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Volume 15 Winter 1990 -'91 Number 6

Magazine tor International Affairs

World Affairs, Dutch Affairs?


CON TEN T S

Jason Magazine is a bimonthly review published by the Jason Foundation for International Affairs Editorial Board Chief EdilOr: Halls van der Lee Hllns·Paul Andriessen Arthur Crcmers René Dt:ntener Frank Kleibrink Gernro Kreijen Jaap Rcerink Marcel Ruiter Teun Struycken

Executive Board Chainnan: Hendrik Jan Lascur Vice·Chainnan: Wim Debets Secretary: Marijke Schuil Treasurer: Theo Dersigni Public Relations: Luccttc Mascim General Coordinator: Marianne van Leeuwen

EDITORlAL

1 MESSAGE FROM THE NETHERLANDS MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS Mr. Hans van den Broek we lcomes the readers across the At lanli c Ocean.

2 ABSOLUTES AND OBSOlETES Rene B. Denlener, editor of Jason Magazi ne, exami nes the post-war foreign policy of lhe Netherlands o n the basis of some case-studies.

3 DIPLOMATS GO DUTCH Jaap Reerink .nd Frank Kl eibrink. editors of Jason Magazi ne. give an inside view of Dutch dipl omacy.

9 JASON ON THE SPOT: TAlE OF TWO CONFERENCES

General Board Mr. A.G.F. M. Alting von Geusau Mr. FC.M . Caris MI.drs. P.H. Goedhan Mr. FA .M. van den Heuvel Drs. A.M. Knaapen FJ . Marcus Mr. RJI . van der Meer Drs. FJ J . Princen Drs. R.W Z:mgman Drs. 0. 11 . Zandee

Advisory Council Prof.d r. W. Dekkcr. Chainnan Prof.dr. lThJ. van den Berg Prof.dr. H. de Haan Prof.dr... V. l-laJbcrstadl Drs. GJ.J.M. Hayen C.C van den Heuvel II. A. M. Hoefnagels Mr. J.G.N. de Hoop Scheffer R.W. Meines R.D. Pra:ming Dn.. W. K.N. Schmelzcr Prof.dr. lG. Siccama I'rof.dr. A. \ an Staden Prof.dr. H. W. Tromp Dr.. L. Wecke

Jason Foundation Lllan van Meerder.oor1 % 2517 AR l nc Haguc The NClherlands le1cI>honc: (O)70-J60565R

111e Jason Foundillion calUml OC· ht'ltl J":' countabll' fUT Ihc uplnion~ put fOT\\:trd 111 Jawn Magali ne. Anicle .. can only Ix: re· produced with pemli .. ~ion of the Elhlmial Board.

ISSN 016S -8336

A report o n lhe Jason Conference on CSCE, which look place at the Peace Palace in November.

11 THE NETHERLANDS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Mr J.L. $ ussana of the Net herlands Foreign Trade Agency examines the (inter)nati o nal econom ics of the Nelherlands.

12 THE WORLD ECONOMY AFTER "EUROPE 1992" Marcel Ruiter. ed itor of Jason Magazine, interviewed Dr. W. Dekker of {he Philips Corporati on on the EC inte mal markel. and European (rade re lations wilh Eastem Europe, Japan and Ihe Un ited Slales.

18 DEVElOPMENT COOPERATION: A DUTCH PREOCCUPATION Dr. W. Tims. Professor of Developmenl Economics at the Free University Amsterdam . traces Ihe origins and exam ine ~ the structure of Dutch de\'e lopment cooperalion.

21 A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONCEPT AND REAlITY? Peter du Lingg examines th c most recenl policy paper on deve Jopmenl cooperali on and its cOllseq uences.

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EDITORlAL

World Affairs, Dutch Affai'rs? In the first fifteen years of its existence, th ree English-Ianguage editions of Jason Magazine have been published. They were issued in the framework of specific projects: an exchange programme in connection with the 8icentennial of Netherlands-United States relations (I982), and the Jason Conference on oil (I 986). More frequently than before, however, conferences and other activities of Jason are conducted in English. This trend will be continued in the years to come. An Englishlanguage edition of Jason Magazine on an annual basis is highly desirabIe in the context of further intemationalization of Jason. These yearly Magazines will have to cover issues which are interesting to both our regular subscribers in the Netherlands and our target group abroad, and they must not lose their topicality in a few months ' time. In our view, the central theme of this edition -the international relations of the Netherlandssatisfies both requirements. If the question World Affairs, Du/eh Affairs? can be answered in a positive sen se (and we bel ieve th is Magazine contains proof of th is), it seems appropriate for the Jason Foundation to be able to reach across the borders of the Netherlands. We hope this Magazine can play an important role in this respect.

H.J.C. Laseur, Chairman A.w,L. van der Lee, Chief Editor


' !lt .., .

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MINISTER FOR FO REIGN AFFAIRS

Message trom the Netherlands Minister tor Foreign Attairs Many dramatic changes have taken place in Europe during the last two years. Democratically elected governments came to power in countries th at suffered more than forty years as a result of Communist rule. Germany was unified. The member states of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact signed the CFE Treaty th at provides for unprecedented reductions of conventional arms and declared explicitly to be adversaries no longer. Last November's CSCE Summit meeting in Paris was generally considered to mark the end of East-West antagonism, a true watershed. The North Atlantic Alliance has played a major role in bringing about these remarkable changes. NATO is the expression of the solidarity th at binds North America and Europe's democracies together. Since 1948 the United States and Canada have been close allies within NATO in the defence of peace and stability in Europe, and from 1973 onwards they have played a major role in the CSCE process in the efforts to promote peace and security, human rights and cooperation in Europe. The strength of the transatlantic relationship not merely depends on shared interests. It is based upon common historic roots, common culture and shared values. Democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law served as the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty and have now effectively become the basic principles of the CSCE process. Today these values are the guidelines for young democracies in Eastern Europe, and hopefully they will continue to influence the world tomorrow. In addition to the continuing relevance of NATO's collective defence structure, an important reason why the transatlantic partnership remains a necessary component of international politics, is the need to further promote the ideas we jointly stand for. The Netherlands has always considered astrong transatlantic partnership to be a cornerstone of its foreign policy. For this reason it welcomes the importance the Jason Foundation for International Affairs attaches to informing young Dutch citizens, in a balanced way, about NATO and transatlantic relations. With this English issue of Jason Magazine the Foundation extends its activities to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, I would like to express a warm word of welcome to the readers in Canada and the United States.

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Absolutes and Obsoletes By RenĂŠ Dente ne r

From agiobal colonial powe r, the Netherlands degenerated to a marginal factor in international politics after the Second World War. Nevertheless, the Netherlands has tried to compensate for th is loss of prestige by pursuing an active foreign policy, among others by participation in international organizations such as the European Community (EC), the North Atlantie Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) . Vet, the conduct of a moralist-Iegalist poliey does not always lead to favourable results. This article examines the premises of Dutch foreign policy on the basis of some casestudies. I f we consider fore ign pol icy as the maintenance and cultiv3tion of intern ational relati ons. for the Netherland s this onl y applies to the period after World War Two. Before th at, it is true, the Netherlands did mai nt ain bilateral relation s with olher countries, but these were fragmenlary and unstructured. Ta a large ex tent the Netherlands, with its colonies in

the West and East (ndies, was selfsufficient. The need 10 cultivate bilateral re lations was not very greal. Besides thi s. the country conducted a policy of aloofness with regard to conflicts between

the interests of both Brita in and Germany. In the Second World War as weil, at first strict neutraJity was observed. But becau se of the di sinteg ration of the balance of power (dating back to lhe 19th century), and Hitler's as piring 10 power, neutrality was thrown on the scrap-heap. After 1945, the awareness that the Netherland s could na langer safeguard nati anal interests on its own , and growing interdependenee -especially in the fi eld of economics- led to the adaplion of an acti ve fo reign poli cy.

other European states. This was a

I. Foreign Poliey Premises

direct result of the Vienna Conference of 18 15. which restricted the conduct of power politics to the

Foreign policy is the face with whi ch a nation presents ilself la the outside world. lts primary goal is equ al for all states: the protecti on of national integrit y and national interests. The way in which th is goal is fornlU lated, howe ver, is different rar each state, and is influeneed by national pecul iarities. The Dutch political scientist Soetendorp has identified three long-term goals for the Netherlands. Fi rsUy, the protecti on of territori al sovereignty through an ac ti ve members hip of NATO;

fi ve major European powers. and wh ich degraded sma lle r nati ons to mere spectators along (he sideline. For examp le, the Netherlands' missions abroad were only allowed the statu s of legati on, whil e Great Brita in co ul d be represented by ambassadors. During the First World War, th e Netherland s observed neutrality and res tricted itsclf (0 care for war refugees. Dutch aloofness served

second ly, the promotion of Eu ropean integration within the framework of the EC; and, last but not least, the creation of an international legal order to replace the rule of force.

