Tactic Booklet by Sydney School of Architecture, Design and Planning

36°09’57.1”N 36°37’53.7”E

TACTIC 01

Architectural maneuvers through military event space

Christopher Tjhia Dezheng Liu Kaihao Yang Liza Khamitova Nidhi P. Mallikarjuna Olivia D’Souza Yuwen Sun

TACTIC 01 Architectural maneuvers through military event space

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The work herein was developed during the Architecture of Assassination studio run at The University of Sydney School of Architecture Design and Planning from 04 August - 10 November 2023. Co-designed by Frank La Paz (The University of Sydney) and Joanna Naples-Mitchell (The Zomia Centre), this studio hinged on a specific instance of civilian harm that occurred during a US military raid to ‘capture or kill’ the then leader of the Islamic State militant group, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The objects of inquiry were the highly complex architectures that set the conditions for this harm to unfold. Studio participants worked to locate, examine and then respond to the material conditions which came to pass during this event. What is offered here are the architectural analyses that extend from such inquiry. The report allows for a careful, but powerful rethinking of military tactics by considering the quiet architectural tactics also implicated in military event-space: the tactics that allow for an event to be conducted in the first place. The Architecture of Assassination studio was made possible through the support of external advisors, project supporters and guest critics: Joanna Naples-Mitchell, Zomia Centre Emily Tripp, Airwars Joe Dyke, Airwars Daniel Estrin, National Public Radio Chris L Smith, The University of Sydney Anita Samson, Recognition Learning Hannes Frykholm, The University of Sydney Sophia Maalsen, The University of Sydney Jennifer Ferng, The University of Sydney Liza Walling Kevin Hui (Archimarathon) Guillermo Fernández-Abascal, The University of Sydney Dylan Wozniak-O’Conner, The University of Sydney Gracie Guan, The University of Sydney Evander-Liam Makani, The University of Sydney Steven Burns, The University of Sydney Zoë Skinner, The University of Sydney Adrian Thai, The University of Sydney Jess Valenzuela, The University of Sydney Byron Dexter, The University of Sydney

RESEARCH TEAM PROJECT COORDINATOR

Frank La Paz PROJECT TEAM (A-Z)

Adam Goldie Boris Chan Christopher Tjhia Dezheng (Luke) Liu Jiaying (Cyrus) Xu Kaihao (Ken) Yang Haolan (Justin) Yu Liza Khamitova Mohamed Mouallem Nidhi Peddapalli Mallikarjuna Olivia D'Souza Ruofan (Grace) Guan Yuwen (Oliver) Sun STRATEGIC PARTNER The Zomia Center was founded in 2017 to address gaps in service delivery, aid, and knowledge in ungoverned and semi-governed areas. A US-registered nonprofit, Zomia runs humanitarian, public health, research, and advocacy projects in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Zomia does not seek to replace government services, but rather collaborates with local community groups to help build sustainable and autonomous approaches to local governance. Zomia’s Redress Program advocates for civilians harmed in US and Coalition military operations in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. The program helps impacted civilians request acknowledgment and redress from the military, facilitates medical and rehabilitative assistance when possible, and advocates for accountability more broadly. The independant analyses of the al-Baghdadi raid offered herein are developed for The Zomia Centre to support unfolding advocacy and redress action.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

ANALYSIS

REFERENCE

EVENT

TACTICS

DEPLOYMENT

(DIS)APPEAR

INTERIA

AN ARCHITECTURE OF 1.08S

CLOUDS OF TERRAIN

VISIBILITY

ISOLATION STRIKE

(RE)MANEUVER

INTRODUCTION: ARCHITECTURE OF ASSASSINATION EVENT On the night of the 26 October 2019, the United States (US) military conducted a raid to assassinate Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the then leader of the militant group, Islamic State. The location of this raid was a compound structure located to the West of the village of Barisha, in the Idlib province of Syria. At 2330h local time, a joint US task force of ground troops, helicopters, aircraft, drones, military robots and canine units moved through this location, unfurling a prefigured battle space over the village and its surrounds.1 The raid lasted four (4) hours, concluding at 0330h, 27 October 2019. The US military consider the raid to have been a success: al-Baghdadi along with 11 'enemy combatants' were killed, and his compound was destroyed via a strike with precision guided munitions. In the aftermath of the raid, reports began to surface that civilians had been implicated in the event.2 At 0026h, 27 October, as the raid was ongoing, three (3) men in a white van were observed by the US military, passing through Barisha on their way to Hattan, a neighboring village located to the West of Barisha. A combination of engagements with enemy combatants earlier in the night - as well as the van's ignorance of "terrain denial fires" launched at the beginning of the raid - led the US to assert that the van had "demonstrated hostile intent." 3 As the van approached an intersection at the South of Barisha, it momentarily stopped, turned West and accelerated toward al-Baghdadi's compound. The van was unknowingly travelling through a highly controlled battlespace and was now heading toward a designated military objective. As a response to this incursion, warning shots - likely machine gun fire from a helicopter - were issued 15m ahead of the van. As the bullets hit the ground, the intended effect of the warning shots sent atmospheric plumes of dust and asphalt into the air. That the van then continued on its path, seemingly unheeding this warning, served to confirm the US military's notion that the drivers of the van were exhibiting an 'hostile intent'. As the van approached a US blocking position - established 150m away from the compound - self defence action was taken by US forces. The van was kinetically engaged via the deployment of missiles and machine gun fire initiated by attack helicopters. As a result of these engagements, the van was rendered inoperable. Two (2) men were killed and a third man, heavily wounded. When pressed to investigate the allegations of civilian casualties, the US Government reviewed their records

of the event and reported: "Based on a thorough assessment of all reasonably available evidence, it is more likely than not that CIVCAS DID NOT occur as a result of this strike. This CIVCAS allegation is deemed NOT CREDIBLE."4 In their recount, the van demonstrated 'hostile intent' and did not stop when warned. And this legitimised the destruction of the van and the engagement of the men inside. This notion of credibility is of paramount importance when we come to analyse the event as surveyors of alterity. It is the vehicle we drive with full force to destabilise the dominant narrative of the event that is established by the US Government. To make clear, as a collective, we are not interested in a head to head with the US Government. We are not poised against formal accounts, but against the habitual ways of thinking space and time, that the US Government relies on for its narrative to function. It is through deftly weaving between dominant and minor architectures, governed and ungoverned spaces, that we, as architects, are uniquely poised to grapple with the highly spatio-temporal qualities of event-space. Our ultimate goal of destabilising habitual ways of thinking is achieved through the uncovering of quiet aspects of the al-Baghdadi raid which exceed the dominant narrative. And from this, we work to raise these alternate figurations to a level of credibility.

TACTICS Tactics are able to move and shift in subtle or dramatic plays that can reshape the characteristics of the spatio-temporal. The tactic constantly moves between foreground and background able to rearrange or recreate the conditions of space. Tactic is taken as the title for this report as to operate with agile maneuverability in the dynamics of event space analysis. Originating from a military arena the etymology of tactic co-evolved with military strategy. From the Greek taxis meaning ‘to order’ or ‘arrange’, to the later tactica referring to the ‘art of drawing soldiers into formation’.5,6 In a contemporary military sense, a tactic can be described in broad terms as a deployment of a means of arrangement to achieve a predetermined result. 7 An architectural tactic differs from its military counterpart. In architecture, a tactic is the primary means of operating, but the result of deploying tactics is often unknown. This is to say that the process of employing a tactic can be more important to the resulting spatial relations than its particular utilisation. Both the military and architectural use of tactic involves the careful empirical understanding of space through orders, arrangements and relations. But the difference here is that the military tactic is primarily planned to operate backwards from specific goals: an architectural tactic is fluid and reactive to the dynamics of spatial relations as they develop and can respond creatively to the macro or micro without the need for pre-

set guidelines. This is possible because as Roman architect Vitruvius discusses in De Architectura, architectural tactics deal with the fundamentals of spatial organisation, the basic principles from which all subsequent tactical analysis has evolved.8 Our deployment of architectural tactical analyses herein is situated against the established field of forensic architecture. Like forensic architecture, architectural tactics are investigative practices that closely analyse the spatio-temprality of event space. The tactics employed within this report will build upon the pre-existing field of research and offer unique perspectives of spatial organisation. These tactics will operate with neutral independence, considerate but not constrained by the politics of the event space and wider contexts. The tactics used in this report raise the minor narratives of the event to a level of credibility. Inertia, operability of time and space, the affect of terrain, the impact of a strike, means of maneuver, issues of disappearance, and visibility will be brought into focus through an architectural tactical analysis.

DEPLOYMENT The primary aim of this tactical report is to provide an independent and objective analysis of the alBaghdadi raid. Our analysis functions as a standalone body of work and also possesses the potential of evolving into compelling evidence, adding significant value to the ongoing advocacy initiatives of the Zomia Center on behalf of affected civilians. Our work may also take on a life of its own, extending beyond our individual reach and control, beyond this particular event and the people involved. It could be employed in analysing other military events and potentially catalyse changes in military operations. The work may become a pivotal step in forming a new type of analysis, shifting the way we interpret and understand military spaces. Moreover, our work may come to interest urban designers, journalists, lawyers, and foster interdisciplinary connections where they have traditionally been absent. This report delves into the impact of architectural analysis within military contexts, instigating a reconsideration of architecture's significance and its potential to reveal unanticipated political implications. We have developed an innovative methodology that allows us to work politically, so as to read, re-read and analyse military space. Our work demonstrates the capabilities of architectural expertise and its relevance when operating beyond the confines of traditional practice. We harness the communicative and analytical potential of architecture, which involves critically examining, critiquing and reading military event space and exploring its relationship with spatio-temporal

principles. By critically engaging with the intersection of architecture and military events, we shed light on the often-overlooked architectural dynamics in such contexts, thereby providing valuable insights that transcend the boundaries of both conventional military and architectural thinking. Within the report analysis of the al-Baghdadi raid, references are made to both traditional and unorthodox architectural principles to enhance the tactical analysis, which we refer to as 'deployments.' We have employed methods to interpret dynamic event space(s) and have also designed deployments of our own to understand the event from a decidedly architectural perspective.

NOTE 1. "Visual guide to the raid that killed Isis leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi" The Guardian, N o ve m b e r 1 , 2 0 1 9 , h t t p s : / / w w w. theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/28/ visual-guide-to-the-raid-that-killed-isisleader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi 2. Daniel Estrin, "Syrians Say U.S. Helicopter Fire Killed Civilians During The Raid On Baghdadi," National Public Radio, December 3, 2019. https://www.npr. org/2019/12/03/784089600/syrianssay-u-s-helicopter-fire-killed-civiliansduring-the-raid-on-baghdadi. 3. US DoD. Analyst Summary of Conclusions for CCAR Allegation (North Carolina: US CENTCOM, 2020): 218 4. US DoD, Analyst Summary of CCAR, 209. 5. Martin van Creveld, “tactics.” Encyclopedia Britannica, November 5, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ tactics#:~:text=tactics%2C%20 in%20warfare%2C%20the%20 art,movements%20for%20attack%20 or%20defense 6. “tactic (n.),” Online Etymology Dictionary, Accessed Sep 25, 2023, https://www. etymonline.com/word/tactic 7. Headquarters, Department of Army, Offence and Defence, ADP 3-90, Washington:Army Doctrin Publication July 2019. PDF, https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/adp3_90. pdf. (Accessed September 25, 2023), 1-1. 8. Vitruvius. De Architectura. Translated by Richard Schofield. London: Penguin Group, 2009.

