual journalistic values and the autonomy of individual journalists within media institutions.” The resulting media models derive from the varying combinations of these four media characteristics; thus, an Authoritarian-Conservative Model would describe a nation’s media with an authoritarian government or limited democracy and a lack of journalistic professionalism (Ostini & Fung, 2002). This media theory indicates viable application for modern media systems because of the unique focus of journalistic practices and the relationship between journalism and the state as a variable in defining a system. Particularly due to the volatile Russian environment for journalists and Russia’s history of state superiority in the context of information regulation, using this model for analyzing the Russian media structure today would be a valuable tool for researchers. Developed specifically to examine the media in the context of Russia’s political past, the Neo-Soviet Model explains the modern media system as a derivative of a preceding media model. Media theorists speculate if the complex, historically- and culturally-rooted Russian media inhibits the modern media structure from aligning with any normative media theory, which led one scholar to develop the Neo-Soviet Model. This model constitutes a media with “rejection of balance or objectivity, flaws in media law, self-censorship, government interference and harassment of media outlets, the lack of journalistic professionalism, and an atmosphere of violence against journalists” (Oates, 2007, p. 1279). According to this theory, media systems are

reflective of historic media norms both institutionally and based on cultural consumer trends (Oates, 2007). In the context of a post-Communist nation, this model posits the media today would contain some similarities of the Soviet Communist press theory due to persisting government authority and the culturally-propagated subordination of consumers to the state and media (Oates, 2007). This model provides a useful tool for examining the Russian media due to the prominent, unprecedented focus on the historical foundation of media systems and inclusion of citizens’ role in the media. When applied to Russia’s modern media, researchers could make connections between the Soviet and Russian media systems and determine if the Soviet-era media environment was influential enough to continue defining the Russian media today, such as the Neo-Soviet Model implies. DATA AND METHODS I studied academic journals and books to gain a comprehensive understanding of the contemporary Russian media in a historical context and existing theoretical models for media system classification. Peer-reviewed articles from academic journals reflect scholars’ attempts to address disciplinary debates concerning how the modern Russian media adheres to a specific media model. These secondary sources contain previous research about Russia’s autocratic history juxtaposed with the political climate and media environment in Putin’s Russia. Data from academic publications also explore how Putin’s media control tactics exemplify a contemporary approach to authoritarian media regulation. Certain books and articles provided statistics about media industry ownership as well as the cultural relationship between the state, media, and Russian consumers, yielding useful data for understanding the quantitative scope of state ownership of media and the role of a Russian audience in the country’s media system. As a former communist country with a current powerful autocrat and struggling democracy, Russia’s

political status has elicited the publication of many academic journal articles investigating the evolution of government media control and the Russian media environment, allowing for a wide range of secondary sources for data collection. Further, by studying previous publications of media communication theories, I was able to systematically compare the Russian media with these models in attempt to define the country’s current media system. I also collected data from both Russian and non-Russian news media. Like the peerreviewed journals, these news articles provided information about the contemporary Russian media structure and Putin’s authoritarian media control methods but additionally offered pragmatic perspectives and more recent narratives about Russia’s media environment. The Russian news articles illustrated realities of the media in the context of a Russian journalistic framing. Further, the ability to compare publications from more liberal outlets with the Kremlinowned media encouraged further scrutiny of Russian journalism and highlighted the complications of analyzing a media system with authoritarian regulation. Additionally, news articles from international publications such as The New York Times and The Guardian provided current, comprehensive outlooks on Russian events, Putin’s actions, and global perceptions of Russian media freedom. The combination of domestic and global news media offers insight about Russia’s contemporary media system from the perspective of Russian journalists in addition to foreign spectators, creating an adequate balance of sources. Using news media for data analysis also acts as an ideal supplement to the secondary academic research by providing a realistic overview of Putin’s media control in Russia today. For both the academic journals and news media articles, I primarily collected data through online research. The online networks I explored include archival databases such as JSTOR and ProQuest, permitting the comprehensive investigation of the contemporary Russian

media and established media theories through peer-reviewed articles and other previous academic research. I discovered relevant Russian news articles from databases like Current Digest of the Russian Press and Russian Central Newspapers; similarly, I used the LexisNexis and Johnson’s Russia List databases to obtain news media from major global networks. To identify academic and news articles specifically about Russia, the search terms included phrases such as “Russian media,” “Putin media control,” and “media system in Russia,” while phrases like “authoritarian media control,” “modern media models,” and “media system theories” yielded data relevant to the project’s theoretical focus. Online research through archival databases provides the framework for a thorough informational foundation of the topic, while data from online recent news reports fosters relevance and accuracy regarding the research question. As a U.S.-bound undergraduate researcher, this project required online research to ensure feasibility, allowing in-depth data collection and analysis without traveling to Russia. To analyze the data, I used content analysis paired with thematic coding. The analysis process began with thematic coding in order to identify Putin’s distinct media control techniques and compartmentalize defining elements of the current media system. I separated passages from peer-reviewed journal articles and news articles to create categories about the structural, cultural, and political aspects defining the country’s media system. The five most recurrent categories developed into themes representing essential features of Russian media, thus establishing the structure of the analysis section and prompting the paper’s five-dimension proposal for media system classification. These five thematic dimensions emerged as the structure of media ownership, dominant media industry, Internet development, journalistic environment, and consumer culture. The initial thematic coding permitted a thorough content analysis of media components instrumental in defining the Russian media and addressing the research question.