RenĂŠ Dentener is editor of Joson Magozine.

Ethies and International Polities The Netherlands emphasizes the international legal order and international law at every opportunity. In th is fie ld our country has a reputati on to up ho ld. One of the found ing fathe rs of international law was our own Hugo Grotius ( 1583-1645). A natural law th inker, he emphasized the concept of j ustice in law, for instance regarding just and unjust war. Nowadays, this noti on can sti ll be fo und in the right lo self-detennination, and in humanitarian law. As indicated earl ier, after being excl uded from the cond uct of power politics, the Netherlands adopted a policy of ne utrali ty. Thus, it was thought, it would contribu te 10 the European balance of po wer and thereby 10 world peace. The Ne therl ands came to regard itself as th e very cradie of intern ati onal law and the centre of juslice. This resulted in the moralist-Iegalist view that our country was to play a leading role in the creation of an intern alional legal order. In the 20th century the Perm anent Coun International of Arb itration ( 1907) and the Permanent Coun of International Justice ( 192 1) were establ ished in The Hague, strengthening this view. One ean doubt the wisdom of conducting foreign policy on a moralist-Iegalist basis. There is a tradi tional stress bet ween ethi cs and international polities. A moralist

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attitude towards other states presupposes the infringement of national interests of those stales that do nol meet the requirements. The problem is: what is considered morally right in one country, does not have 10 he sa in another country with different standards. There is no international moral consensus strong enough to guarantee an alJ-embracing, binding system of international ethics. Therefore, il is unrealistic to incorporate a moral dimension of inlernational law in foreign policy. International law is concerned with the limits rather than Ihe substance of international politics: ils object is to counter irregularities and excesses in the hehaviour of nations, not to si t in moral judgment over Iheir normal behaviour. Besides, a country co uld run the ri sk of havin g its own foreign policy judged by its own standards. The crisis over New Guinea is a striking example. Furthennore, a government is thought la represent society as a whoie. While this is already difficult because of the democratization of foreign policy, moralism as a main constiluting factor raises the question whether a simple majorily in Parliament is adequate. A policy based on judgment in temlS of good and bad fails to appreciate the possibilities of diplomacy. The former promotes conflict. while the latter recognizes national interests, and tri es to resolve contliet through compromise. Apart from that, the Dutch gove rnment is not consist.ent in putting moralism-Iegalism into practice. Sometimes it is not there at all. More often, however, it is applied in an ambiguous way. Minister of Foreign Affairs Van den Broek commented on the US military operation in Panama (December 1989): "Of course, we always reg- I ret the use of violence ( ... ) I hope the si tuation can be controlled, but I do not believe we are in a position to condemn thi s US action."

European Integration In the first years after the Second World War, the econom y of the Netherlands was in a shambles. Reconstruction was still underway

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and the Netherlands East Indies were lost. Belgium, Lu xembourg and the Netherlands agreed to a Benelux economie union 10 combat economie difficulties together, and to utilize opportunities for cooperation. Vet , after initial successes (the abolishment of border controls, import and export tariffs) the Benelux never reali zed its full potential. But it was a catalyst for the European Communities (EC), of which the European Economie Community (EEC, founded in 1958) is the most important. Within the EC, the Netherlands has always actively sought to broaden and deepen economie cooperation. Considering the importanee of EC trade for its Gross National Product (GNP), this is entirel y logical. Membership of the EC allows a mediumsized power like the Netherlands to exerci se more influence. Many decisions made by the Council of the European Communities require unanimity, and wilh respect 10 qualified majority decisions (many of those me ntioned in the Single European Act of 1987) we ighted voting prevents the smaller member states from being outvoted by the bigger ones. Foreign Minister Van den Broek was less than enthusiastic aboul the proposal concernin g lhe European Political Union (E PU), put forward by Chancellor Kohl and President Miuerand at the Rome summit in December 1990. Up to now, foreign policy has been the exclusive domain of the member states. Intergovernmental consultations wilhin the context of European Political Cooperation (E PC) serve to coordinate these policies. A leading part is reserved for the European Council, an institutionaii zed forum consisting of the twelve heads of state and government, created in 1979. The Kohl -Mitterand proposal is based on reinforcing the innuence and power of the European Council within a future EPU. The main object ion is that the European Council is not mentioned anywhere in the EEC Treaty and is hence not bound to institutional rul es (of competence). These rul es provide for a balance between the Council of the Euro-

pean Communities, the European Commission and the European Parliament. The recent proposal would transfonn the European Council into a kind of superministerial council beyond democratie control. The European Commission would be relegated to the role of policy executor, instead of policy-maker. Moreover, the smaller member states could be outvoted by the bigger ones, in this case France and Germany. As a general rule, Kohl and Mitterand want European Council decisions within the EPU to be made with qualified majority voting. The Netherlands is always keen on the equal treatment of states in international organizations. Small wonder, therefore, that it opposed the proposal. It considered the matter closed with the remark that it is but one of many ideas for a political union. The Dutc h contribution to EC economie policy can be characterized as one pervaded by a sense of reality. With the EC heading for a political union , let us hope th at the Netherlands will not try to promote their moralism-Iegalism there. In 1986, the member states agreed to institute trade measures against the apartheid regime in South Africa. These were an oil embargo, an import ban on South African gold coins, and an investment ban in South Africa. The Netherlands had wanted 10 adopt more far-reaching measures, but fail ed to rall y the support of other EC co untries. Subsequently, the Dutch govemment unilaterall y imposed stri cter sanctions and severed almost all ti es -except diplomaticwith South Africa. This included the discontinuance of cultural and scientific agreements. As aresuIt, the Sou th African govemme nt was no Jonger receptive 10 DUlch criticism, which showed a total disregard for the situation in th at country. As opposed to Britain , for example, which was still willing to engage in a (c riti cal) dialogue, and which employed the measures in a more tlexible manner. It goes wilhout saying, th at an apartheid regime is reprehensible, and in thi s case the Netherlands were fortunate to he able to impose stricter sancti ons. In an EPU, with only


one voice in the formulation and execution of EC foreign policy, thi s will be impossible. If and when the Dutch govemment wants to operate as a moralist-Iegalisl guide-country in thi s forum, il will soon iso late itself and lose its credibi lit y. In a world increasi ngly divided inlo Irade blocs, an EPU has to be able 10 conduct a foreign policy that is on the bali and interspersed with realpolitik. EC discussions on drastic cuts in fann subsidies and the subseq uent fai 1ure of the GATT (Genera I Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiation s are an indication of interdependence losing ground to uncompromising bloc stances. A country like the Netherlands will have to use diplomacy 10 make good for its lack of power. Olherwise, it would be obliged to cooperate with its Benelux partners. In view of the fact that the Benelu x is as good as dead, th is is not a reali stic scenario.

11. 5ecurity Issues At the end of World War Two, the Dutch governme nt placed great trust in the still -to-be-fou nded United Nations (UN), with the prevention of war through a collecti ve security system as the primary objeclive. In fact, in San Francisco on 25 J une 1945, we signed the United Nations Charter. This confidence in the UN cannot be seen independent from Dutch efforts to achieve an intemationallegal order. In such an order there is a total equality between smaller and larger states, and the factor power is neutrali zed. This would bring the Netherlands many benefits. Yet, events that followed the war quite rapidly wou ld shatter the belief in the omnipotence of the UN in matters of war and peace.

A Faithful Ally Whereas Ihe US had quickly demobilized and withdrawn its forces from Europe, the USSR maintained 80 army divisions at its Eastern borders. Stalin's intention became clear very soon: between the end of lhe war and 1947 a large number of Easlern European slates came within lhe sphere of innuence of the Soviet Union.