Location:

(DIS)APPEAR

36°09’57.1”N 36°37’53.7”E near Barisha, Idlib Province, Syria

University of Sydney

Sydney School of Architecture, Design and Planning

Thesis Studio

Project B - Architecture of Assassination Master of Architecture

Research Period

Aug 2023 - Nov 2023

Publish Date 13 Nov 2023

Author

Kaihao Yang

Tutor

Frank La Paz

Individual Work

Abstract In the operation carried out by the US military on 27 October 2019, a white van became implicated in a regime of military event space, resulting in civilian casualties. The varying perspectives of the urban and road configurations provided different perceptual experiences for both the US military personnel and the individuals inside the van, contributing to the unfolding tragedy. From the vantage point of the US military, an unusual trajectory was construed as a potentially 'hostile' movement. However, when the perspective shifted to ground level, this peculiar trajectory might have been a consequence of subtle yet critical factors imperceptible to the US military. This paper seeks to reconstruct and methodically analyze the minute elements contributing to the incident from both the US military’s aerial perspective and the perspective of the individuals inside the van on the ground. Within the context of a dark environment, as the vehicle progressed, the urban and road configurations ahead and on either side gradually appeared and disappeared, perpetuating this cyclical process. The urban environment, in this scenario, manifested as dynamic rather than static, undergoing continual transformation with each passing moment. In such a situation, a driver might find themselves compelled to engage in a constant negotiation with the surrounding environment, informing their subsequent actions and decisions with every passing instant.

In this incident, the aerial perspective of the US military and the ground-level view from the van could affect their understanding and perception of urban morphology, leading to differences in behavior and decision-making. While the US military described the van’s “strange trajectory” as 'hostile,' there might be other subtle yet critical factors influencing the van’s path from the ground perspective. For the US military, these “minute elements” might be imperceptible from the air or through military technology. 是非成败转头空，青山依旧在，惯看秋月春风。一壶浊酒喜相逢，古今多少事，滚滚长江东逝水，浪花淘尽英雄。几度夕阳红。白发渔樵江渚上，都付

In the early hours of 27 October 2019 , a white van carrying three(3) men passed through the T-intersection in Barisha while en route to Hanta. The van slowed down near the T-intersection, stopping in front of a house previously attacked by US military, then turned right at the intersection and accelerated towards the direction of the compound. The US military described this trajectory as potentially 'hostile'1. When the van was about 360m from the compound, the US military fired isolation shots in an attempt to change the van’s direction. However, this did not alter the vehicle’s course, and the US military subsequently attacked the van, resulting in two(2) deaths and one(1) serious injury2. CONFIGURATION

BETWEEM 0029h AND 0031h,27 OCT 2019 (bx1i1.4(a> scanned the village. Upon return to he st ike location, both front doors of the van were opened.

AT 0036h,27 OCT 2019 , Cbx1i1.4(aJ the remaining adult male at the N s de of the roofless building.

26.OCT.2019 11:00PM

At 0026h,27 OCT 2019 acquired one van that traveled from the N FOV through Barisha, Syria with unknown occupants. The van continued S on the roadway and turned W at a T-intersection .

At 0027h,27 OCT 2019 AT 0227h, 27 OCT 2019

<bx1i1.4<a> utilized containment fires around the van. <bx1i1.4<a> cut the roadway withL bJ(1J1.4a isolation fires approximately 15 meters in front of the van which was struck as it con inue to travel W. The van stopped to the S of one roofless building and one small re tangular building

conducted a HAF raid ISO Operation (b) )1 .4(a) ,,_ ___ --.IOT capture/kill ISIS Caliph Abu Du'a aka Abu Bakr AI-Baghadi (bJ<1>1A<ai (b)(1)1.4(a) IVO ldlib, Syria

350M

Figure 1. Overview of the timing of the assassination

50M

The headlights don't shine parallel to the front, they drop down. For every 7500mm from the headlights, the headlights will drop 50mm in a vertical direction

STREET LIGHT

HANTA STREET LIGHTS

ROAD BEFORE VAN ENTERING VILLAGE

MOONLIGHT VISIBILITY:0.08%

CENTRAL ROAD IN BARISHA

STREET LIGHTS STREET SHOWS IN ZOOM-IN SECTION VAN’S PLANNED ROUTINE

f e

d b c

Figure 2. Streetlight analysis and moonlight analysis.(Source:moonrise,moonset and moon phase in Syria,2019)

Investigating the perspective of those inside the van on 27 October 2019, sheds light on the situation that day. A critical factor throughout the event was lighting. Research on the moon in Syria on that date showed only 1.1% visibility, meaning there was virtually no moonlight. This could have influenced the US military’s decision to act on this night, as darkness suits an assassination plan. Google Maps showed streetlights in areas surrounding the T-intersection, including Hatan and central Barisha village. However, no streetlight patterns appeared on the map at the T-intersection, indicating the van drove in darkness, reliant solely on its headlights for illumination and information. The driver, navigating at night, was limited to the 30-40m3 range illuminated by the headlights, unlike the 400-700m4 visibility during the day, necessitating constant adaptation and decision-making in response to the evolving environment. According to the street lights found by hanta and barisha, street lights are shown on the map with satellites of this resolution.Zooming in on t-intersecion's road (the road that van passes over), the map doesn't show any shapes that resemble streetlights.We can conclude, 27.oct, that there were no streetlights when the car was traveling on the road that night.

An examination of a photograph taken on 27 October (Figure 3), depicting the northern side of a compound, reveals two(2) conspicuous white accumulations on the right building’s wall. A truck is stationed at a gap in this wall, with 12

an individual standing beside the white material. On the adjacent left building, a dissimilar white filler substance is present on the wall, with additional white accumulations on its southern side. This evidence strongly suggests these white accumulations are construction materials, likely stockpiled by Barisha residents for wall repairs or new construction, conveniently placed alongside the walls and roads. On the night of 27 OCT, the moonlight visibility was only 0.08%. IN SUMMARY, ON THAT NIGHT, THE HEADLIGHTS WERE THE ONLY LIGHT SOURCE.

Furthermore, another photograph (Figure 4) taken on the same date provides a clear depiction of a multi-level building, offering insight into the nature of the white areas observed on maps. The shadows in the photograph, along with distinct features such as rectangular blocks on the road and a nearby tree, assist in pinpointing the photograph’s location. Satellite imagery shows a white area on the eastern side of the road in front of this multilevel building. A comparative analysis of the satellite images and photographs indicates the presence of a triangular-shaped white accumulation in front of a pile of bricks, resembling cementitious materials. This aligns with the hypothesis that these white areas on the map represent accumulations of construction materials

WHAT COULD WHITE WHATTHE COULD THEAREAS WHITE BE? AREAS BE?

On 27/10/2019, a drone captured the condition of a house and road near where the

Oncompound 27/10/2019, a drone captured the condition of a house and road near where the was exploded compound was exploded

Photo taken on 12/11/2019

WHITE PILE

WHITE PILE TRUCK A MAN WAS STANDING ON A TRUCK WHITE PILE NEXT TO A TRUCK

A MAN WAS STANDING ON A CONCLUSION: WHITE PILE NEXT TO A TRUCK Comparing the satellite map on google map from February to November 2019, the road conditions in barisha are changing. Especially on the roads in the neighborhood of the house, white areas It is obvious from the picture that the stone composition of the enclosure has a portion of Figure 3. Speculation about the white areas on the map.(Source: youtube,voice of america,2019) CONCLUSION: appear gradually after February and the location, size and shape of the white areas keep white fill. There is a strong possibility that the villagers have repaired the enclosure with changing. The of some white map areasfrom decreases overtotime and new2019, whitethe areas a cement-like material. Meanwhile, there is a white pile on the outside of the fence Comparing the size satellite mapofonthegoogle February November roadappear conditions February. Until November, some areas in gradually disappeared.of the house, white areas inafter barisha are changing. Especially onwhite the roads the neighborhood

It is obvious from the picture that the stone composition of the enclosure has a portion of white fill. There is a strong possibility that the villagers have repaired the enclosure with a cement-like material. Meanwhile, there is a white pile on the outside of the fence

On 27 October 2019, the van was traveling on the left side of the road, and it is evident from the map that there are two(2) white areas marked within red circles, occupying a portion of the road. Based on the previous analysis of these white areas, it was deduced that they consist of accumulations of a substance resembling white cement powder, implying that these two(2) white areas are likely composed of the same construction material.

appear gradually after February and the location, size and shape of the white areas keep changing. The size of some of the white areas decreases over time and new white areas appear after February. Until November, some white areas gradually disappeared.

With this evidence-supported reasoning, it is highly probable that these two(2) construction debris may have influenced the trajectory of the vehicle to some extent. The size and height of these construction debris would have played a role in the driver’s decision-making, whether to 'maneuver' the vehicle around them or drive directly over them. Even without direct access to satellite imagery from 27 October 2019 to obtain precise information about the relative sizes of the construction debris on that day, a rough estimate can be derived by comparing satellite imagery from September 28th and November 12th.

Figure 4. Restore the perspective of the photo by 3d modeling

4400mm

pile A on 28/09/2019

3000mm

2800mm

3800mm

pile A on 28/09/2019

pile A on 12/11/2019 14days

31days 31days = 70% 44days

29/10/2019 3200mm

2600mm

pile B on 28/09/2019

overlapping a pile at different times

Satellite map taken on 28/09/2019

potential shape of pile A on 29/10/2019

If the rate of consumption of cement-like pile is constant over the course of construction, then the potential shape of the pile A on 29/10 would be 70% of pile on 28/9 while being 143% of pile on 12/11

pile size on 28/09/2019

pile A on 12/11/2019

5400mm

4200mm

pile B on 28/09/2019

pile B disappeared on 12/11/2019 14days

31days

29/10/2019 31days = 70% 44days

3000mm

2600mm

potential shape of pile B on 29/10/2019 Satellite map taken on 12/11/2019

pile size on 12/11/2019

20mm X 20mm grid

If the rate of consumption of cement-like pile is constant over the course of construction, then the potential shape of pile B on 29/10 will be 30% of shape of pile on 28/9

Figure 5. Analysis of the potential dimensions of the two(2) white areas on the left-hand portion of the roadway(Source:google map,2019)

When driver is navigating the road leading to the T-intersection under normal daytime conditions, they have the advantage of an extended field of vision. During daylight hours, visual cues from the surroundings are far more accessible, allowing the driver to anticipate potential obstacles well in advance. However, the situation takes a dramatic turn when we shift our perspective to the events of the 27 October. On that fateful night, the driver's primary source of illumination and information is the vehicle's headlights. These beams of light cut through the surrounding darkness, revealing the road ahead in a limited cone of visibility, roughly 30 to 40m in front of the vehicle. Consequently, the driver's perceptual experience is profoundly altered. In this nocturnal setting, t h e r o a d a n d t h e u r b a n e nv i r o n m e n t n o longer present themselves as static entities. Instead, they become a dynamic, ever-changing landscape that unfolds in real-time as the vehicle progresses. This transformation is due to the intrinsic connection between the vehicle's movement and the direction of the headlights. From the US military’s aerial viewpoint, the urban and road layouts are static, fully exposed 14

The range of the car lights is about 30-40m. As the van approaches the T-intersection, the roads and buildings gradually become clearer.

