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Magazine JASON !HagaÛ"t isth( prriodiwlof/hrjAS ON Foundl/tion.

Editorial Board I. FrÎtz. chiefeditor

R. Kampherbeek C.l. Lasseur R. van der Maar I. M. Wielders


Th. Mentjox

Exetutive Board

1.I.A. Posseth,president A. Cengjc, secretary R. C. L Heijdra. general affoirs E,C,J. Cusell. treasurer intern

General 80ard 5. La Bianco R. Boudewijn


Oetached idealism and endless debates T hc forcign poliey of thc Cl inton administration R uudJanssens Ameriean leadership in world affairs after the November 2000 elections M arianne va n L eeuwen

and Europe Equal ity or a more balaneed partn ership? M artin v an H euven NATO

US- EU economie relations: A vision of global co-leadership

D avid Comper!

F. W. )oustra A. F. van der Meulen

Mexieo and the reconquest ofthe United States

H.M . Ruijg

R aymond Buve

M. G. H. Ruiter F. S. L. Schouten M. Sie Dhian Ho M,Y. Voslamber

jASON Reporting Transformation and adaption . ESDP and NATO: lmplications for Europe and the United States

Advisory Boa rd

W. F. van Eekelen, vice-president F. de Bakker J. Th .). van den Berg H. de Haan V. Halberstadt G.J.I . M. Hayen

jASON Reporting Transatlantie relations: Cooperation and competition . Conference in cel ebration of the twenty- fifth anniversary ofthe jASON foundation

H.A.M. Hoefnagels

J. G. N. de Hoop Scheffer R. W. Meines R. D. Praaning

I.G . Siccama l. F. M. Sprangers A. van Stad en l. Wecke Office JASON


Bezuidenhoutseweg 237-239 2S94 AM Den Haag The Netherlands Telephone +3170 360 S6 S8

Editorial T he past 25 years jASO N has successfully provided well balanced info rmation to young people interes ted in, or working in the fi eld of international relations. And we should continue to do so! T his was the mai n conclusion which could be detected among the participants at th e conference in celebration of the 25th anniversary of JASON. Consequently, we wi Ucontinue our mission in our 26th year of existencc: P roviding you with up to date info rmation about international rcl ations.

Tele fax +3170 363 32 8S E·mail : stichtingjason@hotmail.com 0165·8336 All rights reserved . Neilher the JASON foundation ISSN

nor the editorial board of JASON Magazine can be helt accountable fo r viewsexpressed in the written contribulions 10 th is periodical. Subscriptions are au tomatically renewed fo r one calender year unless theyare withd rawn in writing be fore 1 December. layout design · Hans van der lagt, Zeist Prinl · Drukkerij lansen ev , l eiden

This year we start with a special issue which is published in cooperation with Atlantisch Perspectief, the periodical of the Netherlands Atlanti c Association. We started this coopcration in 1999 and with th is issue we express our inte ntions to conti nue working closely with each other. T heme of this special issue is, what else could it be, the United States and the presidential electi ons ofl ast year. In a series of articles different authors will take you on a tour through the political and economic implications of the recent us elections on Am erican rclations with Europe, NATO and Mexico. Hopefu lly you' ll fin d it interesting!

IIja Fritz Covrr pholo: Slars anti s/ripts (AS p)

JASON M agazine .

Volllm e 26

Detached idealism and endless debates The foreign policy ofthe Clinton adminstration Ruud)anssens

When the American people elected Clinton as president in I992, it was because he promised to devote himselfprincipally to the economy and socialpolicy. In the I992 election campaign Clinton had labeled President Bush the foreign policy president." Clinton promised to be different and to fOCUS like a laser beam on this economy." The reason that Clinton directed himselfto domestic policy lay not only in his analysis ofthe problems and ofpublic opinion in the United States, but also because he saw no foreign policy objectives with which he could score. Clinton said he "didn't see a winner in the whole lot. "He charged his staf!with keeping him informed on matters, but they were also cautioned "don't take too much ofhis time. "r


y the time th ar Clinton began his second term th e si tuation had dramatieally ehanged. On the

domestic poliey front Clinton had had few victories. Sioce the 1994 elections the Republican s held a maj ority in borh hou ses of Congress, and Ncwt G ingrieh and hi s eolleagues had bloeked C linton's poliey in any war possible. Foreign poliey is the area where Congre ss traditi onally has less power rhan the president. This gave Clinton the opportunity ta portray himself as a leader. Therefore foreign poliey occupied a completely different position in the president's thinking rhan it had fou r years earl ier. Clinton and his administration now set them selves in opposition to suppo sed Ameriean isolationi sm and emphasized the importance of an active role in the world for the United States. Clinton said in [994: "Whether the problem is nuclear proliferation, regional instability, the reversal of reform in th e former Soviet empire, or unfair trade praetices, the threats and challenges we face demand coo perative, multinational solutions. Therefore the o nly responsible us strategy is one that seeks to ensure us influence over and participatio n in colleetive decisionmaking in a wide and growing range of circumstances."l

JASOH Magazine _

Policy advisers and idealism Given that Clinton had initially wanted to involve himself as litde as possible in foreign poliey, his foreign poli cy advisers had a relatively prominent role. The team that Clinton chose for hi s first term represented, above all, experience from the Ji mmy Carter administration. Although fo rm er Secretary of State Cyeus Vance, former Defense Secretary Harold Brown and former National Securiry Adviser Zb igniew Brzezinslci were still active, Clinton chose from those who had se rved in secondary-Icvcl positions undcr Carter; perhaps he did not want to be overshadowed by more experienced experts. Clinton chose Warren Chrisropher as Secretary of State, Vance's deputy and former Vi ce-Chairman of the Council of Foreign Re1ation s (CFR). Christopher selected Peter Tarnoff as hi s deputy, the Chairman of the CFR and also a former member of the Vance's State Department team. Madeleine Albright, the new ambassador to the United Nations, had also worked for Vance, but was mostly known as a Professor ofInternational Relation s at Georgetown University and as a protĂŠgĂŠ of Brzezinski. The new National Security Adviser was Anthony Lake. He was Professor ofInternational Relations at Mount H olyoke College and had worked for Vance as head of the Poliey Planning staff.

/ 200/


The Bush legacy Bush had done his best to creare a "'Ncw \"'orld Order" after the end of the C old Wa r. This had no t rcally succeeded, in part because Bush had not c1early defined what he meant by the term. In plaee of a new order C linron found himself co nfronted with a number of unresolved issues.

The nominations ofS rrobe Talbott and Les Aspin we re more surpri sing because (hey had had Icss cxccurivc branch expcricncc. Talbott had been a close (ri end of C linton sincc (heir student yea rs at Oxford, and was a leadingjou rnali st at Time magazine. H e becamc special amba ssad or to rhe newly independe nt stares of the former Soviet Union. Aspin, C linto n's piek for D efense Sec rctary, had been for many years Chairman of the H ouse Arm ed Services Com mittee. lt was feared thar bccau se of hi s political and less bureaucra ti e attitude he would not last long in the adminisrration. Within a ye aT William Perry had repl aced Aspin, fo llowing the failcd American intervention in Somalia aocl a wavering involveme nt in H aïti in 1993. Perry had also se rved in th e Carter administration. J

Bush had sent troops to Somalia to support a hum anitari an intervention. Ir soo n became apparent that th e problems in Somalia were diffi culr to solve. Cli nton with drcw American rroop s aftc r eightcc n American and hundred s of Somali soldiers were killed in a failed attempt to arrest the warlord Aideed. Peace keeping o perations rurned o ut to be more diffi clIlt than expected, and Americans we re not prepared ro put their own soldiers at risk in "me re" hllm an itarian mi ssions witho ut a dear nati onal interest at stakc.

Eve n amo ng C linton supporters there was so me di sappointment over the fo reign policy team. Left- Iea ning Democrats found that "ncw Democrats" loo ked a lo t Iike "old D emocrats." eo-conservatives feared an obsession with negotiations, angst over using mil itary force, and, from their point of view, too low an intellectua!l eve!. ' The fear that C linto n would ho!d back fro m military intervention arose beeause C Jin ton had hi mse lf not se rved in the milita ry and had demon strated aga inst American involvement in Vietnam. These worrie s appear to have been exaggerated. In the 2000 prcsidenti al election campaign th e Republica ns acellsed C linton and Gore of ove rus ing military force.

ln rh e election ca mpai gn Clinton had specifically attackcd Bush on the grounds th at hi s fo rcign policy failed on humanitarian issues. C linto n wanted firm intervention in Bosnia, China and HaÎti. As preside nt, Clinton was more cautious than as ca ndidare. To avoid confron ta ti on with China's rulers, C linton softened hi s cri ti cism of hu man rights in C hina in o rder to put more em phasis on eco nom ic rclat ions (as Bush had al so done). lust like Bush, C linton was not indined to se nd troops ro Bos ni a. Parricipario n in the Bosnia co nflict came about more by accident rhan by desig n. I n 1994 the American governmenr had promised th~lt Ameri ca n troops would help in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR (th e U nited Nation troops in Bosnia) if the situation gat o ut of hand. When things became worse in 1995 C l in to n had little choi ce other than to agree to American involvement. C linton not o nly providcd traop s, but al so Richard H olb rooke as nego tiator, wh o dclivc red th e D ayto n Accords as a C linron succcss. 6

Beeause Ca rter adm inistration vete rans se t C linton's forcig n policy, it was expected that idealism wou ld play a prominent role in the policy, the use of force wou ld get lcss attention and hum ani ta rian intervention more. Unilateral interventio n would not be the rul e. Allicd Înterventio n, aften throug h the UnÎted Nations, wou ld be th e policy of choice. Th is approach was possible bceause of thc situatio n at th e end of th e Cold W ar.

C linton was not com pletely sa ti sfied with the fun ctioDuring th e elecrion campaign C linron had said th at he wo uld restorc to power J ea n- Bertrand Ari stidc, who ning of hi s fo re ign poliey team. Shorrly after hi s rc cleetio n he replaeed a number of appointees: M ade lcine had been democra ti cally elected but drivcn from Haiti. AJbrig ht replaced Warren Christopher as Secretary of Bush was se nding H aitian rcfugees escapi ng by boat back to rhe island. But whcn Clinton bccame president Statej Willi am Cohen, a Republican, replaced WiJli am he did no t really change that policy. Thc Perry as D efense Secretary; and Sandy Berge r beca me the new Natio nal SecuAmerican gove rnm cnt did II1crease , Especially rity Advi ser. From thi s group of advisers international pressure on the H aitian governmcnt. A United Nati ons embargo Clinton wanted fewe r ideas and more in his lirst term and other means wou ld in the long term results, and he expected to become more successful in both publie opin ion and in bring Aristidc back to power. Armed relations wi th Congress. H enry Ki ss inC1inton emphasized supporters of General Ccdras prevented ger, fo rm er National Security Adviser rhe u.s.s. Har/a" Count) from deli ve ring to Port-a u- Prince a g roup of American s economie policy. ' und er Nixon and Ford, opined that Sanand Canadians wh o were to train Hai dy Berger was no t a strategic thinker. Ki ssi nge r saw th is as an indi cation ofthe tian poli ce. This oecurred just afrer rhe debacle in Somali a, and th e American govcrnment C linto n poli cy: "But you ca n't blame a trade lawyer for wanted no more easualties. Thc ship turncd bac k, and no t being agioba! srrategisr. The Sceurity Advi ser reflects what the preside nt wants, and 1 don't think the supporters of the causes of hu man rights and the United Nations within the Amcrica n govc rnmcnr , including president asks him to eome up with agiobal strategy." 5 the backers of Anthony Lake, regard ed th is incident as


IA S O M Magaz ine

Volume 26

us involvement In Europe : American soldiers in Macedonia.

stimulated by the removal of import tariffs, the us economy would grow. In the end all the expectations turned out to be exaggerated. A report issued by the C linton administration showed th at NAFTA had limited results.9 An important conseque nce of the political battle over NAFTA was thar C linton lost mueh political support: thc trade unions srrongly opposed thc free tradc treat)' and three-fifth s of rhe Democrats in Congress voted against Clinton. Clinton's rclat ions with the Republicans in Congress werc already poor, and those with the Democrats would never be ve r)' good again.

a defeat. Ultimately, C1inton decided to employ armed inrervention. In the short term, thi s proved a success, which the Clinron administration long brandished. 7 At thc end of 1999 troops were withdrawn from H aiti even though the goals had not been attained. There was too linie money for the opera ti on, and there was 110 longer interest in American public opinion for the situation in Haiti. 8 A continuing problcm from the Bush years was lraq. Since Saddam Hussei n had been allowed ro remain in power after the GulfWar whilc at the sa me time promises were made ro the Kurd s among othcrs and international weapons inspections were taking pi ace, conflict was to be expectcd. Thc Americans ente red into action many times, through rhe UN weapons inspecror Scott Ritter, through air attacks (because lraq violated rhe nony zone in lrag), and through Operation Provide Comfort to help the Kurd s attacked hy lraqi ground troops. Clinron was nor preparcd to intervene more forcefully. Thc possibility was al so perhaps no longer availab le, because the Gu lf War coalition had slowly di sappcared. 13ush's military success was a limited political success, and Clinton could not improve it.

The (old War is over, whal now? During the Cold W ar each president had had a clear pol iey, his own "Doctrine." Both Bush and Clinton found ir diffieuIt to ereate a dear foreign policy without a single great enemy. Clinton did have so me idcas abour foreign poliey. ln his thinking, domestic policy and the eeonomy continued to play a major role. From thc beginning, he rold Anrhony Lake, "fore ign poliey is domestic pol ie)'." C linton, above all, cmphasized economie polic)'. At the beginning ofhis administration he gave a speech in which hc rcferred to the poor economie situation in rhe United States and to rhe inereasi ng importance of the international economy. Through linking these two developmenrs he arrived at a view that eneompassed domestie and foreign pol ie)'.

Another part of rhe Bush legacy and a "Iimired" success for Clinton was NAI-' TA. There was much opposition to the free trade agreement among the Unitcd States, Canada :tnd Mexico. Ir was fcared tllar many busincs ses and jobs would rclocate to Mexico beeause of the lower wages there. Bush and Clinton, however, saw more advantages. Thcy cxpccted that through the increased demand for American produets in Canada and Mexico,

jASOH Ma gazine

For Clinton thc most important goa l was "to gct our own economie house in order." After th at, trade mu st become a priorit)' in Ameri ean security pol ie)'. This approach quiekly lcd to a conflier with Japan thar


1 2001


almost became a trade war. At the last moment a treaty was agreed upon , which in fact meant that the United States backcd down.