With help from the USSR, communist parties came to power in these countries. Communist gains in the first post-war elec tion s in Western Europe struck terror into the minds of policy-makers. The Communist Part y of the NeIherlands (CPN) obtained lOper cent of the seals in lhe Second Cham ber of Parliament in the May 1946 elections. As a result, CPN members were barred from government positions. To counter-balance the Soviet threal, lhe Nelherlands, togcther with Britain, France, Belgiul11 and Luxembourg established the European Union, providing for military assistance in case of an attack on one of ilSmember states. It was not viabie, however, since its member slales were busy reconstructing lheir economies. AIthough at first th e US opposed th e idea of blocs, they saw the need for all effective defen sive system, in which they wou ld have to figure prominenlly. AI the initialive of Senalors Conally and Vandenberg, on II June 1948 a resolulion was passed in the US Congress lhat made US participation in such a system possible. The North Atlantic Trealy was signed on 4 April 1949. The Nelherlands was a cosignatory. In the fifties and sixti es, our country unmislakably was a failhfu l ally within the North Allantic Treaty Organization (N ATO). In view of lhe securily si tualion in Europe, there was no room for a moralist poJicy. However, in theory the possibilily did exist, for a ll NATO decisions require unanimity. As in the EC, the rule of unani mity was taken into account in the decision to take part in NATO. We have Dr. Joseph Luns (Fore ign Minister from 1952-197 1) 10 thank for the fact lhat the Netherlands did not use lhis opportunity for a very long time. He shaped lhe role of failhful ally during the fifties and sixties. He, and man y policymakers wilh him, held the view that Western Europe could not withstand the Soviet threat withoul US nuclear guarantees. Time afler time, the linkage belween Weslern Europe and the US was re-emphasized. The Dutch govemment

greeted any move towards a European Defence Community with a sceptical eye.

Signs of Détente The question whelher lhe Soviel UIl ion had any intenlion at all 10 Ihreaten to Western Europe was less important. By keeping the DUlch mililary effort al a conslanl level, il was Ihoughl, Ihe NeIherlands would contribule 10 solidarity within the alliance. Détenle could only be the result of negoliations from a common position of strength . American policy-makers thought along the same lines. This line of thought was e mbedded in Ihe 1967 Hamoel Report and agreed upon as NATO's official negotiating stralegy. The Nelherlands certainly did not have an open-handed policy in bilateral relations with Eastern Europe. Turning point was the Den Uyl government ( 1973- 1977) which intensified contacts with the East, believing that Brezhnev honestly pursued a policy of détente and peaceful coexistence. Brezhnev's avowed détente was severely put to the lest in 1976, when the Soviet Union instalJ ed SS-20 missiles targeted at Western Europe. The folJowing year, a Hi gh Level Group (HLG ) was established to study the new threat and Ihe possibie modemization of nuclear weapons as an answer to the SS-20. The Den Uy l government and its successor, led by Prime Minister Van Agl ( 1977- 1981), however, wanted to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in NATO. The Dutch delegation to the HLG had to represent this standpoint and initiall y met with little or no response. Despite thi s, the Dutch standpoint was incorporated in the DOl/bie Track Decision of December 1979: "The program (tIle deployment of crui se missiles and Pershings l!, ed.) will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons." This is a major Dutch con tri but ion in the field of disarmament. Apart from the modernization of nuclear weapons, within the framework of the DOl/bie Track Decision some 1000 nuclear warheads were unilaterally wilhdrawn . This was entirely concurrent

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with the Hanne l fonnul a. Besides. as a result of the Montebello Agree ment of 1983. an add itional 1,400 nuclear warheads we re

withdrawn, bringing NATO's nuclear arsenal 10 its lowest level in 20 years.

The INF Debate With the DOl/bie Track D eciJiol/ , the Netherl ands had committed itself 10 stationing 48 crui se missiIes on its territory. BUI the decision was not implemented ovemight and even became uncertain. The government coalition of Christian

Democrats and Conservati ves did not have a majorit y in Parliament, because of the presence of ten-odd

dissidenls within the Chrislian Democratie parliamenlary party. The peace movement was al 50 in advan ce. As earl y as 1977, the IKV (Interkerke lij k Vredesberaad . or lnterchurch Peace M ovement, ed.) started a campaign with the slogan : " He lp rid the wo rld of nucl ear weapons, starting in the Netherl ands." On top of it a ll , the coaliti on lost the May 198 1 elections and was repl aced by a

Labour-Christian DemocratieLiberai coalition. Labo ur vehementl y opposed the deployment of crui se missiles. That fall , the peace movement staged a massive demonstrati on in Am sterdam again st stati on ing. Chances that the Nethe rl ands would compl y with the DOl/bie Track D ecisiol/ were slim . Events look a turn for the better, whe n,'after earl y elections in 1982, the Christian Democratic-Conservati ve coalition returned 10 power. A decision was postponed until 1986, c iting probl ems in Parliament. Other member states had begun stationing in November 1982. In the meantime, the Dutch govemme nt had already lost its credibility with its NATO partn ers, especially with the US. There was talk of ho llanditis. In a bid to, at least partia ll y, regain credibil ity, on I June 1984 Prime Mini ster Lubbers decided to make stationing conditional on the number of SS-20s deployed by the Sov iet Uni on. If on I November 1985 the ir num ber should e.ceed 378. the Netherland s would go ahead as planned . This was suppo-

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sed to send a signal to Moscow. Naturall y, the num be r did e.ceed 378 and in February 1986 ParI iament fi nally concurred in the 513ti oning ag reement with the US. The crui se missile questi on kepi fĂŻ ve successive govemments busy and di vided Dutch society int o two camps. The image of the Netherlands was severe ly damaged : a fa ithful all y was no more. Onl y Prime M inister Lubbers' position

vis-a-vis the modemi zation of the Lance-missiles in 1988 (the so-called SNF questi on) would contri bute to slowly regaining the conli dence of the allies.

111. The Decolonization Process O ne of the matte rs that kept Dutch

post-war governments busy, was the decoloniz3tion of overseas territories. The Japanese in vasion of the Ne therlands East Indies in 1942 had marked th e e nd of Dutch authority there. After the war, the

Dutch govemment tri ed 10 regain contro l, but fo und several obstac1es along the way. On 17 A ugust 1945, Sukamo un ilatera ll y proc tai med the Republic of Indonesia. He was aided by the Japanese. although they had a lready capi tul ated . Moreover, the US did not support the Nethe rlands. The US, lacking a colonial tradition. were opposed to th e continuati on of the coloni a l relati onship. In the newlyfo unded UN, the call for indepe ndence gre w ever louder. From that moment on, the Dutch position

was extremely difficult and in the end untenable. With two police acti ons (in 1947 and 1948), the Dutch govemment tri ed to prese nt the world with a fait accompli . In both instances, the UN Securit y Council look preventive action. Eve ntua ll y, after lengthy negotiations the Drees government resigned itself to the transfer af savere ignty to Indonesia, whi ch took place in December 1949. New Guinea, for the time being, was e.cluded from the settlement. This was the Dutch perception, for the status of New Guinea had still to be negotiated with Indonesia. Negotiations were postponed time after time, becau se the lndanesians onl y wanted to ta lk about the

transfer o f sove re ignty. From 1954 to 1957, Sukam o unsuccessfull y tried ta put the questi on on the age nda of the UN General Assembly. Economic ties with the Netherl ands were severed, and after 1958 th ings reall y got out of hand. Indonesia acti ve ly tried to undennine Duteh authority over New Guinea by infiltrati on, and in 196 1 plans fo r an anned assault were deve loped . US Pres ident Kennedy personall y intervened: at his urging, the Dutch Foreign Minister Luns sought to intemationali ze the matter. The Netherl ands could have saved face by creati ng a New G uinea Counc il , its task being the preparati on of the Papua's for self-govemment. But thi s would have been rather overdue, for the Papua people were still li ving in the Stone Age. As a result of the internat ionalizati on, in 1962 New G uinea was placed under trusteeship of the UNo After six months, control over the territory was transferred to Indonesia and in due course a referendum on self-dete nnination wo ul d be organized. Of course, [hi s never came abo ut. Indonesia simply anne.ed New Guinea. Dutch-Indonesian relati ons were stra ined for a conside rable peri od after th at. During the sevent ies, development cooperatian was started, and at the moment Indonesia is one of the countries where Duteh development aid is concentrated. Last year, Mini ster for Development Cooperation Pronk visited, and emotions nared up again. Pronk, not known for his tact and dipl omacy, temporaril y suspended 27 million guilders worth of aid after six executions and other viola ti ons of human rights. He made ex tensive use of the medi a. With thi s moralismlegalism, the Netherl ands once again presented itself at its worst. Minister of Foreign Affai rs Van den Broek blew the whistle on Pronk . Thi s does not mean, however, that human rights should not be taken into account in the decision whether or not to grant development aid . In view of the historie relalionship wĂŽth Indonesia, perhaps it would have been better if Dutch di ssatisfaction had been


expressed through diplomatie

channels.

