SOUTH KOREA - DO OR DO NOT?

The spectre of South Korea going nuclear could turn security equations on their head in the prosperous but volatile East Asia.

The perennial debate that rocks the Republic of Korea (ROK) politics from time to time was triggered again in January. President Yoon Suk Yeol, during a meeting with his foreign and defence ministries, is reported to have raised the issue of going nuclear if the North Korean threat of nukes continues to grow at the current sizzling pace.

While creating a totally home-grown nuclear arsenal may take time, as it will have to be started from scratch, the option of deploying American nukes on the peninsula is a viable option, although fraught with political risks. The President’s remark could be a delicate but deft diplomatic message. It conveys the essence while camouflaging the growing criticism within the country against the reliability and infallibility of the American military shield, including its strategic component, to protect the ROK. It will be recollected that all U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from South Korea in 1991 as part of American efforts towards global arms and cost reduction in the afterglow of its ‘victory’ in the Cold War.

SOUTH KOREA- A HOBSON’S CHOICE

It is a matter of record that the ROK ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as far back as 1975, some say under the unrelenting pressure exerted by the U.S. In 1974, U.S. intelligence agencies were reporting the existence of a robust South Korean nuclear weapons programme. Considering the technological advancements the country had made in the last two decades since the cessation of hostilities with its Northern neighbour, it was assumed that the programme would quickly fructify into a credible nuclear deterrence. As per details available in the public domain, the South Koreans were looking at a plutonium-based weapon programme for which they negotiated with the Canadians for the heavy-water CANDU reactors in 1972.

For decades, Seoul refused to consider a nuclear deterrent feeling confident with the nuclear umbrella extended by Washington. So, what has changed now?

Then came the 1974 Indian nuclear test, which is alleged to have used plutonium from the CANDU reactors, and Canada imposed stringent safeguards on its exported heavy-water reactors. It agreed to sell CANDU reactors to ROK only after the latter had ratified the NPT. There was pressure also building in the U.S. with a 1975 Congressional resolution demanding a ban on any international financing to South Korea for reactor construction that would enable its quest for nukes.

On the other hand, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea signed the NPT only in 1985. Later in 1991, both Koreas signed a joint declaration agreeing not to “test, manufacture, produce, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.” That this agreement was not worth the paper it was written upon became clear a decade and a half later when

DPRK walked out of the NPT regime by conducting six nuclear tests in quick succession starting in 2006. Since early 2022, U.S. and western intelligence agencies have warned of an imminent seventh nuclear test, perhaps of a much more powerful thermonuclear device.

TAKING THE PLUNGE?

For years, the U.S. and the ROK have continued with the false belief that, ultimately, due to immense economic pressure, North Korea will denuclearise. This is a chimaera because unless the Kim Jong Un regime collapses or implodes, DPRK is unlikely to hand over its nukes to the UN in a gesture of goodwill. Writing for the New York Times, Jeffery Lewis has claimed that it was about time for the U.S. to accept North Korea as a full-fledged nuclear power, whose weapons threaten the U.S. and its closest East Asian allies-Japan and ROK. If this is a fact, can Seoul be faulted for desiring the only effective antidote to a nuclear threat for their embattled nation- an indigenous nuclear deterrent?

No one understands the complexity of the nuclear dimension on the Korean peninsula more than the South Koreans themselves. Evidently, the signing of the NPT did not deter the ROK from its quest for nuclear weapons, as its nuclear weapons programme was not formally suspended till the end of 1976. Even then, the ROK scientific community continued with its efforts to procure reactors from France and other suppliers. Today with its current level of technological advancement, an indigenous effort can be only a matter of time once a decision is made.

Seoul has been indicting that to start with, it may opt for tactical nukes, which will either be direct purchases from its ally or indigenously developed by its highly advanced military-industrial complex, already churning out sophisticated world-class artillery guns, armoured fighting vehicles, fighter jets and warships. “We can have our own nuclear weapons pretty quickly, given our scientific and technological capabilities,” said Mr Yoon. In this approach, Mr Yoon has the backing of his conservative People Power Party and an increasing number of supporters who daily witness North Korea’s rapidly expanding nuclear capability and a will to use it as a warfighting tool.

However, the entire country is not supporting an allout nuclearization of their prosperous country. It would divert a considerable part of its revenue and technological effort towards a non-productive enterprise- something that will require consistent investment but may never get used. A more affordable option would be to invite the U.S. to redeploy its nuclear weapons on the peninsula to reduce the response time to any North Korean nuclear misadventure. Towards this end, the deployment of nuclear-capable B1 bombers during the recent US-South Korean military drills could be indicative.

CHANGING THE SECURITY PARADIGM?

Seoul can scarcely be blamed for being hypersensi- tive to the threat of a nuclear misstep by Kim Jong Un. The ‘Supreme Leader’ is inordinately proud of his nuclear-tipped missiles and loses no opportunity to posture aggressively with them. Isolated and shunned by the international community, starved of trade and even essential items for the daily sustenance of his people, the strong man incites fear in his neighbours, including Japan, by threatening an irrational recourse to these immensely powerful weapons. It is a nightmare for the region and the entire world, with Seoul in its centre. Many analysts call his blusters as bluffing to cow down the west into making concessions but for the South Koreans, staring down the nuclear barrel, it is as real a threat as it could ever get.

For decades, Seoul refused to consider a nuclear deterrent feeling confident with the nuclear umbrella extended by Washington. So, what has changed now?

The U.S. still has a considerable military presence in the peninsula with over 28000 troops stationed in military bases and more available through the speedy despatch by air and through fast-moving Carrier Strike Groups stationed in the Pacific around the clock. South Korean military analysts feel that the American presence is too small to stop the 1.28 million strong North Korean military backed by another 600,000 reservists from rolling down the 38th parallel, especially once a few well-placed nukes have put out of action allied command and control centres and a few carrier groups heading for the Korean Peninsula. Some South Koreans also ask, “ Would Washington risk San Francisco for Seoul in the event of a nuclear exchange?”

Assessment

That Seoul’s fears are well founded is vindicated by the 2022 American Nuclear Posture Review, which notes the ‘deterrence dilemmas’ posed by the North Korean nuclear threat.

On the other hand, President Yoon Suk Yeol could be playing a game of Chinese Checkers by prompting Big Brother China to clamp down on Kim Jong Un’s nuclear ambitions. China would be wary of further nuclearization of its immediate neighbourhood as there is a real chance that with South Korea’s nuclearization, Japan may not be far behind if the North Korean genie refuses to return to the bottle.

Rejecting NPT entails its own set of problems for South Korea, with its economy still not recovered from the aftereffects of the pandemic, the Ukrainian war triggered energy crisis and the Damocles Sword hanging over its exports due to the sharpening US-China cold war. Surely going nuclear may also attract a host of sanctions globally which the country may not be well placed at this juncture to deal with.