Page 1

Jaargang 20 Nummer 1 Februari 1995

Magazine voor Internationale Vraagstukken

NATO and Enlargement?


1.

Nationality and nationalism in the course of reforms in Russia

1!d1tors: Drs.Mike den Hanog Drs.Rolf Koster Drs.Miriam Meekels Drs.Koen Schermer Drs.Guido Widdershoven Ronald Sandee

6.

The PiP Program and the Visegrad Group's Co-operation

Editorfal Board's Addre8II Center for Peace Research University of Nijmegen POB9108 6500 HK Ni/'megen The Nether andS

9.

Tbe JIIIIOIl magaz!ne Is a blmonthly publicadon oftbeJason Foundation

13

Editorfal Board Editor-in-chief: Drs.Cyril Widdershoven

Exec:udve Board Chairman: Vice-Chairman: Intern. Secretary: Treassurer: Secretary: Fundraiser: P.R.-Coordinator:

A/exander Duleha PhD

Partnership for Peace Some merits and limits Constantin V/ad •

Ukraine: balance as a form of stability K. Bomdin

Gijs Jeuken Steven Metz Andries van der Meulen Antione van Veldhuizen Diane de Vries joyce Oomen Ofga van Schaik

General Board Drs. LJ. Bal Drs. F.G.H. van den Broek Mr. F.A.M. van den Heuvel Mw. Drs. K. Hustinx Drs. J.A. de Koning, M.Phil Drs. 1I~. Laseur Drs. F... Princen M. de eger Drs. E. J. Weterings Mr. ].C,S. Wijnan<ls

17.

Creating All-European security structures: tbe difficult road of Central European countries to membership of European institutions drs. Rj.M. Koster

22.

Biography Willy Claes

23.

NATO on track for the 21st century dr. Christoph Bertram

Advisory Coundl Prof.Dr. E.Dekker, voorzitter F. de Bakker Prof. Dr. I.Th.). van den Berg Prof.Dr. 1I. de Haan Prof.Drs. V. Halberstadt Drs. G.].].M. Hayen C.c. van den Heuvel H.A.M. Hoefnagels Mr.].G.N. de Iroop Scheffer Drs. R.W. Meines R.D. Praaning Drs. W.K.N. Schmelzer Prof.Dr.J.G. Siccarna Prof.Dr. A. van Staden Drs. L. Wecke

26.

Biography Jose Cutileiro

27.

The Atlantic Community

JIIIIOIl Contactpoints Leiden: carin Tiggeloven (071-140468) Amsterdam: Annemane Duinstee (020-6854204) Rotterdam: Mark Schipper (010-4144600 Utrecht: Maaike de Langen (0~1230) Groningen: Diede rik van Rappard (050-180262) Maastricht: Hanneke van der Tas (043-219250)

31.

Kirchberg Erklärung der Westeuropäischen Union

33.

Report on the Atlantic Treaty Association Youth Seminar

Dén Helder: Peter van Vliet

35.

NATO: New challenges, old structures

Nijme~n:

mr. Ma/colm Rijkind

29.

mr_ Willy Claes at the meeting with UN and Regional and other organizations

(02230-30772)

dr. Manen van Heuven

{:::- Foundation van Meerdervoort 96

2517A1lW

Phone: 070Fax: 070- 33

58 5

TbeJuon F01mdadon cannot he held 3(:couiitable tor&l!lnions p1!t forward in contrIbutions to publ1cätion Subscrlotions wiII he automatlca11y renewed.uriIe8s}'OU send 118 a Wiitten i::anceladon before tbe ftrst of december lay-out: Mamix Arnold PrInt: Haape Drukkery

Speech by the Secretary General of NATO

37.

Russia's role in European security structures dr. Djanguir AtaJnali

39.

General statement of the ATA youth seminar Gijs j euken & Andries Vermeu/en

4 1. Book reviews


Nationality and nationalism in the course of reforms in Russia

T

he growing significa nee o f nation- specti ve of national elevelopments, solal problems in Russia in th e cour- ving national problems, ete. in the politise of reforms is conditio neel by th - cal vocabula lY. ree groups of fa ctors: 1. Changes in the global situa tion , i.e . 2. The genera l econom ic situation, politransformati o n o f (he unita dan sta te i11lo ti ca! cha os, th e absence of a n ~lIional 15 new s la les basecl primar il y o n the program to overcome the crisis create claims of (heir national sovereignty, in- the si tu ation for new attempts and expeclucling (he sovere ignty of Ru ssia from riments at every level of the social stru cthe USS R. Thi s change has been inesca- llIre. There are new opportunit ies for a p abl y fo ll owed b y th e search for a new very strong !ayer of natio nal eli tes, th at status of Russia in th e wade! cO llllllu nity. did not have access to power w ithin the Thus, a ne of (h e most importa nt fjelds Soviet system. The most convenient slowi thin a modern political space was ga ns fo r th ese eli tes are taken f rom the o pened ( usi ng [he concept ion of Pierre nati o nalist vocabu !ary. it is normal th at Bou rdi eu). Th e ou tco l11e of thi s f ig ht at in th e course of democratization rh at (h e moment is ralh er far from being set- ideas of nati onal intereSIS are advanced; in th is case they played the ir mobili zatled. As a matter o f fact the sea rch of this new l iona l ro les against th e tSo vie t em pire t statu s is going on unde r the banner of anc! tRussian cha uvinism t. The decentraRU 5s ia's national interests anc! it ca nJlo t lization of ways of governing th e countly be clone o t herwise wit hin a politica I openecl the cloors to a revival o f regionasp a ce occup ied by nation -s tates. The lism, c re~ltin g new li nes of conflicts beproblem is tha t aftel' Rll ssia appeared on tween ce ntral and reg ional powers. A the p o liti ca l arena , olhe r acto rs were long period of fighting for the statu s o f obliged to reformu late th ei r own in te- nationa l autonomies anel ad ministrati ve rests, in spite of the fact of their internal districts (oblast) w ithin the Ru ssian Festabilit y. It means that the problem of dera ti a n seems l O be comi ng (Q an end Ru ssia has no t only beco me a domestic due ro th e ne\v Cons tituti o n aclopted in one. it has become agiobal problem to the course of referendum in December find possibilities of quite a ne\v type of 1993. I t h as been recogni ze el by al l th e members of th e Fec!eration excep t one internationa l relations. Another aspect of the same prob lem is Chechnya. that the claim fo r an interpretation of nat io nal interests of Ru ss ia must be left to 3. The growrh of nationa l consCĂ&#x17D;ousness an act in g governme nt , whether ot he r resultec! from th e failure of commu nist partners Iike it or not. It represents these indoctrination , which has been t1y ing to interests in the same way as ot her gover- join two opposite tendencies. Al th e lenments represent th e interests o f their ve l of declarations th e official ideologiown countries, in spite of the fact of dif- cal doctrine suggested a conce pti on of ferent farms o f legitimization anel th e re- Soviet Man who was free fro m any kind lative insrabil ity of th e home situatio n, as of nationa l prejudices. But at the practiweil as the economic anc! political cri sis, ca l l evel the nati ona l policy was more which Russia is passing throllgh. As a na- complicateel anel controvers ial. Th e retural consequ ence o f thi s new situation gula ti on of a na t ional co mpositi on of o ne ca n obser ve the growing usage of cadres was o ne ofthe issues at all levels such terms as nat ion , natio nal intere st , of powe r. Th e breakdown of the Soviet natio nal dignity, nati ona l resources, per- Union was in Illany aspects a victory o f a

national principle over th e concept ion of class solida ri ty, international obligati o ns of the USSR, c1ass stru ggle anel c1ass enemies. As a result a basis for persona l ideologica l identifi ca ti on ha s been ta ke n ou l. A SOI1 of psycho logical vacu um arose, wh ich wa s ro be replaced by a national ethos. All these three aspec ts ifthe new SilUalion in Ru ssia co nstitut e the basis for process of rec!efining the natio nal in terests of all types of actars: graups, institutions a r personaliti es. a nc ca nn a! ignore all these changes anc! think anel act as ifthe situation has not changed. Mo re th an that , the more active an aC(Qr is, the more clea rl y he shou lcl cl efj ne for himself anc! fo r th e other acto rs where he is stand ing in all these respects, inclucling part of politicaI space he is occupy ing. Na ti o nality became, as thc german sociologist H. Krismanski notec! , a sort of a trad e stamp in the course of rrans fo rmati o n to the market econamy, fixing ( 1) a stereotypical percepti o n of national and eth nic groups , on th e o lle hand , anel (2) a certai n p lace in the symbo lic (clll tllral) space of a person , on the o lher hand. It prodllces a very controversi al si tllarion with refere nce ra th e crucial aspects of democratization , such as, for examp!e, the problem of human rights. Looking at it from this perspecti ve, these lhree factors were transformed into three main dimensions w hi ch are important for personal identification. But the order of variables in the personal frame of re fe rence \vill be not t he same as for the state or for an orga nizalion with an international statu s. In the structure of natio nal id enti fi ca ti o n the first c leme nt is language. Th ere are abo ut three thou sa nel !anguages o n Earth , \vhi ch are native ta a l arge or sillall number of people. Th e minority ofthe whole populatio n which is bilingual ,though for some cu ltures 10

fasoll Magazine no. 1, February 1995

1


be bilingu a l is the rld e ra th e r th a n th e exception . The second line of a natio nal b e lo nging is connected with cul ture in a mo re gene ra l context than is ju st the lI se of langua ge. The third line will be connected with including of a pe rson into the syste m of roles and relatio ns hips ascri bed by the culture. these are the symbols o f socialization linked to unde rstanding famil y re la{jo ns anc! su rro unding p ersons involved

be exp ired in a last versio n o f anthro p o-

logica I dictionaly. T o m ak e sen se of thi s artempt to sys tcm ati ze th e l ea d ing fea tures o f nat io n al identity it is necessary to fo nnulate two conclusions.

The first o ne is that the wo rld o f nations is tremendo u sly d ive rse. Ernest Gell ner in his !lNations and Nati o nalisrn " divieleel all nati o ns into agrari an anel indu stri ali zeel . th e el ist incrions c hosen b y thi s aut-

ging lO a naLĂ&#x17D; o n is d iffe ren t. Tt is not th e po int th at rhem m eaning o f being An1erica n as we i l as d iffe r en t fr o m b e i n g a German. T he problem is that for the Germ an as weil as fo r p erson s of o th er n ationalities the sense of belonging 1O Cl natio n is no t th e same w ithin th e sam e nati o n , th ou gh it is p ossible to o utlin e same mo re o r less w idesprea el ch ara cteristics typical o f p eopl e w ith a more or less simi lar cultural level.

in the med iatio n betwee n the fa mil y a nd ho r expla ins the diffe re nces in the types I wo ulcllik e to use he re severa l typi ca l communiry . A certain composition o f the o f natio nal identifica tio n: peasa nts think images o f p eopl e, w h o are within th e ab o ut (h eir co untry i n diffe ren t te rm s co rnmuni cative spa ce o f p erson s gi ve th an p ersons w ho live in a m odern cit y. the primary idea a bout ho me land , na - Ho weve r, it is no t th e only way of c1ass itio n and place o f birth as a particular cul- fi calion. Natio ns may domi nate o th ers o r tll ral compo nent o f a natio nal iclentity. ] t be dependent , prosperou s o r p aar, mu lis {h e fo u ndat io n o f {h e im age o f ' we' , ti ethn ic lik e Am eri ca o r o rga n ize el b y a which is stre ngthe ne d late r by the com- nati o n-state as some European societies are. Th ey m ay h ave a di as p o ra in th e plex o f images of 'they", The last line o f constru ctio n of the pe r- wo rld and again m ay no l. A very impo rsan al notio n o f b elo nging la a natio n is tant distin cti on consists o f the exp erienconnected wi th a sort o f rati o na l refl ex ce o f ge nocid e o r th e ab se n ce o f su ch a nc! self-consci o us ness , w ith {he mea- exp erience.

an sw e r s in th e i n te r v i ews o n th e qu esri o n : w h at d oes it m ea n fo r yo u ra be of (his nat ionaliry? A me rica n : l am an Ame ri can beca u se I am a d ti ze n o f th e USA an el I don' t ca re

a b o ut m y e thni c it y. (T h o ug h th e re is now a great interest amo ng Ameri ca ns in

the questio n o f w ho the ir g ra nd-gra nd-

p arents were). Ge rm an : I am a germ an beca u se I bela ng to th is cul ture, b eca use I kn ow thi s language from my chilcl hood ancllove to sp ea k th is lan guage, I love t h e germ an cultural herirage, in spi te o f th e fact that I ning a pe rson can re ly upo n in th inking o f himself as bei n g a Ru ssian , a j ew, an Th e seco nd co nclu sio n is that it i s n o t hate same p an s o f german H istory. l am Am erica n , a Ger man , a Fren chman etc. o nl y n ~lti o n s w hi c h are di ve r se i n lh e no t British, n ot Am er ica n ancl nOL Ru sEach o ne ma y continue this list till it will mode rn wo rlc!. The me an ing of be lo n- sian.

Mr. Willy CIaes, Secretary-General of NATO and mr. A. Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs Russian Federation. (NATO Office for Press ancl lnformatio n) 2

jasonMagaz ille no . I , February 1995


A new Ru ssian: I do n't care aboUl nalionality, I am a man of th e worlel . Th e language is a burden for me as soon as ir Iimits m y possibilities. I w o uld like 10 use mod ern means of communi calio n and be a cosmopolitan . An yway, in th e internal co mpositio n o f nat io n, as it is o bv io us now more th an it w as in prev i o us tim es, th e pro bl em of genera ti o n seems to be th e mos t impo rtant o ne. So metĂ&#x17D;rn es a new generation acce pts th e ex peri ence o fth e previou s, but it happens rath er o f ten in th e twen ti eth ce ntury that this exp e rien ce i s ques ti o neel . Th ere mig ht be th e peri o cl of natio naJself- refl ecrio n Wilh lhe dominant questi on ; w ho are we beJo nging to the sa me natio n? At th e end of the sixties thi s kind o f q uesti o ning w as quile constru criv e fo r rh e german s. Th ey did no t refut e th e pas t , th ey w ere trying to live throu gh th is past and to discover new respansibilities in the warld o f nalio ns. Now, it is a ralher difficuIt tim e 10 be a Russian . Th e dead are try ing to embrace th e living sou Is. The easiest w ay is jusr to deciare o neself a cosmo po litan as wa s in lhe case in the intervi ew memio necl above, b ut th e easi eSl wa y is lead s 10 lhe emptiness whi ch has discovered in Mitsc herli chs baa k "U nfahi g k e it zulrauern ". In April 1994 in Moscow at Russian Inelependent InslĂ&#x17D;tute for Social and Nati onal Pro bl e m s ther e w as an int e rnational syrnpos ium to di scuss th c pro bl ems of Interactio n of Political and National Conflicts in Ru ssia . I wouJd like to quote same o f th e speakers th ere w ith th e most I y p ica l p os ili o n s co n ce rnin g th e queslio n under analysis. Pro f. G.S imo n (Germ any):" Hussia is as n o rmal a co untry as man y Europ ean countries are. Th ere is much wik abo ut p o l y-e thni c ity, b ut rh ere af e couillries w ere th e situat ion is mo re compl ica ted fro m {hi s po int o fvi ew ... ln many Eu ropean countries the mino ril y gro ups constitute 15-20 percent. AnOlher problem is "Russian Universalism". J think thi s concep t ha s bee n bo rro w ed fro m th e 19th century, o r even mo re ancient times. In th e \Vest, thi s conceptio n, as weil as rh at o f t he Ru ss ian idea , is o f ten tak en as a 5011 o fthrea t. 1t I-lis o ppo nent was Pro f. V.Mezhuev. He argu ed th at Rli ss ia is a pan o f th e \Vest, bu t even in th e fram ew o rk o fth c Wes t Ru ss ia ha s ce rlain sp ec itl c features whi ch are a sort o f historiea llegacy. Different fro m the o ther Europcan countries Ru ss i ~1 was nOl able (Q fo llow th e pmh o f "nati o n-s tat es" , because o f its multi-eth nici ty, w hich was not of th e same nature

Mr. A. Kozyrev, Minis te r o f Foreign Affaics Russian Fed eratio n . (NATO O ffice fo r Press anel Info rmatio n) as th at o fth e co Jonial empires of Grea t Britain o r France. he sta l ed that Ru ss ia ha s discove reel a sort o f new histo ri cal path in the fo rm of a supranatio naJ state. Thi s was prccise l y th e esse nce o f th e Ru ss i a n icl ea at l east in th e f a rm anel wording o f VJ adimir SoJovjev, a cla ssical auth o r o f Ru ssian religious philosoph y in lhe last century. lI Ru ssia ," V.Mezhu ev argus, "wa s never led bya sort o fn atio nal ielea in its narrow sense. Whateverthe p o liti cal reg ime wa s it did no t change th e nature o fthe sllpran ati o nal state . ThaI is w hy b rin ging th e iclea o f th e nati o nal state (Q th e fo re nowadays means pushing Ru ss ia (Q th e verge o f destru ctio n . At th e same tim e, th e idea o fa Ru s-

si an nat i o n b asecl o nl y o n ci ti ze nship and avoiding the ethnical compo nent , as sllgges ted b y m o dern 'we ste rni ze rs ' w o u ld no t w o rk in th i s country. No nRussian ethni c gro ups ielentify no t o nly Wilh lhe Stat c, but also w ith Ihe territo ry lhey have occupied since p re histori e ti mes, and tho ugh th ese grollps elo n't constitute a majo rity o fthe po pulation , they are elisp e rsed ove r a hu ge t e rrit o ry ( ab o ut halfthe t err i tor y o f th e whole co ul1lry), from whi c h th c ir ex iste nce call1lo t be alienated . Ru ssia may go fo rw arel o nly as a multiethni c anel slipra nalio n ~11 stat e, o r it will destray itself compierei)'''. T o fini sh thi s p art o f th e di sc ll ss i o n J

jason Magllz i'/e no. 1, Febru," y 1995

3


woulel like to introduce here some elata

taken from the all-Ru ssi. n poll conduc-

Table

teel by th e Ru ssian Independent Institute

Distribution of answers about the different aspects of respondent's personal si-

for Socia l and Natio nal Problems in March 1994 (sam pling about a thousand

tuation (percentages)

responelents from regions of Russia).

The matter of evaluations

good+satisfactory

bad

Question 1. What is yO /lr evaluatioll 0 the attitude of th e developed Western

family relations

87,2

7,9

1. They are no t interes ted in what will ha ppen to Russia , they look fo r solvi ng

communication Wilh frienels

80,8

12,1

their own problems here.

nu{rition

79,6 (20+60)

16,0

2. Western cou nrri es wan t to weaken Russia anel transform this country into a

health

78,8 (20+58)

16,3

dependent state. 26,8%

lhe chances to express one's poliLical views

75,7

16,3

help Russia. 13,0% 4. It is difficult to say. 15,5%

accommodarÎon

70,3 (26+44)

24,9

the chances 10 realize oneself in professional activiry

64,008+46)

28,6

This el istribution of positions shows that the eliscussion on th e theme "Russia anel the West ll is deeply rooleel in the mind of th e people, anel that a rationalization of

material conditions in general

57,5

37,8

Iife in all aspects

74,601+64)

20,2

eounlries 10 Russia?

39,7%

3. \Xles tern countri es sincere ly want to

the problem is needed bOlh on the theoretical and the public opinion levels. ow it is time to turn our attent ion ra sa- re expressed by berween 8 la 38% of the me socio-psychological processes which people and uSing , more strict criteri a, are quite important 10 grasp the tenelen- berween 20 and 35% of population. Thecies lowarels nati o nali sm within thi s cou ntry, Th e sta rting point of {hi s analysis is {h e assumption that nationa list feelings anel attitudes present a sart of com-

se figures m ay be used as indicators of sodal tension , which ma y under certain conclitions fun ction as a basis for nationalistic feelings. This is (h e indicator of

No I don't care

37.3 27.7

It wou lcl be rather interesting to compare Ihese results with th ose characlerizing the siluaüon with nationaltensions in other counlries. For (he mornen l I can use

pensation for losses in different field or the e1ectorate basis of the Liberal-Demo- the data from the poll , condllcted by a group from th e Münster Institute of Socratic Party led by Zhirinovski. That is why we sho uldtry 10 make an Now, we shall come to a group of direct ciology, where the natiomllistic attitudes activiry.

evalua ti on of the achievemems anel losses as th ey are appreciated in public co nsc io usness. I will rely upon the re SUllS ofthe same poll, I ha ve mentioned before. To make the situation more evident I suggest to fo llow the su mmarized distributions w hich conce ntrate atten-

quest ions on the nationality problems in (h e same sa mplin g. A numb e r of questions were formulated to measure fh e degree of nationalist orientations. Lel us take some examples:

Question 2. D o yOIl ag ree Ibal adll/I (Aus/änder zl.llïïel.,1jesehiekl werden)?

tion o n the problem of losses:

persolls should have tbe legal right to

of German and Dwch population have been compa rec1 . I tak e here only a coupIe of indicators: Quesl ion 1. Do yotl agree Ihal foreigners

mllsl re lurn homefrom ollrco unlry

It is worth adding to this composilion of change Ih ei r nationa! idenfily aeeDr- CCltainly yes Ccnainl y na indicators {he appredation of changes in ding la fbeir wisb? the well-being of respondents during the Answers in Germany Agree 39.5% last two years. Don't agree 44.9 32.4 5.5 3.4 percents stated that they signifi22.9 Answers in the Neth erla nds Don't know cantly improved their situation 8.2 33.8

17.2

improved

15,5 Iived in the same situation from this point o f view

QlIestion 3. Does the l1ational identity of a person inJluenee yollr attitude to him?

25.6 saiclthattheir level of material weil being somewhal declined 33.9 significantly declined

Yes No Ca nnOl say

12.2--37.9% 35.3--70.6 9. 1--19.6

Question 2. Do yOIl have a(eelillg ofpridefor the bistOly ofYOllr COllllt ry? Certainl y yes

Yes

Cenainl y

and no no

Taking into account th ese raw figures Question 4. Do yOIt Ihink it is llecesscl1y (a nd they are more or less reliable) o ne 10 stale onels l1aliona! iden lily in a new Answers in Germany can concl ude thatthe reasons for the dif- RussiclIl passport (idel1tity CC/rcl)? 14.9 29.9 ferent levels of sodal disS~lli sfac ti o n weYes 30.5% Answers in the Netherl ands

4

Jas01' Magaz i"e no. I , February 1995

25.8


190

40.0

elec ti ons of 1993 Z hirin ovski anel his party accumulatec! all the SOUfces o f c!i ssatisfac ti on c!irected against th e consequ ences of the policy of radi cal economie liberali sm co ndu cted by Gaidar's govern ment. This generally negative attitude has been enforced by the vio lence in Moscow in October 1993 - o nl y two m o nths has passed aftel' the shoo ting of the Ru ssian White House. I n March 1994 - three Illont hs after th e elections - on ly 53.2 % saiel in the poll that they would hold th e same position which they expressed in December.

3.1

These a nswers s uppo rt lhe conce pt io n o f a situational significa nee of nati o na Iism as a channel for the absorbti on of all

kind of grieva nccs anc! dissatisfactions. The heavier load of protests aga inst foreigners in the Neth erlancl s can be explained by the absence of job vacancies feit th ere more often in personal terms. A ge ne ral co nclusio n from the analysis o f th e data is that th e more \videspreacl the dissatisfaction with different social co nditi o n s is , the higher is th e level of probability of national fee lings. Thi s interconnecti o n is feit by the politicians o f Ru ssia; that is w h y another side of the picture m ay be formulated as follows: the higher the degree of the populist inclinations of a p olitica I leader group of p arty, th e more probable the appeal to

tical and econom ie stabil ization is over. It does nat mean thar one sholl lc! ignore the p ossib iliti es of il turnin g wo rse, when th e co untry is just in th e inilia! phase of the stabili zing pracess and th e attempts ta lIse th e elements of archaislll are rather obvious anc! naLOrious , but at the same time there are assuranees that the road to stabil ization lies in the ex tent of modernization of social life, w hich exc1ud es [he possibilities o f a rhrea t for the \Vest ancl East from Hu ssia. Ta enS lIre th is develapment a reflexive p oliey is neecled in all areas o f political activity.

â&#x20AC;˘

Keeping in mind th e whole comp lex il y o f the processes with a sort of cycl ica l regul arity of moving from one extreme to ~lI1other with so me periods o f quietude anc! some signs o f stabiliza ti on, an attenlive analyst may come LO the conclusion that nationalistic extrem ism will nOL b e nationa list s logans anel vocabub ry. supported by the majority o f popu latio n The fiTst wave of nationalist ie resymboli- in Rli ssia unde!" the conditions that some zation has been proclu ced by th e demo- new ex tra ord inalY fa ctors discriminating crats (De moc rati e Russia) , when they national pride are nor involvec!. were populist trying to mob ili ze Ill ass suppon against co mmuni sm anc! bu- Th e process that works in favour of polireaucracy. tical stabilization in Ru ssia is the formation of th e n ew pol iti ca l eli te which is Zhirinovski ancl some mher extremi srs o f more aware of rhe dom est ic problems of n ati ona list fame represen t the seco nd the eou ntt¡i es and getting to acqu ire a wave o f populist o rientation, which is al- sense o f responsibiliry. The representa tiready not so efficient for th em beeause yes of extreme nationalism p layed their the process of p olitica I desrabilization role of clowns in th e politica I theatre of has starteel. In the case o f the december Russia and their tim e in the case of poli-

I

JasollMagaz i"e no. 1, FebrualY ] 995

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The PfP Program and the Visegrad Group's Co-operation Alexander Duleba PbD Securily chal/e"g es oflh e poslCo ld -War Th e pfp program is N ATO's answe r to lh e c h all enges o f lhe new posl-Cold wa r times. I don't disparage lhe responsibility of the CEE polilical elil es for securing their co untries in a security sphe-

re for th emse lves, affirming tllat th e W est , and first of all NATO as winner of th e EaSl-WeSl bipolar conflict , had lhe opportunity o f lhe hi sto ri ca l initiative for mak ing a ncw strategy o f interna tio nal develo pmenl. O n lhe Olher hand, Ru ssia together with th e former Soviet republics as weil as the states of the European Union have equa lly b een trying to find an answer to th e cha llenges o f new post-eold W~lr times. The position o f the no n-p ost-Soviel but post-communist CEE countries is veey significa nt for the development of these tfounded processest, ancl is a barometer of creat ing a new architecture o f EUfOp e. Beca u se n e ith e r EU n o r CI S anel also N ATO ( lhey are th e main integra ti o n strU CLUrcs embracing the military co mponents) ca n't develo p (h eir perspectives without ha ving fo und th e answer to th e question o f th e future position of th ase cO llntfĂ&#x17D; es in future developmem of Europe. Therefore, the poim o flhc future NATO role in Europe is relal ed to the sign ificanee as weil as lhe possibilities the pfp program o ffers those countries now and in the future.