15°

As the distance between the van and the pile is shortened to 30-40m, the pile gradually appears in the driver's field of vision.

10°

Figure 6. Possible trajectories of vehicles under the influence of construction debris 225°

150°

When the drive the steering w steering wheel

As the headlights illuminate the pile, the driver gains information about the road ahead and begins to decide which way to avoid it.

As the van approaches the first PILE, the driver turns the steering wheel to the right and the building on the right appears, while the view of the road ahead fades away

When van dodged the first pile

As the headlights illuminate the pile, the driver gains information about the road ahead and begins to decide which way to avoid it.

As the van approaches the first PILE, the driver turns the steering wheel to the right and the building on the right appears, while the view of the road ahead fades away

When van dodged the first pile

As van dodges the first pile, the second pile is illuminated by the headlights, and the driver then decides on his next move

After van has dodged the 2nd PILE, the driver will turn the steering wheel to the right to control the vehicle back to the centerline of the right side of the roadway for safe travel.

van returned to the centerline of the right-hand side of the road and drove normally

Figure 7. The view a driver might see when a vehicle is dodging a pile As van dodges the first pile, the second pile is illuminated by the headlights,

After van has dodged the 2nd PILE, the driver will turn the steering wheel

van returned to the centerline of the right-hand side of the road and drove

and the driver then decides on his next move to the right to control the vehicle back to the centerline of the right side to military technology and aerial surveillance. decisions. The normally urban and road layouts, under the of the roadway for safe travel. influence of headlights and construction debris, The militar y can easily obtain this static information to plan and arrange scenarios appear fragmented, constantly appearing and disappearing as the van moves. This continuous, conducive to their assassination mission. In this context, only the van, as a moving object, dynamic transformation of the city and road can be easily predicted by the military, with any layout requires the driver to constantly negotiate with the environment for their next move. While deviation from the expected trajectory seen as potentially 'hostile'. However, for those on the the objective reality of the material world is undeniable, subjective information obtained from ground, including the van, the limited field of view prevents a complete understanding of the different heights and perspectives significantly reshapes how this world is perceived. What urban and road form5, resembling a panoramic view composed of countless momentar y appears as a “strange trajectory” from above, potentially 'hostile' in movement, might be images. Particularly on the night of the 27th, the area illuminated by the van’s headlights the result of continuous negotiation between and roadside construction debris becomes movement and environment when viewed from ground level. critical in influencing the driver’s actions and

road is fixed,immobie

urban form is fixed,immobile

van should move in a very regular way

For the U.S. military, cities don't move, roads don't move, and they're using helicopter radar and pictures to get information or intent on vehicles. This is a very macro judgment. The U.S. military has an expectation of the trajectory of a vehicle, and anything beyond that is characterized as hostile.

The road slowly appears and disappears as the van moves

ubran form appears as the van moves

ubran form disappears as the van moves

The deceleration, stopping, turning, and acceleration in the van movement are a strange movement for the US military.

piles restric van’s movement

On 29/10, in the darkness of the night, the driver, who only has the headlights to get effective information, sees the entire urban form, the

Figure 8. US military anditself human's inandvehicles' of inurban state of the roads, everything as moving, repeating in disappearance appearance. Theperception piling of the road surface, this case, morphology, roadways. reinforces to a great extent this change of disappearance and appearance, and the driver is constantly negotiating his surroundings as he travels, always making decisions about what to do next. This is not a pre-set or fixed road, but a trajectory that is constantly in flux.

INERTIA

Location:

36°09’57.1”N 36°37’53.7”E near Barisha, Idlib Province, Syria

A PROBLEM OF STOPPING

University of Sydney

Sydney School of Architecture, Design and Planning

Thesis Studio

Project B - Architecture of Assassination Master of Architecture

Research Period

Aug 2023 - Nov 2023

Publish Date 13 Nov 2023

Author

Nidhi P. Mallikarjuna

Tutor

Frank La Paz

Individual Work

Abstract The chapter “Inertia : Problem of stopping” investigates the intricacies of movement, focusing particularly on a van's movements of momentarily stopping, accelerating and its failure to stop within a specific spatio-temporal context. These actions were interpreted as 'hostile' and triggered a series of violent events in Barisha, Syria on the early morning hours of 27 October 2019. The analysis navigates the challenges associated with movement within spatial and political dynamics. It delves into the intricate issues of not stopping that extend beyond the driver's reaction and are embedded within the mechanics of a vehicle - a zone after breaking and before the car come to a complete stop. This is an architectural space of Inertia , a space characterised by the lack of control as two(2) opposing forces clash: the dominant force of motion striving to maintain movement and the newly applied braking force fighting against the inertial force to halt the body. The study problematises the material aspects of inertia2 within and around the van, contributing to the delay in stopping and ultimately resulting in the van being struck after surpassing the stopping threshold. The investigation also questions the appropriateness of an approximate 15m stopping distance and challenges the plausibility of the van stopping, even under ideal conditions, within such a confined space and time. This then raises concerns about establishing an unrealistic stopping distance, particularly in times of conflict where the cost of not stopping is life itself.

The centcom report1 describes the vans movements as follows: It becomes evident that there were a few key movements of the van that appeared 'hostile' to the US military and these are : · Stopped momentarily · Accelerated towards · Failed to stop In further analysis we study these movements with respect to physical context and dwell deeper in the search of credibility. The analysis is highly architectural as the research constantly changes in scale. The Analysis views the situation as a problem and constantly connects back to the event (as narrated in the CENTCOM report1) for ways to solve this problem of credibility.

Figure 1. Illustrates a contextual diagram showcasing the van's uphill movement near the T-intersection. This visual serves as a crucial reference point, offering insight into the spatial dynamics during this significant phase of the investigation."

Stopped Momentarily "Stopped momentarily" describes a situation where a vehicle briefly comes to a halt, with minimal or near-complete slowdown and limited movement for a short duration of time. In the context of the report, this term is used to refer to specific instances during the van's journey through a particular area in Barisha, Syria, during the operation to capture/kill the then ISIS Leader al-Baghdadi on the early morning of 27 October 2019. These momentary stops are of particular significance and are attributed to several factors and environmental conditions. Accelerated towards The term "accelerated towards" refers to the act of increasing the speed or velocity of a vehicle, in this case, a van, as it moves in a specific direction. In the context of the report1 mentioned earlier, "accelerated towards" indicates that the van, while in motion, deliberately or unintentionally increased its speed as it moved in a particular direction or towards a specific point. The importance of understanding this term in the context of the report1 lies in its significance for the sequence of events.

Figure 2. Depicts a potential multi-storey building, suggested as the housing site for the EQRF, strategically positioned near the T-intersection. This visual aids in our analysis, emphasizing the plausible correlation between the building's location and its role as a potential headquarters for the Emergency Quick Reaction Force.

Failing to stop Figure 3. Presents a diagram indicating the potential location of the van moments before the fire. This visual representation contributes to our understanding of the van's spatial context leading up to the critical event, providing crucial insights for the forensic analysis.

Figure 4. Illustrates a diagram depicting the potential location of the van moments before the fire. This visual aid enhances our forensic analysis, offering valuable insights into the van's spatial dynamics leading up to the critical event.

Approximately 15m from the point where warning shots were fired, this is the juncture that held the utmost significance. (Figure 3) It's at this point where the van faced a critical decision – a decision that could have determined the outcome of the situation. The van failed to stop or change its course as a response to the warning shots, and analysing the options available to it is essential to understanding this pivotal moment. The failure of the van to stop or change its course at this juncture was a crucial factor in the subsequent events. This moment underscores the critical importance of timely and appropriate driver responses in high-stress and time-sensitive situations. The van's inability to come to a complete stop within this limited distance had significant implications for the safety of those involved and the overall outcome of the operation.

An Architecture of Inertia An architecture of Inertia It elucidates the persistent tendency of an object to maintain its current velocity, direction, or stationary position unless acted upon by an external force. Understanding inertia unveils the essence of how objects naturally preserve their momentum, offering insights into the stability, predictability, and resistance to change observed in the physical world.

The clash between these two(2) forces unfolds in the zone of inertial architecture. The characteristics of this zone significantly depend on both the mechanical composition of the van and the immediate environment in which it operates. The van's mass, size, braking system, and overall mechanical design all play a role in shaping the dynamics of this zone. Likewise, the terrain, road conditions, and any external factors contribute to determining the van's eventual stopping distance and the size of the zone of inertia it traverses. The failure of the van to stop or change its course at this juncture was a crucial factor in the subsequent events. This moment underscores the critical importance of timely and appropriate driver responses in high-stress and time-sensitive situations. The van's inability to come to a complete stop within this limited distance had significant implications for the safety of those involved and the overall outcome of the operation. 19

The Materiality of stopping

The materiality of stopping a vehicle is a multifaceted process influenced by various factors, each contributing to the overall stopping distance. The moment when the driver deploys the brakes is pivotal in the stopping process. This reaction time depends on several factors, including the driver's experience, level of fatigue, intoxication, and distractions.

An experienced, alert, and sober driver is more likely to react promptly to a potential threat, reducing the reaction time. Conversely, a fatigued, distracted, or intoxicated driver may exhibit delayed reactions, which can impact the overall stopping distance. Once the driver initiates braking, the vehicle is still in motion, traveling through space and time. It's at this point that the vehicle's mechanical components come into play, beginning with the brakes themselves. When the driver presses the brake pedal, it activates the braking system, and the brakes' strength comes into action. The brakes are designed to exert pressure on the spinning wheels, initiating the process of slowing down the vehicle.