Moreover, the straightforward approach to organizing and examining data with this analysis method was most feasible for undergraduate research and potentially a preliminary project. In order to conduct Russian analysis specifically for the “consumer culture” dimension of the media, I utilized public opinion polls provided by Russian interfaces and databases. Data deriving from opinion-based statistics reflects attitudes of the public and offers insight about the Russian media from a native perspective. For data collection, the Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service offered an English interface with survey results from public opinion polls about relevant subjects ranging from government approval to trust in mass media. I obtained similar data from the Levada-Center, a Russian non-governmental research organization providing statistical information free from Kremlin bias or manipulation. To collect this data, I identified the survey titles and questions relevant to the project and accumulated the results into a data compilation of Russian public opinion. For analysis, I examined and compared the spectrum of answers for polls measuring public approval and trust of the government, Putin, and the media. Results from public opinion polls helped construct the idea of consumer culture affecting a media system. Without this primary data, I could not have thoroughly explored the cultural relationship between media and citizen in modern Russia or properly analyzed this dimension. ANALYSIS Structure of Media Ownership The majority of media outlets in Russia today are government-owned and state-run, particularly Russian television networks. Broadcast television is the country’s most widelyconsumed media outlet and consequently an essential industry for dominant state ownership to sustain Putin’s media regulation. Shortly after becoming president in 2000, Putin gained control of Russian television by using legal manipulation to eradicate the independent television market,

immediately establishing three main TV channels as the government’s “own political resource, a one-way communication tube that has since been used effectively to shape public opinion” (Lipman, 2010; Lipman, 2014, p. 181). State ownership of central television stations has been crucial to the Kremlin’s control of the media because inadequate telecommunication infrastructure and newspaper subscription expenses have resulted in an underdevelopment of the Internet and low subscription rates to national newspapers, positioning television as the country’s dominant media (Oates, 2007). Today, television dominates Russian media with 74 percent of the population routinely watching the three government-owned channels; subsequently, these networks can broadcast news framed with a Kremlin bias for an extensive Russian audience (Lipman, 2010). In media systems containing an authoritarian power structure, government ownership of the media allows the state to regulate information, monopolize the media industry, and disseminate material reflecting the ruling party’s agenda. The Russian media structure comprised of predominantly state-owned media is a defining element for the country’s modern media system by preserving the structural opportunities for government control. Putin avoids total state ownership while maintaining control by relying on the proKremlin political affiliations of Russian media company leaders to effectually serve government interests. These indirectly government-owned media outlets supplement the state-owned media in sustaining Putin’s media monopoly. Putin uses implicit control strategies including strategically selecting and manipulating media owners and encouraging pro-Kremlin businessmen to invest in media outlets (Warf, 2011). For example, Putin’s strategy for Internet regulation entails instructing members of elite Kremlin support groups to buy or fill leadership positions at media companies, planting the possibility for the Kremlin agenda to emerge in the networks’ future business decisions or news coverage (Pallin, 2017). The government further

controls the Internet without definite ownership by regulating telecommunication infrastructure and funding pro-government websites, resulting in an inconspicuous state oversight of online media not necessarily apparent to Russian consumers (Pallin, 2017; Oates, 2007). These unconventional, behind-closed-doors media control methods represent the contemporary autocrat’s evolving strategy for authoritarian regulation. This system of indirect ownership through political and financial manipulation allows the Kremlin to maintain a media structure that bolsters Putin’s power and popularity, hampering improvements in Russia’s media environment. The media structure in Putin’s Russia also includes a limited semi-free media. The existence of a private media market renounces complete government ownership of the media, avoiding all-inclusive dictatorial restrictions common in exclusively public media structures but creating a façade of media freedom in Russia. The independent media has endured only as a niche for the “critically minded and politically concerned minority” because the bulk of Russian consumers remain loyal to the state-owned national television despite these private media alternatives (Lipman, 2014, p. 181). Essentially, Putin tolerates a private media because the predominantly state-owned media structure guarantees the political irrelevance of most independent outlets (Lipman, 2014). Further, this limited free media, although providing the very means for free expression and dissemination of liberal ideas, also serves Putin’s political motives to “prove that Russia does not have serious problems with freedom of the press” (Lipman, 2010, p. 158). Therefore, the privately-owned sector of Russia’s media structure contributes to the overarching government media monopoly by adding a passive alternative for state intervention. Based on Putin’s controlled free media, the structure of Russian media ownership distinguishes the current media system from the country’s past Soviet Communist model, but the enduring

Russian culture of political apathy limits the independent media’s role to implicitly supporting the Kremlin. Dominant Media Industry National television is the dominant industry in Russia’s media system based on popularity and correlating audience reach. The Kremlin-run national television stations retain widespread viewership based on consumer choice as well as a structural predisposition for public access to the networks. Nearly 100 percent of Russian households have at least one TV with around 94 percent of Russians watching TV every day (Hallin & Mancini, 2011, p. 136). Moreover, approximately 83 percent and 75 percent of urban Russians per week view the state-funded stations Channel One and Russia-1, respectively (Oates, 2006, p. 128). The public may be inclined to select these state-run channels due to the extensive coverage these stations have throughout the country; across both urban and rural populations, Channel One has almost complete exposure, with high exposure rates for Russia-1 and NTV as well (Figure 1; Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service, 2016). The clear popularity of television among Russian consumers, high viewership of the country’s two primary national TV channels, and the extensive coverage of these channels across the country demonstrate the dominance of broadcast television in Russia’s mass media market. Identifying the dominating media sector in an authoritarian media system is essential for evaluating the government’s operationalization of the leading industry, justifying Putin’s focus on national television for regulating or manipulating media content.