Surinam: An Ambiguous Treatment Dutch-Surinam relations also have been rather un sati sfactory. Policy

towards Surinam can he characterized as a zigzag mavement. In 1954 Surinam becanlC a full -tledged partner under the Statute of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, with total autonomy in inlemal affairs. In 1973 the National Party Combination (N PC), of which the National Party of Surinam (N PS) constituted the greatest part, won the elections. A coalition led by (Surinam) Prime Minister Henk Arron (N PS) stron gly favoured total independence. That same yeaT, the Netherlands witnessed

the ascent to power of the Den Uyl govemmenl, which had decolonizat ion high on the agenda. On 25 November 1975, Surinam became independent. lts constitu ti on and parliamentary system were carbon copies of their Outch equivalents. At independence, the people were free in their choice of nationality: as aresuIt, that year a lone, about

40.000 Surinamese came to the Netherlands. At the moment, there are some 180.000 Surinamese in the Netherlands, which is about one third of Surinam 's total population. The causes of the migration are the bad socio-economie cir-

cumstances and political instability sioce independence. At independence, a Oevelopment Cooperation Treaty was signed, which provided for 3,7 billion gui lders worth of (non -intlationprooI) aid over a period of 15 years. In the tirst 5 years, pari ia-

mentary democracy in Surinam did not function very weil. Oue to election fraud, nepotism, corruption and waste of development aid. the desired model decoloni zation did not materialize. In theory, through the 1975 Treaty the Outch govemment had the opportunity to influence Surinam 's intemal affairs. However, it did not do so, probably for fear of being labe lled neo-colonial ist. There were no conditions govemi ng the spending of Outch development aid. Per capita development assistance was

among the hi ghest in the world. Nevertheless, most of it di sappeared into the pockets of the elite. It is not easy to see how thi s could be reconciled with the objective of the Den Uyl govemment to impIement social change through tinan cial aid. In 1980, a minor political skimlish led to a successful military coup by non-commissioned oftkers (NCO 's) of the Surinam anny under the command of Sergeantmajor Oesi Oe lano Bouterse. In the prev ious year, a conflict had erupted -bet ween the govemment and anny commanders on the one hand, and arrny NCO's on the other hand- over the questĂŽon whether the establishme nt of an NCO union was within the framework of the 1975 Constitution. The govemment thought it was not and refused la recognize such a union. Therupon, the NCO's started organizi ng a campaign. The people, as we il as the parliamentary opposition were sympalhetic. Finally, on 25 February 1980, 16 sergeants seized power without bloodshed and established a National Military Counci l (N MR ). The President, Dr. Ferrier, was allowed la continue in office. The military wanted to ereate order, punish corruption and promote economie development, while encouraging the remi gration of Surinam people living in the Netherlands., The 1975 Constitution wou ld be observed (later on it was suspended), and ;1/ due course (October 1982) genera l elections wou ld be called. The enthusiasm with which the people responded to the coup d'ĂŠtat, showed how impopular the lirst post-independence govemment really was. In view of the President 's remaining in office, and because of popular support , the Outch govemment accepted the new situation, while forrnally regrening the violent seizure of power. Only Jan Pronk, then a Member of the SecOlld Chamber of Parliament (Labour Party), strongly condemned wh at had happened. Oevelopment aid would be continued, and the NMR 's experiment would receive the benefit of the doubt. Other coun-

tries in Ihe region , such as the US, Brazil and Venezuela, maintained re lations with Surinam. The NMR ordered the forrnation of a new civilian govemment , which was 10 be headed by Prime Minister Henk Chin A Sen. The radical left-wing majority of the NMR viewed the Chin A Sen govemment as a mere exec utor of their policy. At tirst, Bouterse (and his future secondin-command Horb) supported the civi lian govemment. and tried 10 compensale for his minority stance by gaining control over the anny. When he had accomp lished thi s, in fact, he had become the strong man of Surinam. Meanwhile. Parliament had been reduced to a farce. An Enabling Act was adopled, which gave the civilian government a full man date for the execution of poliey -as set down in the govemment 's policy declaration of March 1980- beyond parli amentary control. In spite of thi s, the Net herlands expressed its view thatlhe govemment of Surinam would succeed in gradually reducing the military factor, until it would be eliminated at the time of the 1982 general elections. From the beginning, the Outch govemment ignored the military, restricting taLks to the govemment of Chin A Sen. This was hardly a realistic attitude. Oissati sfaction of radical lert-wing NMR members with the functioning of civilian govemment increased, as it became apparent that political problems were not being tackled. A plot against the govemment was laid. But the govemment quickly handed over power to Bouterse and Horb, and the conspirators were arresled. A new govemment was formed. with Chin A Sen now both as Prime Minister and President. According to the 1975 Constitution, however, the appointment of a President had to be approved by Parliament. Under the pretext of emergency constitutional law, the Constitution was temporarily suspended, and measures were ordered by decree. This lasted until 1987! It was decreed that govemi ng power within Surinam would rest with the President, the Ministerial Counci l and the military (i.e. with the mil i-

7


lary). Thus, Ihe mililary faclor in

govemment was actually legalized. Again, the DUlch gove mmenl supported the new govemment,

allhough Ihe slepping down of Dr. Ferrier as President was deplored. Fram that moment on, things starled 10 gel out of hand. March 1982 wilnessed an abortive coup d 'ĂŠlal by lieulenant Rambocus, who had earlier taken refuge in the Netherlands. In Ihe meanlime, Ihe people (nolably Ihe trade unions) had become less enthusiastic about the turn of events in Surinam : eleclions slill had 10 be called, ParIia-

ment was not functioning, and the military had Lo return to barracks. AI Ihe end of OClober 1982, Ihe Moederbond (MOIher Union: an

umbrella organization of lrade unions) proclaimed a general stri ke, which vinually paralyzed Ihe economy. Afte r negotiations with Moederbond chairrnan Cyrill Daal, Major Horb -speaking on behalf of the mililary- agreed 10 Iheir demands. Yel, il was Boulerse's underslanding Ihallhe union was encroaehing upan his power. He reacted in a violenl way. On 8 December 1982, his forces arresled and executed 15 prominent

members of Surinam society (including Daal and his second-incommand Horb. who was accused of conspiracy). These execulions are sjnce known as the December Murders. Thi s gross violation of human rights belaledly opened Ihe DUlch govemmenl 's eyes 10 the true nalure of Ihe regime. OUlslanding developmenl aid (1,7 billion guilders) was frozen. Of course, Ihe 1980 coup should have indicaled thallhings would evenlUally gel oul of hand. After Ihe discontinuance of DUlch developmenl aid, Ihe Surinam economy collapsed. Boulerse eslablished relations wilh queslionable

regimes, such as Maurice Bishop's in Grenada, Jerry Rawlin gs' in Ghana, as weil as with Fidel Castro and Muarnmar Kadhafi , Ihereby funher isolating himself from the international community. He became involved in cocaine smuggling. This was proven beyond any doubl when his second-incommand, Caplain Elienne Boerenveen, was arrested in Miami by

8

Ihe US Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 1986. Afler Ihe December Murders no one dared to offer resistance to the corrupt regime of Boulerse. Yel, in 1986 his fomler bodyguard Ronnie Brunswijk slarted a guerrilla oul of Easl-Surinam. Boulerse responded with terror against the maroon people of Easl-Surinam, Ihe peopIe Brunswijk belonged 10. Villages were bumt down. In November, in Ihe village of Moi Wana, 200 innocent civilians were killed by the arrny. These violalions of human righls we re confirrned by Amnesly Intemalional and Dr. Amos Wako. Ihe special rapporleur on human righls of Ihe UN. One fifth of Ihe maroon people fled 10 neighbouring French Guyana; loday, some 6.500 remain Ihere in refugee cam ps. The Nelherlands restricted itself 10 humanilarian aid. Boulerse reali zed Ihallhe moun ting polilical problems were gelling beyond his conlrol.ln 1987, general elections were called and a new Constitution was drafted. However, Ihe polilical parties in Parliament were Ihe same as before 1980, and the aulOnomous posilion of Ihe arrny was embedded in the Constitution for the nexl 5 years. Still, in 1988 Ihe Dulch MinisIer for Developmenl Cocperat ion, Bukman, decided 10 grant 125 million guilders worth of assistance. An important factor in this decision may have been the con sideralion Ih al Ihe granl would enabie Ihe civilian govemmenl gradually 10 reduce Ihe mililary faclOr. How illusive Ih al hope was! Bouterse is rumoured to have said in 1987: 'Til give Ihe govemmenl three years, and if Ihey faill'lI lake over again." Wilh Ihe coup d 'ĂŠlal of25 December 1990 he has apparenlly kepI his promise. Surinam has come full circle to (he situalion of 1980, wilh one slighl difference; Ihe Netherlands has losl all opportunily 10 influence the siluation in a positive way. Over and over again, Ihe DulCh govemment sent out the wrong signals 10 Paramaribo: firslly by condoning Ihe 1980 coup, secondIy by supporting !he NMR-controlled Chin A Sen govemment,