Figure 5. Stopping distance against time and velocity

Stopping Distance = Thinking Distance + Braking Distance = [v * tp-r] + [v2 / (2*u*g) ] Reaction Time (tp-r)=1 s Coefficient of Friction (u) = 0.7 Acceleration due to gravity (g) = 9.8 m/s2

Expressed through the equation (1/2 * mass * velocity^2) = frictional force * distance, and simplifying, the braking distance formula can be determined as: Braking distance (s) = (velocity^2) / (2 * coefficient of friction * gravitational acceleration).

Velocity(v) = 45 km/h = 12.5 m/s

Velocity(v) = 55 km/h = 15.28 m/s These parameters not only provide a detailed breakdown of the components of the stopping distance but also enable a more comprehensive understanding of the intricate mechanics involved in bringing a moving vehicle to a halt. This amalgamation of thinking distance, determined by driver perception and reaction time, and braking distance, reliant on energy conversion and frictional forces, constitutes the fundamental dynamics dictating the halting process of a moving vehicle.

The physics of Trauma For fairness to be introduced into the dynamics of war, there is a necessity for adherence to the laws of the physical environment. The rules of engagement, strategies, and weaponry must align with these fundamental principles to ensure a level playing field. Ignoring or attempting to circumvent the physical laws may lead to unpredictable and potentially catastrophic outcomes as seen in Barisha.

AN ARCHITECTURE OF 1.08S

Location:

36°09’57.1”N 36°37’53.7”E near Barisha, Idlib Province, Syria

University of Sydney

Sydney School of Architecture, Design and Planning

Thesis Studio

Project B - Architecture of Assassination Master of Architecture

Research Period

Aug 2023 - Nov 2023

Publish Date 13 Nov 2023

Author

Olivia D’Souza

Tutor

Frank La Paz

Individual Work

Abstract The US narrative of the al-Baghdadi raid relies on the van’s continued demonstration of ‘hostile intent’ in response to warning shots. The credibility of this major narrative can be challenged when considering the spatio-temporal operability of the warning provided to the men in the van. Analysing the deployment of terrain denial fires and the instrumentalisation of the road as a ‘vector of the hunt’, the sufficiency of the warning begins to degrade. The proposed military tactics of the Kill Box and Trigger Line further reduce the operable space and time of the men to solely what is visible in the van’s headlights. This can be calculated over various speeds the van could have been travelling at and distance of the van to warning shots. If the van was travelling at 50km/h the men had 1.08s to respond to the warning shots. The men’s operability in 1.08s is greatly restricted: the sufficiency of the warning provided by the US is called into question. A spatial-temporal zone of 1.08s is inadequate to effectively respond to warning shots, and the time and space provided to the men was reduced to a level of inoperability to meet conditions of de-escalation. The deficiency of a 1.08s warning proposes an alternative narrative that the men did not respond to the warning shots because the spatio-temporal conditions of the warning provided were insufficient.

The operational time and space of the warning given to the men in the van as it travelled West of Barisha on 27 October 2019 is the critical zone in which the credibility of the US narrative can be challenged and an alternative offered. The credibility of the US narrative rests on a few key assertions outlined in the released CENTCOM report. The report concludes five factors contributed to the US claim that the van was “demonstrating imminent hostile intent” and is used as a validation for actions undertaken by US forces towards the van.1 These factors include: time of night, location of van, intelligence reports, the van’s movement towards gunfire and the vans’ reaction after the warning shots were fired.2 It is possible to discount some

of these factors which contribute to US claims, despite this the van’s lack of response to the isolation fires remains a plausible justification of hostile intent. Importantly, for this claim to hold the US narrative relies on the van having had the operative time and space to respond to the warning shots. The question becomes, what constitutes an adequate time and space to respond to a warning? An adequate warning could be described as spatio-temporal conditions which are operational or able to be operated within. For the US narrative to retain credibility the men in the van needed the operative time and space to act otherwise, to alter their trajectory.

Figure 1. Impact on movement of terrain denial fires that funnel movement onto the remaining vectorial.

THE KILL BOX PROPOSED MILITARY RECONFIGURATION OF SPACE 37SBA 86985 04980 37SBA 86985 04980 37SBA 86985 04980

THE TRIGGER LINE PROPOSED LOCATION IN BARISHA

37SBA 86935 04935 37SBA 86935 04935 37SBA 86935 04935

B.P

Figure 3. Proposed Location of Kill Box. TOTAL AREA: 2 475m2 TOTAL AREA: 2 475m2

VAN DESTROYED VAN DESTROYED VAN DESTROYED

K.I.ATOTAL or W.I.AAREA: 2LOCATION 475m2 AT I.F. K.I.A or W.I.A LOCATION AT I.F. K.I.A or W.I.A LOCATION AT I.F.

VAN HIT WITH I.F VAN HIT WITH I.F VAN HIT WITH I.F

K.B T.L

Figure 2. Diagrammatic representation of proposed logistical 'maneuvers' to aid implementation of Kill Box.

Figure 4. Proposed Location of Trigger Line.

TRIGGER LINE

“At approximately 0228C, a white van was observed driving from the village and towards both the Target Co points of impact of the terrain denial fires. The van turned west at the same T-intersection referenced above along the road leading directly to both the U.S. Blocking positions and the Target Compound.”

0484

Terrain Preparation U.S. CENTCOM 8700

The spatio-temporal characteristics of the warning are influenced by the US logistical deployment of terrain denial fires. If the aim of the terrain denial fires is as outlined in the report, the movement of the van West of the village should not have been possible. In the process of pacification and limiting movement West of the village the terrain denial fires failed to destroy the main access road from the village to the target compound and US positions. The road, the most likely point of access for additional EQRF or civilians was left undamaged. If the terrain denial fires were intendent on preventing movement to the target compound, why not destroy the main arterial which provides access? Leaving the road intact and traversable instrumentalises the road, activating it as a trajectory, a wanted path of movement. 24

Battle Space Geometry Configurations

Military tactics that may be in play that explains the instrumentalization of the road is the Kill Box (Figure 3) and Trigger Line (Figure 4). The Kill Zone is defined by the US military as, “A threedimensional area reference that enables timely, effective coordination and control and facilitates rapid attacks.”3 While the official documentation does not specify the use of these tactics, if the Kill Box was in use, a series of area preparation manoeuvres would have been undertaken to ensure the effectiveness of the tactic (Figure 2). Notably as described in a lesson from University of Iowa Army ROTC the surrounding terrain is fired on to force movement of the enemy into a trajectory which leads to both Trigger Line and Kill Box.4 The tactical reshaping of Barisha altered the men’s ability to act and react to the isolation fires.

Figure 5. Locating the re-creation video at 00:23:19:01 to where the van would have been when isolation fires were deployed.

AL SU VI

VI SU AL

T 62o

30o

50o

LI M

SYM BOL RECOGNITION

THE ROAD OCCUPIES APPROXIMATELY 58.71o OF THE HORIZONTAL FIELD OF VISION AT 8M IN FRONT OF THE VAN VI SU AL

The operational time and space for the men in the van or the time the men had to respond to the warning shots can be calculated based on US and NPR reporting. The location of the re-creation video at 00:23:19:01 corresponds to the location of the van when isolation fires were deployed (Figure 5). From this the visible distance ITof the driverVISfrom the re-creation U IM LL LI videoISUAcan be measured atAL30m in front of the MI T V vehicle and at a of maximum 9m width. This corresponds to 13.18o of the vertical62 and 58.71o of the horizontal field of vision (Figure 6-7). This is the visible range of the driver in the recreation vehicle at the same location of the van 30 30 just before the isolation fires were deployed. It 0 SYMto note that is important this analysis has some BOL RECOGNITION limitations e.g. the field of view from a camera vs a human eye.

62o

30o

Operational Time and Space

25o

YE XE MA ATION T RO

L UA VIS

62o

00:23:19:01

VAN LOCATION AT ISOLATION FIRES

STANDARD LINE OF SIGHT

NO LINE RMAL OF S IGHT MA RO X E TA YE TI ON

15o

30o

LIM

THE ROAD OCCUPIES APPROXIMATELY 58.71o OF THE HORIZONTAL FIELD OF VISION AT 8M IN FRONT OF THE VAN

70o

Figure 6. Horizontal (top) and vertical (below) visual range based on NPR re-creation video. THE ROAD OCCUPIES APPROXIMATELY 13.18o OF THE HORIZONTAL FIELD OF VISION

SYM BOL RECOGNITION

The value of the time and space that constitute a warning was changed within the US logistical system. Operational time was reduced, forced along a trajectory of manipulated and controlled movement, times lineal predictability became uncertain, suspended. The operational time and space of the warning zone was fundamentally altered impacting the men’s ability to respond to isolation fires.

From this analysis, at the moment of isolation fires, if it is assumed that the van was travelling at 50km/h thus, the operational time for the men is 1.08s for 15m of distance before the isolation fires struck the van (Figure 8).

of disorientation and inability to map sense onto matter. Thus, within 1.08s the men’s ability to react, to break, decelerate or turn to counter the momentum of the ‘hostile’ trajectory would have been limited. An architecture of 1.08s created by US actions was inadequate for the men to be operative.

For the US narrative of credibility to hold it claims the warning, calculated to be 1.08s, provided to the men was sufficient to be operative, to react. However, it is proposed that 1.08s of time and space is not enough to be operative or to operate within, to understand or make understood, to decide or act otherwise. Furthermore, the average reaction time of drivers to respond to a car accident range between 1.3s – 1.5s which exceeds the 1.08s warning time provided to the men.5 It is suggested that the US narrative of sufficient warning lacks the spatio-temporal conditions that are conducive to warn. The 1.08s offered by the US was not enough time for the men to overcome the sensations of collapse. In this collapse the men likely experienced a sense

0M M

15 0

00M M

00 MM

If the van was traveling 50km/h it would have had the operative distance of 30m and operative time of 2.16s. VAN BEFORE LOCATION THE AT I.FISOLATION FIRES THE VAN: JUST LATION FIRES THE VAN:

AVELLING 50KM/H HAD THE OPERATIVE D OPERATIVE TIME OF 2.16 SECONDS

90 00M M

Understanding the spatio-temporal architecture of 1.08s is important to determine the men’s ability to act and react to the warning. A series of experiments were conducted using LiDar and photogrammetry to map or record the operative time and space of 1.08s. (Figure 9). The mapping of how space unfolds through the time of 1.08s, as seen in the experiments, switches the normal understanding of space-time relations. Instead, reading space through time demonstrates the complexity of a person’s navigation through a zone. An architecture of 1.08s is not static but moves and it is in this movement that the body negotiates the spatial parameters of the

If the van was traveling 50km/h it would have had the operative distance of 15m and operative time of 1.08s. VAN LOCATION AT I.F

IF THE VAN WAS TRAVELLING 50KM/H HAD THE OPERATIVE

Figure 7. Visible space just DISTANCE before isolation OF 15Mfires. AND OPERATIVE TIME OF 1.08 SECONDS

ISOLATION FIRES fires. Figure 8. Visible space at time of isolation

temporal. The operativity of this 1.08s frame is limited as shown through the challenge of accurately mapping 1.08s with civilian technology when movement and trajectory are in play. The autonomy of movement within 1.08s is shown to be relative to the movement of space and the fluid object. Reactions in the mapped zone of the experiments became predetermined, the operability of a person controlled through their relational reactivity to external movement. This impairs a person’s ability to act within 1.08s, rendering the warning given as ineffectual. Understanding what constitutes the operability of a warning has impacts that extend beyond this event. Evaluating spatio-temporal conditions given to a warning changes how operable space is determined. This can have implications for current spatial and temporal conditions of warnings militaries give civilians to evacuate or respond to hostility. Considering recent events in Gaza, understanding the operative zone of 24hrs

Location: Footpath in Shopping Area Scan Length: 4m Scan Time Overall: 3s

to evacuate millions of people calls into question the sufficiency or effectiveness of warnings to civilians. The complex spatial-temporal physicalities of the warning from a civilian perspective are often overlooked, especially in terms of movement. The analysis and mapping technique provided in this architectural tactical analysis offer a different way to represent and understand warning zones. This form of analysis can assist in providing future framework for warnings provided to civilians through a greater understanding of the temporal conditions of event space.