Because Channel One and Russia-1 are state-funded and have a large audience reach, the government has been able to exploit Russia’s broadcast television market to reflect the Kremlin’s agenda. Minimal freedom among private outlets exists largely on behalf of the faithful audience these channels retain. Channel One’s dominance in the TV market stems primarily from the continued airing of traditional Soviet-era programs including Russia’s most popular evening newscast, Vremya, while both channels face criticism for a pro-Kremlin bias (Beumers et al., 2009, p. 7). The government funds Russia-1 in entirety, whereas Channel One receives financial backing from a variety of Kremlin-associated donors, including political tycoon and Putin’s wellknown friend, Yury Kovalchuk, who acquired 25 percent of shares of the station in 2011 (Lipman, 2014). Today, multiple federal subsidiaries and this Russian billionaire with longstanding personal ties to Putin constitute Channel One’s funding, effectually reflecting the Kremlin (Lipman, 2010). The complex ownership status of Channel One highlights the Kremlin’s ability to regulate media through maintaining relationships with government-friendly media owners as a recurring technique for achieving control in a modern media realm. In an

authoritarian media structure, the foremost popular media industry provides greater opportunity for effective news framing or public influence. Russia’s dominating television market therefore explains the deeply-rooted financial and political government involvement the national TV channels and Putin’s strategic preservation of television state funding or ownership. The Kremlin’s current control of the third national TV channel, NTV, further contributes to the state monopoly of Russia’s television market. However, NTV did not always act as a government propaganda disseminator nor can the government claim direct financial ownership. Signifying the largest media holding in Russia today, NTV is owned by a subsidiary of a massive state-funded energy company, Gazprom-Media. (“Russia Profile – Media,” 2017). NTV’s initial reputation of authentic and critical reporting developed in the late 1990’s during the station’s investigative coverage of the Chechen War (“NTV: Timeline of Events,” 2001). Consequentially, Gazprom bought a 30 percent stake in NTV in 1996 and by the end of 2001, the company controlled 65 percent of shares after the state-initiated arrest of NTV’s original owner (“NTV: Timeline of Events,” 2001). NTV’s evolution from initially a relatively liberal station to Gazprom-Media property illustrates state domination of broadcast television industry as a definite government control strategy for the media system in Putin’s Russia. Russia’s national TV channels effectively reinforce the government’s media monopoly because control of the media sector with predominant popularity is decisive in maintaining political popularity. With national television dominating Russian mass media and subsequently the Kremlin’s regulation efforts, the radio industry is supplementary in both public consumption and government control. Russia’s prominent radio stations are state-owned, but the radio’s smaller audience compared to Russian TV viewers reduces the realistic implications of governmental control. In a 2015 study, only 61 percent of Russians reported listening to the radio three to four

times per week during a two-week period, juxtaposed with 94 percent of Russians watching TV five to six times per week (Deloitte CIS Research Centre, 2016). A prominent radio audience would include the daily 2.7 million Russians tuning into Ekho Moskvy, arguably the country’s most liberal radio station despite losing “some of the [its] political edge” as a result of Gazprom buyout in 2005 (Beumers et al., 2009, p. 18). Nevertheless, the state-run VGTRK (All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company) owns five major radio stations more popular than Ekho, demonstrating the Russian tendency to prefer government-associated media regardless of regulation implications (Beumers et al., 2009, p. 19). Russian radio denotes a paradox in which relative media freedom allowing stations like Ekho to persevere is crippled by the limited consumption of non-state channels and increasingly radio in general. Declining radio consumption in Russia posits the triviality of radio in media system classification in the 21st century. The struggling print media industry in Russia mirrors a global trend developing in tandem with technological advancement. Subsequently, the print press in Russia’s modern media system lacks the popularity and necessary audience to constitute a relevant threat to the Kremlin. Print media consumption in Russia is on the decline, with a 17 percent decrease between 2012 and 2015, and while this phenomenon markedly reflects the international print media market, national newspapers in Russia have historically had lower consumption rates than other media outlets (Deloitte CIS Research Centre, 2016; Oates, 2007). Nonetheless, print publications are still susceptible to Putin’s authoritarian media control, mainly through state-ownership of prominent newspapers through company moguls like Gazprom (“The press in Russia,” 2008). The Russian print media, although sustaining a significantly smaller public audience, faces state regulation comparable to the control tactics Putin employs in other media sectors, constituting a

relevance if minor to a media system’s compilation of media sectors. As the industry’s decline in Russia demonstrates, considering the print media for media theory application is not viable for contemporary media systems and models of the future. This modern media evolvement weakens media theories with concentrations on the mass circulation press and suggests a system’s dominating media sector for analysis. Development of the Internet Internet exposure in Russia has increased within the past two decades, sparking Putin’s increased efforts to regulate online media. In a modern authoritarian media model, higher Internet penetration rates require greater state control to maintain the desired media monopoly. In 2000, 3.4 million Russian users constituted less than 2 percent the country’s Internet access, rising to 16.5 percent by 2005 and jumping to 74.8 percent by 2016 (Beumers et al., 2009, p. 12; Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service, 2017). Although Internet exposure has grown during Putin’s reign, Russia still lags behind the West, with over 50 percent of U.S. and European populations having Internet access in 2005 juxtaposed with Russia’s less than one fourth (Beumers et al., 2009, p. 12). During these years of lower Internet exposure, the Internet remained “relatively free compared to other media spheres” and remained so during the 2012 Russian protests in response to Putin’s second presidency, up until 2014 when Freedom House still deemed the Internet “partly free” (Pallin, 2017, p. 16). With currently more than three fourths of the Russian population with Internet access, Kremlin regulation of online media has become essential for upholding Putin’s media structure. This correlation between Internet exposure rising in tandem with stricter government control limits the possibility for improved online media freedom as Internet usage in Russia continues to grow.

