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Journal on International Mfairs · Volume 24 · 1- 1999

Diplomacy and Force Report on the JASON Seminar NATO:

Kosovo: a Mandate for NATO?

The Scope of Europe

South Africa's Three-in-One Revolution


Contents JASON

Maga:ûnr is Ih~ quarltTry puhlishrd by llu JASON

Foundali~n.

Ed itorlal Board K.]. de Boer Ms ].I.R. Doets M.] . Fraanje I. Fritz L.A. de Jager A.W.l. van der lee G.]. Ment jox R.Sandee DrawJngs Th. Mentjox Execut]ve Board President · J. J. A. Posseth Vice-President · D. R. Changoer First Secretary . M. D. Fink Second Secretary . Ms S. E. Plümicke Treasurer · E.C.]. Cusell International Secrerary . Ms F. E. Stigter Fundraiser· S. V. lansen General Board Dr A. Boxhoorn (Netherlands Atlan tic Association) T. H.A. Dersigni Ms N.Y. ]aa rsma Ms H. M. Ruijg M. G. H. Ruiter Ms M. Sie Dhian Ho F. F.]. Q. Smits van Oven Ms M. Voslamber

Advlsory Board DrW. Dekker. President DrW. F. van Eekelen, Vice· President F. de Bakker Dr]. Th.]. van den Berg Dr H. de Haan V. Halberstadt G.J.].M. Haven H.A. M. Hoefnagels j.G. N. de Hoop Scheffer R. W. Meines R. D. Praaning Dr J.G . Siccama Ms l. F. M. Sprangers Dr A. van Sladen l. Wecke Add ress jASON Foundation laan van Meerdervoort96 2517 AR The Hague The Netherlands phone +3170 360 56 58 fax +3170 363 32 85 ISSN 0165-8336 Neither (he )ASON Foundation nor the Editorial8oard Of)ASO N Magazine are responsible for the opinions in contributions l a this periodical. Your subscription will be automaticallv renewed, unless a cancella tion in writing is received before 1 December. lavou t design . Hans van der Jagl, Zeist Print · Drukkerij lansen BV,leiden

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Richard Holbroo/t.( and Gmrra/ W,slty Clar~

al NATO hraJqullr/rrsjusl bifor, Ih, /uunch ofOprrar jonAllj(d For" ( NATO

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Preface and Editorial

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)ASON

Seminar NATO: Diplomacy and Force

Day One: 12 April International C ourt ofJustice and a discussion on the Kosovo cri sis.

Day Two: 13 April Ministry ofDefen ce with speakers on Netherlands foreign and security policy.

Simulation game North Atlantic C ouncil meeting on Kosovo at "Clingendael".

Day Three Working conference on NAT O'S revised Strategie C oncept at "De Witte".

Hungary and NATO An essay by Judith Barna.

The United States and NATO An essay by Jasen Castillo.

Finland and NATO An essay by Karoliina Honkanen.

The Czech Republic and NATO An essay by H araid Scheu.

List of Participants.

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Kosovo : a Mandate for NATO? Dick Leurdijk on th e international law aspect of the Kosovo cri sis.

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)ASON Reporting: the Scope of Europe Impression of a lecture by State Secretary for European Affairs Dick Benschop.

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South Africa's Three-in-One Revolution Amb ass ad or Carl Niehaus on the economie, socia! and political developmen ts of South Africa.

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Preface

Editorial Wanted : Competent PolItIclans with Spine

Enthusiastic reactio ns of rhe participanrs in rhe [999 JASON Semi nar NATO: Diplomacy and Force encouraged me ra put my pen ra paper aod rhank those who contributed ra this international event.

The image constructed of an advcrsary can see m very coherent but, in time, turn out to be rather less accurate and true rhan previously assumed. Sometimes it even has had na basis in fact whatsoever.

The seminar was organised on (he occasion of NATO'S joth anniversary aod broughr 23 srudents aod academies from all over the world rogerher ro discuss relations aod confl icrs between diplomacy and force wÎthin NATO. The composition of the group of participants created a 'real-life' representation of op ini ons within the Euro-Atlantic are(n}a aod, maybc, in this way jA SON has broughr fururc diplomats a linie bit more togcther... Furthermore, by organising this seminar, jASON has intensifled its co-operation with relatcd organisations in The Netherlands.

Ten years ago, the most threatening post-war adversarial image was shattered by the democratie revolution s in Central and Easte rn Europe, followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

With this, I come to the point of the future of JASON. At the moment there are discussions about )ASON'S 'strategy', e.g. to what cxtent must there be co-operation with related organisations and what will our main topics and audiencc be? This must not be see n as a preparation for out-of-area opera ri ons, but more as organisarional steps to guaranree a prosperous start in the next century. In my opin ion, one thing is elear and that is that, apart from the answers on the preceding questions, the main issue is quality. Th e development of jASON Magazine fit s this stateme nt and I therefore want to congratulate the editorial board, and in particular Hans van der Lee, with thc results. Unfortunately, after many years of ded ication, Han s has decided ro leave JASON. On behalf of the ]ASON execurive board I would like to thank him for all the work he ha s done and wish him the best [or the future. The summ er period wi11 be used by the executive board to sch edule activities for the second half of rhe year. In addition, an Internet group is preparing )ASON'S homepage. Hopcfully with this, we will meet your expectations for the near future.

Johan Posseth

With a reeeding nuelear threat, NATO'S old adversary had ceased to beo The bipolar or, if you will, tripolar world had come to an end. Instead, a broad spectru m of security ri sks has developed, such as the acquisition or development of NBC weapons by so-called 'failed' or 'rogue statcs' and new forms of terrorism. Another important risk is posed by (inter)national multi-eth nie conflict, eombined with large-scale viola60n of human rights and other privileges of international law as set out, among others, in the UN system from 1945 onwards. Internationallaw in itsc1f, however, is only part of the story and cannot provide an integrated approach. 1t has followed and will continue to follow international political practice. The composition of the UN Security Council, for instanee, can be traeed directly to the immediate post-war period, whereas changes could nowadays rightfully be argued. Into the 1990S there more or less was a clear-cut division between matters of internationallawand a country's internal affairs. However) international law must be more than just a set of norms, for it becomes a placebo if and when states are unwilling to enforce them. I could not agree more with the ICJ judge and former Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kooijman s, whose words in Realism and Moralism in International Re/atÎons I have paraphrased here. is a regional organization recognized by the United Nations, and currently engaged in enforcing the norms of internationallaw in Yugoslavia. NATO

President, JASON Foundation

This requires politicians who do not regard the if-then scenarios or degrees of certainty presented to them by their military as absolutes. Politicians who are not immediately 'troubled by their conscience' when Milosevic does not instantly give in as a result of some half-baked 'clean' air war and a ground offensive becomes inevitable. In short, competent politicians with spine.

Hans van der Lee

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~l{-I~ Seminar NATo·Diplomacy and Force

DayOne: 12 April Jlnze de BQer

Neither diplomacy norforce. That would hav e been a better themefor the JAS ON seminar with regard to the International Court ofJustice. As a matter offact the ICJ, situated in the beautiful Peace Palace in The Hague, does not belong to either ofthe seemingly opposed concepts ofdiplomacy andforce which are the topics ofthis seminar. On thefirst day participants attended a lecture by Mr A. Witteveen, Secretary ofthe Court, and a discussion on Kosovo with Dr E. Bakker (Centre for Peace and Security, Nijmegen) , Lt. Gen. (ret.) H. Couzy (former CoS RNLArmy) and Mr H. van Bommel (MP for the Socialist Party).

he I nternational Court ofJustice is (he principal judicia] afgan of (he United Nations, and has described Îtself as an afgan ofintcrnationallaw; as it is neither a legislative body nor an academie Însti turian. The Court began work in 1946, when it replaced the Permanent Court ofInternational J ustice wh ich had functioned in (he Peace Palace since 1922, lin ked with (he then League ofNatÎons. The I nternationa l Court of J usti ce operates under a Statute largely sim ilar to (har of its predecesso r and which is an integral part of (he Charter of the Un ited Nations. The Court has a dual role. Fi rstly, to settIe in accordance with international law the legal di sputes submitted to it by states, and seco ndly, to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized international organs and agencies. The Court is co mposed of 15 judges elected to nine-year term s of office by the United Nations General Asse mbly and the United Nations Security Council sitting independently of each other. Acco rding to the Statute the members of he Court do not represe nt the governments of the nationality they belang to, but are indepe nden t magistrates. Besides, the Court may not include more than one judge of any nationality. H owever val uable, the nationali ty criteriu m in the next decade or sa might weU prove to be insufficientIy dividing the international sce ne

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and in doing so not providing a balanced Court. As of now four ofirs 15 members belong ro a nation ality which is part of an ever closer European Union. And for sOc of its members the same can be said with regard to N ATO. W hether such a situati on is bound ra prevail remain s doubtful. This doubt becomes more poignant in the light of current developmcnts conccrning Ko sovo. Still, the members of the Court are obliged not to represent the government of their nationality and its friencls. Let us first take a look at the Court's function to settIe lcgal disputes. As wÎth most judicial proccedings one generally ca n ask four questions. Who are the parties appearing before the Court, wh at is the Cou rt 's jurisdi ction , how is (he C ourt 's deci sion coming along - i.e., its procedu re - and which are the sourees of applicable law? If the reader doe s not mind, your edito r leaves aside the procedure and focuses on (he ather questians. Up to now only states have been ablc to apply to and appear before the Court. These include all members of th e U ni ted Nat ions and Nauru and Switzerland , two no n-membe rs which have become parties to the Statute of the Court. In the light of current internatio nal developme nts one m ight argue that the fac t that states are the only accepted pa rties is a deficiency. I ndeed, many specialists have stre ssed (he impo rtance of accepting

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other parties, suc h as public and private international organisations and multinational co mpanies. But changing the Court's Statute, means changing the UN Charter, as the Statute is an integral part of the latter. One does not need much imagination to understa nd that an initial proposa! to change the Charter will soon lead to a lor of si milar proposals regarding other articles and chapters of thc Charter. If one member brings forward its wishes, aU others wou ld like to do the sa me with theirs. Viewing the life such experiments usuall y lead in the international sce ne, at thc end of the bigger part of a quarter of a ce ntury of negotiations one would probably end up with nothing at all. Therefore, and wisely, no effort is being made to change the Statute, howcvcr appropriate it may be.

Court's "fu ncr.ion is to decidc in accordancc with internatio nal law such di sputes as are submirred to it". Ir goes o n to state that the internationallaw to be applied by the Court is to be deri ve d from the following sources: a international conventions, wh ether ge neral or particular, establishing mies expressly recognized by the co ntesting states; b international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c the ge nera! principles of law recogni zed by civilized nati ons; d subject to the provisions of Article 59 , judicial decisions and the teachings of thc most hi ghly qualificd publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary mea ns for the determin ation of rules oflaw".

jurisdiction As far as its jurisdictio n is concerned, the comperency ofthe C ou rt does not range faro The Court is competent to adjudicatc a di spure only then, whcn the parties co nce rned have accepted its jurisdiction. That means thar th e Court's jurisdiction is rather limited and its competen ce ce rtainly not absolute. The que stion then is how the parties co ncerned ca n accept the Court's jurisdiction. I n general, there are three options in accepting jurisdict ion of the Iq:

How eve r, the above doe s not prese nt a n exhaustive statement of the foundatio ns on which the Court ca n co nstruct its decisioll. 1t doe s not mention, for exam ple, suc h principies or consideration s as those of equity and justi ce, to whi ch the Court is always entitled to have recourse. Most of the additional foundations, however, are implicit to thi s statement or to the Court's fun crion as a wo rld tribunal.

The second role of the Court is co nce rn ed with giv in g advisory opinions to international organi za rion s. But the parties concerned conclude a special agreement to sub mit thc di spute to the Court; the procedure is open solely to public international orga ni sa ti ons and not even all ofthem. As at present the 2 by virtue of aso ca lled jurisdictional c lau se. For example, when the parties concerned are both parties to o nly bodies authorized under th e Statute are (ive orga ns of the United Nations and 16 speciala treaty containing a provision whereby, ized agencies belonging (O the UN fami in the evc nt of a disagreement over its 'The factthat Iy. All others will have re do withour interpretarion or applicati on, one of advisory opinions of th e I nternational them may refer the dispute to the IC]. at the IC) states are the Several hundred treaties and conve nCourt ofJustice. The advisory opinio ns, tion s conrain a clause to such effect; not surpri singly, are advisory, i.e. unlike the Court's judgments in contentious only accepted parties 3 through thc re ciprocal effect of a ce rtain type of declaratio n. This type of cases, they have 110 binding effect. Thc is a deficiency. ' declaration is made unde r the Statute, requesting body remain s free to, or not whereby a state has accepted the juristo, give effect to rh e opinion by any means open ro ir. Howevcr, in a few spedi ction of the Court as compulsory in ciflc cases it is stipulated beforehand rhat an o pinion the event of a di spute with another state having made a similar declaration. The declarations of 60 states are ar shall have binding force, for example in cOIwenti o ns o n prese nt in force, a number of them having been made the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. subject to the exclusion of ce rtain categories of dispute. From th e Court's establishment in 1946 unril now, the ] n case of doubt as to whether the Court has jurisdicdivision between contentious cases and advisory opintio n, it is th e Court itself which dec ides. The same is ions is in the range of 75 per cent to 25 per cent respectrue when th e two parties di sagree under what kind of tive1y. Especially in the past ten ro flfteen years th e IC) jurisdiction the di spute concern ed fails. As in the Fishhas show n a great increase in cases purring press ure o n eries Juri sd iction case between Spain and Canada. The an alrcady insufficiently manned and flllanced institu tion. editors were info rmed that a close intercession on rhis subject took place between the Spanish and Canadian dclegations prese nt at the se minar. At the time of writOf course, much more can be said abollt rhe IC). That, ing rh e resulrs of th is cvenr we re not yet known. I n 25 however, is not the purpose of thi s short introducti on. years time or so we might ge t a clue, however. For the interested reader a short bibliography is included bclow. FinalIy, we arrivc at rhe sources of applicable law. Article 38, parag raph I , of the Statute declare s th atthe 1

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Demonstration of tank firings by the Hungarian Detente Fortes. Would they pa rtici pate in a tuture

In Resolution 4,v'3 of the UN General Assembly of 17 November 1989, the General Assembly declared the period 1990-1999 as the United Nations Decade of International Law. One can have mixed feelings about this declaration. On the one hand a greater number of cases was brought to the Court. On the other hand a show of weakness of the international system , including deficiencies ofthe ICj, with regard to grave violations of international - mainly humanitarian - law, and at the end of the decade the prospect of entering a new chapter in international law with NATO'S use of force in Kosovo. Not the envisaged consolidation, but new uncertainties regarding internationallaw.

NATO

operation ?

he argued that other parties apparcntly left their brains at home during the course of events. Among these mistakes are the guerrilla war of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UÇK). This provided Milosevic with an alib i regarding militaryactions in Kosovo: to free the country from 'terrorists'. Another factor which partIy caused the crisis might be the disinterest of the ethnic Albanians with regard to the latest presidential elections. The international community, particularly the West, is not entirely free from blame too. Bakker mentioned the early and unwise recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany, a sign of support which, however, was merely political and not backed by any military precautions.

Discussion on Kosovo The diplomats are also to blame. According to Bakker In the tranquil environment of the Peace Palace in The no president would ever sign a document forcing him to Hague the participants of the }ASON seminar were conallow foreign troops on his country' s territory, as envis fronted with a major con temporary and aged in the proposed Rambouillet troublesome issue 10 international agreement. And of course the difficult affairs: Kosovo. Each of the three speak'Air strikes and sentimental attitude of the Rusers in the discussion focused on a differsians. All of these examples find a place ent aspect of the vast amount of things as a means in the densely populated area of miswhich went wrong and/or were not takes with regard to the Kosovo probof projecting force Iem. In his conclusion, Bakker stressed going the right way. Dr Bakker of the Centre for Peace and th at it is rather unrealistic to put all of are a waste Security at Nijmegen asked whether the blame on one party alone, however wicked Milosevic may beo Milosevic was th e only one ra blame for the current crisis in the area of Kosovo. solution . ' He stressed that Milosevic ce rtainly Lieutenant General (ret.) Couzy, former plays a very large and awkward role, but Chief of Staff of the RNL Army, largely

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agreed with Bakker. H e, however, took more interest in the politico- military side o f the problem . Firstly he stated th at Kosovo has been neglected due to the attention for Bos nia, though everyone concerned knew th at a crisis in Kosovo was inevitable. Couzy also stressed that the N ATO forces put into action against Serbian forces and infras tructure are insuffi cient. Forces should be put into action at the appropriate sc ale. That means accepting casualties and thus being prepared to submit ground farces. Air strikes as a means of projecting force without taking the risk of heavy casualties are a waste soluti on. But as N ATO is a politica-military organization these decisions remain the responsibility ofrhe poliricians.

however, to stop the bombiog now sioce it would meao loss of face ro NATO members in action. But acco rding ro Van Bommel aod his party, the soo ner the parties return to Rambouillet th e better. Kosovo is a political problem, to be solved by politica! means and not by military, said van BommeL

Blbllography W~b s ite:

Eisemann, Pierre Michel, Vincent Coussirat-Coustère and Paul Hur Pttit monut! dt lo j urisprudtnu dt la Court ;nttrnationalt dtJustiu 4th edition, Pms, 1984.