Sensor Set Length: 1.3m 1.08s: Walking 1.3m behind a person 1.08s after scan registered Figure 9. LiDar and Photogrammetry experiment to map An Architecture of 1.08s.

Location:

CLOUDS OF TERRAIN

36°09’57.1”N 36°37’53.7”E near Barisha, Idlib Province, Syria

University of Sydney

Sydney School of Architecture, Design and Planning

Thesis Studio

Project B - Architecture of Assassination Master of Architecture

Research Period

Aug 2023 - Nov 2023

Publish Date 13 Nov 2023

Author

Liza Khamitova

Tutor

Frank La Paz

Individual Work

Abstract Architectural elements and tactics can be found in unexpected scenarios, and once acknowledged, can change perception of reality and discredit dominant politics at play. This chapter investigates the relationship between US military fires on the Syrian terrain and the geometries of space which prove to matter immensely to the lives of three (3) civilian men during the al-Baghdadi raid. During the event, the US military engaged fires onto the terrain, which led to a reactive cloud of dust, road and soil particles being thrown in the air via ballistic force, creating moments of obscurity, confusion, and optical blur. This resulted in a change of operative space, which was instrumental to the unfolding of the event as it affected the actions and reaction time of three(3) civilian men involved on the ground. The methodology employed in this research involves a tactical analysis and comprehensive study of the workings of the al-Baghdadi raid following four(4) main lines of inquiry. It begins with an in-depth study of Syrian soil data and its characteristics. A careful comparative mapping of another engagement during that event follows, which works to understand the approximate size and reach of terrain clouds. The third line deploys methodologies to map the affect the terrain cloud had on the van at different points in time, and the last line involves understanding how lighting and weather conditions played a part in the whole experience.

Production and Destruction In the early hours of the 27 October 2019, three(3) men drove through the village of Barisha on their way home from work at an olive farm North of Barisha. As they neared 360m from the al-Baghdadi compound, a helicopter engaged isolation fires 15m in front of the moving van to deter it. The moment the fires struck the terrain, the environment produced an explosion reaction, triggering a cloud of dust and other particles. Rather than stopping, the presumed action the US expected from apparent civilians, the van continued driving. The men didn’t conform to the expected patterns of movement, to certain negotiations of space and time, such as stopping and accelerating. Due of this, the US perceived the actions of the men as ‘hostile intent’ and proceeded to directly targeted the men within.3

Firstly, military credibility relies on precision and structure, yet the unexpected terrain cloud challenge this by introducing chaos and disrupting form. Secondly, the atmospheric production altered the operational space, influencing the actions and reaction time of civilians. While the US narrative centers on men as enemy militants for not conforming to expected movements, it neglects the productive quality of the military’s actions. This oversight questions the credibility of the US military narrative, challenging transparency and precision in the overall event reporting and revealing potential inconsistencies.

The impact of isolation fires is pivotal for two(2) reasons. Figure 2.1. Conditions of terrain at engaged locations. Source: Google Earth

Figure 1. Geo-location of the al-Baghdadi Compound, van engagement and secondary soldier engagement. Source: Google Earth

Figure 2.2. Engagement video frame overlaid over satellite imager y. Source: Google Earth and US DoD

Figure 3. Images of meadow near Barisha. Source: Google Earth

Figure 4. Images of van after US military engagement. Source: Omar Haj Kadour 2019

Through a thorough analysis of maps, site images and satellite imagery, the soil characteristics can be understood. Plants found near the site suggest the soil is sandy, well-drained with sandstone and limestone components (Figure 3), which is reinforced with data from a geological map. The road is likely composed of asphalt or compressed dirt. These various surfaces would respond differently to ballistic force. The arid soil likely experienced substantial displacement, manifesting as disorienting dust clouds upon impact. Conversely, the road, with higher density and impact absorption, likely resisted extensive cloud-like displacement but exhibited localized damage such as craters (Figure 4). This soil study contributes to a theoretical comprehension of the terrain’s response to aerial force, shedding light on the diverse reactions of different surfaces within the site.

The US military released footage of another engagement in Barisha that occurred during the al-Baghdadi raid, providing insights on the soil’s response to fires and the resultant terrain clouds. Situated 500m Northeast of the compound (Figure 1), this Secondary Soldier Engagement (SSE) likely occurred prior to the van attack and is invaluable in mapping the terrain’s response, particularly considering the relatively stable atmospheric conditions such as wind over the course of the raid. To a n a l y s e t h e 1 3 - s e c o n d v i d e o o f t h e engagement, we extracted a series of 25 frames at 10 frames per second, allowing a precise time mapping. This analysis focused on the development and movement of five(5) distinct clouds across various surfaces—A and B on the soil, C on the road rock boundary, D on the building, and E on the road (Figure 2.1, 6.2).

Figure 5. Extracted clouds of terrain. Stills frames taken from video released by US military of SSE video. Image base source: US DoD

Figure 6.2 illustrates the overall span of each terrain cloud, revealing a consistent eastward movement of 5m, likely influenced by the wind.

Figure 6.1. Still frames taken from the SSE. Red circles highlight size of terrain clouds. Image base source: US DoD

Figure 5 presents the extracted mapping size of explosions, organized at 0.1s intervals. Soil clouds consistently displayed larger sizes, enduring for 1.81.9s, while road clouds lingered briefly. The house cloud attained the largest span, persisting beyond the video recording. Contextual constants, including weather conditions and soil and road types, allow reasonable parallels to be drawn between this Secondary Soldier Engagement video data and the isolation fires that struck ahead of the van. This detailed mapping and analysis significantly contribute to a nuanced understanding of the unfolding event.

Figure 6.2. Maximum reach of terrain clouds. Stills frames taken from video released by US military of SSE video. Image base source: US DoD

Figure 7. Location of isolation fires. Source: Analyst Summary of Conclusions for CCAR Allegation 2020)

Figure 8. Axonometric diagram depicting growth of terrain clouds, 0.8s after isolation strike fired.

Figure 9. Section diagram depicting growth of terrain clouds in night conditions, 0.8s after i

By utilizing the analysis from the Secondary Soldier Engagement video, we generated axonometric diagrams (Figure 8) illustrating the likely development and movement of the road and soil terrain clouds and estimated their advancement towards the van. The US CENTCOM reports highlight that these warning shots were fired in a line perpendicular to the road, spread across soil on both sides of the road (Figure 7). We also generated section drawings illustrating the likely trajector y of the terrain clouds advancing towards the van (Figure 9). As the wind shifted the terrain clouds 5m east in the SSE video, it is

likely that the cloud and van intersected at 11m from the vans initial position, within 0.8s of the bullets hitting the terrain. Considering this data, the US military allowed the men in the van merely 0.8s to enter an unexpected military event space, process the situation and respond with particular matters of movement to survive. Temporality and optic obscurity are key elements at play. The vision that the cars headlights illuminated would have been completely obfuscated by the terrain clouds, shattering any sense of time and space. In these unique conditions, the perception of light and speed changes entirely (Figure 11).

isolation strikes fired.

Figure 10. Recreation video overlaid with dust cloud refraction conditions. Base image source: Omar Haj Kadour for NPR, 2023

The problem of obfuscation unfolds on multiple levels. As the van moves, the perception of the men driving changes— from seeing the dust cloud ahead to being engulfed in it. Figure 10 is a synthetic image that encapsulates the absolute analysis and ramifications of the terrain clouds in a single representational model. It is a hybrid still shot, with the NPR recreation video as a basis overlaid with a measured but artificial representation of the cloud. The production of these clouds of terrain within operative space is the hinge on which the event pivots. Spatial dynamics depend the concept of visibility—being able to perceive and navigate through space with clarity. This essential visibility was shattered and replaced with optical blur and obfuscation, reshaping the narrative of action and reaction.

Visibility holds transformative power, severely impacting the capacity of individuals to act and react. The men in the van could not have pursued alternative courses of action, as spatial conditions were not crafted to accommodate choice. The men’s actions were influenced by forces beyond their anticipation. In essence, the atmospheric shift catalyzed a departure from predefined paths, rendering the notion of doing otherwise within the spatial context rooted in structured rules of battlespace. The production of clouds of terrain by the US military led to a juxtaposition of military order and unregulated formlessness. This ultimately resulted in a divergence from expected trajectories and led to two (2) civilian casualties and one (1) civilian severely injured.

Figure 11. Still frame extracted from recreation video. Source: Omar Haj Kadour for NPR, 2023

Location:

VISIBILITY

36°09’57.1”N 36°37’53.7”E near Barisha, Idlib Province, Syria

University of Sydney

Sydney School of Architecture, Design and Planning

Thesis Studio

Project B - Architecture of Assassination Master of Architecture

Research Period

Aug 2023 - Nov 2023

Publish Date 13 Nov 2023

Author

Yuwen Sun

Tutor

Frank La Paz

Individual Work

Abstract This van and its passengers are classified by the US military as unprivileged combatants with 'hostile' intentions and strategic mobility. However, the report lacks concrete evidence to confirm the presence of weapons in the vehicle or any 'hostile' actions by the targeted civilians. Therefore, it seems that the military’s actions to destroy vehicles and cause harm to civilians are based on subjective reasons. Through the forensic analysis of official reports, photos and media records, a micro-reconstruction of isolation fire is developed through architectural means and technology. What is determined is that the warning shots used by the US military were so low in visibility that they did not have sufficient conditions to attract the driver’s attention. Secondly, it is argued that the US military used a variety of potential weapons to attack vehicles, but only used one(1) weapon that caused the least visual impact to warn vehicles.