Jlrip ol bruJh/alld ill Ihe Hom

of AFica

or Jome place


parched earth by Ihe j ordal1 R iver. But the true IlIeaJlIre of our inleresllies Ilol in how small or distont these places are or in whether we have froub/e;n pronormcテ始g their /lames. The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to Ollr seeurity oflelling conjhctsfester and spread? We cmmot, indeed, we shou/d not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our vaIlus and our interests are al slake and where we can make a diffirence, we must be prepared 10 do SO. And we must remember thaI the real challenge ofjoreign po/icy is 10 deal wilh prob/ems before Ihey haml our lIaliollal interesls. "Il

C linton promotcd fiuther development of an international econom ic com munity. The role of international eco nomic bodies from NA FTA to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (A PEC) to the c-7 became important, as did th e promotion of devclopment in developing co untries and in the former Eastern Bloc. IO Clinton was a streng supporter of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO confe rence in Seatde at th e end of 1999 was, however, a failure bec3use of th c activism of various non -governme ntal orga nizations (NCOS), and Clinton gave in to public opinion.

Cri ties found th is a typ ical Clinton speech. H e did not give any firm ove rall poliey, but instead produeed a long list of conditions. We must not interve ne eve rywhere, "but where ou r values and ou r interests are at stake and where we can make a d ifferenee, we must be prepared te do so." Tt is difficuit to sec how such a pronouncement ean lead te a c1earer poliey.IJ

After the midterm elections of 1994 the newly elected Republican majority in Congress forced Clinton and his foreign policy team to defe nd international cooperation. Thc Clinton advisers were concerned that th e Republicans would bring the United States back to isolationism as in the years immediately preceding the Second World War. There were reasons for such co ncerns, including th e speech of Jesse H elms, the Repu blican chai rman of the Senatc Foreign Relations Comm ittee. For example, Helms said that he wou ld end foreign development aid because, aceording te him , Ameriea ns should stop "pouring hard-earned money down th ose ratholes." 11 Helms also withheld us flIlan cial eo ntribution te th e United Nations for many years.

Personalleadership and international problems Clinton's leadership style also did not make it easy to conduct a dear foreign poliey. C linton wanred to listen to lots of different opinions and had difficulty in reaehing a decision. Often, as in th e case of Bos nia, ci rcum stances - rather than the implementation of a wellthought-o ut strategy - foreed him to choose. Lloyd Hentsen, Clinton's first Treasury Seeretary, ealled him "thc meeting-est fellow ] know." D avid Cergen, a Republjea n poliey adviser hired by Clinton to improve his image, was unpleasantIy surprised by th e meeting styIe, but also saw adva ntages in it:

This last act of Helms was aetuaUy more represe ntative of the di scussion about Ameriean international involvement. Ir was less a qu estion ofisolationism than th at the Rep ublica ns wanted to act unilaterally and not through the Uni ted Nations or oth er international organ izations. loo r th ese Republi eans, th e sove reignty of the "l found Clintons style ofleadership very distressing atjirst. Unitcd Statcs was paramount, and th ey feit that particiThe Repub/ican Presidenis J'd served - Nixon, Ford and pation in international organizations would undenninc Reagan - had a dear visioll olwhere they were going, and us independence. Another major di scussion point was Iheir Jlaffi rejlected Ihat. Clilltoll had all JorlJ ofpeople al under what eireu mstanees should the Uni the tabIe, all sorts of opiuiom he had to hear ted States enter into international military from: ' leW Democrals and old Democrats, oud , Clinton's aetions. Somalia ca me to be viewed as a fem inisls, mullhe Imionfolks, and it oJJel1ded warning. The Vietnam syndrome as an my old-school sort ol slyle. But l even tually example of a lengthy and costly involveleadershipstyle realized that this was a !leW, postmodern style ment without positive results had not eo mof leadmhip Ihal waJ illevilable. IlIlacl, 1 pletely disappeared. made a clear believe its a rifleclioll ofthe countrys divers iIy. li J pOJJible Ihal all1"lure Presidell /J will Almost at the end of hjs second te rm , foreign policy make their decisiol1S;11 this way. "1;4 Clinton arr ived at his own poliey principle for his admin istrarion, whieh was quiekly C linton's leaders hip styl e was not aiways a difficult. ' labeled the Clinton Doctrin e by th e media. disadvantage. l n long-run ning confl iets At th e beginning of 1999 Clinton made a like Nonhern lreland and the Middle East forei gn poliey speec h in which the qucstions about us it could even be an advantage te speak at lcngth with all involvemenr in a new wocld eame up. Climon attempthe parties and co nsider all th c standpoints. ]n th e case ted to explain when and why the Un ited States should ofNorthern lreland Clinton took th e initiativc to iss ue becomc involved: a visa te Ccrry Adams, the President of Sinn Fein (the poiitieal wing ofthe lrish Republican Army, IRA ), for a visit te the United States. On his next visit Adams was "Jt s easy,jor example, 10 say Ihat we really have no interesls invited to the White H ouse. Alth ough the British in who lives in this or thaI volley in Bosnia or who OWflS a


JASO M Magazi ne


Volume 26

governmcnt was angry at Clinton (Prime Minister John M ajor cven refused for a wt:ck ro take phonc eaUs from C linton) C linron's approac h met with sueccss. Thc IRA announ ccd a cease-fire for th e first tim e since 1969. Cl inton organized an econom ie summit ra create more cmployment opportunitics and se nt the form er Senate Majority Leader George Mitehell to lreland to lead th e disarmame nt discussions. An agree ment was flllally signed and a Northern Ircland Asse mbly ereated, whi eh in the long run would replaee Briti sh authority. 15 Thc nego tiati ons benveen th e l sraelis and the Palesti ni an~ mostly took placc in O slo with little us involvcmcnt. That changed whcn both parties reaehed an agrcemcnt. Clinton brought Rabin and Arafat to Washingto n for thc eercmony. Later Isracl and Jorda n endcd their state of war. After this devclopme nt, th ere was so me baeksliding, and relations bctween th e di verse parties did not always rUil smoothly. Clinton brought the parties aga in to the tahle to sign a new treaty, the W ye Memorandum. The PLO promised to refrain from calling fo r the desrru ction of Israel and to comba t weapons smuggling, while ]srael released 750 Palcstinians from jail and gave fourtec n percent of thc Wcst Bank (0 the Palestini ans. ,6 Alth ough it later beeame apparent that in both Northern lrcland and the M idd lc East permanent solutio ns to the problems were still so me distanee away, bo th of these diplomatie undertakings ca n he eo nsidered successes. In both cases Clinton foreed a brcakthrough and created a vision of a betrer society. It would he asking too mu ch for such long-runni ng confli ets to he solved in a single stroke. C linton had more sucecss with the expansion of NATO. He had deeided on this early in his presideney. There was eo nsiderable opposition to th e idea, espceially on the part of Russia (where the qucstion was poscd as to why NATO should still exist after the end of thc Cold War), but also in the United States and in Europe (where Ît was asked whether it was reasonabl e to provoke rhe Ru ssians in th is way now thar relat ions had improved.) After a half-hearted attem pt through the Partnership for Peaec program, C linton reeeived the neeessary support for the expansion of NATO from the US Senate (from 35 Demoerats and 45 Republi ca ns) and from the NAT O allies. Relati olls with Ru ssia d id not suffer appreeiably with the expa nsion of NATO. Di sa rm ament, including nuclear weapons, contin ued as se heduled. But the world did not beeome neeessarily safer. Other eou ntries, including North Korea, built nuclear weapons. ]n 1993 Nort h Korea wirhdrew from the nuclear non-proliferation agreement it had signed in 1985 . C linton asked former PresidentJimmy Ca rtt: r to undertake a diplomati e mission to Pyo ngya ng. Ca rter did so, but he exeeeded his mandate by makin g va riou s promises of whieh the Clin ton admi nistration was unaware. C linton had no choice but to confirm Carte r's agreements with Kim

JASO N Ma gazi ne .

To 'pL-1y 57,41\' Wl/I\'.r oN HY ow';; / ;." 6olNG-

Il Sung. ] n the end, afrer many eo mpli ca tions, the I1cgotiation poliey toward North Korea appeared to go the right way, and there see mcd to be a chan ce that the l1uclea r program would not be co ntinued, especially after the recent visit of Secretary of State Albright. 17 Thc nu clea r explosions in Indi a closely followed by nucl ear tests in Pakistan were a grearer surpri se for C linton. The intelligc nce se rvices had not foreseen th ese tests. The intelligence se rvices had already been sevcrcly eri ti cized for failing to fo resec the end of the Cold War and Iraq's invasion of Kmva it. Onee agai n it proved di ff!Cult to predict military and politieal devel opmenrs. Ir remaÎn s a question of how much C linton ea n be blamed for not taking preventive measurcs. But these incidet1ts strengthened th e image of an ad hoc fo reign pol icy under C lin ton. Under the heading "leadership" wc also have to eonsidcr Clinton's pcrso nal behavior and in particular the political eonsequenees of his (real and assumed) extram arital relations. In particular, rhe eo nsequenees of his relations with a Whire House intern and his lies abour th e rel ationship caused political and diplomatie problems. Alth ough foreign leaders did not al ter their behavior toward Clinton, many diplomats were eoncerned about Clinton's weakened position vis-à-vis the United Statcs Congress. 18 This conce rn , howeve r, they should have had in any casco Relations benveen C linton and thc Congress were 50 poo r in general thar it Illight be asked wh ether the se ncw co mpli eations eould make mueh difference. The only time tint he eould exert some influen ce was after he was acqu itred in the impeae hm enr trial. Shortly afterwards, at the end of 1999, th e Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was ratified. C linton had badIy wanted this treaty to be approved. Although there were a numher of ge nuine drawbacks in the treaty, thc vot ing followed party lines as if thc Rep ubli ea ns in Co ngress wanted ro make it evident th at although C linton rem ained president, they still had a lot of powe r. 19

1 2001



call Senator from A rizo na and preside nri al eandidate in 2000, sum mari zed th e cri tieism as fo ll ows:

1t had been expected thar Clinton wo uld offer an articulated long- term vision. This expectation was based on prcsiden ti al experi ence in both World W ars and in thc Cold W ar. H owever, we mu st ask whether we cDuld fairIy expec t C lin ton to co ntinue thi s strategy. It is casy to crca re a poliey when th ere is a d car enemy or challcngc. Today the re is less cl. ri ty. As politieal seientist Stephen M . W alt wrote: "The foreign poliey of the Clinton admin is tration has been weil suited to an era wh en th ece is litde to gain in fo reign poliey and much to lose." 10

"There haven't heen ally major disaJters, hul you wonder ij Ihe seeds ofJuture prob/ems have heen SOWfl. He hutterjlies Jrom iJJl/e to iJJlIe, oudfortign po/icyjmt doem'l work Ihat way. 1t has to he steady, concentrated, preeise. H e goes to Beijing and cal/s the Chinese our 'stmtegie' partner. Wel/, yOl/wonder what the j apanese, who are our strategÎc partners in A sia, thÎnk ahollt that. He 'wim ugly' in Kosovo hy

bOn/bing ftom fifteen thollsand feet, a po/icy / cO/lSidered immoral, and Ihen the Russiam Jee! free 10 l/se the exact same policy in Chechnya. "1I

Eve n a president wÎth exceptional vision wou ld have had to have a d ifferent app roac h. C linton, with his preference fo r domestic poliey and co nse nsus poli ties, gave himself 110 chance of being an exce ptional preside nt. W e must a150 as k whether Co ngress woul d have given him the spaee to bri ng sueh avisio n to reali ty.

This issue of the unintcnded eonsequcnees of C linta n's poliey presents a ehallcnge ta thc nex t president of the U ni ted States, just as President Bush's actions fa r a gaad deal dete rm Îned C lin ton's poliey.


T here is still one more criticism directed at C lin to n. Prcciscly beeause he paid so littie attentio n to fo reign poliey, there was also limi ted attention to the eo nseque nees of eertain aetions. John M cCain, the Repu bli-

Notes 1 Wil liam G. Hyland, Glinton swor!d: R emakÎng AmerÎ((J1zforeigll poliry


(Westport CT: Praege r, 1999), p. 18. W ill iam J. Clin ton, "Advancingour interests through engagement and enlargemem: A nat ional seeurity strategy of engagements and enla rgements,Julr 1994," The C/illtollfortigll policy reader: Presidmtial spu(hes wilh (ommm tary, edited by

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayevieh and Boris Zlotnikov (Ncw Vork: M. E. Sharpe, '2 000), p. 28. Hyland, Glinlons world, pp. 19- 20.

3 4 I-Iyla nd, Glintons world, p. 10. 5 Elaine Sciolino, "Berger is manager of cri ses, not global strategy," The N ew York T imes, May 18 1998.

6 James McGregor Burns and Georgia J. Sorenson, Dead unter: Glinton- Gore leadershipand the perits ofmodera/ion

(Ncw Vork: A Lisa Drew Book! Scribner, 1999), pp.

308- 309.

7 1-lyJand, Glintonsworld, pp. 59 and 65·

Dr R. V.A.}amJmJ is 0 hijloriu" u",1 Amujran SluJin $(/,olu,. Ih ürtl'm on lnlrrnationo/ Re/atiorlS ut tht Ro)"al NtthtrlanJJ Navol LO/ügt.

in H ai ti to leave unstable nation, "

presidency," The N ew Yorker,

The New Vork Tim es, August 26 1999.

October 16 and 23 2000,

9 Hyland, Glinlons world, p. 7). 10 W iLliamJ. C linran, "Libe ral internationalism: Amcrica and the global economy," speech at American Un iversity, Februar)' 26 1993, in Rubinstein,

pp. 198 and 199.

15 Blirns, Deadunler, pp. 313-316. 16 Burns, Dead unier, pp. 317 and )24.

'7 Burns,Deadul/ter,pp. '73 - '79. 18 R W . Apple, "Deepeoneern in the world over weakened Clinton,"

The Clil/tollfortign poli(y reader,

pp.8 - IJ. 11 Martin Walke r, ~ W hose international ism, whose isolationi sm?" h ti p:// world poliey. org/wal ker. h tml. 12 W illiamJ. C linton, "On the cve ofthe millennium," speech on fore ign polic)', San Francisco, Feb ruary 26 '999 in Rubinstcin, The GIjnIon fortign poliry reader, p. 37. 13 Another attempt to bring order ra C1inron's policy can be found in a recent piece by his Na tional Seeurity Adviser, Samuel R. Be rger, '''A foreign polier fo r the global age," Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 6

(Novembe r/ December zooo), p. 2239.

14 J oe Klein, "Reporter at large: Eight

8 Stephen Lee Myers, "Full- time us force

years. Bill C linton looks back on his


JAS ON M agazi ne

Volum e 26

The Nl'W Vork Times,

Septembe r 15 1998.

19 Some cri tics claimed that Clinton used military force to shift attention away from his political scandals, as when the bombing of Iraq was ordered just before the vote on impeachmenr in Congress. Sec Bill Gertz, Betmyal: H ow the GIjnion adm jnistm/jon undermj,ud Amerimfl sewrily (Washington De: 20

Regner Publi shing, 1999), p. zo8. Stephen M. Walt, 'T wo chee rs for C linton's fo reign poliey,"

Fortign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 2 (March/April 1000), p. 79. 21 Klein, "Reporter at large, " p.200.