H . van Bommel, an M P for the Socialist Party, expressed his co ncerns about the N ATO air strikes. H e stressed that due to the strikes relief organisations such as U N H C R are not able to do their work anymore. This means the air strikes have an unwanted and opposite effect. Unwanted not only in the field of relief for th e Kosovars, but also with rega rd ra our relations with Russia. In th is way air strikes are endangering PfP What is more, what ro do with similar problems in Spain and Turkey, now th at we use force to protect the Kosovars? Ir is impossible,

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http://www. icj-cij.org

Rosenne, Shabtai Tht Law and Praetiu oftht 1nt07lat1ono/ Court znd revised edirion, Dordrecht, 1985. Rosenne, Shabtai Tht World Court - What 1t Is and How 1t Workr 5th revised edition, Dordrecht, 1995

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~ t1"I~ Seminar

NATO¡ Diplomacy

and Force

DayTwo:

13 April lij. Fritz

The morning and afternoon sessions ofthe second day were alsa markedly different. First participants visited the Netherlands Ministry ofDefence (MoD) where they attended a series oflectures on Dutch security policy on the road to the next century hy experts.from the MoD and the Ministry ofForeignAffairs (MFA). The afternoon (and evening) was spent with an NAC simulation game at the Netherlands Institute ofInternational Relations "Clingendael".

century. Decade after decade NATO has, he explained, set the scene for foreign and military poliey planning in the Netherland s. The Alliance enabled the armed force s to develop into a professio nal organization, through co-operation with A1lies. After the developments in Eastern Europe at the end of the I980s, NATO has proved it eould adapt itself to a new geopolitical si tuation where threats have been replaced by security ri sks. NATO has remained the only security organization combining politica! consultation with the possibility of concrete action through NATO'S integrated military structure. This does not mean, and Sonneveld was very elear on thi s, that the OSCE, the WEU or EU'S CFSP are not important factors too for safeguardin g a Europe that may develop peaceful1y. His point was rhat Dutch military planning wiU remain directed towards NATO military planning.

t the Ministry of D efenee, ehairman-of-theday Dr W. F. van Eekelen (former SeeretaryGeneral of WEU) started the day with some co mments on the so-called European Security and Defenee Identity (ESDI). As President C linton, af ter his election in 1994, slowly developed an assertive foreign poliey (look at Bosnia, the Middle East, Northern l reland, l raq) the necd for the Europeans to develop a Common Foreign and Seeu rity Poliey (CFSP) remained smal!. This is one of the reasa ns why, 50 far, an ESDI has meant very litde. But at a cerrain point in time in the future, Van Eekelen remarkcd, the Americans wilt no longer tolerate a situation in which the us constantly takes the lead, delivers most of the troops ancl bears most of the casts when it comes to countering crises situations. They wiU say: "Th is is not our Qwn responsibility, you Europeans have to bear some of the burden." In other words, a situation in which there would be an area where Europeans would take prime responsibili ty and where operations would be European-led. Dr Van Eekelen expressed his wish that something like an ESDI would evenrually materialize. While the si ruation in Kosovo shows that the us is still leading, it is remarkable th at all of the European member countries of NATO agree with the operations in Kosovo. This was c1early something more than Van Eekelen dared hope for six months ago.

After so me remarks about the ncw security ri sks to the Alliance - terrorism, the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian crises etc. - Mr Sonneveld referred to the the so-ca ll ed Defence Framework Memorandum (DFM) as published by the Ministry ofDefence three months ago. It has set the tone for the adaptation of the arm ed forces to these new security risks. The DFM determines three main issues for the Netherlands armed force s. The first is collective defence through NATO and defence against a number of other risks with a diffuse character. SecondIy, the protection and promotion of the order and rule of international law. Thirdly the support of national civil

After this, Col. H. Sonneveld (Head of the Conceptual Affairs department of the MoD) spoke about the miLitary aspects of Dutch foreign poliey at the turn of the

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authorities in maintaining the law and more general support of civil autharities internationally. According ta him, the document reflects public opinion in the Netherlands on the disappearing distinction between 'classic' collective defence operations and other tasks, suc h as humanitarian assistance. Ir also reflects the willingness of Dutch society to take part in the realisation of universal human rights, disaster relief etc. Finally, Mr Sonneveld eommented on the belief of the Netherlands' authorities that, with the good co-operati on with our Allies in Europe and the United States, it would be unwi se to embark on a unilateral operation. For th at reason , th e armed forces are and wiU continue to be designed to co mribute in a modular way to international forces.

Experi ments Mr P. cle Gooijer (Heacl of the Politieal Mfairs department, MFA) took a closer look at European experiments in the field of foreign and seeurity poliey. In the 1970S and 1980s, security policy was not part of the European integration process. Political integration and co-operation did not include security policy, but dealt primarily with regional foreign policy questions and human rights. The fall of the Iron Curtain ehanged this.

trave! on his/her own and take initiatives. Concerning Common Strategies, De Gooijer said the EU has spent millions of dollars on diverse foreign policy activities but not alway in a well-structured, co-ordi nated and therefore well-understood fashion. The idea behind th e Common Strategies is to change this. Mr C. C. Sanders (Head of the Seeurity Poliey department, MFA) started with some historical observations about Duteh foreign and seeur ity poliey. H e then turned to the position vis-Ă -vis NATO'S new missions. In this context the Netherlands' authorities strongly prefer aspecific mandate of the United Nations Security Council under Article VII. In the end, however, the Netherlands also agree that it may not be possible under all circu mstances to have unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council, as in the case of Kosovo. For the future, it is necessary to try to define more sharply the conditions under which such humanitarian intervention is allowed, in orde r to avo id setting a precedent. In other words, to prevent other countries saying "If NATO ca n undertake humanitarian interventions on its own, then why can't we?

Another item for the revised Strategic Concept, Mr Sanders continued, is nuclear policy. What will be the role of nuclear wapons in NATO'S strategy? Over th e past 50 years it has become clear th at only in extreme cases where NATO'S survival is at stake the Alliance wou ld At Maastri cht in 1991 the question of a European forco nsider their use. There are important groups in th e eign and security policy was discussed. In those years general public which ask NATO to deliver a no first use there were two forces at play among Europan Union declaration. Mr Sanders does not think it would be member states: on the one hand, the wise, because we still can imagine euphoria at th at time led some countries threats and risks under which we would 'Threats have been to believe that it was a historical opporhave to deter possible aggression. If you tunity to include a Common Foreign do spelt out th e circumstances under and Seeurity Poliey (CFSP). At the same replaced by which you would use nuclear weapons, time, Europe saw the crisis in Yugoslavia he eXplained, the effect of deterrence woud be lost and possibly somebody as an opportunity to show a unified security risks.' Europe. The political compromise in might be willing to take the risk. Maastricht, according to Mr D e Gooijer, was the development of a common foreign policy European defence in the co ntext of NATO'S Strategie including some security elements but not including Concept is also important. What will Europe co nmiLitary means. Ir was agreed that an ESDI wou ld first tribute towards its defence? NATO certainly allows for have to be developed before a eo mmon defenee poliey the development of an ESDI and the EU eventually will could be developed in the long run. Sa, the CFSP as set develop an autonomous capability. The main qu estion out in the Maastricht Treaty was only a halfway house is then: where wil! that eapability end? The Netherlands feel the IW should have the expertise and instrum enrs which couId not fulfill expectations. necessary to take responsibility in military matters. This means military committees, planning cells, strategic H e then looked briefly at the Amsterdam Treaty and what it means for the CFSP by introducing new means. analysis units etc. But as soon as actual operations are The treaty brings two new things in this area. One is a necessary and there is need for headquarters and operational planning staffs, it is better to entrust it to NATO or High Rep rese ntative for Foreig n and Security Policy (M r or Mrs CFSP), seco nd th e instrument ofthe soa European arrangement, preferably within NATO, if the ealled Common Strategy. The High Rcprese ntative will us for whatever reaso n is unwilling to act. So far, the problem has been that the EU lacks the capacity of co nbe somewhere in-between the European Council and the European Commission. While he/she will formally sensus-building on military operations which NATO has. be an instrument of the Council and operating in close collaboration with the Preside ncy, he/she will also have The last item Mr Sanders spoke about is NATO'S open an independent and authoritative voice. He /s he can door policy. He did not expect any invitations to be

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issued at the Washington Summit. NATO is eurrently digesting the aeeession of Poland, Hungary and the Czeeh Republic. The Netherlands is in favour of inviting other European friends to become NATO members, but we need consensus within NATO. Therefore, it is working on an approach which wiU increase the perspective for aspiring member states as much as it can. The Netherlands is eertainly committed to seriously following through this process and trying to avoid the lmpresslOn th at thc door is now closed, Mr Sanders concluded.

Questions and answers

Europe can count on this eapability or it has to develop this herself. Mr Sanders pointed out NATO wiU certainly not go to Southeast Asia. Of course, there are security risks emanating from the periphery of NATO, which is North Africa and the Middle East. We see risks emerging there in terms of the development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. These could be a direct threat to our security, having a range which brings them well within NATO'S borders. In the revised Strategie Concept, therefore, we wiU put an increased emphasis on what we ean do to counter those risks. Apart from that we have non-artic1e V crisis management operations, which also might take us into those areas. Politically it is impossible te agree to draw a preei se boundary because you would get an enormous debate on why a country is inside or outside the peri phery. So the political solution is to define 'periphery' and also 'common interest' deliberately vague in order to avoid problcms with being consistent: i.e. why do we want to intervene here and not there?

How do the individual speakers see theJuture ofWEU? Dr Van Eekelen thinks the WEU ultimately has to disappear. How and when exactly this will happen is not sure. lt is very difficuIt to envisage that you have a separate securiry and defence/military policy. The EU can very weIl say it wants to handle colleetive defence and other missions through NATO, but th en you still have to have a eomprchensivc , The EU lacks poliey. Ncxt to this, there is the question whether we can be certain of promises the capacity th at NATO assets wiU be available if the Americans are not prepared to join in of consensus-building certain (European) operations? Van Eekelen is not sa sure.

With regard to developments in Kosovo, is it not true that militaryaction would lead to more instabi/ity in the region? What shou/d be Russia's role? Mr Sanders said air strikes in the short term do not contribute to stability on military operations on the Balkans. The question here, however, is what sort of stability we want to Mr De Gooijer explained WEU must achieve? Do we want the sort of stability have a role to pIay, otherwise we should which NATO has. ' not maintain it. WEU does have one core of a system where a country on its territask, which is astrong commitment to tory can show behaviour not acceptable collective security. Before we do away with th at you te the international community? The OSCE accepted the principle that we may intervene in 'internal' affairs if must have an alternative. Attempts te define such altersuch conduct is being demonstrated. If such a situation native roles, however, have proved unsuccessful. In occurs, Mr Sanders said, we do not say for the sake of addition, given the fact that in 1998 the WEU Treatywas stability that wc are not going to do anything. And if, in extended indefinitely, it would require parliamentary the end, it turns out there is only one option available to approval of all member states to abolish it. There would influence peopJe committing crimes against humanity, be an cnOfmous political debate to which nobody is th en that is the only op ti on Jeft after years of negotialooking forward. So what will acrually happen, accordtion. Wanting to estabJish a new stability based on coming to him, is that WEU will become dormant. The EU man values, we make th is effort to restare order. In this, wilt absorb th ase useful elcmcnts/instruments necessary the Netherlands very much want to keep the Russians for a EU capability to act. on board. We certainJy cannot reach a settlement without Russia. There hos been a lot of talk abou.t NATO operations in the

periphery NATO,

of Ihe Alliance.

Whal exactly is Ihe periphery of

where will NATO draw the line? And what is Jtop-

ping Europe from a,quiring logislical assels (e.g. lift ,apability) in order to be able to carry out its own operations? Dr Van Eekelen said that, in order to answer the second qucstion, you will first have to decide where you want te go. For example, in Bosnia you do not need lift capabiliry because you can go there by ship. Lift capability can be important in certain situations, but not in all. The real problem lies in the lack of satellite-based rcal -time intelligence, which only the Americans have. Here an arrangement has to be worked out: either

10

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Mr de Gooijer pointed out that Ru ssia is part of our security environment. NATO and the EU are trying as hard as we can to include Russia in all decisions taken with regard to th at environment. There are regular high-level meetings, in which we deal with issues fundamentally different from those of forry years ago. At the same time, stability can na longer be the stability of the past forty years, based upon the repression of the legitimate aspirations of the peopies of Central and Eastern Europe.

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~ U 'I~ Seminar

N A TO' Diplomacy

and Force

Simulation game IIja Fritz

The aim ofthe simulation game, in w hich a N orth At/antic Council (NAC) meeting was simulated, was to give participants an insight in the international decision making process within

NATO.

Each participant had to represent one ofthe

19 NATO countries. On the agenda was the Kosovo crisis. As participants had to represent countries other than their own, they w ereforced to learn to adapt to other countries'positions. The overallpurpose was to agree on a statementofthe NAC, based on consensus and, therefore, on compromises between the v arious national positions.

B

Czec h Republic) and co untrie s which m o re o r less eforehand M r D. H . Za ndee, the "Cli ngendael"' searched for a compromise (Denmark, Canada). This staff member aering as NATO Secretary-General ph ase of sharing info rmatio n and finding supporters for aoci a former board member of JA SO N, provided a certain po siti o n took a lot of time. P a rti ci pant s a sho rt introduction on forma! and informal dec isionreali sed th is as, after the in itial m ore or less chao ti c making processes. Another staff member, Mr J. D ijksphase, there came a more structured ph ase in whi ch ce rtra, aering as Chairman of the Military Committee tain countries came up with draft proposals putting (representing NATO mil itary authorities in the NAC) together the various national posit ions. T hese proposals supplied the participants with so me practical instrucserved as a basis fo r fu nh er negoriati ons ti ons. After this, a draft concept of the which co nt inued over dinner. By th ar tcxt of the NAC statement was handed , Remarkably, t ime it had beco me c1ear that th ere were out and the participants received written two g roups of countries emerging (ltaly, instruction s, de scribing the posit ion and the two groups Fran ce, H ungary, Poland, Portugal, views of the nati on co ncerned. They had Greece, The Netherlands, Non vay and to try to incorporate these inst ructio ns, working simultaneously the C zec h Republic on the one hand, i.c. their 'nati onal pos ition', in the fioal and C anada, the United States, France, text of the NAC statement as mu ch as on two draf! proposals Great Brita.ĂŽ n and Germany on the othposs ible. er) whi ch were both worki ng simultanewere not very eager Then informal nego ti ation s, for whi ch ouslyon draf! propos als. Remarkably, th e (wo group s we re not very eager to several roo ms were reserved, took off. to consult each other.' co nsult each o the r. I n fact, wh en at one Instantly pa rticipaots drew ragether in smal! groups ra find out with whom ta time the Gennan repre sentative (played fo rm caali tion s based on slu red pos iby the Spanish participant) wanted ra present a compromise on which anc of the g roups was ti ons. As the instructions reflected th e real-life posiworking, he was given very li ttl e time to present it and tion s of the countries concerncd, it should come as 0 0 when he did, he was kind ly asked to leave the consultasurpri se rh a t t h e mo st power ful co u n tr ies (France, ti on roo m. G reat Britain, th e United States) withi n NATO consulted with each other first. Other heavy co nsultations took At 20:00 hrs, four hours after the informal negotiations place between countries in the regio n whose interests were most at stake (Greece, Turkey, ltaly, H ungary, started, every participant was expected to be prese nt in

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North Atlantic Council Meeting

the largest room of the "Clingendacl" Ouring thc ncgotiations o ne could see Institute ro start rhe formal session of 'After six hours the parallel with real life ve ry c1early. the NAC . The Secretary-Gcncral opcncd Supporters stood against opponents of of tough negotiations, the sess ion, af ter which the Unitcd sending in ground troops and intensifying the air strike s against Yugoslav and Srares asked permission to prese nt, in Serbian targe ts and cxpanding these to thc nam e of seve ral cou ntrie s (sec there was no civilian infrastructure, including ecoabovc), a drafr text. Mrer this proposal, nomic targets etc. There were also disNAC statement the Grcck participant, as the spokespe rcussions abollt a timetable in whieh so n for the ether group, did the same. and negotiations (In real - life there can be no situation NATO would cease air strikes ifMilosevic showed hi s willingness to fulfill the five where a co untry speaks on behalf of a NATO demands and if so, the exaet coalition, Mr Zandee later eXplained, were broken ofl. ' moment when: was a c1ear intention on because ir is diplomatically ofTensive te the part of Serbia to withdraw its troops orher countries.) Thcn formal negoriafrom Kosovo suffieient or sho uJd it first co mpl etely ful ti ons started which were tightly led by rhe SecrcraryfiU all NATO demands? To give an impress ion of the difGenera!. H owcver, 500n ir became elcar thar, despite a ficulty of the negotiations: partiei pants did not even ge t suspension of the meeting by the Secretary-General to to the most important points (J A .nd B) of the draf! sec wh ethcr all countries cDuld agree on a proposed statement until the very end of forma! negoti ation s, compromise text, positions were too far away to allow for a co mpromise to be successfully co ncluded. Time bccause they already had so mu ch diffi culty agreeing on other, minor points. lmagine what real life mu st be was too short and the subject of the meeting, the Kosolike ... vo cri sis, very difficult. At 22:00 lus, therefore, after Slx hours of toug h negotiations, there was no NAC statement and negotiations were broken off.