Negative cOllsequellces of PjP? What is th e significa nee of the pfp program fo r th e CEE countries' Th e politica l elites o f the CEE countries have waited for thi s cru cia l step for m o re th e n fo ur yea rs. What are the specific results of thi s 'wa iting-p eri o d '? Th e pfp program provides new conditio ns for a better quality of com munica ti o n between

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N ATO anel postcommunislic stat es o n the military level. Uneloubleelly, this is a "progress" for it self. But , first o f all I wou ld like to concentrate m y attentio n on some negative co nseque nces o f th e pfp p rog ram fo r CEE countries. We ca n start th e survey o f some o f those nega ti ve consequences from the prin ciple o f th e "indi vidual approach" w hich is supposed LO b e in th is N ATO pfp program . I wou ld like to demonstra te th is nega ti ve influence by using using the exampIe o f the Visegrad slales. NATO's individual approach to th ese countries on the military level o f communicalions inevitably in c re~l ses the military emulation among th em . Thi s rea lity forms the favourab le conditions fo r Immching same kind of regional milita ry competition in lhe CEE. Th e q u estio n d oes eme rge if th is is the co rrec t way of stre ngthe ning th e seclirit y anel stabilit y in th is part o f Elirope? We would ha ve 10 take into consideration thatth e reaching of secllrit y g uaram ees is o ne of the most important prioriti es of th ose countries. The co mpetition in military sp he re \ViII in ev itabl y ca use th e g row th of co mpli ca ti ons in the developmem of tl1e regional polities co-opera tio n processes. \Ve wO lild have 10 remember th at th e Viseg rad "Th ree" , la ter o n the V isegrad "Four" , was established as a consuIting forum ofl he Czech Republic. Hungary, Po land anel Slovak ia o n the purpose o f the co-ordimlted adva nce in joining gradually to the \'<Ieste rn integration structures incillding N ATO. But th e 'i ndi v idllal approach' embracecl within the pfp program lallnches contrary processes in mutllal relatio ns of th e Visegracl states sllppo rting th e growth of national egoism "s weil as the growth o f national ri v~alry among them. Co nseq lle ntl y , the V isegra d states are situated in a ve ry paradoxica! positio n . Th eir mlltll al co-opera ti o n within th e

JaSOlI Magazt" e no. 1, February 1995

fram ework of lh e Visegrael fo rum should c1emonstrate th eir preparedness to join th e Europea n Un ion accordin g to th e advancemem of the European integration p r ocess. Many political leaders of th e EU h ave lIneieriined this 'prepara to ry aspec t' of th e Visegrad group's co-operatio n. WIe should realize that the politica! insta nee o f the integration model. the Eliropean Un io n states' behaviouf as we il as th e will of th e Visegrad sta tes elites to jo in th e European Un io n, is o ne of most impo rtant factors slrenglhening lhe stabil ity , no t only in lh is pan of lhe 'old m ainland'. It is really not possible to doubt (his positive rea lity. Th e co ntinllit y ofl h e political coopera tion of th e Visegrael grollp is complicated by the Pfl) program. I wou ld like to undcrlinc anOlher negati ve consequence o f the PO) program in cohe rence w ith th e above mentioned "militar y individual approach". Th e governm ent s of lhe Visegrad grou p have accepted the co nclitions o f the Pfp program becuise th ey cl o n't ha ve anOlher secllrity alt ernative . What a re th e internal politica! conseqlIenees for them' Und oubted ly , each government of (h e Visegrad stat es grollp w ill eneleavour l o keep eqlla l positio ns with their ne ighbours o n a "military co mpet itive way" to NATO. \'<Illat \ViII it signify for lhem' The stale budget ha s to be ada pted in co nfo rmit y wi th this reality. Regardless of the generally we ll - kn ow n prob le m s accom p anie d with the economic transition of lhe CEE cOllntries , th e concerning sta te-governmenlmllst en!arge the milita ry part o f the state budget, that is no t taken inro the pfp program. The new dem ocrati e CEE constitutions orde red a civ ic con tra ! regarding th e militar y stru ct ures at home. But we sh o lild re,dize lh at still th er e a re no transformation processes w ho ll y finish-


Every region of th e world has preva iled its typiea l way of civic anel power commllnica ti on, a syste m of va lues, hisl ory , traclitions, morals ete. \'(lith in those regiona l spaces th ey have been arising na tural economica l , eultllral anel politieal integrating strllCtli res. The military stru ctu res ha ve to b e formeel in co nform i ty w ith Ît. Where economieal , eultura l, politi ca l anel military structures are no t uniform, th ere are always aetua l elestruetion proeesses as weIl as the t h rea t of tensians in internatio na l relations. Aeeorelin g to my po int of v iew , taking th ose /lltegrati01l proces ses factors not inro cons id eration military Th e pfp prog ram is o pen to eae h state stru ctures are arrificia l and non-perspeecapable to contriblile to the stability and tive. sec urity o f the Eliro-Atiant ie area. The Some alterllatives question is : w hat are th e boundaries of th e Euro-Atlanti c area? So, we know the notion the IlNorth -Atl antie area!! as weil NATO finels itself in a erucia l posilion afas the nOl ion th e IlElIro-Asiatic area!! lh- ter the end ofthe bipolar con fli ct as weil ro ugh the explanarion lately, o f the CISI as lhe end of a anificial military d~vision po liti ca l leaders. I donlt regard thi s no- of the world. Th e leaders of NATO must tion eomparable w ith th e space determi- make a new el erin ition o f NATO's targetnari on of th e worlel regions as o nl y an area as \ve ll as the new ro le and fune tions of th eir military organizatÎon. useless Il p lay o f wareIs" . Th e el eveloprn ent of a worlel civilization They have ra see realities as follows: the eluring last deeaeles has demonstrateel CI S ha s been taking th e unambiguous the o ri gi n of th e sp ecia l wo rlel regions. direction to th e estab li shme nt o f the

ed. Th e sign ifi ca nee o f the military ci rd es wi ll increase in every CEE sta te. The growth o f the influ enee of mili tary- industrial complexes inside the state, already was qualified by Joseph Schumpeter as a negative factor of the democratie deve lo pm ent of society strlle tures many yea rs ago. Th e Pfp program enab les a participating state to preserve anel proteet its democratie socie ty. But the realizatio n of th e pfp program partically does causes contralY effects.

whole uni ty of ilS eeo nomies, polities anel military stru etures. Tt has grael uall y crea ted an image o f a va luabl e g l oba l partner in the military sphere. Th e European Union has formeel lh e mil i tary st ru et u res in th e framework of \'(lE U. Both th e n ew military st r u etures are build in coherence w ith lhe natural integration proeesses in the \Xlest and Easr of Europe. Thase ones arose as natural adc\itional st r uetur es to th e preceeling struetures in eeonom ies anel po lities spheres. Th ey have no artifieia l eharaetel'. In my opinion, the erucia l issue of N ATO's future fole in Europe wil l be co ncentrated in the cl evelo pmenl of the NATO -\X'E U relal ions as \vell as in th e new division of military anel sec ll r il y tasks among [h em . 50, I suppose, there are some alternarives:

1. Th e \'(IEU wil l turn into an European pillar of NATO shou lc\ering th e o rganization's dominant responsibiliry of th e military seeur ity of Europe , in accorelance w ith th e processes of the natural European Întegrati o n sp ace. Th i s reality \vDuld signify the detraction o f immediate influenee eoneerning the military ~lI1c\ seeurity affairs in Eu rope fol' the Non h

Mr. Olechowslti, Polish Forcign Minister talking to mr. A. Kozyrcv, Minister of Foreign Affairs Russian Federation. (NATO Office Fm Press and l nformation) Jasoll Magazille no. 1, Fcbruary 1995

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Ameri can partn ers. Thi s fa ct wou ld have to lead to the transfo rm atio n o f N ATO's internal stru ctures as w eil as ra changes in the decisio n-making procedu res. This alternati ve is indicared through th e differences of NATO ancl WEU approaches to the non-post-Soviet CEE countries. Tt will be only slightly sufficient to turn over the l ea fs o f th e NATO pfp program fro m Janu ary 1994 and th e WE U Ki rchberg d ec\arati o n from May 1994 to t he und erstanding of both o nes. 2. Th e N ATO wi ll tran sform itse l f to a military mechanism adding th e CSCE poIitical mechanism for a non-NATO Eu rope. Thi s o ne w ill fulfil a" roof fun cti on " supp o rtin g th e sec u ri t y o f Euro p e. 1 [hink , we woule! have to consicler rhat it could neverturn inro a functional comprehensive "military integrati o n stru cture fo r th em all ". Thi s al tern ati ve supposes th e preserva t io n o f o ld inrern al Slru ctu res of the N ATO as weil as th e po licy of th e intern ati o nal relati o ns' status quo at all. I n m y po int o f v iew th i s li ne is no t p ersp ecri ve f o r a l o ng tim e beca use il eloesn't rega rel th e continuity o fthe integ r ati o n processes in th e Eas t anel t he West of Eu rope. NATO w ill have not any

military partn er amo ng sing le C I S-sl~Hes as Ru ssia, Azerbayel zan etc., ilS rea l parln er w i ll b e th e CIS co ll ec ti ve sec ur il y system as a unity , but in same years. O n rh e other hand , th is alternati ve w ill prolo ng t he process o f th e \'\IE Us determi natio n anel simul tan eously o f lhe w ho le integrati o n process o f Eu ro pe inside its natural space. It is impossible to eliminate tensio ns w hich may ari se th ro ugh th is facts.

PbD Alexa nder Duleba is a resea rcber of /he Slovak Ins/i/ute fo r In/ ernational Studies in PresolJ, Slovakta. Hts research is co ncen/ra/ed 0 11 Eas/ Eliropean subjee/sJ primarily rela/ed 10 Ukrail1e and Russia.

3. The NATO w ill not change its contemp o ra ry intern al stru cture s and its pos i tion in Europe. On th e ot her han d , th e NATO w ill be ca pabl e to tak e respo nsi bility fo r the military security in th e w hoIe natu ral inregrat io n space of the European Unio n - rega rdin g nat o nly military as p ec ts. I n thi s case [ h e N A TO mu st change its position in rh e questio n abo ut t h e acce din g o f n o n -p os t Sov i et CEE countries. But it should be another positi on than w h ich is supposed to be in the NATO pfP program . EIse, there are other alrernatives too. Th e future d evel o pme nts w i ll sho w w hi ch one is rea !. â&#x20AC;˘

-'.:. l-~

Ja/luary 1994

Mr. Kovacs, Foreign Minister Hungary and mr. Veleti, Defense Minister Hungary. (NATO O ffice for Press and Informati on) 8

JasonMagaz ine no. 1, February 1995


Partnership for Peace Some merits and limits Constantin Vlad

T

he Partnership fo r Peace (prp ) is already in an operat ional phase. More than 20 sta tes ha ve sign ed the Framework Document anc! a number

of (h em pre pared the indi vidual Partners hip Progra mme, agreed upon wirh NATO. Insicle the Nort h Atlantic Alliance specia l structures started to o perate ancl

same jo int military exercises are lInd er way. I mentio n in th is respect thar Rumani a was the first country which signecl the Framework Document anc! amang lh e first co unt r i es w hi c h h armoni ze d with NATO the indi vid u al Partn ership Prog rallll11 e. The Romani a n military atte ncl ed a l1utnber of exe rc ises as part ners, bath o n national territory anc! abra-

ad, ancl two battalions of the Romanian armee! forces are ncw trained fo r peacekeeping missions. However, the debates o n Partnership for Pe,l ee continu e, so me p eople eonsidering that pfP is going on very we il , beyond the initia l expeetat io n s, some 0 [ hers, b y th e eon trary, thinking th e Part nership is a failure. I think both of sueh opinions are exaggerateel ; may be , lh e lruth is so m ewhe re in between. From th is point of view in th e present articJ e I should like to address some q u esti o n s eoneerrling m erils anel limits of Pfl\ taking into consideration not o nly the eonce ptio n on Partnership , but the practiee o f ilS implementation roo , in the contex t of overa ll developments in Europe. I will pay a partiClliar attention to the p o litieal aspeets o f pfp anel to ilS significa nee for NATO's expansion to the East. As far as th e Merits of Pann ership are conce rn ed, I be l ieve first o f all we 111llst remember the conditions when th e Partn ersh ip iel ea was born and b ecame a practical initiative o f the Alliance. Firsl, as it is weil known , aflerthe collapse oft he communi~t regimes in the Central anel Ea stern Eu ro pean cO llntries, afte l' Ih e elismantlement of th e \X'ar saw

Treaty O rgan iza tio n (WTO) and the end of the USSR in th e Central and Eas tern part o f the Continent a vacuum o f security appeared. The Central anel Eastern Europ ea n cOLl ntri es, former members of \VfO , expressed the option 10 be admitted to NATO ancl WEU. Suc h an option was ch osen alo ng with their adhere nce to democratic val u es of political pluralism an el free mark eI eco n omy, unde r con clition s of uncertainties anc! uneasin ess of post-Cold War Europe "within the no n-confrontati o n - high instability environmentl " . According with its basic stan ce aelopted in Lo ndon ( 1990) and Rome (1991), th e No rth Atlantic Allian ce sh oweel unelerstanelin g for that option , a first sig n of th at understaneling bei ng lhe creation of the North Atlantic Coop erati on Council (NACC, 199I), o p en to al l forme r memb ers of \VfO , inclueling those which are the Sllccessors o fthe fo rmer USSR. In adcliti o n to close li es anel syslematic cooperati o n between the All iance anel the participating countries, NACC left an open doo r for an eventual en largement of NATO . Rlissia, being fa vollrable to coop eration with NATO, after som e hesitation anel ambiguity, sa iel a clea r 'njet' to the ielea of th e Alliance ex pan sion to th e East. But the Centra I anel Eastern Europ ean cou nrries reaffjrm eel their des i re anel el eterminatio n to get NATO m embership. As aresuit, the signs of a reborn Eas t- West syn elrom e anel a renewecl competition for spheres of influence w ithin the very hea rt of th e Conrinel1l have appeared. The Partnership initiative was meant just to "re m ove th e primer Il of such a potential very nega ti ve el eve lo p m ent. Did the Pfp sll eceed to do that' I do not think so. In m y opinion , the partn ers hip on l y p ostpo n ed an answe r to that partiClilar ques tion . Such a post p onement is also represented by the recent deci sion of the Nort h Atlanric Council to set up a working grollp to stud y the con-

e1 itio ns for NATO 's flItlIre en largement. On the o th er hanel , the renewed oppositi on o f Ru ssia to sueh an enlargement to th e East is a proofth at the question still remains open. Second l y, the Documenls concernin g Partnership for Peace are ba seel o n cleal' anel fi r m co mmitm ent of (h e participa tin g countries to the democratic va lues anel the prin ciples of internatio na! law. As the Framework D oc um ent slat es: ttThey reaffjrm their cOl11mitment 10 fulfil in gooel faith th e obli gatio ns of rhe Charter of th e Un iteel Na ti ons an el th e princ ipl es ofrhe Uni ve rsa ! Declaralion on Human Hig hts; sp ecifica ll y to refrain fr0 111 th e threat or use of fo rce aga inst the terri toria ! integrilY or politica l inde pen dence of any state, to respect existi ng borders and to sell ie displltes by peaceful meanS.l It is clifTi cult to overest imale th e sig nifi cance o f that sta tements, if lhe exp er ien ce of th e first years o f the post-Cold War periocl is taken into consiel erati on. I have in minel th e tenclen cies appeared in those yea rs to\v,lI'cl s so m e c hanges o f th e sta te-con fjguratio n, as it was establishecl by sys tem ofVersa ill es tr ea ti es aftel' W\'Xll. Th ere is no do ubt that even such lenelen cies have fed discre te, but unambiguo us revisionary hopes, even claims within a cl im ate co ndu ci ve to regiomli instabilities anel ethnic conflicts in large pans o f the Con tinent . if (hi s kind of tendencies woulcl not be stoppeel, incilleling mea ns available 10 Pfl>, th e prospeets in Europe woulcl be gloomy. Third ly, aecording to th e basic iele" of th e Partn ers h i p for Peace unel e r new concl itio ns, th e security in Europe shall be comm o n anel eq llal fo r alt states, [hat il can b e obtainecl o nl y by coop era ti o n o f parties ca n cern eel, first of all o fth e farmer ene mi es, founcleel o n mutua l conficlence. in th is respect I wo ulel share th e p o int of view ex pressed by th e former Sweel ish minisrer of fore ign afTairs,

Jasol/ Magaz ine no . 1, February 1995

9


Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas: Il pfp is com m a n o r co n ve rg e nt inl er es ts w ill by its n ature a confidence building pro- prevail 50 the co-operatio n, i.e. partnerscess",. But I shou ld add: the Part ne rship hip wil l be anel rem ai n a need , even a is conceived to be a confidence building must. I s suc h a perspeclive arealistic process, and it must remain faithfu l to its o ne' I'm doublful. very essence in order to be l asting and Fourt h , b est but n or least , among lh e merits of Partnership for Peace must be fruitful. As a re su!t, pfp is open to all coumries, co nsicle red rhe perspecrive o pe n by il form er members o f WTO as weil as to for the p articipating cOll ntries to get NAmher countries, known for their neutrali- TO membership. ry in lhe past, like Sweden , Finland, Aus- Rumani a, Iike all oth er Central and Eastria, SwitzerJand. In sllch a way Pfll over- tern European countries required o ffi -

passes the framewo rk of the yeste rda ys blocks. It is inte resring in rh is regard rhe pace forward represented by pfP in com-

parison wirh NACC: rhe latter comprises only lh e former members o f WTO ; a single neutral coumry , Fin land was ad-

Europe. I think that a signifi ca nt contribUlion to those endeavours is represen-

led b y NATO anel WEU , req uireme nl s

expressed usually in an informal manner - to the cou nu'ies f rom the Cen tral ancl Eastern Europe concerning the necessity o f solv ing th eir eventual disputes prior ra the accession to the Membership. This requirem ent corroborated w ith goa ls of [he Pact fo r Stability, could exert a positive influ e nce in the eliminating o f th e sources of potential tensions 3mong {h ocially in December] 993 to be ad mitted se countries, including the tensions relaro rhe Alli a nce, as a part of its genera l ted to th e natio na l minorities. poliey of integration into European anel Euro-Atlantic stru ctures. In such a per- As far as th e limits of PfV are concern ed, spective as far as Rumania is concerned, in a very short analysis , I would !ik e to the Partnership represents a precursory make the fo llowing remarks:

mitted as observer. The idea o f a large and pre p a ralor y phase lO NATO . I First of all , the PFP is a partial a nswer ro openness of PfP fro m Vancouv e r to shotdd m entio n that th is ba sic stan ce of the question concerning th e security of Vladivosrok is par excellence an o primis- Rumania is approved and supporred by th e Central and Eastern European coun tic one. I th ink, it is excessive optimistic. all poli tica ! parties represented in Pari ia- tries, a question w hich is a more comprehensive o ne. Moreover, this answer reB eca u se ir sta rts from the assumption ment. thar the relations among th e participa- The pe rspecti ve o f NATO enlargemenl fers to som e aspec t s of sec urit y if th e ting states will continue to b e co-op erati - to the East introd u ces a di stincti ve cli- ab ove-me nt io ned states which are n o t ve and nonconflictive at least in the fore- mension into conceptio n and practise of necessarily th e essential ones. Let me exseeable furure , rhar in deal ing with rhe Pfp, p i aces the agenda of its act ivities in pl.in. prob lems concerning peace, stability, se- the broader framework o f the end e- Th e esse nce of the policy of any stale curity and th e development all partici pa- avours aimed to built up the new archi- co ncerning its sec urit y co n si srs in the ting states will be able ro assu re rhar lhe tec ture of security and cooperatio n in ex iSl ence of some rea l and effective gu-

Minister of State & Foreign Affairs mr. T.V. Melesc anu. (NATO Office fo r Press and Informatio n)

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Jason Magaz ine no. 1, February ]995


aramees, able to assure the protectio n o f its natio nal interests, against patential th real S 10 its borders, territoria I integrity, po liti ca I independen ce , thre ats whi ch can invo l ve th e use o f fo r ce; in oth e r w o rds, against an y kind of aggression. Or, th e Pfp , by its content and finalit y, ha s na int e nli o n to appro ac h th e questio n related to the guarantees fo r securiry o f lhe partner-states. This is in my opinion, o ne o f the fundalllentallimits of the idea of pfp and of the PfP programm . of course, th e PfV Documems camp ri se th e provision concerning consulrations between NATO anel any active participaring state if th e latter pereeive a direct threal to ilS territorial integrity, political inel e p enel e nce o r se c llril y. Th e N ATO o penn ess to sueh eo nsuItati o n rep resents, undoubtedl y, an improvement o f generaI conditions under whi ch th e partnerstates pronlOte lheir national security interes ts. But th e above mentio ned provision does not go beyond, for exalllpl e, of lhe content of anicle 4 o f the North Allantic Treal y, which stipul ates the necessity of co nsulration s wh enever, in th e opini o n o f an y N ATO member " ... the territoria I imegrity, political independence o r security o f an y o f th e Parties is th -

reatened ". Yet, the North Atl antic Treaty d oes no t limit to sllch consultati o ns. It goes further and , by article 5, provides guarantees of secllrity to alllllembers of lh e Allian ce and t o th e Alli an ce as a whoi e. In a similar manner proceeds th e Modified Treary of Brussels by anicl e V. Thi s kind o f provisions represent typical exalllpi es o f guarantees o r arrangements o f securiry, provicled by two military-politica l alliances - in oth er w o rd s, by tw o g enllin e sec urit y stru c ture s - to their members. Or, pfP doesnit represent such an allian ce ; it is o nl y a sort of coo perati o n o f a number o f stat es: lh e pannerstates , and an alliance: NATO. In this regard, I note, as fo r Rumania , th e D ocuments o f Partnership do go no t fllrrh er , fo r exampl e, than the article 6 f rom th e Trea t y fo r fri endl y und erstanding and cooperation between Rum ania and France , signed in 199 1, whi ch incilld es th e pro vi sio n concernin g consultati o ns between Parties in th e case of a perceived rhreat. thar 's wh y, I eonsicler an exaggeration lhe appreciari on given by the Romanian go vernm ent to th e Partnership fo r Peace whi ch w ou ld tak e "into consid erati o n unequivoca l the vital interes ts o f th e securiry o f Rumania " . In m y o pi -

nio n slich an appreciati o n means 10 s~l y ancl ro expect to much from Pfl). I shollid also note th at some ROlllani ~1I1 anal ysl s and politi ci an s sp eak a bo ut "e xpli ci t" and "illlpli cit" g uarantecs fo r sec urily, the PfP being a case o frh e lalter. I consider thi s kinel o f vi ew p o int a 'confll sio n in terllls' . Of course, the partici patio n in th e PfP and th e line o f integrali o n inl o Euro pea n stru Clures impra ve th e imernatio nal condition o f Rum ania , bUL does nat represenr, as such , guaranrees fo r its national security. th e guarantees fo r security are d ear anel o pen , i .e. expli cit , under form al juridical , po litical anel military commilme nt s. As a co nseq ue nce , th e pnJ , in spite o f sa me benefi ci al effeets, does not put an end to the vacuum of security exi stin g in Ce ntra I anel Eastern Euro p e. Fo r thi s reason , I be li eve H enry Ki ss inge l' is ri g ht in stalin g that 11 â&#x20AC;˘ â&#x20AC;˘ th e ad m ini stration p o li cy - I w o u lel add , the Euro p ean po li cy- creales lWO categori es o f fronti ers with in Euro p e: those wh ich are guarant eed are nOLrhre aten ed ) and those whi ch are threatened are n Ol guaranteed ". 4And sll ch a do uble Slatu s o f th e fromiers represent not o nl y a paradoxi cal siruation but a very justifi cative ca llse o f lIneasiness too , beca ll se

Canadian Foreign Minister mr. OueUet and Romanian Foreign Minister Melescanu. (NATO Office for Press anct Info rmatio n) ]aso" Magaz{r/e no. I , February ]995

11


Europe has a sad tradition conce rnin g the guaranreed and not guaranteed borde rs, condition which by na means consolidated the status qu o but encouraged aggression anel revisionism. In co nnectio n with the p e rs pec ti ve of NATO e nlargement, the initiato rs of PIP underli ned from the starting points that the eventual status of the Alliance membership fo r some partner-states will be the result of a e lect io n - even of a selfe lect ion- acco rding to the level the ir participatio n in the Program me. of course, it is understandab le that (he access ion to the quality ofNATO-membership req uires some preliminary prepa ration o f the ca ndidate-s(ates, including in the military fie ld. And it is a positive thing that the PIP Docume nts treat the candidate-states o n an equa l footing in th is respect, byoffering to all of them th e same s tartin g point. In this way, the sta rt is undiscriminating . But does the sa me starting poi nt mea n an equality of chances for the candidate-states in getting the NATO memb e rship? Thi s is, of co urse , an ope n question. It is to be expected that the selection of ca ndidate-states to be guided bya number of objective crite ria . Neve rthe less, it ca nnot be excluded the possibi lity of some subjective , even bi ased position take n inside of the decision bodies of the Alliance during the process of selection . Fo r exa mple, the re are information about different ialion which could exist among some power, member o f NATO , con ce rn ing th e sch e dul e of ad mittanee into the Alliance of the Centr-

al and Ea s te rn European countries. if s uch a differentiation is confirme d , the process of NATO e nlargem e nt to th e East will , without do ubt, la y the ground for some power games and beh ind scene manoeuvres. As a res uit, the Alliance cou lel find itself under the influe nce of some pressure gro ups, and the move towards NATO wil l stimulate the competitio n among the candidate-states. That's why, PFl' cmild proof to be a kin d of dark screen , behind which the future differentiatio ns among the Ce ntra I a nel Easte rn EUfopean countries a re pre pa red. And s uch a di fferentia tio ns wou lel de ny, in practica l te rms, the discriminating treatme nt anel the e quality of cha nces for some of the canelidate-states. This kind of discriminat ion amo ng th e countries which want to be ad mittec! to NATO would create two categories of st:Hes , this time within Celllral an el Eastern Europe: one e njoyi ng of NATO proteclive um b re lla, a nel another without a ny guarantees for securit y. Even for a while, suc h e1iscriminatio n wo uld generate very seri ous stresses o n security anel s tability ofthe region and o fthe Continent. Because, under present conelitio ns, any "plust! in security matte rs for some s tates would be a "minu s" fo r others in (he sa me fie ld. Mo reover, any discriminaling conditions will stimulate the competitio n for sphe res of intlue nce in Central anel Eastern Eu rope. If this kind of d evelop ment w ill ta ke p lace , th e ve ry foundation of the PIP w ill be an nulled . .

Notes. 1. Pavel K. Baev , Peace -keeping as a cha lle nge to Europea n borders, in : 'Security Dialogue' , Volume 24 , no. 2,June 1993, p. 148 2. See Part ne rship for Peace: Framework Document NATO Review no.l , February 1994 , p.29 3. Baroness Margaretha af ugglas , Sweden's securi ty policy in post-Co ld War Europe, NATO Review, no. 2, April 1994, p.14 4. Re uter Co mm e ntary September 28 1994

Constanti n Vlad is the scientific director of the Romanian Instilute for fllternational Relations, tbe Tomorrows Rumania Foundation . He is cu rrenlly p rofessor of International Affairs atthe Un iuersity of Bucbarest anel al IS pinl Ha re( Uniuersity.

I

Tbe Editorial Board of]aso .. Mag az i ..e for I ..ter..atio ..al Affairs as ks editors, journalists, researche rs, scho lars and stude nts fro m the Net he rlands, the EU a nd Ce ntral anc! Eastern Europe to contribute articles, schemes and photo's to the Magazine. Subjects to be addressed are NATO, PIP, CEE, International Relations, Economic deve lopment in yOllr own regio n, peace-keep ing and peace-e nforceme nt, Mediterranean region , Baltic Kaukasus ete. Every single subject, related to international affairs a nel with relevanee to o ur subscribers, cao be discussed. Of particular inte rest is your opinion o f the articles injason Magazine. Please, write it down anel sent it to our address. If you're will ing to contribllte to Jason, the following style po ints have to be kept in mind: · write it down in Word Perfect 4.2 o r 5.1 · if possible , sent it on flopp y · otherwise, sent it by mail or fax (00-31-80-611839) · use not more than 3,500 words · additiona l mate ria l like photo's and graphics has to be sent to: Drs C.j.C.G.Widdershoven Center for Peace Research POB9108 6500 HK Nijmegen The Netherlands

12

]aso.. Magaz ine no. 1, February 1995


Ukraine: balance as a form of stability K. Borodin The separation ofthe independent Ukrainian State from the Russian Empire is afact, importance ofwhich is left recognized and understood by few on both sides ofthe Atlantic. The irony and maybe - the tragedy of this developmentfor Ukrainians is that their independence came with the defeat ofthe Soviet Union in the Cold War and is limited to the strategic regrouping in the continent. The title ofthis article interprets the very issue of stability in and of Ukraine as a subject of balance, thus leaving the possibility of it being removed ifthe necessity to shift the balance arise. The "ew securily architecture ;11 Eu -

rope Thro ug h th e d ista nt anel unclear arches of the future security architec ture some major groups - determi ners of ba l ance ea n already be see n - the Uni ted States, th e WEU , th e CI S - linked bet wee n th emse l ves by lhe n et of con tin en tal, transa ti arHic anel global security institu tions - the OSCE , lhe NA CC and l he UNo The ro le of NATO - the institu tion fllndamenta l fo r Eu ropean stability dllring the

las t 45 yea rs - is put under questi o n by af the Alliance w ith the follawing re locathe pull-ollt of the American farces. tion of troops anel th e increase in militaThe yea r J 996 will elecisively innu ence ry spendi ng of the eurrent Allies can be the structure of the continental security: only be made understood to the public if the EU slIl11 l1lit is like ly to legiti- major crises in Ru ssia occur or the natiomi ze t he "dua l speed" organization of nalists came ta power. The obvio us acl lhe Un io n . The "care co untries" can try va ntage o f th e ' Partnership' is lhat lhe hard to p rove thei r w ill to p lay a more concept ofthe progra m puts everyl hing important ra le in preserving th e peace elependel1l o n the behaviour o f Ru ssi a, leaving the cemral Europeans same time anel stability in th e European house; presidential elecrio ns in the Uni- to prepa re lhemselves for Ihe full memted States will show wel her the US w ill bershi p and g iving th e CIS cou ntri es a fo llow the isolation course suggested by clear answer - they still have to undergo Clinto n during th e J 992 campa ign anel lhe lo ng way 10 EU f ope lhemselves. As g radua ll y imple mentecl w ith significant Al Gore on ce put it, Twith the best w ill in decrease of the Amer ican p resence in the world we ca n not help thase w ho do n ot want to help themselves '. Few EUfope in the last yearsj presidential elections in the Rus- leaders favour an enlargement of Europe sian Federalion will p rovicle an answer to as far as th e Russian border on Ihe exof whe th cr Americans ca n afforel transf- pense of putting their cout1 tries o n lh e erring to Europeans more responsibility b rink ofthe TCoid Peace') w ith th e b iggest mil itary power in Eu ro pe. Th e p rofor th emselves. gram offers the pan i cipat in g stat es as PartnerslJipfor Peace much coopera ti on as is politically affordable for th em. The 'Part nership for Peace' initiative, put In th is context 'Partnership" ean be seen forward as a \'V'estern contributio n to the as benefining Ukraine. The opportu nity atmosphere of un ce rta inly , perfectly lO ha ve senior o ffi cers ga ining Western suits the ongoing process of self-e1 eter- experience in th e democrmic organizamination o f Russ i a. lts sou nd n ame ti o n o f th e armed fo rces, defense p lanwhich reminds many on the famous "pe_ ning and jo int peace- kee ping exercises ace for territories" plan of the Arab- l srae- are all a vely attracrive apportun ity to reIi settlement, provokes criticism even on mind the international co mmun ity lhe the initial stage of ana l yz ing the pl an . rea liry of Ukrainian independence. Some But is it really as bad as many East-Euro- more prac ti ca l aspecl s - mliltinmiona l pean leaders try to show? My answer is a d iscussions among the pa rtners concerdefjni te 'noT. I t is baseel on realism anel n ing the re locatian of lroops and - most fl exibil ity, compromising the interests o f impo rt an t - security eo nsuitations with Allies, the Russi an leadersh ip anel th e the All ies are the major advantage of co"in-between" nations. Unfortunately, th e operation. new East-Eurapean demacracies tend to A lth o ugh it is not clea r how the consul forge t that they are nOl the only ones on tation can influence the All iance posit ion the conti nent , concerned w ith seeurity o n eco nomi e presslIre o r on ather nonissues. The affili ario n with th e Alliance is military th reats to the pa rtn ers, availabilirather a question of international recog- ty o f th e mechanism ilself is seen by Uknition , 'members hip in th e club' l han a rainian poliey-makers as anoth er re infor! needed response (0 a milit3ly threa t con- cement o f the 'secll rity-guaranties' given franting th em. Second , the enlargement to their cou nuy clurin g lhe Budapesl OSJlISO"

Magazi"e no.