American leadership in world affairs after the November 2000 elections Marianne van Leeuwen

It has become a habit ofAmeriea watehers to use presidential elections as a moment to rejlect on thejuture ofthe Ameriean role in world affairs in general and ofus relations with their own part ofthe world in partieular. Why they should do so is obvious. The United States is the leading military and economie power in the world. Consequently, Ameriea's ehoiee ofpresident arguably is ofimportanee to all ofus. The president is the eoun try 's eommander in ehiefand its supreme diplomat. Foreign poliey is traditionally eonsidered to be something ofa presidentialpreserve or, sometimes, a presidential refugefrom the hard world ofdomestic polities.


thers qualify th is thesis. For one thing, tllcy point at the l1umerous official and unofficial domestic li mÎtat Îons to presidenrial foreign pol -

trend s rath er than personalities will steer us forci g n poliey.

icymaking powers. Thc federal Congress can thwart prcsidential polier significand y, mainly rhrough its

The outcome of the 2000 elecrions raises rhe qucsrion s of the efficacy or "powe r" and thc purpose of th c new president anel of American foreign policy more sh arply than has been the case in a long time. Thi s articlc attempts to anaJyze both aspecrs: cfficacy alld purpose.

power of thc purse, but also through the Senare's privilege of d eci din g on US rarification of (reaties and the

appointment of American diplomats abroad. Then there are those who point out rhat a ncw leadership tcam of thc United Starcs, generally spcaking, wiU no t be able to change course sharply and rapidly. Rather, chey compare the country to a large a il tanker, sail ing with o r againsr thc ti de ofla rge bureaucratie, economie, institutional interests. 1t may eve ntu ally change course dram ati cally. but it ca n do 50 only very gradually. N ewly elec ted presidents will always have to deal with poli cics that they inherit from rheir predecessors. They wiU rarely be in a position ro abandon bluntly these immediarcly. Analysts al so emphasize th at the United States may be the "sole remaining superpower," but rh at ir is not almighty. Regardlcss of its leadership at a spe cifi c time, its foreign policy wil! to a significant extc nt have to be react ive to impulses from abroad rather than playing an initiaring role. Some of those wh o emphas ize [his si de of the coin argue th ar in fact, it isn't relevant who is elecred president; thar domesri c and foreign

IASO" Magazine •


The 2000 ele(Iiom: a recipefor weflk leadership? UntiJ its remarkable aftermath, the American prcsidential elecrion cam paign of ::1:000 has been as unexci ting as it has been extensive. Thankfully, the candidate s did not seek to ga in voters' favor by slandering rh ei r opponent in rhe aggressive ways thar h ad become fami li ar over the years alld climaxed in the early 1990S, during the heyday of now-fo rgotren Republ ican ideologue Newt Gingrich, a truc master of abuse and innu en do. America ns, polls indicatcd, were utterly tired o f th e mud-si inging approach. ] t made them turn their backs on polities. Thc ca ndidates heeded th ese sentiments. Still, the suhstan ce of the campaigns evolvccl around charactcr issues rather than politically substan tial issues.

/ 200/


Obviollsly, the character of an Ameri ca n president is a legitimate and important campaign issue. No one would like ro sec an irresponsible, lecherou s, petty- mindcd, por-s moking de spot reside in the White I-Iouse. Yet even the most accomplished spin -doctors had a hard time keeping their audiences enthralled for over twclve month s abollt the charaeter of their dient and that ofhis opponent. Both A1bert Gore and George W. Bush arc deadly dece nt - too decent, in fact, to be exciting.

created by th e clection and th e ensuing co nfli ct over votes. He will have to reach out immed iatcly, demonstrativcly and persistently to members of the opposing party in the House and the Senate. lt \ViII be wi se to invite lcading perso nalities of the other party to join his eabinct, preferably on posts \Vhcre co ntroversial issue s are expeeted to eome to the forc. Such attempts arc the best chan ce that the preside nt has to safeg uard hi s ability to get so mething done. Pres ident Bush has stated he will be a unite r of peo ple. ]fhe does not succeed, the result may be paralysis. 1f he does live up to hi s word, logically such a co nciliatory, harmonizing approach wilt lead to moderation and compromise rather than daring initiatives.

Substantive issues were rai sed during the campaigns, but mainly in the form of promises rather than poliey proposal s. As has become usual ove r the past eight years o r 50, foreign policy iss ues were very low o n thc list. lmcntions rather than potential policies were di se ussed, and in a manner insllffi, Promises, cient ro prese m asolid indication of where the ncw president's foreign poliey mig ht be head ed. not proposals

The make- up of the 107th Congress points in the same directio n of a choi ce between middle -of- the-road policics - or stalcmate. In both the H ouse of Represe nratives and the Senate, scats arc almost evenly split I n spite of all the candidates' exertions and were made during between Republica ns and Democrats. The the enormQtIS amounts of money spent on Republi can s man aged to keep co ntrol of attra cting th e involvemem of Ameri ca n the election both hou ses, but onl)' jus!. Arguabl)', it will citize ns, only tifty percent of those eligible be diffi cuIt for the Republi can conservacampaign.' to vote actually went to the poUs on tives to move sharply to the rig ht, because November 7 2000. 1'0 all intents and purmoderate Republi cans may forge insurposes, the Democratie and the Republi can mountable coalitions with like- mincled presidcntial candidates each managed to attract half of Democrats to counter su eh a move. I n Congress, too, those voters to their ticket. The evenrual win ne r, the best way to move forward and make policy under the George W. Bush, ha s won the support of 25 perce nt of prese nt circumstances is to demo nstrate a willing ness to the America n voters, plus a handful. The new leader of apply moderatio n and compromise. A refusal to do so the most powerful state in the world today wilI start fulmay be prese nted as being principled, but in practice filling hi s awesome duties with a wafer-thin mandate. williead to stalemates that may cos t politicians thei r re cleetion. One need only remember how the Clinton For many Am erican s, the outcome of the presidemial administration was able to cas h in o n the Republica ns' c1ectio ns, or rather the laek of it, did more to rai se their stubbornne ss over passing the annual budget in 1996. intercst in the political process of their country than thc Tm mitional hazards campaig ns them selves had done. Optimists interpreted thc haggling in Florida over dimples in voting forms as A short- to medium-term ri sk undcrmining the proof of Amcri ca's democrati e vitaJity, adding that build-up of cfticacy in policymaking lies in the transit ion "everybody was having fun." An increasingly biner battle period. 1 As a re sult of the vote-co unting controversies, between the lawyers of both candidates ensued over the the president-clect's opportunities to farm an energc ti c, inspired, intelligent and harm oniou s team to govern the rcco unting ofballots. Those who hope for strong Americou ntry have narrowed co nsiderably. In fac t, Ameri ca ns ca n leadership may take courage from the amazi ng way in and the world mu st reckon with thc likelihood of prowhich John F. Kenned)', who in 1960 was e1ected presidcnt with the smallest of margins (his opponent Richard longed team-building diffi culties th at ma)' go on for Nixon won the popular vote, but Kennedy wo n the elecso me time after the ncw president has been swo rn in eartomi coll ege), managed ro establish a bo nd between himIy in 2001. In the United States, this task is even mo re self and the American pcople. But unlike the ncw presistrenuou s than it wo uld be in the I ctherlands, because the bureaucratie leadership of ministries, senior staff dent, Kennedy did not actually have to litigatc hi s way into the White House. Moreover, he had a huge natural function s of special o rganization s like th e National Secutalent for charming the media that G eorge W. Bush wiU rity Council and sco res of other important pos ts will also not be able to equa\. have to be manned by new people. ] n the worst case, a substantial part of 2001 may be spe nt on cons tru cting the administration and bickering in the Senate over the Ameri can s, including, up to a point, elected represe nconfirmation of appointees, while it would obviollsly be tativcs, have a habit of rallying behind the flag, of suphighly prcferable if a ncw administratio n could "hit the porring their elected leader eve n if they did not votc for him. But thi s time, the new president will have to ground running" at the beginning of the race, rather than gathering up some speed halfway after a srumbling start. make a very dedicated effort indeed to effectuatc such The ncw president will have to offer his vision o n thc a response, to overcome the sharp parrisa n divi sions


IASOH Ma gazi ne _

Volume 26

George W. Bush at the Republica n National Convention in August ::zooo.

State ofthe Union inlatcJanuary 2001. Chances are th at his presentation will be rather cursory, which under the present circum stances is especially regrettabl e. Thc Congrcss and the country are in need of assurance and inspiration. Delays in team -building and the formulat ion of policics might have a negative impact on the domesti c front. They would almos t ce rtain ly have adve rse international effecrs as weil. A prolonged lull in Ameri ca n internarionalleadership duc to transirional problcms thi s year would be especially worriso me with regard to destabi lizing devclopments in the Middle East, first of all in the co nflict betwee n l srae l and the Palestinian s. A lengthy American abstinence from the issue might be used by hardlin ers in th e conflict who are after "tota1 vicro ry" rather th an a rcl atively peaceful solution based on compromise. It might, in a worst-case sce nario, lead to escalation and reg ional warfare in an area where a number of participants have Ilon-conventional weapons at their di sposal.


Foreign policyond Campaign :1000 Poli tical candidares on the ca mpaign {rail try [Q draw sharp dividing lines between their own points of view and those of their opponent. Sometimes the sugges ted di srincrion s are artificial. Thi s has arguably been the case with regard to a number of foreign poli cy matters di scussed during the rece nt presidenrial campaign. 1 Gn ce again: it should be borne in mind th at foreign affai rs in general hard ly figured during the campaign; the American elecrorare hardly cares about international affairs as long as there arc no elear and prese nt dangers threatening the co untry from across its borders. George W. Bush eritieized the foreign poliey of th e Clinton administration, implying th at, by and large, Vice-President G ore was planning to continue thi s pol-

JASON Magazine 窶「

icy should hc be clec red to the highest office in the us. Basically, Bush co mplained th ar the Democrati c administrati on did not have a guiding vision on the United Statcs' role in rhe worle!. lts actions, he claimed, were reactivc rather than proaerive . It was given to ad hoc-e ry. lt had allowed the U ni ted States to get suckcd into all kind s of local or rcgional qu arrcls in whi ch no national us interests were at stake, all because ofits misraken human itarian philosophies and ill - advi sed pcnchant for multilareralism. The Republican candida tc claimcd that he would reintrodll ce vision to American forcign policy-making by usテ始g "th e national interest" rather than hu man itarianism as his guiding star. us troops should not be put in harm's way unl ess thc national interest was clearly involved, and th en on ly if a well-defi ned exi t strategy prcvented indefini te exten sion oftheir involvcmen t abroad in, for insran ce, pc acekeeping missions. Thc Clinton administration, thc Rcpublica n argument continued, had spent political capital on counrerp roductive support for the intern ati onal non - proliferari on regime, rhe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in particular, while slO\ving down the build- up of a national defense system (National Missile Defe nse, Nl\'1 D) aga inst loo ming missile attacks by rogue stares such as lraq or North Korea. To make matters worse, thc D emoc rats had been negleerin g th e armed fo rces. Working conditi ons in the military had been dereriora ting rap idly. l-l ighly necessary modernization of us annaments was ignored. Small wonde r, then, that many highly sllitable and talented yO llng people opted out of the army becallse of jts gloomy ca reer prospects. As far as economic policies were concerned, ca ndidate Bush was critical of his D emocrati e oppone nr 's intention to inse rt environmental TUles and measures ro ensure proper labo r condition s inro trad e agreements th at rhe United States was negotiating with foreign partners, arguing rh at suc h conditions would undermin e free trade principles.

I 2001


The Gore campaign's tack was to drawattenti on to who rightly or wrongly had come to sy mboli ze all that George W . Bush's lack of knowledge abou t ancl experiAmericans do not like about the UN, especially Third ence in foreign affairs, and to emphasize the wisdom and Worldlin ess ancl spendthriftness.J More importantly the achievements of Democratie foreign policy. lt was still, the Clinton administration played a leading role in self-evident thar Al Gore had an enormOlIS lead on his stimulating NATO acti on over Kosovo, committing opponent as far as foreign policy was conce rned. Even as American soldiers to this endeavor without an offICial a Senator, he had beco me familiar with formandate from the UnÎted Natio ns. The eign policy issues. During his years as Vi ceClinton administration and th e Gore ca m'Both parties President, he had the opportunity to paign made much out of the sugges ti on by become intimately involved in many of th e G eo rge Bush th at he would speedily with Clin ton admin istration's international poliwantthe us draw American soldiers from Kosovo cies. He had come to kn ow the issues and should he be electecl president. The the foreign pbyers very weil. The Gore 10 play an active Democrats interprered rhi s as particubrly campaign criticized the Republi ca n candirevealing proof of Republican isolationism date 's views on American leadership, leadership role and warned the electorate that such policies claiming that Bush's unilateralism and as proposecl b)' Bush would undermine emphasis on "the" national interest would American credib ility with its allies and se nd in the world. ' amoun t to isolationism and the abandona message to the enem ies of the United ment of trusted and valued allies; th at his States that they co uld ge t away with repreaggressive counterproliferation policies were ill-adviscd hensible acti ons unopposed and unpuni shed. I n fac t, bccausc they would cause major frictions with the Un itjudging b)' the noise that they made, D emocratie cd States' European allies as weIl as with rh e leadership spokespeople al most suggested th at the Repub li cans in M oscow and Beijing and would mean a violati on of were considering leaving NATO, or at least "Europe." I n the Anti- Ballisti c Missile Treary, which the Unitcd realiry, Democratie and Republican views on the need States had ratified in th e early 19 70s. How could the for a continued close alliance with Europe are quite simUnited States criticize others for breaching international ilar. Even their views on committing Am erica n troops to obligations if it itself broke its solcmn promises when help solve confliets abroad are not as diametrical1y opposed as all th at. The Democra ts are no more supconvenicnt? Constructive American participation in international organizations, according to the D emocra tportive of open-ended, indefmite commitment by ic point of view, would be a major prerequisite for widely American soldiers in peacekeepi ng missions than the and smoothly accepted leadership, and would help to Republicans. Thus, it took the Clinton adm inistration a make the material burdens ofleadership bearable. Even great deal of soul -searching before it co mmitted troops to the mi ssion in Bosnia; and it gready reduced Ameriif, arguably, 110 vital national interests of the United States were invo lved, the United States should not on ca n military presence in Kosovo as soo n as it could after principle distance itself from military participation in the NATO fighting missions had come to an end . hum anitarian acti ons abroad, or from financial support through the IMF for states in dire straits wh o were trying Genuine differen ces seem to exist on thc best ways to to prepare th ei r countries for economi c liberali zation. deal with proliferation (although both parties co nsider Such endeavors, the Democrats argued, befitted a nonproliferation and counterp roliferation poli eies a nation claiming to be a democrati e beacon to the world. high prioriry). The Clinton adm inistrati on and ca ndi date AI G ore both strongly supported us ratifi cation of JsolalionÎsm versus ÎnternatÎonalism? the Comprehensive Test Ban Trea ty, wh ile rh e RepubliSober analys is indicates th at on a numbcr of major can camp opposed su eh a step becau sc it considercd the issues, di stinctio ns between the Republican and DemoTreat)' inadequate and contra ry to Amcri can security interes ts. In practi ee, ratifi cation of th c Trca ry depends cratie approaches ca nnor be drawn nearly as sharply as not so much on th e American s' choice of president, but has been suggested during the campaigns. This may perhaps bc illustrated mos t clearly around the theme of on their votes for Congressional candidates. In view of alleged Republican isolationi sm versus alJeged D emoits new co mposi tion, it is highly unlikc1y th at the Scncratic internationalism, or Republican unilateralis m ate will muster the two-thi rds majority necessary for the ve rsus D emocratie multilaterali sm . Treaty. There is no doubt that both Republicans and D cmocrats want their country to play an ac tive leade rship ro le in the wo rld . Republican s are no more narrow- minded isolationi sts than Democrats are mind less internationalists. Rcpubli ca ns arc more openly criticalof the Un ited Nations than the D emocrats, but th e Clinton administration has hardly bee n subservienr to the instituti on. 1t has, for instance, actively contributed to the ea rly dismissal of Secretary-General Bou tros Bou tros-Ghali,