At 0026h, 27 October 2019, a Hyundai van crossed a thruway junction south of the village of Barisha, which was subsequently monitored by US forces. The van was ultimately destroyed within 300 m (Figure 1) of the US Army’s designated assassination target. Subsequently, the United States military launched an attack on personnel attempting to flee the vehicle, resulting in two(2) deaths and one(1) injury. In an official report, the United States military claimed that the van’s acceleration towards the target area posed an imminent threat. They argued that subsequent attempts to isolate and stop the van’s trajectory were ineffective, which justified their decision to carry out the forceful attack1.

Contrary to the military’s claims, an interview with the victim, Barakat Barakat, conducted by National Public Radio (NPR), revealed that the attack on their vehicle occurred suddenly and without warning2. Significantly, according to the victims’ recollections, a helicopter quickly approached their vehicle and opened fire. This suggests that the “isolation fires” used by the military may not have been as effective in attracting the attention of the drivers or producing a noticeable visual effect as the US military initially claimed. In short, the visibility of the “isolation fires” is likely to be a key factor in explaining the events of that night.

Figure 1. The area of the isolation fire and the location of the van (Image Source: Analyst Summmary of Conclusions for CCAR Allegation 2020)

Figure 2. Typical references can be used to estimate pothole size and spacing (Images Source: Omar Haj Kadour, 2019) Figure 5. Bullet holes in the body of the destroyed van (Images Source: Omar Haj Kadour, 2019; Mustafa Dahnon, 2019)

Figure 3. Local children in Barisha

Figure 6. Ballistic speculation

T h e t h r e e ( 3 ) m o t o r b i ke s i n t h e p i c t u r e apparently feature a design typical of the 2000 Suzuki GS125, which is about 1,945 mm long. Their rear wheels typically have 18-inch rims and are approximately 457 mm. The length of the right foot of an adult Asian male is assumed to be about 270 mm. Comparing the diameter of the craters with the diameter of the rear wheel of the motorbike in the photographs, it is estimated to be approximately 270 to 300 mm in diameter. Some of the surrounding potholes appear to be potentially larger. It is therefore highly probable that the munition capable of creating such a large pothole in a solid road surface was a medium-calibre 30-mm munition rather than a 7.62-mm bullet. In addition, a rough estimate of the maximum gap between the two(2) sets 36

of craters is about 3890 mm, or about four(4) m. This means that the munitions that caused the two(2) sets of craters were fired at regular intervals. It is highly probable that they were used by the United States forces for different operational purposes. (Figure 2) In 2019, SMART News Agency provided photographs showing US artillery shells that were found by children residing in the area in which US forces killed al-Baghdadi. Among other things, the simulation of the children’s hands and postures in the photographs allowed an estimate of the length of the black shell casing at approximately 100 mm, which is highly consistent with the dimensions of a 30mm chain gun bullet3. Meanwhile, details of a

a displaying two(2) types of cartridges (Source: SMART News Agency 2019; almohrarmedia.net, 2019)

Figure 4. Penetration projectile (Source: Zaid and Paul 1957)

shell casing photographed by an Arab media outlet can pinpoint the type of shell to the 30-mm M789, a HEDP high-performance artillery shell commonly used by the US military in the Middle East. The yellow shell casing is approximately 50 mm in length, which is a high match to the 7.62-mm NATO round (Figure 3).

distinguish between incoming and outgoing bullet holes in the vehicle. On the basis of this analysis, it was possible to deduce and simulate the ballistic trajectories of certain vehicles in order to approximate the approximate orientation and flight path of the United States helicopters on that night (Figure 6).

The distribution of bullet holes of varying sizes in the body of a destroyed vehicle (Figure 5) can be distinguished by observing the indentations in the sheet metal and comparing them with the experimental phenomenon of a high-velocity bullet penetrating the metal 4 . This helps to

The different sizes of bullet holes in the body of the van prove that the United States military used a variety of possible weapons to attack the van (Figure 7). The characteristics of these potential weapons help to surmise and decipher the ambiguous parts of the official United States report.

Figure 7. Damage to the bodywork by different weapons (Image Source: Anadolu Agency, 2019)

Figure 8. Video analysis of night driving on the same road (Vedio Images Source: Omar Haj Kadour, 2019)

According to Omar Haj Kadour, on 24 July 2023, he shot a video (Figure 8) of cars driving on the same road at night for National Public Radio5. The video shows that in a dark environment, a car’s headlights provide a very limited range of illumination. Due to the slightly elevated terrain of the road and the obscuring of weeds and stones on both sides, the environmental conditions in other areas are almost difficult to be seen by drivers travelling at night. This is because there are no other light sources in the environment outside the range of vehicle illumination that can provide sufficient reflective conditions for objects. Some reference objects in the video are instrumental in pinpointing the precise location of the photographer’s vehicle on the road at that moment, freezing a unique moment in the event. Seven(7) frames from this video have been extracted and subjected to a film-like treatment in Photoshop, making it possible to clearly illustrate the illumination range of the vehicle’s headlights. The red area denotes the highest luminosity, while the yellow area represents a general illumination zone, characterized by relatively lower brightness that gradually diminishes with increasing distance. The rest 38

of the frame corresponds to non-illuminated reflective areas, rendering them nearly invisible to the driver. The position in the second image is similar to the position of the van when the United States forces set up “isolation fires” that night. The vehicle’s headlights were affected by the stones on the left and right sides of the road and the illumination of the area beyond the road surface was obscured. In addition, the illumination extends only as far as where the road is about to turn, which is approximately less than 15 m from the vehicle. Based on the planar analysis in the 3D model, the point of impact on the ground caused by the US “isolation fires” was located just inside the blind spot of illumination caused by the bend in the road. This suggests that when the separation fire is set to signal to the driver to stop, it may not be visible to the driver at all. According to the LHT ECE standard (E-mark mandated traffic safety standard), the data points at 25L and 25R are critical in determining the appropriate level of brightness to enable the driver to perceive any potential hazards6 (Figure. 9). In other words, in the road environment where the vehicle in the video is located, the vehicle’s headlights are illuminated at a distance

Figure 10. Lighting range in the video

Figure 9.

significantly less than 25 m. This means that it is very difficult for the driver to see and react in time to any potential hazards in front of him. As a result, the visibility of the “isolation fires" was virtually non-existent from the driver’s perspective.

Figure 11. Characteristics of the three(3) weapons and visual effects (Vedio Image Source: YouTube.com, 2023)

The armed helicopter that attacked the vehicle was equipped with three(3) potential weapons, and other weapons could have provided higher visibility for the driver during the deployment of “isolation fires”. However, the US military ultimately chose weapons that, in comparison, offered the lowest visibility during deployment (Figure 12). Such a choice is perplexing and seems unreasonable.

Figure 12. Visibility of isolation fire with three(3) ammunition types

Location:

ISOLATION STRIKES

36°09’57.1”N 36°37’53.7”E near Barisha, Idlib Province, Syria

University of Sydney

Sydney School of Architecture, Design and Planning

Thesis Studio

Project B - Architecture of Assassination Master of Architecture

Research Period

Aug 2023 - Nov 2023

Publish Date 13 Nov 2023

Author

Christopher Tjhia

Tutor

Frank La Paz

Individual Work

Abstract In the wake of the 2019 assassination of Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, allegations that civilians were killed during the raid were levelled at the US military. Three(3) men, travelling home from work at a local olive press, unknowingly entered a battlespace laid over the village of Barisha and became implicated within the military operation. This is an architectural examination of that event, focusing on one key moment, a warning shot that hit the civilians as they were travelling. A series of misinterpreted reactions followed, leading the US to escalate, resulting in the deaths of two(2) of the men and the wounding of a third. Upon investigating the claims that the men in the van were civilians, US Central Command ultimately found the allegations to be plausible but not credible. This analysis will examine how the van could be struck and how that could have affected the reactions of the men. Rigorous empirical analysis of the event is conducted using architecture’s unique mode of operation, in order to tread the path of the alternate. It is through the deployment of innovative architectural techniques and tactics, that we seek to make credible the moments which lead to civilian harm in the event, and in doing so, exceed the dominant narrative as configured by the State.

Isolation Strikes

The consequence of using deadly force as a warning tool. On the 3rd of December, 2019, an article published by NPR brought forward allegations that three(3) civilians in a van were amongst the casualties of the US Military’s raid against al-Baghdadi.1 On the morning of the raid, at 0026h local time, US forces observed a white panel van travelling through the prefigured battle space overlaid on Barisha. Isolation fires were issued by the helicopter - warning shots that were fired 15m ahead of the van intended to halt its advance. It was observed that the van did not stop and so 'hostile intent' was confirmed. Acting in self defence of the van, the US military engaged with deadly force, killing two(2) civilians and wounding a third. In response to the claims of civilian harm, a formal investigation of the event was launched by US CENTCOM in order to assess the credibility

of the allegations that civilian harm occurred. A CCAR was released by CENTCOM and within it, the US Military found that the allegations were not credible. Within the report, a narrative was configured, where adequate warning was given to the van, which was not heeded as the van ‘failed to stop or alter course.’ The ignorance of the warning shots confirmed that the van harboured ‘hostile intent’, which, according to US ROE, allowed a response of deadly force.2 However, in the FMV/WSV review found in the CCAR we discover that ‘the van was struck’ during the issuing of the isolation fires (Figure 3). It is upon this line found in the FMV review that the outcomes of that morning hinge on. The fact that FMV/WSV review is where our moment of fixation lies is valuable due to the level of aesthetic truth inherent in the medium of video.

Figure 1. 'Figure 4' from the CCAR report. An important still frame for this investigation. (Source: Analyst Summmary of Conclusions for CCAR Allegation 2020)

Moment of Figure 4. Impacts 0 1

Strike zone 6

0 sec

10m

Indicated area of Isolation Fire 12

15m

+1 sec

Figure 2. Diagram of the event space leading up to the moment of isolation fires.

From this line we are able to open an alternate reading of the situation, one that seeks to unbalance the credibility of the dominant narrative. From this line, we question the precision which the military claims to work with, the totality of information they proclaim to have - as well as the techniques and tools used in the event - some of which have historically been incredibly problematic when it comes to inflicting civilian harm. One of the tools in question, the M230 Autocannon is a helicopter mounted gun which fires explosive rounds at a rate of 600 per minute or 10 per second (Figure 4). The bullets are M789 HEDP munitions, containing a fuse in the tip of the bullet which detonates a charge within the round when a surface is struck.3 This charge simultaneously expels a molten projectile forward to pierce vehicle armour, whilst fragmenting its metal casing to expel antipersonnel shrapnel in a 4m radius (Figure 5).