Entering the mass media market foreign to traditional media control, the Internet emerged in Russia as viable outlet for improving media freedom and checking Putin’s control of media. The increasing technological advancements of the digital age have expanded the Internet’s global reach and augmented the difficulty for information regulation, posing a threat to Putin’s media manipulation. Global social media channels and search engines can expose and spread nondomestic information; unsurprisingly, such information originating from non-Russian interfaces is more difficult for Putin to control because “international companies are less willing than the Russian-based ones to comply with demands from Russian authorities for content to be removed” (Pallin, 2017, p. 21). Further, on international media channels allowing individual posting abilities like YouTube, the Kremlin must compete for online space on the same level as opposing political parties, independent media companies, and average citizens, preventing the state ownership monopoly traditional media enables (Beumers et al., 2009, p. 14). In addition, the Internet offers a low cost of production and easy consumption, providing access for unlimited sources of information for an audience with nearly no discrimination, further complicating the government’s ability for extensive regulation (Warf, 2011, p. 18). Although the Kremlin maintains sufficient control of Internet content on state-owned platforms, Putin has struggled to regulate global outlets and social media channels, proposing the Internet may be the Achilles’ heel of the contemporary autocrat’s media control approach. The Internet’s limitless outlets for expression and information proposes obstacles for state regulation of online networks in Russia unsusceptible to traditional control methods, indicating the Internet is instrumental in defining modern media models. In response to the Internet’s optimistic potential for increasing media freedom and unbalancing the state media monopoly, the Kremlin has implemented online control methods in

tandem with the Internet’s rise across the country. Putin’s efforts throughout the past decade to regulate the Internet have impeded the likelihood of substantially transforming the modern Russian media environment. In 2013, state-run or Kremlin-affiliated companies increased ownership of Russia’s Internet infrastructure, allowing the government to regulate the Internet through control of telecommunication infrastructure (Pallin, 2017, p. 28). The Kremlin has achieved further online regulation by buying independent websites, funding pro-government websites, and “fostering a network of government-friendly bloggers” (Warf, 2011, p. 11). The “non-systemic and non-intrusive nature” of these methods fosters Putin’s success by limiting the public’s awareness of online government control; further, to the extent of Russians’ understanding, Putin justifies the Kremlin’s intensification of Internet control as a necessary approach to national security (Pallin, 2017, p. 28). Putin’s explicit efforts to regulate online content in Russia through these covert tactics are characteristic of authoritarian media control in the 21st century. The effective use of these tactics suggests even with the continued advancement of the Internet through new technology and global scope, online media is equally susceptible to authoritarian media regulation as traditional media. The delayed but steady development of the Internet in Russia has created opportunity for increased public expression through online channels, but traditional media remains dominant for purposes of public discussion and news publication. The presence of government elites and state intervention in Russian offline outlets indicates the financial advantage and political leverage of traditional Russian media. The Internet is a supplement to traditional sources of information, rather than a substitute, and because the Kremlin or Russian elites control or own most traditional media outlets, these outlets will continue to have more influence than the lesser regulated Internet (Rowbottom, 2006, p. 501). Furthermore, the straggling development of the

Internet in the first decade of the 21st century solidified the leading position of the alreadyprominent national television market as the most popular media outlet among Russian consumers (Beumers et al., 2009). Despite the extensive opportunities for online expression the Internet offers, this seemingly limitless nature of the Internet as a forum for free expression and pervasive content instigated an equally extensive opportunity for heightened government media control. The role of the Internet is instrumental in defining a contemporary media system by expanding the traditional media realm for both the state and consumers. In Russia, delayed Internet development preceded Putin stifling online media as a challenger of the Kremlin monopoly. Journalistic Environment Putin has fostered a volatile atmosphere for journalists. This environment helps sustain the Kremlinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s regulation of Russian media because even by relying on state ownership and political manipulation, ultimately journalists still operates the companies Putin controls. Since Putin came to power in 2000, 29 Russian journalists and media assistants have been killed (Reporters Without Borders, 2018), but these discreet assassinations of outspoken independent journalists during the past two decades have been largely ignored, rarely receiving proper investigations or convictions and sometimes failing to become public knowledge at all (Lipman, 2010). The murder of Novaya Gazeta reporter Anna Politkovskaya in 2006 is one well-known representation of Russian journalist violence; seven years investigating the extensive human rights violations in Chechnya resulted in repetitive threats, attacks, imprisonment, exile, poisoning, and four fatal gunshots defining and eventually ending Politkovskayaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s journalist career (Committee to Protect Journalists, n.d.; Walker, 2016). Most recently, a politicallymotivated intruder stabbed the deputy editor of Ekho Moskvy inside the liberal radio stationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Moscow studio in October 2017 (Walker, 2017). Scholars have repeatedly included journalistic

environment has an instrumental component of media theories, signifying the efficacy of analyzing the journalism aspect of media structures in order to determine a fitting media model. The perpetuating violence underlying the journalism profession in modern Russia reflects a hostile journalistic environment describing the country’s media system. Journalists and media professionals also face nonphysical government harassment in response to actions unfavorable for the Kremlin. These tactics of legal intimidation and political coercion bolster Putin’s media control and further define the environment of journalists in Russia. Through government-initiated media transferals or leadership reorganization of strategic political figures, the Kremlin can threaten, control, or end the professional careers of journalists (Lipman, 2014). In 2013, dozens of journalists lost jobs at the once-mainstream Kommersant newspaper after the editor-in-chief ran an anti-Putin photo (Lipman, 2014). Shortly before Putin’s reelection in 2012, the Kremlin-backed Gazprom-Media ordered an impromptu rearrangement of Ekho Moskvy’s board of directors; the change ousted two long-time independent directors known for shaping the station into “one of Russia’s few remaining platforms for criticism of the Kremlin” (“Gazprom-Media to Change Director at Ekho Moskvy,” 2015; Ognianova, 2012). This fear of career destruction lowers standards of professionalism among Russian journalists, contributing to a volatile environment characteristic of authoritarian media models. By infringing upon press freedom and diminishing the viability of the truth in news media, Putin’s targeted journalist harassment through media manipulation fosters the journalistic environment key to media system classification. Journalism in Russia generally lacks standards of objectivity and professionalism due to limited media freedom and a tendency for journalistic self-censorship. By taking advantage of these characteristics of Russian journalism, Putin aims to prevent Russian journalists from