and lastl y by supplying bridging credils 10 Ihe Shankar govemmenl (also conlrolled by Ihe mililary). h should have adopled a moralisllegali sl auilude after Ihe 1980 coup, and nol afler the 1982 December Murders. The irony is, thallhe only person who strongly condemned Ihe 1980 coup, namely Jan Pronk, is now left 10 face Ihe music as Minister for Development Cooperation. IV. Conduding Remarks The foreign policy of Ihe NeIherlands has had ils ups and downs. The decolonization process has not been smoolh. Wilh regard 10 Surinam, fundamental mistakes were made: bUI Ihe lessons leamed are now being applied 10 Ihe Anlilles and Aruba. The DUlch moralisllegalist attitude has not consistentIy, if al all, been pUI inlo praclice. The security situation in Europe up 10 Ihe 1970s did nol allow for Ihal. The fUlUre anilUde of the Nelherlands in an EPU remains unclear. ft is clear. however, that when Ihe EPU has come aboul, the possibilities for a national foreign policy will be even more limited. As aresuh, Ihe Nelherlands will have 10 use skillful diplomacy. Whelher the resuhs of EPU policy will be beuer Ihan Ihose of Dutch policy remains to be seen. A European Communily of Iwelve member slales nol only has Iwe lve different cultural tradition s but also twelve different traditions of foreign policy. h is easy 10 see Ihal thi s wi ll bring aboul conniclS. The Gulf Crisis has demonstraled Ihis. While the EC adopted a single European slandpoinl and imposed sanclions on lraq, in Ihe hoslage crisis all member slales, including the Netherlands, went their own separate ways. When the EPU has materialized, every member state will have 10 give up part of ils foreign policy tradition. This probably means the end of DUlch moralisl-Iegalisl policy.


Diplomats Go Dutch By Jaap Reerink Ei Fra nk Kleibrink This article will describe some aspects of the Dutch Fo re ign Service, beginning with the education of fut ure Dutch diplo· mats. They are a lucky few. Will they become ambassador? If so, how do they spe nd their days and do they like it? In othe r words: wh at does it mean to be a diplomat of a sma ll count ry like the Nethe rlands? Mr J.G.N. de Hoop Scheffer, a one-time Dutch Permane nt Re presentative to NATO a nd curre ntly director of the Selection Committee of future diplomats and Mr AP. van Walsum, Director-General Polit ical Affairs of t he Dutch Foreign Minist ry, g ive an inside view.

given subject? De Hoop Scheffer: " He can do without the wife. Nowadays he may have a boyfriend! " The Ministry of Fore ig n Affairs is quile liberal in these matters. However, in practice a gay cDupJe would be doomed to a Scandinavian post. In some countries homosex ualit y is punishable by law. A gay ambassador has no business there. De Hoop Sc heffer agrees: "One does not send out an ort hodox l ew to Baghdad."

P ublic opinion tends to think th at the corps diplomatique consists entirely of law students of the Uni· versity of Leiden. All have been member of a fral.emity and most of them see m to be of noble birth. It goes witho ut saying that, after twenty years in the Service, they enjoy the spo ils of being an ambassador. Accordin g to De Hoop Scheffer

"1 know your country quite weil; I have just been to luxembourg"

th is image is incorrect or at least o utdated: "There is not a sin gle law student among the last ten applicants who were admitted 10 the training. FUlthennore, nowada ys you do not become am bassador as a maller of course. Some thirt y years ago pcople said: " h is his turn now." Thai is history !" The training of future diplomats takes nine months. It consisls of

courses in international affairs, lang uages, and the subtieties of diplomacy. The interest in the training is overwhe lming. Last year, over 1700 people applied for the 40 available posts. Therefore the select ion is tough. Wh y do people want to become a diplomat? De Hoop Scheffer: " If you want to make a rast buck. do not bo ther to apply! On the ot he r hand, if you Iike change and vari ety in yaur wo rk , yo u are bound to feel at ho me at the Foreign Ministry. At any given embassy, your

may deal with such different sub·

jects as economics, culture, polities and tattl e at cocktail ho ur." There is na doubt salaries of beginning diplomats are low. espe· ciall y w hen compared 10 the money theiT peers in business

make. Howeve r, " as a representative of your cou ntry. you enjoy a

status which is invaluable. Vou are somebody!" At thi s point De Hoop Scheffer is beaming. "Neven heless, in my op in ion salaries sho ul d go up. This is necessary 10 altract well-qualified people and to prevent them from stepping over 10

trade and industry."

Wife or Boyfrie nd? Is every ambassador married to a cultured woman, who can gracefully make conversation on any

loop Reerink ond Frank Kleibrink are editors of

loson Magazine.

The eve ryday life of an ambassador varies reportin g 10 and tak ing orde rs from The Hague, to advanc ing contacts. Social obli gation s play an important role. De Hoop Scheffer: "The coming and goi ng of all types of Dutch visitors, who are eager 10 put their feet under thc

ambassadors tabie. is a lime-consumin g business. Also, an ambassador typically spends a lot of time at the airpon, wa iting for a plane that is ei ther delayed or will never arrive." According to De Hoop Scheffe r represenlalion is very impo rtant. especiall y on th e bigge r postin gs: "A co untry such as the Net he r· lands has to put itself o n the map. Otherwise you run the ri sk that some American Se nator te lls you: " I know your country q uite weil : I have just been in Luxembourg·'. Only when problems arise, you become interesting. Some years ago, when we we re considerin g 10 stali on crui se miss iles, we were c learl yon the map in Washing· ton ."

Cammittee far future

On Line?

Jasan),

Mr. I.G.N. de Hoop Scheffer, farmer Netherlands ' Permanent Representative

ta Nota, Chairman af the Selectian diplamats (phata

Ever-improving communica ti ons do not seem 10 leave the ambassador much latitude in making hi s

9


own policy. According to Van Walsurn, Director-General Politi-

the European Community our

Walsum, the current Director路General

cal Affairs, instruetions from The

down to same extent, but elsewhe-

Political Affairs of the Netherlands '

Hague have become "both more comprehensive and specific. Also,

re they tend to grow. The Foreign Service will constantly have to

Foreign Ministry

an ambassador is expected to

adapt itself 10 ne w cireumstanees. but it seem s to be here to stay",

Mr. A.P. van

(photo Jason).

Embassies have already slimmed

report back more quickly. On the other hand, thanks to these same modem communieations he has

almast as much access to {he Juli pielt/re as The Hague has. As a result, he can carry on considera-

bl y more sophisticated discussions than he would have been able to 25 years ago." Despite improved communications, the ambassador is not

always in line with The Hague. Van Walsum rep lies diplomaticalIy' " From time to time strong disagreements may occur as to what

needs to be done. However, both parties have the same interest at

heart, i.e. that of the Netherlands. If an ambassador has a good case and is capable of stating it effectively, his views are likel y to prevail, unless they are overridden by wider interests as pereeived by

"Feeling weil above the Danes"

the political interests of its country. Do economie eonsiderations earry most weight? Van Wal surn: Hit is impossible to

state that one type of consideration will carry more weight than another. Any conclusion reaehed on a given issue will invariably be based on a mix of considerations.