1"50N Magazi ne •

As to the controve rsial National M issilc D cfe nse, here th e Democrati e team had a point in stressi ng th at the sys tem wiIl not perform the tas ks th at its proponents expect. M oreover, installation of the miss iIe defense wou ld be controversial among Am erica's allies. They might weil considcr thcmselvcs left out in the rain with th e Ameri cans selfishly monopolizi ng thei r umbreUa. More seriously still, China and Ru ssia would interpret activation of the NMD as a hos tilc act. This necd not

Volume 26

lead to a ncw nuclear arms race but it will hinder devel opment of sound rel ari ons co nsiderably. In thi s case, agai n, practical aspects play an important role. Until now, the technical devc10pment ofthe NMD system s has suffered fro m major flaws. This grants th e ncw administra tion and Congre ss some time to reco nsider the final installation. It is, however, unlikel)' th at President Bush and his conscrvative supporters in Congress wil! change their views on the iss ue. On economi c iss ues as on matters of nati onal security and internationalleaders hip, differences somcrimes have been embroidered during the election cam paign. Ba th D emocrats and Rcpublicans are supportive of free trade and economic liberalizati on in the world, and bath want their country to be in the lead when globalization expand s. Arguably, the Repub li ca ns' version of econom ie liberali sm has more of a laissez-faire character than th at of the Democrats. Yet only in 2000, Vi ce- Presiden t Albert Gore has not insisted th at enviro nm ental and labor conditi ons be inserted in trade agreements wirh the People's Republic of China.

Some conciusions lt does matter who is c1ected president of the United Statcs. His ability to provide leade rship and instill coof,dence at home and abroad matters. H is wisdom in choosing the mem hers of his admin istration matters. His priori ties wil! be a maj or fac tor in influe ncing the political age nda ofthe United States and the age ndas of many other leade rs and politicians in th e world. Still, th ere arc stru ctural domesti c and inrernational limits to wh at any president of th e United Statcs can achi eve. On the domesti c front, the ncwly elected president wil! have to start working in a highl)' divided setting. H e will have to deal with a substantial number ofi nfluential institutions, groups and ind ividuals, some of whom he may expect to be very critical, but first of all with a Congress th at is neatly split in (Wo halves as far as party membership is concern ed. As has bee n argued above, the preside nt would be wise to reach out to his oppo-

Notes 1


nents, by inviting and minding rh eir views, and by trying ro in volve thcm in his own admin istration. On ly then will he be able to gather the power needed to achieve. On rhe international fro nt, rhc ncw president of th e United States will be co nfrontcd by the fac t th at th ere arc powers and ac ta rs out there, sa me big, some very small, tint do not agree with A merica n views, th at arc not willing to se rve Ameri can interests, and that arc quite capable of making life diffi cuit for the leading power in the world today. The president needs vision but he also will have to livc with real ities and he mu st so metimes bc willing to co mp romi se ben.veen th e best and the obtainable. He will also experience thc Unitcd States' need for tru sted allies. Thc admini strarion will, it is to bc hopcd, mind th c views and interests of its close allics. Thcy, toa, willn ot always sec c)'e ro cye with W ashingto n. What is more, the admin isrration may have to take into accou nt that its foreign allics and partners actually may have se rious grounds for questioning the wisdom and intenti ons of Am erican poliey, for instan ee on the issue of the NI\'IIJ. E specially with a view to rh e exccptional circum stanccs accompanying rh e creari on of the ncw Am erican admini stration, however, allics of th e United States th ar wish for effccti ve and inspired Am eri can leadership should forget th at they really preferred A1bert Gore (if thcy did ), and reach out to the ncw president with selfco nfid ence, but also as constructively as possible. Putting all these elements toge ther, inspirational leadership and daring initiarives sec m toa mueh to expect from the ncw president of the United States for the time being. But if he brings solid co mmitment to hi s job, the ab ility to seek and heed good advice and the amhiti on to bridge differences worthy of reconciliation, he may yct surpri se his coun trym en and thc world .


Or ft1Iln'ann( wn Luuwm is Dtputy DirtrtorojSfuJ't$ ar fix NrrINrlllnJ$lnJlllultqjïnttrllolirmal RrllllionJ -Chngm,{lltr 'n 7~ J I"gut.

j anuarylFcbruary 2000, pp. 6)-78;

Forexa mple,Al Kamen,

~ Dclaym ay

"The Un ited Statcs and the United

Stephen M. Walt, "Two C hecrs for

Nation s: A n uneasy rclationship,"

underm ine president ial tran sition," in :

Cli lHon's Foreign Poliey," in: Foreign

in: Marianne van Leeuwen and Aukc

Washington Post, Novembe r 20 2000,

AJlairs 79 (2), M arch/April 2000, pp. 6)-97; and Bowman W . Cutter,

Vene ma (eds), Seleaive engagement. Ameri((lfIfortig71 policy at Ihe tUnt cf/he cenlury(Th c H agl.le: Nethe rlands

p. AA I. For same valuable insighrs into

j oan Spero and Laura d'Andrea Tyson,

D emocrati e and Republiean thinking on foreign affairs, see: Condolcczza Riec,

~ Pro m oti ng

the natio nal inte resr,"

in: Foreigll AJlairs 79 ( l ), j :muaryl


"Ncw world, new deal," in : Foreigll Affairs 79 (2) , M archi April 2000,

Atlantic Com mi ssion and Net herlands

PI'· 80-9 8. Admittcdly, the C1inton adminisrra-

"Clingendael", October 1996), p. 9).

Fcbruary 2000, pp. 45-62; Robe rt B.

tion did so in order to take lhe wind out

A Republ iean Fo rcign Zocll iek, U

of the sails of prcsidential ha peful

Po liey," in: Foreign Affairs 79 ( 1),

Robert Dole. See D. A. Leurdijk,

J"5 0 " Ma gaz ine •



InstÎrute of Internatio nal Rel at ions


NATO and Europe Equality or a more balancedpartnership? Marten van Heuven

Is the relatianship between Eurape and NATO an alliance ofequals? Ta start with, lam intriglled by the way that this qllestian is jramed,jl/xtapasing El/rape and NATO.

Seventeen afthe current nineteen members ofNATO are Eurapean col/ntries.

They belang ta NATO because they want ta. By daing sa they presumably do not consider themselves any less Eurapean. Ijl am wrong abaut this, I shall have ta conclude, with that New Yark Yankees 'philasapher Yogi Berra, that thejilfllre ain't what it used ta beo

Equals? Pcrhaps 1 sho uld rinker with the que stion a linie, :tnd ask whcthcr, within nato, the Euro pean count ri es arc cquals to the North American members, in particular thc Uni ted Stares. The answer, ir sce ms to me, is: "Of course nor!" Thc European members and thc United Stares have each eome into nato with their individual hi storie s, wÎth differing perspcctives, at different time s, under different conditions, and with different capacitics. And let us not forger th e geographi c difference: Europcan countries arc in EUfope, and {hat fact, in 1949, induced nato's birth. Nor are th c European mem bers as a group today equals of the North Ameri ca ns. Some European mcmbers are prospcrous, others not yet. Same look cast, othcrs look south. Some have capabie armed forces - even including nuclcar wcapo ns others not. Even the sum of the diverse experiences, inputs and o utlooks of rhe European members of nato differs markedly from rhar of the American s and the Canadians.

rope, and now in providing sccurity and stability in the Balkans. ThiJ concept providcs a positive answer to the questio n of whether within thc bundlc of co mmitments, efforts and procedures that we call NATO, the Europeans are the "equals" of thc North Americans. Thcyarc.

Variables Since different co nceprual avenue s ro equality producc con tradictory an swers, approach may be more producti vc. Let variables that will shape th e Alliance and to "equality analysis."

th e issue of a pragmaric me take five subject th em

The first var iabie is en large ment. Therc arc now nvo processes under way: one in NATO and the othe r in the Europcan Union. These processes are roughly parallel. Thcy Întersec t, however, in rhe sense thar they involve many of the same players. What 'Europe does the record teil us? Ten years ago rhere From another perspecrive, however, there is were marked differences in the approach to equali ty within the alliance. Ir is not so much and America Gennan unificati on, a de facto cnlargcmenr ofbo th NATO and the EU. The Bush adminisan equal iry bcnyccn rhe European members are not drifting tration was a key driver in the process, as was of NATO as a group and rhe North Americans. Rath er, it is an equal ity in the commitmenrs Chanccllor Kohl', govcrnmcnt. London .ncl Paris, however, were visibly un enthu siastic. made byeach member party to the North Atapart. ' l n the mid - 1990S, European NATO alli es Jantic Trcaty, and the equally shared acquiJ of joined the American iniriative to add the NAT O - th c shared commitments to frcedom, Czech Republi c, Hungary and Poland to NATO. EU democracy, security and human rights, th c commo n policies, the joint capabilities, and the common members, however, co nrinu cd their srrugglc with rhe achievements during thc Cold W ar in safeguarding Eu dilemma between deepening and widening, again st a


1"50 N Magazi ne •

Volume 26

us Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and German Foreign Minister Josch ka Fischer at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Vienna on 27 November 2000.

backdrop of America n calls for speed in crcating a Europe whole and frec. 1 Now both enlargernel1t processes are under way. So there seern s to be grearer similarity in approach on both sides of the Atlantic, although not exactlyequality.

on the one hand and Eliropean members of the Al li ance on the other hand. J Thi s srate of affairs al so co nrriburcs to orher incqualiries, in diplomacy and in inflll enee generall y. Moreover, these inequalities are likely ra endure.

The seco nd variabie is tasks. l Historically, they have been defense, deterrence, dĂŠtente and now cooperation. Future NATO tasks will contain eIernents of all four. Thc current so-called Petersberg tasks - compri si ng hum anitarian and re scue mi ssions, peacekeeping, cri sis management and peace enforcement - rcveal a kaleidoscope of inputs th at are hard to arrange in any pattern th at suggcsts equality. Nonetheless, they have been characte rized by the principle of equally shared risks. Ir is not certain, however, whether thi s dcgrec of cquality wOlild persist if NATO was challenged out-af-area.

50 a pragmatie review of key variab ics that will shape the A ll iance points to changing tasks, to a new allocati on of respol1sibilities, to new pattcrns ofburden sharing, to cvolvi ng eapabil ities, and to a ncw balance in thc tran satlantic partnership. But equaliry between the European members of the Alliance and the United States is no more accu rate a deseription of past condi rions than ir is of the present, or of rhe likcly furure .

The third variabIe is organization and leadershi p. Let me focus on two c1emcnts. Partnership for Pcace involves partner counties in NATO activities as never beforc. As aresu it, the distinction berween members, mcmbcrs- to-be, and partners is increasingly blurred. A Iso, the drive tO\vard a European Sccuriry and D efen se Policy (ES OP) is rai sin g th c issue of European autono my. These elements suggest a rebalaneing of the tran sa tlanrie partnership. They do not, howcver, point to equality. A fourth variabie is the promotion of a eonstruerive Ru ssian role in Europc. The bilateral relationship between Ru ss ia and thc United Statcs is not likc1y to lose irs significance. H owever, the European eounrries in the Alliance - Germ.ny in particul.r - face the challenge ofhelping to bring Ru ss ia into a constructive role within Europe, rhrough NATO institurions sueh as the Permanent Joint Commiss ion (pJc), as well as bilateralIy, ancl through th e EU. I f suecessful, these efforts will demonstra te cooperario n more than equality. Thc last variabie is capabilities. 1 shall not reargue th e obvious point, which is rhat there are gross disparities between the mi litary capabilities of rhe United States

JASON Ma gazi ne _

Rebalancing On the issue of equality, I have (\"'0 more comments. They both rclate to how we shou lcl think ancl talk "bout the process of rebalancing the rransatlantic partnership. The first comment is that on the subject of ES OP, talk about a common foreign and secllrity policy should not outrun reality. We Ameriea ns undersrand that policy requircs visio n, and that vi sions may be beyond reaeh. Nor are we stran gers to hyperboic. Suggestions thar equali ry in eapabilities is around the corner might lead publie opi nion in rhe United Srares to conclude that a us military prese nce in Europe is no longer necessa ry.4 The seeo nd comme nr is that expli cir calls from within the EU family for "Europe" to assert its equality with the United Statcs convey the not-so- hidd en view rhar wc are dealing with a zero-sum transatl antic relati onshi p, and that the rime has eo me ro meet perceived American hegemony head-o n. I need not stress rhe dangers of thi s approach, which erodes rhe very conceprs of unity of pllrpose and shared ri sks th ar are at the heart of th e A lliance.

Partnership In eonclusio n, I want to address the transatlantic rela tion ship beyond rhe issue of securiry.