realistically posing as political threats. Journalists largely do not embrace the role of “political watchdogs” or seek to challenge authority by bringing attention to human rights violations and government corruption or even producing truly objective publications (Oates, 2007, p. 1285). The level of media freedom in Russia is evident in the country’s 148/180 ranking in the 2017 World Press Freedom Index; Reporters Without Borders indicated a growing pressure on independent media since Putin’s second presidency in 2012 and attributed the “increasingly oppressive [climate] for those who try to maintain quality journalism” as factor for the low press freedom score (Reporters Without Borders, 2017). Additionally, in a study concerning the postSoviet Russian media, journalists reported practicing self-censorship “in order to keep their jobs and, in some cases, to avoid physical violence” (Oates, 2007, p. 1292). Journalistic trends of unprofessionalism and self-censorship create a grueling journalistic environment that fosters the necessary climate for effective authoritarian media control. The propagating pattern in liberal journalist violence and intimidation constitute the roots of Russia’s flawed journalism, further sustaining the Kremlin’s current regulation of the media and defining the modern Russian media. Despite the institutional and professional flaws of Russian journalism, some independent journalists continue to publish liberal news material and political propaganda opposing Putin. This niche collection of resilient reporters and media specialists offers a glimpse of optimism in the journalistic struggle for media freedom within Russia’s overall unpromising journalistic environment. The Novaya Gazeta newspaper and Ekho Moskvy radio station are well-known for critical coverage and investigative reporting of Russian politics and social issues; not coincidentally, these outlets also have extensive histories of Kremlin persecution (Oates, 2007). Dozhd, also known as TV Rain, is one of Russia’s few independent TV channels and a source for the liberal voice, willing to run coverage critical of the Kremlin and even broadcast opposing

politicians (Schearf, 2016). However, this media outlet has also seen the Kremlin’s wrath, most recently from a government-initiated investigation on slander charges in January 2018 following the channel’s airing of a film connecting Putin to the Mafia (Krasilnikov, 2018). The persistence of these three media companies signifies explicit journalistic attempts to undermine Putin’s media regulation, but these outlets for the opposition and free expression represent the exception, not the norm or even a near-future norm. The Kremlin’s continuous physical, legal, and financial attacks on liberal journalists and outlets solidifies Russia’s the enduring hostile journalistic environment, reflecting the reality of the modern Russian media system. Russian Consumer Culture The independent media lacks a necessary relevance in the contemporary Russian media system because the public generally accepts the Kremlin-fed news and propaganda rather than seeking out liberal outlets and ideas. The Kremlin’s persevering media monopoly relies on Russians’ general endorsement of the government control. The liberal Russian community is a considerable minority and the general public fails to show dissent towards Kremlin control, arguably even favoring the government’s strict regulation (Lipman, 2014). For example, one Russian public opinion survey reflecting the paradoxical relationship between media control and the public reported 88 percent of Russian respondents chose “order” when asked to show preference between “order” or “freedom,” 11 percent reported an unwillingness to surrender freedoms of speech, press, or movement in exchange for stability, and 76 percent of Russians favored “restoring censorship over the mass media” (Pipes, 2004, p. 11). Additionally, Russian media has historically played the role of a government-associated institution aiming to guide and stabilize the country “rather than question or undermine,” (Oates, 2007, p. 1296). While the explicit media regulation measures the Kremlin has implemented create an institutional

foundation for Russia’s controlled media system, Russian lack of dissent toward these measures vindicates Putin’s ability to constrain media freedom to the country’s historically low level. The enigmatic correlation between state media control and Russians’ failure to demand civil liberties like press freedom indicates consumer culture contributes to a country’s media structure, with a passive citizen role in Russia both deriving from and supporting authoritarianism. Approval ratings of Putin are high, suggesting the public’s indifference about the president’s authoritarian approach to media control. The overall positive public opinion regarding Putin not only signifies an obvious lack of citizen dissent, but subsequent Russian approval in the Kremlin’s current regulation of media. In a 2016 non-governmental public opinion survey, 74 percent of Russians reported Putin as “fully credible” and 83 percent expressed approval in “Putin’s actions as the President of Russia”; interestingly, only 50 percent reported approval in the Russian government as a whole (Levada-Center, n.d.). The overwhelming degrees of victory in both Putin’s 2012 and recent 2018 presidential elections— 63.6 percent and 76.6 percent with nearly a 70 percent voter turnout, respectively—provide further concrete evidence for Putin’s prevailing popularity, even when assuming a certain amount of Kremlin interference in the elections to ensure Putin’s triumph (MacFarquhar, 2018). Moreover, a majority of Russians in 2014 did not “feel overly concerned about infringements of their freedom on the Internet” and even felt regulating the Internet was “necessary” and “tolerable,” while approval in mass media ranged from 56 to 66 percent in 2017 (Pallin, 2017, p. 20; Russian Public Opinion Research Center, n.d.). Because the public generally approves of Putin, citizens are unlikely to express dissent about Putin’s actions, including the government’s control of the media. This cultural phenomenon fosters a cycle of Russian stoic indifference allowing the government to continue monopolizing Russian media and thwarting possibilities for