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Etem ents of an NACstatement on Kosovo

Drafl by the Secretary-General condemns the continuing operations by the Yugo$/avArmy and Serhian police forces in Kos(JVo, which have caused a tremendous humanitarian disaster. The Alliance holds President Milosroic responsihle for this tragedy, which has already multed in ahout / mil/ion KosOfJar Alhanjans bling driven from their homes.

agreement for KosOfJO in conformity with intunationallaw and the Charterofthe United Nations.

will only cease its air strius against Yugoslav and Serbian targets ij the Federal Repuhlic ofYugoslavia and Serhia fulftll the101lowing demands:

(and will expand these to eivilian infrastructure, including economic targets etc.)

NATO

IJ these demandJ are not met, NATO will further intensify its air strikes against Yugosla v and Serbian targets:

NATO

ANo'oR

Ta ensure a verifiahle stop to all military ac/ion and the immediate ending ofviolence and repression; 2 To ensure the withdrawalfrom Kos()'f)() ofthe military, police and paramilitary policeforces; 3 To agree to the stationing in KosOfJO ofan international military 1

(will start preparations for expanding Operation AI/ied Force to inc/ude ground force operations. Accordingly, the North Atlantic Couneil has directed NATO Military Authorities to droe/op a pre/imary concept ofoperatjons and toforward various optionsfor ground deployments to the Council al the ear/iest possibIe date.)

presence; 4 To agree to the unconditianal and soft return of al/ refugees and displaced persons and unhindered aeem to them by humanitarian aid arganisations; 5 Ta prOfJide credible assurance ofwil/ingness to work on the basis of the Ramhouillet AeeordJ in the establishment ofa politicalframework

will continue to pTO'Uide assistance la the humanitarian operations in Albania and in the former Yugoslav Republic o/Macedonia, in close coordinalion wilh UN H CR, the OSCE, the CouncilofEurope, the European Union and the Western European Union.

NATO

NAVO na negenennegentig Opgilven voor het Nederlilnds Veiligheidsbeleid Dit rapport van een door de Atlantische Commissie in het leven geroepen studiewerkgroep ve rscheen in maart 1999. Het rapport brengt de nieuwe veilighe idssituatie in Europa in ka art en geeft aan wat de gevolgen van de ve randerde omstand igheden zijn voor de NAVO en voo r het Nederlands veilighe idsbeleid. Er wordt aa ndacht besteed aan zowel politiek-militaire als aan economische aspecten. U kunt een exemplaar van het rapport bestellen door {IO,' over te maken op bankrekening 48.01.59.513 of op girorekening 346.1382 van de Atlantische Commissie in Den Haag, onder vermelding van uw naam en adres en ¡Studierapport'.

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~lt-J~ Seminar NATo ·D iplomacy and Force

DayThree:

14 April leonard de Jager

On Wednesday April 14th, day three ofthe seminar, participants and other interested Dutch students took part in a working conference dealing with the revised Strategic Concept ofNATO. The conference was held in "De Witte ", The Hague. An introduction was given hy Dr Bram Boxhoorn, director of the Netherlands A tlantic Association.

D

r Boxhoorn started with a de scription of how the fall of the Berlin WallIed to feelings of vietory and joy, while behind the scenes, Western polieymakers painstakingly tried to develop a new concept for NATO: what role cDuld [his organisatÎon play in the post-cold war world? One of the diffieulties the alliance had ro face, was the question how to integrate the defence structures ofCentral European countrÎes in NATO partnership programmes, while at th e same time appeasing the Russian Federation. Wh en the term ' NATO expansion' caused more uproar in Ru ssia rhan had been expected, NATO officials referred to the same process as 'NATO enlargement'. Nowadays, on1y an 'open door mentality' is mentioned. According to Boxhoorn, much of what materialised from NATO'S Russia policy consisted of semantics. In his reply to que stion s from the au dien ce, he put the matter of tensions in NATo-Russia relations in perspective by stating that "Western polities does not have that much influence on domestie polities in Ru ssiaj people are more concerned with food shortages than with NATO enlargement." Another mu ch needed change of policy for NATO eonce rned the formulation of the idea of collecti ve defence. In the days of the Cold War, it would suffiee to speak of 'positive politica! changes' and the wiU to end 'unnatural barriers'. A more precise formulation of goals and means proved diffi culr. In the Paris D eclaration of 1997, NATO and Ru ssia simply stated that 'seeurity is indivisible'. Dr Boxhoorn expeeted that NATO'S new Strategie Concept wiU include combati ng terrorism, socall ed 'out-of-area opera tion s' and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruetion. Of course, eol-

JASON Magazine •

lective defence of the territory of the Alliance will remain NATO'S core task. A major que stion th at is raised by introducing the concept of 'out- of-area operations'. Boxhoorn continued, concerns the legitimaey under international law of such actions. Since World War lI , internati onal law has been very clear on the subje ct of the use of force in international relations. Only when acting in self-defence or with a clear mandate from th e UN Security Council is the use of force permitted. Recen tly, opinions have been voiced which suggest that in the case of humanitarian eme rgenc ies, the use of force can be permitted even without a proper mandate from the UN Security Council. Th e term used for th ese operation s i s 'H umanitarian intervention'. In his response to questions from the audience whether NATO'S actions are legitimate, Dr Boxhoorn stated that attention should b e g iven not on ly to legal iss ue s , but also to moral issue s. H e al so thought that thc opinio ns of Permanent Security Council M embcrs Russia and (eve n more so) China should be eonsidered in light of the faet th at, eventualy, these eountrics have no vital national interest on the Balkans. Contrary to rhetorical statements mad e by Russian politicians, Russia has no military or eco nomi e interests with regard to Serbia. Russia plays th e 'Serbian' card to gain a seat at the negotiating tahIe, was the speaker's view. Further, it is difficult to di still a cohe rent foreign policy from the many eontradictory 'official' statements that arc made in Moscow. "Who is in charge in Ru ssia? We do not know", was Boxhoorn's comment on the W est's main problem in detcrmining Russia's international position.

Volume 24


2 A reunited Germany wanting to take its place in world polities would be accomodared. 3 The possible adoption of a more isolationist approach by thc us. Current praetice is for the us to lead a military operation to whieh the EU con tributes finaneially. 4 Smaller countries benefir from military protection. 5 Ir would provide for a co-ordinating mechanism for countries wishing to join NATO. RNL Marine Corps Major-General C . Homan (ret.), until reeendy Di rector of the Netherlands Defenee College, discussed the military aspects. 1nirialIy, NATO relied on the 'sword and shield' strategy, based on conventional force s. However, because of the high costs, the Alliance shifted its emphasis towards nuclear defence. Up until the late 19505 this entailed the co ncept of massive (nuclear) retaliation. In the following decade NATO adopred the strategy of flexible response, more focused and downsized, but including the nuclear NATO and the European Union option. From 1967 onwards the process of detente Mr J. Penders, a former Member of European Parliaensued, among others as a result of the Cuban Missile ment for the Christian Demoerats, first addresscd th e specific nature of the relationship between NATO and Crisis of 1962, resulting in the SALT 1 treaty. Since 1991 the EU. In his view, the EU basically is a politieal idea, NATO eo-operates with its former adversaries, for cxamwhereas NATO is orientated towards defence. Thc forple in Partnership for Peaee (PfP). Today, in NATO we sec a shift from common defen ce mer is an economie construction, the latter a military to the protection of NATO'S interests. The us want NATO one. In the 1950S politieal reality is dominated by sueh to become a 'global player', whereas Europe wants to keep it a regional organization. cvents as the definitive establishment of the Iron CurWith regard to NATO'S relations with Ru ssia, tain and the Korean War. France successfully opposes a European defence, in which Germany would take part. Homan found Russia' s opposition to cnlargement realConsequently, the EU focuses on ecoistic from a military point of view. He pointed at Ru ssia's refusal ro ratifiy the nomie co-operation with evident suc'Force cannot serve cess, since at th is moment fifteen counSTART 11 arms control agreement, because NATO would have gained conventional tries have applied for membership. The most dimcult problem for the EU to as a panacea arms supremacy. overcome is its dual 'statu s' of an ecoAt present, NATO operates under the for achieving nomie giant and a political dwarf. 'willing and able' formula, mea ning only Eeonomy and polities are closely linked, those countries wishing to join in a military opcration will actually do so. as see n in rhe case of the boycott of political goals . ' Homan eited the Combined Joint Task South Afri ea and the oil crisis of 1973. Forces (CJTF) as an example. Both IFOR Penders eaUs thc Maastricht Treaty of 1991 a hybrid. Apart from establishing a timeframe and SFOR operated under a UN Security Council manfor monetary union, the treaty provided for a European date. Today's Operation AJlied Force operates without defence. The Western European Union (WEU) is envissuch amandate. aged as the defenee organization of the EU, while at the same time having a role as the 'European pillar' of NATO. Thus far, the EU has ignored rhe rreaty in this NATO and the OSCE respect. In future, WEU co uld possibly develop into a The eh.irm.n of this working group, Mr W. Kemp, eXplaincd the differences in the security concept of 'shared' organization: the military side would go over to NATO< the economie side to the EU. NATO and the OSCE. Only whcn these two co nceprs of Amsterdam 1997 provided for the establishment of a securiry are combined, he said, the international co m'policy centre' to co-ordinate thc EU'S Common Foreign munity can be successful in prevenring or solving international cri ses. and Seeurity Poliey (C FSP ) as wel! as for a procedure on constructive abstention. This procedure centres on asking opponents of a proposal not to vote against but to He flrst desc ribed how rhe OSCE started as the CSCE abstain, thereby not blocJcing deeision-maJcing. in Helsinki. Thc CSCE made a link betwccn security and What are the reaso ns for wanting a so-called Eurohuman rights. Ir advocated security through cooperapean Seeurity and Defenee Jdentity (ESOl)? tion, One might argue that this process oflinJcing secu1 Thc tU's politi cal power would eome illto line with rity with human rights has helped to end the Cold War irs economie srarure. in a f.vourable way for the West. After the Cold War,

Mter this extensive introduction the participants of the working conference split up into four different working groups. Group A discussed the relationship between NATO and the EU. Speakers were Mr J. Penders (former MEP) and Marine Corps Maj. Gen. (rel.) C. Homan. The relationship between NATO and the OSCE was discussed in Group B. Speakers in this group were Mr W. Kemp (assistant to OSCE High Commis sio ner for Minorities, Mr Van der Stoel) and Mr E. Povel, Netherlands Liaison Omee r at NATO. Group C diseussed the relationship between NATO and the UNo The speaker was Mr D. Leurdijk, a UN expert from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael". Finally, the role of NATO in the struggle against terrorism was discu ssed in Group D, with as a speaker Mrs M. van Leeuwen, also working at "Clingendael".

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CSCE was not abolished, but tran sfo rmed into the OSCE. The Conference had become an Orga nization. Since then OSCE has undertaken several missions of preventive diplomacy, some of them in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Mr Kemp then touched upon the issue of limirs ro diplomacy and force, as Mr Leurdijk did in hi s introduction to the working group on NATO-UN relarĂ&#x17D;ons. The OSCE is based on rhe norion th at security co nsisrs of more than just military securi ty. The focus of rhe OSCE is on cooperative security, while NATO focus es on coercive security. One aspect of cooperative security is th at within the OSCE, decisions are based on consensus: all votes are needed, including the vote from the countries to which the pending decision pertains. There are, however, limits to thi s form of security, as the case of Kosovo shows. On the other hand, coercive security is also limĂ&#x17D;ted in effect. NATO is trying to project securiry in Kosovo. We should recogni se, however, th at NATO can not solve today's security problems on its OWIl alld solely by force. The OSCE is the main European organisation to prevent co nflicts through cooperation. When the international community feels the need to deal with tcnsions th at arise within Europe, it should conccntrate irs efforts through OSCE. In cases where this prevelltive dip lomacy fai ls, NATO might act as a fire brigade ro end the conflicr by (threatening to use) fo rce.

force and diplomacy, with the two elements well combined, can achieve lasti ng results in the field of peacekeep ing. Already during the war in Bosnia, the role of NATO and the organization's relation to rhe UN was di scussed. Then, before the Dayton peace agreement, the involvement of NATO in peacekeeping operarions was organized 'by the book' in terms of internationallaw: NATO accepted the political primacy of the UN Security Council and accepted that it would act on ly if called upon. The Dayton peace agreement provided for the deployment of an 'Implementation Force' in Bosnia. The parties to the agreement asked the UN Securiry Council to authorise this implied use of force, which the Council did shortly after it had taken notice of the parties' request (UNSC res. 1095). The verifi cation mission of OSCE in Kosovo was also authorised by the UN Securiry Council (UNSC res. 1203 ) . In Kosovo, the international communiry faced a different situation: with no co nse nsus in the Securiry Council on the matter of military intervcntion, NATO was no longer able to operate 'by the book'. Both the Ru ss ian Federation .nd China would undoubtedly veto a draft resoluti on that allows rhe use of force in Kosovo. chose to intervene anyway. ln October 1998, the alli ance issued rhe so-called 'Activarjon Orders', thereby authorising NATO'S Secretary-GeneraI, Mr Solana, to order ai rstrikes again st Serbia. When taking th at decision, NATO knew that it was bypassi ng the UN Securiry Council. In fact, the debare on the legitimacy under international law of the present NATO intervention should have been opened six months ago! ational parliaments of NATO member states accepted th is construction with little or no debate, while they also should have di scussed the bypassing of the Security Council. NATO

In formularing a ncw structure for dealing wirh security issues in Europe, we shouId, Mr. Kemp co nrinued , disringuish between organisations and between their respective roles. These organisarions should not compete with each othef. However, they show a tenden cy to sell rhemselves. But competition between such instruments is illogical. NATO and OSCE are not exclusive towards each other. They are 'Today, NATO seems co mpatible. Only whcn the concepts of coercive security and coopcrative securi ty are combined can rh e international to be less focused co mmuniry be successful in preventing on collective defence or so lving crises.

Within NATO however, there was co nsiderable debate on th is iss ue. The us did not accept a situation in which the UN would be in a position to block military action by NATO. European member statcs had se riou s doubrs and wanted legitimization by the UN Security Council. They re.soned th at the UN than on international NATO and t he u N Charter should be respected. This matprotection of ter was neve r resolved: NATO failed ro Mr Leurdijk srarted his lecture by pointing at rhe uniqueness of the cooperarion reach unity on rh is quesrion. The Norrh Atlanri c Council did nor issue an offibetween NATO and the UN regarding forinterests. ' cial declaration, as had been norm al mer Yugoslavia. He stressed that bo th practice before. Ir was left to the nationdiplomacy and force are limited in their effects. Ir is ge nerally accepted th ar in order to persuade al governments to formu late a legal basis for rhe pending militaryaction. The Dutch Minister for Foreign warring factions to compromise, it can be efficient to Affairs, Mr. Van Aartsen, referred to UN Security h.ve diplomacy followed by force, if the former fail s to Council resolution 1199, when he said that military produce sufficienr results. W e shou ld, however, realise th at force cannot se rve as a panacea for achievi ng politiaction was "suffic iently legitimized". The Dutch parcal goals, as indicated by the fact th at after weeks of air liament accepted this explanation, although UNSC resosrrikes, no progress in the political field has been made lution r 199 doe s not mention air strikes or any other use of force . w ith regard to Kosovo. In other words, only a mix of

,6

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Volume 24


Dir

rr

r

Mr Leurdijk was quite o utspo ken on the poss ible consequences of the lack of a legal basis for NATO' S actions. This NATO action with no proper mandate from the UN Secu rity Council sets a dangerous precedent, even as NAT O emphasizes rhar it considers the current situatio n to be all exception. The regulation of the use of force in international relations conce rn s a co rnerstone of internationallaw. This elear and present danger of a precedent is the real sig nifica nce of the intervention by NATO.