1 2001


1 do nor subscribe ro rhc view rhar Europe and Ame rica arc drifring apart. In this era of expo ncntially increased communications, the evidence suggests the contrary. This pattcrn may illuminate inevitable differences, and often does. On both continents we are increasi ngly in vo lved with one another. M oreove r, ou r shared interest in promoting our common values suggests the in evi tabili ty of working together as never before. What strikes me is th e tendency on this side of the Atlant ic to think of Europe as divided between those co untries and peoples who arc integral parts of the EU system, and those on the outside. Within the EU , the word "Eu rope" more often than not refers to EU Europe. IncidentaUy, BBC weather forecasts still talk about Europe as not including the British isles. M orcover, a significant segment of European leaders - including former French President Giscard d 'Estaing, former Gcrman Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. and that highly respected European statesman M ax Kohnstamm - prefer to decpen the Union before letti ng in new members.5 Americans, however, see Europe whole and operate on the vision of Europe whole and free. 6 1n this Ameri ca n view, any other approach simply serves to accentuate dysfun ctional dividing lines. This way of

Noles 1

There is also linkage berween rhe us commi unellt ro Europe and funhe r NATO cnla rgemen r. " Everyone understands thar cnlargcmcnt is founded on


1I1arttn tJan Iltll'Wn iJ a Srnior Consultant at MAND. Tlm art,dt,s hllsd '1'1 tIN /ntTOllurtiun tlJnt Ix ga'lJi' un N(}1!tmhrr J 7 1000 a! tIN(Onftrrnrr tnmltrl"Trrmsjormal'(Jn anrl adllplal/un. [SDP and NATO: Imphrat,unsfor Europtand tbr Un,lrJ Stll/(S


urganiud by IIN NrthrrlandsAtlllnl;r A JS«ial;un om/JA5oN Fuumlal;un.

Securiry and Dcfense Policy: A practi cal vision for EUfope," Thc Atlantic Council of the United

cxpansion of NATO and the European Union. l ndeed, our ent ire foreign policy, for many dccades, has had as its

States, BIII/tt;", vol. IX, no. 3,

staning poi nt an unshakeable co mmit-

August 2000. "Th is will rcquire that Europeans exert

ment to Europe. That commi tment is enduring. ft rests on the premise that Europcan countri es are cqually commined to thc rclationship. n

vicwcd as rock-solid, the Europea n allies wi ll be most reluctant to take on

abou t Europcan scl f-asser tion will fail

Unde r- Secrelary ofSate for Political

to win support in thc United Statcs. " NATO Secretary General Lord

Affairs Thomas Pickering, in all addrcss [ 0 the Slovak Foreign Policy

Robert son <lt a conference on "Defcnse

Association , Bratislava, Slovakia,


sador to NATO Robert E. Hunter, face s a new rhrear:

européen nc: Lc conce pt de conver-

President Bush," Los Ar/geles Tim es,

ge nce," Brussels, M arch

October 26 2000. FOT a dctailed :tnd authoritative account

29 2000.

S Valcry Giscard d'Estaing and H clmut


Fcbruary 4 2000. For a recent claborarion of the official us governmcnt vicw for the issues at the

Sc hm idt, "T ime to slow down and con-

heart of a more balanced partnership,

solidatc around 'curo- Europe',"

sce thc address of the us Permanent

{n/erna/io"cl Herald Tribune, April I1 2000. For the simi lar views of

Rcprcsenrative to NATO, Alexander Vershbow, ro rhe Norwegian

defense," Institute for Strategic

Ma" Kohnstamm, see "W ie isr Europe zu Sichern? Die Suche nach konzep-

ArIantic Comm inee in O slo on September 25 2000. Ve rshbow makes

Studies, Western EUfopean Union,

tioneller C estaltungskra ft ,"

the case for regular consulrations and

Chail/o/ Papers 39, April

Bergedo rfer Gespraechskreis,

closc coopera tion berwee n the EU and NATO. He also makes the point [hat the

defense policy, see Stanley R. Sloan, "The United Stares and European


See Philip H . Cordon , 'T heirown

Pr%Ro/l, no. 11 1,

army? M aki ng European defense work," in ForeignAffairs, vol. 79, no. 4,

scc M arten van H euven, "Wie ist

Julyl August


199 7 , at p. 86. For a response to Kohnstamm's views,

For concrete

suggesrions for steps rhar would all ow the w to achieve a foreign and securiry



what I may eall 'rhetorical di scipline.' An ~;S DI rhat comes across as beingjust

of American views of the EUfopean drive roward a com mon securiry and


The current di scussion about a more balanced transatlantic partnership and a new division of responsibil ities has now reached a point where EU countri cs have set out to create a capability, th rough ESDP, to act militarily under the EU when NATO decides not te be engaged. Thc United Statcs has droppcd earl ier reservations and supports th is approach. ' This adjustm en t of roles and co ntributions within the Alliance wiU be diffICult to manage under th e best of cÎrcumstances. The devi l is in th e many details. Mishandled, it co uld cause se rious political problems. But th e countries of the Alliance have met tough challenges before, and ] am confident th at they ca n do so again .

thc us strategic commitment to Europc; if that commitment is not

:tny more charges." Former us Ambas-


thinking is also strong in eastern and ce ntra I Europe, as was co nfirmed by many speakers at the forty-sixth annual meeting of the Atlantic Treaty AssocÎation in Budapest in November 2000.


Europe zu Sichern?" at p. 95. "The us cnvi sions a tran satlantic com -

willingness of all six non-EU aJliesthe Czech Republic, l-Iungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey - to conrribute to future


operation s entitles

muniry in which all countries look to

them 10 spccial status in the ncw struc-

pol iey that strength ens Europe and the

the ir neighbors as partners, not threats.

tures of Europcan Security and

Alliance, sec General Klaus Naumann (rcr.), "Implementing the European

That is why thc United States strongly

Defense Policy.

supports European integrarion and the


Maga zi ne _

Volzune :16

US-EU economie relations: Avision of global co-leadership David Gompert

An open economic relationship between the United States and the European Union - by which is meant one ofcooperation and competition - is increasingly v ital to the American, European and global economies. According to David Gompert, itfollows that governments on both sides ofthe Atlantic, while playing an ever lighter role in their respective economies, have a heavy duty both to remove obstacles to transatlantic competition and to cooperate, as partners, in shaping and managing a new global economy.

Brisk competition

re such ambit ions realistic? After all, wc hear warnings thar (he Unitcd Starcs and (he Europea n Un ion are beco ming rivals. Th is fcaf of rivalry see rn s m isgu ided for [he si mple reason th at th e us and (he EU have a huge and growi ng stake in each other's economie success. Thc stronger the European economy, the better European tcchnology, th e more product ive European workers and the mOfC competitive Europcan firms, the better it is for Am erica ns. And th e prospeets for Europc's economy raday would be anything but bri ght if the us economy was slu mping instcad of thriving.

At the same time, there IS co mpetition gOlll g on bctween thc EU and the US: over capital and labor. But thi s is a virtuous competition that spu rs governments o n both sides of the Atlanti c to adopt better policies - bette r monetary and fiscal policies to attract capita!, better immigration and education policies to attract talent. Take away the ture of the American eco nomy, and Europeans might not be reforming rax taws , expediting privatization, an d reco nsidering immigrati on poli ei es to invigo rate their economies. This brisk competi tion over the basic factors of production - capitat and labo r - undersco res how entangled the Amer ica n and European eco nomies have becollle. M o rcover, as the world's tv.ro largest and strongcst eco nomi es, their relationship is pivotal fo r th e worl d eco nomy. This rai ses three important qucst ions:

Therc are other reasons not to be alarmed about US-EU eco nomie rivalry. Of course us and European firms compete with cach other, but (h ey compete as fierccly with domestic firms. M o reover, more and mo re corporations are neither purely us nor European, thanks to extensive transatlantic investment and corpora te alliances. anc out of rwelve Ame ricans works for a corporation th at is mainly Europea n-owned. Finally, white there are exceptions in old econo mi e sectors, su eh as steel , most leading compa nie s in emerging sec tors, especially technology and services, would be aghast at the speeter of US-EU eco nomie rivalry. They need unrestri cted movement of products, capital, and ideas to thrive in global markets.

JASON M agazi ne

• Wh at are the respective po li cies and prospeets of th e us and Europcan cconomies? • Wh at relationship between thc two eco nom ies do we seek for the long term? • What goals do the us and the EU have for the global economy? The answers are interconnected: The healthier eac h of the two economies are, the casier it is to ex pand both

/ 200/


competit ion and coope rati on with the othe r. The more ope n to each other, the betrer th eir abiliry to exercise co-Ieade rship of a new global economy. And a strongcr global eco nomy is esse ntial to sustain the hcalth of the us and Europcan economies for rh e long term .

across northern Eu rope. Tax reform has been enactecl in Germany, France, and other key cOllntrics. Srill, rhe EU'S lagging productivity gai ns teil a lot. European businesses have heen less aggressive rh an us bllsinesses in utili zing IT strategically. The us ex perien ce shows rh at it take s ye ars to ada pt corporate strucrure s and processes fully to exploit IT . This suggests th at majo r IT- rel ated productivity ga in s arc some years away in Europe. But even wirh tim e, improved European productivity is not inevitable. The rigidiry of European labor markets impedes th e exploiration of ncw technology - particularly IT , whi ch depend s on often painful co rporate restru cttlring and dcman ds and rcwarcls mobile labor.

Si mila ri ties and dissimilarities The us and European economies arc similar in so me rcspccts. Add Canada and Mexico - through the North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA ) - alld rh e eco nomi es are roughl y the same sizc, with co mparable per capita income. Borh economi es are good at ge nerating capi tal and rechnology, as weil as at high- valueadded producrion and service. Both depend heavily on trad e.

A viabie hybrid economy? Not all Europeans accept th is diagnosis or prescripti on. Same cire Sweden, Denmark and rhe Netherlands as evidence th at it is possible ro maintain prorective labor laws and ge nerous social welfare program s yet still achieve non- inflationary low un empl oyment. lndeed, they argue that European workers are more likely to rake ri sks if rhey know that there is a safety net. M ore philosophically, they believe in a viabIe hybrid between srate welfare economics and Ameri can- style "turbocapitalism." They believe that th e latter is not only unfair because of its wide disparities in inco me and wea lth hut also zmnecessary to ach ieve growrh.

But there arc also sharp dissimilarities:

• The us is capable of mee ting its energy needs; th e EU is not. • The us cDuld feed irs population scveraJ times ove r; Europea n agricu ltu re depends on governm ent subsidies to survive. • The us is good at both ereating and applying IT, the dcfining rechnology of the post-i ndustrial era; Emopeans are good at applying but less good at creating IT . • Talent from around the world is flooding inro us graduate schools and firm s. • Taxation is, on average, about 50 perce nt higher in the EU th an in the us. • Labor laws and labor unions are weaker in th e us Europeans may wish to retain sta te support and lahor rhan in th e EU. prorection policies for reasons of di srributive equity and social harmony, but they should not pretend that there • American entrepreneurs fail more frequently than their European counterparts, which indiis no cost in doing sa. After all, if lahor ca res that they te st the limits of th eir ideas ca nnot adjust to exploit rapidly changi ng and mca ns. 'Europe can learn rechnology, increasingly effi cienr capital markers, and fluid opportunities, neither As a consequen ce of these differen ces, the from American the technology nor the capital nor the opportunities wil1 be efficiendy urilized. us economy has been outperforming the EU'S: Thc rcsult will be - indecd is - lagging successes productivity. There has a1so been a ce rtain • Ir has expe ri enced remarkable producamount of denial in regard to why the euro and mistakes. ' tivity growth over rhe past flve years, has lost 30 percent of its value aga inst the reaching as high as 6 percent per year. The dollar in irs short lifetime. Popular EuroEU'S has been abour 2 percent. Even the United Kingpean explanations inclllde: dom - often viewed as one of rhe most vibrant European eco nomies - has see n productivity growth of less • The Europea n Ccntral Ban k is incxpericnced - toa than 2 percent per year over the past five yea rs. secretive yet too talkative. • The US economy has low inflation (3 percent) and • Higher us interest rates siphon away capita!. full employment ( 4 percent), whereas low inflation in • World markers have bee n slmvcr than hoped to the EU is acco mpani ed by stubbornly hi gh unemployaccept the euro as a re se rve currency. ment (9 percent). While there is so me truth to all threc explanati ons, rhey miss the more important point: markets know th at the There are signs of the new economy breaking through the cru st of European economie life. Use of mobile us economy has heen more productive and thus has co mmunications, personal computers, and thc Internet offered the prospect of growth, whi ch rewards Învestis growing rapidly. Several north European countrics ment, with /ow injlatÎol1, whi ch proterts Înveslmen t. The have brought down unemployment to roughly thc level euro may go up or down next week or next year. But ir is in rh e us. Privatization and deregulati on are sweepÎng where it is now because the prospects for euroland's


JASON M agazine

Volum t 26

economy, while not poor, have been comparalively unex ei tll1g. At the same time, thc EU economy can benefit from lagging the us cconomy. Strong us dcmand for imports obviously helps European producers. AIso, Europe can learn from American successes and mistakes. For examplc, the information revolution in the us, which has had vinually no government involvemcnt, has produced a digital divide and has not penetratcd key public sectors - such as edllcation and health care - as weIl as it might have. The European Commission's "e-Europe" initiative ailll :S al Joing it betreL Also Europcan corpora te rcengineering can karn from America n cxamples.

Toward an Allantic Free Trade Association ? Of course, Amcricans would be foo1 s to hope that Europe co ntinu es to lag. Let's assume th at the EU cco nomy follows a similar path te the U S cconomy: improving productivity by crearing fle xibility in labor markers and harnessing IT, thus sustaining growth with low unemployment and low inflation. Undcr these circumstance s, stagnant European industries and flrm s will give way and dynamic ones that know how te usc hu man capital wilI become more competitivej the euro wil] gain strength and be accep ted as the seeond great rese rve currency. Thi s European suceess story would be grcat for the us by: United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshevs ky.

• lnereasing demand for us goods and se rvices. • lmp roving return s for us companies operating in the EU.

• Generating more European capital to Învest in the us. • lntensif)ring pressure on us firm s and policies te attract talent and capital. A more vibrant EU economy would also permit a more open US-EU economie relarionship. Some farm of North Atlantic free trade arrangement could become reali stic. Europeans may not feel secure enough at the moment to re move all barriers to tran satlantic trade. But an EU with grea ter labor mobility, productivity, and inventiveness - and without high chronic unemployment - could enter with eonfidence inte free trade wirh the us in IT, biotech, services, aerospacc, defense and general manufacturing. The inclusion of agriculture would depend on political pressures in the us to inc1ude it and political pressure in th e EU to exclude it. The us should not let agriculture bar the road to otherwise free tran satlantic trade. Amcricans would not, and should not, be intercsted in free trade with half of Europe - namely, the half th at was fortunare enough to benefit from the Marshall Plan, NATO, and European integration. EU membership for Europe's ncw democraci es, with their vast untappcd human potential, is justified not only on political aod moral but also for economic reasons.