media freedom improvement, demonstrating the influence of consumers in classifying a media system. Despite approving Putin and expressing acceptance of the government’s media control, Russians generally do not trust the media. This public lack of trust but persisting refusal to oppose the Russian media reality reveals a paradox underlying the constrained structure of the modern media system. In a 2015 study, 40 percent of respondents reported trust in “news, analysis, [and] official websites on the Internet” and 29 percent trusted the television (Deloitte CIS Research Centre, 2016). Additionally, 34 percent of Russians felt “something being withheld, not getting the full story, or distracted form important events” occurs “somewhat often” when watching TV, listening to the radio, or reading the newspaper and 46 percent of respondents reported these media outlets as “not fully credible” (Levada-Center, n.d.). This trust versus approval paradox suggests the Russian media audience is aware the media “omits key facts and censors political opposition” but justifies this autocratic phenomenon by recognizing the media as “a key player in both the establishment and maintenance of an effective Russian state” (Oates, 2007, p. 1296). Thus, even the public’s inability to trust the Russian media based on a basic knowledge of the media’s government bias and subsequent lack of impartiality does not cause citizen dissent. Russians understand the national media to represent and promote the Kremlin’s agenda, and although perhaps not believing the news content in entirety, the incessant failure to oppose government control of media only sustains Putin’s ability to do so. This cultural phenomenon influences the extent of state media control, in turn shaping the media system. The generally positive public opinion of Putin’s media regulation and Russians’ passive mentality regarding government control derives from the country’s structural foundation involving powerful authoritarian regimes. The suppression of freedom during two key periods of

Russia’s history has diluted the people’s general desire for free expression within the media, providing a cultural weakness for Putin to exploit in order to sustain an authoritarian media model and Putin’s own popularity. For example, the country’s deeply-rooted tsarist history fostered an absence of social unity or nationalism and an ignorance of civil rights, inciting Russians to crave strong, harsh rulers; citizens today still associate weak or democratic governments with anarchy and lawlessness (Oates, 2007). Citizen oppression in the Soviet era further cultivated a “weak public demand for political rights and civil liberties, media freedom being no exception,” leaving Russians today accustomed to the inability and lack of desire to hold the government accountable (Lipman, 2014, p. 180). Furthermore, Putin’s popularity directly stems from the revival of Russia’s traditional autocratic state and government control, emphasizing a lack of political responsibility for citizens today and creating an “artificial unity” by portraying the Western world as foreign enemies (Pipes, 2004, p. 15). Without Russia’s communist past providing the foundation for the cultural mindset still prevalent in Russian society today, Putin would not be as successful in controlling mass media without total state ownership. The historical supremacy of the autocratic state and the subordinate Russian people contributes to modern cultural tendencies including the failure to challenge Putin’s propagating control of the Russian media that defines the current media system. DISCUSSION Modern Dimensions and Authoritarian Roots This project proposes five central components for defining national media systems in the 21st century. As explained in the analysis above, these dimensions include the structure of media ownership, spectrum of media industry popularity, development of the Internet, journalistic environment, and the public’s cultural role in media consumption. In Russia, direct or indirect

government ownership defines the media structure, promoting the broadcast television market as the dominating media sector. The delayed development of the Internet is a result of the elitist information regulation in Russia’s communist past and the violent environment for journalists has perpetuated historic levels of low journalistic professionalism. A cultural passive mentality towards societal involvement and the persisting failure for Russians to oppose the media system Putin sustains further defines the Russian media. When analyzing Russia’s contemporary media, these components either aligned with dimensions of the analyzed theories or represented the normative differentiations inciting a hybrid model. The realities of each component within the Russian media constitute an inclusive, modern reflection of the country’s current media system. The authoritarian press model provides the ideological foundation for the media system in contemporary Russia and consequentially, modern media theories applicable to Russian media must be rooted in the theory as well. The media’s role in fostering the subordinate relationship between the state and the people is central to Seibert’s theory (1956) and evident in Russia’s media system today. A fundamental element of the authoritarian media theory is the government’s pervasive jurisdiction over the media without a purely public media market (Siebert et al., 1956). This rationale characterizes Russian media, where the mass media is a tool for sustaining Kremlin popularity and political dominance notwithstanding private media outlets. Additionally, Russians generally have a passive role in media consumption and political involvement, further illustrating the man versus state complex instrumental in the authoritarian theory of the press. The modern Russian media system demonstrates the stipulations for an authoritarian press as Siebert described. Strong reflections of the theory in the Russian media insinuate the most fitting media model must be based on authoritarianism.

While Russia’s current media system does adhere to Siebert’s authoritarian theory of the press, the simplicity and historical limitations of this prototypal model fail to define the modern media in entirety. These limitations prevent the authoritarian theory from solely explaining the modern Russian media, but the paralleled ideology between the theoretical model and existing media reveals the necessary foundation of authoritarianism for a media model to define the Russian press. The inability of this media archetype to address discrepancies across multiple media sectors, consider the Internet as a media contributor, or rely on the essential historical development of media markets post-1956 indicates the authoritarian theory of the press is too outdated to accurately describe a cohesive media system in the 21st century. Further, in Siebert’s model the media is controlled “through government patents, guilds, licensing, [and] sometimes censorship,” but Putin’s distinct, savvy media control techniques reflect evolving strategies for contemporary authoritarian media control Siebert could not have foreseen (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 7). The authoritarian theory of the press therefore cannot comprehensively define the modern Russian media despite sharing an ideological basis. Although influential in its time and beneficial for understanding the origin of media theory, the in-depth contemporary analysis of the theory and application to Russia reveals the authoritarian theory of the press lacks imperative modern elements of the media necessary to define media systems today. Modern Press Theories Applied to the Russian Media Polarized Pluralist Model Russia’s media market reflects the first dimension of press development for the Polarized Pluralist Model. The late development of the mass circulation press in Russia with an emphasis on low newspaper consumption mirrors the model’s stipulations. A weak print media market characterizes the Polarized Pluralist Model, with newspaper sales around one fifth of the print