The political interests of a country such as the Netherlands are to a large ex tent determined by our economic interests. However, other interests such as security, arm s control , human ri ghts, and

development all add up to our The Hague." Communications have another dimension. Ouring the Romanian revolution last December, the

Dutch ambassador Stork was acting rather like a special corre-

spondent informing the public, than as a representative of the

Dutch govemment. " Perhaps he went toa faro His first duty should have been to inform the Minister

Deathblow Ifthe EC carries out her ambitious program and European integration

becomes a fact, decisions wi ll be made in Brussels. Embassies of smaller eountries may become

obsolete. In short, will Europe 1992 be the deathblow to the

may infonn its govemment aecor-

Foreign Service? Van Wal sum finds it "interestin g to note that as of now, (here are no Franco-German, Benelux, let alone European eommunity embassies. One of the reasons is that no matter how enthusiasti eally we pool our visa sections or share our information on the domestic political scene, we continue to be competitors in the economie fi eld." "It seems inevitable that sooner or later the European integration process will somehaw be reflected in the size and structure of our

dingly." An Embassy is there to look after

Foreign Service, but it is difficult to predict how and when. Within

of Foreign Affairs. The man is, after all, his employer", says De Hoop Scheffer. Polities

According to Van Walsurn, " the primary political function of an Embassy is to serve as the formal embodiment of the relations that exist between two sovereign sta-

tes. In practi ce, the political staff of an Embassy will typically be engaged in trying to grasp all angles of the local political scene sa it

10

political interests. Polities encompasses everything."

says Van Walsurn. Sa, the Dutch diplomat does have a future. What distingui shes him from foreign diplomats? De Hoop Scheffer is very decisive: "The Dutch diplomat has a nair for languages, and is well-informed. People tend to think of him as a reliable sart of chap. It must be said though, that we sometimes overstate the importanee of the Netherlands. We wou ld Iike to eompare ourselves with countries

like Germany and Britain, whi le feeling we il above the Danes. However, generally speaking the Dutch diplomat is looked upon benignly."


JASON ON THE SPOT

Tale of Two Conferences Report

On Wednesday, 28 November 1990 the jason Foundation for International Affairs organized the conference furope, Quo Vodis? to commemorate its 15th anniversary. Topic of the conference was the recent Paris summit of another -much grander- one; the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) . jason's birthday-feast took place in the International Court of justice in the Hague. Some 200 people were in on it, most of them students who are not bothered by such mundane things as working from 9 to 5. In his opening address Mr M. Patijn, Sec retary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Defence, briefly commented on the freshly signed treaty for the red uction of con ventional forces in Europe. According 10 Patijn , ane of the most impor-

tant aspecIs of the accord is the slIfficiency rule, that prohibils any country from having more than roughly a third of all weapon systern s of a certain category. The sufficiency rule was designed specificall y 10 cu rb Soviet military potential. It went down weil with the Eastern European countries. Patijn al 50 drew attention to "the unprecedented and very intrusive inspection regime". The treaty provides for inspections on the spot, "guaranleeing a ncw openness and far more tran sparance in military matters". Patijn concluded th at the inspection regime itself is "one of the pillars of the new sec urity structure in Europe". One of the results of the Paris summit is the attempt to turn the CSCE, up to now just aprocess, into an institution. The 34 participating states agreed to set up a sec retariat in Prague and a Confli ct Pre ve ntion Centre (CPC) in Vienna. In some quarters there are high hopes that the new ly structu red CSCE will eventuall y replace NATO and the Warsaw pact. Maybe so. For the time being however, Patijn preferred " NATO 10 stay out of the museum". In hi s talk, Mr M. van der Stoel,

Net herl ands Fore ign Minister at the time of the He lsinki Final Act ( 1975), outlined the cons iderabie progress made in the fie ld of human rights w ithin the CSCE framework. Dr. Rudy V. Peri na, who is tipped to become director of the CPC in Vi enna , spoke nex l. He cred ited Gorbachev for giving the CSCE new impulses. As a member of the US delegation , Pe rina has been involved in the CSCE talks. According la him , the Russ ians have only recentl y given up th eir unflinching standpoims. As a res ult , negotiation s have become more fruitful.

The next speaker was Dr. KJ. Citron, the Gennan ambassador to the Nethe rl ands. It was only weeks before the confe rence th at he presented hi s Letters of Credence to the Queen. Citron traeed the beginnings of the CS CE. He stressed the importance of the Helsi nki Final Act: "Quite a number of those who signed it. did not rea li ze wh at it meant. " Citron then menti o ned some of those "who we re swept away by the late results of the ir signature": Honecker, Zhivkov, Husak , Ceaucescu. After lunchtime, people were encouraged 10 take part in workshops dealin g with the different baskets of the CSCE. The following panel di sc ussion was a bit of a let-down. The argument concentrated on the expected relaxation of Soviet emi gration laws. The main di sagree menl seemed 10 be over as to how Ihe Russians wo uld sneak into th e West; by car, bus, train , o r on foot. This discussion was 10 be continued over cocktail s, wh ich were -appropriale ly - se rved in the late aftemoon. to celebrate Jason 's 151h anniversary.

This report was made

by Jaap Reerink, editor of Jason Magazine.

Dr. K.I. Gtron, the

new German ambassador to the Netherlands, during his speech at the conference (p hoto lason).

"


The Netherlands and the European Community By J.l. Sussana Mr IL Sussana holds

0

8ochelor's degree in Engineering ond is

0

stoff member of the Communication Directorate of the Netherlands Foreign Trade Agency.

Figure 1.: International comparisons of per capita GNP.

12

The European Community, in which 12 European countries are currently united, has developed very rapidly in recent years. The twelve governments have growing closer with increasing speed not only economically, but also increasingly in financial and political terms. The governments of the member states are represented directly in the Council of Ministers. This Council is the body in which decisions are made on the shape of a United Europe. The presidency of the Council is held in turns. The Netherlands will accept the presidency in July 1991 and will then lead the process of uniting all these different economies in a single European market. In 1987, the process of unification accelerated significantly when I January 1993 was set as the target date for full integration. By th is date, completely free movement of people, goods, services and capital must be achieved. From the very first, the Netherlands promoted the cause of the economic and political unification of Europe. As early as 1952, the Netherlands was one of the participants in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) along with West Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg. Even then, people were working for the integration of the national European economies inta a single European economy. As a result, in 1957 the European Economie Community was founded , with the signing of the Treaty of Rome. At the same time, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was founded. In 1967, the three Communities (the EEC, ECSC and Euratom) merged in the European Community. On I January 1973 the European Community was en larged when Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined. These were followed into the European Community in 1981 by Greece, while Spain and Portugal became members in

1986, so that the European Community now eomprises 12 member states with a total population of 325 million. This compares with the United States of America's population of 234 million , the Soviet Union's population of270 million and Japan 's 119 million.

The Netherlands' Share of Europe's Economy On the map of Europe, the Netherlands is not very impressive in

tenns of size. lts area compares with that of Switzerland. Contrary to what one would expeet from its geographi cal size and its population of 15 million, the Netherlands' economic achievements are ho wever impressive. In tenns of Gross National Product (GNP) the Netherlands ' economy is bigger than that of countries sueh as Sweden and Switzerland. The Netherlands ' GNP puts it in sixth place in Europe behind Gennany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. Looked at from agiobal perspective, Dutch GNP ranks 13th. Another measure of the strength of the economy is the trend in consumer prices. Dutch inflation has been among the Jowest in the world over the last five years. matching the level of inflation in countries such as Japan and the Federal Republic of Gennany. The very low level of wage rises in the 1980s contributed greatly to this. The Netherlands' Central Bank's

comparison of Gross National Product in 1989 Countries United States Japan Fed. Rep. of Germany Francs Oenmarl< ltaly United Kingdom The Netherlands Belgium European Community Spain Ireland Portugal

GNP GNP per capita (bin US SI (Ppp·S·, EC . 1001

5,178.5 2.807.7 1,167.8 926.4 102.2 857.0 805.8 219.6 146.0 4,732.1 369.7 32.2 44.3

154.5 115.8 113.3 108.5 108.0 105.1 104.6 103.5_ 102.4 100.0. 75.7 66.0 54.5

-

• PPP is PurchlSing Power Panty Souree: EC; estimates to latlst netianel fivures.

The Netherlands is one of the smaller member states of the European Community with respect to surface area. However, it ranks among the medium-large economies ith respect to votume of the GNP.


policy over a number of years of

plier of industrial hi gh tech eq uipment and consumcr products. The Netherlands' share of West Ger-

maintaining a slabJe guilder exchange rate and thereby obtaining the greatest possible pri ce stability has been very successful. Moreover the Netherlands' traditional balance of payments surpl us puts it among that select group of countries with balance of pay-

man y's imports is greater than that

and West Germany.

of the United States o r the United Kingdom. Another illustration of the stren gth of Dutch ex ports is the fact that the Netherlands is one of the very few countries in the world with a trade surplu s with West Germany.