NATO

and terrorism

I n the working gro up on NATO 'S ro le in the battle aga inst terrori sm di scuss ion focused on the changed character of terrori sm aoci the que sti on whcther the West should choose NATO as the organisation to combat the phenomenon. After a sho rt welcome to th e participants of the working group, M rs. Van Leeuwen started the session with a lecture on so me of th e definitions of terrorism. A s there are so many and none all -e nco mpass ing, it would be better, she argued, to look first at some ge neral aspects of terrorism. First of all perpetrators are , she eXplained, motivated by politica! or, more widely, ideologica! motivations. They justify their actions by aiming for a ' better world ', not just for them selves but for others. Secondly, perpetra tors are, or threaten to be, extrcmely violent on pur-

JAS ON Magaz i n e â&#x20AC;˘

pose. Often their aim is to d rawattention to their politica! or ideological demands by all means necessary. To reach th is end, mos t terrori sts try to induce maximum terror by minimum means: i.e., the number of victims need not be large, as long as th e terrori st act by itself is spectacularly gruesome and, mo st important of all, leads to media coverage of their politica! struggle. By th is means, terrori sts may hope to co nvin ce th e official powers to adjust their policies to suit their political or ideo!ogica! aim s. Also, the aim of violent acts may be to destabilize the government or politica! order. By provoking the use of wtalitarian, indiscriminate suppressive means w fight terrori sm, terrori sts may hope that peop!e will turn against the state or existing politica! order, destabi li zing it w such an ex tent that th e terrorist organisation can become a popular movement and take over power. Thirdly, terrori sts often have selectcd and specified targets, such as ministers, captains ofi ndu stry, peop!e with a certain nationality or relig ion, etc. In this way they can get their politica! message across and may expect to gain sympathy from the audiencc they hope to win for their views. On the other hand , Van Leeuwen was quick w point out, terrorists have a!so targeted co mpl etcly unin volved civilians. This goes especially for religiously moti vated and terro rists, who have engaged in suicidal actions. M ost terrori sts, however, prefer w stay ali ve them selves. Lastly, terrori sts are organ ized as subnational gro ups wh ich may be sponsored by states. Solitary perpctrarors

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'The revision of the Strategie Concept of politically or ideologicaily motivated this field. Except when the Alliance has violence are generally not considered (0 to defend itself against terrorist attacks is defined in muddy fit (he definition of a jreal' terrorist. The or if NATO wants to play a role in putting state sponsors of terrorism - so-called same goes for paramilitary or guerrillaMaeedonia, Bosnia farce s. rogue states - under con trol. Mrer some of these general remarks and Kosovo.' about terrorism had been very briefly disAfter lunch Van Leeuwen returned to cussed (which made elear thar there are the central question: is there aspecific many exceptions to (he above mentioned 'rules'), Van task for NATO in countering terrorism? There was a short discussion on defining a role for NATO in the fight Leeuwen continued her leeture by pointing out so me recent changes in character and means of terrorism. against terrorism, but it soon emerged th at most of the The most important change see rns (0 be (he shift participants thought that NATO was not the proper organisation to deal with terrorism. A s the above menfrom politically and ideologically motivated terrorism to religiously motivated terrorism. Seen in (he light of tioned points were discu ssed more in detail, it soon emerged NATO could play a role in the prevention of ter(he general remarks on terrorism it seerns thar more and rorism, but only in so far as the terrorist act was planned more frequently, religiously motivated terrorists aim for (he highest possible number of victims without botheragainst a NATo-member country. Obtaining and processing intelligence, much needed to counter terrorism, ing to claim responsibility for their actions. aften this was deemed rather a task of specialized agencies such as kind of violen ce is perpetrated in the form of suicidal actions. Interpol, the Centra! Inteiligence Agency (CIA), or the Netherlands Inteiligence Agency (BVD), as weil as speOther worrisome developments are the new means and techniques available to terrorists. The possi bility of cialized military agencies. In addition, counteracting terrorist groups using sophisticated weapons suc h as terrorism in progre ss and punishment af ter defect short range missiles or even nuclear, chemicalor biologsee med rather a task for national states than for NATO ical weapons is very real. Much concern in this context while there might be an intermediary role for the Unitis related to the sharply deteriorated level of safekeeping ed Nations. There might be a role for NATO in harmoof military materials and hard ware in the former SovÎet nizing the policies of states facing a terrorist crisis, the harmonization of export and custom rules, and the harUnion. This may make it far easier for terrorists to lay monization of judicial procedures. But this will not be their hands on sophisticated, highly de structive realized in the short term because sovereign states are weaponry. not eager to give up their room for manoeuvre in these matters. The conclusion that lay at hand was that if Mter th is briefintroduction on terrorism, Van Leeuwen made the connection between terrori sm and NATO: NATO can play a role in the fight against terrorism, it wiU he a very modest one. It will he defensive (and not while it has been announced that new responsibilities in the field of coun ter terrorism will be included in NATO'S offensive) in nature, strictly confined to prevent terrori st attacks on NATo-memher countries. new Strategic Concept, it is, according to Van Leeuwen, hard to imagine how NATO can play a prominent role in

Al bijna 25 jaar informeert de stichting ,ASON over de achtergronden van de internationale economie, politiek en veiligheid. Zij richt zich daarbij vooral - maar niet uitsluitend - op jongeren in de leeftijd van 18 tor 35 jaar. is niet gebonden aan enige politieke stroming of gebaseerd op een levensbeschouwelijke grondslag; draagt bij aan meningsvorming, maar heeft zelf geen mening; laat altijd de voors en tegens zien, laat altijd de voor- en tegenstanders aan het woord; éé n activiteit of artikel geeft in kort tijdbestek een zo volledig mogelijk beeld van een actueel internationaal onde rwerp.

,ASON

De stichting weet zich daarbij gesteund door deskundigen uit de ambtenarij, het bedrijfsleven, de journalistiek, de politiek en de wetenschap, die optreden op activiteiten of schrijven in het kwartaalblad JASON Magazine. Anno 1999 is 'JASON' een merknaam. De stichting organiseert halfjaarlijks een grote activiteit en daarnaast verschillende kleinere activiteiten. Dit voorjaar vond het seminar NATO: Diplomacy and Force plaats, waaraan 23 jongeren uit EAPc -landen deelnamen. Verder sprak de Staatssecretaris voor Europese Zaken, Dick 8enschop, de dag na het aftreden van de Europese Commissie ove r 'de grenzen van Europa'. Een jaarabonnement op JASON Magazine kost al jaren slechts fJo,-. Daarvoor ontvangt u ook uitnodigingen voor de activiteiten (waarvoor bij grotere evenementen een deelnameprijs geldt). Voor een abonnement kunt u de kaart op pagina 23 invullen. Stichting ,ASON· Laan van Meerdervoort 96 . 2517 AR Den Haag Telefoon 070 . 360 56 58

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IASO N M agaz in e •

Volume 24


~Ii{"~ Seminar NATooDiplomacy and Force

Hungaryand NATO ludit Sarna

In the 1980s and 90S fundamental changes have taken place with regard to the Euro-Atlantic region 's stability and security. With the democratic transformation in several countries ofthe Socialist bloc and the dissolution ofthe Warsaw Pact, the hostilities and the division ofthe Cold War have disappeared.

oday's situatio n, lacki ng a clearly defm.ble superpower as adversary hut fuU of smaller 10cal crises, on the onc hand calls fo r new ways of coo peration in promoting stabi lity and security and on thc other for change in thc institutions responsible for these issues. NATO has been adapting to the demands of the ncw situation in various ways. FiTst of all, by condu cting all Înternal reform (started in 199 1) and, secondly, by making it possible for new members to join the A Uiance and thu s extend the area of stabi li ty and of democratie values anci principles in Europe.

and effectiveness of the Alliance are co ncerned. In the second part Hungary's past and present performance in the process of preparation, the tasks to be don e and the variou s possibilities of Hungarian conrribution to thc work of NATO \ViII be examined.

General public's perception

Public opinio n on the access ion ofl-Iungary, Poland and the Czech Republic is, in short, positive, although on the level of the ge neral public NATO enlargement doe s not see m to be an everyday issue, constantly on the mind of people. In the Netherlands, for example, the 10 an atrempt to understand how NATO member co un tries view Hungary's preparedness just some weeks public di splays an ovenvhelming di sinterest in it. For before its access ion to the Alliance, I conducted a series most peopte it is enoug h to know in broad terms what of interviews with foreig n and security the purpose of NATO is and th at th e co npolicy expe rts statio ned in Budapest . cept has worked for 50 years. NATO These are: Anneli Conroy (First Secre'Hungary's joining enlargement is not really a publicly tary, British Embassy), Gianni Ghisi debatcd issue in the UK, Italy or Spain (First Counsellor, lralian Embassy), Cor NATO is a recognition either. In ge neral, it can be said th at the van H onk (Counsellor .nd Deputy population of the member countries Chief of Mi ss ion , Netherland s of the fact believes that if others want to join NATO, Embassy) , José Luis Jacoste (Political nothing could prevem them from accedth at democracy, Attaché, Spani s h Emba ssy ), Peter ing soone r or later, should they accept Rückert (Defence Attaché , German the principles of th e Alliance and meet Embassy) and Szurgyi Arpád (forme r us lasting democratie their own obligations. Military Attaché). This paper intends to Thc lack ofinrerest on the part a fthe provide a summary of these interviews, standards, values and public runs counter to the efforts of the in the flrst part focu sing on the quespolicy elite and the academie world, who a market economy tion s ofhow NATO accessio n is perceived have been co nsidering NATO enlargeby th e general public and the experts; ment to be an importanr and pos itive wh at kind of mi sund erstandings have are all process for everyone involved. This is a emerged in con nection to it; whcn and small group of experts who realize what why it will take place; to wh at extent and firmly entrenched.' NATO is, how it will develop, what thc why it is a symbolic evenr; and wh at access ion process actual1y mean s and ri sks it might carry as fa r as the integrity how it should take place.

JASO" Magazine.

I 1999

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Here, it is weil worth taking a closer look at one of the member countries' attitudes towards enlargement which in general terms might be called characteristic with regard to the six interviews. At the same time, however, it carries a deeper meaning, thanks to the German term for the process. In Germany, former Minister of Defence Volker Rühe was the lirst to actively promate and develop the idea of NATO enlargement. In German, says Mr Rückert, its name is NATO Öffnung, literally 'NATO opening', clearly expressing the stance taken towards the new would-be members. According to this, Germany does not see the process as an extension of NATO'S territory in the Eastern direction, but rather as a 'welcorne' indicating th at the Alliance is ready to accept new countri es wishing to join. Both the previous and current German governrnents have supported the decision of Hungary to join NATO, expressed by the early ratification of the accession, on 24 March 1998. Similarly, the ratificatian process went smoothly in the majority of the 16 member countries, completed by The Netherlands in December 1998.

mation of the armed forces to the required level of preparedness will take several more years. From a symbolic point of view it would have been nice to have th e accession ceremony at the Washington Summit. On the other hand this step tes tifies to the fact that NATO itselfhas also changed. Firstly, it was and wiU continue to be a defence alliance which must remain effective and strong. Bearing th is in mind, th e enlargement process can only take place and continue smoothly if NATO effectÎveness is maintained. Secondly, however, NATO now has a wider range of peace-keeping anci occasionally peacemaking tasks. In this sense, inviting new members will most probably add to rather than detract from the main objective of self-defence, as it can only benefit aU concerned when more experiences are shared in a situation where Europe faces new challenges. As Mr Van Honk says, this process is not simply about "doing someone else a favour, it is also in our own (N ATO members, JB) interests to carry out thi s integrati o n proce ss to the end ". Nevertheless, NATO enlargement is not viewed as a necessity stemming from the new chailenges facing the Alliance. As it was able to resist the threat [rom the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact with its 16 members, it could weil survive without the new countries in the future to~. The accession of new members is nothing el se but a 'welcom e' viewed as helpful by Hunga ry's future partners, wh o are glad ta see new countries changing their system, turning towards demacracy and opening up to new cultural values based on European anci American history and the Euro-Atlantic relatÎonship.

A political step In connection to NATO enlargement there seem ta be certain basic misunderstandings present in the general public opinion on what kind of process it is and what NATO is about. According to Mr Rückert, it is neccesary to make it dear that, in the first place, a politica! step is being taken, even though a large part of the Hungarian population is still in the belief that accession primarily is a military process. First of all, NATO is a political alliance, headed by the North Atlantic Council consisting of politicians, only secondly the military co mes into play. Looking at the military role of NATO, Mr Van Honk emphasized a different kind of misunderstanding. According to him, many people - bath in The Netherlands and in Hungary - think NATO is still a military organisation which guarantees a place under the nuclear protection 'umbrella' even though the Cold War is over and th e threat has changed considerably over the past decade. European security is not so much endangered by a nudear war anymore, as by smaller but very persistent and protracted conflicts, not threatening the territorial integrity of NATO members, but destabilising both economically and paliticaily whole regions in Europe. Thus, the rol e of NATO in promoting growth and stability, trying to make people ad opt the principles of th e Washington Treaty, accept multi-party democracy, transparency of government, tolerance for minorities and democratic principles in general, is more important today than ever befa re.

The qu estion arises whether there are any possible risks whi ch can affe ct access ion of th e three co untri es. Indeed, importing new confliets with th e invitation of new members mi ght be a risk accompanying the integration process, but the potential co ntribution of th e three countries seems to outweigh this consideration. L ooking at the negative side, one can see th at Hungary is in a precarious situation with armed confli cts nearby and relatively large Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries. On the positive side, however, Hungary's position might be considereci of key importance when trying to engage in useful debate in order to remove risks from the area. Politically, the country is important for its connections towards the East and is weU suited to becoming a regional centre.

Anticipation of accession With an eye to eventual accession, Hungary has bee n very active in various NATO( -led) activities, such as PiP, lFOR and SFO R. Ir has do ne a lot of work not only with NATO members or would-be members but also with oth ers. This is co nsidered to be excellent, because this kind of co-operation helps to avo id the creation of new division lines between NATO and non-NATO territory. For this reason, it is essential th at co-operation in PfP co ntinues after the accession, in order to show th e res t is not being excluded.

In political terms, Hungary wiU be ready to join on 1 2 March, earlier than the original date set of 24 April at the 50 year celebration of the Washi ngton Treaty. This is a recognitio n of the fact th at democracy, lasting demacrati c standards, values and a market economy are all firmly entrenched in H ungary. Of course, transfor-

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Volum e 24


'Hungary can make a considerable In a cDupie of years' time, the size of the army has been redu ced from 15°,000 to about 50,000. Besides, several parts of the Home Defence Forces have been the containment of prepared to execute NATO tasks. problems in the area In 1995. the General Staff started to peepace interoperability within NATO because of structures, creating the Euro-AtlantÎc Integration Working Group. This preits knowledge pared documents and regulations, seminars for officers and non -commissio ned offlcers, and slowly but sure1y a new of the region . ' leadership and command structure were organized. In the future this process will In general, regarding the question of continue, together with the integration of the commuco ntribution the interviewees agree that NATO is not about a con tribution co ntest. All members have to connications and air defence into the NATO sys rem. tribute according to their possibilities. Two aspects are The integration of political and military perso nne1 wil! have to continue. According to Mr Van Honk and very important in case of determining a country' s conMr Szurgyi, thi s kind of investmenr in peopte and tribution. The first is th at the tasks of each partner have expertise is what really matters and has ro be given prito be clearly defined in order to be able to plan the conori ty over th e acquisition and interope rability of tribution and the kind of equipment to be acquired. The weaponry. A big and persisting problcm in thc field is second is that many things will come and have been the question oflanguage ability. Then, there is a need to coming for free: the advice and expertise on bath sides. construct that important base which is missi ng from the In this latter respect, Hungary ca n make a considerorganization of the armed forces: a strong NCO force . able contribution in the political field to the containCurrently, the division of ranks in the army is not as ment of problems in the area, as it has accumulated a great knowledge on the regi on. Hungary can look back balanced as NATO requires; there are too may officers and too few NCOS. This difference in co mmand stru con several decades of co-operation with the former ture might create a potential communi cation problem Soviet Union and other Central and Eastern European coun tries. The integration of new ideas into NATO'S with the personne1 of NATO forces. political and strategie thinking is always a very good In conclusion, it can be said th at Hungary's offICial contribution, as Mr Rückert says. Hungary has succesaccession to NATO is viewed positively by the current sfuUy dcveloped relationships with its neighbouring member countries of the Alliance. Even though th e countries, including Yugoslavia. The German Attaché further identified the country' s capacity for diplomatie general public may not realize it, the experts are weU aware of thc fact th at a step of histori cal importa nce is and political arrangements and solutions, such as in the being taken with the enlargement of NATO. They recent past with Romania and Slovakia. Finally, a contribution to NATO'S military capabilities believe that, in our changing world, where th e Alliance and its role is changing too, new ways of co-operation wiU be neccesary too, most importantly encompassing and ncw partners are important in order to preserve and air defence, the dedication of various army and air force promo te stability and security in Europe. Moreover, as a units to NATO'S Rapid Reactio n Force. Hungary's political and military perso nnel wiil have to be integrated general sign of acknowledgement of the transformation into the NATO infrastructure with fuU representation in which has taken place in Hungary, the enlargement is both areas. vicwed as a factor favourably influencing the cou ntry' s relationships abroad and preparation for the integration into other Euro-Atlantic structures. This leads (0 the question which steps have to be taken by new members in order to achieve fuil integration. One of the tasks is the legal adaptation of H ungarian Jud;, Barna ('J) is a Program MallagtrQ/11N H~IIgar,all AtlQlltir Co"",,1 jll Ru,IQfHJI. legislation which will probably be concl uded by the end SIN wrt/ü Ibis ma) ill tarly Marrb 10 par/iripau in IIN JASON umillar i'<ATO. D'p1omalJ,,,,d Forfr_ of the year. Although the bulk of the work isstiU 10 come. Hungary has already startcd to reorganize its armed farces.