J, February 1995

13


CE Summit. The pra cti cal implementation of th e guaranties and the consultat ions mechanism is by no means overva lued by Kiev ancl i s rather a face-saving way out of th e internal challe nges co nnec tecl w ith th e surre nd er o f the third largest nuclear arsenal in the worlc!. More-over th e decisio n to g ive up we a-

pons was fina ll y adopted because o f the convic ti o n th at th e politi cal cost of its preservation will overweight the benefits

of been a de facto nuclear state. The quick signing o f the Partn e rship document (o n February 8 , 1994) is a sign a I th at the Ukraine wa nts to start a broad but vague co-operatio n with the Alliance 'just in case'. In th e sam e time po litical

realities make the logical progress of the Partnership o ut of question at least for som e tim e. O n the o th er hand , not expecting practical results from th e discus-

sio n o f indirect threats to it with the Al liance, the Ukraine ca n nevertheless try to bring th ese threats to the anention of the international commun ity. SeclIrity Concenls and Iheir Backg-

round

Republican statu s, respecrively w ithin the conflic ts in both Transdnestria and the structure o f th e Soviet Union). I f the Abkhazia was ano th er factor, help ing to situat ion in the peninsuia is carefu ll y avoid a major crisis. The famous affairo f

a nalyzed , o ne can notice that all the ne- the Ukra inia n Selfdefense (UNSO) in the cessary conclitio ns for the beginning of a con tli ct are already th ere: the presence of a pro-Russian movement as a primary condition th e legitimi za ti o n of this movement and the whole tendency to separation a propagand ist campaign in th e Russian mass-media rh e presence of Russian army units - esse ntial but no t necessa ril y impera tive. As th e experi ence of the recent confli cts in [he FSU shows , after the "pro-Ru ssian leadershipl! or II movement" has stabili zed its presence by lega l, propagandist and financi al means, a provoca ti ve political dec ision i s made. Causing vagu e reaction from the 'target state' which is much concerned with preserving peace, order ancl integrity , or d oes not exerc ise full contro l over the territory, a 'chall engi ng formation' tends to a as-fast-as-possible esca lation , leav ing th e 'targe t state' far behind in terms of comba t reacliness anc! Pllblic preparedness. After all the gradll -

Abkhasian \var, en joying broad popular sup port in Ukrain e , was nevenheless met with the o utla w ofthe orga niz:u io n by the President , frightened to give Hussian nationalists a justification fo r an anti- Ukrainian cru sa d e. Moreover, with very few g round fo r outc ry about the ri ghts o f the Ru ssia n minoriry anc! significant unders tandi ng founc! between th e Ukrai nian Nati o nal Assembly ancl Russia n nationalistic organizations, involvement in the Ukraine was nQ[ an easy task to j ustify in Ru ss ia. Third fa cwr helping to avoid hostiliti es was the uncertainty in the Kremlin on where the polities o f su pporring regimes olltside Russ ia lead: d uring th e Moscow cr isi s she llin g of th e Par liam ent in 1993 , th e exper i e nce d fighters f rom both Tr an sdn es ti a and Abkhasia Glme to the Parliaments, not to the Presiclents support. Th e increasing co-ope rati on between the puppet regimes aoel Ru ssia n o pposi ti on is w ith o ut do ubt a matter of serious concern in the Kremlin. The fOlll1h cleterrent, w hieh ap-

The issue whieh is most likely to be risen pea red qlliet recentl y is the pro-Russian as a matter of sec urity concern s o f the al stages ha ve been comple ted, the pro- e lectoral platform (not policy after the Ukra ine is the division of the Bl ack Sea voca ti ve military move i s being ei th er electi o n) of the newly elected Preside nt

Fleer. The presence of the Russian forces made o r faked. The hostilities begin. in the d is puted part o f the Ukraine is by no mea ns contributing to the security of Deterrellts the country. It is weil understood in Kiev that it would be most important to reach

So w hat were the main deterrents whieh

any reasonable final dec is ion o n the pro- prevented esca lation oft he co nfli ct in cedures and timetable of d ivision of th e Crimea to rhe 'hot' stage? Can {hey safely Fleet and lease o f Sevastopol nava l base b e relied o n further or ex ported to the to Ru ss ia . If the peri o d of lease is coe- other parts of rh e former Soviet em pire? qual with th e transfer of the remaining Thi s question is complex enough to benuclear weapons ro Ru ssia, this decision come subject of a sepa rate research but w illundo ubte dl y be appreciated b y all some basic factors can still be outlined. the political forces in the Ukra ine. Unfor- First, the importance paid by (he West 10 tun a te ly, the fin a l solu ti on d oes not the remova l of the nuclea r arsenal from seem to be a purpose of the Russian de- the Ukraine. Any sign of support of the legation , which claims this 99-years lea- secess io nist movement or even th e inse should not be limi ted to Sevastopol , t ens ifi ca ti on of suc h movement , was but also to include the Fleet infrastructu- sure to lea d ( 0 the aholition o f (he decire - s hipyard s a nd na va l bases on the sio n to become a non-nudear state - the mainland of the Ukraine - a proposal ob- d eve l opment decisive in U krain eanAmerican relations before th e Tripartite viously unacceptable for Kiev. Another issue of th e legit imate secu rity treaty was sign e d o n 12January 1994. concerns is not a milita ry one as weil. Se- Any Russian move caus ing th is decision paratist moves o f {he Cri mea n Autono- in th e Ukraine was undo ubtedly 10 be mous Republ i c become in creasi ng l y met to ugh in Washington with dear improvocative. Direct military involvement plications for the tran sfer of aid to Ru shas never been th e meth od of concerns sia. The importance o f th e aid despite all of th e Ce ntral and Eastern European the rhetori c in Moscow collid clearly be countries (Chechnia is an internal issue seen when linked to the removal of Rusfrom a lega l po int of view, although the sian troops from Ba ltic states. o nl y difference between it a nd ,he Uk- Second l y , th e compa rativ ely moderate raine is the Sov iet and th e Autonomous position Ukrainian o ffi cia ls rook during

14

JasonMagazine no. I , February 1995

Kll chma of Ukra ine . Although a fte r the eleclio ns he failed to grant the Russian language the official status, the new President i s still very popular among the Russian-speaking poplilation o f the eastern southe rn Ukraine. The victory o f Kuchma ha s become a v i c tory of proRu ss ian ideas aga inst an ti -Russian. Any hostiIe move againsr Uk rain e, for exa mple the cut-o ff of energy supplies from Ru ssia (by the way impossible technica IIy because Uk rain ian trans it pipelines carry some 97% of Ru ssi an gas to \Vestern customers) w ill ca use th e o utcry in the Ru ssi an nationa list ca mp : "freezing to death Slavic brothers, etc". Ukraille as a COIl1lterweighl 10 RllS-

sial On the Olher hand , growing problems in relat ions between Ru ssia and th e West could not have the p ro-Ru ssian electoral rethoric of Kuchma left without attention in \'(,'ashington. The Project Husso-Ukrainian "Ag reeme nt on Joint Air Defense

w hich is repeatedly leakecl from the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, gave the \Vest a dea r wa rnin g : if it is interes ted in an independen t Ukraine, time to prove it has come. Th e agreement fo resaw granti ng Ru ss ia th e respo nsibility fo r the defense


o fthe Ukraini an ai r space and a ri ght to lease three sa tellite tracking sites in Yevpatari a, M yko layiv and Mllkachevo. Proposals about th e coordin ati on o f th e foreign po licies of th ese two eOllnties expressed by th e Spea ker of th e Parliamem Mo roz in th e Ukrainian Embassy in Mosco w in Au g u st 1994, se t o falarm s in Washington . D ebate within lhe Ru ssian po liti ca I establishment o n w heth er th e nllkes are ro be transferred from Ukrai ne, o r ea n simpl y be l e ft th e re und e r Ru ssian supervisio n elid not ga in enthusiastic w elcome in the State Depaltment. T aking th e menti o neel above prospeets into eo n siel e rati o n th e \'(fhit e H o u se fa ces th e need ro aeti vate th e independent po litical cou rse o f Ukrain e w hi ch w as somethin g tak en for granted eluring Kra vchuk yea rs of Presielency. Balancing o n th e issue o f su ppo rt o f Ukrainian inelepenelence wa s good enou gh to contro l rnan oe uvres of Ru ss ian Federati o n o n Îts Euro pea n bo rd ers anel beyoncl - in th e CEE r eg i o n. Failure o f M oscow to steadil y move În the ri ght elirecti on cOllid have been met with th e scale assistan ce to Ukraine, w hil e success o f Kremlin in getting cl oser to th e peril s o f democracy could have been 3warded w ith autho ri za t io n to drive its neig hbo urs in th e same clirecti o n. \'(fith the unexpected electi o n o f Ku chm a rh e Whit e H o use ca n l oose th e o nl y possibl e bargain fo r th e eastwa rd expansio n of N ATO. If th e inde pencl ence i s no t g i ve n a convin cin g support th e matter o f bargain may elisa ppea r. These consielerati ons togeth er with th e ratifi ca ti o n of th e N PT seem to have freed th e w ay ta b road coopenltio n betw ee n lh e two states. \'(fh en th e w ho le course ofrh e American fo reign po licy in rh e regio n o f th e fa rm er Soviet Unio n is criticizeel in bath the Congress anel Senate fo r centrali zing Ru ssia, Ukrain e directi o n see m s to b e th e o nl y pa rti cl!l ar achievement o f th e Clinto n aclministratio n. In th e sa me time, lhe new ly fOlll1c1 overseas f ri end does no t seem to be a sol uti o n for Ukrain e. Few can igno re th e remote contro l bomb in Crimea . The fu ture o f Ukr ain e as an in de pe nde nt stat e can o nl y l oo k bright if th e co untr y avo ids thi s conflict. Th e base o f lhe secess io nislm ovemenrs in th e Crim ea is rath er psycho logical anel econo mic th an an ethnic o ne. Speculatio ns abo ut eliscriminati o n of lhe Ru ssian language have no ba se to say at least - lh e first Ukraini an cl ass in th e secondary eelu ca lio n was o nl y o pened thi s Se ptember. th ere is stilt no single Ukraini an school in th e

peninsui a wh ere U kraini ans compose 800,000 of th e tot al 2,000,000 p o pula tio n. The Crim ea n bomb can be neutralizeel using th e comb ination o f three majo r approaches - econo mi c prosperiry, ethnic freeel om and effici ent work of the state secu r iry se rvice. Th e nrst anel th e la st can be o nl y achieved within a somewhat pro lo ngecl peri ocl of tim e. But in th e near flItlIre some oth er d etermi nants hold th e potential to influence the situation in the peninsuia: th e amount o f th e aid to Ru ss ia anel thu s its depenelence on the West th e attentio n put by the internati o nal commllnity ro th e process o f Uk r;:line's nllclea r elisannament th e refll sa l fro m sh arp m oves concerning NATO enlargement sca l e econ o mi c ass i stan ce t o Ukraine strictly linkeel to its progress o n th e way of refo rm s qui ck anel firm reac ti o n of th e intern ational commllnity on any possible escalation in Crimea the reaeliness o f Ukrain e to saerifi ce the minor achievements to preserve the ma in - inelependence. Facto rs as listed above are basecl o n th e assllmption th at Ru ssia ca n no t be transfo rm ed into a democrati c country w ith (he sodal o ri ented mark et economy. The alltho r of th is articl e in no w ay preteneIs to be an ex p ert o n Ru ss ian affairs h ut think that some brief analysis ca n still be essential to prove this hypoth esis.

Is Rltssia lost? If th e wa r in Ca ucuses brak es o ut fo r a parti Clliar peri od of tim e, reminding peo pl e o n Afg hanistan anel taking ever increas in g numbe rs o f Rli ss ian li ves, th e stabilit y o f th e Ru ss ian Fed eral Empire w ill be put under queslÎo n. Few noticed th at Rli ss ian tro ops we re sho t at in th e neig hbo uring Auton o mo us Republi c of Ing ushelia - th e lInity o f th e Nonh Ca ucuses in the 1I1timate situati o n is likely to b eco m e a r ea lit y. In cr easecl f ear w ill keep q uiet other subjects of the Federare trea ty w ithin Ru ss ia, but give a new impulse ( 0 states in th e no mans land - territOly o f th e CIS. New w aves of pressures fo r th e NATO enlargement, thi s time from the Baltic States can give th e Alliance a hard time. Ru ssian direc t interference in Chec hnia is ill-mineled eno ugh to ha ve somelhing l O d o with Y e lt sin 's failur e t o shak e hands w ith Iri sh Prime Minister Alb en Reyno lds earl ier thi s year. Th e tempora-

r y Co un c il Opp os ili o n in Ch ec hni a w hieh enjoyed massive equipmenl , alllmunitio n and cash injecti o ns w as sta bie e n o ll g h t o carr y o n f o r a l o n g tim eIllllch lo nger th en tired Dliclayev government could affo rd to fi ght. With no inflow o f cas h ( th e re publi c stillu ses ru bles) bl ock ed access 10 th e rerril o ry o f oth er parts o f Ru ss ia, no spare pan s fo r equipment ere. rh e downfall o f Dlidayev w ilt sooner o r later happen. The decisio n to interve ne wi lt se ri o usl y elamage prospects ofYeItsin's reelection if th ere is any. Th e votes o f th e nati o nal min orities , po pulati o n o f th e Aut o nomo us rep ublics anel Krais, elderl y peopIe, ancl same servicemen are likely l O he lost. Mo reover , lhe o pinio nfo rm ers - artisrs, writers, fo rm er d issielents anel especiall y TV anel writin g jOllrnalists - remove their backing fro m th e President , takin g away th e votes o f th e intelligentsia anel 'Euro pea n Rli ss ia'. Th e vague democra ti c move ment of Ru ss ia - split alrea d yw ill hardly manage to find a new leader or consolielare its fo rces aro llnd, say Ga iel ar in 1996. Yeltsin's ill-mineled eledsio n means th e enel of his po litica l ca reer anel a major challenge fo r the world in 1996.

Implicatiol/s for Ukrail/e With th e particlilar shift of lh e m ilil ary ba la nce in Euro pe towa rds th e east, Uk raine finds itself o n th e cross-road : semistability if she jo ins Eas L o r c i vil wa r if she jo in s rh e \'(fest. With o ut an y el o ubt th c way it chooses w ill become elecisive fo r w h er e th e ne w el ivi si o n lin es are elrawn w hen th e tim e fo r such develo pm ent s co m es. Tr ans f o rmali o n o fth e country into a buffer zone bel-w een new democracies of th e CentraI Euro pe anel th e Euro- Asian bloc o f the fo rm er Soviet Rep ubli cs Finland alik e anel ba se el o n broad econo mi c co-operation w ith both blocs seems to be an adoptedlo ng-rerm strategy o f Ukraine's new leadership. Rece ntl y launched eco no mi c refo rm s, th e dec isio n to g ive up Ih e nucl ear arse nal anel effo rts ro no rm a li ze rc lali o nship w ith Ru ss ia o n Ih e b ase of prag malism are all steps in thi s direcli o n . O n rh e o ther hand, being far behind Ru ssia in illlpl em e ntin g eco n o mi c re fo rm and reslructurin g its econo mic sys tem, uilstabIe instituli o nall y, unclear legislati vel y, uncenainly nati o nally, anel envia blc econo mica ll y, Ukraine ca n become a co meand -tak e v ictim of th e Ru ss ian neo- im peri ali sm in a sho rt run . Rapi cl ex p an si o n of N ATO would in ev itabl y lead to th e incl usio n of Ukraine into military alliance w ith th e Ru ssian Fecl eralio n.

Jasotl Magazine no. I , FebrualY 1995

15


Apart from negative economie progress the Ukra ine manageel to reach partiClJiar results in el evelopme nt of eivic society and human freedoms , for exa mpl e re-

cently published by the American hu man-rights group Freeclom House , aclcled Uk rain e to the list of d emocrat ie counn'ies, fjrst in the CIS. Rapicl developme nt ofthe National Armed Forces, appointment of a civilian to th e position of the Defense Minister leaves much more optimi sm for its survi val as a democratie cou ntry. Ifthe Ukraine is given enough time to restructure the economie system, imp lement lega l anel constituti onal reforms , complete privatisation and develop a civic soc iety democratie Europe w ill reac h some 2,000 kilometres more

Appendix I withdrawn by May 6, 1992

Taetical Weapons: Strategie Weapons: Grou nd based:

Location: Airbased: Tankers: Location:

1656 nudear warheads 1230 nude"r warheads 780 nudear warlleaels 130 SS-19 Pervomaisk and Khe melnytski 460 warlleads 46 SS-24 ScaipellCBM 11 6 bombers 23 Tu-95 Bear-H bombers 19 TU-169 20 !I-78 Air bases at Uzyn anel Pryluki

eastwards and stability wi ll become a permanent featu re of Eastern EUfope.

â&#x20AC;˘

Ukranial~

Mr. K. Borodin is head of /he Press Agency Uk LId .. /-Ie is alaso head 0 the [nforma/ion Depaltment ofthe Ukranian Cel'lIre for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) in Kiev.

Appendix 11: Armed Forces of Ukraine Armed Forces of the Uk raine are maele of the Soviet Army units, baseel districts; Carpathan, Kiev a nel Oelessa

Carpathian and Kiev MD Equipment Main battle tanks Arti llery, MRt, Mort, Combat aircraft Anmed Helicopters

Units now 3,556 2,171 1,235 230

Units accoreling to the limi ts of the CFE Treaty 3,400 3,150 1,090 330

OdessaMD Main battle ta nks Artillery etc Combat aircraft Armeel helicopters

1,838 680 1,554 890 225 40 -

(souree: Military Balanee 1994-95, lISS London)

16

jasoll Magaz i"e no. 1, February 1995


Creating All-European security structures: the difficuit road of Central European countries to membership of European institutions

drs. RJ.M.Koster s a result of the miraculolls year of 1989, highlighting the breakdown of COlllmunist power in East anel Ce ntral EUfope , anel the subsequent rapid decline of the Cold War and the bipolar system, high exp eetations for a secu re anel prospero1l5 fUllIre fea tured the general mooel all over East anel Central Europe.(I) The new anel freely eleeted governments of Centra I Europe, as weil as their populations, expec ted th e West European instit uti ons ro realize these demands by expanding eastward. Moreover, with th e dismantling of the Warsaw Treaty Organization anel th e Cou n cil for Mutual anel Economie Assi-

A

stan ce during the yea rs following the ve lvet revolutions, th e process of expanding European integration seemecl in th e long run , at least from a Cen tral European point of view, to be unavoidable. Anel th is general foreign policy orienta li on could be aclopted by the Centra I European countries without the fear of intern ational penalty, sinee the politieal elite of th e Soviet-Union had accepted the loss of lheir hold o n the region. In th is article, current international political elevelopments anel poliey positions influe nc in g the "enlargem en t-debate" will be disclissed. Furthermore, the viability of NATO will be analyzecl with re ga rd to [hese problems facing the Central Eliropean cOlln tri es. Th e article will ehallenge th e ability of NATO lO deal with the mliltidimensional problems fa ced by the Central European cou mries. The actions of lhe Eliropean institlltions with regard to the Yligoslav crisis seem to show their incompelence - o r worse: re lu c L ~l nce - in deal i ng effecti ve ly with the problems of th is region. Contrary to what is almost a common opinion in EU anel NATO cOlln trics, the YlIgoslav crisis is not as lInique as some might wish. Although, of co urse to a much lesser exten t, some ethnic, economie, historica! ,

anel territoria I ingrediems ofthe con tli ct Czech Hepllblic is th e only Cen tral Euroare also presem in other pans of Europe. pean coun tly where lhe former CommuThe way the European institutions have nists play na key political role). This dealt with this type of con tli ct so faf does image o f being a sta bie elemocr ~lcy not prove that they are ready to take up sholild lead the Czceh Repllblie to becothe ta sk of ereating a all-Europea n secu- me what Czech politicians calJ"a normal ril y stru cture, despile lhc vague promi- European country".(S) ses ro the Cent ral Europe~lIl countries. A firsl example for the exogenous clevelopment ra Central European membersAftel' five years, Ihe inlensity of the Cen- hip is th e Hussia n foreign policy, which tral Ellfopean elemands to belong to is said to have become more asse ni ve Western Ellropean institu tions have not dllring 1993 and 1994.(6) Seconelly, th e decreased. However, the internatio nal as lack o f a common \Xr'estern approach in weil as th e regio nal politica I ci rcul1lstan - dealing with the Yugoslav cris is anel the ces influ enci ng the process of the east- subseq u ent worsening of the imagc of ward enlargement have cha nged cons i- NATO as we il as the European Un i o n derably. And the Centra I European ex- (7), ra ises se fi ous cloubts about the e fperie nces with the new politica l reality fectiveness of th ese instilutions anellheir ha ve at l east been q uite soberi ng. For ability 10 pla y a significant role in crethe region of Central EUfope we can re- aling a new European security sysl"em. veal exogenous as weIl as endogenous Thirdl y, the results of the NATO SU l11l11it deve lopments affeeting the pace of the ofjanllary 1994 ha ve cl el110nst rat eel th e process of achnission to \'Ves t Ellfopean neeclIo strenglhen the Europe~1I1 ident ity in stitution s, of which th e European pi ll ar within the Euro-Atlantic Alliance , Unio n anel NATO will be of centra I con- which mighr inclicHc a growing inclinace rn in th i s arricle. An example of Ih e tion in the Uniteel States to focus m ore former being the grow ing competition on other foreign policy object ives, which among lhe Visegrad cOll ntries in their includes e n courag ing trade wit h the race to admission anel their reluctance to countries o fth e Pacific cooperation <lncl come up with co m111on stat eme nts on the countries o fth e American continent. the issue of en iarge lllent, which is sup- This c\evelopmenl mighl in the long run posed to be o f C0l111110n interest.(2) Thi s reduce the American influence in EUfOprevems them from slrenglhening [heir p e, which cOlil d be taken over by the political coopcra tion which is ncccssary German s, anel it will sure l y streng lh en to speed up integration. Some cou ntries, the pfocess of EUfopeanizat ion o f NAlike the Slovak Repub lie, still suffer a ne- TO. New initiati ves within the fram ewgative international il11age.(3) Dlie to in- ark of the Pallnership for Peace Program tema I political tunnoil ancl its re luctance have al reac\ y stren glheneel the military to treat its Hungarian m inority according cooperalion between France , Germany to accepted European stand ards (4), the and Poland which might prove to be an process of eco n o mie reform is clearly important vehicle for the cre~lti o n of a slowing down in contrast to the surroun- European security stru clure. ding countries. The Czechs for th is reaso n turn away ffom the politica I co-operat ion within the Visegrad framew ork, Cetltral Eltrop ea1l competitio1l a1ld out of fear of being identifjed with devecober ellce lopmems that could damage their soliel internationa l image (at rh e momem , the As soon as 1990, coope rati on between Jasoll Magtlz ille no. 1, Febrllary 1995

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Po land , Hungary and at th at tim e Czechoslova ki a evolved o n a number of issues, w hieh were rega rded to be of commo n imeres ts. First o f ~i1I , th ere was th e presence of the olcl econo mie strU ClUre of Soviet-Communist d o m in a n ee ove r these countri es, w hi ch becam e mo re and mo re obsolete due to rapidly changing realities in Ce ntrJI Europe. j o int effo rts o f Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which beca me known as th e Visegrad Three, were established in ord er to try to escape from the traditional Ru ssian sphere o f influ ence. The dismantling o f th e CM EA and th e Warsa w Treaty Organiza ti o n had to be negoti ated with Gorbachev, w ho admitted Central Euro pean independenee by dissolving these o rganizations. Th e cooperati o n o f th e V isegrad Three w as ex p ec ted to be useful also in th eir approach to th e Euro pea n Community and N ATO , beca use all three count ries pursued th e sa me policy goa l as a resuIt o f th e p ro jec t o f ' Return ing to Eu ro pe'. Ta at least so ften th e security concerns and to compensa te th e loss o f th e econo mie ties, new reg ional re lati onships were established as weil as relationships w ith lhe Euro pea n Uni on (at that tilTI e the Eu ro pea n Community) , the Council o f Eu ro pe and N ATO. So far , th e V i segrad co-operati on offered a fram ework for regulating the new relations of Centra l Euro p e w ith th e Euro p ea n U ni o n , w ith w hom th ey concl uded assoeiati on agreements in December 1991. At the same time, th e V isegrad eountries rried (Q eneourage regional cooperation through th e esta b lishment of a Centra I Eu ro pea n Free-Trade Zone.(8) Th e elec ti on of Klaus as th e new lead er of th e Czechs and Meciar as th e po litica l l ea d er o f th e Sl ova k s sp eed ed up th e p rocess of d issolving th e Fecleratio n. After thi s vel vet divorce was formally completed by th e first o f j anuary 1993 , th e differences between the newly establishecl Czcch Rcpublic ancl thc Slova k Rcpubli c soon beca me dear. W he re M eciar had to convince the West that he w o uld proceed w ith th e economie reform process, Kl aus beca me int ern ati o nall y known for his declica tion to rap id economic changes and his consequ ent W estern approach . Du e to a number o f diplomatic incidents of Meci ar it was elear that an ind ep e nd ent Sl o vak Republi c would have gre.t difficulties to prevent it se l f f ro m b eco min g i so l at ed . Fo r a number of reasons, Premier Kl aus could increasingly afford to turn away from his Vi segrad partn ers and pursue a 'go- it-