Europe's Fourth Biggest Exporter

Transporter for the European Community

The surplus on the CUITent account of the balance of payments is mainl y due to the performance of visible export s. Th e Netherlands' export figures put it among the world 's top 10 ex port countries and the top four in the European Community. The value of total Dutch exports is equal to that of Switzerland and Sweden together and almast as large as the total value ofthe Soviet Union's exports. The major export markets are the European Community (75.3 per cent of total exports), followed by the EFTA cu untries (6.5 per cent oftotal exports) and the US (4.5 per cent of total exports). Within the European Community, West Germany is the larges t export market. In thi s sophi sticated, very demanding market, the Netherlands is the second biggest sup-

In addition to the ex port of goods produced by domestic manufactu rers, the Netherlands has an extensive commercial serv ices sector, whi ch is very international in o utlook. When one looks at last year 's figures it is strikin g that in visibl e exports rose faster than visible exports. The serv ices of transport companies and constructi on compani es were large ly responsible for this. lts geographical situati on destined the Netherlands to be the port of entry for goods traffi c by sea from the United States to Europe. lts Lheun:lical di sLribuLiun pULe nlial was trans lated into commercial success when trade barriers were abolished in Europe and the Netherlands became the port of entry for transhipment to the European hinterland. This entrepot funclion also attracted many

ments surpluses including Japan

Exports and imports of goods and services as percentage of tIle GNP in 1989 Countrie. Exports Imports Ireland Fad. Rep. of Germany

70.0 31.3

60.7 25.7

58.2

54.7

34.7

31.6

72.6

ltaly

75.2 t2.0 28.5 20.3

France

23.3

23.3

9.0 19.5

tl .0 22.0

24.9 36.1

28.7 463

The Netharlands Denmarlt Selgium & luxemburg Japan EC-12

United States Spain United Kingdom Portugal Source: EC.

Trade Salanee

=

9.8

28.2. 20.2

The Europaan Communfty represents a prosperous economie power in the world; only four of the twelve member st8tes have a negative trade balance.

foreig n production companies. Thanks 10 the infrastructure and the storage facilities offered by the sea- and airports, the Netherlands has become a major transhipme nt location for goods traffic from America and Asia to the industries of the European hinterland . The Netherlands' hi ghl y develo ped di stributi on fun ctio n has given tran sport companies a large share of the European transport market. Deve lopments in aviation have meant thi s transport and di stributio n function has grow n into a commercial operatio n which today reaches far beyond Europe alone. Schiphol airport, for exampl e, also function s as a l(}Calion fo r the di stribution of goods from America to the Middle East and North Africa. This has helped to make Schiphol the fourth biggest airport in the European Communily in tems of freight and fifth in terms of passenger movem ents. Dutch seaports' share of the total shippin g arrivals in the area from Northern Germany to Southem Spain is over 40 per cent. The Netherlands also has a major share in the di stribution of goods from the seaports on the Dutch coast to the European hinterl and via inland waterways and roads. Around 40 per cent of internation al transport via Western European waterways is supplied by Dutch companies. In the fi eld of international road haulage, Dutch road hauliers account for more lhan a quarter of the total cross-border road tran sport within the EC. The Dutch govemment is working to libera li ze the transport of goods and people even more in Europe and is traditionally a champion of free trade in the European Community. One result of th is is the customs union established by the Benelux countries. This economic union between Be lgi um , the Netherlands and Luxembourg represents one of the most advanced fonn s of international economic co-operation in the world, and is therefore a model for the European Community as a who Ie.

Financial Gateway to Europe All these trading and transport

Figure 2.: EC comparisons of value of visible exports.

13


aClivilies are su pponed by a DUlch

t誰nancial sector which is strongly intemational -minded. Amsterdam in particular function s nOl only as a financial centTe for Dutch businesses bUI also fulfills a funclion as a t誰nancial gateway 10 Europe. The largesl DUlch bank, Ihe ABN AMRO Holding. is Ihe only European bank wilh offices in all 12 member states of the COlTIlllunity. The major DUlch banks have strong ties with North Arnerica. Rabobank and NMB Poslbank Group have offices in Atlant3,

Chicago, Los Angeles. New York. HousIOn. Philadelphia. BosIon. Lisie, Miami. Pittsburgh. San Francisco and Seailie. ABN AMRO Bank in panicular is slrong ly present in Ihe Uniled Stales and has a major share of Ihe t誰nancial market in Illinois. among others. The Amsterdam Bourse ranks as Ihe fifth largesl slock exchange in Europe. wilh Ihal of Milan. behind London, Zurich, Paris and Frankfun bul clearly in fronl of Brussels and (he Scandinavian stock exchanges. The Amsterdam Bourse is remarkable for its international nalUre, which is shown by Ihe large number of foreign slocks and bonds lisled. Ranked according la the number of foreign companies lisled il is second only la London. The majorily of these foreign com-

panies are from lhe United States, while around 2S companies are Japanese.

Manufacturing Industry The Dulch economy has a very versali le domestic manufacturing industry, in which every high lech sector is represented, from the manufacture of integrated circuits to aerospace product ion and biolechnology. The two largesl seclors are Ihe food process ing and chemicals industries. These sectors account for over half of Ihe Nelherlands ' indUSlrial tumover.

Chemicals Industry The Dutch chemicals industry is relalively large by European standards. accounting for seven per cent of the industry's turnover in the European Communily. This sector occupies a remarkab le posi-

14

tion within DUlch industry as a whoie: employing only 10% of Ihe industrial workforce, it is Ihe major DUlc h expon induslry. This is panly accounled for by the facl thai among Dutch chemicals companies are a number of multinational s, such as Shell Chemie. DSM and Akzo, which are among Ihe 13 largest chemical concerns in the world. These companies are largely supplied with raw materials by five extrcmely large oil refineries near Rolterdam. AnOlher important raw material is natural gas found in the Nelherlands and in the DulCh COIllinental Shelf in Ihe Nonh Sea. All the EC countrics use this gas 10 a greater or lesser exlenl as a raw malerial or f uel. For example, the Nelherlands su pplies around 25 per cenl of West Gennany's natural gas needs via Ihe European gas supply nelwork. Chem icals produclion in the Netherlands consisls mainly of bulk chemicals. In addition recent years have seen Ihe ri se of specialty chemica Is, wilh new hi gh chem producls for hi ghly-specialised applicalions. One example of Ihis is chemicals of extremely high purity for Ihe micro-electronics induslry. In addition 10 these electronic chemicals Ihe Netherlands produces calalyslS for the petrochemicai induslry and environmenlal chemicals for breaking down pollulion which harm s the environment. Intennediate produels for anlibiolics and card iovascular remedies are among the innovative products with which the DUlch chemical industry has been able 10 strengthen its international position.

The Biodelta of Europe Within Ihe chemicals industry, and even more in the food processing sector, advanced research is taJdng place in the applicalion of biotechnology la replace chemical processes. DUlch sales of advanced bi 0technology producls amounl 10 some ten to eleven billion guilders a year. Thai represents around seven per cent of the world markeI. In Ihe Iradilionally strong agri business seclor and the pharmaceutical industry, great

advances have been made in the applicalion of new biolechnology. Alt hough al the momenl hundreds of enzymes are available on a laboralory sca le, on ly around 20 enzymes are produced on an industrial scale. Gist 8rocades is the second biggest producer of enzymes in the world and supplies Ihem, for example, for Ihe pre paration of wines. fruit juices and beer. Imponant for the soft drink s industry is the new sweetener aspaname. The di sadvanlages of Ihe chemical melhod of producing thi s s ubstance are helped with enzymatic product ion melhods such as those applied by DSM. Healthy li veslock are vilally imponanl for food production. Inlervel has built up a strong posilion in most West-European countries in the area of endocrinological preparations and vaccines. In fact it is currently one of the ten biggest vaccine producers in the world. Intervel has developed an intemationally successful programme of vaccines for livestock, poultry, dogs, cats and recentl y horses, in order la prevent the spread of fatal virus diseases. lIS knowledge in Ihe field of recombinanl DNA lechniques has enabled Intervel la become the firsl producer in the world 10 launch lwO vaccines for the prevenlion of infectious diarrhoea in pigs and calves, based on the applicalion of genetic manipulation. In addition to veterinary science, Dutch companies have done pioneering work in applying biotechnology to manufacture products for human medici nes. One of Ihe most important medici nes de veloped thi s century is penicillin. Gist Brocades produces 25% of the world 's penicillin. Modified micro-organisms have been used in the Netherlands for a number of years to purify in dustrial sewage. The results of the research activilies of the Netherlands' biolechnology sector are among the best in the European Community. This is illustrated by the Netherlands' 13 per cent share of financial suppon from the European biolechnology developmenl fund BRIDGE.