Feedback on the performance of the Hungarian medica! crew anci engineering battalion in IFOR (and later in SFOR) is very positive. That is the kind of cootribution, says Anneli Conroy, "rhat we cao aod should work together aod have both sides benefit" . In various missions, Hungarians have had the chance te share their knowledge aoci to acquire a lot of experience on how to co-operate with units [rom ather countries, NATO headquarters etc.

contribution to

JASO N M agazine

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1999

21


~t{'I~ Seminar NATo oD iplomacy and Force

The United States and NATO Jasen (astillo

During the last halfcentury the United States remained committed to Europe through the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization. For a country with a long tradition ofisolationism such a commitment is extraordinary. Three twentieth-centuryfarces exorcised the isolationist spiritfrom the American character. This article examines the transatlantic relationship.

irst aod foremost, the threat posed by the Soviet Union provided the initial motÎvatÎon for the American presence in Europe. After World War II the Soviet Union, with its formidabie array of military capabilities aod an antithetical poli tica! ideology, represe nted a potential menace to non-communist Europe. A com mon political identity along with a mutual desire (0 keep the SovÎet Union from becoming toa powerful made Americans aod W estern Europeans . natural allies. A lucrative transatlantic trading rela tionship aod a population with cultural ties to Europe a150 persuaded the United Stares to stand guard over its allies. Today, however, the ties th at bind the United States to Europe are weaken ing. Many have prophesied th at the absence of the Soviet threat will eventually undermine the cohesiveness of NATO. Further, Ameriean security concerns have gravitated eastvlard towards Asia, where China couJd become its next potential peer competitor. Economic and demographie changes have also weakened transatlantie bonds. In economie terms, Asia has leapfrogged Europe as the most important trading partner to the United States. Moreover, the significant influx of Asian and Latin American immigrants into the United States has begun to depreciate the American population's overall cultural attachment to Europe. D o these changes foreshadow a return to isolationism for the United States and the end of NATO?

The tria d behind enlargeme nt lronically, rather than abandoning the Alliance, Europe and the United States have enlarged NATO membership

IASON Magazine •

to include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. M oreover, as Operation Allied Force suggests, Europe and the United States do not envision mothballs but new missions for NATO. CaUs to rnaintain the Alliance drown out the prognosticators who forecast NATO'S doom. Bath Europe and the United States see great value in keeping the Alliance alive and well. SpecificalIy, mernbers see three key benefits to the maintenanee and enlargernent of NATO . Firstly, NATO keeps the peace in Western Europe. Since the end of Worid War 11 , members of NATO have experienced a period of tranquiJ relations. With American forces providing seeurity. ·W estern Europeans no longer feel the need to ernbark upon costly arms races or to forrn blocs of opposing alliances. Instead, under the green house of Arnerican security guarantees, a flora of international institutions have sprouted. These institutions have transforrned longstanding great power rivalries arnong Britain, France and Gerrnany into the foundation for a united Europe. Members of the transatlantic alliance reeognize the pacifying effect of American forees. NATO embodies the lesson of rwo world wars in one ce ntury: Europe desires to avoid revcrting back to its competitive tendencies and the United States wants to avoid leaving the continent only to return onee a war erupts. Secondly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides the United States and Europe with insurance against a reva nchist Ru ssia. While the end of the Cold War has rernoved the Soviet threat to Europe, Ru ssia still posscsses the potcntial for becoming a long-term danger to NATO. Western planners fcar the failure of economie and political reform s in Russia rnight change

Volume 24


'The ties that bind the United States the aid of NATO Allies, for example, the United States was able to organize a multinational coalition to fight th e Perders of the former Soviet Union. NATO sian GulfWar. offers Europe and the United States a are weakening. ' hedge against a revi sionist Ru ssian Put simply, the list of potential dan gers is long .nd NATO planners will find governmcnt whi ch mighr believe conit difficult to antieipate which threats to qucst still pays. Finally, NATO serves as a vehicle for the tran satJantic stability are most likely to emerge next. The greatcst communiry to deal with the ncw and unpredicrable threat ro thc ties that bind NATO comes from dcaling with these unpredictable dangers. Cone is the constant thre.ts which might con front Europe and the United threat ofinvasion from the Soviet Union. T oday's NATO Stares. European security issues no longer center around the conventional balance along the inncr-Gerguards against not one but all possible threats to stabiliman border. Concerns regarding eth nĂ&#x17D; c disputes, conty. As the Alliance moves into the uncharted waters of flict among farmer Warsaw Pact members and nuclear these new missions, it may find the co-ordination is no e.sy task. proliferation capture the attention of today's analysts. These various forms of'instabiliry', to use a catchph rase M y research addresses the forces likely ro tear apart the transatlantic security community by asking the fol1oof the Clinron administration, have done much (0 transform the Alliance and could lead to further chanwing question: why is co-operatio n more successful in some wartime alliances than others? The NATO alliance ges in NATO. proved its worth during the Cold War by maintaining its solidarity in the face of the Soviet threat. Now, however, the Alliance must demonstrate its ability to eo-operate New instab ility, new missions in military operations far different from the missions its During the last few years, the Alliance has heeded the call to guard against the forces of instability. With members anticipated. To ou di ne the conditions under American logistical capabilities providing the key comwhich military coalitions can co-operate successfully, my ponent of NATO'S military muscle, the Alliance has dissertation examines five wartime alliances from the undertaken interventions in both Bosnia and Kosovo to Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, World War II, the end ethni c conflict. Not only do these missions fulfill a Persian CulfWar and the NATO intervention in Bosnia. moral obligation, but they also help prevent these smalUnderstanding the political dynamics which tran spire in ler wars from becoming large-seale eonflagrations. The wartime alliances wil1 provide a useful guide for NATO, as it undertakes those missions that will define modern Alliance's military forces also permit it ro inrercede in transatlantic security relati ons. Economie and demodisputes among non-NATO members. graphic changes in the United States could foreshadow a In addition to acting as Europe's nightwatchman, weaker American commitment to NATO in the future. NATO possesses the ability to conduct out-of-area missions. These operations might range from humanitarian Should co-operation in these new ventures turn SOuf, interventions to the projection of force outside Europe the ties that bind the United States to Europe could to stop potenrial proliferarors. Ir seerns within the realm unravel. of possibility that NATO might decide to use force to stop ethnic cleansing in Africa. Similarly, the Alliance might conclude th at it should act to prevent a Middle Eastcrn state from acqui ring nuclcar weapons. With Hl Ihij m lly i" MllfTh IC fIlrliripau;~ tM J"'SO~ m,.i~ll r NATO: D,plc/rtllryll"J F~m its nascent democracy into a nationalist coun try bent on re-establishing the bor-

to Europe

'WrtJ/r

Ondergetekende abonneert zich op JASON Magazine en ontvangt voor 130,00 vier nummers van voornoemd magazine alsmede uitnodigingen voor de activiteiten van de stichting JASON. Naam Adres Postcode Woonplaats Telefoon Handtekening Deze antwoordkaart in een enveloppe zonder postzegel sturen naar Stichting JASON, Antwoordnummer 10711, 2501 we Den Haag. U wordt verzocht te wachten met betaling totdat u een acceptgiro wordt toegezonden.

JASO N M agazine

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~1!{'1~ Seminar NATo路Diplomacy and Force

Finland and NATO Karoliina Honkanen

The end o/the Cold War marked a remarkable change in the Finnish foreign and security policy . I t meant a more active participation in the management o/common European security affairs and, consequently, a stronger international position. A lthough not looking/or membership O/NATO, Finland appreciates its new role and ranks the co-operation with NATO high in importance.

inn ish Pres ident Ahtisaari noted in 1995 thar all European countries, members anci non-members alike, h ave benefited from NATO' S re sponsibie role in Europe. By partieipating in the EAr c, the PIP programme and NATo-led crisis management operation s, militarily non-allied countries su eh as Finland

cao conrribute to the creation of a new European secufity structure based on comprehensive co-operation and indivisibi li ry of secu riry. Good anci close relations with NATO have beco me an important element in Finland's post-Cold War seeurity poliey. Finland's relations with NATO have experienced a drasti c change in th is decade. The situation was very different during the Cold War, as the Deputy Di reetorGe neral of the M inistry of Defenee aptly described in his artic1c in NATO Review ( 1997): "O uring the Cold W ar, Finland's relation with NATO was an uneasy one. On the other hand, Finland was c1earIy a country with a longstanding tradition of demoeraey and market economy, with a military that against aH odds had gained a defensive victory in the Seeond World War against the budding military superpower of the Soviet Uni on. At the same time, it held to a policy of neutralitythe alternative being integration with the East, not the West - with the politieal implieations of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assis tan ce of 1948 with the Soviet Un ion, and the restrictions on its military imposed by the Paris Peaee Treaty of 1947 furthcr eurtaiIing its margin for manoeuvre. For many Finnish politi cians NATO was taboo and , as aresuit, co ntacts wi th NATO at any level we re kept to a minimum. " First rclations with NATO were established 10 1992, when Finland joined the North Atlantic Cooperation

Council. Two years later, Finland took an important step in approaeh ing N ATO by joining the Partn ers hip fo r Peace programme. lt appreciates the programme as a constructive tooi for fundamentally shaping the po litico-military landscape of Europe. As a result, Finland supports the furthe r development of PIP as a eomprehensive framework for mi litary co-opera tion among all European countries, a co-opera ti on arrangement which enables operations such as IFOR in Bosnia. The programme plays an important role in Finland's current security poliey agenda: it improves the mi litary interoperability of the armed forces and increases Finland's influence on crisis managemen t co-o pera tion . l n 1995, F inland joined the EU and became an observer in WEU. The F inni sh gove rn ment statcd that Fi nl and wi ll remai n outside mili tary alli ances and it w iU only participate in peace- keep ing, not in peace enforcement. Fi nland began the Plan ning A nd Review Proeess ( PAR P) in February '995. The battalio ns to be used in NATO'S crisis manageme nt operation were named, aod interoperability goals were defined for Finnish forces. This year, Finnish forces participated in a PfP exe rci se for th e first time. Finland also joined the NATo- led IFOR operation in Bosn ia rig ht from the beg inning. Three years ago Finland bega n an intensive dialogue with NATO regard ing the Alli ance's enlargemcnt. Finla nd stated its appreciatio n of co-opera tio n with NATO, but is no t looki ng for mem bership. T he tra ining of the firs t internatio nal battali on, the NATO interoperabie Rapid Reaction Force, was startcd. Fin ni sh sold iers participated in altogether 15 PfP exercises, 27 co urses and 65 sem inars. The second part of the PARP was in itiated in 1997 as new interoperabi lity goals were set for


the Finnish forees. Finland joined the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council right away, aocl the counrry's NATO missian was opened in Brussels. Last yeaT, a toral of 1°70 Finnish soldiers participated in PiP exercises aocl NATO courses aod meetings. This yeae the President, cabinet members aod the commander of the armed forces wiU participate in the 50th anniversary meeting in Washington.

PfP and

EAPC

Finland has supported

NATO'S

ncw role in constructing

- together wÎth ether European organizations - a ncw European 'securiry architecture' based on each state's right ro choose or change its securiry arrangements.

Thc Finnish view stresses the importance of building security aod co-operation transparently aod without ncw dividing lioes: the ncw structure must follow OSCE principles. The importance of the EAPC and the PEP programme as the cornerstones of the pan- European order has been emphasized in the Finnish view. For Finland it is important that PfP is not perceived as only a waiting room for full NATO membership. President Abtisaari in a speech noted th at the program me has different meanings for different countries. For the old Allies it means adapting the Alliance to the new security environment. For the former com munist countries now aspiring to membership it is the first step on the path to fulI mem bership while for others, such as Finland, Ît is a channel for panicipating in practical co-operation and crisis management. A s aresult, Abtisaari has proposed strengthening the role of PEP, making it a permanent and dynamic element of European co-operation struetures, and developing the [APC as an effectÎve co-operati on forum. In Finland's view NATO'S willingness to open its structure to a11 partners in the form of the PFP programme and EAPC is even more important than its enlargement. Actually, Finland sees NATO enlargement as a small part of a broader picture. Ir believes there are also risks connected to NATO'S first post-Cold War enlargement round. 1t could hamper the position of third countries or restri ct their possibility to make their own secu riry ehoices. By its participatory polities Finland aims at prcvcnting ncw division lines or spheres of influenee whieh eou ld result from enlargement or the NATO-Russia contract. 1t attaches special importanee to Northern Europe and the Baltie Sea region. Finland has brought up the issue of integrating the three Baltie states into Euro-Atlantie structures, the EU and NATO.

butes to crisis prevention and management. Finland a]so is an active partner in NATO'S eo-operation arrangements. It does not now plan to apply for membership but wants to keep the possibility open for the future. Again st this backdrop, the issue of a possible membership of NATO has been increasingly debated in the domestic arena. The government has justified with two arguments the current policy of remaining outside of NATO but keeping up active and close relations with it. First, Finland does not fecl threatened militarily. Secondly, it perceives the current policy as best promoting thc sceurity of the country and its region. As President Ahtisaari has noted in Parliament: "By being fuIly integrated into the European Union but remaining militarily non -allied we contribute to a controlled process of change with maximum srability in the northern part of our continent." Many experts believe that if Finland will become a NATO Ally, it wiIl only happen through slowand gradual change s. According to the Director of the Finnish lnstitute for Foreign Affairs, Tuomas Fo rsbe rg, the internal development of the European Union plays a crucial role in Finland's security policy planning, since the EU is looking for a situation in which a11 member countries would be militarily allied. Al so, Forsberg considers it likely that the ideas and understanding that the Finns have of NATO and its role may change in the future, the Finns may eome up with a new interpretation of Cold War history and they may form a new image of Finland's position in the international order. Juhani Kaskcala from the Finnish Ministry of Defenee also believe, the only possible path leading to NATO membership is the eFSP of the EU . He belicves the common defence will be organized through NATO, because most of the EU member countries already belong to NATO. This process has already begun, as the EU wants to use military power in crisis management. Finland already strongly partieipates in NATO crisis management and, because ofthis, it would not be aproblem. The development of Sweden's seeurity poliey is also a noteworthy factor in Finnish sec urity policy planning. The government's Report to Parliament notes that Sweden's securiry poliey choices have an impact on Finland's security because of the hi stori ca11y special relati ons between the two countries and also because of commo n interests. l\1oreover, it is mentioned th at Finland and Sweden have a similar view on how to best develop security and stabiliry in the region. This implics Finland would reconsider its foreign and secu rity policy orientation, ifSweden decided to apply for NATO membership. Narurally, other significa nt changes in the country's securiry environment would also lead to a reconsideration of standing policy.

(onneclion 10 EU developmenl Finland's current security poliey is based on military non alignment and independent defence. A s a member of the EU it participates in the development of the Union's Common Foreign and Seeurity Poliey (ersp) and eontri-

IA5 0 N Ma gazi ne •

i n t /N JA SON . " '''",.. NATO: DipfDmDty llntl F aru_

1 1999


~t{"I~ Seminar NATo ·D iplomacy and Force

The Czech Republic and NATO Haraid Scheu

After the end ofcommunist rule in Central and Eastern Europe it hecame a main task for the foreign and security policy ofthe states which had achieved their political sov ereignty to redefine their new security conception. It was ahsolutely clear that the Warsaw Pact had lost its significance and that a new idea ofsecurity and alliance had to he developed.

Determi ned t o achieve membershi p For these reasons it seems natural th at Czechaslovakia after 1990 wanted te remove all signs of communist

power and of hum iliation. The government very soon established contacts and friendly relations with Western European and North American countries. Czechoslovakia declared te resume the traditions of the First Czechoslovakian Republic. At th at time NATO membersh ip was not realistic yet, but Czechoslovakia came closer te the Alliance. As a matter of fact, neutrality was recommended to Czechoslovakia several times. Statesmen discu ssed the creatian of a neutral belt composed by Poland, Czechoslovakia and H ungary. According to H enry Ki ssinger at the ti me, such an approach "would be both realistic and comprehensive. lt would break the pattern of searching among the various Soviet schemes for the ones th at do the least damage - an esseotially negative enterprise". The same conception was proposed by Russia. It feared it would lose the strategic advantage it had acqui red duri ng the Cold War period. Therefore, it was the main goal of Russian foreign policy to stop the process of NATO enlargement. During the Budapest Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Russian President Yeltsin even warned there could be a 'Cold Peace' between Russia and NATO if the enlargement weIH ahead. Nevertheless, the government of the Czech RepubI ic after 1993 was determined to achieve membership. T here was wish for a credible security guarantee, especially when the wars in former Yugoslavia and on the territory of the fo rm er Soviet Union had shown that the fall of the Iro n Curtain did not automatically mean peace and stab ility for the whole of Europe. NATO was the only reliable alternative to a status of neutrality. Czech society is, in a certain way, sti ll traumatized by

26

Volume 24

fter 1989 the Czechoslovak government co nfirmed its co mmitment ra the principles of democracy, rule of law and the respect for human rights. This means th at after the Velvet Revolution Czechoslovakia adopted principles which had been part of the constitutional order of the First Czechoslovak Republi c. The Czechoslovak Republic after '9,8 had a democratie constitution, free elections and a politica! system respecting human rights and the rights of national minorities. The government had the intention to live on the democratie traditÎon s of Western Europe and North America. She considered the Czechoslovakian state as a natural part of the democratic system. More than 40 years of communism and violation of basic democratic principles and rights have caused hum iliation te the Czechoslovakian state and its peoples, the Czechs and the Slovaks. Czechoslovakia became a Soviet satellite and was controlled by a totalitarian regime. Czechs and Slovaks tried to overcome this regime in 1968, but the small and exhau sted state could not withstand the power of the allied troops of the Warsaw Pact. Czechoslovakia came under an occupation regime, which meant the presence of occupatioo farces in the country uotil 1990. Czechs and Slovaks had to accept the Soviet power to play a decisive influence 00 all matters of Czech fo reign policy. However, spring 1968 will always remain a symbol for the wish of people to live in freedom and democracy.