JASO N Ma g azi ne _

Unif}ring NAFTA and rhe EU - with the EU eneompassing easte rn Europe and with NA FTA stretching funher into Latin Ameriea - would create a vast free - trade area linking the world's two largcst economies and applying pressure on rhe rest of the world, especially East A sia, to ope n up or even join up. North Atlantic free trade could be both the model and the locomotivc of a new global economy, while also positioning thc Atlantic partnership to modernize the global system: • The EU an d thc Us could becomc co-champions of worl dwide open trade. • They eould be co-engineers of a ren ovated institu ti onal sys tem of global economie and finan cial governancc. • They could co-m anage the integration of China, ]ndia and othcr emcrging economics. • They eould rcdesign and reinvigoratc effon s to help poor countries. • They cç>uld deve lop a eommon approach to protecting rhe information infrastructure on which all global markets increasi ngly depend. • They could coordinate strategies to reconcilc economie growth and development with environmental protection, including global climate prorecrion. ]n all of these endeavors, the EU sholild have as much say as the us. lndeed, in some ofthem, American policy would benefit from Europcan influence.

1 2001


Why the us needs a partner But can rhe us and the EU fulfill rhis vision of co- Ieadership if rhey are engaged in trade trcnch-warfare - the laresr battle of which is over us rax breaks to promote

cxpons? There is no nccd to be worried about such trade di sputes. FOf one rhing, heaIthy businesses arc lcss inc1illcd to seek government help, and governmcnts arc lcss inclincd the se days to help sick olles. Morcover, while rules are bcing worked out and rcsred, di sputcs are inevirable as cconomies become morc intcrtwinccl. Trade disputcs bct\veen the us and thc EU will not o bstruet thc partnership as long as thc World Trade Organizarion (WTO) sys tem kecps gctti ng stronger. Borh eco nomie powers have a grmving sta ke in thc WTO'S effectiveness. Therefo re, moves toward Arlantic free trad e should be a template for, rather than an alternative to, global free trade. At the same time, it would be better ro concentrate at this stage o n creating Atlantic free trade instead of having another compre hen sive global round of trade negotiations. With things seemi ng ly going its way, why should the us be eager no t on ly to have free trade with thc EU but also to accept it as its partner in shaping a new global economy? There are two rea so ns, one economic and one politica!. For all their cockiness, Americans would be wisc to understand rhar their economy may not remain hcalthy without healthier European and global econom ies. The us has yet to canfront two huge problems. One is the co ming crunch in social security and health care as the baby boomcrs work less, live longer, and de mand more. The other is the appalling state of American mass education. Both problems are solvable only if low- inflarionary growth continues and a national budget surplus is available. Yer sustaining the robustness of the us cconomy - and rhus the ability to tackle these two great problems - will depend on how Europe and rhe rest of the wo rld are doing. Already, us corporate earnlllgs have been hurt by rhe weakness of the euro.

Moreover, as the recent us presidential c1ecrion shows, the nat ion and the government are divided even ly and sharply along party lines - and one of those parties, the Democrats, is divided over rrade. Do not forget that even with a supportive Republi can co ngressional majority, President Clinton was unablc to get an extension of fasttrack trade negotiating authority. So the EU need s to step up to the role of co-leader. Statements by EU Trade Comm issioner Pascal Lamy prove th at it - or at least he - is wi lli ng. But it also requires th at the EU economy and industries become more flexible, more inventivc, and more daring. The vision of US-EU global economie leadership is consiste nt with the view th ar rhc us and the EU should become global secu rity partners as weil, rransforming their existing alliance to th ar end. 5uch a security partnership would loek in the ga ins of democratization wirhin and weil beyond Europc, protect the flows of goods, money and informatÎoll and rhe infrastrucrure of the world economy, ensure access to the one resource that lies beyond their reaeh - energy - manage the diffu sion of porentially dangerou s rechnologies, and cape with the emergence of C h ina. Aga in, it is not likely to see either rhe us or the EU aeeepr ing sueh re sponsib ilities unIe ss the orher does. Agiobal sec urity partne rship of the us and the EU is justified in large part by co mmon global economie interests. And the closer their two economies, the stfOnger rhe justifi cation for agiobal security partnership as well as a global economie partnership. ] n securiry and 111 economics, the new era is rich in opportunities and fraught with risks. There is a need for principled, aecountable, steady leadership. Many Americans are fond of claiming the mantIe of global leadership - and at thc mo ment that may be thc only aItcrnative. But for the long haul, one should count on not just Ameriean but Adant ie leadership. At least that should be our goal.


The us also need s a partner because it is na langer wil ling to accept so le responsibility for economie leadership. Ir did sa during the Cold War because the economie strength of the free world was a strategie imperative. But it has no such eompelling strategic motivation now.

{In [Hu mlMT 7 1 0 0 0.


Volume 26

10\5 0 " Magaz in e •

Dat/id Gomp"1 is Pmi.!"'1 afRAND Europr. T his iJ IJ mtulrfitdwrsion ofo /m urf lhallx gaw onllN omlJion afllH twmly-fifih an niwrsary ofllN jA SON Foundation

Mexico and the reconquest of the United States Raymond Buve

At the end ofthe millennium many M exicansfeared that the nearly 200-year-old struggle between the search for a Mexican identity - expressed in nationalism and admirationforoverpowering European andAmerican models had come to an end. Has the American model won?


eopolitical, economie aod commercial interests induced Spain t France aod the United Stares [0 cooquer aod control large pans of the territory. Mexicans fought themsclves free from Spain in 1821, then [rom France in 1867. but Mexico has been unable to ge t the us off its back. Beeause of American expansioni sm, Mexico lost half of its territory in 1848 and suffered a number of America n punitive military interventions. Every self- re specting municipal council in Mexico saw to it thar the main avenues were named after the heroes who fought intervening Europeans aod Americans. Is thi s enough proof to co nclude thar there is a layer of hurt nati onal feelings which c10uds us and EU relations wÎth Mexico? Yes and no, because in Mexi co there is a se nsc of admiration th at is mixed with hatred; increasi ng dependence provoked annoyed feel ings but was accepted as inevitable.

A short history of us·Mexican relations The problem lies in a rather fundamcntal Mexica n dilemma concerning Mexico's relatÎ ons with Europe and the us. We ca n only partially compare it to other postcolonial relationships, for example those between the United Kingdom and former African or Asian colonies, becausc in the case of Mexico two European countries and the us were involved in conqllest and dominati on aod, seco ndly, the cliltural and soeietal indoetrination with patterns from Western civilization went much deeper. Mexican elites we re (and arc) mainly white. They adm ired European alld Ameri ca n modcls of state formation and political system s. The educated urban elite and higher middle groups (at most IQ percent of the population) took France and the United Kingdom as

JASON Maga zi ne.

their frames of reference, and literary clubs and societies discllssed the same topics as those in Paris or London. After the hllmiliating defeat against the us in 1848 alld the costly struggle to undo the ambitions of the French empero r Napoleon 111 from 1862-1867, Mexico for several decades tried its best to ignore both the us and Europe. But European or Ameri can models in education , urbani zation, technology and sociallife remained dominant. The indigcnous heritagc was glorifled as a counterpoint against European conquest and rape, but it was done in Spanish. The histo ry of the Tndians was expropriated by the American- born white minorities to legitimize their own aspirations for independence. Finally, lndians were viewed as minors who had to be forcibly educated in order te serve the developing capimlist economy, flrst in mining, plantations and railways, later in industry and se rvices. By the 187°5, thc Mexican government was convinccd th at the country's road to progress was foreign investment and t rade. Rearrangement of debts and prompt payment as weil as eager foreign markets triggered the massive influx of foreign capital and management in mining, infrastructure, agriculture and industry. The re sulting linkages between the American, Eliropean and the Mexican economies - between 1876 and 191 foreign investment grew hy 700 percent - established American domÎnation with nearly 40 percent of foreign investment coming from the us and 70 percent of foreign trade to and from the us. Europe lost its dominance in foreign trade, but remained thc chi ef invcstor, partly because of a deliberate early-twentieth-century Mexican government poliey to favor European invest-





ments in strategie sectors sueh as oil, port in stallations, publie servi ces and banking.

have a democracy, be it onc under th e guardianship of a srrong executive.

The founding ofthe PRI Mexico and the (old War Then th e M exican revolution ( ' 9 TO- T92 0) and th e First For the us, Mexican support for Ameri can hemispheri World War significantI)' changed the theater in favor of cal defen se policies had bee n crueial since 1947. But th e us. The 1\1exican rcvolution was, certainly at the mindful ofMexi can sensibilities, th e American govern beginning, a popular outery against the ment left Mexico - be ir grudgingly - space social di slocations cau sed by accclerated for an "independent" foreign policy. Mexicapitalist development, but it was also 'European influence co protested fiercel)' at Ameri can involvcimbued with an aggressivc nationalism and ment in the 1954 coup against a progre ssive the diabolizing of foreign enterprise. The in Mexico civilian government in Guatemala, which popular rebel movements foreed a very prowas suspectcd of Communism by the gressivc Constitution on the new regime was marginal Ei senhower govcrnment. Ir also steadfastly and during its period of political consolidarefu sed te sever rc!ations with Castro's ti on it had to abide b)' the social articles of compared Cuba. But Mexico remaincd finnl)' capi talist, outlawed its own Communist party the '9'7 Constitution on the rights of peasants and laborers. However, once firm and all Castro sympathizers or vi sitors to the us. ' Iy in power, the regime focused on a full from Cuba were registered. To a cerrain fledged industrial Mexico, based on a degree Mexico senred as a suitable intereheap labor force controlled by a strong presidential mediary for the us in its delicate relations with those regime and its government party, thc Partido R evo/u countries that refused to commit to one or the other ciorzario lnsliluciona/ (PRI). This regime would manage side in the Cold War. to stay in power until I December 2000. Ir was not before the 1960s that European interests The 1940S saw the beginning of an informal pact of gradually returncd. One can think of the automotive mutual support between the PR I regime and the Ameriindustry and the role of European technolog)' in the can government. Relations with the us during thc Mexibuilding of a subway system in Mexico City. Also, in can revolution were based on protracted negotiations the 1960s French and German cultural institutcs were the us wanted compensation for damage to Americanfounded in Mexico, and hundreds of Mexican students owned property and guarantees for American investors went te the United Kingdom and France for postgraduand entrepreneurs - but the Second World War forced ate stu die s. After Franco's death in 1975 hundreds of the us to support the new regime in exchange for imporMexican srudents went to Spain and many "respectcd" tant Mexican conrributions to the American war econofami lies looked for their lberian roots. Gne of the few my. 1t is truc that Mexican migrant labor to thc us had cultural treaties rhat the Dutch government concluded existed already for many decades, but now it became with Latin American countries was indeed with Mexiinsti tu tiolul ized. co, but the number offellowships was limited anci most went te students in higher professional cducatĂ&#x17D;on. The The impact of virtually exclusive American influence in Mexican government responded with the foundation of the '940S and 1950S was decisive for Mexico's future in several centers of Mexican Stud ies, among othe rs lil the sccond half of the rwentieth century a!ld, quite h aly, France, Belgium and the Netherland s. probably, for this centur)'. Mexican law prohibited foreign property in the frontier areas and limitcd foreign But European influence in technology, trade, invcstment and mass cultu re for the popular classes was rather investment in several ways, but these limiting rules were cleverly circumvented wirh the complianee of an marginal compared with those of the us. Tradc between cntrenched PRI -con trolled bureaucracy and the lub rithe European Economie Community (EEe) countries cant of corrupti on . andMexico remaincd minima} comparcd to that of thc us wi th Mexico. The us won the battle for the Mexican From the Mexican side, all approaches te the us had to T V syste m from French Secam, while the strong linkage follow official PRI-eontrolled ehannels. This not only between the state oil company PEMEX and the US kept conccrncd import quota, concessions, permits and sophisti cated European oil and gas technology out. arrangements for investments, but for many decades, at least until the 1970s, it dominated the image of Mexico in the us as that of a stab ie country with a WirtMexico's changing politica I climate schaftswunder like West Gcrmany. Censorship and The Mexican poiiticaI model of a tutelary democracy with a co ntrolled legislative and judiciary gradually lost monopolies kept the rapidly growi ng Mexican media under control. Few Mexicans went abroad to explai n the its Icgitimacy, because of a widening gap between offideficiencies of the regime and American political sciencial ideology and social reality and an all - pervading tists agreeci for a long time that Mexico did, in essence, petrified .nd corrupt government party. The r.ther


JASON Magazine â&#x20AC;˘

Volum e 26

impress ive resu lts of the free-of-charge public schoo l sysrem was an eve r- increasing flow of high school pupils into th e universities, and thi s educated public started to criti cize the regime for Iack of democracy, in creasing social inequal ity and poverty among the masses. Thc answer was more aut ho ritarian ism, expressed in increa si ng c1ecroral fraud and vio lence, whi ch foste red the develo pment of increasing po litical o ppositio n o n the le ft, fin ally resulting in a unifi ed Parlido de la Revo/uci贸n Democr谩lira (PRO), wh ile the hi g h degrec of state- lcd co n trol of the national economy, govc rnmcnt-co ntrolled relations ro thc us and the privileges accordcd to PRI -related business and labo r unio ns lcd to in creasing o pposition o n th e right, thc Parlido de A((i贸n Nllciona/ (PAN ), a party rh ar voiced privatizario n of state enterprises and th e opening up of the market.

Brig. gen. John J. Pershing l ed the punitive expedition into Mexico in 1916.

lt may bc intcresting to know that Fox, a fa rmer anel forIller lead ing execu tive of Coca-Cola in M ex ico, is a good fricnd of th e Bush family. I n their views on society and economy, Bush Jr. and Fox see m qu ite similar - that is, large i)' co nse rvative - but Fox see ms, perhaps more th~lIl Bush, prepared to dcliver social progra ms. H is plans for fIScai reform will certainly affect the happy few alld th e midd lc c! ass, and they appcar orien ted to improvc the statc's capabili ry ro deliver soc ial prog ram s for th c rural and urban poor.

Neo- liberalism was alrcady en vogue in W as hington wh en the debt cri sis of th e ' 980s forced th e PR I gove rn ment to submit its acute finan ciaI problcms (debts and overspending) to thc internatio nal fillancial insti tution s. M exico had to balan ce its budge t, privatize most of its state enterpr ises, eliminate subsidies and redu ce its budge t fo r soci al services and, last but not leas t, ope n up its markcts. Unemployment rose and purchasing power plummetcd.

Vicente Fox and NAFTA ]n the early 1990S Pres ident Salinas de Gortari started ncgotiatiollS with Canada and the us to joill their already cxisting free trade association. On January 1 1994 M exico joined thc North Ameri can Frce Trade Associati on

Preside nt Salinas de G ortari 's di sastrou s finan cial poli cies in th e earlYI990S triggered a crisis, whi ch in '995 resulted in wholesalc losses of jobs, budge t cuts alld plummering purchasin g power. After at least duee di sasrrou s I'RI presidencies, th e righ t-wing presidcntial candidate, Vi cc ntc Fox (PAN), won the elections. This happened Iargcly because a sizable part of th e Mexica n left and ce nter, anxio lls to gc t rid of th e PRI, o pted ra vote o nJuly 2 2000 for the most likely winner.