18

alo ne' strategy fo r th e Czech Re publi c. O n th e one hand, th e success of his econo mie reform program was intern ationall y recog nized , and the relatio nship wit h Germa ny was very fruitfu l. O n the oth er hand , the trade be twee n th e Visegrad partn ers was of no grear significance, eve n ~Ift c r th e officia l eSlablishmem o f a Free-Tradc Zone o n 1 March 1993. O n seve ral occas ions Kl aus ma de elea r that th e Czech Republi c would d o no thing th at could possibl y slo w do wn th e integrat io n o f th e count ry with in NATO anel th e EU. If it w ere fo r th e Czechs, th e V isegrad coo perati o n eo ul d be narrowed dow n to o nl y econo mie eoo peration . AI so, an instituti onaliza ti on of th e eooperation was considered to be unnecessary by the Czechs. Thi s lack of solida rit y amo ng th e mem be rs o f th e V i segn, d Gro up was m os t d ea rl y shown eluring the ATO Summit o f j anuary 1994 anel the subsequent visit of Presidem Clinton lO Prague to have a meelテ始g w ith the po litica lleaders of th e Viseg ra cl eo untri es. Th e first da y of his visit became a purely US-Czech bilateral mee ting, th e second da y th e oth er countri es we re add resse d . Bo th Clinto n and th e US ambassa d o r to th e UN Albright have rep ea tedl y stated th at th ey w ould have welcomed a joilll statement of th e Vi segrad Four to lhe Partn ership for Peace Program.

t io n betwee n Ru ss ia an el N ATO. T here are d ifferent historica l experienees, and th e rela ti ve prox imity to th e cast o r th e wes t also affects their fo reign policy positio n. Fro lll all th e V isegrad countries, Poland seems lO be most stro ngly determined not to be le Ft in a tg rey zo ne' or posi tion of neu trality, in w hieh it would be too vlilnerab ie to Ru ss ian inOlI enee. For th at reason, they seem to be strongly detenn ined to strength en both regional cooperati on as we il as its lies \vith th e West. But despite th e differe nces between the Viseg rad count ries , th ey share a co mmon goa l of es tablishing stro ng and lastin g ties to \Veste rn in st ituti ons. T he Partnershi p fo r Peace Program made cIear th at th e as pec t o f interoperability o f th e military fo rces w ill become an import ant criterium in th e dec ision o f admitling lhe cOllntries to NATO. T he integrati on w ithi n th e Europea n Unio n w ill be even mo re elifficult to es tablish, because the proces8 has many dimensions. Th e Visegracl countries wOlilcl ce rtainl y sp eed up th e p rocess o f int eg rati o n if th ey woulcl sueceed in es tab li shin g a deep level of regional econo mic and poIitica l co-ope rati on. An d th e short term benefit wou ld be an increase of a se nse of seeuriry. RIISsia1l sellsiUvi ties

The Central Euro pea n countries may increasingly fee l the need to be individ ualIy approac hed by th e Western countries on the issue of integrati on. The differences in economic progress they have made so far might justify such a choice. However, the strategie and economie integratio n of Centra l Europe depends largely from th e eompatibility of th ese eountries with NATO crit eri a for admission as weil as meetin g th e standa rds of the European Union. If these eountries can not establish regio nal co-operatio n, it w ill be diffi cul t to convince th e Euro pea n institutions oFlheir ability 10 wo rk togelher in these institutions. Thi s not io n is va lid for Hunga ry as weil as Slovak ia, fo r w hom the integration is as a guarantee for stab ie relatio ns and fri endly neighbo rship . It is d ifficult to imagine that th e European institu tions would wa nt to act as loeal fire- briga de, tr ying lO ex tin guish interethni c tension as a result of improper legal guarant ees for ethni c minorities anel unskilful diplomati e behaviour from same CentraI Europea n governm ents. The recent deve lo pments in CentraI Euro pe make cJear that the countries differ in th e way th ey perceive th eir strategie posi-

Jas01/ MagazilIe no. 1, February 1995

Already in 1993 it beea me cl ea r th at th e p rev iously pro-Western ap proach of the fo re ig n po li ey of Ru ss ia was cha nging.CIO) Unw illing to accept a mi nor roIe in internati onal politics in contrast to lhe undisputed intern ational status ofthe fa rm er Sov iel- Unio n, Rlls sia start ed [Q reassert its inOllencc in former Yll goslavia by back ing Serbi an demands in Bosnia and by blockin g N ATO ai r strik es o n th e Serbs. Al so, it became cJ ear th at th e Russians we re afraid of being isolated in case th e Ellro pean U n io n and NA T O woulcl enlarge in easl wa rcl direction , a decisio n they most d earl y tried to b lock at th e Budapesl CSCE Summit in November 1994. Two yea rs ago, it was not ye t el ea r how stro ng these objecti ons we re fe it by th e Ru ss ians. Therefo re, these alleged "Ru ssia n sensitiviti es" served as an argum ent to th e \Ves t to ju sti fy a ea uti o us approac h . Th c p o litica l instabilit y o f Ru ss ia al th e same tim e made cl ear th at so mc thin g sho uld be do ne to alleviate th e security worri es in Ce ntra I Europe, whieh was a result of th e dismantling of the \Va rsaw Trea ty O rga niza tion. Same even reFerred lO Centra I Europe as


co

UL E I

Prime Minister Meciar of Slovakia signing the PiP 9.2.1994. (NATO Office for Press ancllnformalion)

a na man's land , a situation which cDu ld remind lhe Po les of bad historica I times. But ex cept for lhe Germans, na key NATO member country wanred 10 see NATO enlarged (11) , because it was sa icllo iso l ate Hu ss i a. Anel a membe rship of Huss ia to NATO would be a big psychologica l step ahead \vhich wou ld cha nge the very essence of the Alliance. But th e

d evelopments in Ru ssia by the en d of 1993 showecllh e failure oflhe WeSlern

co-operative poliey towards Russia. Desp ite th is c3utioliS Western poliey , the extreme-nationalists , led by the much debated Zhi rinovsk i, strength ened their position in parliament co ns iderab ly during the Dece mber e l ections o f 1993. The Western approach proveel to be a weak ba sis for policy. It .Iso exagge rated the influence the \'({est th ought to have on lhe intern al politica I developmenrs o f Russi a. A mistake was made with re gard to position o f the Russian Democrat s. By being sensilive to Ru ssian objecti ons, \'(Testern count r ies th o ught to suppo rt the ir position in rc lat io n to the conservative hardliners and the military. However, in 1993 il became clear lhal co nsiderable co nsensus had eme rged among civ il pol itic ians and the mi litary

leaders on Russians fore ign policy priorities.(12) The Partn ers hip for Peace Prog r am, which was o ffi cia lly launcheel by NATO at th e Summit of j anuary 10 anel 11 , served as a welco me ou tcome fro m this prohl emat i c position of the \'(Te ste rn countries. By offering some form of permanent co-operation and joint training, the program tried to solve simu ltaneousIy lhe problem of Hussia n objeclions and Cen tral European sense of vu lnerability, two policy goals wh ich are largely in co mpatib le. Al the sa me t im e, the program should offer NATO a new missio n. However, it ha s been warned that the policy of Western cou ntri es toward s Ru ssia is doomed lO failure , because the underly ing premises of th e strat egy of partnership between the \'(l es t ancl Ru ssi a is all easl toa idealislic.(J3) A partnership with Ru ssia wh ich permits it to ar least co- d eci d e on the issue o f the eas twarcl enlarge me nt of NATO may st rengthen the so-cal led imperia ! impulse.(14) Cont rary to officia l Ru ss ian worr ies, it is hard to see how an integrated Central Europea n reg ion, which is committed to democracy anc! a free market, could pose a threat to the stabili ty in th e

region of Ru ss ia anc! its Wes tern periphery. But most worrying is the fact that \'(Iestern governments choose not to encou nter th ese Ru ssian arguments. Jt becomes clear that \'\Iestern con sti tu e nt countries to NAT O wou!d not wa nt lO enlarge th e Alliance, nOl beca use of Russian sensitivi ti es, but because it does nat fee i lO have vita! interests in Centra l Europe. By an eastward enl argemenl , NATO might ri sk to become involved in fu ture canflicts in thi s regio n sim ilar to the conflicts in fo rmer Yugaslavia. A lso, enlargement might threa ten the internal cohere nce as weil as the effectiveness af the Alliance, as the argu ment goes. Viability

of Ellropea/l orga/lizatio/ls

Aftel' lhe end o f the Cold Wa r pcri ocl anel the subsequ en t breakdown of the Soviet-Un io n, NATO clearly tried ta adjust to the changing canstella tio n of states o n the northern hemisphere. Co-aperati o n wĂ&#x17D;[h its fa rmer adversarics was established ancl even instilutionalized w i th lh e creatian af th e Nonh Atlantic Coopera tio n Council in 199 "1 . New possibiliries ta work together on a nu mber of issues were crea l ecl during lhejanuary 1994 NA-

]aso/l Magazi/le no. 1, Februa lY 1995

19


T O SUllllllit , anel slow ly a new Ill ission evolved l which tri es to combine objecti yes that are in fact incolllpatibie. Because o f thi s new se t of o bjec ti ves, NAT O has becollle increasingly involveel in the integraLi on of East Centra I Europe within same sart of security stru cture. Anel only NATO seems to be the engine in the process of uniting Europel since altern ati ve o rganiza tio ns like the OSCE ( previo usly the CSCE) seems to have d isappeared fro m th e age nd a o f Euro p ean sec urit y. Thi s preocc upmi o n with N ATO as an answ e r to all th e ill s o f CentraI Europe d oes not tak e inlO account th e different dimensions of security in Ce ntral Europe. Fo r NATO may have tried to adjustto the new seCllrity situation in Europe, the essence its defe nsive pos ture rellla ins unaltered . Th e sa ca lleel power vaCllUlll in Central Europe w as but one feature of th e many changes th at occurred in th e region after 1989. Beside th is mil itary aspect of securitYI there are growing economic and soda l problems as a result of rapid economie changes anc! the lack of sodal security arrangements. Th e results ofth e electi ons in Lithuania in 1992, in Po land in 1993, in Hungary May 1994 and rece ntly in Bulgari a, have show n th at fa rm er Communi st parti es ea n es tahlish a new powe rbase o n th e growing unease aboUlthe soda l consequenees o f the econo mie changes, ref1 ecling a general aspec t o f uncertainty fea tu ring this tr.msitional peri od of Central Europe society. This situ ati on is being agg ra va ted by th e l ack o f any p erspeeti ve or til1l et ~lbl e of closer cooperatio n w ith Europea n institu tio ns like th e EU. Socialist panies could c1 ea rl y benefit from this ge neraI sense of insecuritYI which at the sam e tim e cl arifies th e prioriti es o f th e people w ho voted fo r th em . This situation might affect the position of th e Ce ntra l Euro p ea n p o liti ca l elit es committed [Q \Xlesrern inspired po litica I projeCls of economie reform, anel it may in th e end endanger th e suppo rt fo r th e project of politica l and economic reform as a w ho ie. A co nt inuin g situ ati o n of popular frustralion could certainl y affect the pro-Western mood thro ugho ut Central Europe. O pinio n polls have alread y shown a decreasing suppo rt of Central European populations for th e European Unio n.( 5) More in general , th e implication s of th e Yu gosla v cri sis and th e decline of the prestige o f Euro pean o rga nizatÎons, as a result of the way the conflict has been dealt w ith , are large ly underestimated . M any W es te rn governm ents are of the opinion th at th e conflict in former Yu gos lav ia is uniq ue in its nature

20

anc! Ît w ill ha ve only loca l consequences ones th e gunfighting has ceascd . Howeve r, an enc! uri ng con niet on th e Balkans pl aces the neighbouring cou ntrics for a diffic uIt cho ice bet wee n o n th e o ne hand {heir own immediate national interests anc! on th e oth er hand the continuance o f fo llowing th e strategy o f th e internati onal commu niry anc! European instituti o ns. Th e intern ati o nal eco nomi c san cti o ns aga inst Se rbi a hit th e ir own economies.(l6)

NOl es Ahh ough general definit ions are mo re broa dl y defi n ed , in t hi s a rt icle IlCelll ra l Euro pe" wi ll refer 10 Hunga ry, Po land, andthe Czech anel Slovak Republics, knowas th e Visegrad Four.

(I)

(2) Reiseh, Alfred A., "Central Europ els Di sapp o intm e nt s anel H o pes, "IU'E/ RL Resea rch Repo rt, Vo l. 3, no. 12, 25 March 1994.

COllclllsions An enduring connicl in form er-Yu goslavia maya lso raise qu est io ns about the commitment of key \'{festern countries to th e reg io n " nd th e ability to dea l w ith these k inds of conflicts. Of w hat value is ~I security commitment of N ATO, if it is clea rl y rclu ctant to get ill volved in former Yugoslavia? In oth er parts of this reg io n inte r-e thni c tensio ns co uld al so lead to conflict if the social-economic S Îtu ati on deteri o rales and economie anc! e thni c c1 ea vage s coin ci de . \V o ulcl a rn ainly defensive orga ni zation ba secl on military doc trin e - w hi ch is still th e essence of NATO - be w illin g and able to interve ne belween member states? Th e facl th at ATO considers lO incl ucle [h e Czech rcpublic aS a testcase, a re lati vely r isk less o ptio n , sheds lig ht o n th e m issi o n it d efin es fo r itse l f. N ATO in f act sees no role for ilself in crea ting an enlarged secll rily stru cture. It a pts for a safe stra tegy which necessa ril y has a ralher lim itccl scope fo r th e co nstru cti o n o f a Europea n security stru cture. II seems that an economic integration of Ce ntral Euro pe w ithin th e Euro pean U ni o n wo uld be a sa fe o pti o n to th e complex rea Jit y of th e region. Membership of th c Europea n Uni on would pose no immec! iate threa t to any country, but at th e sa me tim e it clearl y Împli es a securily d ime nsio n ~I S weil. Flinhermo re, economi c integnlt ion might have a far more stabilizing effect on inter-e thni c relations in the region than a securily guarantee fron"! NATO. It could provicle gooel prospeets fo r re lati vely frag iIe democrades in term s o f ancho rin g democ rati c valu es ancl orga niza ti onal princi ples like inter-personal tru st anel compromise.

(3) Fisher, Sharo n, "S lova ki a's Fore ig n Po li cy since In ele p e nde nce , "RFE/ IU Resea rch Report, Vol. 2, no. 49, JO December 1993. (4) Puffl erová, Sa rl o ta, "Na tÎ o nal Minorit ies in Slovak ia, " Helsinki M onito r, Vol. 5, no. I , 1994.

(5) Reiseh, Al fred A ., "Central Ellro pe's Di sa p po intm e nt s a nel H o pes, "RFE/ RL Resea rch Repo rt, Vo l. 3, no. 12, 25 March 1994. (6) Ly nc h , All en , "Af te r Em pire: Rli ss ia a nd lt s \Xlestern Ne ig hbo urs, "RFE/R L Resea rch Repon . Vol. 3, no. 12. 25 Ma rch 1994. (7) Wohlfeld , Monika, "Implications for Rclari ons betwee n \Xlestern and Central Europe," InstitLue fo r Scclirity Studies, W.E.U., Chai llo l Papers, 17, October 1994. (8) O k o licsa ny i, Kiiroly, "The Visegrad Tri ang le's Free Tr acI e Zo ne, "RFE/ RL Resea rch Report, Vo l. 2, no. 3, 15 j anllaly 1993. (9) O k o licsanyi, Károly , "Th e Viseg rad Triang l e's Free Trade Zo n e, "RFE/ RL Research Repo rt , Vo l. 2, no. 3, 15Janllary 1993.

(0) Crow, Suza nn e, !1 Hu ss ia Reas sert s lts Strateg ie Age nda." RF E/ RL Researc h Re p o rt , no. 50 , 17 D ece m ber 1993. Mi halka , Michael, "Sqllarin g the Circle: NATO's O ffe r to the East, "R FE/ RL Resea rch Repo rt , Vo l. 3, no. 12, 25 March 1994.

(I J)

Drs. Ro!f Koster is as Cl researcber sp ecia lized in CEE affairs, co ncerning infer- (12)

Crow , Suza nn c , II Ru ss ia ReasIla /iollal a lld na/ional p oli/ies. H ejo i- se rts lts Strateg ie Age nda , "RF E/ RL Rel1ed reeen/ly /he Ed itorial Board ofJasol'l searc h Re p o rt , n o. 50 , 17 D ece mbe r 1993. /v/agaz ille.

jason M ag az ille no. I , Febnlary 1995


(13)

Brzezinski , Zbig niew, "The pre- I

mature Partn ership," Foreign Affairs, Vo-

lume 73, no. 2. "NATO ONIlNE"

(14)

Brzezinski , Zbig niew, "The Pre-

mature Partnership," Fo reign Affairs, Vo-

lume 73, no. 2. (1 5)

Ko lank iewicz , Geo rge , "Con -

se nsu s an c! Compe titi o n in th e Eastern En largem enl o f th e EUfo p ea n U nio n , 11

Inte rnatio na l Affa irs 70, no.3. 1994. (1 6) Wo hlfe ld, Mo nika, "Implicatio ns fo r Re lations be twee n Weste rn and Centra l EUfo p e," lnstitute fo r Sec urit y Stu di es, W.E. U., Cha ill o t Pape rs, 17, Octobe r 1994.

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Jasoll Magaz i lle no. 1, Fe bruary 1995

21


Biography Willy Claes o m in Ha sselt in no rth -easr Belgium o n 24th Novem be r 1938 , Mr. Cia es w as el ected l O th e H assel t City Council in 1964, going o n fo uur years lat er to ente r parliam e nt w hen he

B

was elected to rhe H o use of representati-

yes and appo inted ta repo rt o n the Budget. From 1971 onwa rds, he was one of th e sp o k esmen o f th e Bel gi an Socialist Party ea ch time a govern emtn w as fo rmeel . His first m inisteria l appo intment was to [h e D epartm enr of educa tion in th e gove rnm ent headeel b y Mr. Gasto n Eysk ens in 1972. In 1973, he w as pu t in charge o f th e D epartment of Economie A ffairs in th e Leburto n-DeCl erq-tinelemans government.

In the seconel government heade by Mr. Tinde mans (1 977) , Mr. Cl aes was o nce m ore appo inted Minister of Eco nomie Affairs. Between 1978- 1982 , W ill y Claes was Minister of Eco nomie A ffairs in fo ur

governm e nts led b y Wilfired M art ens and in o ne heade by Mark Eysk ens. He w as also appo intecl D epury Prime M inister, a post he has held five times.

In Decembe r 1983 , Kin g Bael o uin appo inteel him M inister o f State. Fro m 1988 to 1992 , he was Deputy Prime Minister ancl Min iste r o f Eco n o mi e A ffairs in rh e

gove rnm e n t l ed by Mr. M art en s. I n March 1992 , wh en M r. Jea n-Luc Oehaene beca m e Prim e M ini ste r, M r C laes w as

appoi nte d Depu ty Prim e minist er anc! minister of Foreign Affairs. He was elected Chairman o f th e Party o f Euro pea n Socialists inJu ly 1992.

In September 1994 Mr. CIaes w as no minated by NATO Fo reign Minister to succeed Manfred W o rn er as Secrera ry General o f NATO. He taok up his appo inlmem as Secrerary Genera l on 17 O ctober

1994. Mr. Claes is a we ll - kn ow n o rches tra l co nducto r anc! accomplished llltl Sic ian . Mr. C!aes is married te Suza nn e Meynen , a fo rme r nurse anc! mid w ife, n QW acti ve

in several associa tions prov iding psych o-social anc! m edica l ass istance. They

have l wo chi lelren.

â&#x20AC;˘ 22

]aso .. Magaz i .. e no. 1, Februaly 1995

(NATO O ffice o f Information & Press)


The 40th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association

"NATO on track for the 21st Century" Wednesday, October 26,1994 Hall of Knights, The Hague Dr Christoph Bertram f you invi ted me today 10 provide reassurance that every thing is ror lhe best in the beslof all possible Atlantic worlds , I ha ve 10 di sa ppoint you. Th e th eme o f yOll r mee tin g is no mo re (han wishfu llhin king. NATO is n Ol on Irack ror the 2 1s1 ce ntu ry. Instca d it is in d eep , enduring c risis and ma)' not even reach Ihe end o f the decade.

succesfull y wilh thc dragon who threalened us fo r fOrly years bUIIhere are slill an aw full or of po isono us snakes in lhe jungle. Quile right. But in co ntrast LO the d an ge r e manaling from the dra go n. w hich uniled us, Iha d ~lIlg e rs emana tin g from lhe snakcs d iv idc us! Thc Soviet th reat was coa litio n-buildin g. The new th rea ts are coa litio n-d estroying. You only have to look at Ihe \X'estern disa rray o ver Th e reason fo r Ihis d isturbing sWl e of af- Yu gos la v ia to d ay or th e Iikel y Western fairs is no t juS! the familiar anc! now ban- cli sarra y over, say, Algeria tomolTOW. al o nc thaI NATO 'S aid reason fo r ex isting is 11 0 lo nger around. It is, mo re pro- Now yo u \ViJl repl y - as m an y in N ATO foundty , that th is unique Weste rn securi- do - tha t Yugos lavia is a sepcrate issue. I Iy cl ub - uniqu e in its traditi o n o f COI11- wish it were . But howeve r yo u m ay try 111 0 n re fl exes, uniqu e in the person al to get away from the fa ct: th is is rh e nrst netwo rk il has woven over the yca rs anc! p os t- eokl \Xl ar Eu ropea n co nfli ct ! Fo r for whieh this gathering is proof, unique over Ihree yea rs and all110sl fo ur winters in ilS wondrous abilit y o f tyi ng th e two the o nh Allamic Alliance which pricles sh o r es o f Ih e Atlantic togelher - h as a itscl f in being the o nl y fu nclio ning secu cam man mernory but no lo nger a co m - rity o rga ni za ti o n in Europe, has been inca pabl e o f c1 0 ing in Ih e Balkans what ma n purpose. functioning securit y o rgani za ti o n s are Now Ih e ca mmQn mern ory \V iII aSSLIre supposed to d o, namely to pur an end to th at Ihi s club ca n s till so ldi e r o n for a a European war that co uld so eas il y w hile. Therc a rc S lIllllllit meetings to be spre ad an d that ha s alrea d y infes ted held , Secrel ary Ge nera ls to he c h ase n , \X'estern rc lalio nships. co n sul tations anel manoeuvers t o b e co nclu c tecl. Co mlTI o n proced ur es wil l No, I am afraid that Yugoslavia is not an keep ministers, bureaucrats anc! soldiers ex cep ti o n 10 rhe rul e, it is th e new rule : busy for so m e tim e. But lh e se n se o f w hen less (han ex istential lhrea ts occu!'. purp ose is l acking. NAT O does n ot this Alliance will nOl eohere into a single know w here 10 go. I r it is o n track (h en assesment and action bUI disso lve inlO o nly in Ihe sense of the olct saying: If you 16 different assesmenls and 16 reasons don'( know w here you are going, any ro- for inaction .

I

ad willtake yO lllh crc - o r any tra c k if you wi ll. Now you will reply Ihat NATO has never

been as pa plllar as toclay, with many of th e ncw democr.ac ies of Eas tern Eu rope knocking al th c door lO he let in . But that

does nat seem to ha ve helpccl (hose insiel e to kn ow w hallh ey are abolIl. You

w ill argue that Ihe wortel is no safe place , thaI - asjamcs \Vooi sey. th c OireCLOr o f Ihe CIA , likcs 10 p oint out , wc have dealt

Aga in , you m ~l y arg ue that this is du e to Ihe fact that Ihe Balkan War is no real securily threat 1O the Alliance. Faced with a real thre at , NA TO would o n ce aga in stand firm , anel firml y stanel toget her. nUL lh at begs lhe quest io n. It is, I am afraid , o nl y t hc o kllyp c o f security threat that can bring us togclhc r aga in - an over-bearing ex pan sio nist Ru ss ia , c hall enging n o t ju st \'(.Tes tern Europe wirh co n ve n lional forces hU I :I lso, and al the sa me ti -

me , the Un itecl Sw tes wilh nuclea r intercont inen tal miss iles. BUI w hareve r w ill happ e n in Ru ss i a - an d things a re l ooking rath er hetter (h an many proph ers pred i Cled o nl y a fcw yea rs ba c k that o ld type o f Ihrea l w ill nOl rcappea r and hel p solve NATO's problems. NATO insl ea d has to show that it ca n d eal wi Lh th e n ew I ypes o f i n secu ril y o f wh i c h Yugoslavia is a pro tot ype; it is nol the lhrea t of an invas io n by tank s but o r a massive inflow o f refugees cĂŠtu sed hy wa r; it is no t Ihe thre~1t o f conquering I he \Xfes l but o f c1 es tabi li z in g its p e riph e r y and (hu s undermining il s co hes io n; it is n Ol th e threa t of hlowing up the world but of cre~Hing prececle nts lice nsing the v io la ti o n of internatio nallaw. h ru tal intimidation and et hnic cleansing. These are Ihe ingredienrs of the new threals, practicalIy w herever they occur on Ihe periphery of EUfope: in Nonhern Arrica , in Asia M inor, in the Balkans. Ca n anyone w ho argues Ihat Yugoslavia must not be seen as a tes t for \Xlc sl ern co h es io n claim wi th any clegree of conficlcnce thai thai cohesion w ill be ge neratcd in Ihe ncx l cr isis? Manfred \XlĂś rn er , NATOls lal e Sec retary General , o nee pred icl cd thaI the Alli ance would not surv ive ian ot her Y ugoslavia. Ir is dirficult 10 co n vince o neself that he was w ro ng. The cri sis of NATO is sym pl o mati c, nOL accidenlal. W hy indcecl shou ld all lhose democrat ie slates which held together for such a long time under ::l n overwhelming threat still hok l logelher to th e sam e degree o nce Ihal d<lnger is no more? Quite understandahly 100: O nee Soviet miss ile th rears na lange r negate geograph y by givi n g p eo pl e in J-I olls l on anel th e Hague Ih c fee ling o f b eing Ihreaten e d eq uall y and at Ihe sa me tim e. geography will reasse rl ilself. ft is. aftel' all , the o ldesl element in strategy. In the olel days. no US Secrel ary o f Stal e could have said what \X' arren Christopher recent-

jason M agazine no. I . FcbrualY 1995

23


Iy told the Financial Times; that Bosnia was of n a vita) secu ril y interes t to the United States bUL Haiiti was. Onee fear no longer justifies sacrifi ce, democracit soc ieti es qu ite rightly want lO spend their m o n ey on a th e f items

(han defence. Ooee inte rnationa l o rder i s n a l o n ge r the m ain co n cern , gover-

nments can anel must concentrate on domest ie we lfare a nel address the urgent repair jobs which were neglecled during th e years of th e Cold War. Ir is cusl o mary fo r Europeans to blame o nl y the United States for an attitud e of self-ri g hteous ncglec t towards the upkeep of interna ti onal o rd er. BUl reme111-

ber: Respect for democratie va lu es has

rhrow of th e diee, nOL o ne si ng le issue , one single threat, one single institulÎonal improvement. Th e big issues w hich o nce brought us logether have shrun k. We will have ro make use of th e smaller issues ro revita lize th e o ld bonds. But as we know from Gulliver's Travels, many th in rhreads can still mak e a powerful net. They may eve n weave a bridge - wobbl y, it is true - across th e Atlantic. I ca n think o f three such threacls - a comman project, th e recognitio n ofwieler Atlantie interests, anel institutional refo rms. Firsl , a com m o n project. It is unlik e l y (hat we will find aga in an encompassing comma n purpose for NATO. Bul al least we can become e n g~l ge el toget her in a common cha ll enge. The most obv ious , most pressing such common project is tp proviele a new struc tu re for European stabil ity. Sa far, NATO has shied away fro m addressing it head-on. Instead it has o pted for th e half-way-house of Part nership for Peace. pf!) , however , neilher refl ec ts th e new rea liti es o f Europe nor offers a clear perspective e ither to th e East Elifopean democracies or to Russia.

been the hallmark of th is Alliance. ClearIy the majority of lhe Americans are in creasingly reluctant to see their country play the ro le o f inlernal ional gendarme. Moreover, the inward-turning of the United Sta t es i s na different from th e in ward-turning of Western societies everywhere. The ")apaniz3tion" of foregn poliey - to promote th e sa l e of o nels p roduers o n wor ld markets rather than expose o neself in th e protection o f intern ational stability - is not just an Ameri ean, il is a general phenomenan , na less Euro- The Partnership for Peace na l anger repean than Ameriean. flects European realities. It still assumes that, somehow, th ere is ti chance o fbllil If it were only American, then at least the ding an al l-encompassing securily sysEuropeans could begin l a make up for tem "fro m Vancouver to Vladivostock" the deficit in US l eaders hip . We h ave and opts for ambiguity precisely becallse see n that they can not and th aI they do it wants to avoid elrawing a new divieling notwant ro. And so Europeans si t arollnd line thro ugh Eu rope. But a new seperahoping that Ameriean leaders ma y re- ti on lin e is c1ea rl y eme rgi ng in Europe eog ni ze o n ee again that American already; with lhe new East European deleadership in foreign policy is good not mocracies, inclueling the Baltic sta tes, stju st for ge n e ratin g vo t es in mid - te rm ruggling 10 swim wesrward, and the fa rel ecti o ns but vita l to the do mes ti c inte- mer republics of he soviet empire cluste· rests of the United Stales as weil. Vet th e- ring aro uncl Ru ssia primarily due (0 their re is na sense in fooling o urselves: Am e- co ntinuing eco no mi c dependenee ri ca w ill no t resume th e a id leade rship w hich formal sovereigm y anel inclepenrole. If and w hen America tak es th e lead, dence has do ne linie to redllce. Hence a it will be parti al, limited, ad hoc and dic- n ew \Ves t anel a new East are already t ated more by domestic concerns and farm ing. 11 is a realiry w hich any attempt pressures than by any internationa l am- to promote more durable stability in ou r bition. It will be welcome when it hap- regio n has ro take as ilS sta rting point. pens. But it is fUlil e to wait for it to hapFor the relationship between NATO and pen everylime. the new democracies of East anel Centra I Sa the Western Alliance is deprived o f its Europe, this must mean a farewell from two, eonneeted mainsta ys; the lIniting ambiguity. Of co urse, {here i s na Soviet threa t, anel th e uniting American question of immecliate aelmission o f, say, l ea d ership. Ne ith er o f these can be re - th e Visegrad states, into th e Western Alsurrected . And you sti ll want to claim liance; it was always m isleacling 10 put that "NATO is o n tra ck for the 21st Cen- the ques ti o n of NATO 's Eastward enl arge ment in th ose term s. \Vhat is neecl eel turt? instead is a cl ea r, dated perspective with Th e r ea l , rh e ce ntral question is rhis; a calender of speci fi c steps which ha ve what ca n put it ba ck on track? NOLone 10 be comp leted befare admission as a

24

Jasoll MagazilIe no. 1, February 1995

full member can lake place . Sli ch a perspect i ve wou lel do much to provide for these cOll ntries the secu rity o utlook they seek and , al lhe sa me time, help shape the dynamics of th eir internal debate_ Simulr"neously, Ihe Alliance has to offer la Russia an instilutional rel ati o nship which bath respects Ru ss ia's stat us anel se nsiti vi ti es as weil as NAT Ols sel f- inrerest. Trying la sqlleeze Rlissia into NATO wOlilel fatally wounel th e \X1estern Alliance; as a member, Ru ssia would c1 emand a special, prominent ro le w hich lhe \Vest ca nno t gram it in ilS own cOUllCil. Hence lhe o nly sensible al ternati ve is to creare a new institulion , tailor-made for permanent coope rat ion bel ween NATO anel Russia. It sholild have allthe elements of modern international institutions; Secretary Genera is, Ministerial and AmbassadariaI Counci ls, Summit Meetings, military liaison committees anel parliamentary fora. BOlh Ru ssi" ,md NATO wOli ld th us inflllence each other wi th ou t inrerfering in each ot hers affa irs. Bat h Ru ssials anel NATO 's needs would be assllred. And the counn-ies of East anel Central Europe would take p::U1 in this elialogue as members o f NA T O, nOll efl ou t in th e cold w hich Ihey rightly fear. This th en wou ld be the m ost obv i o us common project for the Alliance to make its own. \Vhile it would not be enough ro tie us together for another fou r decades, it wi ll at least give us achallenging task fo r the next decade. Second: We need la broaden th e Atlantic base. For forty yea rs, the cam man fea r implieclthat the strongest element of th is base was pol itica I-m ilitary. ft is clear that th is is na lo ngel' th e case. Ta lIy ancl give life l a the Allantic relalions hip throllgh the primary reliance on COllllllo n security concerns means to condemn both the Alliance anel the Atlantic relationship to a slow but certain ca ncel' o f mutual indifference. Inslead of thinking NAT O , we w ill have to think Atlantic Cornmunity. If this corn muniry mea ns anything, th ere must be o th er issues in addition to th e security o ne which llnite us - is it not perllaps an anachronism that your orga nizatio n still ca lls itself lhe "Atlanti c T rea ty Association" instead o f just the HAtl antic Associati on"? Ou r ci ti ze ns o n bath sicl es o f the Atl antic are, afteraIl , not concern ed with tolally different problems, o n the contrary; socia l, seellri ty , immigration , economic wellbeing, environmental protection


are no less important to people whether they live in Denver, Delft, or DĂźsseldorf. Ta think in terms of the Atlantic CommuI1Ă&#x17D;ty means to address th ese issues not in isolation but in com mon, at least in comma n elialogue. Most of them are , it is true, primarily elomestic concerns. But it is equa ll y tru e that none of them can be tackleel succesfu ll y without some elegree of cooperation among sta tes which sha re the same va lues anel th e traelition of eloing important thin gs together, anel that all of th e m , when they go wrong , can have international implicarions. Thi s eloes not mean that I ~lm arguing for a revival of Lllat fam o us Article 2 of th e Washington Treaty which concerns economi c anel ot her fjelels of mutual interest. It woulel he a fatalmistake to try anel squeeze all issues of common concern into lhe NATO framework. Rath er we w ill have to develop, outs ide NATO, institutional arrangements w hi ch are particularly suited to th e spec ific tasks , often mu ch less formal , much less bureaucr<lrizeel that the NATO m<lchinery, often ael hoc. There is much room here for imaginative innovations. The main point, howcver, is this; we ca n no langer afforel to leave US-ELIropean relations to th e ministe rs of foreign affairs anel el efence or to the ch iefs of staff; we must get the ministers of hea lth , of labour, of social affa irs, of the environ ment together. I f the latter ha ve nothing to say to each oth er, the farmer w ill also, sooner mthe!" than later, run ou t of a common agenda. Thirel , we neecl ra acljust the ex isting NATO institutions. Th e prese nt ones assu mecl a common approach, the new on es are neede to genera l e iL Here, the main problem lies not with lhe Europeans who if anything are aware of the neecl to maintain a close secu rit y link with the Unitecl States but w ith the Americans who have difficulty in convincing th emselves that they are ancl must remain a European power. N ATO institulions shou ld be adjusLed in o rcl er to help Americans to think ofthemselves as a European power. \Xlha t can be clone to clo th is? For one, it is time for an American lO serve as NATO 's Sec reta ry Genera!. It made good sense in lhe past, when Am eri ca was the Alliance's undispllted leader and AmeriC :IIl S look pride in their European rol e, th at the Europeans were allowed to compensate for this by rilling the post of NATO 's chief civili3n represent3live. Today, when Americans na langer want l a

play the o lcl ro le, it becomes imperative to impress on America's Pllblic opinio n that this is their all iance, too. Nobod y can do this m ore effectively than an American Secretary Genera l (in additio n to an American SACEUR!). This is no cri ticism of the personality which has just been appointed to the job. But it does sllgge ts that NATO' s governments sho uld ha ve paused and looked at the new challenges facing their o rganization before taking the c\ecision.

say last month that Bosnia is of no v ital security interest for the United States. he - and his fellow -Americans wi Lh him may change his mincl next month when Sarajevo's stran gli lat io n cau ld weil clominate the television sc reens ancl chal lenge the international credibility ofthe West as a whoie.

And while the military cha llenges to the \Vest will be less ce ntral , there will stil l be those w here NATO can c\emonstrate ilS continueel relevance. This will requiFor another, we might consi cl er th e set- resome reassessment as we il as the wilting up of an Atlantic Sta nding Group in lingness to learn afresh lessons oft he \Vashington which wOlild be auachecl to past. various US Governmen t departments and to Congress and whose main task, The reassessmen t concern s NATO's role apan from high-level liaiso n, would be in "olit-of-area"-co nOi cts. All too often to act as an early-warning el evice ror cri - over the past years, NATO gavernm eI1ls ses w hich might affect th e Alliance and h ave c\efinecl this role as that of a subthe Atlantic relationship. Same of you contraClo r to lhe United Nat ions or the will remember the a id Standi ng Grollp CSCE. But this is a blincl alley as Bosnia of senior military representatives in \Va s- is showi ng day by day. NATO has delehington w hich for years servecl a lIseflll gatecl th e decision o n ,vhether ancl how coordinating function between the US to use force not only to th e UN Secu rit y administration ancl NATO military esta- Cou nci l but in adclition to the Secretar)' blishments. Today. with a less military General ancl his representatives o n the compositian ancl a \Vider brief, it cou ld grouncl in former Yugas l avia. But thi s assure Atlantic considera tio ns of <I n earl y implies that the use of force is left to an hearing in the US decision-making pro- o rganiza lion which , for the surviva l of its cess. mission ancl th e need la mainlain impart iality , is loalh to use force at all. UN Finall y, huw abollt a "Preside ncy o f th e commanders have to worry about Ihe efAtlantic Commllnity" rot~lting among th e fects on their troops if th ey aULhorize air heads af governments of member cou n- st rik es [ 0 punish o ne sicle or the other in tries? In today's world in which ideas are the conflict becallse, once the NATO receiving creclibility through personali- planes have come ancl gone, they will be ties , it is important to perso nalize th e alone in dealing wi lh the consequences. common pllrpose. Th e President woulel For the Alliance to link its own creclibilibe someone with consiclerabl e visibility, ty to the credibility of the UN is to loose responsible during his o r her tenure for creclibility, and na amount of NATO propromoting ideas, for venting initiatives, test to the Secretary General to take mofor breathing Iife and spirit into Atlantic re forceful act ion can change that. To rerelationships. generate its own crecl ibility as a se riou s actor in serious intern ationa l con tli cls, These are the kind of ideas this co nfe- NATO w ill also have to be able to operarence may want to discuss over the next te on its own. few days. ft ca n do 50 in the know ledge [hal, while NATO 's crisis is deep, there is The lesson thm neecls to be learnecl afstill enough of a base to build on. resh concern s cleterrence. That strategy was responsib le for NATO's greatest SllCo lel alliances. afteraIl , do not just fade cess, ancl ye L it seems to h ~lve been ra ~Iwa y. Th ere remains a bond o f having pidly fOl'gotten after the Col d War was clone exciting thin gs together, of ha vi ng ove r , not least by military men. \Vh en been remarkably su ccesful together. politicians wonclerecl how to employ miThat bond wiIl no t holcl forever but at litary force in the new , non-nllclear ancl least for a while longer. blurred confli cts which have occu rred sin ce, they were tolel by many of their Geography reasse rts itself, true, but not military advisers that force could on ly be irreversably sa. Distance does not matter employee! responsibly if it were massive all that mllch in the global village . Com- fo rce, that th e object ive \voulel have to munications link together what oceans be no thing less than vic tory, that in any sepe ratc. If \Varren Christopher cOlild case th ere coule! he no "military solution"

]ason Magazine no. 1, Febnla.y 1995

25


and h en ce n o se n se in tr y ing. nut remember; deterrence w as not about massive fo rce, no t abo ut victo ry, not about "milita ry solutio ns"! Ir was abo ut th e use o f military mean s to uph o ld o r resta re rul es o f intern ati o nal b eha v i o ur. Th at has remained th e challenge. Anel just as in th e nudear age, w hen determination had to b e show n ea rl y o n , ir w ould be q uite w ro ng to regard , in th e new confli cts oftoday and tomorrow, force as the "last resolt" - the later you employ it, th e less succes ful it will be, and th e mo re o f that essential ingredient o f force, credihility, will have been wasteel.

elifficult to get back o n track . Th e Alli ance has triumph ed in the lo ng Cold Wa r. It has managed illlpressi vel y {h e depa rture fro m the a id sys telll . Now it has to d efin e and deve lo p its ro le in new and uncharteel circulllslances. You will , Lad ies anel Ge ntl emen, hea r many N ATO officials over th e nex t few days wh o w ill teil yo u o th erw i se , wh o w ill ex to ll th e progress th is Allian ce ha s made. Listen to th em ca refull y \v heth er (h ey refer to the indeecl w elco me achievement of ha ving succes full y eleparted fro m th e o ld or ro the much mo re daunfing o ne of having arrived in th e new.

Th ese lhen are th e challenges, these th e steps w hich th is Alli ance and this Atl antic Community w ill have to consider serio ll sl y. N ATO is not o n track now, anel to pretend otherw ise is to mak e it mo re

I have tri ed to ma ke deal' w hy I {hink we still have a ve ry lo ng w ay to go befo re we arri ve . I would not mind 5 0 mu ch if J w ere not convineed that all o f us wOllld su ffer a tremendous 1055 in o ur security,

o ur stability an d o ur internati o nal commitment if thi s A lli ance los t il s way. It has to fin cl it soon . Th e 21st Century, aftel' all , is just around lhe corn er.

Jose Cutileiro Secretary-General Western European Union Bo rn in Evora o n 20 November 1934 Married

1968

D.Phil (O xon.) Social Anthropo logy

1968-71

Research Fellow, St. Anto ny's College, Oxford

1971-74

Lecturer in Social Anthropology, Lonelo n School o f Economics anel PoliticaI Science

1974-77

Cultural COllllcello r at th e POI1ugese Embassy, Lo nelon

1977-80

POlt ugese penTwnent Representative to {h e Council of Europe

1980-83

Portugese Ambassador to Maputo

1983-86 Heael o f Po rtugese Delega tion to th e Stockho lm Conference (Conference o n Disarlllalll ent in Euro pe-CDE)

1986-88

Po litica I Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon

1988

Negoti ator of Po rtugal 's accession

1988-89

[0

\VEU

Heael o f Po rt ugese delegation to consultatio n w ith th e United States o n the use of the Lages air base in th e Azores

1989-91

POI1uges Ambassaclor to Preto ria

1992

Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister during th e Po rtugese Presidency of the Eu ro pean Community Coordina tor of th e EC Conference on Y ugoslavia, chaired by Lo rd Ca rrington

1993

Speci al Adviser to the Foreign minister Director of the Foreign Ministry Departmenr o f Anal ysis anel Forecasting

Nov. 1994

Secretary-General WEU

26 Jason Magazine no. 1, February 1995

â&#x20AC;˘


Thc Atlantic Community Speech by the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, to the Pilgrims Society (15 november 1994)

T

he end o f Ihe Co ld War is an his-

torie oppOrl unit y. A s Tom Paine sa icl during the American Revolution "\Ve h ave it in Dur power to start th e

world again'. In 1990 afler Ihe fall of lhe Berlin Wall and Ihe collapse o f CommuniS111 we all experie nced a sense of eupho ri a, the possibility of a new jerusalem.

Th e 'e nd o f hi sto ry ' was procl aimed.

The n, pe rlups inevitab ly, a reaction anc! a disillu sio n se t in as war bro k e O llt in Cen tral a nel EaSlcrn EUfope anel as new threats anel connicts appea red . Many assume that the main challcnges to be addressed arc Ihose faced by Ihe pec ple of Ru ssia , o r lhe new democ racies of EaSlern Europe. While Iheir problems are awesome lhat must not blind LIS l a th e funda mental issues th ai need l a be addressed by th e natio ns of th e Atlantic Allian ce. Th ere are cTucial questions lhal must be addresseel over Ihe nex t few years. Th ey arc th e re lalionship between Europe anel North Am erica ; between the European Unia n anel th e Uniteel Stat es and th e ca ntributi a n that lh e U nited Kin gelom ca n make l a the cam man elesliny o f Ihe WeSlern Worlel. For fihy yea rs Ih e Europe"n -Americ"n relationship has been expresseel in comma n defense anel securil y instituti o ns; a pro du cl firsl o f Ihe Second World War andlhen of lhe Cold War. Th roug h NATO , Eurape anel Na rth Am eri ca forged an alli ance th at has no histori ca l preceelent anel which has more than sa ti sfied all the most ambitiaus as piralia ns of il s fa unders. N ATO remain s cru CÎa lta the defen ce anel sec urit y nee el s o f th e n ~ltion s o n bath sides of th e Atlanti c. ft is an irreplacea bl e guaranto r af a ur mutual security. It is an unparall eleel provider o f pa-

Iiti ca! and milita ry stability fo r \'Vestern Europe anel now for th e new democra cies o f Ce ntra! and Ea stern Europe as weil. It is a sou rce o f unique militalY experience anel asselS for such peace k eeping o r peacemak ing roles as m ay be elesireel by its member sl~ltes. BUI NATO is, by ilself, only a partial expression of Atlantic solielarit y beGluse , es peciall y in Ihe posl -Cold War \Vorld el efence anel security have become on ly a fa cet o f our muwa! interests ra ther [han the overridin g o ne as when 'we faced an aggressive Soviet Unio n anel a mo nolith ie Wmsaw Paet. Toda y we f ace new challengcs l a our cam man interests. The rea l and potential threats to the physica l seeurity of Eu ro pe have to be sel alo ngsiele th e g rowing th reat s to th e va lu e , 10 th e t rade. to th e economic prosperit y anel perhaps, la the p ol ili ca l bel i ef s of bOlh Europe and Nort h Ameriea. \X!' hile \'VeSl ern va lu es and po liti ea l instituti o ns ma y be mo re preva lent than befare, already we ca n see the political , cultural and economic challenges Ihal we will be facing in th e years ahead. Militant Islamie eXlremism ha s tak en root in several Moslem countri es anel may be a major source of insta bili ty along th e North African littoral close la lh e hart o f Eu ro p e. Far Eastern countries enjoy growth rates anel economic ex pansio n that have ~drea el y overtaken Europe and co u lel do th e same [ 0 Ihe Uniled SI'lIes. The sleeping gianllhal i s China is ass ureelly awak ing , anel if Ha ng Ko ng , Singapo re and Taiw an are evidence o f th c eco no mÎe potent ia I of Chin ese people , o nce libera l ed fro m dogma , th en we w ill soon w itness th e massive econo mie tr"lIls fo rmatio n of China itsel f. Th e resurgence of nati o nalism amang sections o f th e population in Russia , Eastern Europe anel elsewhere means we cannO( take th e permanent preeminenee of Iiberal elemoeraey fo r granled. Terrorislll , drug peddling and internati o nal crim e remain majo r threa ts [0 polilical slability and socia l progress. O n eac h anel every o ne of th ese iss ues the interests of Europe and Nort h Ameri -

ca are at o ne. Th ose who say that the end o f Ihe Co ld War wilil ea d to a parting o f ways between the United States and Europe do not understa nd histo ry. Twi ee thi s ce ntury America sent its young men to Europe to fight, anel a ften to el ie, for Europels freedom . ft is worth rememberin g that o n neither occas io n was Commun ism nor th e Sov jet nion Ihe enem y. Th e demise o f bOlh will nOl result in a loss of comma n int erest anel cOlll lllitlll ent. That p re el ateel th e Col cl \Xlar and w illlive o n aftel' it. Th e Uniled States continues la neeel Europe as much as Eurorc needs Ihe UnilecJ Slales. BUI l repeat tha t defence anel securit y are no t in themselvcs a suffjcient ex pressio n o f th e abiding fricnelship betwee n Euro pe anel North Ameri ca. \'\Ihat is req uired is a new symbo lism ancl a new framework that w illtransccnd anel givc ex pression to the w ho le range o f o ur comma n interests. \'\Ih at is needeel is an Atlantic Comrnu nity. An Atl antic Communit y that wi ll rest on lhe four pillars o f o ur shared el estin y and no l o n N ATO alo ne. Th e firsl pillar mUSI be defenee and secu rit y as represe nl ed by Ihe N AT O alliance. Th e seco nd is our shared belief in t hc ru Ie o f law and parliamenlary democracy. T he thi rel is libe ral cap italism anel free trade which has given all o u r peoples unprece elen ted p ros perit y. Anel fo urth is th e shareel European cultura! herit age emanating from G reece anel Ro me thro ug h the RenaÎssa nce 10 th e sharcel va lues. beliefs and civilisation of ou r own century. Such an Atl antic Con"lITlunit-y need impl y no dim in ut ion o f sovereignty nor loss of independence. Like Ihe Council of Europe after th e \'\Ia r o r th c Unileel Na ti o ns, itself, it sho uld be a means of ex pressing our commo n asp irati o ns anel int erests. l ts frdmework , ilS symbols and its purpose shou!e1 fa cilitalc th e inl imate eooperation , consultatio n anel coo rdinati o n necessa ry 10 pro tee t th ese co mm a n interests anel enlighten our respecti ve peoples to th e ir share d es tin y . The invol vement o f Ca nada. w ilh ils lIniq ue French as weil as British herit~l ge would give acl-

Jasoll Magl,z ille no. I , February 1995

27


eleel ri chness ra the Atl antic relationship. The U nited Kingd om , b y vi rtu e o f its geographieal positio n, its language anel its hi sto ri c allinks w ith t h e U niteel Stat es could be pivotal in ensuring that the At la nt ic O cean wa s a brid ge rath er than a gulf between our two cominems. A sense o f commo n destin y is alreacl y an instinctive ass umptio n in the mineIs o f many peopl e in Europe and North America, most pani eul arl y in the wa y the y view th eir internati o n al relation ships. Ir is not surpri sing that th e n ew Central anel Eastern Euro p ea n e1 em ocra ci es are n o w anxi o u s to p arti ci pate in th e \Y/estern famil y o f natio ns. But th eir security n eeds a wid er than an y purel y military arrangemenl. Partnership fo r Peace must broa den (he vision o f these states th ar aspire 10 ATO m embership, b eyond seeing th eir security solely in terms o f (heir bilateral rel ati o n ship w ith Ru ss i a. W e should encourage a deepening and ripening o f AtJanticist vaJues in Ce ntra I anel Eastern Euro pe, so that th ey can , in elue course, full y participate in such an Atlan tic Community. Freedo m , parliamentary elemocracy anel the mie o f law are essenti al requirements fo r th e Atlanti c Com munity o f N atio n s. Freed o m fo r indi vi du als to fulfil th em se lves ; th e g ive anel tak e o f dem ocra cy, w ith different ideas co mpe tin g fo r public suppo rt , th e p eacefulmo vement o f elifferent parties into anel o ut o f government, the 101eran ee o f compro rni se anel eliversity . Th ese are funelamentaito o ur societi es. We all struggl e with similar pro blems. Rising cri me rates, the inexorabl e tenclency o f publi c exp e neliture l o ri se , th e battl e aga inst inflation and unemployment. Free tracI e is fundam ental to Great Britain , ex ponin g as w e d o 25 percent of our G OP , a greater p o rtion than any other m ajo r nat io n , but liberal capitalism anel free trad e are a v ital part o ur rela tio nship with the olher nalions o f Ihe Atlantic Community. Th ey reinfo rce th e sen se o f o p enness anel tru st in each o ther , working togeth er fo r the common gooel . H o wev er whil e free fl ow of la bour, ca pilal anel good s williead 10 a d ynamic economy, d ynamism means change. Change threate n s indi vielual s and commun ities and it is a necessary part o f th e rol e of p o liticalleadership l a embra ce necessary change whilst ameliorating th e negati ve co n se quences , for North Am eri ca anel Europe th e widest self-interest is represented by econo mie o p enness, o f tru st in free-traele and no t pro m o tin g autark y as a so lutio n to econo mie problems. To aeldress Ihese pro-

28

Mr . Malcolm Rifkind, Secr e tary of State fo r Defen ce UK (NATO Office for Press and Info rm ation) bl em s requires p o olin g o f ea c h other's ex perience. Perh aps th e normal exchange of diplomaIs sho lild be reinforeed b y th e c ro ss p os tin g o f civ il se r va nt b etwee n n ati o nal aelmini strations. Wie ca n alllearn fro m each o th er. Since civil serva nlS in all o f Ihe Allanti e Commllnity co ul1lries administer an ything b et w een 30 to 50 p erce nt of lhe cxp enditure o f lheir natio ns w ealLh , th e broa elesl inplll ro pro bl e m so l v in g i s se n sibl e. Th e exc hange o f ci v il se rv ~lI1t s w o uld al so buitd a ne tw o rk o f admini strati ve tru st and info rmal co mmllni c ati o n s that w o uld h elp cem ent o ur Community o f Natio ns. Th e more w c b ccome aware of Ollr different approaches to problem solv ing {h e greater Ollr collec tiv e wi selom in m a n aging w hat are bro aell y similar pro ble m s. Lik ewi se p arliam entari an s, sludem s, indu stri alists anel o th ers fro m b Olh si el es o f Ihe All anlic n eed reglil ar exchanges in a Illannc r lhat has becOlne commo n in Eu ro p e ove r th e Jast 40 years. In tim e su c h an Atl anti c Co mmuni( y might evolve fo rma I stm ctures but at th is stage w h at is mos t requireel is a health y anel unreslrained debate about o ur Atlantie relationship , how it C:ln b e strength e n ecl and h o w it c an c ov er the full spectrum of our commo n interes(s and aspiratio ns. Just as o ur democracy does nol fear Ihe c hallenge o f olh er p o litical phil osophies so w e have an open cultural h erita ge. o rth Amcri ca anel Euro p e h ave laye r upo n b ye r o f differenl influ-

Jaso7l Magazi7le no. 1, February 1995

en ces . Fo r each nat ion th e influ ence of Greece , lIal y , Fran c e , Britain and th e United Stal es will b c different. Th e na tio ns o fthe Atlamic Community are confid e nt in t he ir c ultural h e rit age. Th e ex change o f ideas , an, th ea tre etc bind us lOgeIher. CO IlClli Sioll

Th e Euro pea n Uni o n ha s made \va r in \Xlestern Euro pe unlhinkable. NATO has prevented w are against \Xlestern Euro pe. H o w ever th e end o fth e Soviet military anel ic!co log ical threat w ill no t leael to a disintegration o f the bo nds across the Atl anti c. Our pann ership is f Ollndeel o n shareel cliltural va lll es, a commo n history anc! simil ar aspiratio ns fo r th e flIture. An Atlami c Comt11unity w ill prevent th e Euro p e~ln Unio n anc! th e Uniteel States b ecoming in wa rd looking. The European Uni o n , ~ AT O , th e Unilec! States and Canada are all th e product o f m any centuries o f Euro pea n progress anc! civili zarion . An At lantic Communily woulc! be a histo ri e and ~Ippro priate initimive as w e approach a n ew century and th e third millennium. â&#x20AC;˘

(Embassy ofGreal Britail1, Tbe Hag ueJ


Speech by the Secretary General of NATO, mr. Willy Claes at the meeting with UN and Regional and other organizations Budapest, CSCE Summit, December 5th 1994, Hilton Hotel

General R emarks

tions, at all possible levels ( p o litica l and military conraC1S between NATO H eaclquarters anel U H eaclquarl ers , operati onal coorel inati on AFSOUTH-UNPROFOR). The Alliance is ready to strengthen its relalionships with the olher International Orga ni za lio ns dealing wit h sec u ri ty issues anel partieli larl y with the CSCE and the WEU. In thal sense, we are looking forwa rd to the res ults o f th i s SUl11111it which, ho p efull y, will reinforce CSCE ca pabi lilies o n these areas.

I would like to express m y appreciation to the CSCE Chai rm an in offi ce fo r organi zing thi s meeting, w hich contributes a useful follow-up to th e I st August m eeting in New Vork, orga nized by Or. Boutros-G hali. Events of the last few years have shown that increased co-operatio n between intern ati ona l orga ni za li o ns has become a must if we wan t 10 achieve effecl ive cooniet preventio n anel successful cri sis ma- Alliallce 's role 111 cOliflict preVelltioll n agement, including peacekeeping "nel Th e Alliance is making an important peace enfo rcemcnt. con tributi o n 10 con fli ct p reve ntion th The Uni ted Na lÎons, through its Secu rity rough its efforts to enhance stability and Council, must retain the primaty respo n- secllriry in th e wieler Eu ro-At lant ie area. s ibility ror international pe~lce anel secli- In fael, projecling stabi lity 10 the new derit y anel must be lhe SOUfee of relevant mocracies in Centra! and Easlern Europe mandates. The increasecl co-ope rati o n has become o ne of the major goals o f belween interna ti ona l o rga ni za ti ons the Alliance. sholilel be baseel o n complementarity of Since 1990, NATO has reached out to the efforl ; in Glher words, a ralio n al alloca- countries o f Centra I and Eastern EUfope, ti o n o f tasks and miss io ns , more than created th e Nort h At l anti c Coope rat io n just a straight elivi sio n of labou r. In ael- Co unc il (99 1) and l au n che el the Partelressi ng confli cl s and crises, eac h SilU- nership for Peace (1994). These are ma alio n neeels to be aelclresseel o n a case - jor i nitiat ives th aI we arc sw ift ly impleby-case basis, taking into account the ca- menting. pabilities ancl comparative advantages o f Th e process has contributed to building the va ri ous o rga nizat io ns. Lel me stress trust ancl co-operation. \Xle, in th e Allian th at a eo-o p era ti ve app roac h lo\varcls ce, attach a lo t of i mportance to th ese m ainta ining inrernat ional seeurity ancl initiatives ancl we are fully committed (Q stability is needccl now mo re Ihan ever. make them a suceess. \'(Je can nOl miss Ihc historie opportunity to further co-operati on among us all. \Y/e Tbe AllitlllCe 's role ill crisis ma1lage· have to react to th ese fast changing times me"t ll1ld p e a cekeepi"g and seize the opponunili es thatthey bring. While reta ining its functi o n o f providing All intern at iona l organization s ha ve to collective defe nse to its M ember Sta tes, adap t to (hi s new farm o f co-operation th e Allian ce has l aken up new m issions anel have to establish contacts, based on based o n Ministerial anel Summit deci· transparency ancl m utual understaneling. sions sin ce 1992 to support p eacekeeA special effon of generosi ty anel Oe xi bi- ping o p erations and o th er ope r ations lity w il ! b e clemancl ed from u s. \Ve are under the responsibility of th e CSCE or unel er th e aut h o rit y oft h e UNSC, on a ready (Q do it. NATO has est,dJlished close cooperatio n case- by -case basis ancl in accorda n ce and coo rdinat ion wil h lhe Unit ed la_ w ith Alliance procedures. The Alliance is

making a major contribut ion 10 Ih c UN and Co nt act G roup efforts to end th e fighting and se ttl e thc conOict in fonner Yugoslavia, ancl we are ready 10 continue to do so. Let me make dear once more , I ATO is ac tin g on th e basis of a UN manelate. NATO has performed the ta5ks that th e UNSC has requested her to do. We have a supporling ro le for th c UNo in lhe crisis in the former Yugoslavia. I elraw a c1ea r lesson of o ur common experience in forrner Yugoslavb anel that is Ihat , it is necessa ly to reach cammon unelerstanding o n definitions. prillCip! es <l ncl concepls o f peacekeeping and peace en fo r cement. The NACC/ PFP Ad H oc G ro up on Co-operalio n in Peacekeeping, with CSCE representation and a sta ndi ng invitaLÎo n (Q the U 10 ~IIl end , con tinu es to address these issu es, wh ieh canstitu te esse nli al questi ons lh a t we have gat to answer if we wa nt lO l ac kl e. in an e ffi cie nt way , th e new ehall enges we are now facing.

COllClllSiOll The Alliance eontinlles to enha nce its ro· Ie in co nfli c t prevention thr o u g h th e NACC/ pn) process anel its new decisions o n futu re enlargement. Th e Alliance rema ins ready to sup p o rt peacekeeping and o l her opera lio ns, based o n a U or CSCE manelate. but effectiv en ess reqlli res effieient inlcraction ancl coo rdin atio n both at the politica!, st r ateg i e anel at the tactinll l evel. \V/e n eed l a co ntinu e to sllldy al ilhese aspeelS, as a maner of u rgency. in o rd er la get the b es t resu lt s fro m o ur O rga ni zations' ca pabilities.

(NA TO Ojjice 0/ 111/0 rll/CI/ ia 11 & Press)

Jaso" Magazille no. I. Februaty 1995

29


NACC Landmarks Bey01ld dialogue alld cooperati01I

6 July 1990: NATO Summit Meeting. Heads of State and Government issue th e London Deelaration of a transformed orth Atlantic Alliance and establish re-

Centra I and Eastern European eountries.

At th e January 1994 AT O Summit in Bru sse ls, Allian ce lea d ers laun ched a

gula r diplomatie liaison with

majo r new initiative, "Partnership for Pe-

6 June 1991:

ace" ( PFP) , within the NA CC fram ework , o pen to ather stales part'icipating in the N ACC ancl oth er m ember co untri es o f

on Partnership with the Countries of Centra I and Eastern Europe and endorse

NATO Foreign Ministers, m eeting in Copcnhagen, issue a Statemenr fluther initiatives to strengthen relations anel promote contacts.

lhe Confere nce o n Securi ty allel Coope-

rati on in Eu rope (CSCE) able and willing la contribute 10 the PFP programme. The Partnership fo r Pea ce exp ands anel inrensifies military anel po litical co -ope ra tion in EUfope . Depending on th e capacity anel desire of indi vidual participating pa rtn e r states, N ATO is w o rking w Îrh each o f th em toward s transparency in

defence budgeting, promoting democra ti e co ntro l of de fence IllÎn istri es , jo int planning, joint military exerci se s, anel creating an ability to o perate with NATO fo rces in su eh fie ld s as peace keeping , sear ch anel resc ue and humanitari an o peratio ns, allel alh er as m ay be agreed . T o fac ilitate co -o p era ti o n acti v iti es ,

8 November 1991: ATO Heads of State and Govemment issue the Rome Declaration on Peace and Co-operation and publish the Alliance's new Strategie Concept. The I{ome Declaration announces measures

(Q

instirutionalise consultation anel co-

operatio n with Central and Eastern European countries through the establishmem of a "Nonh Arlanric Co-operatio n Council ".

20 December 1991: At th e fjrst meeting of the North Atlantic Co-operatio n Council (NACC), Foreign Ministers of NATO and nine Central European countries issue a Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Co-operation. 10 March 1992, Brussels: Ten newly independen t states on the territory of the former U SR are weicomed as NA CC mcmbers; the first Work Plan for Dialogue , Partnership and Co-operation is published.

ACC partner countries and oth er PFP parti cipating st.H es ha ve been in vited 1O se nel p e rman e nt li a iso n o ffi ces to lh e n e w Partn e rship building at N ATO Heaelquarte rs anel [Q s separate Partners-

hip Coordination Cell in Mons ( B elgi um) , w here the Supre me H eadqu arters,

Allied Pow ers Euro pe (SHAPE) is . Iso 10eated .

5 June 1992, Oslo: Albania and Georgia are weicomed as NACC members and Finland as an obscrver.

18 December 1992, Brussels: A second Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Co-operation is published; the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia are weicomed as independent NACC members as from 1 January 1993 .

• 11 June 1993, Athens: Publica tion o f a repo rt by the NA CC Ad Hoc Group o n Co-operation in Pe.cekeeping, established at the beginning of 1993, ineluding a progralTUne of practical cooperation activities in preparation for participation in peacekeeping operations under UN and CSCE mandate. 3 December 1993, Brussels: NATO and NACC Foreign Min isters publish a second report by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Co-opera ti on in Peacekeeping, as weil as the NACC Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Co-operation for 1994. 10 June 1994, Istanbul: Review of progress on implementation of the Partnership for Peace initiative within the framework ofNACC, launched by the NATO Summit in January 1994; publication of a further report by th e ACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.

(NATO Office of lnfonnation & Pressj

30

]asonMagaztne no. 1, February 1995


Kirchberg Erk1ärung der Westeuropäischen Union 9. Mai 1994 in Luxemburg

D

ie Minister widmeten ei n en er- ti on uncl Ictz li c h ihren Beitritl zur Euheblichen Teil ihrer Beratungen ropä isc he Unio n darstellen lInd wiededer Stärkun g der Beziehungen rum die Möglichkeit einer Mitgliedschaft ZlI den n eul1 miucleufopäischen Part- in der WEU eröffnen . Diese Initiative nern lInd der Verabschiedung eines As- e rgän zl in vollem Umfa ng die Zusamsoziiertenstatus in der \VE U, der den Hö- menarbeit im Rahmen des Bündnisses, hepunkt der InÎliatÎ ve darstelil , die auf insbesondere innerhalb des programm s der Tagung in Lu xemburg im November Pannersc haft für den Frieden, und die vergangenen Jahres zu ihren Gunsten er- Zusammenarheit im Ibhmen des Sta biIiüitspakts, wobei diese Po rzesse sich gegriffen wurde. Zu den weiteren Themen dieser Ta gu ng gcnseitig ve rs t ~irke n . gehörten der ve rbessene Status, der den Die M inister waren der Auffassung, daS künftigen assoziien en Milgliedern ange- eine g röSere Beteiligung diese r Sta aten balen wird, und di e Stärku ng der eu- an den Aktivitäten der \'«E U zusammen ropäischcn Sicherhe it s- lInd Verteidi- mil einer sich hieraus ergebenden engegungidentität SOw Îc der opera ti o nell en ren Abstimmung in Sicherh eitsfragen in Fähigkeiten der WEU . Angesichts der bedelltendem MaBe zu gröBerer Sta bipalitischen und apera ti anellen Bedeu- Iität in Europa beitragen wird. tun g der Ergebnisse des G ipfeltreffens des Bundnisscs vam januar 1994 für die AnläBlich ihrer ersten Tagung nach dem \'VEU crönerte n die Minister die be- Gipfeltreffen des Atlantischen Bündnisträchtlichen Möglichkeiten , die sich hier- ses im Janllar 1994 begrüBlen die Minisdu rch für die künfligcn Allsbal' der \VEU ter nachdrück lic h, daB das 13ündnis seibieten. Schlie81ich erörtert en sie die Ent- ne 1I1llfassende Unte rstüt zun g für die wicklu ng d es Dialags mit den Mittel- Emwicklung einer Europäischen sicherll1 ee rst~at e n sowie die Komakte ZlI Ru S- heits- und Verteidigungsidentität bekun land lInd der Ukrain e. det hat. Sie ~illBe rt e n ihre Befriedigung darüber, daB die einschWgigen Teile cler I m AnschlllS an die Beratungen des Lux e mburge r Erk l ärung vom 22. NoStändige n Rates auf der Gru ndlage des vember 1993, die als eu ro p ~ii sc h e r Bei tihm am 22. Navember 1993 im Luxem- rag ZlI dem Gipfeltreffe n der Allianz gebu rg el1eilten Mandats begrüBten die Mi- dacht waren, gebü hrend berücksichtigt nister nachdrücklich die Übe reinstim- wo rden sind . In diesem Zusammenhang mung, d ie hinsichtlich des Inhalts und wü rdig ten sie die Bedeutung des Beschder ModaliUiten c in es den Konsulta- lusses des Bündnisses zu prüfen , wie es LÎonspartnern angcboten Assoziierten- seine Strukturen und Verfahren we itestatu s in der \'\IEU erzie lt w urde. Sie ei- rentwickeln uncl anpassen könne. nigten sic h auf ein DokUll1cnL zu einell1 Sie begrüBten , daG das G ipfeltreffen den A ssoziiene n status , das T eil 11 di ese r Grundsatz bestätigte, won ach ko llektive Ressolll"cen llncl Fähigkeiten des BündErklärung bildet. Die WEU ergreift dicse bedeluende pali- nisses für \'«E U-Operati o nen zu r Verfüti sche Initiative ill1 Z usalllll1en hang mit g ung ges tellt werden könn en , um die den sich entwi ckc l nclcn Ve rbindllll gen WEU als Verteidigungskomponente der zwischen cli csen Staaten und euro päi - Europäische Union l Jncl als In st rument schen Inst itutionen, insbcson dc re durch zur S t ~i rkun g des ellropü ischen pfeilers die Ellropa-Ahkollllllen . Dies wircl ei nen der Allianz zu st~irken. Sic betomen, daS konkreten 13ei trag der \'\IEU zur Vorl)e- die Modalitälen , nach denen diese zur reitung dieser Staaten auf ihre Imeg ra - Verfügllng gestellt werden, die eigenen

Planungsverfahren und -f:ihigkeiten der \'\IEU wahren solhen. Die Minister betomen , w ie wichtig die I"u fenden Arbei ten in dcr WEU zu den mit der \XlEU zusamme nh ü n ge nd en Aspekten der Anpassung der Strukturen des Atlantis c he n l3ündnisses sind. Um die Fähigkeit der \'«EU auszubauen , die in der Petersberg-Erk!3 run g defi nienen Aufgaben ZlI erfüll en, besl,i tigt en die Mini ste r das K onzept, die zu r Durc hflih run g der notwcndigen militürischen Aufgaben erford c rli c hen Resso urce n und Potenzia le zu bestimmen. Die Minster unterstrichen , w ie wichtig eine Abstimmung mit dern Bündnis über die Umsetzu ng des Konzepls alJierter Streitkräftekomlllandos und die Entwicklung trennbarer, jedoch nich t getrennter militärischer Fähigkeiten ist, um gegebenenfalls ihren effckt iven Einsatz durch die \'«E U und in diesem Fali e l lllt er ih rem Kommando zu gewü hrleisten . Die Minister erinn en cn an ihr Beke nntni s zu Stärkung der o p c rati o n elle n Fähigkeiten der \'«E U und waren sich ferner darin einig, daB die \'\IEU von einer sorgfä ltige n Vcrwaltung cl er Ressou rcen \vie auch vo n bestchenden standa rdi sierten Verfahren profitieren würde. Die Minister ersu c ht en den SUinclige n Rat , die l3eratu ngen lIber t liese Angelegenheiten so bakt wie möglich fOrlzlIsetzen , damit rechtzei ti g gemeinsa me Posili o n en in den KonsultationsprozeB irn Bündnis eingebracht werden können. Die Minister erinncne n daran, daS die \XlE U in vo ll e m Umfang bereit i st , ihre Ro lle in Übereinstimmung mit dem Vert rag liber di e Europ ~ii sc h e Unio n sow ie der Erklärung von Maastricht warzllnehmen lInd Ersuchen der Euro päi sc h en Union hinsichllic h ihrer Besc hlüsse und MaBnahmcn , d ie sic h auf di e Verteidigung auswirken , Zll e nlsprcchen. Sie begrüSten, dag jetzI Arbcitsbeziehllngcn zur Europ~iischcn Union fo rentwicke lt werden. Sie erÎn nel1en fe m er daran , daS

j asoll M ag a z ille na. I . February 1995

31


sie au f ihrer letzten Tagung die MaSnahmen zur Sicherstellung einer engen Z usamm enarb eit zw isc hen der EUfOp ä ischen U nio n und der \V EU unterstüt zten , die in den Se hlliSfo l gerlin gen d es Rates "AlI ge mein e An ge le ge nh e ite n" vo m 26. O kt o b er 1993 enth alten sind und am 29. O kto ber 1993 vom ElIro päisehen Rat gebilligt w urden. In diesem Z usammenhang belOnten die Minister die Notwend igkeit , die Zu sa rn menarbeit insbesondere bei der Kri senb e w ~ilti g ung zu ve rbesse ren, und sahen einer engen Zusammenarbeil zwischen den b eiden Orga nisli ti o nen entgegen, damit im Krisenfall raseh lInd w irksa m reag ierr we rd en k önne. In di ese m Z usammenhang begrü Sten die Minister das Ersli chen der Euro päisch en Unio n, e inen Beitra g zur künfti ge n Ve rw altun g Mosrars durch die Europäisc hen Union ZlI leisten, und bestiitigten, daS die WEU be reit sei, ihre U nterslützung anzubieten. Dies stelle e ill vi e lve rsprechendes Beispi el für die enge Z usa mmenarbei t zw ise h en d e r W EU und d e r Euro p äi schen Union im Sinn e des M aastri chter Veltnlgs dar. Di e Minister b egrüBten fe rn e r den e rfo lgreiehen An sehlu S der Ve rh andlungen über den Beitritt Finnlands, Norwege ns, Ös terreichs und Sc hwe dens zur Europ äischen U nion, wobei sich diese Länder unter and ere m ve rpnicht ete n, d e n Bes itzstand d e r Ge me inse haft im Bereich der Gemeinsarn en Au Be n- und Sicherh eitspo litik zu übern ehmen. Sie äuSen en die Ho ffnung , daS der Beitritt

32

z um 1. ja nu ar 1995 w irk sam we rd e n Die Minister b egrüBten nac hdrückli ch kö nn e, und erinn erL c n dara n , daB d ie die Ve rabschiedung gemeinsa lller ErkläWEU illl Vorfeld dieses 13eitrins zur Süir- run ge n. in denen di e Bedingllnge n für kung der Kontakte bereit sei. d en Einsa tz d er be lg ise h-de utse h-ni edcrläncli sc h-briri sc hen M uit i nationa len Die Minister ve rwiesen auf di e länger- Di visio n ( Mine) und d es al11phib isehen fri slige Perspekti ve einer gemeinsa men V ern abd s des Vereinigten Königreichs Vert eid igungspolitik in der Euro päisehe und d e r N ie de rl and e im Hahm e n d e r Union, die im Laufe der Zeil zu einer ge- WEU und der diesbezügliehen Vereinbameinsa men Ve rteidigung führen könne. rungen festgelegt werden. die mil der des Atlantischen Bündnisses Di e Minister nahmen mi t Be friedi gung ve reinbar ist. In diesem Sinne beauftrag- die Entscheidung Lu xe mburgs zur Kenten sic den Ständigen Rat, die Arbeit an ntni s, si ch de m Euro k o rps an z u sc hder Fo rm uli erun g einer ge mein sam en lieSen. europä ischen Ve rteidi gungspo litik rnit Die Minister billigten den "W EU-Operadem Z iel aufzunehmen, ihnen auf ihrer tio nsplan Combined Endeavo ll r" ( G enächsten Ministertagung in den ieder- meinsa me Anstrengung) fOr die Zusamlanden vorl äufige Sehlu Bfo lgerun gen ZlI m e n ste lllln g e in es \'V EU - Mari n eve runrerbreiten. ba nds, w ie von der Planllgszell e vorgeDi e Minister erinn err en daran , w elche schlagen, und kamen überein , daB diese Bedeutllng sie der kontinllierli chen ope- Initi ati ve in ÜbereinsrilTImun g mit dem r at io ne ll en Entwi eklun g de r WE U al s ursprünglichen Mandat weiterentwickelt Ven eidigungskomponente der Europäi- werden solle. sc h e lll U ni o n und als In strum e nt z lIr Des we iteren hofften die Minister au f die Stärk ung des euro päisehen Pfei/ers der \Ve ite re nt wic klun g de r it alie ni sc he n Vorsc hl äge , die derze it mi t Frank reich Allianz be imessen. Die Minister nahmen die Arbeit der Pla- und Spanien geprüft w erd en und die einllngszell e Zll den der \VEU zugeordn e- nen der \VE U zugeordn elen lTIultinatioten militäri sc hen Kräft en zlIr Kenntni s n ale n Ve rb and vo n Land slreitkräften und forden en diese auf, eine Bes tand - vorsehen. sliste von Truppenpakelen we iterzuent• w ickeln , die es der WEU crmöglicht, d ie ihr übertragenen Aufgaben, insbesonde- (Ojjice oj ll1jormalio l1 Cl l1 d Press, Cerre im Bereich humanitäre Einsätze, Frie- man Hmbassy 70e Hague) d ense rhaltllng und Kri senbew ältigung, ZlI erfüll en . Sie nahmen fern er den Ber ichl üb e r de i Ro ll e de r \'<lEU b e i de r Friedenserhaltung zu r Kenntnis.

]ason Magazine no. 1, Feblualy 1995


Report on the Atlantic Treaty Association Youth Seminar October 21 - 29, 1994

T

his year th e Net herlands Atlantic ned us aboul European security insti tu -

New Cha llellges, Old Slrucl ures l/ was

Comm issio n o rgani zed the 40th

lio ns and sl rll ctu res lIsi ng he r famous It interlockin g instituli o nslt (spagh etti)

helel at Ihe Erasmlls Uni ve rsiry of Rott erdam, The morni ng cons isted of a seri es

Treaty Associati o n with a cen tral theme model. This was fo llowecJ by a v i sit to "NA 1'0 011 tra ckfor tb e 2 1s I ee n/u ry ". th e M ari tim e Museum and the a id I-I ar-

of lectures by Mr Rob de W ijk (M in istry

Parallel to th e General Assembly the jas- bour of Rotterdam. on Fou ndation, in coope rat ion with the

( RA D Corpo ration, USA) , Mr Djangu ir

Genera l Assembl y o fth e Atl antic

Netheri<lnds All an ti c Commissiol1 , organi zed anc! hostecl a youlh seminar. Thir-

o f D efe n se) , Mr Manen va n H e ll ve n Atamali ( Assoc iati on for Eliro-At ia ntic

Cooperat io n , Ru ssia) and Mr .Iamie Shea terial wi th lectUl'es by DI' Koen Koch, Se- (NATO Headquarters) .

Sunday promised some st imulating m a-

ty-five stud ents and young professio nals nior Lectlll'er at Ihe University of Leyden, from NATO and 1'1'1' countries attended and Prof. Dr j an Geen Siccama, Head of Mr de Wijk 's lecture dea lt w ith th e Eu roth e ATA You th Seminar from October 21 Hesea rch at Ihe Neth crlancl s In stitut e of pean cJefense identity, and whet her NA- 29 , 1994. Th e se mi nar dea lt wi th the Inte rnational He lat io ns "C linge nel ael". TO now faced an identity crisis. Th e next

changing CÎrCll ll1 st3 n ces coneenling Eu- The lectures li veclup to the expectatio ns lectllre , by MI' va n !-l e u ve n Ci ncillel ecl, ropean securit y ancl (he consequences o f

these changes for Europea n stabilit y. In lh e disclissions, lec tures a nc! debates

NATO's role in Europe and the American ro le in NATO p layed a central role. Differences of o pinio n were healthily abu ndant, anc! th e clisclissions l ook pla ce with th e know l edge that the sem inar woulcl be co ncluded w ith a stat eme nt made

and proviclccl some interesting insights and provocalive ideas. These were di s-

cussed and debated in workshops in th e afternoon after which th e parti cipants departed 10 Brussels for th e visit to ATO Headquaners.

p ,•• ) conce rn ed th c impo rt ant questi o n o f th e fli lu re of Tr ansat la ntic re lal io ns

and was fo llowed by an interesting disclI ssion. M I' Ata ma li's speech (a lso inclueleel) dea lt w ith RlI ssia' s ro le in the seclIrity instiluli o ns and st rll ctures, and illuminated th aI RlI ss ia is not , w hat Chur-

At N ATO we \Vere we lcomed ea rl y o n

chili assumed , a rid cll e w rapp ecJ in a

M o nday mo rning by MI' Bram Tri eslram,

m ys le ry insid e a n e nigma, but instea el

by a re presentati ve o f th e seminar w ho gave an introdu ctory speech . O ne sho uld and wou ld pla y their pa rt in th e

at th e cJ osi ng session o f th e General As- of the highlight.s o f th e week was definite ly th e lunc h w ith th e Deputy Dutch sembly.(For speech see pAl) Perma nen t Hepresentati ve to NATO , Mr Th e participants spent th e week at th e P. Fe ith wh o hos ted a working lun ch . Van Ghent K aze rn e in Ro tt erda m . Th e Bes ides be ing able to enjoy a scrumpfirst m orn ing was ce ntred o n an intro- ti o us mea l th e participants we re askeel ducti on w ith the host country; Mrs Mari- and prompted to make sta tements or ask Iyn Wa rman o f th e NUFFIC (Netherlands questio ns pertaining to NATO . ThrougOrganiza tio n for Internatio nal Coopera- ho ut the day the participants listened to tion in High e r Educat i o n ) ex p osed inte rest ing lec tures a nd we re ab le to

chaired by Mr Leo n Wecke, Director of the Stu dy Centre fo r Peace.

Dutch peculiarities and ca ri catu res, Thi s ga in va lu a bl e insights. For a semina r

Dliring th e aftern oo n wo rksh ops \vere

European securiry architecture. Mr Jam ie Shea fro m N ATO , who ca m e

esp ecially from Dublin for the con ference gave a light-heaned and clear presentati o n o f th e way N ATO i s adap ting to

(he ncw surroun dings and new respo nsibilities. Th e mo rning sessio n was ably

was fo llowed by a speech o n the fo reign aboul secllrity in Europe, and especia ll y held dealing w ith Partn ership for Peace, policy o f Th e Neth erlands by Mr Will em dealing w ith lhe future of NATO th e visit Refugees and Migratio n , Pro liferati o n of Wansink , ed ito r o f th e 'El sev ier', In his w as essential. Chemica l Weapons and Transatlantic Respeech Mr Wan sin k conce ntrated on rece nt d eve lo pm e nt s and ex pec ted ten dencies,

Afte r lun ch the parli cipa nts were co nfronted w ith th e first subject-matter real-

lations, W e were fortll nale 10 have extreDue 10 stud ent dem o nstrati o ns in Bru sse l s th e o ri g in a l v isil 10 the cen tr e of lown wa s cancelled , insteacl the evening was passed in Antwerpen.

mely good chainnen for th e Worksho ps; Mr Brent Hardt fro m th e US Embassy, Mr Anil Wadhwa of th e O PCW (O rga ni zation for th e Pro hib itio n of Che mica l \V/e-

apo ns), Dr St"ni sla va H ybnerova f ro m

On Tu esda y j ason was to ho ld its bian- C h a rl es U ni ve rsit y in Prague a nd Mr nual conference whi ch wou ld , in accor- Shea. Th e day was co nclu ded by a reElse H0jberg, o f the Multilatera l and Re- dance wilh lhe seminar, deal w ith the fu- ce ptio n hosted by th e Ro tt erda m T o wn giona l Mfairs Sectio n o f NATO enlig hte- ture o f NATO. Th e Conference "NA TO; Hall. Iy pertaining to w haL th e seminar was lO dea l w ith ; Europea n secll rity, Mrs Anna-

Jason Magazine no. 1, Fcbruary 1995

33


Wednesday was possibly Ihe climax of the week as it was spe nt in the p res ti g i o u s H al l of Knighl s in The Ha g u e . Queen Bea lrix allended Ihe conference, Prime MinisIer Wim Kok addressed the delegates , and Ihe Minister o f Fo rei gn Affairs Mr H ans va n Mierl o anc! the Minister o f Defense Mr Jori s Voorhoeve both made sp eec hes. Additionally th e delegales were able 10 lisl en to General j oulwan , Supreme Alli ed Commander in Europe (SACEU R). The mosl emhralling sp eec h of th e da y was debatably th e o p e ning speec h by C ri sto ph B e rtram which must have resemblecl th e a ne ma-

de by Egidio at Ihe Fifth Lateral Council in Ro me in 151 2. 11 has been said o f Egidi a's speec h lh a t it was "ha rd 10 teil

wbelber bis words lvere Ibe praclised eloquen.ce of a rel1owl1ed preacber deliveril1g Ih e keynote address, or C/Il impassion.ed al1d gellll il1e cly fo r a change of co urse before il was 100 lale " ( B.W. Tuchman , 1' .10 1, 1984). Mr Be rtram 's

o pe ning speec h was just as confrontational anel critica!.

Thufscla y was spent pre paring the Statement that was to be made o n Friday at th e closing session o f Ih e General Assembly. Making a speech w hich would refJ ecI what 35 different people from 20 different cOllntries thollght (with alltheir different perceplions o f dangers and problems) was expected 10 be difficuh. Fortunately, after a clay of debating ancl discussing Lh e las t ve rsi o n was read to the participants anel a rew small alteratio ns made al 01.30 hours.

On Friday delegales were ab le to listen 10 th e first speech made by the new Secretary General o f NATO , Mr Willy Claes and to G ijs Jelike n who prese nted the Statement. Afrer a visir to the Mauritshuis Museum and a traditional"rijst-tafel" dinner at the Van Ghent Kazerne Ihe offi cial program ended. Saturday mo rning saw th e departure of severa l exhauslecl participa nts who had spent an extremely busy but enj oyab le week in Th e Neth erlands.

â&#x20AC;˘

34

jason Magazine no. I , Febru ary 1995


NATO: New Challenges, Oid Structures Dr. Marten van Heuvell

Speech for the JASON Autumn Conference, October

25, 1994 Cha nging Trallsatltllllic Relations, jmpUcatiolls for Secllrily M y subject is tra nsatl a ntic re latio ns a nel th e impli ca ti o n s ro r sec urit y. Thi s i s anoth e r w ay o f pos in g lh e iss ue o f th e Am eri ca n ro le in th e Eu ro p ean Cornmunity. My thesb this mo rning is threefolel: Firsr, Euro p ea n securit y d epends o n a co mm OIl Europ eall an el Am e ri c an ejfor/; Second, Euro pea n security is 11 0 1 a zero slim ga me; il does no t de pe nd ei/her o n a ElirO pe~1n or an America n element; Third , th e grea t changes in Eu ro pe req uire a read ju slm ent o f th e res pec ti ve Europea n anel Ameri ca n ro les. Talk abo ut EUfopean sccuriry sounds cl inica l anel de tachecl . 50 lel me begin on a p ersonal no te anel share some conclu sia ns fro m my own ex peri ence w ith securit y in Euro p c. Th e first was o n Ma y 10, 1940, wh en th e Neth erl ands w as inva ded by foreign troops. Dutch resistance, while v~il ia nt , was ineffecti ve. \'{Ih at I l ea rn ed was t he im p o rt ance o f d efe nse. M y nex t ex per ie nce was five years o f wa r and occupation. That taught me th e va lu e o f freed om. At th e end o f th e wa r m y fa mil y anel l we re li be rated by Ca nadi an fo rces. Th at burnt into m y memo ry th e impo rtan ce o f th e /ra l1sa/lanfic rela fiollship. In 1963 1 sta rt ed a tour at th e u.s. M issio n in Berlin , separated by man y miles from th e Wes t b y Sov iet fo rces. During th ese years I grew to appreci ate th e value of a//ia /l ces. A decade later I wa s pan o f an Am erica n diploma tic (Cam engaged in anns cant ro l negoti ati o ns w ith Soviets and o th ers in

New Yo rk anel Geneva. Thi s ex peri ence ro l e in th e unifi ca li o n of Ge rm a ny in bro ug ht ho me to me th c impo rtan ce o f 1990. Th ro ugho ut thi s entire peri oel the co n/rolling weapo ll s of mass Uniled States has b ee n co mmitt ed to a d es/ r /i ctiol1. In the late seve nties, at th e ntrans<l tlantic ba rgain n in w hich th e niAmerica n Embassy in Bo nn , I fOlll1d my- ted Stat es unelertook to leael the effo r! to self in the mieldle o f th e Europea n eleba- keep the alliance secure., te o n th e d ep loy m ent o f int erm edi ate In contra st, th e enel o fth e Colel War has range nuclea r wea pons on Ihe Eu ro pean bro ught w arnin gs o f overslrel ch and elecontinent . This episode underlin ed the clin e o f Am eri can powe r. JTh e brea kup impo n ance o f deterrence. As Nat io nal of th e Soviet Union anc! the disappearanIntelligence o ffi cer for Euro pe in (he late ce o fth e Sov iet comminist threa t remo80s I saw the Soviet empi re crumble, the veclthe energi zing element that tri gge\'{Iarsaw Pact cl isintcgrate, th e Iro n Cur- red American leadership during thc Cold tain disappea r a nel Germ any unify. Th e- \'(Iar ye ars. G reat e r e mph as i s o n th e se evel1lS bro ug ht me face to fa ce w ith a Am eri can do mesti c agenda has p ro dupowe r f u l focu s o f hi sto r y and funela - ce d pu b lic attitud es that no lo nger acmental changes in the ba lance of pow er. ce pt th e prem ise th at th e Unit c d S t ~H es Now, at RAN D, I wa tch a Euro pe th at. in- should continue to exel1 a majo r effon to ste~l d o f settlin g down after major trans- provicle security in Europe w hen th e maformations, is expericnci ng an accelera- jo r threa t to Euro pe's securil y has vanistio n of change inside countries and in re- heel. Now , co ng ressio n al o p i n io n lations among them . All this brings ho me questi o ns Am eri ca n commitments abroth e conclu si o n th at Euro p ea n securit y ad , ancl th eir costs. Same academic voiremains elusive. ces call for a po li cy th at woulel el eta ch Am eri ca from Euro pe, cease wh at th ey Sin ce it s e ntry into \'(Io rld \'(Iar 11 , th e re gard as an unnecessa ry drain o n U.S. Uni teel States has pl ayed a leadi ng ro le resources, and w ithcl raw fro m overseas in th e security o f Euro pe. It maintained commi lmenrs. 1In sho rt, Ihe pro posilio n th is ro le for half a ce ntury, up thro ug h rhat Am eri ca pla ys a n a tur ~li ro le in th e the last el ays o fth e Col el War. In contrast security of Europe is under challenge. l a isolation du ring the preced ing centu- Th e future o f th e America n involvement ry, Am erica's involvernent in Euro pe ca- w ith Eu ro pe w ill be neither a wh o leheme 10 be regard ed as a natural state. Pre- art ed commil ment to assume lhe lead o n side nt Haoseve lt helpecl ta d raw th e li- all m aja r iss u es - an d t he ma jo r cas ts nes of Postwa r Europe al Ya lta. Am eri - such a co mmit me nt WGuid em ail - nor ca n mi lit a r y fo rces llifn eel th e tiel e an aba ndonlllent of previo us A merica n against Nazi Gcrmany. Secretary of State respo nsibilit ies. Th e Un iteel States posiMarshall crea teel th e condi ti o ns fo r th e ti o n w ill be sOlllething in bet wee n . Horeconstru cti o n o f Euro pe. \'{Iashin gton wever, the debate o n just \Vha! this posibecam e lh e mainstay o f N ATO , whi ch ti o n shollld be has o nl y just begun . The kept th e members of th e alliance secure outcollle rcmains 10 be shaped . anel Wes t Be rlin free. Af te r Pres id e nt President Cl imo n has skelched his admiKennedy, the United States took the lead nistrari o n's view o f th e U.S. ro le with rein graduall y building up an mms control spec t to Euro p e in three addresses du regime w ith th e Sovi et Unio n whi ch ai- rin g 1994 in Brusse ls, Pari s, an el Berlin . meel at keeping th e peace in Euro pe at a He sees Am erica anel Euro pe as part o f a lower leve l o f m ilit ary co nfro ntatio n . larger econo mic re latio nship, inclucl ing Th e Bu sh administrat ion playeel a k ey Japan anel oth er countrics, th at l ogether

]asoll Mtlgazille no. I . Febrll<l1Y 1995

35


ca n provide jobs and prosperity by trade under free market condi tÎ o ns. H e ha s given assurance of a continueel U.S. military force presence at the level of 100,000. Th e Cl inton administrati o n has welcomeel the intention of the co untries o f the

European Union ra create a European security identity and, ultimately, a European defense policy. It has proposed the concept o f eombined jo int task fa rces, based o n the notion that European defense efforts ca n be separable bu t not separate from those of the United States. It has talked about Europe whole and free . lt has pursued a relationship with Russia that seeks ro ma ximi ze comman objecti-

four differenl approaches .1 O ne is rea li sm , based o n a perceived n ee d to mainta in stabJ e security balanees in regio ns important ta the Un itecl Slates , inclllcling Europe. An other is eo l1 eclive seeurity, seek ing secllrity rhro ugh eaopera ti ve arrangements anel extending these as conditions permit. A third is democrati c il1lernationalism. based o n the spread

Moreover, European eountries w ill want it that way. The bu relen will have to be reelistributeel , fro m th e transal!;uHic bargai n in which

the Uniteel States [Ook th e lead in p rovoking stra teg ic securit y, 10 Ge rman Defense Minister Volker Ruhe's new transat lanti e co ntract th at mak es roo m for a m eas ure of independence -and of re-

of li beral values. Th e las t is strategie in- sponsibilit y- o n the part ofthe cou ntries d epe nde nce , essen tiall y a go-i t-alo ne of Eu rope in coping with new problems Am erica. \'Vh atever the o utco m e o f the e1 eba te , it is likely to bear marks of each

o f th ese fou r approaches. As to Europe, the likely Olltcome is some combination

o f European seeuriry. 11 w ill be th e ta sk o f Europea n anel Am erica n lea de rship to pursuc po licies that w ill co ntinue ro make th e respect ive

of the First anel the second. NATO provi- contributions on bath sides o f the Atlanves. Above alJ, it has resta ted the impor- eleel balanee o f power during t he Cold tic greater than the sum of its parts. tanee it attaches to NATO anel p ro poga- War. The new tasks of eollective securi ty red a p o liey of "partnership for peacc" and cri sis management still need to be Finally, w hil e the grea t progress towa rd that seeks to promate closer working re- put to the test. a Europe whole anel free does not permit lat io nships with th e military

farces ancl In hi s adelress to a Berlin audience la st th e co n cl u sio n th at we G in eli sp e nse

defense officia ls of non-NATO countries.

month , V ice Preside nt Gore spoke of a wo rld fae ing a profollnd transition , and

These factors norwithstandi ng, Europeans ancl o thers are still lerl wit h question about America's future ra le on the continent. Events in Somali a ha ve lessened \'Va shingron's earl ier emphasis on "asserti ve multilateralism ", a doctrine advan-

asserted th at the United States anel its al- seeurity in Europe , based o n dialogue ,

eed by U.S. United Nations Ambassaelor Madeleine Albright. AMerican reluctance ta co mmit ground forces in Bosnia until

there is an agreed se ttl eme nt suggests that the Uniteel States w ill have a tendency 10 ho ld ba ck , eve n in a major crisis

lies need to rerhink the ve ry m ea ning of Europe;:111 secllrity .~ The evocation of this objec ti ve ca m e in th e co ntex t of persistent official Am erican eneouragement of a grearer German role in shaping th e future o f Europe. I think it is fair to ex peet rhat w ith the strategie changes in th e situation in Eu rope, the U ni ted States w ill seek a reallocation of responsibilities. Congress is Ji kely 10 insisi o n new terms fo r burden-sha ring wi th Am e ri ea's N A-

that cou ld engulf th e Ba lkans anel even if TO all ies. ( WO m ajor allies of the U nited States have co mmined military forces. Ea rlier offi cia l America n suggestions thai this was a European problem - nlther Ihan an outof-a re~1 alliance problem to be lackled in fjrsl in stance by Europcans - raised

questions whether Was hingto n might be abandoning lhe proposirio n that alliance

seeurity is indivisible. Th e cooli ng American anitude toward th e use of Ameri-

w ith a co ntinueel alliance efforl, th e way is now open to start building eollee ti ve coopera ti on and tru st. Th is w ill require

Europea n leaelership and a strong America n contributio n.

• Dr Marlen va n H e/wen is a senior consullanl al RA N D CO lporalion , Uniled

Slales of Amen·ca.

I The te rm was first used by former u.s. Permanent Representative 10 NATO H ar-

At the sa m e time, the Un ited States is li-

lan Cleveland , NATO, The Tra/lSallanlic Bargain , Harper & Row , Ncw Vork , largement of European insl itutions - NA- 1970. TO, the European Union (EU) , and the Western European Un ion (WEU) - to en- , See Paul Kennedy, The Hise anel Fall of kely to lend continued suppon to the en-

co mpass Other countrics that w ish lO join , thereby expan ding seeurit y eastward . \'V'ashinglOn is like ly 1O co ntinue iLS lead ro le wilh Moscow in the pursu il of strategie arms redllcrions. No doubl America

lh e Grea t Powers: Economie Change

anel Military Co nfli c t from 1500- 2000 , Ranelom H ouse, New Vo rk , 1987. j See Chri sto ph e r Layne anel Benjamin Sehwa rz , American H egemo lly - \ViI-

ean military forees has addeel doubts un- will pursue the Middle East peace p ro- hOLlI all Ellemy, Foreign Po liey, no. 92 , cess. Finally the Un iteel States is likely to Fall 1993, pp. 5-23 wi ll be w illing to use force. The long list p roceed o n the premise th ar the crea ti on • Fo r an exposi ti on of these approaches , of co nditio ns for American participat ion of grea re r di alogue , coo p erat ion , and see Norm an D. Levin, ed . ,Prisms Cl lid in peacek eeping - ca talogll ed in Pres i- tru st wit h the co untries th al do no t now Policy: Sec l./ rily SI ra I egy A/ier Ib e de ntial Decisio n D ocumenr 25 - ha s, if belong to West Europea n in sLitliti ons, Colcl War, HAND , MR-365-A , 1994. anything, in creased those doubts. Th e will be 10 a large extenl a fllnction not so , Speec h delivereel by V ice Pres id en t case of Haiti , which reve~ded st rong Pll- IllUCh of governments but of the private Gore to the Conference on New Tradiblic and congressiona l opposi ti o n 10 the sector. tions: The Fu ture of U.S. - German Relader wha t circumsrances leh United Stales

u.s.

threatened U.S. use of fo rce , does linie to add asslirance. Th e debate about a new nationa l securi-

ty strategy for the United States - and the issue of th e U.S. ro le in Europe - in the Post-Colel War era will finel an American public that i s profounel l y ambival e nt about the role th e Uniteel States shou lel play. The debate will have el ements of

36

tions , Berlin , Germany , Sep te mbe r 9 , As I survey the lessons from my Qwn experience w ith Europe , th e ev idence drives me to two co nclu sio ns: G ive n the American interest in astrong, free, democratie and prosperous Europe, the Un ited States will remain involved \vith the issue of European securiry.

]aso .. M " gc<Zille no. 1, February 1995

1994. Press Release , The White House, O ffi ce of th e Vice President.


Russia's role in European Security Structures Speech ATA-Youth Congress,1994 Dr Djanguir Atamali el me nrst of all ex te nd my gratitude to Jason , who invited me ra speak at yO Uf se minar. I cl o believe lhat s uc h a meeting with va ri o lIs spea-

L

k ers from different countries provides a good opporlu nity fo r yOll ng people to

beller understand issues, developments anc! o ptĂ&#x17D;o ns o n the way of building security in contem porary EUfope. In !TIy statem ent I willlry to pre se nt an approach fro m the Ru ssia n p erspecti ve pert aining to Ru ss Ă&#x17D;,I'S place and fa le in th e European securit y architecture anel ils eventualIy changing structllres. FirSI , so m e co n side rations of ge n era l

c haracle r. The bipolar world - two S li perpowers , lWO military-political alliances: NAT O anc! \Xlars3w Trea ty, and nu-

dear deterrence as lhe corn crs to n e o f securit y was in a way a muc h more understandabie, predictabi e and manageab le pattern o f inte rn ati o n al relati o n s and stabilit y. Today Europe faces new c hall e nges and co nfli c ts th at are offsprings of th e defeat o f comm unism and th e collapse o f the USSR. Some dangerous factors underminin g Europe~1O stability are lhe o ngoing wa r in Bosnia , elhni c con nicis in a number o f CI S states , namely in Mo lelavia, Georgia , Azerbaijan (which arc all now in the CSCE area [OSCE L AcicllO Ihis Ih e ~liarmin g ri se of soca llecl natio nal-p atriot ic fo rces in Russia. Yel , I am $ure we all admit th at the new post cald - war si tu ati o n in Europe i s much safe r ~mel offers a beller o ppo rtu nity for rearranging its securit y on a new more stabie, co-operati ve anellong-term ba sis. BUI this requires recognition of legitimate security interests o f all th e European sta l cs , incl uding Ru ss ia , '-mei it will cl epe ncl o n o ur ab ility 10 crea l e su c h a sys tem that wOlild be acceptab le b y all pl ,tyers . That w ill definitely n eed w isclom and Illutual compro mises 10 over-

come th e contemporary situatio n which same experts eall "unstable peace". \Vilh o ut re iteration o f euph e mi sm s aboul "winners" ancl "losers" in the "coldwar", let uS face one obvious result: Russia's im age in Europe and Ihe world is far from being equal to the USSR, among Ol her big powers. At th e same time, new democratie Ru ssia cominu es to b e th e major military anel nuclear power, anel as su eh a k ey pla ye r in th e Euro-Atlantic ancl internation al security en viro nment. The geopolitica ll' tndscape around Ru ssia has compl etely ch anged dllring th e last years. Th at is why Ru ssia is b ound to sea rch for a new adequate foreign poli ey , for a n ew ro le in th e Ellropean ancl internati onal interl oeking instirurio ns, in the dynamics o f bilateral and multilateral cooperatio n, and last but n ot leas t , for new channels o f inf]lIence and building trust 10 change its own seeurily anel stabilit y. No doubt that Ru ss ia, intern all y stro ng o n th e ba sis of eo nsecuti ve ancl success fulm ark et reforms anel stablc cl emoeracy, helping to builel n ew fri endl y anel co-operati ve relationships wi th o ther states on the geopolitical tc rri tory of the form er USSR, cO lilel become asolid pillar of peace, security ancl democrati e international relations in Europe ancl beyond. That is, provided th e West will help th is process by seri o us steps involving Ru ssia in a new see urit y arrangement in Europe. I-laving saicl that, we should ielentify some major issues w hich are currently ca using cenain mistnIst between Ru ssia anel th e \Xle st , lhc i ss u es whieh pcnain IO Ru ssia's relatio ns with th e countries - fa rm e r USS R rep ubli cs - anel the fo rm er memhers of the Warsaw Treary. Theyare: - decbratio n by Ru ssia of its sp ecia l interest in re lati o ns with th e neighbouring

states (sa ea lleel 11near abroad"). This was firml y rei tc ratecl b y President Yeltsin in September during his visit to th e United States. - o ngo in g integ rati o n <llllong Ihe C I S eountri es (on new dem ocrat ie principles, opposite to the former USSR) , efforts to extend Ihis integration to th e security sphere, th o ugh no t vely su cccss ful until now. - peace - k eeping ancl p eace-Illak ing effans of Ru ssia to help solve armeel conf]icts around th e borders. To be sho rt , we believe Ihat fears in th e \Vest and in the Centra I and Eastern Europe, that Russia is tly ing or wi lJt l)' to rebuild th e "cm pire ll , seems l o h e m o re emotional than releva nl. Ru ssia simpl y ca n not do it. even if it wanted to. w hateve r government wi ll be in power in Ru ssia. These are cle~lr priorities of Russia's security imeresl s ancl Ru ssia 's effons in this respec t sho lild b e lIn derstooel, p roviclecl they are b ased on democracy ancl intern atio nal law. Now I want to sp ea k m o re co n c rete l y aboul approaches in Russia to Ihe security system in EUfope. One ca n blame ATO , like lhe Ru ssian cOlllmunists ancl nati ona l-patriots do , that it d id not seize to ex ist af ter the dissoilition of the Warsaw Pact. But it is clear thaI th e 16 memhe rs of N ATO and many, if not all ElIJ'opean eountrics are interested in its functi o ning ancl funh er developmenl. More th a n th at , Ru ssia sh ollicl also be int erestecl , NATO cont inues to play th e ro l e as the o nly ex ist ing Euro-atlantic milital)'-political seclirity Slructure w ith th e US presence. Anyhow, the ideal solutio n for Russia see llls n OL 10 ha ve lh e enlargecl NATO. but to enha n ce beller co-ope rati o n o f th e CSCE wi th NATO w hile building close co-ordinati o n wit h ATO itse lf, and simultaneou sly strength ening th e secu rity arrangements within th e CI S. Tili s is

Jaso1l Mag a z i1le no. I , Febru<tty 1995

37


wha t Ru ssia is actua lly tryi ng la da. But as we all knaw, ideal salutia ns very rareIy come true. This also goes for NATO , w hich has come up lastJanu ary with a very constru clive proposa l of th e program "Partnership for Peace". All agree , th at it was a compromise on the issue of enlargement of NATO that has solved the problem for a ce rt ain period of tim e. Incidentally , PFP turn ed out to be some thin g m o re than that. As the new Secretary General of NAT O Mr. Will y Claes has stressed , "PFP is the system which can provide secu rity for all European states ll . We all know me rits of the PFP and I wi ll not dweil upon them. Anel it was undoubtedly very inspiring that Ru ssia joineel the Program . What was not inspiring ta me, as weil as to many athers, was th e so-ca lled II lllulti-door" 'diplomacy' \vhich preceded thi s decision of Russia. By this ) mean many con troversia l statements by President Yeltsin , members ofhis administ ration , by th e Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, as to if, w hen and how Ru ssia w iJl join the PFP . Unfortun ately, th is was not d ue to the usuallack of coorelination between officia ls, bur a elear reOection of an alarming lack of consensus in the Russian society rega rdin g the ATO and th e ways of maintaining Russian secllrity illlerests. The obvioll s reason for thi s is th e feeling that PFP is, a m o n g o ther thin gs a mere "wa iting room ll for the countri es of Central and Eastern Europe befare gra nting them full membership status , exclllding ){ussia. The reason is weil grollnded , since [hi s app roach seems lO be predominant am o ng W' es tern expe rt s anel o ffi c ial s: Ru ssia is vagu el y recog ni zed as a key pl ayer in th e new securit y stru cture in Europe , but it ca n not be integrated in the NATO. Russia's relatio nship w ith the \VEU is even more vague, due to its being an integral part of EU. Ta many Russian paliticians, by the way al so from th e democratic parties, [his mea ns that Ru ssia will be isolated or "Ieft alone" fa cing the enlarged NATO (j nevitable questions: wha l f or? aga in st whom?) while lhe seclirity arrangements w ithin the CIS are not at all sufficiently iclen tifj ecl. It is abso lutel y correct that Russia sh o uld no t h ave ( in rea lit y it d oes n't h ave) th e ri g ht of veto on an y eventual ex pansion of NATO, but if this development is nOl accompanied by an effective partnership arrangeme nt between Rli ss ia and ATO, the co nsequences of su eh development mig ht be very negalive.

38

In Rlissia there will be man)' inOlIential poli ti cia ns who will advocal e a ban on the CUlTent reclllclion of lhe armed forces , anel a rise in the military expe ncl itu rc. Anel in case of changcs o n the politica l sce ne in Ru ss ia this situ alio n mighr even provoke ne\v co nfronta ti o n with the \'Vest and eventually return 10 a new panern of llcold \var". Some Ru ssia n politicians. like Roris Fedorov (former Minister of Finance) even call far Ru ss ia 's immedia te applica ti o n fo r NATO's membership to find out the "tru e alliwde of the \XlcsllOwa rd Russia" . (After all , let us remember that President Clinlon once ment io ned Ihat NATO is open for al. ) Of course , thi s is one of possible scenarios, bu t NATO shou ld be prepared for il. I cia nOL feel th at th is is th e best way to check NATO's approach towa rd s Ru ssia but some arguments against Ru ss i a's membership are defi nitcly nol seri ous, li ke: Russia is a less European sta te than the USA or Turkey. I n spite of Ru ss ia's geograp hy, it has fo r centuries been in th e Eu ropea n spa ce, anel elefinitely is an integra l part o f th e Big Europe ( not th e Big Asia). At the sa me time Ol her argum en IS, like: that Russ ia in as b ig as the whole of NATO are valiel. It is all the more importa nt to integrate RlI ssia in a new co-operat ive security sysl em , because left olltside of it Russi a might seriausly weaken efforts to creale an effective Europea n security enviro nment. Of cou rse, it is dear thaL in case of Russia's eventual membe rsh ip NAT O wi ll have to undergo seriolls reform and to become a commo n securiry o rganization mther than a commo n defence organization, but this is happen ing anel will even more have to happen in any case if NATO adopts cou ntri es of th e Ce ntral and Eastern Europe. Theoretically we can imaging an even more balanced and powerfu l configuration of NATO w ith Russia being a member or otherw ise dosely linked w ith NAT O decision-mak in g in some other form , for instance through a sepa nlle binding rreary (16 o r more plus 1).

Lel us al50 have in mine! rhe internal si w ation in RlIssia, where the oppositio n is gaining more influence using the economic crisis as a politica I lever. At a certain stage lhe issue of Russia 's weakened securit y might become lh e ma in slogan in effon s to set back the course of democratie reforms. Jntegrati on of Russia in the new Euro-Atlantic co-operative secLi rity stru cture w illundoubted ly provide additiana l guara ntees of its democratie development, Iike it was in th e case of

jasonMagazine no. 1, February 1995

Germany soon after Ihc Second \Vorld \Var. Yes Russia will always have its own securil y interests, but so does the USA or France. After all we must ael mit that cootraelictions bel ween even members of NAT O do occur, wi th ou t w recki ng th e orga nizat ion as such. Unfortunately the eventual enla rgement of ATO is now the main concern oflhe Russian decision-makers. Yel at this moment the 1l10St effic ient policy far Russia seems to be somewhal clifferen t. That is, n ot 10 pa y excessive attention to a would-be pattern of "formai" relatio ns w ith NATO , but rather to build these relalions o n practice in every possible way through bi-Ialeral cooperation within the PFP framewo rk and beyond , on the basis of correspancl ing interests, and these are more lhan enough. Finally, we have to understand that true partnership is a two-way raad and try to fjnd righl so lutions on Ihis track to lhe benefit of all Europea n nat ions.

â&#x20AC;˘ Dr Dja}[gul,. Atamali is Ihe Depltly Coor-

dil1alillg DireClor of Ihe Associaliol1 for Euro-Allanlic Cooperaliol1, Russicl.


General Statement of the ATA Youth Seminar Gijs jeuken & Andries van der Meulen

Presented by Gijs jeuken at the Atlantic Treaty Association GeneralAssembly the Ridderzaa~ The Hague, October 28, 1994.

T

his week th e }ASON Founelation , in cooperal ion wi l h the Netherland s Atlanti c Co mmissi o n, ha s had the ho no ur anel privilege of hosting the Atlantic Treaty Association Youth Se-

minar. During the week elelegates from the NATO anel ACC countries have been able 10 exchange ideas ~Ind experienccs. A visit to NAT O I-I eaelq u art ers on Monelay provided u s w ith stilllui ati n g lectures anel c1iscLissions. On Tuesday, at (he Jaso n Autumn Conference, lhe participants

exc hangc cl views with Dut c h stud e nrs abou t th e p o int s t o u c h eel upon b y among e thers MI". van Il euven anel Mr.

Atamali , bath presen t he re. Thro ughout Lh e week wc h ave tak en advantage of thi s unique o pportuni ty 10 discuss o ur elifferent perceptions of possible threats o r risks. anel Ihe potenlüd solutions.

Ir has been a pleasure 10 hos t sllch a dive rse g ro up , consist ing o f 20 nationaliti es, representing the v~lri o u s schaals af tha ught present in the security arena. Yeslerday, in a both viviel anel hea teel e1ebate, we canclueled upan the major issues e1ealt with during this weck. We wouJd likt: l O share th ese ca n c lu sians w ith you. We can peree ive no immceliate mi li tary thrcat ta th e no rth Atlanti c regio n . It has been repeateell y argued thal there are na longer any threats but that the post cold war e ra h as eo nfro nr cel with n ew anel unpred ictabl e p oints o f co n cern . This

uIlstabie period is markeel by va ri ous issues that eleserve our attent ion anel alertness , anel that were put forwarel by the p~lrticipants. Ethnic tension. migration , pro lifera tio n anel religious ex tremism are ignoreel at o ur own peri! anel sho uld nat ar ca nno l be underestima l ed in the victorious eupho ria fo llowing the co ld war. I nt ern ati o nal wars are re pl:-1 ceel by in ternal co nflic ts bet ween different anel differing ethnie entities; poplilation pressure accompanieel IJy elisappointing economie progress enco urages migration to Western Europe. This tenelency is inlensi fi eel b y war anel strife anel \ViII evemually ca use too big a problem to deal wi th effective ly. Religious extremism Illight in th e near future lead to new eliv ieling Hnes bet ween the north ern anel sOUlhern hemispheres. Th e uncontrolled spreadi ng o f various kineIs o f weapans of mass e1eslruction is obv io uslya pro blem which has a e1 estabili zing patential . Ladies anel gentlem en, we feel thai NATO as such ca n no t react <Idequately and effec ti ve ly to all th e above m enti o neel fa ctors. It Call1l o t be expecteel that NATO has th e ea pa cit y to solve th e socio-econom ic prohlems anel cl eavages; nor w ill following the route o f en largement by itse lf b e th e mu c h n ceeled fo rmula fo r long term stabilit y . Economic, political anel mililary aspeets h ave beeome inc reasing l y il1lerd ep en e1em anel entwi neel. In thi s respect both NATO anel th e EU can no t be see n apart from each ot her in shaping Eurapets fu ture in th ese fjelds. Does th is mean Ihat o ur generati on lacks a secure and cenain future ? \VilIlhi s result in th e demise o f N ATO , or is NATO merel y o n th e wrong tra ck? NO , we feel th at N ATO d oes play, sh o ulel pla y and wi ll p lay <111 ex tremely impo rtant ro le in shaping th e destiny o f Europe. N ATO ha s a rcspo nsibility throughout Europe anel is - un tiIJ now - b y far th e

most creelible anel c ffeclive instrument of security. We argue this for th e fo llowing three reasons; First. Ihe transa tlanti c honels ensure th e Am erican commil ment , altho llgh inevitabl y th e ir prese n ce wi ll eve ntu all y d ecline , it i s a major point o f int eres t for both parties th at th ese links are taken care o f - bath in th e economie anel in the security fielel . \'Vh c th c r wc Iike it o r no t w e are eles lin eel , at lea st o n the shOrl term - to share corn m on il1leres ts anel va llles. Seconelly , thro ugh Ih e mechanisms of NATO , cooperatio n anel multilateral c1ia logue have been institulionaliseel. On th e o ne hand Ihe ex isting st ru ctures provide all partners wilh the n ecessa ry materi al anel info rm ation and o n th e o ther hand it givcs th c partners a p osition no t baseel solely o n geo-po litical El ctors, bU I o n a ba sis o f equality anel mlltual resp ect. We fee l ve r y stro ngl y that th e I'FI' is a soliel ba sis l a cX l enci futlIre coop erati o n and integ ration in ce ntra l and eas tern europe. It wou!d be nai ve th o ug h 10 alread y pUl all o nets faith in il. All slep s taken 50 far - for instan ce th e mult il aleral military exe rc ises h el d in Th e Ne th erlands this week - have certa inl y conlri buted immense ly l a improv ing Ihe CÎrc umsta nces. It is, however, in the interest of EaSl ern and Cenl ra ! European stability anel growth, Ihus also in ATO 's own interest that el efjnit e guielelines anel rea listi e tim eta bl es are deve lo p eel anel implementeel. Ir nat , Partn ership for Peace ll1î ght in th e end st ~lI1d fo r no m o re than tpape r for Paper' , providing only il lusionalY anel imaginalY peaee. \X1o rse still it could resuIt in a resurgence o f po litica! eXlremisnl o r lead to th e implosion o fthc still fragiIe el crnocracies. What, we have rc pe'tt ed ly askeel o urselYes. ca n we - rc prcse ntin g th c N ATO

Jaso1l MlIgazi1le no. I. Febnwry 1995

39


and NACC counrri es - co ntribute o r in to În st Îtution alise the ATA-Youth sem Îall humility, recommend to keeping NA- nar, starting wit h sÎmil ar projects next year. As a result af these projects mutual TO on track towards the 21 st century. We have been presenreel w ith a unique respect ancl und ers tan uin g ea n be ÎIl1 -

op p ort unil y of being ab le ra s hare proved. views, information anel perceptions. H a-

ving appreciated the value of the expe- On be half of the participants I would rience we feel that we ha ve a n o bli ga- therefar onee mo re Iike ra express ou r

th e future o f NA T O. \'(1 e are however aware a f the immense effa lts that we have ta make , in a rd er la ensure that th e past cald-wa r periael wil l be o ne of stabilil y anel peace in EUl'ape. It is ou r respa nsibilit y ta do all th at we ca n ta achieve these goals for th e 21st century.

ti on to ensure that this must be clone on gratituele that jASON foundation - w ith

a regular ba sis. With the mean s ar our ex tensive help from rh e Netherl ands Atdisposa l we sho uld build an internatio n- lantie Commission - has been able to aral network ; joint research projects , the gan Îse this seminar. crea tion and maintenance of information Chairman, laelies and gentleman I woulcl centres ancl links between Youth orga nÎ- like to conclude with the follow ing. We za ti ons. Plans have alreael y been made are not sce ptica I nor pessimistic abaut

i~

JAS~N Conference:

50 Years UN: United for a better World? March 24, 09:30 hrs.

Localion: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, va n Kleffe nszaa l. Entrancefee:fI5 ,- (Jason subscribe rs and D UNSA members), othe rsf20,-. Includes conference folder, lunch, drinks and publication on the UNo For fUIther inforrnatian , please contact: Y. Donders or jason Faundation

#31-(0)30-343927

#31-(0)70-3605658

Adclitional informa tion will be given in the next issue of jason Magazine.

40 JasonMagaz ine

no . I , February 1995


Book Reviews Andre Corvisier A dtctiotlary ofmilitary btstory 8laekwell Publishers, Oxford 1994 0-631-16848-6 .1:.35_00 (he) This work of Professor Corvisier, o ri gin-

ally publicated in French as Diclionnaire d'Arl el d'Hisiaire Jl1i1ilaires, is among

the innumerable dictionaries, encyclopa-

edias anc! reference baoks clevoled to military hislory an exceptional ane. Ra ther than proclucing the trad itional list of battles anel potteel biographies of famous genera is, Professor Corv isier concen tra -

ted on important themes , topics anc! developm ents w ithin military hislory. Hi s attention concentrated on the relations belween ar mee! farces anc! soc i et i es , especially related te the major countries o f the world (in hislOry). A fU lther attraction was lhe substa ntial nature ofthe major entries , may of article length , enabling the presentation of detailed arguIll ents suppo rLeel by sufficient i llustration. His origi nal work and scheme has been amendeel in the English ve rsion in two ways. First , accounts of some twentieth-century wars have been inclueled. Th e Korean war anel th e G ulf War o r 1991 have bee n includeel because they were two new types of conflict: wa rs between farces o f th e Un iteel Natio ns anel countri es which hael offeneleel against its resolutions. Other changes in th is eclition are the replacement of the battl e of Suomussa lmi by an article on the Ru ssoFinish War o r the introelucement of colonial wars like lhe Vietnam \'(1ar or the Falklanels War of 1982. Severa l lessons of these military experiences during the last decades are usecl in Olher articles , like on military strategy or military manoeuvres. The re levance of th is work is obv io us. \X1ar has retur neel in Europe , milita ry eonfljets like Bosnia, Nagorno-Karabach or Nonhern-Irelancl prove th at the study of \'(1ar anel its mi litary constru ct io n are of g rea t importanee 10 reach peace! I r yo u don!t k now war anel its repercussio ns for whole soc ieti es, you can' t unele rstand the relevanee of peace either. A lso, like Professo r Corvis ier anel John Ch ilels sta te, it is obv ious th:H the state o f hi story teach i ng in Fran ce anu Bri tain

(a lso the Netherl ancls) is of elub ious level. Ir appears that ch ilelren are no longer tallgln facts but vague historica I techniques without the contexts or [he inforrnation to unclerstanel flil ly what they are trying to achieve. Th e military varie ty of history now pla ys a diminished anel diIllinishing role even in that area where it Illight be expectecl to possess crucia l importance: the educat i o n oft he ar my , navy and air force o fficers. Th e retllrning of \'(1ar in Europe , (he development of major crises in Central anel Eastern Ellrope , [he coll apse of the Warsaw Pact, the crum bli ng dow n of the Soviet Empi re, the resurgence of nat io nalism. all th ese developlllen ts ended European stability. At the time of w riting, vicious civil wars are raging in Yligoslavia , a ge neral war in the Balka n reg ion seems in ev itable , states of the old Soviet Union are at war, and crude nationalism and ra cism are reeme rg in g ac ross much of Ce ntral anc! Eastern Elirope , while the co-operation and common pllrposes once promised by the European Community seem to rece el e rather than ex panc!. Once again, war in its numerous manifestations has become a centra I issue in Eliropean politica l anel social elevelopment. Th e publica tion of thi s sort of book is appropri ate cons iderin g the changing international contex t. I t attem pts to investigate the trends , themes anel common cl enomina tors which have shapeel both the conduct of wa r and th e politica I and social employment of war throughout history. There rem ains one last justificarion for th is book. Ouring th e nineteenth anc! twentieth cen turi es warfare has eeasec! to be remote activity practised by professional arm ed farces. Mass co nscriprio n eluring the First anel Seconel Worlel Wa rs brought persona l expe rience ofthe armeel se rv ices , campaigns anel battJes to millio ns, while tota l war involves emire populati ons.Now, with the assistallCe of radio, televisio ns anel sa tell ite broadcasting , war can be reported in real-time, life cove rage from the front- Iine. Th e experience o fw arfa re , fo r non -parri ei pants , is no longer res t ricted 10 the recons truet ions of fi ction ; it is some thin g whic h any indiviellial eq llippeel wit h a telecommunications receiver can choose to indu l ge v i ca ri o ll sl y atl eisure. Th e

Vietnam War was th c first lclcv iseel con~i ct and has been ro lloweel by the Brilish campa ign in Northern Irelanel, war in th e Falklands, the civil wars in the Lebanon. the Yugos lav ian civ il war w hich began in 1991 , anel the Unitec! Na t ions- iraq conflict (th" G ulf wa r , 199 1). Thi s brought {he factor war under the pllblic eye again. Some negativc aspeCls are also available. In a elictionary o f mil i tary history it shou ld be necessary to finel same arlicles or subjects conce rnin g lhe terminology of war ancl peace. These terms are nOl at all available in lh is book. A lso, some of the well-known scholars in this fi eld like Ga ltung are no t of inte rest maybc. As a reader, I a 111 ge ttin g cur i ous t o kn ow why th is has happeneel. Also. why th ere are more subjects co nce rnin g ea rli er wars , tacties , troops anel genera Is (h an subj ects like Habin , PM of I srael anel c hi ef-or Sla ff of the lOF. AIso , as a Dutchman I am wondering why battlefi e ld s like Arnhem , Ni jm ege n o r th e bOl1lbarelmel1l of Rotterda m are not at all mentioned. Otherw i se ~ (his wo rk i s of great va lu e for stu cl en ts, scholars anel politicians interested in military history anel the phenol1lenon of war.

Cyril \\'1iddersboven

Dick A. Leurdijk Tbe Uuited Natious aud NATO tu Former Yugoslavia pp_l06

f 19,95 At the initiative of th e Netherl anels Atlan ti c Commission anel in co-operali on with the Nelherlands Institute of Interna ti onal Relatio ns 'Clingenelael ', Dick A. Leurelijk has written a stuel y on the evolvi ng re lati onsh ip between rhe Unitecl Nat i o ns and the Norrh Atlanti c Treaty Orga ni sa tion . Although the rclation be tween th e UN and regional o rganisations has become a worl dwide developlllent since the enel of the Ca lel War, Leurdijk restricts his study to the developments in forme r Yugoslavia. Th ere is na cl oubt that th e debate on th e re lationships ber-ween UN anel NATO has been very much affectecl by the Yugoslav crisis.

J asou Magazille no. 1, February 1995

41


Since the Gulf War, the UN has been ac-

planning.

Leurdijk's stud y covers a comprehensive

tively seized in a n almosl e ndless series More compl i ca t ed i s the q u es ti on of summary of the eve nts relating to the o f con flict situations as in Angola, Cam- commanel anel control because both 01'- form er Yugoslavia , making it useful for bodja, Soma lia, Rw a nda , Haïti a nel the ganisa tÎ ons have the ir own milit ary anyone interested in this co mpliC:Hed fonner Yugos\avia. Th e new fale o f the UN has led to a rethinking of the system of co ll ective secur it y. Th e UN had to acknow led ge, given i ts l ack of resources, that it was unable ta do the job alone anel it appea led to regiona l o rganisations for assistance. In his An Agendafor Peace Boutfos-Ghali slressecl th at re-

structllres when it comes to t he implementation o f r esolut i ons. The peacekeep i ng UNP ROFOR forces on the ground are uneler direct UN command o Th e ships and aeroplanes enforcing the economic anel arm s embargo in the Adrialic Sea and the no~fly zone are uneler elirect NATO commando Th e concep t of g ional o rga nisatio ns possess a potential 'peace-keeping' on the grolllld and 'pethat should be utili se d in serv in g the ace-enforcemenr' in the air does not confun ctions of preventive diplornacy, pe- tribute 1O <In easy clecision-making proace-making, peace-keeping and peace- cess. Leurdijk draws linie attention to the building. concequences o f this complex strll cture. On th e other hand , af ter the end ofthe Divergenci es in commancl anel co ntro l Cold War NATO 's 'classica l ' coll ec ti ve cause d delays in making decisions and defe nse task dimini sheel. Th e Alliance the actualuse of force w hich benefitted hael to adapt from deterring a c1early de- the conflicting parties if former Yugoslafined threat to eopi ng with what emer- via. ged to be an unpredictable security envi- Far more auemion is pakl to a schematic ronment. In 1992 for the first tim e in its survey o f command structures in NATO histor y NATO became in volved in pe- operations 'S harp Guard' a nel 'Deny ace-keeping anel sa nctions en forcement Flight'. In a rather detached but deta iled operations implementing Security Coun- way Leurelijk gives allthe facts anel figueil resolutions with respect to the wa r in res necessary to comprehend th is comfarmer Yugoslavia. With these 'peace~ plex subject, completely with a list of inkeeping' activities, NATO started military vo!vecl m iliralY equipmel1l ancl participaling forces. operations of a new kind. During th e Col el War the UN anel NATO A particll!ar part of the stuely is clevotecl represented "'ther different worlds, poli- to the evo lv ing pa rtnership w ith a g rot i ca l cult ures and sc hoo ls of thought: wing role for NATO . Leurdijk characteri those of bipolarity and those of multila- zes NAT O's involvement by il S gradua l terism. At present, the two organisations development fro m monitoring to enforare heavily involved in a common effort, cing , from sea ra th e air anel from th reaimed at 'crÎsis management' in the for- mening with force to th e actu~li use of mer Yugos l avia. While the Secur i ty I force. From the p erspec ti ve of NAT O Counci l, in adopti ng resoll1tions, provi- this has imp lied th at a number o f 'h istoeled th e legal justification and 'pol itical rie ste ps' had to be l aken: th e firs t cogll idance' for NATO's performance, the ope ratio n with the UN, th e first mil itary Alliance, as a mil itary instru ment, conrri- operation since its establishmen t , the buted ac(ively ra the implementation of first military action 'out-o f~a rea'. UN decisions. Practically, o n the basis of Notwithsta nding the experim en tal charUN resolutions, NAT O Gl rri ed o ut a acter of (heir co-opera tion , Leurdijk pernumber of military operations concer- ceives multiple p oss ibiliti es for silllil ar ning sa nctio ns, a no-fly zone, sa fe areas, NATO su pport of UN operati o ns in th e the safety of UN personnel anel an even- future: with the Security COllrlCil provitual'peace' se ttl ement in Bosnia, in ding th e polit ica l an d legal fra mework fo r ac ti o n , NATO ha s acted as the r eterms of monitoring anel enforcing. The po litica l primacy of the UN in defi- gional, mi litary al liance that p rovides the ning th e mandates of milita ry o p era- UN wit h the instruments for the lIse of ti ons, has never been contested by NA- force. In his conclusion Leurdijk consiTO. H owever, the Alliance ha s made it eIers, clesp ite the doubts one can have dear that it retains its own al1thority abou t the effeeti ve ness of NATO's perw hether or not to support UN (or OSCE) formance in fo rm er Yu goslavia , the use peace-keeping operatio ns. A UN request of fo rce as an integral part of any futu re for support to NATO is subm ineel to the effort at conflict resolution by the interNorth Atlantic Council (NAC), the supre- national com lTIunity - if lhe UN is prepame political body of NATO. After agree- red to go beyond the trad itional'peacement ha s been reac heel with in NATO , keep ing' , and if N ATO is prepa red to go the UN is informeel o f the decision anel beyond the traditional task of a collecti the o utlin e o fth e N ATO operational ve defence organ isa tion .

42

jasonMagazilze no. 1, Februaly 1995

subject. Furthermore, a clear enunciation of concerni ng jargon turns even an occasiona! reader into an absorbing o n e; terms as 'cliplomacy with fo rce' , 'close air support' , 'double key system' or 'CTF440' are no lo nge r a secret. For the already well-informed reaeler, the study in c1ucles an appendix with excerpts o n lhe decision-making by the UN Sec urit y Council , resolutions, sa nctions, humani~ tarian assistance, safe areas etc. In short, Leurdijk succeeeled in writi ng a comprihensive and worth -readi ng study o n the evo l v ing partnersh ip between the UN anel NATO in the fonner Yugoslavia. Miriam Meekels

Martin Navras Goillg ballistic. Tbe bllild-lIp ofmissi/es iJ. tbe Middle East. Brassey's (London, 1993) 262p. 1-85753-020-9 Hardcover. The biggest problem wh ic h faces any author w ho wan ts to write about slIch a subjec t i s obvious ; how to ob t a i n enough valiel infonnation. As Navra s stales himself:" The state of missile fo rces and the progress of missiIe development prog ralll lll es are alllongst the deepest and most closel y guareleel secrets in th e Midelle East. " This is w hy a substan ti al amount of data on the missiles is based on rumou rs anel hea rsay. Although Navras gives an ex tensive l ist of weapon systellls for each state in the region , anc! its sup p liers , it is impossible for the reaeler to decide what is beyond eloubt anel w hat isn't. Nevel1heless, the general picture is clear; many o f th e sUi tes i n the Middle East are in possess ion of ballistic miss iles with or without non-conventional ordnance. Wh en this is taken as startin g-point even {he layman w ill find most parts o f the book very interesting. Th e Midd le East has become the area of greatesl co ncern w ith .. ega rd to missiIe proliferation. Iran , Iraq, Israel , Saueli Arabia , Kuwait, the forme r Vemen Arab Republic anelthe Peop le's Republic of Yemen , Syria , Algeria , Egypt and Libya have all acqu ired ballistic missile systems. Israel , Egypt, Iran , Iraq , Syri a and Lib ya are th ollght to have chem ica I weapons programmes. Egypt, Syri a, Iran, Iraq and Ismel are believed ra have biological ca-


pabilities. Israel deploys a nuclear arsen ai , w hile Iraq , until 1991 , possessed an ex ten sive nuclear progra mme. Moreover, a number o f th ese countries are investin g vast amounts o f mo ney in their OW Il missile programmes. Th c most intense proliferation appeared amo ng those states with lhe most intense elisputes: lraq anel Iran ; Isra el anel Syria ; Nonh and Sout h Vemen. States w ith a steaelfasl anti-Israel position anel raelical creelen tial s su ch as Lib ya , Iran anel I raCJ ( unti I 1991l now ha ve th e ca pability to reach th e territ o ry o f th eir en emy. Th e potentialof missiles to help undermine regional stability is one aspect o f the p roblem , even Europea n cou ntri es a n el th e Soviet U ni o n are vul n erab le to Thir el \'(10 rI el missiles fo r th e first time. I foun d Ihc most interesti ng pan s ofrhe book: 1) The rationales and motiva lio ns for the acquisilion and, eventually , deployment of the missiles. 2) The analysis of the acwa l con flicts anel wars in the region in w hi c h ba lli st i c Illi ss il es were used ancl their innu en ce o n Ih e o utcome. I ) Accorcling 10 Navras Mieldle Eastern cou ntries are attra ctecl l a ba ll islic missiIes for three esse ntial milit ~lry reasons. First , ballislic missil es are v iewed as a means o f allacki ng both ncar and cl istant targets with <:1 rap iclity that in m an y respects precJudes warning. Seconelly. bal· list ic missiles are regarcled as wea p o ns lhar are ext remely eliffjcult to deslroy onee in nighl. They seem vÎ flu ally lO gua ranl ee Ihe penetration of c ncmy air ancl grou nd clefences. Finally, hallistic m issiIes ca n se rve as ve hicles for a variety of destructive munitions in cJ uciin g nonco n ven ti o nal orcl n ance in thc farm of c hemica l , biologica I an d nu clear weapons. As most ballistic miss il es now in th e hanels of Middle East sl ates are neither accu rale enoug h to p rovide a hard target kill ca pability nor large enough to ca rr y suffi c i en t high ex pl os i ve to do massive clamage to populations or propeny, the solutio n to Ihese limitatio ns is ei ther improvement of thc missiles themse l ves o r the lI se of non-conventional payloael. 2) Five ge neral points may be elrawn fro m the hi sto ri ca l record o f Mielelle East missile employment in the 1973·93 pe· rioel:(J) Missiles playcel n o role in any crisis instability that m ay have preceded the va ri olIs con fli c ts;(2) Missiles were m ore effective as eountervaluc te rr o r wcapo ns than countc rforee o r counter-

military systems;(3) Th e possession by both sides of missiIe capabilities clid nOl result in m Ulu a l delerrence;(4) Th e emp loymc nt of missiles against a state that possesses similar weapons die! not necessa ri ly i nvite a respon se in kind aocl (5) T h e el es tru ctio n of en emy mi ss il e lau nchers provecl to be an ex tremely difficult task. Navras states that;" Th e case for both offensive allel clefensive miss il es has, in facl, been strengthen ed by th e Second Gli lf \'(Iar. " Until today, o nly conventio nal orelnance has been used in conflicls in th e Middle Easl. But w h at will h appen when the states are in possession of nuclea r o rdn ance? It is fea reel thaI the farm er Soviet Unio n could be a sup plier of knowleelge anel goods. This wou ld chan· ge the whole set of rules in lhe region. It is a pity Nav ra s gives m ore attention to ways how lO preve nt this. by metlfl S o f lhe Non- Prolifera tion Treaty. than to Ihis future situation . Because I afn afraid it w ill come to this eventua ll y anel th e who lc situal io n in the Midclle East wil l undergo a radical change. Perhaps it was too early fo r Navra s to write about it, or it wiJl be the subject o f his new book. If the latter is the case , I am looking for· ward to it.

Koen Schermer

Inte rn a tiona l Institute of Stra tegie Studies Tbe Military Ba/allce / 994· /995 Brassey's, London 1994 1·857 53·115·9 ;\;22.00

ad anel of foreign stalÎ oncei farces are also g ive n . These details and da ta are not at all an assessment of Iheir ea pabiliti es. It does not attempt 10 eva lual e Ih e quality o f units o r equipmen l , n o r the impact of geograph y . doctrin e, mililary techno logy, eleployment, training, logis· tic support. morale, leadership. t ac ti c~ll or strategic iniliative. terrain , \Ve~lther. p olitiGiI wil I or su pport fro 111 alli ance panners. This vo l ulll c is updatecl cvcry year to provide a timely, quantativc asscsslllcnt o f th e milit ary forces anel defenee spen· ding of over 160 cOllntries, throu ghout the \\larld. Data has been processeel as of l.Junc 1994, currant developmcnts occurred inJune andJlll y 1994 are also re· poneel. Curren l cl eve lop m enls, lik e Ih e cr umbling clown o f the Soviel Union, necessital es a re-evaluatio n of the way in w hich the Military ba lance divides the worlel in seclions. Before 1990 il was easy 10 d iviele th e world in sph eres , eap it alis t anel communist. Nowadays, you have to elivide reg i a n geog r ap hi ca ll y. Hussi:1 is a prob lem o f its own , geog raphica ll y it is Europea n anel Asian . That proves la be a problcm , another is that th e Military Ba· lance assu mes that all former USSH overseas deployments h a ve been t~1 ken on by Hussia (or the CIS). All nudear forces have been taken on by Hussia , Ihose thaI are in th e hands of the successo r sl ates will be eliminated (like th e Ukrain c). All in all this book g ives way to a ge nerall y positive feeling. It contains a \Vide ra nge of topics , conce ntrated on sam e m ajor fl ash-points hut it doesnit gCI into it very Ih o rough l y. Somet i mes some experts wi ll be rat her cl i sappointcd hy this ge· n era l view. Unlike some major vo l atile regiolls like the Mieldle cast or th e fo l" mer Eas l - \'(Iesl con fr o nt at i o n sl ates , severa l regions in th e wo rl el are almos t w ritt cn of. As a Mieldle Easl expert , I 'm foeusecl on Ihis partiClllar region . To get a birds view, Ihis book con lains cnoug h dal a thaI is up 10 date. FO I" more inclepth analysis you h~lve to l ook r or o th e r works th at :He co ncentraling o n onc of more regio nally concen trateel conO icts or internal elisruptions.

The Military Balanee is an indispensable annual handhoo k \vhich provides an ~Iuthoritalive assessment of thc military slrength anel clefence speneling of every country possessing armeel forces. Detailed counrry-by-cou l1lry enlries dera iling milit ary o rga nisa ti o n anel Iist in g equipment ho ldings, manpower and releva nt economic dala are accompa ni ccl b y a su!Jstant ial tabu lar section anel a series o f ana lytica l details. ationa l ent ri es eontain infofm3tion in a format a standard as the 3vailable information permits: eco- Cyril \f/iddersbovell nomic anel d emog raphi c data; military data, inclucling m anpower, le nglh of consc ri pt serv ice, o utline o rga nisa ti o n , number of fonnations ancl units; anel an inventory of lhe m ajor equ ipm en l ~ of each service, followecl w here appl icable bya description o f th ei r deployment. Deta ils of national forces statio ned abro-

Jasoll Magaz ille no. 1, February 1995

43


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Mr. H. van den Broek, Europees Commissaris (interview) Dr. Ir. J.J.e. Voorhoeve, Minister van Defensie (interview) Prof. Dr. A. van Staden, Directeur Instituut Clingendael ( interview) Kleine en gro te corruptie (H . O versloot, Rijksu n iversiteit Leiden) Media en Po litiek (L. M aracz, Uni versiteit va n Amsterdam) Bankwezen en mo netair beleid (H . Conquest, ABN Am ro Bank) Energie-w etgeving in M idden-Europa (c. va n Agt, I nternatio naa l Instituut va n Energierecht) Pri vatisering in het Balti cum (N. va n de Lijn , Katho lieke Uni ve rsiteit Brabant)

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44

jas01IMagaz ille no. I , February 1995


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IndexJason Magazine 1993/1994 1993/ 6. WAR

minde rhede n A . Tro LJ\vborst

O ver stamme n, stand en en stat en in Afrika : het geva l va n Rwanda en Burund i

I lenk Spenke link

De o nw il van de EG - en NA VO -Iidslaten

Mulder

South Lehanon , th e \Xla r co nti -

Jean·Christo phe Rufin

Parad o xes o f Afmeet Protectio n

M arc Klumper

Peace in \Var

To m Kupem s

An Empire D ying

1994/ 4.

liiszlo Maracz & Eric-Jan Key zer

Ano ther Persp ccti vc i.'i Neecl ecl

Redactio neel

Barbara Rijks

ReSITlIcturing th e Security

Miriam M eekels & Cyril \V'iddershoven

De Illan achter cl e \V'EU. Een interview Ille l Secretari s genera al DLMr. \V'. F. van Eekelen

G lIido \'(l iddershoven

Zuid-O ost Azië: niet alles is goud w at er blinkt

M :,u1in Doornbos & Jo hn M"rkakis

Society anc! S ( ~lt e in Crisis: \Vhal w ent wrong in Somalia?

EIll1ll3

!lUes

Council Mathi{'s Ransijn & Jaap l od enburg

Internatio nal G reenho llse Po liey

1994/ 1. Mediapulatie Ra ny Brauman

\X1hen suffering n1~l k c s a gaoel s tOIY

Erik D irksen

Conve rsie in Oost-Europa

Jacob M . Bik

Press anc! Pu b li c Affairs in th e Sccurity Area

f\ liriam M eekels

De wa nkele eenheid van Gelukkig Ara bi ë

Siefan Lansberger Caspar Vddkamp

Chinese med ia Aanhaken b ij BZ: H et lKlasje'

W/ . van I IJssel!

Over o nze Afri kaanse toeko m st

Méelecins sa ns Fromieres

Liberia , leave it to th e Neighbo urs

D o ugl as Hurd

Collecti ve d efence & seclirity in Europe

Michiel de Weger

A landslide going unno ti cecl

Leon Weeke

\Vec ke's \V'creld

The Stanley Fo undatio n

Ethnicily an d Fo reig n Po licy

M . Glenny; D . Hiro: F. Sp ringer

Book Review

1994/2.

Boekbesprekingen

Minister van Buitenlandse Za k en df. P.H . Kooijl11ans

Nederlands 13uitenlands Bele id : Mogelijkhed en en b eperkingen in een verande re nd e o mgeving

1994/ 5

T o rn Kuperu s

Ru ssi" and th e CIS, 1991- 1993

Mirialll Meekels & Cyril \Y/id d ershoven

Changes an c! 0 pp o rluniti es! An interv iew w ith M r.Jarnie P.Shea

Jozef Braun

Project Pal1nership ro r Peace and the Czech Repub lic

NI. va n Hellven

Transatl antic Secu rity

Ro be lt D . Kaplan

The Coming An an. .: h y

Arendjan Boekestijn

De Kwadratuur van dc Nederlandse To maat

Peter Va n d er Kna ap

The COlTlininee o r th e Regio ns: The o utsel o f a 'Europe o f the Regio ns?

Pro f. Dr. G. Teitler

Conflicten aa n de G renzen va n Inv loed ssferen

Bio graphy Manfrcd Wo rner

A. l3oxhoorn

Itali ë: het begin va n de Tweed e o f d e Ve rl engd e Eerste Republiek '

B:IS dc I3ru ijn

!'vledia en Po li lick: een gevaar l ijke relatie

Craig Francis

Au stralian Nati onalldentity

Leon Wec ke

Wecke's Wereld

1994/ 3. Redactio neel Hennie van d er Graaf

\V'ie \va pens zaa it zal geweld oogste n: d e pro liferati e va n co nventio nel e wa pens

Steph an Raes

Medilerrane landen in de tex ti el- en kledinghandel , een wankel succes

Mike d en HaJtog

Verkiezingen in Zuid-Afrika

Leon W ecke

Wecke's We reld

Ro lfKoster

Ho ngarije en haa r buurlanden. De w ederzijdse relaties en d e pro bl ematiek va n de

Boek besprekingen Beno it Va nhees & Mike d en HaJtog

Ko rea's nucleaire intenties: bluf of reële dreig ing

M alcolm Rifkind

Speech

Jason magazine (1995), jaargang 20 nummer 1  
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