,ASON Magazine •


Munich 1938, when the regional powers decided the future ofCzechoslovakia. At the end of th is centu ry, the Czech republic needs partners to rely on. But this was not the only reason why the Czech Republic should become a member of the Alliance. As Czech President H avel said in 1995, the Czechs have always been a part of the Europe which today is called Western Europe. In the Czech Republic there are cathedrals and towns similar to those in France or Germany. For many centuries Charles University has heen one of the ce ntre s of European intellectual and spirituallife. The Czech Republic, therefore, has a deep feeling of responsibility for [he values which she has in camman with ather European and North American demacca-

to prepare them. For this reason Czech Parliament has

not adopted a Refe rendum Act. The deeision about acces sion was supported by all democratie political parties of the country. It was 50 obvious th at NATO membership is a historical event that it would have been irresponsible to wait for the referendum. The consensus among the parties was probably broader than on any other issue. People are aware of the importanee of Czech membership of NATO. For our partners in NATO, th is means the Czech Republic wiU be a credible member, since a change in government w iU have no influence on the realization of obligations resulting from NATO membership.

cles.

The Czech Republi c favours an open door policy of the Alliance. The process of enlargement should not stop here. Democratie states in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia) should be invited to join. NATO should continue to export democratie values and stability to all European countries. This is the only way to guarantee seeuriry to all member states. The Czech Republic is responsible for the protection of democratie values. On the other hand it feels solidariry with countries and soeieties whieh shared the history of communism and totalitarianism. As a member of NATO, it will have to be a mediator for countries which have applied for membership. The Czech Republic understands NATO membership as a historical opportuniry for the country to proteet its independenee and sovereignry and to make her contribution to stabiliry and peace in Europe.

Historicalopportunity

Ir was an honour for the Czech Republi c and its people when NATO invited the country to joio. There is na doubt that the majority of the Czech people are in favour of membership. They feel it wiU be a significant event for the whole country when three former communist countrÎes wiU join the Alliance. This fact underlines th e comeback of Europe-orientated countries which after Yalta 1945 found themselves on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. Thc decision on NATO accession was a democratie decision of the Czech Parliament. Unfortunately, it was not possible to conduct a public referendum on the subject of NATO membership. The Czeeh legal order is still in a stage of tran sition. This means the main principles of a demoeraey and the rule of law have already been adopted by Parliament. They arc part of the Czech co nstitutional order. However, since many laws had to be adopted or amended in a rather short period, some important laws have not yet been adopted, beeause there has not been enough time

H llrll/J St/"" (~9) ;, 11 U I/dml m

I/" PIJJ/ü hl"Nlllli~nill uw 1'11. D. pr~K .."nm.

IIII/" Un;"",;,, -JPrilg"r. Ht OJJf'~Ü IlIismily In ,"rIyMilrrll,~ /'<lrr'li,..". In ,/"J"'50l< um,n"r

The partidpants in the , AS O" Seminar NATO: Dlplomocy ond force

!ASO M Magazine

.

I

1999

27


~L{-I~ Seminar

NATO' Diplomacy

and Force

List of Participants

Mr N. (Nikolai ) Assatiani (24, Russian Federation), Ms I. (Ieva) Kupee (21, Latvia), student, Political Science/lnternational Relatiom, UniversityofLatvia.

Ph.D. student, Institute ofWorld Economy and International Rela/iam, Moscow. Ms]. E. (Ju dit) Barna (22, Hungary), Program Manager, HungarianAtlantic Counci/.

Mr L. (Lars) Maddox (Sweden), Ph.D. student, Uppsala University; research assistant,

Mr T. B. (Thorsteinn) Björnsson (22, l eeland), student, Politica/ Science and International Rela/Îam,

Swedish National DeJence College.

UniversityofIceiand.

MrG.M.]. (Geoffrey) MeVey (23 , United Kingdom) student, Political Science, UniversityofEdinburgh.

Ms K. (Kanykey) Brimkulova (20, Kyrgyzstan), student, BusinessAdministration, American University

Mr O. P. (Oliver) Möhl (25, Switzerland), intern at the Swiss Ministry ofForeign Affairs.

in Kyrgyzstan. Mr]. (Jacek) Carbol (Poland ), student, Warsaw SchoolofEconomics.

Mr K. (Karen) Nahapetyan (25, Armenia), Professor ofInternational Relatjom, Yerevan State University.

Mr].]. (Jasen) Castillo (United States), Ph.D. student, Politica/ Science, UniversityofChicago. Mr N.B. (Nieolae) Gafita (27, Romania), diplomat, Romanian MiniSfTy ofForeignAffairs, WEU

Mr V. (Volodymyr) Pekarchuk (Ukraine), member, Analytical Group, Atlantic Councilof Ukraine.

NATO,

and Strategie Issues depar/ment.

Mr H. C. (HaraId) Seheu (29, Czeeh Republic), Ph.D. student, Public International Law, Universityof Prague.

Mr A.]. (Artur) Girao (26, Portugal), student, Political Science, Lusiada University ofLisbon.

Mr A. (Aidar) Shakenov (29, Kazakhstan), Mr M. (Miguel) Gonzalez WaUaee (24, Spain), student, Business and Economies, UniversityafMadrid.

diplomat, Kazakh Ministry ofForeign AJfairs.

Ms E. B. (Eva) Heringhaus (21, Germany), student, Political Science, University of Cologne.

The JASON seminar report was compiled

from dispatches by]inze de Boer, IIja Fritz and Leonard de] ager. Wouter de Koning provided additional coverage on Day Three.

Ms A. K. (Karoliina) Honkanen (24, Finland), student, International Relations, Universityof Helsinki.

The JASON Foundation would like to thank Ms M. (Maria) Karaklioumi (24, Greeee), student, International Relatiom, Pantion University.

thefollowing sponsors: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken NATO Information and Press Stichting Nederland-Polen Philips

Mr A. (Andriy) Kolesnyk(22, Ukraine), student, International Information, Taras Shevchenko University, Kiev.

SFMO

Shell Nederland Ms A. (Alen ka) Kosi r (24, Slovenia), student, Political Science/lnternational Relatiom,

Onze activiteiten worden mede mogelijk gemaakt door de opbrengsten uit de BankGiroLoterij. Uw deelname aan deze loterij wordt daarom van harte aanbevolen.

UniversityofLjubljana. Mr D. (Deyan) Kostovski (Canada), student, UniversityofToronto.

28

JASON M agazi ne

BV

Volume 24


Kosovo: a Mandale for NATO? Dlck A. Leurdijk

In March NATO launched Operation A llied Force against the Federal R epublic ofYugoslavia and itsforces in Kosovo. A chronology ofthe events leading up to th is point, from the perspective ofinternationallaw.

At an early stage, weU before the outbreak of hosrilities in the f1rst week of March 1998, thc issue of Ko sovo was on the agenda of thc international community. In the fall of 1997, the

Contact Group, which provided for the

iJllunjomltiJ,(hn-,lmurrr

political guidance of the implementarion ofthe Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia and H erzegovina, alreacly met

andf"'lil"alrommmtutorut

to discuss, as a separate issue, for the

D,rk A. uurdijk, UN"':fVTl.

ticst time, the sÎruation in Kosovo. Late January 1998, the six tecn ambassadors ·CfingmdlUT at NATO H eadquarte rs in Brussels devoted (heir weekJy meeting to a debate on the situation in Kosovo. "W e are now g iving as much attention to Kosovo and Montenegro as to Bosnia and H erzegovina", a NATO official indicated. NATO'S concern about the 'potentially explosive' situation in Kosovo, in particuIar, was both related to the fear for a possible 'spill -ove r' into neighbouring countri es such as A lbania and Macedonia and to the poss ibie negative consequences for the consol idation of thc peace implementation process in Bosnia and H erzegovina. These co ncern s were a1so reflected in official statements. On 6 March I99 8 e.g., after a lengthy di scussion, the North Atlantic Council declared: "NATO and the international community have a legitimate interest in developments in Ko sovo, inter ali a because of their impact on the stability of the whole region which is of conce rn to the Alliance". ! The recognition of NATO having 'a legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo' was the starting point for a di scuss ion on the modalitics of a possible military intervention by NATO along its periphe ry - an option al ready men tioned publiely in April. '

tIxNuhn-la"drlmlJlutrrif {I1'""nat,onaf R tlatrons

JASON Magazine _

A legal basis for militaryaction (I) The issue of the international legal basi s for such an action, including the que stion whether an exp li cit auth o rization by the UN Secur ity Counci l would be needecl, led to extensive di scussio ns and differences of opin ion among the Allies. M eanwhi le, at a more prineipied level, a similar debate took place on the fu nclamental relation ship between NATO and the SecurÎty Couneil. After an initial di scuss ion during NATO'S mini steri al meeting in Luxembourg, in June 1998, on the adaptation of NATO'S Strategie Concept to post-Cold War rcal ities, us Secretary of State !vl adeleine Albright summarized the us position as follows: "NATO'S fundamental mi ss ion will always remain collective defence against aggress ion. At the same time, I stresscd that we have always had the option to use NATO'S stren gth beyOlld its borders to proteet our security interests. l fjoint military action is ever needed to proteet vital Alliance interests, NATO should be our instrument of choice."3 She quoted President Clinton, who, on an ea rl ier occasion, had said: "Tomorrow's NATO mu st continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against threats to our security from beyond them - the spread of weapon s of mass destruction, cthnic violenee ancl regio1lal conflict." Mrs Albright in thi s context aUuded to so me of the problems that still had to be solved: the definition of 'eore mi ssions' and 'out-of-area' operations, and the qlle stion whether there should always be a UN authorization for NATO to act. The us Secretary of D efen se, Willi am Cohen, arguing along the sa me lines, did not think it necessary for NATO to subordinate its security to rhe UN, emphasizing NATO'S OWO autonomy in takin g deci sio ns. The us position, however, was not shared by alJ within NATO. Others said th at they wOlild not approve thc use of force by NATO without a UN mandate, fearing both the ri sk of alienating the Ru ss ians and the consequenccs th at sueh a precedent cmild se t for others in the futurc .4

I 1999

29


The differen ces of opinion on this issue among NATO'S sixteen nations were reflected in consecu tテ思e NATO statements by stressing the need for a 'releva nt', an 'appropriate', a 'sufflCient' or a 'sound legal base', while avoiding referen ces to the necd for an explicit UN mandate. For the rest of the year, the iss ue would remain on the agenda of the Alliance and become more policy- relevant than ever.

NATO

contingency planning

A legal basis for militaryaction (11) At th e same time, it was elear that a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in Ko sovo would be vctoed by, among others, the Russian Federation. This made the iss ue of the legal grounds for miJitary act ion all the more acute. Ultimately, NATO members could not agree on ao official, common position in th is respect , divided as th ey were on the que sti on whether NATO needed an explicit authorization of the Security Council on the use of force. This explains why policymakers in Brussels, in justifying the ACTORDS, started using the notion of 'an appropriate legal base'. Secretary- General Solana eXplained th at "all the All ies beli eve that under these grave circumstances in Kosovo, and in the prese nce of the provisions of resolution 1199, there are legitimate grounds for the use of force or the th reat of t h e lI se of force"6. On a later occasion an unidentified NATO offi cial said: "We have suffi cient legal base in internationallaw", basically referring to the legality of humanitarian intervention J Thc European partners of the us, while insisting on the need to have U N authority, co ntended th at Kosovo was an excep tional case because of the impending humanitarian catastrophe. By recognizing th at NATO was unable to present a common declarati on - which would have been in line with NATO'S practi ce before and after ' Dayton' with re spect to the situation in Bosnia and H erzegovi na - the Alliance lefr it to each individual member state to give a separate, legal justiflcation of its own of the ACTOR DS. The lIse of th e noti on of 'a sufficient legal base' thu s served two purposes: it covered the recognition both of the lack of an explicit UN authorization and of the inability of NATO to formulatc an official co mm on legal basis for the planned air operation s. Thi s effectively meant withdrawing its, until then, usual and explicit acceptance of the political primacy of th e Security Council.

Whi le on many occasions diplomats and policy-makers warned for the potentially di sastrou s co nsequen ces of 'a second Bosnia' in Kosovo, the use of mi li tary force by NATO in the spring or su mmer of 1998 was at the same time heavily contested. Notwithstanding repeated threats th at NATO would use force, ultim ately there was only broad conse nsus within the Alliance to go ahead with 'continge ncy planning', the elaboration of scenarios on the possible use of force. This took a few months and was only com pleted in September I998 with agreement on the formulatian of three main categories of military options: 1 the preventive deployment oftroops in AJbani a, 2 various airborn e operations and 3 th e deployment of ground troops in the framework of a cease-fire or a peace agreement.5 At about the same time, the international community continued to increase its pressure on President Milosevic in an effon to se ttle the issue of the future statu s of Kosovo through negotiations. In the fall of I 998 , two co nsiderati ons started to play a crucial role for NATO in re-assessing its pos ture with respect to Kosovo: a the coming winter and the impending humanitarian di saster (a large numbcr of displaced persons); and b NATO'S own credibility, taking into account the many warnings on the use of force by the Allian ce since J\.1ay which were not followed up, in the face of continuing defian ce by Belgrade of the demand s by th e international community. In the new political elimate of mid-September, the Dealing with Milosevic Security Council adopted resolution 1199, which would Thc ACTORDS, in the meantime, functioned as th e ultibecome a key document. By referring to earl ier meamate leverage for us dipl omat Richard Holbrooke in his sures, as contained in th e Contact Group statement of negotiations with President M ilosevic. Thc talks ultimately led to the so-called Milosevic12 June 1998 and the co mmitmenrs H olbrooke 'agreement ', in which the Milosevic made in hi s joint statement 'The OSCE mission former com mitted himself to the implewith President Yeltsin of 16 June 1998, mentati on of the demand s as laid down the Council effectively only repeated demands made already three months in Security Council resolution I19 9. would have before. These concerned a se rie s of This agreement beca me the basis for measures, ineluding the cessati on of sub sequent decision-making by th e to operate in a hostilities, the maintenance of a ceaseinternational com munity, ineluding thc fire, the withdrawal of troops and special step to establish an OSCE verification potentially'hostile' mission. However, as far as the statu s of police forces, the return of refugees and the 'agreement' is conce rned , it should d isplaced persons, access for humanitaenvironment. ' be stressed th at an offi cial text of the rian organization s and international document was never published. This monitoring in Kosovo. Meanwhile, rai ses questions about the legal nature of the document, N ATO se t in motion the procedure th at would culminate in issuing two so-called 'Activation Orders' (ACTORDS) des pite th e fact that it has beco me common sen se to speak of the 'agreement' be tween I\1ilosevic and H o\in mid -Octobcr for both a limited air operation and a brooke as if th ere was a written and signed document. phased air ca mpaign in Kosovo.