Multiple videos of the M230 in past military operations have been studied in order to verify their use in our event and understand the behaviour of the weapon and gunners who employ them. The repeating patterns which are read when reviewing these videos forms a foundation from which the credibility of our assertions can be earned when relating them to our event. Tangential footage of the raid was released by CENTCOM and analysed to conduct an event specific investigation of the behaviour of this weapon and munition in an area geographically adjacent to where our moment of fixation occurred. By locating each impact of the strikes in the video, we know the space that a 2-3s pull of the trigger can occupy. This has been mapped for our purposes as a ‘strike zone’ (Figure 6). In order to find how the van could be struck, we look to examine how long the van spent within an active strike zone. Taking the audio from past operations, we can isolate the sound of the

20m

sight with the objective area. <bx1i1.4<a> engaged the combatants and resumed over-watch.

es 18

ng shot

Moments later <bx1i1.4<a> identified the van moving southbound (on the western side of the the The 20 village) 21 towards 22 23 T-intersection. 24 25 26 van slowed and stopped momentarily at the T-intersection (next to the previously engaged multi-story building) and then proceeded to make a right turn to the west and accelerate towards the objective area (Figure 3). As the van closed on the objective <bx1>1.4<ai employed (b)(1)1.4a isolation fires west of the van (Figure 4). The isolation fires did not deter or cause the vehicle to change course. <b><1>1 A<a>:=! then engaged with destructive I<~>1.4<ai as the van was within 150 meters of the closest friendly force blocking position, and 300m from the objective (Figure 5). The pilot assessed secondary explosions emitted from the vehicle, indicating weapons and explosive devices were on board the panel van. Further subsequent review has been inconclusive in classifying the explosion. Following the explosion <bx1i1.4<a> observed the doors to the panel van were open indicating that unprivileged enemy belligerents had exited the vehicle. <bx1>1.4<ai <bx1i1.4<a> identified 25m the threat maneuvering 30m from the van. <bx1i1.4<a> engaged with <bx1i1.4a rocket as they +2 secmaneuvered in the wood line, which neutralized the threat (Figure 6)

Summary of GET FMV/WSV Review

At 2126Z, <bx1i1.4<a> acquired one van that traveled from the N FOV through Barisha, Syria with unknown occupants. The van continued S on the roadway and turned W at a T-intersection (b)(1J1.4c . At 2127Z, <bx1i1.4<a> utilized containment fires around the van. <bx1i1.4<a> cut the roadway with bJ(1J1.4a isolation fires approximately 15 meters in front of the van which was struck as it continued to travel W. The van stopped to the S of one roofless building and one small rectangular building <b><1J1 .4c. One adult male on the right side of the van moved toward the small rectangular buildling and a second toward the roofless building N of the van. (b)(1J1.4<a> continued to engage the van with [jb>~ Between 2129Z and 2131Z, (bx1i1.4(a> scanned the village. Upon return to the strike location, both front doors of the van were opened. One adult male was PROB KIA approximately 10 meters to the N of the van, two PROB WIA adult males were on the ground approximately one meter to the rear of the van and a fourth adult male was on the N side of the roofless building approximately 30 meters to the N of the strike location. At 2136Z (b)(1J1.4~ re-engaged the van with Cb>c1i14a and one <bJ(1J1.4, At 2139Z, Cbx1i1.4 engaged the remaining adult male at the N side of the roofless building. At 2140Z, <bJ(1J1 A<a> resumed defensive scans of the area. Figure 3. Excerpt of FMV/WSV review (Source: US CENTCOM CCAR, 2020)

autocannon being shot and analyse it through a spectrograph. This gives us a way to read 6 different instances of the trigger of an M230 autocannon being pulled. From this we get from 0.7 to 2s of trigger hold time. Figure 4 (Figure 1 in this report) from the CCAR was an important piece of data that was overlaid above the corresponding satellite imagery in order to closely examine the area before and after the raid. Within the marked area of the isolation fires, there are 2 dark silhouettes which can be seen South of the road, yet do not show up on the satellite images. Studying these silhouettes show that, whilst there is some resemblance to the numerous olive trees found in Barisha, there are distinct aesthetic differences.

Figure 4. M230 Autocannon used within the event. (Source: Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems)

Figure 5. Fragmentation properties of the M789 munition (Source: General Dynamics)

TA R

GE T

43m

Figure 6. M789 impact locations from event mapped on satellite imag source: Maxar Technologies, 2019)

Figure 8. Scorch marks on the road within area of isolation fires.

Figure 9. Syrians walk past a damaged van at the site of helicopter gunfire (Source: Associated Foreign Press, 2019)

What we are seeing are isolation fires in progress (Figure 7). As our van is 10m from the strike zone at the time that Figure 4 is taken, a vehicle travelling at an assumed 50 kph would take 0.72s for it to enter the strike zone. We can see that in 5 of the 6 instances, the strike zone is still active and could continue to be active for another 1 to 11 impacts. (Figure 2) Further examination of Figure 4 unearths a curious circumstance. In satellite imagery taken after the raid in November 2019, we can see a dark shadow on the ground opposite of the buildings where the van was engaged with deadly force. We can recognise this shadow to be scorch marks left on the ground after the van burned out following its engagement (Figure 8). 44

What this tells us is the van entered the area of isolation fires and never left. In the case of a direct hit with an M789 munition, the outcomes would be catastrophic. As the intended effect of the munition is to pierce armour and subsequently release shrapnel within the interior, this would no doubt have a significant impact on the van reacting “appropriately” to the issuing of the warning shots. This is an issue for the credibility of the narrative as set up by the US military, the basis of which hinges on the men not heeding the ‘clear’ and ‘unmistakable warnings’. If the reaction of the van is compromised, then no warning could be heeded. If no warning could be heeded, then the response of the US - an engagement of self

Isolation fires Olive Trees

23m

gery. (Base image

Figure 7. Identifying isolation fires vs olive trees. (Source: US CENTCOM CCAR, 2020)

defence and combatant destruction - was not a proportionate response. Ultimately, the munition is indifferent to the intentions of the pilot and gunner; if there is a chance that the van could be struck and the intention was only to warn, then an imprecise weapon, capable of deadly force, should not be the tool utilised. Through a highly empirical analysis of the events of that morning in Barisha, we have seen that the technologies and techniques utilised by the US military lead to the striking of the van. In doing so, appropriate reactions to the inadequate warning reactions could not possibly be expected.

Figure 10. Mapping potential shrapnel behaviour on the inside of the van (Base image source: Omar Haj Kadour, 2019)

Location:

(RE)MANEUVER

36°09’57.1”N 36°37’53.7”E near Barisha, Idlib Province, Syria

University of Sydney

Sydney School of Architecture, Design and Planning

Thesis Studio

Project B - Architecture of Assassination Master of Architecture

Research Period

Aug 2023 - Nov 2023

Publish Date 13 Nov 2023

Author

Dezheng Liu

Supervisor

Prof. Chris L. Smith

Tutor

Frank La Paz

Individual Work

Abstract The assassination activated on the 27 October 2019, a van unexpectedly entered the US. military operation zone for the raid of al-Baghdadi, leading to two(2) deaths and one(1) injury. According to the US military’s investigation report, within the entire sudden incident - a mere 14-minute timeframe, the van’s motion perceived as ‘hostile intent’ and labeled the subsequent attempt by passengers to escape as 'maneuver'. Upon designating the passengers as 'combatants', a US military helicopter engaged in a second attack on the one(1) individual, who had already distanced himself from the vehicle, ultimately resulting in his death. This event prompted profound reflection on the nature of movement, especially in high-pressure and perilous situations. Movement is not merely a mechanical action but also reflects our intentions, emotions, and perception of external stimuli. Of particular interest in this matter is the description of 'maneuver' in the US. military’s analysis report. This description conveys a highly military specific strategy, emphasizing 'hostile intent' in the actions taken. Conversely, in Barakat’s account, the same 'maneuver' was framed as an attempt to escape. In this context, the same actions can be interpreted as two(2) entirely different intentions, contingent on the specific circumstances. The report endeavors to re-examine this event, deconstructing the credibility of both the US. military and Barakat as direct participants in the incident. It employs architectural techniques to analyze and discuss whether both parties bear a necessary responsibility for the consequences of this same attempt to escape.

Figure 1. Event mapping of background story and key location

Figure 2. Diagram of the van and photo allocation

Situate The contrasting descriptions of 'maneuver'1 are noteworthy. The US. military report emphasizes 'hostile intent,'1 while Barakat’s account frames it as an escape attempt. These interpretations highlight the situational context’s influence on our understanding of the same actions, revealing stark differences in intentions. From the perspective of 'maneuver', the foremost consideration lies in the significant role that the built environment plays in shaping the experience and perception of physical activity. From the predefined spatial arrangements, pathways to urban form and structures, the built environment condition can influence how we navigate and

interact with our surroundings. Contemplating how the spatial layout of a location affects people’s understanding and utilization of physical activity, especially in complex situations like the one mentioned above, can either facilitate or hinder communication and action concerning the surrounding elements. In this event, the physical environment – the terrain layout within the US. military operation area – may have played a crucial role in shaping the course of the event. Analyzing the architectural aspects of the situation at that time can provide valuable insights into the dynamics of physical activity and decision-making. 47

Throughout the entire document, we can discern the frequent occurrence of specific phrases. Among these, the descriptive expressions r e g a r d i n g t h e b eh av i o r a l s t a t e , s u ch a s “continuing toward 2 , not changing/slowing/ stopping,” 3 can be interpreted as denoting a sustained, uniform motion of vehicles and individuals in terms of both speed and direction. Such motion can also be equivalently expressed as any movement other than “changing/slowing/ stopping” in terms of alterations in direction and speed. The US. military report’s emphasis on the phrase “continuing toward, not changing/ slowing/stopping” underscores the critical nature of the observed behavior from the US.military

perspective. This highlights that the white panel van and its occupants were following a persistent and unwavering trajectory, implying a deliberate course of action from the report representation. Therefore, the military report seeks to convey that this behavior was not a random occurrence or an accident but rather a purposeful action with potential implications for the safety of US. forces. As stated in the report, “The demonstration of 'hostile intent' by the members of the van, and the threat they continued to pose, did not stop just because their transportation was disabled. The continued actions after the vehicle was disabled reinforced the assessment that these personnel were a direct threat.”4

Figure 3. Dimensional analysis diagram for human scale and objects

Credibility However, within this report, we can primarily observe that the concept of 'maneuver' is primarily manifesting through the analysis of the movement patterns of the vehicle and its occupants. Viewing this from the perspective of a high-altitude aircraft, it prompts us to question how the US. military is able to determine the intentions of these individuals solely based on the motion trajectories of the vehicle and its occupants. 48

Figure 4. Location mapping for Primary Scene (Base image source: Maxar Technologies, 2019)

Within the nuanced framework of 'maneuver', a minor architectural theory of movement, the manner of one’s movement can be categorized into various actions, an individual’s way of moving can be categorized into various distinct behaviors. Notably, in a specific scenario, a driver’s navigation through terrain represents a defensive act, a self-preserving behavior seeking shelter to evade danger. However, for the US. military, it is constituted as an act of aggression. Both of these interpretations fail to fully encompass the diversity of movement, as motivations

Figure 5. Location mapping for Secondary Scene (Base image source: Maxar Technologies, 2019)

and meanings behind movement can vary significantly based on individual factors, culture, and context. This paradox highlights that in high-pressure situations (as seen in this case, a combat scenario), the same evasive action can be interpreted by the two(2) parties as having entirely distinct intentions. This underscores the multifaceted nature of movement and emphasizes the need for a more comprehensive and multidimensional approach to understanding movement in combat situations.

