Ahmedabad Women’s Action Group Vs. Union of India
Ahmedabad Women’s Action Group Vs. Union of India
Petitioner : Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) & ORS
Respondent : Union of India
Date of Judgement : 24/02/1997
Citation : (AIR 1997, 3 SCC 573)
Bench / Coram : CJI Aziz Mushabber Ahmadi Sujata V. Manohar, K.Venkataswami JJ.
Writ Petition No : (Civil) No. 196 of 1996
(Civil) No. 494 of 1996
(Civil) No. 721 of 1996
Abstract :
Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG), the NGO concerned about women’s rights, an PIL was filed in Supreme Court of India against the Union of India. The PIL was filed responding to the country-wide problem of a tremendous rise in killing of female children before and after birth, especially in the state of Gujarat. AWAG assert that this system is both contravention of the fundamentals rights that the Indian Constitution provide as well there implication of reproducing gender-based discrimination and violence to women.
What was being tested by this court was that prenatal sex determination tests are unconstitutional and wrongfully being used in sex selection done frequently for aborting a female fetus under the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994.
The Supreme Court, in this finding, recognized that this issue was one of the level of serious and indeed the Court held that the rights promised under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution, which include but are not limited to life, equality, and dignity, involved protection of an unborn child from sex-based discrimination. The court highlighted the importance of the PCPNDT Act implementation to disallow the fraudulence of sex-determination tests and to address the community's challenges against female child.
Besides, the court ruled out the central and state governments to be more proactive in eliminating the modern practices of female infanticide and feticide through awareness campaigns, enforcement of laws and provide support to vulnerable mothers without compromise.
The Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India judgment stands as a testimony of a momentous achievement in the enmeshment of Indian legal framework for women's rights, as the state is enforced to provide and by the way of protecting and promoting gender equality and the girl child rights. It exclusively targeted the judiciary for its activism promoting the addressing of discriminatory prejudice, especially against women, and gave birth to gender justice and equality culture.
Introduction :
This kind of case is the one wherein Writ Petitions, which are filed under the Public Interest Litigation Section, are different of personal laws that belong to various religious communities existing here in India.
These petitions filed directly to the Supreme Court challenged the following conditions under the Hindu, Muslim, and various other personal laws: they argued a violation of fundamental rights, provided under the Indian Constitution, 1950.
Facts :
A few PILs questioned the provision in Muslim Personal Law and Hindu Law which contravened the basic right of equality and non-discrimination of fundamental rights.
Complaints included occurrence of polygamy, unilateral accept of divorce, unequal inheritance jurisprudence and testamentary disposal. Borrowing from earlier cases, their arguments were heavily referred to in the courtroom and the Uniform Civil Code was cited as the solution.
Nonetheless, the court ruled against admitting them to the court as it fell under Legislative Prerogative with legal reform being a slow process.
This is as a result of an appeal that was filed to challenge the decision of the court reverse the appeal of the writ petitions.
The appellants argued that the court failed to examine the constitutionality of the abovementioned provisions and that this was wrongly done.
They pointed out the judiciary cinches the label of legislature privilege because it bypasses the judiciary's mandate to protect fundamental rights.
The respondents filed an application before the High Court for the rules against the court's decision seeking the public interest jurisdiction and arguing that it would serve the interest of justice and deserve judicial attention.
Issues Involved :
Whether certain aspects of Muslim Personal Law, such as polygamy and unilateral Talaq, violate Articles 14 (right to equality) and 15 (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth) of the Constitution?
Arguments :
Their argument was that the court's low regard for law making power (-legislative principle-) is a subtle way of saying judges are always behind legislatures performance in the protection of fundamental rights. The appellants urged the court to rethink their decision, emphasising the fact that those issues concerned the questions of public importance and therefore, they did demand the consideration of the court in exercise of their judicial functions.
Ratio decidendi :
Under the Hindu Succession Act, nor even the syariat law, custom-governed tribal people have their own ongoing tradition that kept them on their way.
Item 494 which forbids bigamy and punish the latter applies to Parsis, Christians, and others, but does not extend to Muslims due to their own prevailing religious texts that make them law-abiding in this aspect.
Distinctive backgrounds.
Decenting opinion :
Constitutional Interpretation: A different judge could have taken another view of the particular Indian Constitutional provisions and argued that the relevant right to privacy or that of the freedom and liberty to conduct business (healthcare professionals did these) could be more important than the state interest of stopping sex selective abortion and so on.
Role of the Judiciary: The view of some, entailing the delimitation of the judicial activism in the social sphere, might have been, possibly, itself a rebutted position. The judge lodging a dissent may have supported the fact that the Judiciary did not possess the authority to hand down instructions to the government, suggesting that these were policies which it could have devised rather than issues within the power of the judiciary.
Effectiveness of Legal Measures: The final objection could have been regarding the way legal instruments could not absolutely prevent such prejudices like Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques ( Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994. The dissent might be based on the argument that even though plenty of laws are important, they might not be as effective as they should to combat generational gender prejudices which include other forms of discrimination such as gender discrimination against the girl child.
Individual Autonomy: Alternatively, there could have been dissenting opinion that proved the significance of individual autonomy and the right to make reproductive choice, this option had suggested that when a woman is pregnant, she should have the right to decide over her own body without any interference from the state, including the option of terminating her pregnancy.
Socio-Economic Factors: Applying a different angle with dissenting arguments where it is pointed out that social-economic circumstances which breed the liking for boys attracts the spotlight, so that dealing with the elementary issues around gender discrimination will be much more effective.
The following are assumed facts which the dissenting verdict in the In Women's Action Group v. Union of India may have held.
Judges :
The judgment in the Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India case, commonly known as the Vishaka case, was delivered by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India. The bench consisted of the following judges:The bench consisted of the following judges:
Chief Justice J.S. Verma
Justice Sujata V. Manohar
Justice B.N. Kirpal
These judges collectively authored the landmark judgment that established the Vishaka guidelines to prevent sexual harassment of women at workplaces in India.
Decision :
So far as the challenge to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is concerned, we understand that the said issue is pending before the Constitution Bench.we, therefore, do not see any reason to multiply proceedings in that behalf.
In the result and having regard to the earlier decisions of this Court noticed above, we decline to entertain these writ petitions.Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed.