Jason magazine (1992), jaargang 17 nummer 1

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• Interview with Prof. Brands • jason Conference on the Proliferation of Western Technology • Nato Transformed: See Rome and Die? • Who's Afraid of ...

Germany?

• Security in Latin America

Volume 17 Februari 1992 Number 1

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jason Magazine is a bimonthly publication of the jason

EDITORlAL

Foundation Editorial Board Chief Edilor: Hans van dcr Lee Sub-Editor: Amout Nuyt Hyl ke vun D'lIlt.dg Elenu van der Hoorn Manijn Hop Marie-José Jonker Peter Lingg Martel Ruiter Hcino WaJbrock

Executive Board Chamnan: Marianne van Leeuwen Vice-Chainnan: Ru ud Raken Secretary: Anhur Crcmers Inl. Sccrelary: Duo Jcllema Treasurer: Fred Schonewille Fundraise r: Servaas Dute rloo PR Coordinator: Yolanda Mulicpaard Al:!. Coordinator: David Sanders General Affairs: Christward DielCnJmn

General Board Mr. A.G.EM . Alting von Gcusau Drs. F.G. II . van den Broek Mr. F.C.M . Caris, M .B.A. Drs. AJI . Gierveld Mr. F.A. M. va n den Heuvel Drs. JA de Konin g. M.Phil.

Mr. R.H. va n de r Meer Drs. F.J.J . Princen Drs. E.J . WClcrings Drs. R. W. Zaagman

Advisory Coundl Prof.Dr. W. Dekker. ChaÎnnan F. de Bakker Prof.Dr. lTh.J . van dcn Berg Prof.Dr. H. de Haan Prof. Drs. V. Halberslad t Drs. G J.J.M . Hayen c.c. van den l!euvel !-I .A. M. I-Iocfn agels Mr. J.G.N. de )·Ioop Schcffcr Drs. R.W. Mcines R.D. Praaning Drs. W.K.N. Schrneller Prof.dr. J.G. Siccama Prof. Dr. A. van Stadcn Drs. L Wccke

jason Foundation laan van Meerdervoort 96 2517 AR The Hague The Netherlands

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'THE EUROPEAN GAME' Elena va n der Hoorn , Hans van de r Lee and Arnout Nu yt visiled Professor of History Maarte n Brands for an intervi ew on Germany and Europe.

2 JASON ON THE SPOT: THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE LATHE Hans van der Lee al Ihe Jason Conference on the Proliferalion of Weslern Technology.

5 NATO TRANSFORMED: SEE ROME AND DIE? Christward Dietemlan travell ed to Brussels and re ports on Ihe CUITenl slale of Ihe Allanlic Alliance.

7 WHO' S AFRAID OF ... GERMANY? Historian Geert Wi smans on Gennany 's changing róle in the ncw Europe.

11 UNITED NATIONS: CHANGING OF THE GUARD Marie-José Jonker. editor of Jason Magaz ine. examines the c hanging róle of lhe UN as Perez de Cuellar hands over 10 Boutros Ghali .

16 AF RI CA: THE REBIRTH OF A SOVEREIGN CONTINENT Il1lerviews 'W ith Professors Doornbos and De Gaay Fortman on development and see urit y in Afriea by Peter Lin gg, editor of Jason Magazi ne.

17 AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION Editor Marlijn Hop on the ' Pennanenl Neulralily ' of AUSiria and the chan ging sec urity conste llation in Europe.

21 DEMOCRATIZATION, POLITICAL STABILITY AND SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA Patrie io Silva, on the Doctrine of Nat ional Security.

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Special offers for subscribers: 50% reduction on the ticket for the Jason Spring Conference "Europe Overtaken by Nationalism ?"; 8 May 1992 Free tickets for parts of the program me of the "Seminar on European Polities, Economy and Security"; 6, 7 and 8 April 1992.

See page 28

"Coming in From the Cold...

Since the definitive end of the Cold War with the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the world seems more safe than before. Or does it? Many new and unexpected problems have arisen and still more are looming over the horizon. In this second English edition of Jason Magazine, we have tried to assem bie an overview of security problems beyond the year 2000. Some articles are of a more general nature, while others take the form of so-called case studies.

The emphasis is on Europe (including Germany) and the United States, but other areas, notably Africa and Latin America are treated as weil.

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gy. Next comes a report - based on interviews with Dutch representatives to NATO and high-ranking NATO officials - on the state of the Atlantic Alliance. Historian Mr Wismans sheds some light on the shape of future German foreign policy and the stance the Netherlands should adopt.

A profile examines the changing rale of the UN as Perez de Cuellar handed over to Boutros Ghali. Interviews with Professors Doornbos and De Gaay Fortman show th at the security situation in Africa is unstable and uncertain. Editor Martijn Hop writes on the expected change in the foreign policy of Austria as a result of developments in Europe and between the superpowers. Last but not least, Or. Silva goes into the prospects for peace and stability in Latin Arnerica.

Professor of History and expert on Germany Mr Brands was interviewed on the future of European security and the rale of Germany. A contribution on one of the semi-annuaI conferences of the Jason Foundation goes into the highly current issue of anns exports A.W.L. van der Lee, and the transfer of Western technolo- chief editor

Interview with Prof DI: M .e. Brands

'The European Game' Last December jason Magazine interviewed Prof. Dr. M.e. Brands at his office at the University of Amsterdam . As professor of Contemporary History he is considered one of the Netherlands' leading experts on Germany. In his usual ironic manner he put forward his views on a number of topics. Brands on German foreign policy, its position with regard to Central and Eastern Europe, the extreme right as a factor of influence on foreign policy, the coming to terms with the Stasi past, the marginalization of France, the future of European security and Dutch priori ties.

M. C Brands is Professor of History ot the Unﾃ思er-

WIlG! wil/ fwure Germanforeigll policy look like ?

sity of Amsterdam. He

"'A liow me 10 use a notian which Ihe Gennans di slike immensely, that is the word Sondefweg: the Ihreal of Germany 's laking up an increasi ng ly isolated position and conducting all independent foreign po li cy. In spi Ie of Mr Van den Broek 's annoyance, Ihin gs cou ld have been worse. Whal is happenin g ri ghl now originates neithe r from Ihe ' charaCler ' of lhe German people nor from lhe 'wickedness' of Mr Genscher - of which we like 10 1a lk in Ihe Nelherlands -

was ;nterv;ewed by Jason Magazine editof5 Heno van der Hoorn,

Hans van der Lee ond Amout Nuyt.

but from the exceptional issues confronting lhem , which lhey have 10 face all by Ihemselves. Havin g said thi s, you arrive at the question as 10 why Germany ha s 10 carry a heav ier burden of developmenls since 1989 lhan everyone else in Europe. Koh l said it: " Why do lhe olhers f1al ly refuse 10 lake lheir share?" And it really is true, stati stics speak for themse lves.

President Von Weiszﾃ､cker: "... sanctimonious face ... " (Photo: Jason).

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The Germans do not do this because they are 'good Samaritans' but rather because Germany is the only country in Europe so direcll y confronled by lhe consequences of 1989. The olhers lalk a 101 bullhal is all tin le-lanle, for policies remain unchanged as if 1989 never was. Europe has chan ged so dramaticall y ... yel Brusseis' policy is the same as before 1989.

A second aspect is thai German unification is a direct result from

deve lopmems inside Ihe Soviel Union. Gorbac hev acted on a roman tie notion of lhe Federal Republic; in Bonn Jeltsin has recenlly confinned lhe greal expectat ions the fOffiler Soviet Union has.

A Ihird point: lhe Gennans are lhe on ly people scanered across Europe in Ihis way. How many German s are li ving in the fOffiler Soviet Union nowadays?"

Do yOll foresee any problems concernil1g these 'ethnic Germons'?

"Genscher worries about them alright. Gennany wi ll nol easily gel invo lved in border conflicts.

Howeve r, a compl elely differenl iss ue are the claims. There are claims vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia and Poland. LaslOcIober lhere were negotiations but no agreement was concluded.

There is much talk of a 'return of history ' rather than an 'end of history'. The present situation bears resemblance to that of befare 1914, of course. There is na such thing as a return to history, but in many ways then as weil as now

commitment 10 NATO has suffered since 1989? The US perfonned a strange manoeuvre with the so-called short-range nuclear farces. They made it into the litmus test for Gerrnany 's loyalty!

Berlin was the centre fOT the Central European countries. None of the countries of Mitfe/europa was

Their hiding behind the fact that something was not laid down in the Grulldgesetz ('Basic Law ') is a funn y thing. In the case of Yugoslavia they are right. I think it would be very unfortunate if Germans were to operate there. But they must not keep on claiming a special position with regard to lraq on the basis of an article in the ' Basic Law' prohibiting participation - and thi s may sound harsh coming from someone who does not think lightly of the legacy of World War Two. I call it running away from res ponsibility."

economically self-s upporting and few were independent politically.

Now also those countries have very high hopes about economie cooperation with Gennany.

The central issue is this: since the creation of the FRG its foreign poliey senled down iota a certain ' westemi zation ', Will it last or wi ll

Gennany soon be in a pivotal positi on between East and West? Germany has always been tied to the West in two ways. Through Washington, in a larger sense through NATO, and through Brussels, the EC. Now, accord ing to same, the special conditions goveming Ame-

What is your view on the rise of rhe extreme righl and of Illeir possible il1fluel1ce as a politicalfactor on Germanforeign policy?

riean in vo lvement with Gennany are no langer there. At any rale, European integratio n has become a who le new bali-game.

This is the vis ion of a future hegemonial power which has to be kept in check. You cao doubt this view, for Gerrnany itself wanted to forge a tighter link with Western Europe and introduced the concept of the European Political Union (EPU) as an answer to the Econom ie and Monetary Union (EMU). Why do we have to question this? Precisely becau se it is uncertain how far European integration wiJl go. Suppose that, on paper, it wi 11 be a success, in what way are you going to check a country the size - in the positive as weil as in the negative sense, assets and liabilities - of Gennany?"

Was there not a stro fl g rendellcy towards neutrality before 19891 1f 50, has this changed ?

" I do not for a moment believe that there was such a thing! And I do not see it now either! The Germans have always supported NATO vigourously. Surely, you cannot possibl y believe that their

"German y is also strugg ling with the problem of migrati on. They are trying to reconcile two opposite goals: on the one hand to uphold a liberal image while on the other actually restricting the flow of immigrants. The 1949 ' Basic Law' contains an article - albeit with a noble intention - on account of wh ich people who are politically persecuted can seek refuge in Germany. But if there is a coup d' ĂŠtat in Zaire yo u could end up with the entire Zairean population at your doorstep. I support Kohl , who says thai the artiele should be abo lished but the president, with his sanctimonious face, is blocking thi s.

Gennany has to 'europeanize'.

Europe has to pull together including Gennany. There must be one comman asylum policy. SA why does Mr Van Weiszäcker put up such forceful resistance?

As to the process of coming IQ terms with the Second World War ... NaturaJly, there is nothing beautifu l to teil about wh at happened in Eastem Europe. This also holds true for the recent past and equall y applies to the Hungarians, the Poles and the Gennans. In

addition, the East Gennans are burdened by World War Two, which was swept under the carpet by the most ralse regime we have seen in post-war Europe.

The Stasi past has now been added to this. I think the only solution is

Wh at is happening does not originate trom the 'wickedness' ot Mr Genscher the passing of a generation ... which is very sado But rapid economie growth could make thin gs easier. However, I do not fore see the 'spark ' of the ex treme right go over 10 foreign policy, although we cannot he entirely certain with regard to migration policy."

Are there similarities in the processes of coming to lerms with the nazi and fil e Stasi periods ?

"Yes. Similarities occur in what you might call the ' unpracti cability' of it all. Adenauer was a cyni cal man ... but in many respects he was right, I think. He once said: HA people that is tainted brown for 80% is useless." Having established that, you nevertheless have to say 'life goes on ' . Which did not necessari Iy mean he had 10 bend over backwards and appoint a ruthless nazi for his ri ght-hand man.

The overriding similarity between dealing with these two distinct periads is that they cannot have a happy end ing. The social and politieal climate will continue ta he eontaminated weil into the nex t century.

Germany is too weak tor all the tasks attributed to it The Gennan questian per sĂŠ is the economie miracle which is about to happen, while neighbouring countries are faeed with stagnant eeonomies. They complain that Gerrnany is toa strong to be encapsulated, but the fact of the matter is that it is toa weak for all the tasks attributed ta it. The recent

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budget debate in the Blllldestag for example, showed that the fom,e r GDR is the sin gle greate st debtor within the new Germany.

I never said Gennany is look ing for a strong old-style imperialistic rale but power cannot remain idle so easil y. In the , European Game ' the EC can be a front or act as a disguise for strong national interests. It is easier to label something 'European' than 'Genman '.

That is why Mr Genscher paraphrazed Thomas Mann when he said: "We prefer a European Genmany over a German Europe. "

Wha! wil! Ellropean security look Iike jn theflllure?

"If we look at wh at effecti ve means there are to preserve the existing situation the French start screaming ... you would not believe it. Vet, they will be the first to talk about ' the treachery of the US', should the US ever withdraw from Europe. We are being taken a lon g for aride. The game is called innating the Western European Union (WEU) in order to overcome French qualms. But the question what exactl y we are creating in the process has become

President Mitterand: "... talking of eorJy retirement ... " (Pho,o: AP).

One thing we can see quite clearl y now. is the utter marginal ization of France. Mitterand is not talking of an early retirement for nothing.

Intemall y as weil as extemally France 's future does not look bri ght. All the things th at gave it superpower status are gone. There is a total lack of sense of direction .

The French are behaving more European than ever before, but what do they mean by Europe?

At a recent conference of the European Movement in the Netherl ands some high-ranking French polilicians told me: "Yes, you are absolutely ri ght, we ha ve to stop nagging about the rﾃｳle of the US in NATO". Vet, they will never stop."

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subordinate to the game. We have to be very careful with NATO, because it is the only effecti ve organi zati on in thi s field. The WEU has always lac ked substance and as for the pan-European CSCE, we il ...

In the field of security times are very confusing. There is talk of , first deepening and the n broadening' without taking into account the course and pace of history. We can no lon ger afford thi s. So much has to be done, so man y things that seem contradictory ...

What will be the result of the restructurin g of NATO? What wi ll be Eastem Europe 's place? What kind of security will we offer them ? If there is something to be

leam ed from history, then it is that you are ex tremely vulnerable when you make promises to unstabie countries.

In Central and Eastem Europe possibilities for cooperation are limited. Security policy is conservati ve by nature. It is the issue of the old and the new shoes. We do not yet have an organi zati on, 50 we have to look after thi s Iiule structure whose performance was adequate. Nowadays, even the Green Party gives NATO its thumbs up.

Have l said it: "The only problem with NATO is that we are not in it." Mr Van Mierlo has to stop applauding the 'European pillar'.

They have been working on it for such a long time and still have not gotten anywhere. No country can play the leadin g rﾃｳle in Europe: Germany is not allawed ta, France is incapable to ... Should the US leave, then we are in trouble. ' Demoerats 66' then say "th at is the challenge". I do not think we should let it come that faro Any fonm of political cooperation is fundamentall y different from economie cooperatian. There are no pressure gro ups at the level of EC ' foreign policy', apart from tﾃｯd.de unions. It is a game ror a sm all company wi th national opinians.

I believe that the more sovereignty has been transferred the more fierce the rest of it will be defended.

With security thi s is essential.

There, complex situations aften hoil down to the questioll "do our boys reall y have to get themselves killed over there?"

The Netherlands has no sense of histarical awareness. But we do have good 'caretakers' of our policy at the European level.

For a large part Europe consists of rhetoric: Everybody should be European ﾃ始 her or his thinking.

Mr Hurd may be opposed to a lot of things. he nevertheless manages to prese nt himself as 'Mr Europe '.

One of th e crucial mistakes of the Netherlands is th at no priorities are set. We want everything at once."

JAS 0 NON

T HES POT

Jason Conference on the Proliferation of Western Technology

The Strategie Importanee of the lathe

By Hans van der lee On 1 November, 1991 the lason Foundation for International Affairs organized one of its semi-annual conferences at the Stadsgehoorzaal in leiden. The topic: the proliferation of Western technology. The speakers: business, governmental, politica I and sdentifie experts. The conference was divided into lectures, workshops and a closing debate.

A participant's impression.

T ec hnology transfer - or, without a sense of control, proliferation is a hot issue. Examples of its importanee and its potential

impact on everyday life appear in the med ia almost every day. Iraq's, and man y other Third World co un -

issue and illustrated this by usin g the seemingl y si mpl e question: "Can a lathe he considered a strategie good?"

In hi s view, a trade-off has to be made bel ween 100 per cent control on the one hand and 100 per cent free trade on the other. In the fi eld of export control lwO trends can be diseerned: expand ing present regimes by means of licensing sc hemes (' deepening ') and increas ing the range of subject s that fa ll under the categories non-proliferation and strategie goods (for ex amp le psyehotropie substanees, more commonly known as drugs).

This ' proliferation of non -proliferation ' is undesi rable, aceording to Van den Berg.

He recommended limiting the ongoing expansion of export eontrol lists, wh ile at the same time

increasing the cohesion bet ween lhe different con trol regimes - in cl uding acce lerat ion of European Community eooperation without ig noring th e posilion of business and industry.

In the seeOild speec h of the day, Mr Hoekema, Head of the Political UN Affa irs Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (and one-time ed itor of Jason Magazine), went into the myriad of treaties and ot her international agreements wilh regard 10 non pro liferation. He demonstrated the current nature of the issue by reading alo ud numerous newspaper clippings. Pleadi ng for inereased international cooperation , he nevertheless wondered whether the trend lowards integration of the exis ting control regimes rea ll y does make sense. According 10 him , 'reasonabie suffi e iency'

Hans van der Lee is

edi~

tor af jason Magazine.

Mr Hoekema (Ieft) and Mr Van den Berg (rig ht) during question time in the morning session

(pho'o: R.B. Dentener).

tri es " quest for [he alom bomb and the increased likelihood of 'export' ofnuclear scienti sts from within the Commonwealth of Independen t States (CIS) are but tWQ of them. Decisiolls with regard to the tran sfer of techl1ology deeply affect the political (military ) as weil as the economie (deve lopment) dimensions of EastWest al1d North-South relations.

The Jason Conference provided same insight inta all otherwise very comp lex matter.

lectures First, the Deputy Director-General

for Foreign Econom ie Relati ons (Ministry for Econom ie Affairs), Mr Van den Berg, provided a general overview of the problem of export con trol. He specifiea ll y went jnta the so-ca ll ed ' dual use'

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JAS 0 NON

T HES POT fimns and/or fro nt companies, and by slicing orders into unrecognizabie - seemin gly unrelated - parts.

Lieffers added substance to the assumption thar intelligence officers stationed at embassies are used IQ 'control ' these so-called 'procuremenl networks'.

The forum from left

to right: Mr 5temerdink, Mr Van Aardenne (chairman) and Dr. CoUjn (Photo: R.B. Demener).

Workshops

should be the muin criterium in detennining the range of a certain regime. Of course, the ideal situation would be to ban categories of weapons altogether, for instance biological and/or chemical weapons. Hoekerna emphasized the United Nalions register for conventional anns sales, which was being negotiated in New York at that very moment.

Mr 5temerdink makes a point during the dosing debate (Phata: R.B. Dentener).

Mr Neder/af puts forward a propasitian far the discuss;an (Phato: R.B. Dentener).

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Mr Lieffers, Director for Social and Economic Interests of the Netherlands [ntemal Security Service, made the third and final contribution to the moming session. A hi gh-rankin g official of th is servi ce delivering a public lecture is a rare sighl. He admitted to a slight feeling of disorientation because of this. The topic of his speech was 'technology procurement networks'. He used the case of Or. Abd ul Qadir Khan, a naturali zed Pakistani nuc1ear scientist who was able 10 deliver the secrel of the atom bomb to Pak istan by gat-

hering intelligence at the nuclear enhancing plant of UCN/U renco in the Nethe rl ands.

Techniques for successfull y acqui-

ring technology are: disguising the destination of goods by using third co untries, by rero uting, and by using forged end use certificates; d isguising the use of goods by keeping defence developmenl programmes secrel, by using cover

The aftemoon session consisted of a wide range of study groups or works hops on different aspects of the topic: business intelligence and sec urity; lessons from the Gulf War; the strategy of amns exports; political decision-making and amns export Iicencing; technology transfer and development; the proliferation of delivery systems. [ auended the workshop on the

proliferation of deli very systems, which was chaired by Mr K.A. Nederlof, an expert from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (and one-time first editor of Jason Magazine). The proposition put forward for the general discussion in the ciosing debate was: "11 should be made punishable by law in the Netherlands for scientists to cooperate in (foreign) development programmes for weapons of mass destruction."

The closing debate was chaired by Dr. G.M. V. van Aardenne, fomner Minister for Economic Affairs.

Participants were Mr A. Stemerdink, fonner Minister for Defence (and Social-Democratic MP in the Lower House of Dutch Pari iament) and Dr. K. Colijn, politica! scientist and journalist specializing in anns trade.

NATO Transformed: See Rome and Die?

By Christward Dieterman

The meeting of Alliance Heads of State and Government in Rome on 7 and 8 November 1991 marks a watershed not only in the history of NATO but also of Europe. The Rome Summit was the latest in a series of high-level meetings th at over the past two years have guided the Alliance's transformation and redefined its role and missions in the new Europe. Wh at is significant about th is process of transformation is not simply that is has been completed 50 quickly, but also th at su eh a farreaching exercise has been carried out in an exceptional atmosphere of consensus and common purpose among all the 16 Allies.

In Rome , the Heads of State and Govemment were ab le to announce that commitments made 15 month s before in the London Deelaration had been kept; thi s notwithstanding the diplomatie focus on the Gulf Crisis in this period and the mounting political uncertainties in the fonner Soviet Union both befare and after the Moscow coup of last August.

Progress The action programme decided on by the Heads of State and Goverornent in Loodan contained five key elements: - the establishment of a new relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a nee allied against NATO in the Warsaw Pact but now seeing in the Alliance a willing partner in their desire to draw c10ser to the West and overcome a sense of isolation and insec urity; - the elaboration of a new military strategy that would not on ly reflect the fact that NATO no longer faces a single overwhelming threat but which would also all ow the Alliance to manage the more probable security chall enges and crises it will face in the future;

- the determination to strengthen the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CS CE) and endow it with pennanent inst itution s that would make CSCE more effective as a pan-European forum for cooperatian and an instrument for managing crises and peacefull y settling disputes; - a commitment to pursue the arms con trol process beyond the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty with the aim of Iimiting the offensive potentialof armed forces to the point at which surprise attack or major aggression would become imposs ible. A related aim would be to build tru st and transparency with regard to the military activities of all CSCE states, and finally; - the encouragement of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the construction of a ' European Pillar' within the Alliance, as a means of creating a more balanced and mature transatlantic partnership of equals.

Over the past year and a half, the Alliance has made quite remarkabie progress in all five areas. In the process, it has not only transformed itself but played an essential role in bu ilding a new European

sec urity archilecture. The Alliance, however, has stated th at thi s is not a goal that one institution acting alone can achjeve, no matter how successful its record.

Instead, security, stability and prosperity in the new Europe can come only from a framework of interlocking institutions in which NATO, a European Political Union and the institut iona li zed CSCE process will be the principal aetors. Consequen'tly, from the London Summit onwards. there have been two broad thrusts 10 Alliance act ivities during its phase of transfonnation: {Q establish closer ties among these three institution s and induee them la interaet more ereatively; and to opt imize NATO's political role in those areas where il has a unique contribution 10 make to a future European security arch itecture.

Christword Dieterman is a member of the Executive Board of the lason Foundotion for International Affairs.

Politica I future With reference to NATO's political role in the future, Mr Kriendler, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Polit ical Affairs of NATO has na reason whatsoever to bel ieve that NATO wi ll be obsolescent in the year 2000. On the eontrary. lt seems la him thai the extraordinary transfonnation of the Alliance will ensure that NATO wi ll continue to be of great usefulness we il into the next century. The role that NATO will have in the year 2000 and beyond - according to recorded statements and declarations of NATO officials - will be a major contribution 10 stability and securi ty not just of the AIlies but in all of Europe. This view by the way, is shared by the new partners in Central and Eastem Europe.

As to the role of the United States

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vis-a-v is Europe wi th in NATO, Mr Kri endler quoted President Bush, who said in Rome: "The United States will not, because it cannot, abandon its res pon sibil ities, its ĂŽlllerests and its place in Europe."

He added : 'The US does not want fo llowers in the A lli ance as some allege, but rather partn ers. The Alliance is not an Ameri can enterpri se or a vehicle of A m e ri ~ can power .. .". and he conlinued in

a simi lar vein . Mr Kri end ler think s th at the developments, whi ch have taken place most recent ly in Rome

reaffinn ed by th e NATO Heads of State and Government in Rome. have in faet been implemented or have been refl ee ted in the decisions that were taken at M aastricht. He is far from bei ng afra id of the WEU and he is looking forward to even cl oser cooperati on with it. There has been an evolving relationship for same time now and he thinks with Maastricht there will be added impetu s to cooperate. He al so helieves that there are construetĂŽ ve and usefu l thin gs that NATO can do. lt will be mutua ll y re inforcing and will ensure that the guidelines, whieh have been agreed to, are fulll y implemented.

The new Concept places much greater stress on crisis management and conflict prevention Military strate gy and Maastricht, go a ve ry long way towards assuring th at the 'European Pillar ' within the Alliance will be strengthened even more than has been the case in the past, and ĂŽI is for th at Teasen that Ihe Secretary General very wannl y welcomed the agreements that

were reached at Maastricht. Mr Kriend ler was very heartened to see the degree to whi ch the guidelines For assuring transparency and cooperation, which were agreed to bya ll 16 NATO Foreign Ministers in Copenh agen in June 199 1 and

Press conference at the Rome Summit.

Michael Legge is on the far 'eh (Photo:

NATO Pho' o).

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The London Declarati on announeed the intention to enhance the political component of the Alliance. lt also set out the broad outline of a new military posture for NATO's integrated military structure, refl eetin g some radieal changes from the past. The tas k of preparing a new military strategy was given by the Co unc il to an Ad Hoc Gro up on the Review of NATO 's Military Strategy - which soan became know n as the Strategy Review Gro up (SRG).

An earl y task was to redefine the objecti ves of the Alliance in the

new security environment. ft was quickl y ag reed th at many of the Alliance's aims we re of enduring valid ity - the pure ly de fensive purpose of the Alliance; the indi visability of All iance security; the collecti ve nature of All ied defence; and the cruci al importanee of the transatlantic link . However, these had to be se t into a new political framework lO reflect not only the changed military environment but also developmenls, for example, in artn s control , the CS CE and the emerging European security and defence identity. Ultimate ly, thi s task was made much easie r by the development in the Counc il of the so-called 'care security functions' , which were eventu all y published in a statement approved at the Foreign M inisters' meeting in Copenhagen in J une 199 1. T he tex t ofthi s statement was subsequently incorporated verbatim in the new Strategie Concept. Given their central importance. it is worth repeatin g the four security functi ons in full : - To provide one of the indispensabie foundati ons for a stabie security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democrati c instituti ons and commitment to the peaceful resolut ion of disputes, in which na coun try would be able to intimidal.e ar coerce an y European

nat ion or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

- Ta serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transat lantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues th at affect their vital interests, ind udin g possible deve lopments posing ri sks for members' security, and for appropriate coordinati on of their efforts in fi elds of common concern.

- To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

- Ta preserve the strategie balance within Europe.

Together with the redel誰ned objectives, the ot her key starting point was to analyse the possible future risks to Allied security. The old massive, monolithic and immediate threat to NATO from the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact had clearly di sappeared. But what now existed was a situation in which many of the countries on the periphery of the Alliance we re faced wi th economie, social and political difficulties which mi ght result in cri ses and in turn could lead to a range of unpredictabl e multi-faceted and multi -directional ri sks to Allied sec urity. Defi ning th ese ri sks against a con stantl y changi ng political background the 16 months durin g which the SRG was working saw the unification of Gennany, the di sintegrati on of the Warsaw Pact, the Gulf War, the failure of the coup in the former Soviet Union and civil war in Yugoslavia - was one of the most diffi c ult tasks fac ing the SRG. The eventual outcome was a carefull y balanced assessment of the ri sks which might arise as a result of instabilities in Central and Eastern Europe - with particular referenee to the spec ial case of the former Soviet Union - and on the Southem periphery of the Alliance.

'St rategie Conce pt' Against thi s background of Alliance objectives and potential risks and challenges, the heart of the new Strategie Concept lies in two sections, anc on the "broad approach to security", and the secOlld on

"guide lines for defence". Two key features of the broad approach to securit y are worth hi ghlightin g.

The first is the ex pansion of the forme r Harmel dual approach of dialogue and defence to a triad of cooperation , dia logue and defence.

Thi s commitment to cooperation wi th the co untries of Central and Eastem Europe was first signa led in the London Declaration pledge to ex tend the hand of friendship to NATO's former adversaries, and reaffinned in the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation.

Secondly, the new Concept places much greater stress on the importance of crisis management and confl ict prevention, given the increased opportunities that ex isl for the successful resolution of crises at an earl y stage by careful select ion of a range of appropriate political and military measures.

The guide lines for defe nce, although Iying at the heart of the military strategy, proved one ofthe least difficult sections to draft.

Most of the principles underl ying an effective defence posture are unehanged; the major changes are to the way in which the Alliance's forees are organised to meet the challenges of the new environment.

Many of the key features had already bee n identifi ed in the London Declaration: smaller forces, many at lower levels of readiness; enhanced flexibility and mobility to replace the old statie linear defence (the so-called layer cake defenee concept); increased relianee on multinational forees; grealer ability to build up forces through reinforcement , mobi lizati on and reconstitution; sealing down of training and exercises; redueed reliance on nudear weapons and a very substantial reduction in NATO's sub-strategic nuclear stockpil e in Europe, Much of the debate on this section of the Concept concemed not so much the need 10 resolve disagreements on issues of principle, but more with decidin g the amount of detail th at should be included, bearing in mind that the NATO Military Authorities had been tasked with preparing a separate classified docu-

ment on Ihe implementation of the new strategy.

Transfo rmation The Alliance's new Strategic Concept which was approved in Nove mber 1991 in Rome is a strategy that emphasizes cri sis management. In addition, the Strategic Concept forms the basis for the further development of the collective defence planning, operational concepts, and the conventional and nudear force posture.

The Alliance is making a major

Most of the principles underlying an effective defence posture are unchanged transformation by adopting thi s wholly new Strategic Co ncept.

The aim is to maintain a smaller but capable collec ti ve military organization in order la serve NATO 's political objectives. This struelure will provide sufficient military forces to protee t the peace, to manage cri ses, and 10 provide for defence. Thus NATO has been transfoml ed from an alliance dedicated to immediale collecti ve defence against the possibility of a massive attack to a new political military configuration, watching over peace and prosperity in a time of transit ion and instability. The approach will be a strategy of long- teml stability and security, with the ability 10 manage cri ses as one of its most important aspects. This will requi re political and military structures, processes and relationships which provide a forum for dialogue and cooperation and, if need be, for collecli ve defence.

Controversy?

The fact that the political rol e becomes more important, does not mean th at the military role of NATO becomes less important, with reference to collective defence and collecti ve planning that still lie at the heart of the Alliance, accordi ng to Michae l Legge, Ass istant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Policy and Chainnan of the Strategy Review Group.

9

United States within NATO. As an organi zati on of equal partners, the principles underl ying this coopera-

The shape of things

to come? Royal Dutch Marines

ti on wi 11 remain unchanged.

in Sardinia

Michae l Legge also characteri zes the future of NATO as an effective

(Pho!o : ANP).

collective defence organi zation providing for a strong transatl antic

link .

Changing emphasis The time has come, says Folmer, to change the rati o of ( I) main defence forces, (2) reacti on forces and (3) immedi ate reacti on forces. The Netherlands have conce ntrated on main defence farces, while other

Allies have emphasized th e f1 rst two and neglected the third. " If you do not want be left out of cri sis management you will have to

be able to suppl y the means to participate. Otherwise, you will not have credibility, for na country can

be a political force without the willingness 10 parti cipate in the actual resolving of the cri sis at

hand," says a high-ranking NATO official.

Michael Legge adds: "In terms of NATO 's contribution to stability in something Iike a WEU (Western European Union).

How does the WEU compare to NATO? Legge: " It 's not a ri val

the Sov iet Union and Eastem

organization, the European defen-

- develop their defence fo rces in a

role is su pported by the premise that NATO has two tasks. This is, however, a false premise. NATO

ce pillar is welcomed by NATO. But the WEU has no collecti ve defence structure (as NATO hasj

way which wil! enhance security; - convert their defence industri es

has only ane task - security - within which political and military aspects go hand in hand. For ex ample, nuclear weapons have a

and it is not a collecti ve military planning organi zation . Apart from ters and secretariat. It remains to

- institute democratic contral of their military forces; - educate and train their forces; - contTol their nuclear weapons

Lieutenant General Folmer, Permanent Mil itary Representati ve of

the Ki ngdom of the Netherl ands stated th at the controversy created bet ween the political and military

political func tion, althoug h maybe

NATO has only one task -securitywithin which politica I and military aspects go hand in hand not in Ihe fi rst instance. With

short -range weapons NATO has tried to bring them back int o th e military domain , which according to Folmer was not a success.

Politics have always been more important; the mi litary component cannot be an end in itself, but withOUl one you are reduced la

10

that, they have a small headquar-

Europe the North Atlantic Council has put fo rward th at these countri es have 10:

to peaceful uses;

be seen how they propose to deve-

and the possible destruction of

lop same of the ideas stated in the Maastricht Decl aration. It wil1 pro-

these weapon s.

babl y be compatible with the aims of the Alliance." Folmer adds that

practical assistance."

there are many people who would

Concludes Folmer: " NATO has great potential to ex pand its scope.

Ex pansion of the underl ying prin-

prefer NATO and the WEU to have a reciprocal ri ght of veto wi th regard to the coordin ati on of thei r objecti ves. According to him it

In all these areas NATO can offer

ciples is desirabie in view of recent changes in Eastem Europe

woul d be best fo r NATO not to try

and the fo rmer Sov iet Uni on. Any

and define new tasks, because to define implies to execute.

There is an undiminished belief in NATO's cohesive capacity as an element of the transatlantic link.

organizati on which allows itself to

This is based on the premise th at there is a role of Canada and the

grind to a halt is al ready on the way to the morgue."

Who's Afraid of

•••

Germany?

By Geert W ismans

The ró le a n d p ositio n o f Germ a ny within Euro p e (a nd the w o rld ) have re ce ntly und e rg o ne fund a m e nta l cha ng es. The voice production and e mbouchure o f the n e w united Germany in t he inte rnation a l co nce rt are an impo rtant theme of politica I d e bate, n ot o nly in th e Federal Re public itself but o utside as w eil. With t h e rei n state m e nt of Ge rm a n unity on 3 Octobe r 1990 th e Fe d e ral Republic al so re g a ine d it s full sovereignty. Ha s Germ a ny n o w be come a ' no rmal ' Euro p ea n state like Fra nce a nd Great Brit a in o r will it, beca use of the past, fore ver h a ve a slightly distinctive status a nd be looked upon a ska nce? An atte mpt at a n a lysis a nd so m e re marks on the Du t ch p osi t io n .

S ince unification, the importanee of Gem13ny within Europe and the world has unmi slakably increased.

Sovereignly was full y reslored and with 79 million inhabitants the Federal Republic is Ihe mosl populous country in Europe - w ith the

exception of Ru ssia - leavi ng behind such mcdium -sized powers as France, Greal Brilain and Italy.

Geographically, Ihere is no way around Gennany either: Iy ing at

Ihe heart of Europe. mosl of Ihe main North -Soulh and Easl· Wesl connect iolls run through Gemutn le rrilory. The cenlre of grav ily of Europe is l110ving eastwards from Brussels, Slrasbourg and Paris.

The already powerful economic. scien tifi c and technological potential of Gemlany has onl y increased since unificati on: Gross National

Producl (GNP) no w slands al 2.520 billion D-Marks, conlrasling violenlly wilh Ihe GNP's of France ( 1.726 billion DM) and Greal Bri · lain ( 1.466 billion DM). Togelher wilh Japan and Ihe Uni led Slales,

has gone 'back 10 nonnaley'. The eold War is over and Gennany is na langer a fro nl· line sIaIe. Whereas befare Ihe key la Ihe Gemlan queslion lay in Moscow and the EC and NATO were implicitly meanl "10 keep the Gennans down" , Ihe slereolype of Riesen· :werg now belongs la the past for good. ' Imperial overslrelch ' induced Ihe Uniled Slales in May 1989 la offer ' partnership in leadership ' la Bonn. In American eyes, up to Ihe n, Ihe foreign policy of Ihe Federal Republic was aimed at maintaining the status quo, stabi lity and order and was characteri zed by ri sk-avoiding behaviour and non -interfe rence in the intemal affa irs of other countries. Gemlan national interests were made sub· ordinate ta consensus within NATO and Ihe EC. Presidenl Bush and Secretary of State Baker were under the impression that a uniled Gerrnany would nOl behave ilself in a radically different way from Ihe fonner Federal Republic.

Gennany is in the economie top

Ihree of Ihe world. And although Ihe reconstruction of the five ncw federa l Slales in Ihe fonner GDR requires large-scale in vestme nt s. most peopl e are convineed o f a

repetition of the WirtschajtswlIlI· der e n roule 10 Lhe year 2000.

Po lilicall y. so 10 speak. Gerrnany

Meanwhile, Ihis has proven to be a mi scanceplion. The Gennans seem to have interpreted the American offer as an incentive not to keep themselves in check anymo· re. Rec urring incidel1ls and expres· sions of a new assertive ness have given ri se 10 Ihe bogy of Gerrnan

arrogance and a Gennan Allei,,· gang in London, Paris and Washington; a Gennany delemlined to pursue ils nationa l În terests wit· houI laking inlo accounl EC partners and NATO allies.

Chec kbook During Ihe Gulf Crisis Ihe Federal Republic, conlrary la Greal Brilain and France, refused 10 participate active ly in Opera/ioll Desert Shield and Opera/ion Deser/ Storm and Chancellor Kohl was severely crili cized by Ihe Allies, mosl nOlabl y by the Uniled Slales.

It was reasoned th at lhe new German y, a great European nation

Drs. Ceert w.P.j.

W;smans

;s a histarian

currently working atthe Netherlands Ministry of Home Affairs (Directorate·General for Public Administratian).

He wrote this artic/e à titre personnel.

Most people are convinced of a repetition of the Wirtschaftswunder en route to the year 2000 with an enomlOUS economie potenlia l, cou ld no longe r avoi d its responsibilily in world polilics.

'Checkbook dipl omacy' was no la nger sumdent. The counterargument, thai the Grulldgeser: did nOl allow for mililary ope rations oulside Gennan territory was nol accepted. For con ven ie nee 's sake Ihe facl was neglecled Ihal Ihe Allied viclors of World War Two had imposed Ihis reslricling article on Gerrnany afler 1945.

Moreover, Gennan demonslrations aga inst the Gulf War were, in a sense, predictab ie in view of the strong position of the co umry's peace movemenl in Ihe 1970s.

In Ihe di scussions on Ihe EMU (Economic and Monelary Union) and EPU (European Polilical Union) and in the period immedialely leading up 10 Ihe Maaslrichl Summil, the Federal Repub lic aCled bath as a motor and as a catalyst of European unification.

After the era of 'euroscleros is ' in Ihe 1980s Kohl , logelher wilh Milterand , initiated a substantial breakthrough toward s a European

11

Polit ical Union. However. Gennan

sent. The intensity and scope of

policy with regard to the step-by-

the tradi tionall y close links wi th

Gennany: from the Urals 10 the Oder, from the Baltic to the Adri a-

step introducti on of a common foreign and security policy is ambivalent and unpredictable: on the one hand the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich

all countries in the region have increased. Numerou s treati es of

that Gennan support for Croatia

friendship and cooperation have been signed in such fi elds as trade,

and Slovenia has given ri se to antiGennan sentiments and has

culture, environment and minori-

Ge nscher, and his US cou nterpart

ties. Ge nnany is leader in the field

James Baker come to an agree-

ment on European defence policy

of technical and sci entific assistance, joint ventures and investments.

abruptl y opened old wounds. The French press published accusati ons to the effect that Gennany

which takes into account the vital

There are an estimated 400 coope-

r贸 le of NATO in European sec urity and stab ility. on the other the

rati on agreements between German and Soviet compani es. A DMarkherrschaft in Central and

Franco-Germ an initiati ve towards a European arm y seems in clear con tradicti on 10 th is.

The Ge nn ans feel that they are more attuned to the reality of Eas-

Gennany is by far the most importan t trade partner of the fonner Soviet Un ion and the Central and

tem Europe. Thi s is most striking wi th regard 10 their attitude in the Yugoslavian Cri sis, in which Bonn

Eastem European countries. lts

was clearl y out of time with the

share in total Western support for

European music. Continuing pres-

these regions respec tively amounts

sure on the EC partners to offi cialIy recogni ze Croatia and Slove nia showed a completely new Gemla-

to over 56 per cent and over 32 per

magazine on the occasion of the unification of Germany

(Photo: loson).

hori zon.

D-Markherrschaft and Germanoslavia

cent ! In addition to massive capital

Cover of Time

Eastem Europe is looming at the

fl ows (ove r 90 bi llion D-Marks since 1989) and tec hni cal ass istance. the psyc hological and political effect of an endless stream of privately fi nanced food convoys to St. Petersburg and other threatened areas can hardl y be underestim a-

ted.

Moreover, Germany is omnipre-

ny with a hilhert o unknown asserti veness and energy. In thi s part icular case, maintaining the status

would want 10 rework the fomler Yugoslavian federati on into a

group of small puppet states, who would again look toward s Germany for protecti on and economie assistance. In sum , a German plot aiming at a 'Germanoslavia' in the Balcans.

In turn, according to Li vingston,

the United States have forfeited the right to criti cize Gennan policy towards Yugoslavia. Baker is lak ing care not to get inlo a snake pit the Ameri cans can never come out of on top. M oreo ver, th eir attention is focused on two other important issues, namely the con-

tro l of nuclear weapons in the fo rmer Soviet Union and the Middle East peace conference.

quo and the aims of stability and recognition of existin g borders

were out of the questi on. As we il , the fear of inlerfe rin g in intemal affairs had disappeared. On the contrary. Gennany was now wil ling 10 take substantial ri sks and was even prepared to take a SOI1-

derweg.

The Ge nnan weekl y Der Spiegel stated: "For the first time since

1949 they (the Ge nn ans) have made fo reign policy by themselves," ( I) US histori an Li vingslOn takes it

one step further: Innate Gennan obsessions about Stabilit盲t lInd Ordn llllg lie at the basis of the recognition of dissident republics in war-tom Yugoslavia. Thi s recognition serves to create a

whole new orde r and stability and are a first step on the road 10 a German sphere of influence in

Central and Eastem Europe. The collapse of the Sov iet empire has merely acce lerated a trend already put in motion by the Ostpolitik of Will y Brandt, namely the restoration of influence in a region with a

traditionall y slrong presence of

12

tic. It is not surprising, there fore,

When organi zations like NATO, EC, CSCE and WEU stand aloof or fa il in their mediation atlempls, who is to blame Gennany for putting forward its own concept?

After decades of ex hortations by the US to accept more responsibility on the international stage, reprimanding Ihe Germ ans for their energeti c performance in the Balcans is not very convincing.

But there is more th an meels the eye. The Bush Administrati on is not so much fru strated and annoy-

ed by the fac t that American adv ice was not heeded. 'Yugoslav ia' rather provides further proof for the diminishing possibilities of the US

10

influence events outside the

Western hemisphere by other means lhan military force - an option which was not considered by far in thi s case. As a 'victor' of

the Gulf War and as the onl y remaining superpower it is bitter la see how Germany puts its economie power al the service of poli-

ti cal goals so successfull y, while at the same time not being able to do likewise. (2)

Reasons for the leading röle

Germany is but ane actor in the reconstruction of Central and eastem Europe. (Member states of) the European Community, the United States, Japan, NATO, EFTA, the Council of Europe, CSCE and IMF also contribute.

Nevertheless, Germany leads the way. A number of causes lie at the basis of this leading róle: - the almast magnetic appeal of Gennan economie prosperity 10 the peoples of Central and Eastem Europe.

- !he geographicallocation of Germany - at the centTe of the European continent, bordering on Poland and Czechoslovakia - and the vast number of people of Gcrman descenl in those countries as

weU as relations of East Germans in the farmer GOR. In other words: "Germany is being sucked by its geography and economie strength into taking over the former Soviet Union's leadership in Eastem Europe." (3) - the (Iack of) invol vement from fellow players: the fading influence and róle of the US, as stated earl ier on. Great Britain has its

'whims' within the European Community, while the French role within NATO could be labelled volatile. Thus, the leading position of Germany resuhs from countries th at remain aloof or even act as a brake!

- the - aften painful - experience of the Federal Republic in the farmer GOR with the transition from a communist, centrally led econo-

my 10 democracy and sodal market economy; the Stasi past and Treuhand intricacies make Gennany an advisor as weil as a fellowsufferer of the Eastem European countries.

- federalism in the Federal Republic, with its relatively 3u10nomous Wilder serves as the exampIe par excellence for reforms in civil administration: respect for the cultural and historical peculiarities of the federal states, and the introduction of real decentTalization which gives !he federal states a röle in lhe adoption of national legislation, apart from their autonomous competence. (4)

Germany itself is deeply concerned with !he success of the process of refonn and democrati zation in Central and Eastem Europe. In their view, this offers the best protection against !he spectre of scores of immigrants on their way to the Heimat. The Gl1mdgesetz grants the ri ght LO settle in Germany to anyone who can prove 10 be of German descent. This also explains the pressure Bonn has applied to the Russian govemment to speed up the creation of a new republi c for the ethnic Germans in the Wolga area, which number approximately 2 million. (5) Furthermore, the withdrawal of 546,200 Russian soldiers (including families and civil support) of the former Red Arm y will have to proceed unobstructed until 1994.

Finally, there is a political and moral duty to act: the Germans are not only greatly indebted to the fonner Soviet Union but also to Hungary, which cut the first hole in the Iron Curtain in 1989. Without Gorbachev Gennan unification would never have taken place.

Security and global responsi bility

Here also, we can see a changing róle of Germany. It presses for continued disannament more than others, especiall y in the field of short-range nuclear forces. Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher aims for the strengthening of the CSCE process and its structures and institutions. Gennany's anned forces - like all other Westem anned forces - are now in the midst of a process of fundamental change: restructuring, budget cuts, mobility and flexibility affect the future of the Bundeswelzr.

Up to 1995 the Bl/ndeswehr will be sized down from 580,000 (including the former EaSl German Nationale Volksarmee) to 370,000 personnel and the defence budget wi ll be cut by 8,3 per ce nt during that same period. Specific problems are among others the integration of (non-commissioned) officers of the former NVA and the di smantling, destruction or sale of

NVA equipment. A hi ghly CUITent topic is the action radius of German combat troops. Gennany's checkbook diplomacy was found wanting during the Gulf War and now there is talk of changi ng the ' Bas ic Law ' article prohibiting Bundesweh,. operations oulside Europe, so German farces could participate in United Nations peace-keeping missions and disasterrelief operations. (6) Linked to this is the German ctesire to acquire a pennanent seat in lhe UN Security Counci l. In midJanuary 1991 the ChristlichSoziale Union (CSU) explicitly stated thai Gennan interests had "ta be put forward" in the Security Council.

Chancellor Kohl , for the time being, is more careful. In his New Year's statement he mentioned the "new political responsibilities" of Germany and added this did not necessarily mean a pennanent seat in the UN oAnother possibility is that the permanent seats will be occupied by the EC and other international structures, instead of single European countries.

Kohl wants German to have its ' proper place' within the European Community and be of equal we ight to French and English. This sounds reasonable, in view of the

Sphinx and Real· palitiker Genscher acts an hard (acts.

13

fact th at since uni fication the German language area is the biggest of the EC. Another aspect is the demand for a greater number of German members of European Parliament.

Going Dutch What is the Dutch position with regard to Germany 's recently increased assertiveness? At a confere nce on the role of Gemlany in Europe at the Netherlands Institute for International Re lations 'Cl ingendael' in October 1991 the theme was narrowed down to ' Black Monday ', in other words the debacle of the Dutch proposals for the European Political Uni on and the róle of the Germans therein . On that occasion, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Danken said he had been very disappointed about Germany's lack of support. He sawa certain ambiguity in the Gemtan attitude. In panicular, the behaviour of Foreign Ministe r Genscher had caused much consternation in The Hague, Before , Bonn had been elated about the Dutch proposals, being roughly equi va lent to their wishes.

During the said meeting of the (European) Council of Ministers Genscher wi thdrew his suppon when the proposals only won criti cism, An exasperated Oankert questioned the reliability of German forei gn and European policy.

(7) The way in which Genscher public1y confronted the Dutch EC Presidency's policy vis-a-vis Yugoslavia also produced an angered response in The Hague.

Admonitions to keep in private differences of opinion between EC partners conceming the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia were gentl y brushed aside. The Dutch government was furi ous about the way in which Germany hung out the diny laundry. Meanwhil e, the Gennan press launched destructive attacks at the Dutch member of govemment, calling him 'desperate', ' not credible' and ' incapabie ' while questioning his capacity for judgement. The resulting Dutch rage has still not subsided.

14

In a lecture at the Evangelische Akademie in Tutzing (Bavaria) on 15 January 1992, Danken haul ed the Gennans over the coals: "The German side played it high and substituted forceful language for arguments. Sometimes it looked like the recognition of Germany was at slake. Thi s was a very unfonunate beginning of a common European foreign and securit y policy. (. .. ) It would not have been unbecoming for the Gemtan govemment, had it shie lded the Dutch EC Presidency against the often unju stifïed and sometimes even vicious atlacks by a section of the Gennan media.

After all European solidarity is a two-way street." (8)

Economically, the Netherlands anct the Federal Republi c are c10sely interwoven. About 30% of Dutch expons go to Germany. The increased demand for fore ign produets by the former East Germans contributes to a favourable economie development in the Netherlands.

Nevertheless, other countries seem to benefit more from Gennan unity. The share of Be lgium , France and Ital y in the German marke t is increasing, while that of the Netherlands is sharply decreasing.

The charms of Frau Antje and her Käse und Gemüse allS Holland have apparently diminished.

Moreover, the most important increase in Gennan demand is in industrial products, while the Netherlands mostly expons foodstuffs and semi -manufactured goods. (9) Apart from the discussion on missed opponunities on the German marke t the solo performance of the independentl y operating Bundesbank has caused much concern.

Right after the conclusion of the Treati es of Maastricht interest rates were suddenly rai sed and other European countries had to follow suit.

Pay demands by Gemtan unions - initially over lOper cent - led to higher interest and inflation and consequently less economie growth in the rest of Europe. One could speak of "a simmering resentment against policy dictation

from its Gennan school master", ( 10)

What to make of this myriad of Dutch aggrievance and anxiety?

Firstly, Dutch criticism of the German attitude seems meanl to divert attent ion from its failure in the dipl omati c preparation of the EPU proposals. The reconstruction of 'The Hague Suicide ' in a renowned Dutch daily speaks volumes. ( 11 )

The Federal Republic is a great power in the European theatre whose interests are diverse, aften more diverse th an is realized in the Neth erlands. In a malic ious mood one could ask oneself: " Does Germany really need to be anchored in the European Community through EMU and EPU? Why would the powe rfullet itself be checked by the powerless?" Sphinx and Realpoliliker Genscher acts on hard facts. In spite of numerous problems Gemtany, with 80 million inhabitants, reunited for a year and a half, is on the ri ght track; in government circles and organizations of employers and labourers it is estimated that the fonner East Germany will be up and about in less lhan fïve years! This tour de force wi ll be accomplished without any assistance from EC panners, "Add to thi s the fact that German investments in Poland, Czechoslovak ia and Hun gary exceed total investments from the rest of the world in th at region, and you see the image inside Genscher's head: the greatest economie power of the world, which does not have to take into account such open-ended shows like a watered-down political union of the EC. The one who has the economic power has political power by virtue of thi s. Even ri ght now, resi stance seems useless. ( ... ) Gemlany is engaged in a breath-taking investment in the future while the rest of Europe is quarreling over past attainments," (12) Admittedly, thi s is a somewhat gloomy scenari o; apan from that I resent putting myself in a category with auth ors who trie to outdo

themselves in their antÎ-Gennan feelings and ' KISS attitude' (Keep it Shon and SimpIe, Stupid). For forty years, the Europeans were used 10 a divided and - with regard to foreign policy - cooperalive Gennany. The surpri se when Germany behaves like France and Great Britain traditionally have done is all the more painful. Justi fiably, He ldring wonde rs: " Ho w lon g can the Gennan attitude be measured by other standards than that of ot hers - w ith the ri sk of th ese doubl e standards working like a boomerang?"

The ne xt urgent question wo uld be what the Netherlands are capable of doing about thi s. In creased cohes ion within the EC as a means to eneapsulate Gennany seems unauainabl e, if not outdated. It is for ce nain that Germany will play a vital róle because of its eeonomi c po te ntial and geographieal posi tio n. Tomorrow 's Europe will be dominated by big member states which praetiee power polities in their purest foml, and which keep in equilibrium through a system of checks and balances. In view of the (Gennan) past. sueh an equilibrium in Europe is unrealistic without an Atlantic component , thai is a lastin g in volveme nt of the United States.

"At any rate , he who eomplains and critici zes (... ) without offe ring

cred ible allernatives is doomed 10 irre levance." (13) Sa, it is high time for a new foreign poliey in the Netherlands. Dutch foreign policy deeision-makers should no langer hold on to the obsolete bipolar world view and act on the premise of a new comprehensive polycentrism. In thi s case, fear gives bad counsel. The Hague must not be averse 10 ruthless ly sec uring nalional interests. Why nol revive cooperation within the Bene lu x? Three a linie makes a mickle. The Netherlands should rid itself of Prinzipienreiterei and the ex isting ' merchant mentalit y' wi th its ti xation on costs. To make money, you have 10 spend money !

Nevenheless, as lon g as we persevere in o ur ni ggardl y policy toward s Easlem Europe - viz the pOOf di sc ussion on the financing of embass ies in the new states and we continue Lo let Gemlany pull the chestnuts out of the Eastem European fire for us, the above-mentioned outery and wronged behaviour in my view are a less than perfect example of sober and well-considered diplomacy.

Notes: 1. Der Spiegel. 23 December. 1991.

2. ibidem, 27 January. 1991. R.G. Li vingston is Director of the American Institute for Contemporary Gennan Studies at the Johns Hopkins University.

3. rlle Wall SIreet JOl/rna/. 22 November. 1991.

4. Cfr. R. Stuh, 'Deutschlands neue Rolle im sich wandc1nden Europa', in: Allssenpofilik 43 (1992). p. 22-32.

5. Thc great majority are descendants of la!xlUrers and farmers who were brought to Russia in the 18th century by Catherine the Great. In 1924 they founded the first GCnJlan Wolga Republic in lhe Soviet Union. This was disbanded by Stalin in 1941 and the inhabitants were exi led to Central Asia for fear of collaboration with Hitler's invading troops.

6. Crr. R. Pommerin. Delltsch/lllld's sicherheilspolilisclle wRe in Europa II/u/ i/rre KOllseq/lenzeil. Speech during the International Summcr Course 'Das vereinigte Deutschland. Chance oder Ris iko fUr Europa?' at Friedrich-A lexandcr University Erlangen.Nürnbcrg. R August. 1991.

7. H. HetzeI, ' Duitse rol in Europa slicht veel verwarring', in: Nedt'flondsl! StaalscOilram. 17 October. 1991. H. Hetze! is Benelux correspondent of Die We/I. 8. The text of this speech by State Se<:retary Danken was published in Neder/mulse SlflOISCOI/((1111. 151anuary. 1992.

9. C.W.A.M. van Paridon, 'Nederland mist kansen op Duitse markt'. in: Ecrmomisch-Statistische 8 rrichren. 11anuary. 1992.

10. Tlre Wall Sfreel JOl/rnal. 23 December. 1991.

11. R. Meines. in: NRCIHandeisbla(I, 2 October, 1991.

12. G. Wijnand .. Even slikken. maar Duil~ l and wint op alle fronten'. in: NRC/Hande/sblml. 4 October, 1991.

13.1.L. Heldring. 'Tot irrelevantie gedoemd?'. in: NRC/Handel.rblad. 21 January. 1992.

'Partnership in leadership': Genscher is seoted closely to Bush at the CIS aid

conference (Photo: EPA).

15

PRO

F

I

L

E

United Nations: Changing of the Guard

By Marie-JosĂŠ Jonker Marie-JosĂŠ Jonker is editor of Jasan Magazine.

"The most impossible, the most frustratin g, the most fri ghtening. the most e hallenging, the most reward ing, the most fascinatin g and the most peeuliar job in the world", says an inscriplion inside the headq uaners of the United ati ons in New York abo ut its top job of seeretary genera I. Last Janu ary the Egyplian Boutros Boutros Ghali look over from Javier Perez de C uellar, who ran the UN for ten years. A shon history of both men, who. among other thin gs. deal with the almost too hot to handle iss ue of global see uri ty.

A silent diplomat At his installation as secretary general Perez de Cuellar was seen by most United Nations members as a "dark horse compromise" in a period when eonfidenee in the organizati on was at a low. Nobody had great expeetations of the somewhat dull and eolourless Peruvian diplomat. During his first term in office, however, Perez de Cuellar turned out to be a silent negotiator who was always looking fo r compromises. In 1986. all fi ve perm anent members of the Seeuri ty Co uneilthe refore asked him 10 stay on for a second term .

Perez de Cuellar 's taci t perseverance succeeded in enhancing the a uthority of the United Nalions, while achieving vari ous successes on the international stage. Under hi s superv ision Namibia gained its

16

independenee from South Afriea, peaee was brought to An go la, EI Salvador, the Western Sahara and Kampuchea and the war between Iran and Iraq was brought IQ an end. Of course, most of these achievements were possible beeause of the endi ng of the Cold War. a period de nouneed by the former secretary genera! as Ua political iee-age".

Perez de Cuellar also experieneed some setbacks. The Gul f War was a big di sappointment for him, because he did not succeed in convineing lraq to withdraw from Ku wait. Another hard to solve problem for the United Nalions was the chronic laek of fin aneial resources. This was especially due to the fac t that several countries, among whi ch the United States, refused to support its budget.

The United Nations have as much power as its member states, espeeiall y the ones with ri ght of veto, want it to have. The same goes for its top job. Perez de Cuellar was a man who was very conscious of the Iimitati ons of his function and kepi on working in discretion. "I am not th e guy th at wants to be the main character and the main party in negoti ations", he once said.

A cultural

mix

Boutros Boutros Ghali. whose name means Peter Peter the Beloved One, is the sixth secretary gene ral of the UNo He was an acceptab le choiee fo r the Afri can and Arab countries, who thought they now were entitled to someone from their part of the world. Being both Arab and African he was the perfect man for the job.

Boutros Ghali studied law in Cairo, politica! sciences in Paris and contributed 10 the dail y newspaper AI Ahram. As a Coptic Christian he became a unique figure in Egyptian politics. In 1977 he

got his chance when he accompani ed President Sadat on a histori cal visit to Jerusalem, th at two years later would lead to th e Camp David Accords. This makes him even acceptable to the Israeli govemment in any new Middle Eost agreement. For fourteen years he was a j unior foreign minister, until spring 199 1, when he became deputy prime-minister.

Over the years, Boutros Ghali speeiali zed himself in North -South relations. He urged the Afriean countries to organize themse!ves

and to coord inate their dealings wi th the rich North. He envisages on thi s point same sart of "African Economie Community". He is a!so wide ly ex pected to revi tali ze the di scussion about the debt problem of the Third Worl d. Du ri ng the Gul f War Boutros Ghali played an important role in lining up the broad coalition against Iraq. After the war he suggested 10 found an "ai I bank", in an effon to channe! funds from the ri ch oil-exportin g countries to (heir poor brothers li ke Egypt.

Boutros Ghali , who has a jewish wi fe. impersonates a mix of old cultures and religions. He has a sharp mind, integrity and a good se nse o f hum our. As a skilied diplomat, he has convineed world leaders that he is their man.

May he stay, the Beloved One.

Interviews with Professors Doornbos and De Gaay Fortman

Africa: the Rebirth of a Sovereign Continent The end of the Cold War touched the African continent to the heart and has heralded the umpteenth 'transitional period'.

After gaining independence from the fifties onwards, many African countries were involuntarily dragged along by the East-West-conflict. The interplay between political-military security and the price which had to be paid for it in terms of social-economic security and development remains unclear.

For now, the path of lasting economie development seems to outs-

trip the political-mil itary path.

This is on ly partly true: there is a strong convergence between both roads of political strategy which is hard to measure but definitely unavo idable. Attention is shifting from those who control the means

for wholesale destruction, to those who possess the mean s of production. The majority of African countries are not in th is category.

Military combat still takes place in Africa: civ il wars in Eth iop ia, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia and the S udan. The struggle for power, now apparently free from ideology and interference, is arnong other things the result of a structural absence of pol itical participation and of resu lting discretionary powers of African gavernments. Therefore, the rebirth of Africa as a sovereign continent is necessary fOT its lasting security.

own dynamics. The East-WeSlconflict has also made possible

these wars. Bath the capitalist and communist system were accessible lo various alliances and factions who requested support. This matter has been blown out of proportion and the number of weapons which was supplied has reached a ridicu lo us level. During the EastWest-conflict the acquisition of military support by a regional 'feudal' power from one fa Lhe superpowers resulted in the fact

thai the govemment in question

multi-party concept. Giving it an ethnic twist wou ld render it a very irksome and dangerous matter.

ond Prof. Dr. B. de Gooy

Perhaps it is toa earl y to identify

the Institute of Social

Prof.Dr. M. Doornbos

Fortmon are working ot

democracy with a multi-party sys-

Studies (/55) which

tem. One should also look for other farms in which participation and democracy could be rea li zed."

provides undergroduote and graduate progrom路 mes in development路 related disciplines,

What damage, in your opinion, has been done to the countries in question, besides economie destructioll ?

mainly for Third Warld students. Peter du Lingg, editor of Jason Magazine, had inter路 views with bath of

"Enonnous intellectual damage;

them.

great stagnation and the falling behind of generat ions, particularly

in those countries which 'should have made it'. lt wi ll take a lot of

reconci liation and time to heal soc ial wounds. Nevertheless, a country li ke Uganda has a terrific

elasticity and there are there peopIe who gel down to it with new energy."

cou ld count on this support without having 10 answer toa many questions. Among other things,

mis has led to excessive centralization of powers which could aften be used arbitrari ly, resulting in repression of the people . This appeared to constitute stability, but it was the stability of repression wh ich in turn provoked resistance.

The resistance subsequently sought support from the competing s uperpower."

Doornbos Professor M. Doornbos is the coauthor of " Beyond Conflict in the Hom. Prospeets for Peace, Recovery and Development" wh ich

Do you suppose Ihe chance of

'limited', so-cal/ed 'private' canflicts in this region has decreased or maybe increased?

was published in January 1992.

Wha! do you think was (he cause for the political revolutions in fhe Hom of Africa allhe end of Ihe 1980s?

"We cannot be too pessimistic and we should hope that everyone has leam t their lesson. However, there

is a wide range of future develop-

ments, among which religious and ethnic confl icts. After all , such

"There are many factors that lie at the root of thi s. Firstly. war has its

contliets arise from age-old controversies. Take for example the

When eleprants fight. it is the grass that suffers' (Swahili saylngJ

17

The refl/gee prablem aparl, in what way is Ellrope [oeed wirh fhe consequences of conjlicl in Africa?

"It is more of OUT business than we probably may realize, Many potential leading figures have tled to Europe and the United States, The vast majority of this former political elite is still there, Those are the people who could have taken charge, The problem of their return is quite a large one. I know several people who are looking for a way 10 return but it is no easy matter, because the on ly place they could have gotten in their country has been taken by someone else.

Over there, the institutional basis to intercept and absorb these peopIe is, Iike the economie situation,

very problematic."

can state. Is this not a drasric rhing 10 do?

"Absolutely, and I am very worried about this. Especially after the dissolution of the East-West-confliet , this type of interference has not decrease but rather increased!

Higher demands are made upon the organization of African countries as a result of bad economie

and trade figures , and th at is an alanning process. Again there are more and more people on this side

of the earth who occupy themselves with the problem of how things should be done somewhere else. But let them please find out for themselves! On the one hand there will come a list with require-

ments of how a state is supposed to be organized, while at the same time a policy will be formulated on so many fjelds outside Africa

Why wOl/ld Ihe sl/papowers be interested in (his region?

De Gaay Fortman: 11 Africanism should mean that you are going to relativize borderlines" "They were more devoted to military-strategie interests than to eco-

on a totally different level. One gets entangled even further in this

through the relative coincidence of

where an army stopped conquering. Whatever 'remained' as a state aften became some sart of 'proto-national' community. Take

the Netherlands and its borders with Germany. Those borders were reali zed al a eertain point in time, and from thaI moment on differentiation has set in: developing our own language, etc. That is the way hi story tumed out. Most European eountries have undergo-

ne a long process of growth, while the premises have actually not always been very different from

those of Africa. Naturally, there

nia, etc.

manner: Alsace, Flanders, Wallo-

this advice coming from everyw-

here is that Africa will really lose its capacity to take care of coordination itself. "

"The thing is that people partly do not rea lize this, but there is a phase

"There is some solidarity from Saudi Arabia towards the Sudan, but I am afraid that the OPEC countries have never really aimed at the development of the African continent. What they have done with their oi l funds has very little or nothing to do with the socioeconomie development of Africa.

There is support, but for what? For a fundamentalist regime in the

Convent ion of Vienna in 18 I 5. Or

including Washington, D.e. and The Hague. The danger with all

tionals, for instanee, had already left Africa. This means that Africa has largely been left to its own

Are Ihe nearby Arab oil-slOles still imerested in the Horn ?

on the basis of agreements on conferences. for example during the

were seeds of disruption which could not grow along in the same

nomie ones. Well-known multina-

ming highly dependent on - unfavourable - world-market prices."

over here have also been shaped

in a great number of donor centres,

Is Ihis also Ihe way people see il over rhere?

resources, at the same time beco-

"You have to notice the difference with Europe and then see things in perspective again. For, in the course of European history, frontiers

now wherein they at least recognize thaI there is 'intervention '. It is uncenain wh ether they will draw the conclusion that more detachement is desirabie. Earlier this year

I was invited by the World Bank to preside the sessions about 'governance' in their yearly seminar on economics. In Washington they are very much aware of the delica-

cy ofthe matter, but still they say we should educate local staff, as a eonsequenee of the failure of sa many economie plans. This is a

Can the 'state' stand up to this? It is not easy but it should be possibie. Wh at is the motor and the motive of ethnic agitation and conflict? Thi s is very often based on

actual or supposed unequal treatment and opportunities. Frequently it was for in stance by mere coincidenee thaI the govemment was seated in a certain place and not somewhere else. Developments started around thi s and a eonscious policy often came into being 10 concentrate more on certain regions in the form of provisions and administrative maehinery.

Thus, a certain socio-economie differentiation could grow, resulting in the fact th at sooner or later a farm of social inequality arose,

which could give the appearance of ethnic inequality by regionalcultural differences.'路

fashionable theme, but in my opinion an extremely risky road la go.

Jt is a sart of state-formation at a distance."

How can i1l1ervention be contralled while at the same time cOlltribwing 10 Africa's development?

Is (here a state which is capabIe of everything alld which call serve as an examplefor rhe Africans?

"By showing respect for the autonomy of the policy-makers in Africa, not by si tting on top of

Sudan!"

There have been iniriarives by rhe rich countries ro help wirh rhe 'social engineering' of Ilie Afri-

18

every decision. In addition, Afriea

should rece ive more for its produets and less out of aid e hannels.

But as far as that is conce med, it is still going the wrong way."

Does this internol instabiliry farm a grearer tllrear to a country's securiry (han possible external aggression ?

De Gaay Fortman

"The one is connected to the other.

Africa has been an ex ploi ted continent fo r centuries and it is still continu ing. Every year, the c urrency-flow to the ri ch countries is bigger than the intl ow. This also has to do with intem al weaknesses. The weak state in Africa has an intern al and an ex tern al aspect.

On the one hand the govemmcnt is shaky towards those groups who wish 10 have their own nati ona l identity, and after independenee the Afriean govemment s e nded up with a state whieh eeonomieall y does not add up to mueh. On the other hand the Afriean state appeared on the world stage at a time when worl d-market intern ational izati on was already in full swing.

Reactions to thi s, like the nationalizati on of the mining industry, were doomed to failure. In Afri ea security issues have an economie, a politicaJ and a cultural aspect."

Professor B. de Gaay Fortman has worked at the Institute of Social Studi es in The Hag ue sinee 1972.

He was a senior lecturer on economi es in Zambi a from 1967-'7 1 and a prominent member of the PPR (politieal Party of Radieals) in the Lower House of Duteh Parli ament.

Do you think {here is a structural peace and securiry problem on the A/rh·on continent?

"Certainly, an issue like that has of course bee n there fo r quite some time and il is concentrated most in So uthem Afriea. Mos t Afriean leaders said : it is out of the questi on th at we treat ourselves as free and stabie states as long as Apartheid continues to ex ist in South Afri ea. Now that thi s is undergoing change, re he f is prevalent. A seeond aspect of Afriean sec urity issues has 10 do wi th the nation-state. Th roughout Africa it is impossible to speak of nati onstates. As a res ult of the Berlin Conventi on of 1884 frontiers were drawn through Afriea of whieh the eonsequenees are still pereeptible.

Lines were drawn right across groups of the pop ulation whi eh farm a culture togeth er. The nati on-fonnation whi ch got unde r way after independence, with among other th ings new fl ags, a national anthem, etc., has a highl y fo rced character. During the Biafra War th ere was extremely linie understanding within the Organizati on of Afriean States (OAS) fo r the stru ggle fo r aeknowledgement of the national identity of the Biafran people.

In those years the 'domino theory' was very popular: the borderlines are so anific ial th at if, onl y once, you offer an opportunity for the question " whether or not there should be a switch towards anolher order of national states", the entire building would eoll apse altogether. Subsequentl y one state after another seems to be bothe red by instability and power strugg lc."

What is the meOlling of a politica! and mi!irary illlervention like the one in Zaire ?

"That is of course a sy mptom of the African stale 's weaknesses.

Intem all y and ex temall y guaranteeing sec urity belongs 10 th e tasks of a state. The rule-of-Iaw or an independent legal system never gat off lO a good start in Zaire.

What the Belgians did in 196 1 is still goi ng on. From the see urity point of view not much has changed in the last thirty years."

What do the differences mean which have emerged dItring (he G ulfWar heMeenJol' illstallce Egypr and rhe Sudan ? " Weil , there has always been a difference between countri es from above and below the Sahara. The pan-Afri can notion, as put fo rward

by K wameh Nkruma, ori ginates from Sub-Sahara Afriea. Above the Sahara there ex ists the nOlion of pan-Arabi sm . It is sad that panAfrieani sm has had sa linie res ult.

Travelling from one country to

another in Afri ca is quite a bother, and that at a time when in Europe we think we have to get rid of those frontiers. Pan-Afri canism should not mean that you are go ing to correct borderlines, but rather relati vize them and thi s has hardl y or not happened at all ."

Whar abolll rhe relariollship betweell a st rong economy and a strong state?

"Zambi a, a country whi ch is no longe r a one-party state, rem ains unstable as long as there will not be economi e refonn s whi ch are tangible for people in dai ly life.

The Southem Afri ean context plays an important part in thi s.

From the point of view of economi e sec uri ty it could be very important to aim for a single CUfrency in thi s region. YOll cannot think of political sec urity without a functi oning and working economy. Pri vati zation and dereg ul ati on fonn an internati onal medi cine.

We have learnt Ihis lesson in the West. We now know that the public institut ions and rules yo u are left wi th after 'interventi on' should be s!ronger and not weaker.

This process has fail ed in Afriea.

Without a strong state you will not get any further. I think the debate on development will finall y boil down 10 creating and enforcing political, social and econom ie instituti ons in a country,"

Wil/rhe African cOllllrriesfinal/y get the chance to atlrael more attention, now thar the East-Westconflict be!ongs to [he past?

"There are many different opinions about that. There are people who claim that Afri ca has now beeome uninteresting fo r East and West. But Afriea has shown tbe inaccuracy of the thesis th at Ît does not matter wh at kind of a regime yOll have, as long as you are pu rsuing the right poliey. In Eastem Europe the eyes of the people were nevertheless opened. You will never get a good poliey with a bad regime!"

What IIse have armies been to the Af rican dictators? Is Africa ready

19

for a security structure like

NATO? "No. Africa did nol gel much for its security from all its annies and weapons. On the contrary; the average life expeclancy of a regime in the world in the eighties was nine years. This was caused by Africa. Here in the Netherlands we have had one regime si nce 18 13, briefl y inlerrupled by Ihe nazi occupalion from 1940- '45 . The life expectancy of a state in Africa declined tremendously because of coups d· état. Besides, look at the war in Ethiopia and Somalia. Military securily has become allimportant and annies were looked upon as an instrument for the process of nation-fonnation , which still has 10 gel under way."

Despite the faet tlJar the world is payillg more atlention ra military exeesses now, shou/d we take account of Ille possihilily of coups d' état ill Afriea ? " Ilhin k so, in view of Ihe horrible situation in for instanee Liberia and Burkina Fasso. Africa remains so unintegrated in intemal and exlemal systems of law and mechanisms for political decisionmakin g thaI you cannol rule oul Ihe possibilily."

Institwiolls /ike IMF and tlle World Bank a/ready have their instrumellls ready as an answer to the quesfion !/OW stateJormalioll should lake place. Ifwe look closer ra home , ra Yugoslavia, IlIelI il is all very weil 10 talkfor the rielt countries. " Yes, even more so because we are an obstruction rather than a positive factor for development. People take refuge in an over-emphasis of their cultural identity. This is how processes of whol esale disc rimination come into being, ultimatel y resulting in racism and fascism.

Developmental studi es have taken a very slanted position in the arg ument how to dea l with a centra I bank, which ag ri cultural pricing policy is required, etc., while for development sec urity comes first.

If there is no security, there is linie use in di scussing the development issue. lust take a look at the Hom of Africa and how things are with eco nomi e development."

Do you thillk a stHJng political alld mallagerial centre is capable of decelllralizing fasks and serving all subjecfs and as a resu/t all minorities 011 an eqllal basis? " We have Switzerland as an example, where the basis for success

was Ih al people in one valley did not inte rfere with people from anolher valley. This example is no Jonger up-Io-date. Modem society has become mullic ultural. And with the existing information, people move as we il , and mi grations have become a world-wide phenomenon. It is na longer a question of not interfering with one anolher, but more of locally and regionally looking far loIeranee instead of from a centre. This especiall y holds true for countries where the nation-state is weak anyway, because there is no nation. There is na need for a centre which can arrange everything from there. But there is a demand for a centre which fu lfils its centra I functions effi cientl y."

Whelllhe blad Aft"icall populatiol1 OfSOUlh Afriea wi/l have more access 10 private assets. do you think this wi/l have a posirive effect on .mrroulldil1g countries? " Yes, no doubt. Zambia for ex ample has been surrounded by un stable stales like An gola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Naw that Ihe political configuration is changing in South Africa, the economie basis of Zambia can be ex tended more easil y. Zambia has paid an enormous political and economie price for the di ssocialion from the Soulh African market. " What expectatiolls con fhe African eountries have regarding the ric}, lIeighbollrs of OPEC?

Angolon children marketing food in front of 0 waste dump (Photo: Persunie).

20

"No positive expectations whatsoever. The relationship between Sub-Sahara Africa and the Arab world is hisloricall y also heavil y burdened, at least as heavy as the relatianship with Europe. Look at Oman's average per capita income of US $ 30.000,- per year, and al Ih at of Somalia which is under US $ 500,- per capita per year. These countries bOlh belong 10 the Arab League! This shows Ih al apparentIy so much inequality is to lerated wilhin Ihe Arab world, Ihal we should not try to picture an increased responsibility caming from the Middle East."

Austrian Neutrality and European Security Cooperation

By Martijn Hop In 19B9 Austria put in a request to join the EC. Sinee 1955 Austria has taken up a neutra I position. But ean the Austrians join the EC while they are pursuing a poliey of permanent neutrality? The European Commission advised in favour of this in August 1991 . However, neutrality was to be adapted to be able to join.

The EC is now developing towards an EMU and an EPU . In time the member states would also like to eooperate on defenee matters. Wh at proportion then, do Austrian neutrality and European Seeurity Cooperation bear to one another?

O n May 151h, 1955 lhe Slale Convention on Austria 's status in Europe after lhe Second World War was signed by lhe Greal Powers and Austria. This proper peace treaty was ca lled State Convellliofl because Austria was not considered a fonneT enemy.

The convent ion did not ardain th at Austria had 10 be neutral. Il was only delennined by lhe Uniled States, Great 8ritain, France and lhe Soviel Union lhal Auslria had 10 be independenl and lhal il was forbidden 10 own or 10 produce nuclear or other destructive wea-

future, nor would il pennit lhe scltiement of military bases of other countries on ilS territory. (3) On the 61h of December of lh al year the govemmenls of Oreat Britain, France, lhe Soviel Union and of lhe United Slates acknowledged lhe 'Pennanenl Neutra lily' of Austria.

Now, whal is leflof lhis inde pendence, after 37 years of Austrian ne utrality; wililhe country di sappear ahogelher in lhe fUlure and be lost entirely in an EC or in an EPU?

pons. In addition a number of

practical matters were settled in the State COflventiol/, among olher

things the evacuation of the four zones of occupalion (I). and al lhe same time a few war claims were laid. (2) Al firsl Ru ss ia wished 10 settIe lhe neutral status of Austria in this convent ion, but the Great Four thoughllhal this wenl 100 faro Austria's neutralily was declared on October 261h. 1955 by lhe Austrians themselves by means of the so-called Bundesveifasslingsgesetz. This Bas ic Law stated lhat Austria vo luntarily dec lared ilself pennanently neu tral , in orderta secure the inviolability of its territory and • I.sling preservation of its independence. Austria would not join military alliances in lhe

During lhe time lhal lhe EC was developing, Austria made several attempts to join lhe EC. The majority of these attempts were frustrated by strong objections from Moscow. During the Cold War lhe Russians regarded the EC as an annex 10 NATO; entry by Austria would as aresu It be a violation of the State COllventioll . Therefore, Austria has pursued a neutrality policy for years now and has tried nOl 10 interfere in lhe East-Westconflict. In order to elaborate on thi s neutrality poli cy, it is necessary to further amplify lhe nolion of neutrality or the Immerwährende Neutralität, as the Austrians put it.

Neutrality is originally a tenn

from the law of war, which means that there is only neutrality when a war occurs. Wherever there are , for instanee, two combating parties and a third party adopts an independent attitude, lhe concept of neutrality applies. ThaI is, lhe proleclion of the neutral slate's tefritory and the respect of its integri ty by lhe belligerents. In the economie sphere neutrality confers a state the fight to maintain nonnal international re lations with parties at war and with o ther neutral coun tries, providing na material support is granled for acts of war.

"Pennanent neutrality" is also defined in war-Iaw: already in peacetime a neutral state behaves ilself in such a way as 10 be able to live up to its neutrality under wartime conditions. These are the 50called premature cOllsequellces of "pemlanent neutrality". States which pursue such a policy already adopt measures in time of peace and lake certain legal obligations upon lhemselves. (4)

Mortijn Hop is editor of

Joson Magazine.

Two of these premature consequellces, whi ch are mentioned in lhe law of October 261h 1955, apply 10 Austrian neutralily. (5) Naturally, the neutrality policy has been developed since 1955, and the community of states expressed its confidence in it. (6) Ailhough the Cold War was going on al the time, wherein severe frost was indeed eneountered now and then , no outrighl conflict has occurred.

Auslria has continually laken up a neutral position under these coo l cireumstances. As aresuh , there has been na immediate eau se for Austria to assert its neutrality.

Wilh the chance of an East-Weslconflict gradually decreasing, il becomes less and less relevant for Austria 10 take the actions which wou ld be necessary la assert its

2\

neutrality in ti me of conflict.

and securily in Europe". This is

obligati ons, wi th the exception of

During the eight ies a lot has changed in Eu rope: it was a time of true dĂŠtellle, of spectacular changes in Eastern Europe, of radical deve loprnents in the Soviet Uni on and of its present-day disintegrati on. Owing to these develop-

the offic ial formul ati on of the request for entry.

pean Commission put in its recommendati on conceming the req uest

sancti ons im posed by the United Nations. In tim e of peace (by means of ' political sancti ons') a clash could arise with Austria 's neutrality policy. There would, however, be na question of a legal

ments, the time has come for neu-

in August 199 1. On the economie

tral countri es - Austri a included to redefine their ' (permanent) neutralit y' .

side the advise was very positive.

The ori entation of Au strian economic policy will not have to under-

In the new situation Austri a was in

the position to put in a req uest for me mbership of the European Community, in July 1989. Austria had good reasans to appl y. Firstl y, there were economie reasons. Two

thirds of Austrian trade is canied on with th e twe lve EC countri es.

The Ausrri an economy is one of non-EC economies integrated most full y with the EC. (7) It is important for Austri a 10 share in

the profits of a European internal market. What is more, in Au stri a

there is a general feeling th at coun tri es at the same level of development should seize the opportunity to solve a num ber of important problems together: Those problems concern matters such as traffic, transport. en viron-

ment. research and development.

As Chancellor Vranitzky of Austri a pul it: "nOl just an embrace of

go any fundamental changes after entry.

As far as the acquis communautaire is concemed, which Austria will have to appl y as a new member of the Community, much of it will already be a fact on account of the European Economie Area (EEA) Agreement. Substantial modificati ons will probabl y be necessary for agri eulture and tran-

commitment in the matter of community institulions, except for the very general commitments of the

law on neutrality. The fact that 'pennanent neutrality' entails premature cOflsequences has already

been described. Such conseq uences, even if they are of a politica! nature, could cause problems fo r the Community. This would onl y occur if Austri a would systemati cally resist eertain measures which

would conflict with neutra lity policy; especially as far as the future comma n fo reign and security policy is concerned.

sit traffic. But the European Commission stales its belief th aI it

would be possible to find a solution fo r bath problems during the negotiati ons.

The conclusions of the European Council of June 199 1 in Lu xemba urg stated that " there is a unanimous wish present 10 rein force the Union's identity and its role as a

With regard to ' Permanent Neutrality' the Comm ission added same crit ical observ ati ons. The problem of neutrality needs 10 be examined

in the light of ex isting treati es.

Next to this neutrality has to be investigated in view of the pro-

integration and the EC, but realize

speels named al the two intergovemmental con ferences which

as we il that the true great problems of our continent should not be sol-

are at present charged with the reform of the EC treaties. Howe-

fundamental politica I enti ty in the intemational sphere, as weil as an ambition to ensure the coherence

of all measures taken in the foreign policy sphere". It was acknowledged that the draft convention which was been presented to the Eu ropean Council should be Ihe starting-point for continued

ved on a nalional basis anymore ."

ver, Ihe Commi ssion is also of the

negotiations. Among other things, this draft states that the rein forcement of the Uni on and of the

(9)

opinion th at the change in mea-

mernber states in any way, inclu-

ning which the not ion neutralily

ding long-term defence policy objecti ves, is part of the goals of a comman foreign and sec urity policy. Consequentl y, the question arises whether Austri a will be able to

Prev ious to Austri a's request by

itself has undergone in the Europe-

Minister for Foreign Affairs AloĂŻs Mock, a thorough in vestigation was set up into the compatibil ity of the neutrality obligati ons with the existin g laws (10) and with the objecti ves of the EC. In particul ar,

an contex t, has to be taken inlo account. Thi s is also due 10 events

which have occurred in Eastem Europe since 1989, as we il as to inlemal developments in Austria.

investigation was canied out on

Naturall y, a nu mber of problems

whether neutrality coul d be un ited with the aim of the EPU. As a

arise wi th the common trade poli -

res ult of lhis investigation Ihe Austrian government is convineed

22

After a profound examinalion which lasted two years, the Euro-

cy. Part icul arl y the commonl y used practi ce of the Council to adopt economie sancti ons against

endorse such commitments, if it wishes to assen its 'pcnnanent neutraIity' and to continue its neu-

trality policy. One must ass ume that the decision-mak ing process for the execulion of common

foreign and sec urity policy will be based on consensus. It seems

th at, "as a member of the EC, it will be able to keep fulfilling its legal obligations resulting from the status of a permanentl y neutral state, and to continue the policy of neutrality as aspec ific contribu-

certain countries - by means of

necessary, after all , that the mem-

Article 11 3 of the EC Conventi on - after reaching consensus in the sphere of political cooperation, could prese nt problems. (1 1) In

ber states possess a minimum of legal security eoncerning Austri a's

case of war such sanctions would

tion 10 the preservati on of peace

be incompatible with neutrality

tions. A multitude of problems can come up if decisions regarding

ability to take part in this consensus without consti tutional obstruc-

policy executÎon would be laken with a qualified majority. As fo r th at Austria will have to make its nati onal law, including constiluti ona! provisions, compatible with communily law.

The Austrian govemmenl believes th ai neulralily as such contribules lO Ihe "maintaining of peace and internati onal security" (Anicle 224, EC Conve nti on). In a new global conste llation thi s co untry will have no objections to take pan in a peace-keeping operation of the United Nati ons. Fo r the European Commi ssion, the onl y point whi ch had to be elari fi ed in August 199 1 was whether Austri a would be capable to contribute to a peace-keeping acti on dec ided upon by lhe Communi ty without suppon of the UNo Even if Austri a is granled room for manoeuvre in delennining lhe fonn of the contribution this remains to be seen.

(1 2) The European Commission pUI forward lwo Solulions conceming Austri a's neutrality. During the entry negoti atÎons these Solulions need 10 be disc ussed. Auslria could redefine ils state of neutrality (w ilh a notification of lh is new attilude 10 the EC panners). Anolher possible solution co ul d be found in the directi on of a dispensation, which is incorporated in lhe entry deed 10 the Treaty of Rome.

The poinl is that Aniele 224 of lhe EC Conv ention enabl es lhe member slates 10 avail themselves of a general dispensalion of the Convention's rul es. The possibi lity only holds under permane nt and strict conditions: in case of war and in case of fulfiUin g lhe obligati ons whi ch the member slate look upon itseJf in view of maintaining peace and internati onal security.

Considering lhe strict inlerprelation by lhe Coun of Juslice concerning lhe exceptions on Art icle 224 ( 13), the premise advanced by the Austri an authorities th at it is possible la be exempled from cerlain obligations, has been found unacceptab le. On the other hand. agreement has 10 be reached in Ihe scope of the negotiations on an interpretati on of the generaJ excep-

ti on of Ani cle 224. Moreover, a c hec k has to be made as la whether a commonl y agreed upon interpretation with the necessary changes fo r ECSC and EAC Trealies can be applied.

Should Ani cle 224 disappear fro m the Trealy, as proposed by lhe Commission to the intergovernmental conference, another solution would have 10 be found.

The course of the negoliations in the scope of the intergovemmental conference on the EPU should cause the Community to solicit assurances by Austria, conceming the endorsement of a fuwre common foreign and security policy.

From the above-mentioned considerations, the European Commission concl udes th at Austria's 'permanent neutrality' not onJy causes problern s for the Community but also for Austri a itself. A reserv3lion shou ld be made concerning developments in Ihe intergovernmental conference on the political union. These discussions were continued in Maas tricht with a lentative consensus as far as the common foreign and security policy was concemed and on the reali zation of lhe EPU in due course. The problems abo ut Austrian ne utralily will also legall y not be insurmoun table in the scope of the entry negoti ati ons. ( 14) A lOLhas changed in Europe since Austri a ra ised the subject of its entry in Jul y 1989. The EC looks differe nl as we il since lhis request.

M eanwhile, an agreement has been conel uded bet ween lhe EC and the EFTA on the European Economie Area (EEA) whi ch will be created as from January Ist 1993 out of nineteen EC- and EFTA-co untri es. This agreement solved a num ber of problems for Austria as weil. Consensus was reached among olher things on the issue of transi t trarfi c and panlyon agri culture. The EEA is considered by many in Austri a as an intermediate fonn for complete membership of lhe Ee. Negoliations on thi s matter can start from the I st of January 1993. 1995 has been thought of as the year of Austria's entry.

Within the EC there is lalk of an Economi e and Monelary Uni on (EMU), which Austri a could enter without undue problems concerning ilS neutralil y. There will not be any other insunnountable economic obstacles. Besides thi s the fi rst moves have been made in the direction of a Eu ropean Political Union and negoti alions on European security cooperation are goi ng on. These developmenls in th e EC since lhe request make no diffe rence to Austri •. Ch. ncellor Vranitzky looks upon lhe inlegration, not as a status quo but as a dynamic process. Austri a considers lhe EMU and EP U as lwo very useful inslitutions for the funher development of an inlegrated Europe.

According to Vranitzky the EC would be misunderstood if interpreted as an ' im pon -expon cl ub '.

He thinks one should not lose sight

The economy is one ot the non-EC economies most tully integrated with the EC of lhe political dimension. Discussing a common diplomatie and security architecture becomes more and more important, in view of lhe tough and unsuccessful effons in Yugos lav ia. The Austrians do not want 10 commit themselves as far as th e EPU and a common European security policy are concerned. The general attitu de in Au stria towards these matIers is that the EC should firsl get the EPU off the ground and thaI onl y then il can be assessed whelher Austri a's neutrality would be compalible. In December 199 1 the foundation for an EPU was laid in Maastricht. Afte r elaborati on of the plans for polilical cooperati on, the concept of neutralit y can be fit in and the last obstacIes can be removed by means of negotiations. Parti cularly a neutral country such as Austri a can make an important contribution to a security structurc and security cooper. tion. (1 5) That is, if one want s to define security as something that does nol just carry a military meaning.

23

The fight again st international crime, terrorism, money-Iaundering , and many other forms of heavy crime, comes within th at as weil. This is security as a function of the environment.

As for mi litary security and the construct ion of an EPU the Austrians will first await funher developments after Maastricht. For entry into the EC a country will either gel an exceptional position within the EC or it will have to give up (part of) its neutrality. lt is obviously practically impossible th at Austria will be manoeuvred into an exceptional position. The on ly thin g remaining for the Austrian s then would be to (partly )

"Neutrality as su eh eontributes to the maintaining of peaee and international seeurity" give up their neutrality.

The Austrians will be able to take part in a European intemal market at fairly short nOliee, staTting with the EEA. Subsequently, it is important for them to enter the EC and to witness the deve lopment of Lhe EMU .nd the EPU. After th at it will be possible for Austria to

take part in a cam man European

M. See Ihe recommendation of August Ist 1991 by

security policy in a we ll -i nteg rated Europe .nd • stron gly c h.n ged world, despile a ne w fonn of neutrality.

Ihe European Commis . . ion of the EC with respect 10 Ihe entry of Austria [0 the EC. This is, by Ihe way, also the opinion given by the official authorities in Vienna. as recorded during:1 S.I.B. study-tour of Oclober 1991 with the purpose of examining the entry problems.

Notes: l. Unti! 1955. like Gemlany. Austrla was dividcd into four zones of occupation. Thc castem palt. among which Vicnnna. was under Russi:U1 supervision. Besides thaI the Unitcd Slatcs. Fra/Kc. and Great Britain occupied the olher Ihree zones.

2. Therc was no queslion of rcconslruclion paymenls because Austria was nOl considered an enemy. The Soviel Union did get, among other Ihings. pari o f the Austrian oil profils and ownership of a number of refineries for a cerlain amount oflimc, 3, See among others: Keesillgs lIisrorisch Archief. 1955.

4. Sec among others: T. Nwotny. ·Neutraliliils!X'· Ihik - Mythos und Realitiil'. in: Eliropa·Arehil·, volu me 44. numbcr 13 (July 10, 1989), p. 423432.

5. See also: W. Hummer, M. Schweit7.er. 'Oa." Problem der Neutralität: Österreich und die EGBeitritlsfrage'. in: EllroIX/·Archi\'. volume 43, number 17 (September 10. 1988). p. 501-510.

6. See also: M . Pcçhslein. 'Austria ante porlas: ÖSlCrreichs NeutraliliÎl als Hindernis flir einen EG· Be ilrin?', in: Ellroparc('hl, volume 24, num· ber I (Jan- MaTCh 1989) p. 54-74.

7. 1be coupling ofthe Auslrian Shilling [0 the Gernlan Mark and the close cooperation in the Europcan Monetary System (EMS) can already bc given as an example of this strong economie inlegration,

9. Chanccllor Franz Vranitzky in an interview with André Spoor. NRC. November 22.1991.

Seealso: F. Vranitzky. 'Austria al Ihe Doorslep ', in: ElirOpCOII Affáirs, volume 2. numbcr 4 (winter 1988), p. 49-54.

10. These are Ihe Neulralily Law of Oc[ober 26 1955, the State Convention of 1955 and other internationallaw conventions.

11. When a member state does not apply a rcsolulion adopted under Arlicle 113 EC Convcntion. il nOl only infringes Ihe obligations of the Convention, but also crcates obslTUctions for the free movemenlof gouds and services.

12. FOT el>ample: Argenlina, the Soviel Union, South Africa. Iraq and recenlly Yugoslavia. [n this Ia.~t case the EC and Austria were, as a matter of facto already cooperating and consulting.

13. This was case 222/84 (Marguerite 10hnston).

1986 J urisprudcnee 1651. Points 26. 27 and 60 of the European COUrl or JuslÎce. A strict interpretation ofthe second condilion would limit this case to an action ofthe Security Council on account o f Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

14. Sec the rccommendations of the Europcan Commission with rcspcctlo Austria's entry 10 the ECofAugustls[,I99I. 15. And togcther with Austria other neutral countrits as weil. like Swcden which has put in a request for entry after Auslria. Switzcrland is willing 10 enter the EC, even though thi .~ would bc a long-teml devclopmenl.

Translations ' The European Game ' : Hans van der Lee, ass isted by Amout Nu yt.

Who 's Afraid of ... Germany?: Hans van der Lee. Africa: the Rebirth of a Sovereign Continent: In ge Adama, assisted by Hans van de r Lee and Amo ut Nuyt.

United Nations: Changing of the Guard: Amout Nuyt, assisted by Hans van der Lee. Austrian Neutrality and European Security Cooperation: Inge Adama, ass isted by Hans van der Lee and Amout Nuyt.

24

Democratization, Political Stability and Security in latin America

By Patrido Silva

This article explores the impact of the current process of democratization in Latin Ameriea on national and regional security matters. In the author's view, the restoration of democracy has produced a remarkable shift in the approach towards national and regional security among Latin Ameriean politiealleaders. The security polides have become less militaristie and more politieally-oriented. Moreover, the sodal dimension of domestie security has been stressed, while at the regionallevel, economie integration on basis of tree market competition has become a new commonplace.

Since their independence from

Dr. P. Siwa is Lecturer ot

Spain in the earl y nineteenth cen-

the Institute of Cultural

tury, most of the Latin American

and Sociol Studies of

countries have failed 10 achieve enduring political and economie stability. Several dictatorial regimes have been able for a while to

Leiden University.

impose 'peace and order' based on the use of repression. In the end,

however, they ge nerated deep divi sion s and confliets within society, leading la a new period of politieal unrest. Al so the economie history

of Latin America shows similar pattems of unslability. Short and sporadie periods of prosperity are soon follo wed by profound economie crises. In th is sense, the socalled 'debt crisis' oflhe 1980s on ly represents the lalest expression of the economie and financial

earthquakes which shake lhe reg ion from time 10 time.

Endemie instability Despite the distinctive features of each parti cular country ene can

state that until the mid- 1980s one of the major sourees of instability in the reg ion as a whole was the

inability among lhe local eliles to reach a global consensus about

balh lhe political and economie rul es of the game. The military, industriali sts, landlords, bureaucrats, polilicians, and intellectuals

from opposile ideological positions disputed eaeh olher lhe ri ght 10 dominote rather than 10 goverll Ihe entire society. In fact until very recently, a zero-sum vision of political reality was dominant in the

area. by which eac h group attempled 10 impose on the rest of the

people its partieular ' model ' of society and economic develop-

ment. In lhis polarized political c1imate there was no room availa-

Chile 's former

bie for comprom ises and na

Doctrine of

serious attempts were made 10 achieve a workable formu la 10

National Security

(Photo: R8P).

25

solve or at least to canalize the confliets in society. In some cases, national confliets transgressed their boundaries acquiring a regional dimension. This has been the case in Central America where since the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 the entire Central American isthmus has been submerged in a profound political crisis.

From the early I 970s until the mid-1980s, most of the Latin American countries were under military rule. During this period political intolerance reached its climax, while tensions and fri c· tions between several countries in the region achieved dangerous proportions. For instanee, in 1978 Argentina and Chile, by then both countries being ruled by military govemment, almost went to war.

Until very recently a zero-sum vision of political reality was dominant in the area In 1982 the Argentine army brought the country into a disastrous military confrontation with Great Britain over the Falkland islands, which represented a de sperate populistic attempt of the authoritarian regime to obtain same support from the Argentine people amidst a period of increasing political discontent.

Since the mid-1980s Latin America has been experiencing an unique process of democratization which for the first time embraces the entire continent. Today, almost all the Latin American governmenlS have been elected through free elections according to democratic rules. Of course, democracy in itself has proved not to be a panacea for all the problems and has not produced everywhere the expected political and economical stability. Nevertheless, the achievement of democracy on such a scale alone represents a historical chance to tackle the domestic and regional security problems beyond the narrow militaristic view, by adding to it a new social, economie, and political dimension.

26

Authori tarianism or consen-

sus The experienee of the military regimes of the 1970s has had traumatic effects among the population, but especially among the political elites of several LaLÎn American countries. The violence and the cruelty which characterized some military govemments like Pinochet's in Chi le or Videla's in Argentina produced a tremendous impact among several social and political sectors who in the pre-authoritarian period had combated each other in an intransigent fashion.

Those military govemments adop· ted the so-called Doctrine of National Security which, in essence, identified all left-oriented political sectors in their own countries as an 'intemal enemy' which si mply had to be destrayed. Those sectors were seen as mere 'intemal agents' of Soviet communism, wh ich by its part was indicated as the principal threat for both domestic and regional security. In this battle against cammunism, the security farces used all means to win a 'dirty war', resulting in the imprisonment, torture, and 'disappearance ' of thousands of people.

In the end, the military proved unsuccessful in eradicating the opposition and in some cases those authoritarian govemments were replaced by exactly the same political farces they had attempted to eliminate. In general , the economie performance of the military regimes was paar or simply disastrous, proving the fallacy of the thesis which identified democracy as the main cause of the prior economie crises. In my opinion, all the most important political actors who actively or passively participated in that collective drama have taken their own lessons from the authoritarian experience. To begin with, the military seems to have leamed that acting as a government has very high instilutional casts. lt led to the politicization of the armed farces, threatening its intemaJ unity and in some cases even its very existence because of its great unpopularity among the

population. The considerations about the institutional unity and integrity of the armed farces played an essen ti al role in the decision of the military to leave power to civilians and to go back to their barracks. But also the civilians, and particularly the political elite, have explicitly or tacitly taken important lessons from the autho· ritarian experienee. For instanee, many politicaJ leaders are now willing to recogni ze their role and their own part of the responsibility in generating the political crisis which in most of the cases had preceded or even directl y provoked the military interventions.

They seem also to have learnt that the elasticity and toleranee of the democratie fabric is not unlimited and that in case their countries should become victims of social disorder, military coups constitute a real possibility. They also seem to be aware of the vital need to maintain and to consolidate political stability on the basis of a broad consensus in their countries; this being not a goal in itself, but as a conditio sine qua non to initiate the search for endurable solutions for their developmental problems.

One of the main remarkable changes produced by the authoritarian experience has been the revaluat ion of democracy among several Latin American left-wing sectors.

Befare the military govemment democracy was often seen among those circles as a mere instrument to reach power, being despicably labelled as a ' bourgeois democracy ' . But after the military terror many people painfully experieneed by their own what it really mean to lose Iiberty and to live in a political system with na care for human and civil rights. During the dark years of military rule, among many left-wing leaders the achievement of democracy evolved from an instrumentalist ic objective to a goal in itself. They abandoned their prior marxist postulates and adopted social-democratic-oriented positions. Concertación or democratie consensus has become the keyword in current Latin American polities. Democratie arrangements have obtained a high degree of legitimacy; we must not forget

that both the Sandini sta revolution

in Nicaragua as weil as the dictatorship of Pinochet in Chile came to an end not at the batdefield but at the ballot box.

A new approach Today, one can already obse rve in

several Latin American countries a

For most of the Latin Ame rican political leaders it has become c1ear th atthe main th reat to the security of lheir nalions eomes nOl from their neighbouring countries, but from their eventual inability 10 win their own national battl e aga inst poverty and underdevelopment.

marked shift in the way political leaders have been approaehing the damesti c and regional security

poverty means insecurity too ...

problems in the region as a resuIt

(Photo: joson).

of the restorati on of democracy.

The Doctrille of Natiollal Sec/lrity became obsolete as military goveroment carne 10 an end. In fact it had already become anac hronisti c in the mid- 1980s, when at the internati onal scene an increasing process of rapprochement between East and West was taking pi ace, and the political changes in the

Eastem Bloc countries fonned a prelude to the imminent end of the Cold War. The new democratie govemments rejected almost instincti vely all interpretations or 'solutions' ofthe securily pro-

blems based on militaristic conceplions of confrontati on between 'enemies' and 'friends'. Domestic security problems such as terrori sm and delinquency, are now being approached in countries as Chile as being social and political phenomena which are directl y connec ted with lhe recent political past and with the very poor social conditions in which al most 40 per cent of the population li ves. The eliminati on by peaceful means of the sourees (anct not of indi viduals as in the past) who constitute lhreals for security and stability in those countries is now being increasingly presented as a responsibility and a tas k of the entire population; not a particular ideology, but analfabeti sm, malnutrition, underemployment, and the unfullfilment of basic needs of the populati on are now identifi ed al s the main sourees of domestic insecuri ty. At the regional level. old paroc hial and ideological controversies, have made place for a pragmati c approach in which regional economie integration through free market competition has been adopted as the main criterium 10 orientate foreign poliey.

27

Jason Spring Conference: "Europe Overtaken by Nationalism?"

Date: 8 Mar, 1992

Afte rnoon session (Workshops)

Place: Het Provinciehuis In The Hague

Study groups on the following subjects: Federalization in Nonhem Spain; The Potential Disintegration of the Russian Federation; European Regionali zation and Flemish Initiatives; Czechs and Slovaks in One Country?; Titoism in the Fonner Yugoslavia; CSCE up to a Proper Response?; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nationalism; The Accession of Nationalities 10 the European Communities; Nationalism and Economy.

nme: 9.00 路 17.00 hno Morning session (Lectu res) Mr M. Butora, Special Advisor to the President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Mr J.P. Shea, Assistant to the Secretary-General of NATO: "The Atlantic Response to Nationalism in Eastem Europe" Mr J. Verde y Aldea, Vice-Chainnan of the European Parliament: "The European Parliarnent and Regionalism"

Subscribers to lason Magazi ne are given the opponunity to anend this conference at a reduced rate. Instead of f 20,-. you now only pay f 10,- including coffee, tea, lunch, drinks and preparatory documents. Non-subscribers pay the usual rate of

f25 ,-.

Prof. Dr. H. G. Schenners, Professor of EC La wand lntemational Institutional Law at Leiden University: "The Accession of the Baltic States to the Council of Europe and the State Basis in International Law"

Subscribers who are interested can fill in the relevant coupon in thi s magaz ine. Note: this offer is only valid until I April 1992. " First Come, First Serve".

Tickets available "Seminar on European Polities, Economy aod Security" From 5- 11 April 1992 th e lason Foundation is organizing its so-called Eastem Europe Project "Seminar on European Polities, Economy and Security". 15 students from various faculties at universi ties in Czechoslovakia and Poland get the opponunity to observe the functioning of a Western democracy from nearby. One day each is taken up by polities, economy and security. Study trips to the EC and NATO are included.

Subscribers to lason Magazi ne can atlend pans of the prograrnme: just fill in the coupon and mail it (no stamp needed).

2.7 April 1992 (aftemoon session): Visit to AT&T Tec hno logy in The Hague. Lectures by Dr. A. Szasz (Director Internation al Relations, Netherlands Federal Bank) and Mr R. R眉hl (Head Eastem Europe Desk, NMB/Postbank).

3. 8 April 1992 (moming session): Visit to KPM G/Klijn veld in Amstelveen. Lectures by Prof.Dr. H. lager (U ni ve rsity of Amsterdam), Mr R.A.E. de Haze Winkelman (Association of Shareholders), Prof.Dr. D. Wolfson (Scie ntifi c Council for Govemment Policy) and Mr C. de Wit (Royal PTT Netherlands).

Parts of the above-mentioned are still uncertain.

I. 6 April 1992 (moming session): Visit to the Lower House of Parliament in The Hague. Lectures by Mr A. C. H.M de Kok (MP, Christian-Democrats), Prof.Dr. E.C. Jurgens (MP, SocialDemocrats), Mr J.J .c. Lammers (Queen's Commissioner of the province of Flevoland) and Mr R.W. Mei nes (parliarnentary journalist on foreign policy, NRC/Handelsblad).

28

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WHAT

IS

JASON?

The lason Foundation for International Affairs was founded in 1975 by a group of young people to meet the demand of Dutch youth for unbi ased, balanced infornlation on international affa irs. Jason is not connected to any political party and has no ideo logical fo undation. l ason strives to achieve its aim in two ways. Firstly, by organizing acti vities, ranging from lectures and debates to ra le games and study tours.

Secondly, by publi shing thi s bimonthl y magazine. Recent topics include " the Indian subcontinent" (9 1/ 1), "the international refu gee problem" (9 1/2), " intelligence services" (91 /3) and "the Mediterranean" (9 1/4).

Every year the so-called secondary school project is organized. Thi s consists of a set of lessons on a current internati onal issue - in 1992 post-war European integration - culminating in a ra le game.

For more information, write to the following address: lason Foundation Laan van Meerdervoort 96 251 7 AR The Hague The Netherl ands

Copyright

Jason Information Officers:

Reprod uction of contributi ons to thi s peri odi cal is only permitted when accompanied by a source note along the fo ll owing Iines, with between brackets the data of the contributi on be ing reproduced:

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"Th is contributi on of [name and ti tie author] was publi shed in Jason Magazine, vo lume [volume no.], number [i ssue no. ], Imonth , year] , which had as a theme [titie]. Jason Magazine is a bimonthly publication of the Jason Foundation for International Affairs, The Hague."

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Amev

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Royal Dutch/Shell

Index Jason Magazine 1990 '91 90/5. Europe, Quo Vadis?/Jason 's 15th Anniversary

9112. Refugees. Causes of. Growing Problem

Drs. R.W. Zaagman:

Fifteen Years of CSCE: Balance and Prospeets

H. v.d. Lee:

The Refugee Issue

Dr. F. Wielenga: (i nterview)

The Gennan Home

H. v.d. Lee:

The Sehengen Affair

Jason On Thc Spot:

EBN Cadre Conference

A. Cremer.;:

Belween Unif誰cation and 8all01 Box

R. Denlener:

UNHCR: an Overview

Profile:

Willy Br.tndt

H. v.d Lee:

European Securi ty: A Utopia?

Jason On The Spot:

Securily llnct the Green Pany

F. Kleibrink/H. v.d. Lee:

No Nonsense and Lots of Beer

H. v.d. Lee:

Firteen Years of Jason: Balance and Prospeets

Mr. F,A,M. v.d. Heuvel:

Ja5011, the Quesi Conlinues .

Mr. R. Bru in:

Politica] Asscssment of Asyluill Requesls: Jusitice or Policy?

Bibliography:

Refugees

90/6. World Affairs, Dutch Affairs? (English Edition)

91 /3. 1ntelligence Services

Mr. H. v.d. Broek :

Message to the Reader

Drs. B.M. de Jong:

The KGB in Eastem Europe

R. Dentener:

Dutch Post-war Foreign Poliey: Absolutes and Obsoletes

Profile:

Kim Philby

H. v.d. Lec/P. Lingg:

Playing-garden of Espionage?

F. Kle ibrink/J . Recrink :

Diplomats Go Dutch G.A. Carver. Jr.:

lnte lligence in the 1990s

Jason On The Spot:

Tale ofTwo Conferences: Paris Summit

P. Lingg:

Take off Your Mae. Put on Your Su it

J.L. Susanna:

The Netherlands and the Europcan Communi ty Jason Topic:

Sloven ia Independent

Dr. W. Dekker: (interview)

The World Econorny After "Europe 1992" Bibliography:

Intelligence Services

Dr. W. Tims:

Development Coopcration: a Duteh Preoccupation

P. Lingg:

A World of Difference Between Concept :md Reillity

91 /4. The Mediterranean

9111. The Indian Subcontinent Drs. P.E. Baak/ Drs. A. de Haan:

The Indian Subcontinent: Un ity and Contradictions

Profile:

Rajiv Gandhi

Drs. J.P. Poley:

Bhutan: End of a Dream?

G. Kreijen:

S ri Lanka: a Spi fal of Violcnce

Dr. D. H.A. Kolff:

India: End of a Well-tested

Jason On The Spot:

Shooting in Darra. Demolishing in Gadani

Dr. BJ.S. Hoetjes:

India: Big Brother or Peacc Dove?

Consensu~

Dr. F. Sahagun:

Migration: NATO 's Sout hern Threat?

P. Lingg:

The Mediterranean. a Sea of Problems

Mr. F.A.M. v.d. Heuve l:

Corsica: Future Mallorca Of Croatia'!

Amin Maalouf: (interv iew)

Bridge Between Two Worlds

Or. H.L.M . Obdeijn:

Europc and Nonh Africa: fro m Ne ighbours to Housematcs?