Figure 6. Dimension study within the site photo & Re-model Scene based on site photos (Base image source: Omar Haj Kadour, Ibrahim Yasouf, Anadolu Agency, Ghaith Alsayed, Yahya Nemah 2019 )

Figure 7. Spatial experience of the driver within the event space.

The research further focuses on the central figure of the event, namely, the driver. It does so by analyzing the urban context surrounding the intermediate area, isolates the discussion and analysis of the driver’s escape behavior and potential subsequent escape route steps, aiming to seek insights into the driver’s most plausible thought processes and behavioral logic. During the evasive process, the driver had limited options for covering, both in terms of quantity and type. These spatially included the vehicles recently vacated by the driver, olive trees at a certain distance, rock barrier aside of the road and two(2) distant buildings. Figure 8. Area of interest in the event space.

Moment / Materiality In the detailed examination of the urban context surrounding the intermediate area, the thesis endeavors to gain a deeper understanding of the driver’s behavior and decision-making through empirical examination. Firstly, the thesis acquires relevant size data regarding the vehicle the driver was operating at the time of the event, including dimensional data such as length, width, height, and the obstructed area when vehicle doors open and close. By contrasting the precise measurements of olive trees and the surrounding stone barriers with potential body size data of the driver, the thesis determines the route taken for evasion, ultimately arriving at the location north of the “roofless building” marked in the US. military report, where the driver was subjected to a second-round attack.

Figure 10. Driver’s motion diagram in elevation

Figure 9. Driver’s motion diagram in plan view

Tactical Architecture From that, there’s an alternative interpretation and rationale for a movement. It’s entirely possible for the same movement to signify something fundamentally different. In combat situations, the nuances of movement are far more intricate and complex than what the US. military implies. Back to the sudden incident moment, the driver, faced with a military helicopter which discharging its power, has the first instinct to exit the vehicle and flee as a means to defend himself, seeking appropriate shelter to hide. Different from the counter-intuitive act of standing still as the US Military expected, the attempts to evade during unexpected incidents are intuitively grounded in a sense of adequacy, and quickly seeking the nearest available object for cover in his field of vision. This requires a bodily response before he “realizes” the consequences of his actions, that is, an extremely rapid assessment of the dimensions of surrounding objects and making the fastest possible defensive movement. For this man, this is a clear and only choice. At this moment, his movement has a completely different motive compared to the military’s interpretation -

his defensive action of seeking shelter, from the US. military’s tactical perspective, leave rooms for the potential threat of weaponized attack. In the few second, the way they move in the world matters entirely, the manner of movement can significantly impact results, even demarcating the subtle line between life and death. The significance of this study lies in its profound insights into driver behavior, particularly in situations fraught with danger and pressure. It’s essential and important to have a better understanding on the complexity of movement itself in such scenarios. The decisions made by the driver could have profound implications for their own life and the lives of others. By analyzing the driver’s actions, it is able to gain a better understanding of the choices they faced in such circumstances and how their decisions were influenced by the constraints of their surrounding environment and available resources.

Notes (DIS)APPEAR 1.Daniel Estrin, "Syrians Say U.S. Helicopter Fire Killed Civilians During The Raid On Baghdadi," National Public Radio, December 3, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/12/03/784089600/syrians-say-u-s-helicopter-fire-killed-civilians-during-the-raid-onbaghdadi. 2.US Department of Defence. Analyst Summary of conclusions for CCAR Allegations, USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0469 & 21-0470, (North Carolina: US CENTCOM, 2020): 209. 3.Owens, D. Alfred, and Richard A. Tyrrell. 1999. “Effects of Luminance, Blur, and Age on Nighttime Visual Guidance: A Test of the Selective Degradation Hypothesis.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 5 (2). American Psychological Association: 115–28. doi:10.1037/1076-898x.5.2.115.10. "30mm x 113 Lightweight Dual Purpose Ammunition Suite" General Dynamics, September, 2016, https://www.gd-ots.com/munitions/medium-caliber-ammunition/30x113mm 4.Ramamurthy, Mahalakshmi, and Vasudevan Lakshminarayanan. 2015. “Human Vision and Perception.” In Springer eBooks, 1–23. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-00295-8_46-1. 5.Lynch, Kevin. 1960. The Image of the City. https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA01382449.

INERTIA 1. Lairenlakpam, Robindro & Kumar, Praveen & Thakre, Gananath. (2019). Experimental Investigation of Electric Vehicle Performance and Energy Consumption on Chassis Dynamometer Using Drive Cycle Analysis. SAE International Journal of Sustainable Transportation, Energy, Environment, & Policy. 1. 10.4271/13-01-01-0002. 2. “Hyundai H100 H100 II Panel van 2.5D 1998-2002|Autocatalog.” Autogidas.lt, m.autogidas.lt/en/auto-katalogas/hyundai/h100/ h100-ii-panel-van-2.5d-1998-2002-k37058. Accessed 10 Nov. 2023. 3. 12 Crucial Factors Affecting Car Braking Distance. Trodo, 3 Jan. 2023, www.trodo.com/blog/12-crucial-factors-affecting-carbraking-distance. Accessed 10 Nov. 2023. 4. Rechtien, Thorsten. “Calculating Stopping Distance: Braking Is Not a Matter of Luck - Mobilityblog.” TÜV Rheinland Mobilityblog, 14 Feb. 2020, mobilityblog.tuv.com/en/calculating-stopping-distance-braking-is-not-a-matter-of-luck/. 5. “Stopping Distance Calculator.” Www.omnicalculator.com, www.omnicalculator.com/physics/stopping-distance. 6. “Civilian Casualties.” Airwars.org, airwars.org/civilian-casualties. Accessed 10 Nov. 2023.

ARCHITECTURE OF 1.08S 1. US Department of Defence. Analyst Summary of conclusions for CCAR Allegations, USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0469 & 21-0470, (North Carolina: US CENTCOM, 2020): 218. 2. US Department of Defence. Analyst Summary of conclusions for CCAR Allegations, USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0469 & 21-0470, (North Carolina: US CENTCOM, 2020): 218. 3. Air Land Sea Application Centre, Kill Box: Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and procedures for Kill Box employment, FM 3-09.34, Online: ALSA, 2005. PDF, https://info.publicintelligence.net/fm3_09x34.pdf (Accessed September 2, 2023), i. 4. University of Iowa Army ROTC, “Tactics Perimeter Defence,” Youtube Video, 33:07 Mar 24, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=iFjryipeUX4&t=235s 5. Yugang Wang, Nengchao Lyu, “A Car-Following Model Based on Safety Margin considering ADAS and Driving Experience”, Advances in Civil Engineering, vol. 2021, Article ID 6619137 (2021), https://www.hindawi.com/journals/ ace/2021/6619137/

CLOUDS OF TERRAIN 1. US Department of Defence. Analyst Summary of conclusions for CCAR Allegations, USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0469 & 21-0470, (North Carolina: US CENTCOM, 2020): 212 2. Mohammed, S., A. Khallouf, S. Kiwan, S. Alhenawi, H. Ali, E. Harsányi, J. Kátai, and H. Habib. “Characterization of Major Soil Orders in Syria.” Eurasian Soil Science 53, no. 4 (2020): 420–29 3. P, Mugdha. “Materials Used for the Construction of Roads: Methods, Process, Layers and Road Pavement.” Engineering Notes, July 23, 2018. https://www.engineeringenotes.com/transportation-engineering/highway/materials-used-for-the-constructionof-roads-methods-process-layers-and-road-pavement/48549#

VISIBILITY 1. US Department of Defence. Analyst Summary of conclusions for CCAR Allegations, USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0469 & 21-0470, (North Carolina: US CENTCOM, 2020): 212 2. Daniel Estrin, "Syrians Say U.S. Helicopter Fire Killed Civilians During The Raid On Baghdadi," National Public Radio, December 3, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/12/03/784089600/syrians-say-u-s-helicopter-fire-killed-civilians-during-the-raid-onbaghdadi. 3. Department of Department of Defense. 2017. Army Ammunition Data Sheets Small Caliber Ammunition TM 43-0001-27. 4. Zaid, Melvin, and Burton Paul. 1957. “Mechanics of High Speed Projectile Perforation.” Journal of the Franklin Institute 264 (2): 117–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-0032(57)90892-x. 5. Daniel Estrin, 2023. “Pentagon Files Reveal Flaws in U.S. Claims about Syrian Casualties in Baghdadi Raid.” NPR. July 21, 2023. https://www.npr.org/2023/07/21/1186437871/ pentagon-files-baghdadi-raid-syria-civilian-casualties. 6. Ava. 2019. “What Is a Good Headlight Beam Pattern? (DOT/ECE).” Guangzhou LEDO ElectronicCo.,Ltd. January 24, 2019. https://www.led-car-light-manufacturer.com/good-headlight-beam-pattern-dot-ece/.26.

ISOLATION STRIKES 1. Daniel Estrin, "Syrians Say U.S. Helicopter Fire Killed Civilians During The Raid On Baghdadi," National Public Radio, December 3, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/12/03/784089600/syrians-say-u-s-helicopter-fire-killed-civilians-during-the-raid-onbaghdadi. 2. US Department of Defence. Analyst Summary of conclusions for CCAR Allegations, USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0469 & 21-0470, (North Carolina: US CENTCOM, 2020): 212 3. "30mm x 113 Lightweight Dual Purpose Ammunition Suite" General Dynamics, September, 2016, https://www.gd-ots.com/ munitions/medium-caliber-ammunition/30x113mm 4. Major Beth Riordan, Email message sent to Daniel Estrin, July 20, 2020.

(RE)MANEUVER 1. US Department of Defence. Analyst Summary of conclusions for CCAR Allegations, USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0469 & 21-0470, (North Carolina: US CENTCOM, 2020): 208 2. US Department of Defence. Analyst Summary of conclusions for CCAR Allegations, USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0469 & 21-0470, (North Carolina: US CENTCOM, 2020): 218. 3. US Department of Defence. Analyst Summary of conclusions for CCAR Allegations, USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0469 & 21-0470, (North Carolina: US CENTCOM, 2020): 217. 4. CENTCOM Major Beth Riordan, Email message sent to Daniel Estrin, "Case 1:21-cv-10511-PAC Document 1-1 Filed 12/08/21 Page 26 of 91" The FOIA Project, July 30, 2020. https://foiaproject.org/dc_view/?id=21151907-nys-12021cv10511complaint-attachment-1

TACTIC 01 30.11.2023