GAZPROM: SPORTS WASHING In 2006, the company Gazprom agreed a $125million 5-year deal to sponsor the German football club Schalke. Following success in the early 2000s, winning the DFB Pokal twice and reaching the semi-finals of the UEFA cup in 2005-06, Schalke vied to regularly contend for Bundesliga titles. As well as this, Gazprom’s financial backing could alleviate the club’s mounting debts. Sponsorships for Kits, Stadiums, and advertising boards were and are ubiquitous in football. Sponsorship deals, such as Nike’s with Liverpool, serve a direct economic purpose. Traditional sponsors associate themselves with a club to increase brand exposure and evoke club tribalism, therefore increasing their products’ sales. However, Gazprom is a natural gas company, they are contracted by sovereign states not individual consumers. Subsequently, Gazprom’s sponsorship of Schalke does not operate under sponsorship’s principal logic. On the surface of it Gazprom’s association with Schalke enhances the companies image and is not dissimilar from traditional sponsors. However, there is a separate dimension to the sponsorship. In 2005, the Russian State became the majority stakeholder of Gazprom. Thus, Gazprom’s decisions align with the desires of Putin’s regime. Adjacent to the sponsorship a corruption scandal involving the former German Chancellor Schroder emerged. During his time in office Schroder was a strong advocate for the Nord Stream project, a proposed gas pipeline which would bypass Ukrainian tariffs and supply Germany with Russian natural gas, which would be built and operated by Gazprom. In his last weeks in office Schroder hurried legislation to begin the pipeline. However, soon after leaving office, Schroder accepted Gazprom's nomination as head of the shareholders' committee of Nord Stream AG, raising questions about a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the Nord Stream project was heavily criticised. Relevantly, Schalke is located in The Ruhr Valley, Germany’s industrial heartland; and the club has historic ties with Germany’s energy sector. Therefore, Gazprom vied for support from Schalke supporters many of which were influential in the energy industry, so that the Nord stream project could go ahead. This is one of the earliest examples of Sports washing, however subsequently it has only increased driving football to new financial absurdities. From buyouts of middling clubs like PSG and Manchester City to constant gulf state airline sponsorships; these sponsorships are aimed to increase the reputation of autocratic and abusive regimes and football is indulging in it. The Russia and Qatar world cups are clear examples of corruption and sports washing, which is evident to anyone interested in football. However, The United Arab Emirates’ sports washing is relatively uncriticised. What do you think of when someone mentions Dubai, human rights abuses, probably not? If you are a Manchester city fan you might praise the redevelopment of the local community (although I suspect many do not live in Manchester), or if you are an Arsenal fan you might rail at the blatant capitalism of American owners but happily refer to their stadium as ‘the Emirates’. Not only does this dilute the sport to clashes between petrostates; for example, PSG v Manchester city in the champions league semifinal which can easily translated to Qatar versus the UAE. Which reduces competitiveness, but more importantly it masks the actions of autocrats.
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