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Volume 24


'Operation Apart from its contentious forma! stademand s, but without any enforcement powers whatsoever. These were the contu s, the Milosevic-Holbrooke 'agreeAllied Force ditions under whi ch Milosevic could ment' explicitly acknowledged 'the will have far-reaching accept the international community's interest of (he international community prese nce on his territory. Holbrooke did in fuli- seale monitoring of the si ruation in Kosovo aod Mcrhohija'. Ir was not not succeed in negotiating a heavier, consequences (he fiTst time thar Milosc\'Ă&#x17D;c, originally more inrrusive international presencc. for the international Only gradually policymakers started to strongly opposing .ny form of 'internationalisation' of (he iss ue of Kosovo, reali se the implications of the outcome of politica I system.' the Milosevic- Holbrooke talks. The accepted (he principle of international monitoring. I n his joint statement with OSCE mission would have to operate in a potentially ' hostile environment'. This President Yeltsin of 16 June 1998, he became one of the main concerns for potential contributhad alre.dy committed himself "to provide fuU freedom ing OSCE member states in deciding ro provide verifiers. of movement aod ensurc th ar there wiU be na resrriction s on representatives of foreign Stares aod internaTaking into account the peace- keeping character of the mission, and with the UNPROFOR experience in Bosnia tional institutions accredircd (Q [he Federal Republic of Yugoslavia monitoring the situation in Ko sovo", This and Herzegovina in mind, some governmenrs wanred additional security guarantees for the verifiers, as they commitment led to a fiTst ' international prese nce' on the ground in Kosovo, the so-called 'Kosovo Diplomatwould opera te unarmed in a potentially violent environic Obse rver Mission'. Now, as a result of the talks ment and would be vulnerable as targets for hostage-tak bcrween Miloscvic and Holbrooke, in mid-Octobcr it ing or usc as hum an shields. While the Federal Republic was agreed that the monitoring should be carried out by ofYugoslavia, in signing the verification agreement, had com mitted itself to guaranree the safety and security of a missio n of the OrganizatĂ&#x17D;on for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) "as the best way of enabling the bath veriflcation missions, also in the case of an emergency [[ NATO - in an effort to provide extra security and international community to verify the positive trends underway", as was said rather prematurely in the annex in close co nsulration with the OSCE - establ ished a separate so-called 'Extraction Force' aimed at evacuating the ofthe document se nt by Belgrade to the UN. S verifiers in case of emergency.11 While in Western capitals it was bclieved that both the establishment of the Extraction Force and its use of force were authorized by Verification missions Ulrimately, however, this provision formed the basis for resolurion 12°3, th is argument was heavily contested, two further agreements dirccted at the establishment of both on legal and political grounds, by non-NATO mcmbers of the Security Council, including Costa Ri ca, a verifICation regime consis ting of two co mponenrs: a mission of the OSCE on the ground and a NATO verif!caBrazil and the Russian Federation. 'J These differences of rion mission in the air.9 The aim of both missions was interpretation were already expressed at the time of the the verific.tion of compli ance by the Fedcral Republic of adoption of the resolu tion (24 October 1998), at a time Yugoslavia and 'all others conee rned in Kosovo' with the when NATO was still elaborating the exact modalities af demands of the international eommunity as laid down in the force. 14 When the force became operational on r 2 the Securiry Council re solutions with re spect to Kosovo: December 1998 President Milosevic denied that the deployment was part ofhis 13 O ctober 'agreement' with 1160 (March 1998), 1199 (September 1998) and 120J (October 1998). [0 The reference ta 'all others eoncerned' H olbrooke, and warned that action by this force on the tereitary of Kosovo would be considered 'an act of (diplomatie language for the ethnic Albanians, com prising Rugova c.s. and the Kosovo Liberation Army) is aggressian', provoking retaliatory action. 15 derived from Security Cauncil resolution 1203, adopted on 24 October 1998, in which the Council formally authorized both ve rif!cation missions. Therefore, the Dealing with compli ance requirements were explicitly directed at both Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians parties to the conflict. In the meantime, Holbrooke had Building on H olb rooke's efforts of mid -October, NATO emphasized that the mand ate of the mi ssion was speeifiallowed Milosevic an additional two wecks ro comply cally rclated to verification and not observing or moniwith the demand s for the withdrawal of his troops and toring, although it remained undear in what respecrs heavyweapons from the area (to pre-March 1998 levels) these concepts exactly differed in his opinion. At the and the return of refugee s and displaced persons. Upon sa me time, the missio n - while somewhat misconceived expiry of the latest deadline on 27 October, the North had a typical peace-keeping character, being unarmed Atlantic Council decided not to Iaunch the air strikes. and operating with the consent af the government of the l nstead the ACTORDS were maintained in order to keep 'host' country, underlining the inherently limited powers the Belgrade leadership under press ure and make Miloof the verifiers. They were not in a posi tion to stop viosevic honour his cammitmcnts, induding his consent to lenee, they could not safegua rd the re spect of the rules of the verification regime. While Holbrooke's diplomatie international humanitarian law, they were just 've rifi ers' steps were part of a deliberate effort to prevent the oursupposed to ver ify compliance with international break of a ncw round of large-scale hostilities in thc

JAS ON Ma gaz i ne .

[1999

3'


Icgitimate State and national interests".19 Against this background, the Alliance's military authorities started co ntingency planning on the modalities of the 'international presence', as suggested by the Contact Group, in anti cipation of a positive outcome of the Rambouillet talks. The concept of such a force was directly derived from the Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia, which provided for the deployment of a so-caUed 'lmplementa ti on Force' ( IFOR) or 'Stabilization Force' (SFOR) with the explicit consent of the parties and having enforcement powers to make sure that the force could act in a credible way. The concept, however, was heavily contested by Belgrade, which refused the deployment of foreign troops on its territory, arguing that it would be an infringement on its national sovereignty and th at, if an interim agreement would be reached between the two parties, there was no necd whatsoever for such a force. The issue of the deployment of such a 'Kosovo Force' (KFOR) would become one of the main stumbling blocks during the negotiations in Rambouillet. On the Kosovar Albanian side the main issue became not so much the prospect of independence, which was nonnegotiable for Belgrade, but the holding of a referendum at the end of the transition period, together with the issue of the disarmament of the KLA guerrilla's. At the end of the talks in RambouiUct, the Contact Group consented in a resumption of talks on 15 Mareh, three weeks later, in a new effort to reach agreement on the future status of Kosovo. NATO refrained from the execution of air strikes, repeating that it was 'ready to act' if necessary.

spring of 1999, the international community - desperately hoping to keep the 'momentum of peace' - tried to gct the parties to the negotiating tabie. The momenturn, however, was lost within the shortest time possibie: parties were unable to reach an agreement on the core elements of a political settlement and on the rules and procedures for elections by respectively 2 and 9 November, as fore seen in the timetable th at had been agreed upon by Milosevic and Holbrooke. In the mcantime, while the OSCE was anxiously trying to find the required number of 'verifiers' , a series of incidents on the ground culminated in a massacre at Racak on 15 January, in which 45 Kosovar Albanians died. The bloodbath forced the international community both to acknowledge th at hardly any progress had been made since mid-October in the implementation of its demands and that it had to step up its efIom, bath diplomatically and militarily. On 29 January, the Contact Group agreed to su mmon representatives from the Federal Yugoslav and Serbian governments and a dclegation of the Kosovar Albanians to Rambouillct by 6 February, to begin negotiations with direct involvement of the Contact Group. 16 The parties were given two weeks to reach agreement on a political settlement for a transitional period of three years, based on an outJine presented by the Contact Group which provided for 'a substantial autonomy for Kosovo', while preserving the territorial integrity of the Fedcral Republi c of Yugoslavia, the deployment of an international NATOled force and the disarming of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The Contact Group would hold both sides accountable if they failed to seize the opportunity, a last round of talks on an interim settlement, offered to them. In a carefully coordinated approach, the next day NATO lent its fuU support to this strategy by fortifYing the political initiative with the threat of using force, in line with its ACTOR o s of mid-October. An official statement said that the Alliance was ready "ta take whatcver measures are necessary in thc light ofboth parties' compliance with international commitments and requireroents".17 The North Atlantic Council thus authorized Secretary-General So!ana to order air strikes against targets on ""RY territory, adding that it would take "all appropriate measures" in case of non-compliance by the Kosovar Albanian side, without giving further details. IS Responding to NATO'S decision to empower its Secretary- General to authorize air strikes the government in Belgrade, describing the authorization as "an open threat of aggression" against its sovereignty and territorial integrity, warned th at it would "proteet resolutely its

Notes

K.laus Kinkel, comended there should

Tribune, 18June 1998. In an interview

be "an explicit and unassailable legal basis" for militaryaction by NATO,

on British tv, UN Secretary-General Kof! Annan warned agaillst NATO

28 April 1998.

while his French counterpart, Hubert Vedrine, said: "IfNATo breaks

intervening without a UN mandate, and answered "absolutely" when asked

A/lantie NewJ, No. 3016, 5 June 1998. The German Foreign Secretary,

thar rule roday, orhers will do the same

whcther such conduct would not be

tomorrow.", International Haald

"a licence for military anarchy" in the

1

AtlantĂ&#x17D;e News, No. 2994,

2

6 March 1998. International Herald Tribune,

3 4

Use of force without a legal basis As th is second round of talks did not lead to a breakthrough, on 24 March 1999 NATO starred Operation Allied Force - the execution of air strikes along the lines of the ACTORDS. Only then did the public debate start on the politica!, military and internationallegal implications ofthe use of force by NATO, in terms ofits legitimacy, proportionality, and effectiveness. After weeks of bombing, it is eIear that the operation wiLt have farreaching consequences for the functioning of the international political system as set up after the Second World War. As one German cabinet minister deeIared, one month before the start of the air strikes: "Any way you look at it, if N ATO attacks a sove reign country it will create a histori cal precedent that wiU have unforeseen co nsequences for the Alliance and all of its members". 10 Onc can easily add: "And the rest of the world."

JA$O N M agazine

â&#x20AC;˘

Volume 24


world, A/lan/jc N~wJ, No. 302 4,

tuS

,JulY'99 8.

degree of autonomy, and meaningful

for Kosovo, a subsrantiaJly greater

se! f- ad min i stra tion.

5 At/an/ic News, No. 3038, 1I September 1998.

11

In the 'Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo

A t/an/ic News, No. 3049,

Verifica tion M ission', sig ned by the OSC[

7

14 O ctober 1998. At/an/jc NewJ, 0.3°5], 28 O ctober 1998.

FRV government

Document S/19 98/953 , 14 Octobe r

and security of the Verification Miss io n

8

9

and the Federal Republic of ( FRV ),

JI

December 1998.

6

Yugoslavia

s!Pv·393 7·

'5 Inurna/jollal fI~rtJld Tribuf/t,

in paragraph 6, the

"guaranrees {he safety

16 Contact Group Conclusions, London, 29 January ' 999. D ocument of {he Office of {he High Representative.

'7 At/an/ic NrwJ, '0.3°7 8, 3 February 1999·

18 At NATO I-Icadquarters, it was recogni -

1998, containing

and al l its members ~, adding in para-

'information on the endorsc mcnt by

graph 7: wIn the event ofan emcrgency

rion to exert the sa me military pressure

the Government of the Yugoslav

si tuation in Kosovo which in the judge -

on both Bclgrade and the Kosovar

zed that the AJliancc was not in a pos i-

Republic ofSe rbia' of ,he accord

ment of the M issio n Direcror thrcatens

AJbanians. A, ,he same time, ir was stressed that NATO had detailed infor-

reached by President M ilosevic aod us

the sa fety of members of the

Special Envoy Richard H o lbrooke.

Verificatio n Mission, the

'Ag reement on rhe OSC E Kosovo

permit and cooperale in the evacuation

FRV

shall

ofVerificarion Mi ssion members."

Verifi cation Mission', sig ned,

12 On 4 D ecember 1998,

on 17 0crober 1998, bytheoscE's

marion about the KlA'Sarms smuggl ing and the money it rece ives, NRe

flandelJblad, Jo J an uary 1999. In a separate paragraph, NATO'S state-

C hairman- În -Office and the Minister

the Norrh Atlantic Council issued

ment of 30 January sa id rh at NATO was

of Fo rcign Affairs of thc

the 'Activation Order' for thc

aJready srudying "how 10 support

FRY; and

'The Kosovo Verifica tion M ission

'Extractio n Fo rce', wÎth its headquar-

measures to curb anns smuggling into

Agreement between the No rth Atlantic

[ers in Kumanovo, M acedon ia,

Kosovo".

Treaty Organization and Ihc Fcderal

close 10 the border with Kosovo.

Rcpublic ofYugoslavia', signed on

Atlantic News, No. 3064,

meeting of rhe fcderal gove rnment of

J 5 O ctober

8 D ece mber 1998.

FR. Yugoslavia', Bclgrade, 1 February

1998.

1. In resolution 1160, th e Secllri ryCou n·

13 Sccurity Council, D ocument S'lov. 3937,

cil expressed support for a peacefuJ resolution of thc Kosovo problem

1~

'999· 20 In/n na/ ional l-/erald Tribunr,

24 O ctober 1998.

which would include an enhanced sta-

19 Press Release: 'Statement from the

Provisional Records Security CounciJ,

II

Febru ary 1999.

3937th M eeting, 24 October 1998.

Atlantisch Perspectief Tijdschrift voor Int.matlonal. betrekklnpn en velU ....ldspolitl.k Een jaarabonnement op Atlantisch Perspectief, het tijdschrift van de Atlantische Commissie, kost slechts hs,· per jaar (f2s,· voor scholen en studenten). U krijgt daarvoor acht nummers en de Factsheets van de Atlantische Commissie. Als welkomstgeschenk ontvangt u het boek Een continent op drift. Over de veiligheid van Europa. U kunt ook begunstiger van de Atlantische Commissie worden_ Voor f6s,· per jaar ontvangt u alle publicaties van de Atlantische Commissie en uitnodigingen voor lezingen, seminars en conferenties die de Commissie or,aniseert. Als welkomstgeschenk ontvangt u naast bovengenoemd boek ook het boek The United Natians ond NATO in Farmer Yugoslavia, 1991-1996. Limits ta Diplomoey ond Force van Dick Leurdijk . U kunt deze bon opsturen naar de Atlantische Commissie, Antwoordnummer 304, 2Soo EB, Den Haag (geen postzegel nodig)

o o o o

Ja, ik wil een gratis proefnummer van Atlantisch Perspectier Ja, ik neem nu een abonnement op Atlantisch Perspectief 1135 ,-) Ja, ik neem nu een studentenabonnement op Atlantisch Perspectier (f2s ..) Ja, ik word begunstiger van de Atlantische Commissie ([65, -)

Naam Adres Postcode en woonplaats

IASON Ma gazin e .

/ 1999

33


~t;t"~Reporting

The scope of Europe linze de Boer

'The Scope ofEurope' was the subject ofaforum organized by the ]ASON Foundation on 16 March 1999. One day after the collective resignation ofthe European Commission, all matters European attracted more attention than ever, as witnessed by the 70-odd crowd in attendance. Radiojournalist Mr Gerrit van der Kooy acted as chairman, with State Secretary for European Affairs Mr Dick Benschop and European affairs expert Dr Jan Rood as speakers. The followingprovides a summary ofMr Benschop 5 remarks.

n excltlng evening in exciting times, was Mr Benschop's opinion. Agri culture reform firmly on (he agenda. Oskar Lafontaine, who resigned a week earli er. The talks at Rambo uillet whi ch would be resumed rhar very day. And, of course, the Eu ropean Commission handing in its resignation in the early morning. Exciting times in which, accord ing to Benschop, the scope of Europe is being redefmed.

Outdated 'management culture' Not very far ioto hi s speech it becomes elear rh ar with 'the scope of Europe' he refers (0 inrernal processes. As a consequence, he does not go iIlto the quesrion of the geographic scope of Europe: who is and is not included? Thc firsr 'redefinirion' co nce rn s thc Europcan Union's 'ma nage ment culture\ which in its prese nt farm is outdated. Up to now, said culture as weil as the EU'S structure are of a stri ct separation between, on the one hand, policy formulation, and on th e oth er policy execution and management. Commiss ioners arc rc sponsible for the farmer, officials in the directoratesgeneral for the latter. This model has proved unworkable, says Benschop, "for it creates avertical, hierarchical approach pro ne to abuse. lt allows fo r hu sding and old sc hool ti e polities. But, of course, perso nal responsibility does exist, as the Commission has experienced. H owever, inherent defects in the manage ment structure contribute in a major way." Today, citize ns expect governmcnt to act, cfflCiently, effectively and clearly. Poliey execution therefore ereates more polit-

34

,ASOM

Magazine â&#x20AC;˘

ieal problems than polier formulation. "The present structure and culture of'Europe' are not yet able to meet the demands for efficiency, effectiveness and c1arity. This conclusion is quite shodcing. H owever, the cu rrent crisis a1so se rves as a catalyst for re-examining and, where necessary, reforming the management structure and culture of the European Commission apparatus." l\1l eanwhile, people have to realize that for some time now, the Commission is a political body and rhar Commi ssioners are not just to p-level officials in a bureau cracy. "The Commiss ion should be reformed from an organization solely co nce rn ed wirh policy formu lat io n to one also re sponsible for adequate policy execution. 50, irs management culture ha s to change. Accountabiliry mu st be central to it and more time and effon have to be devoted to execution and co ntrol." The current cri sis must be re solved as quickly as possible. (At th e Berlin Summit, former IraJian Prime Minister Romano Prodi was 'appointcd' as th e future President of thc European Comm ission, ed.) Mr Benschop briefly di scussed Agenda 2000 and rwo elements of importa nce to the Netherlands. These are the country's position as a net conrributor to th e EU, and the Common Ag ri cultural Policy (CAP) including the Structural Funds. With regard to the first, he said the strongcst shouldcrs should carry the heaviest burden. The CAP, he remarked, is outdated. Savings resulting from its modif,cati on as weil as from an adjustmenr of the Ncrhcrlands contribution, are of key importance for the futu re of the

Volume 24


Germany. At prese nt, such a war has become unthinkable due to interdependence. The old goal having been achieved, Europe now has to aim higher. For if we want astrong and social Europe, "we have to position the EU and Europe more firml y in an ever 's maller' world. In other words, we have to ge t rid of the 'Old World ' label. Ncw Europe.n dyn ami cs in a changing worId", however, also means "looking for a new se t of instruments" for integration. The time has come for a new style- integration, a ' New Appeal', in which modern management techniques are brought to bare on Europe. This involves rem oving obstacles and formulating new policy. In short, a ncw methodology not sub stitutin g but co mplemellting the 'classical' in struments.

Dick Benschop

EU. Enlarge ment costs mon ey, money whi ch has to be found so mewherc.