circulation in Hallin and Mancini’s other two models, directly supporting the tendency for broadcast television to dominate the media market in consumer viewership (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 23). The newspaper industry’s weakness derives from the exclusivity of a mass audience, with the Polarized Pluralist print press tending to address an elitist population instead; Russian media reflects this trend with high subscription costs contributing to the lower consumption. Further, the slow-to-evolve print press in Russia produced an industry requiring government involvement or subsidization, foreshadowing the Kremlin’s continued interference in the press and overall state media monopoly (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 22). With critical analysis and application tailored to the Russian narrative, press development in Russia compares to media systems of the Polarized Pluralist Model. However, based on the continuously developing media market, this dimension should include stipulations for other elements of the media structure and correlating consumption, specifically more popular or modern industries like television or the Internet. Connections between the Russian media and the Polarized Pluralist Model’s second dimension of political parallelism are more abstract. High political parallelism characteristic of this model indicates the ability to easily identify the political orientations of media companies based on the normalcy of journalists’ political affiliations shaping media coverage and consumers’ decisions to consume media aligned with coordinating political preferences. Media in Russia is not free from political bias, with predominant state ownership and control of media outlets resulting in inherent reflections of Kremlin ideology in media content. Further, the public broadcasting system in Russia media adheres to the “government model” of a politically parallel media, insinuating the government or political majority directly controls public broadcasting (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 30). However, the blatant lack of considerable political division or

numerous competing political parties contradicts the high political polarization of Polarized Pluralist medias. Putin’s prevailing United Russia party has eroded the possibility for true manifestation of a multi-party system and subsequent party-press parallelism in Russia, complicating the ability to measure political parallelism in Russian media. Discernable political bias in the Russian media reflects the Polarized Pluralist Model, but Russia’s lack of an ideological spectrum for the existing political bias differs from this media theory. Journalistic professionalism in Russia mirrors the low professionalization and limited journalistic standards of the Polarized Pluralist Model. Hallin and Mancini (2004) measured the third dimension of journalistic professionalism by journalist autonomy, the establishment of distinct professional norms, and the extent of a public service orientation. According to this model and manifested in modern Russia, a political climate encouraging self-censorship and state-affiliated media company owners limit the degree of autonomy journalists experience. The lack of autonomy in Russian journalism has fostered a “weak consensus on journalistic standards and limited development of professional self-regulation” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 131). This absence of journalistic professionalism is influential in defining a media system by allowing for the “instrumentalization of journalists by economic or political interests,” a phenomenon evident in the Kremlin’s media monopoly and manipulation of Russian journalists (Brüggemann et al., 2014, p. 1040). The impact of journalistic development on political climate and news quality constitutes professionalism among journalists as a media feature varying across national systems. The nature of journalism in Russia and cultural tendencies of Russian journalists align with the degree of professionalism for the Polarized Pluralist Model, a correlation of theory and reality endorsing the inclusion of journalistic environment as a media system-defining component.

Lastly, a strong degree of state intervention in the media characterizes the Polarized Pluralist Model and Russian media. In this fourth dimension, a state’s historical governing role in society and an authoritarian political past as contributors to the necessary level of state intervention in a Polarized Pluralist media. The government’s interference manifests in media companies most commonly as owner, regulator, or funder, where each state-media relationship solidifies the media’s subordinate position to the state and perpetuates the continuance of high political parallelism and low journalistic professionalism. In Russia, the role of the state reflects “authoritarian traditions of intervention” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 119), and the Kremlin’s predominant ownership through direct funding and indirect political regulation reaffirms the tendency for state intervention in Russian media. The required state intervention of a Polarized Pluralist media therefore reflects the Kremlin’s mass media interference today. This dimension of the model strongly suggests the need for authoritarianism as the foundation of a modern media theory defining Russia’s current media system. Statist Commercialized Model The Statist Commercialized Model accentuates the state’s strategic instrumentalization of the media in defining the media system of Putin’s Russia. As a theory intended to expand the traditional research focus of Western democracies and in a contemporary timeframe, this model intrinsically includes Russia’s political history and technological advancements in the 21st century media realm. The model thoroughly describes the structural and cultural relationship between the media and state in modern Russia, where “neither the state nor the public have supported clear and transparent rules for the media” (Hallin & Mancini, 2011, p. 143). Hallin and Mancini further encapsulate the role of the state in the Putin era as a “re-etatization of the media landscape” in contradiction to the initial post-Soviet government initiative to reduce visibility of

the state in mass media (Hallin & Mancini, 2011, p. 144). The analysis of political parallelism offers a tactical Russian lens, attributing the role of newspapers with political party formulation and consequential polarization in the early 1990’s, but acknowledges the lack of true political parallelism in the current media. This model’s focus on the government’s media exploitation to ensure political stability for the ruling party sufficiently incorporates the historical and contemporary Russian state interference through authoritarian regulation. The situational inception of the Statist Commercialized Model as a Russian case study promotes the value of political history for accurately defining Russia’s current media system. On the other hand, modern realities of Russian media prevent Hallin and Mancini’s Statist Commercialized Model (2011) from offering the most current representation of the country’s media system. The model’s strong emphasis on the commercialization of Russian media as a post-Soviet market development undermines the presiding media structure defined by government ownership and state regulation. The commercializing media process emerged from property privatization in the 1990’s and expanded as Russia’s advertising market grew rapidly in the 2000’s (Hallin & Mancini, 2011). The theorists claim the “commercialization of content strategies, deregulation of electronic media, [and] broadening of the scope for commercial enterprise” (Hallin & Mancini, 2011, p. 140) empirically support the “commercialized” component of this model, but the state-dominated media market in Putin’s Russia and the Kremlin’s developing Internet regulation methods weaken the fundamentality of commercialized media in classifying the media system today. The theory also offers limited empirical consideration for the citizen’s role in the state-media hierarchy or Russians’ political apathy as an influential factor in media consumption and structure (Hallin & Mancini, 2011). While the Statist Commercialized Model describes the Russian media to an extent, the ever-evolving nature of