(NAFT,, ). ha s ce rtainly had positi ve conscquences for large M exican businesses in the auromorivc and othcr hightcch nology sectors. Industrial in vestment in M cxico and trade with the us increased sharply. But partly duc to M ex ican neglige nce in the orig inal nego tiati ons for th e treat)' and partly due to the so-call ed "grandfather's dau se" in th e us, NA FTA'S rc sults for M cx ican agri culturc have been bad if not di sastrou s. Co rn may be thc third most important food erop in the wo rld , bor Mexican agricultural policy is focusing o n techno logy-intensivc large -scale agri culrure for the foreign and urban markcts anel it has left th e more than one-millio n small co rn produci ng peasants on their own. The NA.'TA trcaty forcsees in a few years the complete liberaliz:\rio n of thc co rn trade, and these small produce rs will never be able to compe tc and might be forced to abandon ag ri culture. N A FTA

The PRI no lo nge r ha s a monopoly in rclati ons with th e us, and Mexican s arc c1lang ing their attitude toward th e us and Europe. This is, of course, no t o nly the result of NA FTA and a change in regime. The revoluti on in information tec hno logy in M exico has also bee n impress ive. Th ousa nd s of firm s, association s, sciemists, arri srs, stu de nrs and many o th ers in th e us, Europe and M ex ico arc now participating in all intense e!ectronic dialog and murually consult th eir websites. Mexi can s arc rapidly ove rcom ing th eir insccllrity alld inferiority complex in thei r relations with Amcri ca n, Canadian and Eliropean colleagues wh cn d iscuss in g, among orhers, scie nce, business, mu sic, art, theater or history. In fact, it has bee n noted in rece nt yea rs that l\1exica n popular culture ha s srarred its "reco nquest " of the us and see ms in creasing ly po pular in Euro pe. Mexican movic s, painting, litera ture, fu rniturc, literaturc, theater alld mu sic are virtually invading North Am erica. Ameri cans who want to taste M exica n food no lo nger look for so-catlcd TexasM exican food, but ask for the di she s from south of the border.

JASO N Maga l i ne

Wh at Mexico should do, at leas t in th e eyes of 111:\11)' local ana lys ts, is to ask for arcvi sion, whi ch, at least [eJll porarily, suspends the treaty for th e agricu ltural sector and accciera tes integ ration for other sectors of the !'VI exican econo my. Scveral M ex icans made a pica fo r the EU model of tran sferr ing fund s to lcss-devclo ped areas fo r inves tm ents and infrastru cture and to try to kee p smaller entrepreneurs in ag ri culrural business, wirh limitcd pro tecrion. Fox appoinred as hi s secrctary of agr iculturc


I 2001


Javier Usabiaga, a very successful agricultural entrepreneur from his home state of GUJnajuato and a man who had promoted highly eapitalized and irrigated agriculture as minister of agriculture in that state. But he also made it dear that he wants to maintain Progre sa, a ru ral development program for the extreme poor, and Procam po, geared toward peasant producers. I

investment capital received, but the first five years of NAFTA s existence led ro a sharp decline in the relative importanee of European trade with Mexico. Both "Brussels" and the Mexican government, aware of this problem, were rather eager te conclude a free trade treary in 2000 to liberate mutual trade. By 2007 liberalization in technological-industrial sectors will be the equivalent of NAFTA and by 2010 even the agricultural Fox made it clear already, on a visit to Canada in August sector will be liberared. Hori zo ntal cooperativc treaties 2000, that he is in favor of accclcratcd integration and between Mexico and the E:U will be concluded on investthat one of his aims is the free circulation of ment, education, urban development and labor among Mexico and its northern partenvironment. 3 These treaties follow the ners. Neither Americao nor Canadian 'Mexico general EU strategy toward Latin America approval sterns yet likely, because the issue already established in the 1990S in investof Mexican migrant labor to the us has, wants more ment (ALlNV EST, EC IP), energy (ALURE), through the years, been hand lcd less with urban development (U RBAL), and higher reason than with emotions based on ignothan a tree trade education (ALFA ). Mexico also co ncluded rance, nationalism and xenophobia. Even treaties with other Latin American counthe chairman of the Federal Re se rve, Alan tries. A1though it is still too soon to evaluassociation. ' Greenspan, has pointed te the importance ate, it does not seem li kely th at the effects of foreign labor for the American economy will include a sign ificant change in the and price stability, but Amcrican labor unions aod poor existing trade patterns. But the origina! intention of a whites view :Mexican labor as unwanted co mpetitors. In rapid expansion of NAFTA to Mexico's southern neighborder counties there sometimes exists a real fear of a bors does not seem likely for the coming years, because Mexican majority. Less but not least, during the Reagan domestic re sistance in the us is still considerable and years there were a number of campaigns in the American Chile, for years a rather eager ca ndidate, has now decidmedia slandering indiscriminatcly Latin Americans and ed to join the MERCOSUR. con necting them to drug-related activities, rape and assault. These stereotypes were even brought forward in the early 1990S by some of thc opponents of Mexico's Conclusion entry in the NAFTA. Reform of the Mexican economy in a North American direction and advanced integration in the North AmerOn the Mexican side, nationalism has tried te ignore the ican economy seems likely. Let there be 110 doubt th at fact th at the Mexican economy has never been able to thi s is, at least partly, wh at many Mexicans want. But offer its migrants a job at home. One a1so tends to forget they want more than a free trade association. They want th at the transfers by migrants to their families during free - at least freer - circulation of labor included. In the '990S reached about thirty billion dollars, approxifact, many see the EU with its free circulation of labor mately half of the total amount invested in Mexico durand the transfer of funds from richer cou ntries to poorer ing those years! This money benefits about one million ones as an example to be followed. That also holds for Mexica ns, mosrly living in smaller rural villages. Inrenthe European maintenance of systems of socia! security sified border controls on the American side and and protection of agriculture. Professional education attempts by Mexican illegal immigrants to take the risky will no doubt follow the American path, because it wiU routes through the de se rts have resulted in many more be intimately linked to priori ties within the NAFTAcasua1ties and resulting bitterness in Mexico. Ir seems based integrative economic process. But in cultural quite likely that Fox will plea, within the framework of terms, recent developments (the end of the PRI regime, NAFTA renegotiations, for more labor exchanges, and he the fT revolution and NAFTA) have resulted in a significant change in Mexica n attitudes toward the us and is likely to exe rt sub stantial energy in trying to persuade the us to end the ad hoc protectionism. 2 Europe, and a significant expansion ofMexican culture. In the us, and te alesser degree in Spain, one could M exico has opened its frontiers to the us and the sheer even speak of a reconquest. economie power of the hovering giant in the north will inevitably result in the making of an even more usdependent Mexican economy. Mexico is Latin AmeriRaymond Buvr is rmrTil",J proftJJorofhistoryofLatin Amrrira al Lridrn Univrrsity ca's biggest exporter and ranks second in the amount of Ilndgu~st luturnat thr Nrthnlands Imti,,,,tr ofJn,rn"',;QnIlI RrliJI;Ons ·Clingrnl/Ild·


Notes 1


Gerardo Otero, "Rural Mexico after the 'perfect dictatorship,'" Lasa Forum, xxx!. 3 (2000),

pp. 4-7·

Guillermo Knochenhauer, "Cinco anos con el




Alló/isis XXI,

January 1999, pp. 4- 5; Orero, "Rural Mexico after the 'perfect di cratorship.'" JASON Magazine .

Volum e 26


Nederlandse Staatscourant, 57,

Tu esday March

21 2000.

JASON "" rEportl ng

Transformation and adaption and NATO: lmplicationslor Europe and the United States ESDP

Mark van der Velde & Fleur Tonies

On November I6 and IJ 2000 the Netherlands AtianticAssociation organized a two-day conference on ''European Security and Defence Policy and NATO" in SociĂŤteit de Witte in The Hague. The discussion on the Thursday was limited to a group ofexpertsfrom various countries; on Friday the meeting had a public character and was co-organized with the ]ASON foundation.

he first session of the expert meeting focused on the security dimen sion of the EU (Europea n Security and Defense Poliey, ESDP) and NATO. Speakers on thi s subject were David Gornpert, (direc tor of RAND EUfope), Marten van H euven, (Senior Consultant at RANO) and Uwe Nerl ich (Directe r ofth e Center for European Strategy Resea rch in G ermany).

agreed with Gompert th at too much emphasis on th e institutional side of ESOP is wrong. When too many institutions are involved in ESO P, the risk of deadlock is toa hig h. On the division oflabor, Nerlich said th at th e Europea ns should not loo k at geograph ical factors, but should be willing to deploy their forces outside Europe if nccessary. A prablcm here is the fact that there are only a few "care cou ntries" supplying traop s for those

Compen put forward two factors with regard to th e security poliey of th e Eu ropean Union: fiest the politica! motivation for ES OP, which will reduce dependency o n the United Stares; seco ndly the Ameri ca ns have appealed to th e Europeans to take on more respons ibiliti es. Gompert also di stingui shed three manageable problems for the ES OP. Firstly, the Europeans are doing two things: they arc still transforming their arm ies in the wake of th e end of the Cold W ar; but at the same time they aspire the development of a European force . Secondly, the American view on ESOP is focuscd on the capabiliti es of the Europeans, whereas the Europeans focus on thc institutio nal machi nery of the ESOP. Thirdly, NATO is still th e major defensc organization of Europc. An unman ageable problem is the unequal divi sion oflabor between th e United States and Europe.


In his introduction va n H euven said that th ere was a need for speed with regard to the transformation of Europcan armed farces. Van Heuven further advocated transparcn cy betwee n NATO and the EU in order to make ES OP and ESDI work. The transatlantic relation ca n only endure whcn th c EU and the United States work together. Van H euven used the current cooperatioll ben... ccn th e WEU and NATO as an exam ple. H e said that it was imperati ve that the new US adm inistration conti nued the current foreign policy and the level of cooperation. H e also feit th ar the involvement of non-aligned European countries in thi s process was very important. They are often'already involved with the E U and/or NATO in such programs as Partnership fo r Peace. Van H euven co ncluded hi s comments by saying that European defen se is principally a European matter, in which the United States and Canada should be active participants.

Nerlich responded to the arguments put forward by Gompcrt. He pleaded for harmonization betwee n force transformation and th e integration inro ESDP . He

JA SO N Magazi ne





The second session of the meeting focused on priori ties on both sides of the Atlantic. Speakers were l-Ienning Riecke (Deutsche GeseJlschaft für Auswärtige Poli tik), Steven Everts (Ce ntre for European Reform ), Nadia Arbatova ( IMEMO Moscow) and Samuel WeJls (Woodrow Wilson International Center). Riecke emphasized the different scope of interests th at the United States and Europe have, the first being a supe rpower and the other not. This explains the American preoccupation with other areas in the world, and their attitude toward National Missile Defense (NMD), which is areaction to a threat to their hegemony. Arbatova spoke about the role of Ru ssia in EU-US relati ons. Russia is ilO Jonger the enemy of the West, but it is also not full)' part of Europe. Russia can "improve" the EU-US reiationship, because it is still a common risk factor th at the EU and the United States share. A solution for this would be the integration of Ru ssia in the Western worJd. One way to do that would be to undertake more joint operations like SFOR. Arbatova then talked about Ru ssia's perspective on foreign polic)' in genera!. President Putin's main emphasis is on the economie recovery of Russia. His foreign policy is designed te facilitate this recovery, and that is why the Ru ssia n government is again stre ngthening its ties with the West after a period of distrust foUowing the Kosovo crisis. Arbatova di stinguished tluee areas of threat perception in Ru ssia: nuc1ear arms reduction, which can undermine the credibility of the nuclear deterrent; on the European level the enlargement of NATO, especially with the Baltic states; and finally the Islamic threat from the sou th. The Ru ssian solution to all these problems is the formation of a streng state. The only problem is that Putin knows from persona! experience only one example of a strong country: the USSR. This can cause prob!ems with Europe because the relationship between Russia and the EU is linked to thc Ru ssia-N ATo rc!ationship. Everts focu sed in his introduction on three things: rogue states, National Missile Defense and the deployment of troops. With regard to rogue states Everts spo kc about thc different approaches of the EU and the United States to these countries. The United Statcs depends on negative ways to en force its wiH, such as sa nctions, whereas the Europeans prefer different ways. On NMD Everts said th at it was a destabilizing answer to an exaggerated threat. It is probably better to renegotiate the Anti- Ballistic Missi!e Treaty, rather than discarding it, because of the changes in certain rogue statcs like North Korea. On troop deployments Everts spoke about the differences between Gore and Bush. He suspected th at Bush would use a more selective approach in th is respect. Most Europeans seem to prefer Gore to Bush wh en it comes to security matters.

ycars of dcadlock in Congress. On NMD both Democrats and Republicans are in agreement, but on other issues suc h as international monetary policy there is a lot of disagreement. Wells also re sponded partially to Arbatova's introduction, by referring to the threats to Ru ssian security. Wells believes that the United Stares should support Ru ssia, as it supported Yeltsin in the past. He also specuJated on the enlargement of NATO not including the BaltÎc States in order to paciry the Russians. Most of rhese speakers mentioned above also spoke during thc public meeting on Friday November 17 2000. Hugo Siblesz (D epu ty Direc tor-General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ) provided a brief introduction to the subjects of ESDP and NATO. The American perspective on thi s matter was addressed by Victoria Nuland, (Deputy Chief ofMission, us M ission to NATO). She cxpressed the Amer ican enthusiasm for ES OP, but also stressed her concern abollt an individual course by the European Union on the matter of peacekeeping. Dupli cation should be avoided, beca use NATO and the EU ca n supplement each other in this field. Mr van Hellenberg Hubar (Netherlands Ambassador to the EU'S interim Political and Securiry Committee and to the WEU) emphasized the European pOÎnt of view. Cooperation with NATO is paramount for the success of ESDP, because NATO is the only organization at the moment that has the logistical and intelligence means to mount a major operation. The EU either needs to build up its capabilities, or share capabilities with NATO. After a short break Henning Riccke spo ke about the role of the American presidential elections for future American suppo rt of ES OP. Nadia Arbatova spoke about the role of Ru ssia in the security policy of western Europe. Fritz Rademacher (Politieal Affairs Division, NATO) spoke on the cooperation between NATO and the EU'S interim Politica! and Security Committee, led by Javier Solana. In the afternoon the topic discu ssed was: "Europe and NATO: An alliance of equals?" Marten van Heuven spoke on the American point of view on this subject. He emphasized the ro le of NATO as a provider of support for future European peacekeeping missions. H e also briefly mentioned a divi sion of labor between the two organizations. This was pickcd up by Uwe Nerlich in his introduction. He spoke on the role of the EU in peacekeeping missions and more specifically on the Petersberg tasks. Samuel Wells spoke on the elections in America, the foreign policy stances ofboth presidentia! candidates, and their possib!e repercl..Issions for rcla tions bctween the United States and Europe. Finally MikJos Derer (Secretary-General of the Hungarian Atlantic Counci!) spoke on the integration of ncw European members into NATO, and the road they took in order to integrate fully into the Alliance.