Aecording to Mr Bense hop such a New Appeal eo nsists of peer review, by which member states stimulate each other through constructive criticism and valid exampies. Next to this, ncw policy more frequcnt1y contains so-ealled guidelines (e.g. th e 'global economie guidclines' or the 'cmploymcnr guidelines') member states must adhere to, albeit in a way of their choosing. Thc sys tem is effective, "as no onc wants to be at the battom ofthe official EU score board". Peer review th us leads to peer pressure as a means of mutual influence and guid ance. New style -integration is "a confluence of ncw instruments to challenge member statcs into delivering a maximum performance", says Benschop. UA combination of peer pressUfe and best practi ces." In addition to directives and other legal instrum enrs the guidelines can be applied in flelds hitherto outside the integration proeess. This uncharted territory eould be ealled 'the silent force ofEurope'.

Leapfroggi ng int egration ]n thc State Secretary's opinion, Europe is developing at a very fast pace, rcquiring new dynami cs al ready identifiabie . Bensc hop di scussed th ese and th e neccesity of finding new ways of integration. His starting point were the new processes implemented after ratifYing the Amsterdam Treaty and the creation of the Eco nomi e and Monetary Uni on (EMU). He stated that, in view of the dissolution of national borders within the EU, increased co-opera ti on in the fields of police and justi ce, and asylum and immigration. The Amsterdam Treaty already provided for some imperus. This so-ealled Third Pillar of the European Union will be developed further at a special summit on the asylum problem in October. As regards the Seeond Pillar, the Common Foreign and Seeurity Poliey (CFSP), Mr Bensc hop rem arked that the Amsterdam Treaty created formal instruments, in th e wake of which positive developments can be seen. With this he apparently refcrred to the constru ctive attitude on European security and defence of the UK under Tony Blair. The choiee between 'European' and 'Atl antic' is out of date. European security benefits from astrong Union as well as close transatlanti c relations. European integrati on and modernisation of NATO reinforce each other.

EUfope is looking for further integration as an answer to "fast-movi ng global economie, social and political developments". Ncw poliey and political dynamics which thicken the European ti ssue ca n be disce rned: "Not by imposing furthcr intcgration from above, but by challenging the European players. Not a New Deal but a New Appeal." Changes in management culture and new methods of integration require many adaptati o ns and refor ms. The se, in turn, require courage and creativity. In the end, Europe will have to take shape from the inside. A good sign is the growing internalisation of the European idea. "Th is is crucial for true unifi cati on of Europe. A forma l pillar stru cture with a plethora of laws means nothing as long as Europe is not in thc hcarts a nd mind s of peo ple. Wh at Europe need s is cou rage. What Europe needs is a ncw ge neration of Europeans, both single- minded and up te thejob."

The EMUleuro of the First Pillar, however, is the biggest change. Benschop thinks this makes the EU into a reali ty for citi zens and companies, instead of a guinea pig for politicians. "The euro literally brings EUfope into the hands of the European citizen."

New Appeal When all is said and done, it depends on how the se new dynami cs are dealt with. What are the aims? Acco rding to the State Secretary the 'founding fathers' of European integration have achieved their original goal of preventing war in Europe, mainly between France and

JA SO H Ma g az in e

The JA SON Foundation wou/d like to thank the Min istry

of

Foreign Affairs for ils support in organizing Ihis evenl.

â&#x20AC;˘

I

1999

35


South Africa's Three-in-One Revolution Cart Niehaus

Towards the end ofthe Mandela era SouthAfrica is confronted with an amount of challenges andproblems situated along three ma in tracks, as Mr Niehaus explains. This so-called 'three-in-one revolution' has penetrated almost every layer and aspect ofSouth African society. It seems appropriate to begin by setting out the context in which South Africa should be viewed.

t l.···.··, t."4it ... .•:. 'lI

I .• '..• . •

\

._ ,

:s.. ,

M rCarfG. N idums

After (he euph oria of (he 'liberation' election of 1994, there has inevitably been a certain sense of let-clown. The magi e of (he negotiatcd settlcment has not been followed by an equally mag ical socio- politica! tran sforma tion. A s (he South Mrican governmem wre sties with the problems of transition and the legacy of apartheid, much negatÎve reporting

ncw global marketplace. This ha s meant opening itself up to international competition, reducing tariffbarriers, abolishing exchange- contro! regulation s on non - residents, and allowing the Rand curren cy to float to a market-related level. These have been courageous and necessary steps, but they have al so exposed the country to the blasts of internatio nal financial instabi li ry.

follows. Th is causes some observers to pose

When South Africans went to the polls so hopefully in Apri! of 1994, no -one could anticipate th at within four years from then the winds of financial and market globalisation would blow half the wo rld's econorni es iIlto crisis, causing a flig ht of fund s from emerg ing markets everywhere and unleashing a series of hedge- fund attacks on their currencÎe s. A s the cri sis swepr from Japan through Southeast A sia aod Ru ssia, across Afri ca to Latin Arn eri ca, Somh Afri ca fouod itself caught up in an unanticipated second revoilition, as powerful in its social impact as the l ndu strial Revolution of the 19th century.

thar dreadfully loaded question whether (he IQ TIN Nnhrrlands_

ncw South Africa is not heading down (he same dismal road as much of the rest of (he

Afri can continent. This, I emphatically believe, is not the case . That many expectations have not been met is certainly true, but thi s is not entirely the fault of the new maj ority government. We may have been naively optim istic in setting some of ou r goal s, but the real problem is that the task wh ich confronted the government over th e past five years has proved far more complex and difficult than anyone imag ined it would beo For wh at South Afri ca is undergoin g is not simply a so cio-politi cal revoluti o n of derno crati sing th e mod ern wodd 's m os t dceply entrcnched system of institutionalised raci sm and politi ca! authoritarianism. Daunting thoug h that is in itself, it is in fact three simultaneous revolutions rolled into one.

Thirdl y, and just as challenging, South Afri ca ha s to tran sforrn itself from a primary producing cco nomy based on ag riculture and mining ro becoming an export- driven economy based on manufactured goods. Gold, whi ch used to be the rnain stay of the economy, is a shrinking asset. In 19 80 it provided 17 per ce nt of South Afri ca's rota! nationa! produ ctio n; roday it is a paltry 3,2 per cent. The gold re so urces whi ch yieldcd 70, 2 per cent of rotal Western production in 1980 had dwind led to 13,7 per cent by 199 7 and prodllcti on is still falling. The price ha s been falling steadily too, from 6 r 3 us dollar per fine ounce in 19 80 ro 331 u s dollar in 199 7 and 294 us dollar last year. And because of ri sing labour costs aod the increasing depth s at which the o rc

Even as South Africa tac kle s the task of trying to integrate a society th at has been dividcd by several hundred years of white dominat ion and forty - five years of apartheid ideo logy, the new governm ent mu st also undertake a g igantic economic revoluti on in seeking to tran sform the country's economy from an isolationist siege economy to an eco nomy which participates in the

JASON Magazine

Volu me 24


has to be mined, 50uth Mrica has now become the world's highest-cost producer of gold, behind Australia, Canada and the U nited States. Yields of other mining activities have also declined. 50uth Mrica is a leading exporter of biruminous coal, the world's fifth largest producer of natural diamonds, and it exports a great variety of industrially important metals, including platinum, chrome, iron, vanadium, copper, nickel and manganese ore. In common with fluctuating com modity prices worldwide, many of the mentioned assets have also fallen in price, forcing the mining industry as a who Ie to downsi'l.e. An indica tion of the magn itude of the problem is that since 1994. a third of south Afri ca's 750,000 miners have been retrenched. south Mrica's industries, meanwhile, have histori cally been geared toward import substirution, a pattern intensified by international sanctions during the 1980s. Only a few multinational s, such as Rothman s, south African Breweries and the wine and fruit-canning industries, were significant exporters. At the same time, the ncw government has withdrawn the size ab Ie agriculrural subsidies which the apartheid regime paid to its white farming constituents, many of whom are now succumbing to the hard realities of what is an arid climate in many regions.

Conflicting requirements

not establish businesses, exeept simple shops selling perishable produce, and even then their trading li cences had to be renewed annually. Ir must be the only insta nee in aU of histo ry where a government deliberately crippled the sIcilIs base of its country's worIcing class. I believe this to be the worst of all apartheid's crimes against humanity. Ir is the legaey of that whieh is the ncw democ ratie regime's greatest liability. A massive effort is now being made to build up that sIcilIs base. with a 40 billion Rand (6,67 billion us dollar) education budget talcing up by far the biggest share (21.3 per cent) of the government's total expenditure for the current financial year. One thing stands out above all others. howeve r. If the government is to cope with its three-in-one revoluti on, ifit is to fulfil its pledge to upgrade th e qualiry oflife for its people - to create jobs for the unemployed, to build houses for the 7 million homeless. to provide he alth care for all and education for every child, to bring clean water and electriciry and telephones to the rural poor then it must achieve economie growth. To stop unemployment from growing exponentially worse, simply to stay in the same place, the country needs to average a growth rate of 5 per cent a year for seve ral years, afigure not see n for more than t\vo decades. In addition the south Mrican eeonomy is plagued by high interest rate s, which reached an unpreeedented 25,5 per cen t last October, lowering inflatiol1 from 23 per ce nt under apartheid to 8 per cent at year's end de spite a steep fall in the value of the Rand curren cy. This is laudable in itself, but it has slowed growth dan gerously. Real Cross Domesti c Product (cop) grew by 3,4 per ce nt and 3,2 per ce nt in 1995 and 1996 respectiveIy, but slowed to 1,7 per ce nt in 1997 and an es ti mated I per cent last year.

What compounds the diffieulties in these areas is a crip pling confli ct between the requirements of the se simultaneous revolutions. On the one hand the ANC faces the political imperative of having to deliver more jobs and better pay to its expectant eonstituencies who have been deprived for so long, 'The apartheid while on the other hand the harsh realiry of competitive participation in the global regime, as a matter market is that it leads to press ure on wages and increased unemploymcnt, at least in the short term. of policy.

What the high interes t rates have achieved, is to attract speculative foreign investment, but thi s easy-come-easy-go money has left South Afri ca vulnerable to the wave of nervousness about emerging markets that swept the world in mid - 1998. Foreign capita! fli ght saw a billion dollars leave the cou ntry in the third quarter of th at yea r, while currency speculators attacked th e Rand.

I n see king to make the transition from prevented the black pnmary producer to manufacturing population from exporter, the south African gove rnment is confronted with the fact th at the old acquiring skills. ' ~conomy rt::4uirt::u an abundance of cheap, unskilled labour, while the new Part of the economie problcm is strucone requires a smaller, highly sIcilled rural, stemming from thc socio-econoworkforce - and the apartheid regime, as a matter of polimic distortions caused by apartheid .nd aggravated by the exigencies of the global free market. Ir is no easy tas k cy, preve nted the bl.ck population from . cquiring sIcilIs. trying to transform a sophisticated economy from proBlack people wcre deliberately given separate and inferividing a First World lifesryle for 5 milli on whites to or education (most in fact got no education at all) . They supplying 40 million South Afri cans with the basic were bar red from the major universities. They were pronecessities of life. There is an enormous financial burhibited by law from doing sIcilled work. Until 19 79 they den involved in advancing the black populatioll, and, because of the income gap, only a small number of tax were not allowed te join trade union s, sa they could not acquire skilI s by becoming apprentices. They were not payers who have te be ar thi s burden . 5 per cent of Sou th aUowed to farm partnerships or companies. They eould Afri cans contribute 80 per cent of the tax revenue.

IASO N M agazi ne â&#x20AC;˘

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The economy has to undergo a transition trom primary producer to manufacturing exporte r.

Under these circumstances the ANc -led government has shown a co mmendable pragmatism. Ir is committed to privatising the many (semi-)governmental co rporations established by the apartheid regime. Tt has adopted the concept of a social market econorny whi ch is ernbodied in a catch-all Growth, Employment And Redistribu ti on (G EAR) policy. The alrnos t overwhelrning - and increasingly all-consurning - challenge that South Mrica is faced with is to succeed in the global rnarketplace and at thc sa me time to reduce the burgeoning unemployment problem. In response many economists have provided the simplisti c advi ce th at the government's logical course should be to emulate the newly industrialised countries of50u theast Asia and foll ow a low wage/ high employment policy. They argued th at such an approach wou ld increase co mpetitiveness and also encourage direct foreign investment by manufacturers wanting access to the huge Africa n co ntinental market. Looking at what has been happening in A sia during the past couple of months, 50uth Africa can consider it fortunate that the government has not followed thi s advice to the letter. For a liberation movement pledged to free its people from the gross inegualities of apartheid to deliberately hold down blaek working-c1ass wages while allowing the rich wh ite entrepreneurial class to grow even richer is politieally unthi nkable. As the winds of economic change blew more icily through the southern hemisphere duri ng the winter of 1998, and South Afriea suffered a barrage of blows with cap ital flight, a slump in the gold pri ce, inc reased retrenchments and speculative raids that se nt the Rand

1"50 " MagazIne â&#x20AC;˘

plummeting 26 per cent in two months, the GEAR policy narurally came under increasing pressure. But the govemment held its ground. However, if the international eco nomi c climate does not become more friendly for grmving Ă&#x17D;nvestment in 50uth Africa and open opportunities for 50uth Africa's exports to be competitive, it will become increasingly diffi euit for the newly elected govern ment th at wil! emerge after the narional elections. In sum , therefore, one ca n say that South Africa has hand led the political component of its trip le revolution - the one that commanded everyone's attention because it seemed the most peri lous - with considerable success, navigating the shoals of racial di vide, of political and social di scrimination and the threat of violence, to establish a working democracy based on non-racialism and reconciliation. Ir has bee n a remarkable achievement. The economie revolutio ns, however, have proved far more diffieuit large ly because of global forees beyond the government's co ntrol. Ir is there th at the main risks lie in the future. I n the end success or failure will depend on two things: economie growth and jobs.

Ir is in this context that South Afri ca has to carefully assess its economic relations wĂ&#x17D;th the North. Whether ir concerns the painfully dragged out negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union, or the natu re of the develop ment co-operation assista nce th at it receives from a country such as T he Netherlands.

Ir is a shame th at the negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement have taken so long, and that these are not

Volume:14


yet concluded. Valuable time is being lost, time which South Africa does not have. While these negotiations are dragging on core sectors of the South African economy (especiaUy agriculture) continue to suffer severe blows. Throughout the negotiations the European Union has been playing hard ball. I t is di sturbing th at they were doing so being fully aware of the huge economie eh allenges that South Africa is faced with. The general analysis of South Africa's economic situation provided above, is known to the EU negotiators. To be ho nest, the Sou th African government is deeply concerned by what we perceive as an unnece ssarily hard line and uncompromising stance by the EU . It is difficuit to reconcile the general goodwill that is 50 often expressed towards South Africa with the formal negotiating positions we have to face. Time is running out for those countries in the EU who are blocking an agreement to demonstrate their bona fides and to put their money where their mouths are. In the latter part of last year South Africa feared that the reassess ment of development co-operation policy in The Netherlands would mean exc1usion from the list of countries continui ng to receive development funding. While the 1055 of support for very important projects (e.g. assisting women in rural areas, primary education and youth development) would have been severely feIt, our greater concern was that such a step would have reflected a lack of appreciation for the criti ca! ph ase in the transformation South Afri ca is in. Fortunately, this concern was quickly put to rest by Minister H erfkens' announcement th at South Africa wiU definitely remain on the list. We appreciate the thinking behind the re -assess ment of development aid. E specially as far as Minister Herfken s' insistence that aid must go to the poorest of the poor, and th at it must contribute towards real devel opment of the country in question. In th is context South Africa is very much in agreement that development aid must be administered in such a manner th at it wiU benefit the majority of very poor people in our country, rather than those who have become the privileged

under apartheid, or those in sectors of the previously disadvantaged communities who are able to uplift themselves. South Africa is also very much aware th at we have remained on the list of countries to receive development aid because of our important role as a motor for economie development in the re st of Sub-Saharan Afri ca. As such the recent flyer se nt up by Minister Herfkens about South Mrica becoming a co-partner in development aid program mes in other Afri can countries is interesting. This is especially the case when one considers the importance of astrong and sustainable manufacturing base for the whole region. In thi s regard appropriate technology th at has been developed in South Afri ca for African demand s and conditions can play a very important roie. Development aid program mes specifically directed toward s the empowerment of the poorest of the poor, in order to enable them to create the opportunities for themse1ves to get employmem and to comribute towards economie growth, are what South Africa and the region urgently need. Now that Minister Herfkens has decided on the list of countries that will receive development co-operation funding from The Netherlands, the critical di scussion has to be about wh at agreements wiU be reached in order to ensure that new jobs and economie growth wiU be th e result.

Ir seems to me th at that this wiU have to email making sure th at development co-opera ti on funding will feed into broad and strategie deve10pm ental program mes. In South Africa this will mean th at the gove rnm ent's development and reconstruction programme will have to provide the main guidance for where funds should be applied. The ideal will be for a more programme-orientated approach - rather than the diversity of smaUer projects - concentrating on direct budgetary assistance. Now that the decision has been taken, this wiU have to be the major issue on the agenda. Minister Herfkens and her department wil! find in South Africa a very eager interlocutor. We need truc partners to make sure th at we will able to successfully co ntinue to traverse the huge challenges of our three -in-one revoluti on.

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I 1999

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Jason magazine (1999), jaargang 24 nummer 1