media systems and the media’s expanding technological reach within the past decade has caused the media system to develop outside the bounds of this theory. Hallin and Mancini presented a systematic historical and contemporary analysis of the Russian media, but inevitable transformations in the media realm suggest a media theory even more current would represent a comprehensive depiction of Russia’s media system today. Authoritarian-Conservative Model Russia’s authoritarian past and Putin’s autocratic leadership style combined with journalistic trends of self-censorship and compliancy effectively fit the model’s criteria. Based on these components, the contemporary Russian media system adheres to an AuthoritarianConservative Model. This theory defines authoritarianism as a system “[that] enforces strict obedience by the media to political authorities…operationalized as control of content by the state and a general lack of freedom for the public to criticize” (Ostini & Fung, 2002, p. 47), reflecting the Kremlin’s regulatory monopoly of the Russian media and restriction of media freedom. In addition, Russian journalists embody lower standards of professionalism under the conservatism dimension by supporting the societal status quo and sacrificing personal autonomy or professional values “in favor of the state policy, media stance, and the socialization process of their environment” (Ostini & Fung, 2002, p. 47). Because the analysis of Russian media in this paper revealed the inclusion of journalist values as an influential variable in media model classification, this model normatively defines the Russian media system. By relying on two ideological bases of the Russian media for the theory’s variables and name, the AuthoritarianConservative Model describes the media system in contemporary Russia at a basic level. Conversely, limitations of the Authoritarian-Conservative Model weaken the viability for the theory to best reflect Russia’s complex media reality. This theory fails to incorporate a

spectrum for interference of the state as a model dimension nor the level of political parallelism in media systems. These fundamental omissions stem from the theory’s over-simplification of the authoritarian-democratic dimension, where distinct political climates of different nations could fall into the same category. The polarized spectrum for exclusively conservative versus liberal journalism is also an idealistic simplification preventing the inclusion of political parallelism analysis or the role of the state in media. Authoritarianism and conservativism do characterize the Russian media, but the Authoritarian-Conservative Model does not address the modern complexities of Russia’s media system today. Moreover, this model requires theoretical expansion for feasible application to any contemporary media system. Neo-Soviet Model With the USSR collapsing less than three decades ago, the media structure and state suppression of media freedom in Soviet Russia explicitly influence the Russian media today, requiring a post-Soviet lens for establishing Russia’s current media model. The Neo-Soviet Model therefore characterizes Russia’s contemporary media. Building upon the Soviet journalist environment, the volatile atmosphere for journalists Putin cultivates has resulted in the enduring absence of journalistic professionalism or objective journalism and ensuing trend of selfcensorship. Russian journalists continue to face violence and government harassment as possible repercussions for investigative journalism, media content threatening to the Kremlin, or extreme political opposition. Furthermore, Russians today generally approve of the government’s authoritarian actions, including control of the mass media; during the Soviet era, the public also understood the media as a state institution but accepted the media control and limited media freedom as a justification for a stable society (Oates, 2007, 1295). The Neo-Soviet Model comprehensively explains the modern Russian media by considering the historical roots of the

media system as governed by the state and understood by the people. Although showing potential for application to other national medias, particularly those with authoritarian or communist histories, the formation of this model was partial to Russia as a case study. Therefore, the NeoSoviet Model is one way to define the modern Russian media, but combination with a more normative theory would create an effectual hybrid media model. CONCLUSION The contemporary Russian media reflects a combination of the previous media models, producing a new hybrid media theory. This hybrid theory encompasses the ideological basis of the authoritarian theory of the press, the general conclusions for the Statist Commercialized and Authoritarian-Conservative models, the historical concentration of the Neo-Soviet Model, and the dimensions of the Polarized Pluralist Model with slight variations. The Russian media system mirrors the Polarized Pluralist Modelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s dimensions excluding a high degree of political parallelism, an inconsistency surfacing due to this modelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s focus on democracies with competing polarized parties; thus, adding the authoritarian theoretical foundation would allow for identifying the existing one-party political bias in the Russian media without requiring the trend of polarization. The Statist Commercialized and Authoritarian-Conservative models neglected to consider all necessary components of a comprehensive media system but succeeded in painting a veritable if not thorough depiction of the Russian media. Lastly, the Neo-Soviet Model effectively includes the historical foundation of mass media in Russia as an additional variable for media system classification. The analysis of these media models reveals the aptitude for the universal application of each theory and exemplifies the noted academic difficulty in using normative theoretical frameworks to define national media systems. The application of the models to the Russian case demonstrates the complexity of identifying a concrete media model

for Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s media due to political history distinct from Western democracies, enduring authoritarianism, and modern evolvements of the media realm. A limitation of this research project involved minimal academic publications of theoretical media models for non-Western nations. While four models analyzed in the paper did permit explicit Russian application, the universality of these theories does not match the global reputation of the Western-rooted Polarized Pluralist Model. The lower levels of awareness and acceptance of the former models reduces the credibility of the paperâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s connections between these theories and the Russian reality. Conversely, the Western inception of the Polarized Pluralist Model hindered the capability for an all-inclusive application to the Russian media due to inherent distinctions in state histories and political climates. A more straightforward analysis with less contradicting variables might only incorporate theories originally inclusive of nonWestern application. Another approach to minimizing research limitations would be deploying a stricter set of universal media theories rather than dabbling with hybrid or case-specific models. Future research should analyze other national media systems using the five defining dimensions established through this projectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s hybrid theory. Applying these dimensions of modern mass media to systems differing from Russia would test the universality of a media model constructed based on a fixed-case analysis. A future project could examine the media market, scope of media sector popularity, Internet development, journalistic environment, and consumer culture of media perception in a series of countries in order to potentially determine a multi-model media typology. The analysis of each component in other nations would identify media systems with similarities and distinctions from the Russian media. If the range of media actualities for the dimensions resulted in definite divisions, the future research could establish a normative media theory for defining modern national media systems based on the findings from

this Russian media analysis. By offering an ultra-contemporary media theory typology, these prospective research conclusions would improve pragmatic understanding of international media communication and provide academic justification for establishing universal media models.

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