Wells devoted his introduction to the differences in the foreign policics of now president-elect Bush and VicePresident Gore. The next us preside nt will face four



Volume 26

JASO N Ma g az in e •


JASON "" reportlng

Transatlantic relations: Cooperation & competition Conference in celebration ofthe twenty-jifth anniversary ofthe JASON foundation Iris Wielders

On Thursday December 7 2000 over I20 guests filled the "Uitgevershuis" in the center ofThe Hague.

NATO 5 Director oflnformation

and Press,Jamie Shea,

and president ofrand Europe, David Compert, spoke about "Transatlantic relations: Cooperation and competition." The meeting was organized by the jASON foundation in celebration ofits twenty-jifth anniversary.

he co nference was chaired by Leonard Ornstein, editor of the weekly VrU Nederland. H e briefly introduced thc keynote speakers as we l! as thc panel members H ans Labohm of the Clingendael lnsti tute, Ben Soetendorp of the U niversity of Leiden and Hans Soetens of H ollandse Signaalapparaten B.V. Thereafter he gave the floor to the president of th e execlI tivc board of the JA SON foundation, Johan Posseth.

Mr Posse th began his introduction by stating th at for morc than 25 years JASON has been providing informati on about international rclation s to stuclcnts and yotlng academies. Th roughout these ycars, JASON has organized conferences, semin ars, simulatio n games and it has published its periodieal )ASON Maga zine. )ASON ha s in thi s way stimulated debate and provided opportun ities for students and young academies to work with people in the field of international rclati ons. But, as Mr Posseth added, during the se 25 years the foundation has had same diffIcuit times as weU. The end of the Cold W ar made it nece ssary to find a ncw direction not o nly for路 NATO, but also for the )ASON foundation. In addition the reeruitment of peopJe has at times been difficu it, mainly because of th e increasi ng workl oad on srudents nowadays. H owever, Mr Posse th co ncluded, the dyn am ic situation in intern ational rclations nowadays gives ri se te mu ch di scuss ion and )ASON has an important role to play in thi s.

JASON Magazine .

After hi s brief introducti on I\1r Posseth prese nted the JASON anniversary booklet to Will em van Eeke1en, pres ident of the Advi so ry Board of J ASON and Win fried van den Muij se nberg, former presiden t of the cxeclltivc board ofJAsoN. The booklet is published in commemorat ion of )ASON'S twenty- fifth anni versary and contains (amo ng othor things) essays by experts in the field of international relati ons on the main topic: "Internatio nal relation s in the twenty-first century: Toward globalization o r reg ionalism?" Mter thi s symbolic gesture Mr Posseth gave the fl oo r te Mr van Eekelen and Mr van den M uijsenbergh for a brief comment. Mr van Eekelcn sa id that whcn JA SON was fo un ded in 1975, times were obviously ver)' different from now. H owever, the co nstant element th roughout the years has been the relationship with the United Srares. Back in 1975, he said, JASO N co ntributed to thc realization among young people th at, regardless of the d茅tente that was taking place, American interests in Eu rope would remain. In the present day, now that the Europcan Union is dcveloping its own defense polities, thi s us involvement remain s equally important, Mrvan Eekelen concluded. Mrvan den Muijsenbergh then cXplained that he was filling in for the o rigi nal invitee Mr R. Praaning, who unfortunately was prevc nted from coming that evcning. Mr Praaning had been the first president of thc cxecutive

1 2001


board of rhe jASON foundation in 1975, and Mr van den Muijsenberg praised l\1r Praan ing's important co ntribu tion in setting up rhe organization 25 years ago and ei ted a message from him in which he, like Mr van Eekclen, emphasized the recent developments surrounding th e European Security and Defense Poli cy (ES OP) as new food for discussions to which j ASON could co ntri bute. After comrne moraring this milestone in the history of Mr G ompe rt gave his inrroducrion. H e began his lecture by telling a short illustrat ive story:


/I thousand years ago, a king was standing on the tower oJhis cast/e, looking out over the field. He saw a knight riding out into the fields, lookillg gaI/lUlt with his armor shining. H e musl be on an important mission, the king Ihought. Olle week later, Ihe king was againlooking outfrom his tower and .ww the knight come riding back. Bul flOW his c/othes were torn amf his horse was limping. 'Where have you been?' Ihe king asker/. 'Out west, fightillg your enemies sire." Ihe knight amwerer/. 'But I have no enemies in the west/' said the king. Amwered the knight: JOu do now, sire!'"

Mr Gornpert went on to say thar many of rhe warnings abou t dctcrioration in US-EU relations were mu ch overblown. On the contrary, he stated, the us and the EU had rnany srake s in each orher's successes. The competiti on over labor and capital that does exist between the us and the EU should be seen as positive, because it wilt provide incentives for improvements within both eco nomies. Ir is a healthy comperirion that underscores the entanglement of the two largest eeonomies in the world. He cxprcssed his hope th at the EU economy would become more dynamic. This could lead to more open US-EU relations in the economie field, possibly even to so me kind of trade agree ment between North Ameriea and Europe. In this way, Mr Gompert concluded, the two largest economies could together manage the global economy. Next, Mr Shea stated that there were many difTerences between the EU and NATO. The EU see ms unable to take any decisions without a cOllstitutional debate flrst, while NATO has retain ed th e sa me stru cture sinee its ince ption. For many years, thi s stru eture meant thar it was "either NATO or nothing" when it eame to European security

Ben Soetendorp. Jamie Shea and Wittem van Eekelen at the JASON Anniversary Conference.



Ma gazi ne _

issues. H owever, recently there has been Inuch debatc abou t changes wirhin NATO. The main reason for thi s is the development of a COln lTlO n defense poliey by the EU. NATO will have to adapt to these realities, stating in a poplrl ar phrase thar: "if you ca n't beat 'e m,join 'em." However, Mr Shea continu cd, it is important th at NATO and EU defense policics are integrated. In a cri sis sirua tioll, it would take too much time to reconcile two different plans. In addition , NATO and EU security issues are increasingly overlapping. Mr Shea went on to suggest that the European Strategie Defense Initiative (ESDI) should avo id the dupli cati on of wh at NATO was already offering. Rather, there should be a rational division ofl abor: where NATO could focus on overall defense, the EU might be more suitable for smaller opcrations in pi aces where the us is unwilling to go, like in Afri ca for examplc. Mr Shea concluded by saying that he was looking forward to many interesting days ahead regarding the development of th ese Issues. Afte r these extensive introduction s, Mr Ornstein gave rhe fIoor to the three panel members for their eomments on the words of Mr Gompert and Mr Shea. First, Mr Labohm stated that he agreed with the overall argument put forward by Mr G ompert that the us and the EU have a stake in eaeh oth cr's eco nomi e successes. He emphasized, among other factors, the dangers of a "liberalization fatigue" th at seems to have hit the EU and ]apancse economics as an other in ce ntive for cooperative trade relations between the u s and th e EU. Mr Soetendorp then rook the noo r to play the devil 's advocate. From the perspec tive of a Gaullist, he argued in favor of an autonomous European defen se force, co mpletely independent of the us. Among all the speakers, he appeared to be the only one with thi s opinion. Finally, Mr Socrens emphasized the need for free market eompetition, also in the sector of the defen se industries. In his reaction to the commcnts made by the panel members, Mr Gompert underlined the importance of co mbating the liberalizati on fatigue menrioned by l\1r Labohm. Mr Shea reaeted to the words of Mr Soetendorp by saying th at excluding the us from European sccurity matters would be very diffieult. He argued th at you cannot ignore a superpower, just as you calmot ignore "an elephant rampaging in the baekgarden." Mr Ornstein th en gave the floor to the audienee. In reply to the que stion of what, in the next four years, would be the attitude of the us toward European Security and Defense Poliey (ES DP), Mr Gompert answe red that a Bush administration would probably sec a less heavy srake in EU security matters than a Gore ad ministration. A Bush adrninistration would probably be more inclined to "leave Europe to the Europeans," so that it co uld focus on other areas in rhe world. Mr Shea agrecd with this, but added that, aecording to him, the main problems lie not with the presiden t of the us but with its Congress.

Volume 26

In reply to the question ofhow NATO should lcgitimize its existence to the next gene ration, Mr Shca stated that this would be difficuIt. Co ntrary to the day' of th e Cold War, when securÎty was prÎmarily a passive concep t - as long as nothing happened everything was okay - secu rity matters nowadays ask for a much more active att itude. Furthcrmorc, he addcd, as În foo tbaU "you are only as good as your last three matches." In addition, NATO can cxpcct increasing competition as rhe concept of security is defincd more broadly and pickcd up by other organization s such as the EU, the UN an d the OSCE. NATO \ViII only

be ablc ro legirimize its existence, he said, ifit is involvcd in solving the problems that people nowadays find important. Mr Labohm agreed and pur forward the com pariso n of a fire brigade that retains its use even iftherc is no flrc .


WOl/ld like lolhonk WolIers Klzlwer Nederland, Shell Nederland BV and NATOJor making Ihis evenl possihle.


www .a k zonobel.com


Akzo Nobel, based in the Netherlands, serves customers Ihroughout the world wlth healthcare products, coatings, and chemicais. Consolidated sales for 1999 totaled some EUR 12 billion [USO 13 billion, GBP 8 billion, NLG 26 billion), The Company employs some 68,000 people in 75 countries.

'ASO N Magazine .

1 2001


Aims and objectives of the Netherlands Atlantic Association Since its institution in 1952, the Netherlands Atlantic Association has been providing information on transatlantic security issues and promoting the study of issues such as relations between Europe and the United States, NATO and Europea n security. With th is, the Association hopes to further public discussion on all such issues. Within the framework of these objectives, the Netherlands Atlantic Association organizes national and international conferences, seminars, panel discussions and lectures for specific groups. These activities are supported by both ad hoc and permanent committees. The Atlantie Education Committee, for instance, develops projects for secondary education, an im portant target group of the Netherlands Atlantic Association. The Association is also active in the field of publishing. Among the publications are Atlantisch Perspectief[Atiantic Perspectivel, the periodical of the Association, con feren ce and study reports, and educational brochures . The Association has Iibrary and documentation facilities at its disposal which can be consulted freely. Requests for information can be made in writing or by telephone to the Secretariat. The independence of the Netherlands Atlantic Association is safeguarded by the Board of the organization, in which all the major political parties and relevant academie disciplines are represented. The Association works together with government institutions, non 路governmental organizations and scientific and politica I institutions in the Netherlands and abroad. This (international) cooperation contributes to enabling the Association to organize a variety of national and international conferences. In addition, the Netheriands Atlantic Association is assisting others with the organization and im plementation of projects relating to national and international security issues and is also initiating the development of such projects.

Deze pub licatie is mogelijk gemaakt door:

M.A.O.C. Gravin van Bylandt Stichting I


NATO Information Service


JASOH Magazine _

Volume 26

JASON "" lntsrnatlonalE bt!trll!kklngtn

Al bijna 25 jaa r informeert de stichting JASON over de achtergronden van de internationale economie, politiek en veiligheid. Zij richt zic h daarbij vooral-maar niet uitsluitend-op jongeren in de leeftijd van 18 tot 35 jaar. JASON

is waarclenvrij: niet gebonden aan enige politieke stroming of gebaseerd op een leven sbesc houwelijke

gro ndslag. ,ASON

is neutraal: draagt bij aan meni ngsvorming, maar heeft zelf geen mening.


is eve nwichtig: laat altijd de voors en tege ns zien, laat altijd de voor- en tegenstanders aan het woord.


is verhelderend: één ac tiviteit of artikel geeft in kort tijdbestek een zo volled ig mogel ijk beeld van een

actueel internationaal onderwerp. De stichting weet zich daarbij gesteu nd door deskundigen uÎt de am btenarij , het bedrijfsleven, de journalistiek, de politiek en de wetenschap, die optrede n op activitei ten of schrijven in het kwartaalblad JA SON Magazine, Een stukje geschiedenis: " . Dejaren '70 waren in Nederland een periode van politieke polarisatie, Meningsvorming over hedendaagse internationale politiek werd gedom ineerd door groepen uit het actiewezen. Teneinde te voorzien in een duidelijke behoefte vanjongeren aan meer evenwichtige informatie, richtte een groepje studenten en jongeren in 1975 het j ong Atlantisch Samenwerkings Orgaan Neder/and op, kortweg JASON .

Concentreerde de stichting zich in de eerstejaren op Atlantische samenwerking en Vrede en Veiligheid, gaandeweg verbreedde zij haar activiteiten tot het gehele spectrum van de internationale betrekkingen. De val van het Ijzeren Gordijn en de omwentelingen in de Sovjet-Unie en Oost-Europa veranderden de missie van ]ASON nog verder.' Anno 1999 is 'jASON' geen afkorting meer, maar een merknaam. De stichting organ iseert halfjaarlijks een grote activiteit en daarnaast verschillende kleinere activi teite n. Voorjaar 1999 vond het seminar


Diplomacy and

Force plaats, waaraan 23 jongeren uit EAPc- landen deelnamen, Verde r sprak de Staatssecretari s voo r Europese Zaken, Di ck Benschop, de dag na het aftrede n van de Europese Commissie over 'de gren zen van Europa', Een jaarabonnement op jASON M agazine kost slechts f30,00 (studenten f25 ,00). D aarvoor ontvangt u ook uitnodigingen voor activiteiten (waarvoor bij grotere evenementen een deelnameprij s geldt). Voor een (procf)abonncmenr kunt u onderstaande kaart invullen.

Stichting ,ASON· Bezuidenhoutseweg 237'239 • 2594 AM Den Haag telefoon 070 · 360 5658 _.. - _. - _. -- -- - -- - _. - _. --- --

r ' - _. - _. - _. - _. - _. - _. - _. _ ••••• _ •• _ ••••



Een proefabonnement op JASON Magazine, het tijdschrift van de stichting JASON, kost slechts f20,OO (studenten fts,oo). Hiervoor ontvangt u vier nummers van voornoemd magazine alsmede uitnodigingen voo r activiteiten van de stich ting JASON. Naam Adres Woonplaats Telefo on Studie (i.v.t.l jstud. nr. Handtekening


Deze antwoordkaart kunt u in een enveloppe (pos tzegel niet nodig) sturen naar Stichting JASON, Antwoordnummer 10711,2501 WB Oen Haag, U wordt verzocht te wachten met betaling totdat u een acceptgiro wordt toegezonden.

_. -_. _.. . .,

Profile for Stichting Jason

Jason magazine (2001), jaargang 26 nummer 1  

Jason magazine (2001), jaargang 26 nummer 1