THE IRRATIONALITY OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOUR Rational Behaviour, more formally known as the rational choice theory in the humanities, roughly refers to when a consumer is making choices that result in the most ideal level of utility for an individual. In other, it is the theory that people will choose the thing that will benefit them the most. For example, it is obvious that we would choose the product with the highest quality and at the most affordable price, so that we receive the greatest utility from it. However, such a perception of human psychology is quite contradictory to how we actually act in the real world. This, thus, has great implication for our economic models. With most economic theories, Rational choice theory can find its roots in Adam Smith and his Magnus Opus Wealth of Nation. He proposed that because we can use utility to measure well-being, and that we, at all times, seek to maximise our wellbeing, and as such it is implied, in those propositions, that we are to use utility as a measurement of economic benefits as a result of economics decision. It might seem like we do this all the time: We compare the cost and the benefit of different competitor goods and decides the best good that maximises our utility; we watch a review of a product to rationally decide whether that product would maximise our utility or not. However, we do not. It is, frankly, an illusion, and a false narrative, to believe that we are making rational choices at all times, or even some of the times. We are to believe that our rationale is flawless, and it will, given that we have perfect information of the market, lead to the best possible choice. Not only is our rationale subjected to logical inconsistencies, but more importantly, it is shown that we act more off our impulse, our intuition, than pure logic. We can this in action all the time: The absolute utility of saving 5 Nobel price winning scientist is undoubtedly greater than saving 1 close relative, yet most will save the one close relative. Similarly, one would obviously see the greater utility in paying and having 10 meals overpaying and having a Michelinstarred meal with the same amount of money, for the obvious fact that 10 meals will fulfil our sensation of hunger better than 1 Michelin-starred meal, however good that meal is; but, it is not obvious. It is not obvious in a sense that how should we, the society, value the value judgement of individuals in relation to utility? In our post-modern society, value judgements and judgements on issues are not that judged, and that is an issue. If we have no way of quantitatively turn the values of value judgements into absolutes, or in any form turned into any sorts of objective, then how could we proclaim that “as the demand of good x decrease, price of good x decreases” or “as there is diminishing marginal utility for good x, people will buy that good x less”? It seems that economics and economics models, a supposed reflection of human behaviour and its relationship with money, fails to be any of that other, and perhaps, just perhaps, a fundamental change is needed.
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