Europe's Largest Agricultural Exporter Research in stitutes in the agricul-

tUTal sector and the food processin g industry devote a g reat deal of atlent ion lO breed in g hi gh-qualil y plants, so thai food plants ha ve more food value or a better taste.

Such qualities as resistance to drought and diseases are also

improved. Dutch companies are commercially involved in plant biotechnology. In a period of e ig hteen month s they developed a virus resistant palata variety.

Using traditional techniques this process takes between 10 and 15 years. With the new technology it

is now possible to introduce mullipl e resistances inta a large num-

ber of differe nt vegetables. Thanks 10 Ihe high leve l of agricultural

research in the Netherlands, DUlch agricu lture and horticulture has a very hi gh yie ld per hectare. Com-

bined with its world-wide distribution network, thi s makes the Netherlands the third largest exporter of farm products in the world. The country is known as the garden of Europe, from which

fresh fruit and vegetables are di stributed daily to all corners of

~

Europe. Every day vege lables. fruit and cut flowers are also delivered to far-off destinations in the United States and Japan. Besides thi s the Netherlands is the world's largest exporter for products as potatoes, cocoa- and dairy products. In order to process thi s enomlOUS quantity of agricultural produce. fanners have a wide range of advanced machinery at their disposa i, a lmost all of which has been developed by the domesti c agricultural machinery sector. This sector 's products are so successful thai exports currently account for over half of its tumover. A large proportion of these agricultural products are ho wever processed in Ihe domestic food process in g industTY. The largest company in Ihis sector is Uni lever, with world wide sales of around US$ 3 1 billion. The Dutch machi ne industry has des ign cd and manufactured hi ghl y automated producti on lines for the processing and packaging of almast every sart of food and drink.

The Transport Industry The success of the agricu ltural sector is in large measure due 10

the Netherland s' hig hl y deve loped distribution function in Europe. The tran sport industry has speciaIised tran sport equipment al its di sposal with which everythin g from perishabie goods and sensitive electron ic equipment to complete offshore oi l platforms can be carried quickly and safely to anywhere in th e world. All of these specialised transport services are deve loped in close co-operatian wi th the national veh icle industry. In the Southem Netherlands, truck produce r Daf Trucks not only supplies Dutch road haulage companies but has develaped in a hi g hl y competiti ve market inlo the sixth bi ggest suppli er of truck s in Europe. Within the vehicle industry many companies have also developed as suppliers of components to the European automobile industry. For example, all of the cars produced by West Germany's automobile industry contain many DUlch components, and steel producer Hoogovens s upplies hi gh quality steel for the bodywork of a lm ost all European car producers. But the outstanding qualily of the industry's components For aircrafl, trains and trucks, toa, means they are in

1

~ r~f-lI' I 111 i

'f

Container transport by road (photo Het

Economisch Dagblad).

15


great demand from, for example, the produce rs of France 's high-

Protector of the European Environment

speed trains.

16

Following a difflcult period for the European shipbuilding industry, thi s sector has recovered again in the Netherlands, Dutch shipyards have onee more given the Netherlands a place in Lloyds' " Ieading countries" list of the top 20 shipbuilding nalions in the world. Dutch shipyards are currently concentrating mOfe and mOfe on (he construction of specialised ships such as tugs, fishing boats, dredgers, gas tankers, high-speed ships and refrigerated ships. In order to improve meir productivity and the quality of meir products, most of the shipyards now have covered production facilities. In aircraft production, Fokker is profiting from the boom in aviation. The success of its new shortand medium-haul aircraft, the Fokker 50 and the Fokker 100, has made the company one of the biggest aircraft manufacturers in the world. It has sec ured a promising future and left many other European aircraft manufacturers behind, partly because its new model s are among the few which comply with strict govemment noi se contrals in the United States.

In the past fifteen years environmental legislation has grown markedly in many countries. In the European Community the Dutch govemment, in particu lar, argued for a European e nvironment policy. In order to implement thi s policy Dutch companies set about developing the necessary environmental technology from an early stage. As aresuIt thi s technology became a specialty of many engi neering bureaux. The standard of environmental technology in the Netherlands is now so high that there is already a li vely export trade. This includes products and serv ices for the purification of industrial effluent, for example by means of anaerobic purification and membrane fi ltration. Much equipment has also been built for removing oil slicks from the sea and for processing chemical waste. The first successful operation to clean up an oil spillage in the NOl1h Sea was carried out usi ng Dutch equipment. Automated machinery for separating different types of household refuse has also been produced to aid the recycling of domestic waste.

The Offshore Sector

Information Technology

Following the Nederlands Aardolie Maatschappij's di scovery of one of the world 's biggest gas fields in the Northern Netherlands in 1959, it was decided to drill for oil and gas in the North Sea, too. Dutch industry was involved in the development of oil and gas fields in the North Sea from the beginning. This has contributed to the development of the offshore sector into an intemationally recognised designer and producer of offshore constructions, both for North Sea depths and for greater depths of water and ATelie conditions. Another major part of this industry is the service sector. The companies in this sector provide erane ships for instaHing large offshore constructions at sea. In addition their salvage ships are intemationally famous for moving and salvaging offshore platforms and oil tanke rs.

The effects of information technology have made themselves feit in al most all areas of Dutch soc iety, and have produced both astrong computer services sector and a micro-electronics industry. Software bureau x form an important part of the computer serv ices sector. They have been responsible for much of the automation of the traditionally strong sectors of the Dutch economy and have also developed internalional appl ication s, so that they now export their products to almast all the indusnialised countries of the world. For example, Dutch software plays an important role in the European space program me. Closely connected with automation in the Netherlands is the micro-electronics industry. The electronie instrumentation sector demands the presence of astrong production unit for components.

The Netherlands has the largest integrated c ircuit factory in Europe, which is fully competitive with both the United States and Japan, particularly in silicon MOS and bipolar technology. Since there are now about 60 factori es in Europe producing integraled circuits and semi conductors, a major cluster of suppliers for the semi conductor industry has also developed in the Netherlands. In add ition to components, the Netherlands is internationall y successful in producing consumer electronics, medical equipment and office machines. In this last field, the Netherlands boasts internationally renowned companies such as Tulip Computers (personal computers), Oce van der Grinten (photocopiers), and Philips (con sumer electronics, eleclronic components and profess ional electron ic systems). Medical equipment is a major export product. Over 90% of the instruments produced are destined for export. The product range largely consists of lung function equipment, programmabie pacemakers, X-ray systems, and NMR (Nuclear Magnetic Resonance) and CT (Computer Tomography) system s for medical diagnostics. The trend in X-ray and ultrasonic diagnostic equipment is towards smaller and lighter machines for use in doctors' surgeries and outpatient departments. This offers many new diag nostic poss ibilities for doctors. In the field of consumer electronies, Dutch electronics group PhiIips is the on ly company which has been able to withstand the competi ti on from the Japanese. Philips is WORLD'S LARGEST SEAPORTS, 1989

Million ton nes I. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

ROTTERDAM Singapore Kobe New York Shanghai Yokohama

291.8 174.0 167.2 Japan 147.0 146.0 China 119.0 Japan

Sow'ce: Rotterdam Port Authority


Netherl ands' sa les and exports in 1988 Total sales Ix mln D!I.I Petrochemical, chemical & building industry 70.730 ' -_ _- 'o",... =_~~~

Food industry Electrotechnical industry & transport

Metal & machine

70,000

L=~IlI ~=J!!!!!!!I!!I!!!I!II!l1!I

':=Jn ~ _ ~:l!!!!.!!!!!!!II!!!I 40,360 L

indu stry

38,110

Wood, pa per & printing industry

26,920

Textile. clothing & leather indu stry

7,350

Sou ree: CBS.

one of the leading partners in European co-operati on in (he development of Hi gh Definiti on Te levision (HDTV) and one of the three biggest European companies in the development of sub-micron technology. Many Dutch compani es are cooperating in European tec hnology program mes. Considering the size of the Dutc h industry, it has a relati ve ly large share in th e European prog rammes. Five years of internati onal co-operation in the Eureka program me have produced over 300 projects, of which Dutch companies are involved in a quarter. In the framework of pure and applied scie nce projects in the COST programme, the Netherlands paJ1i cipates in around 90 per cent of all projects.

ineering companies have nonethe-

less succeeded in building structu res in this environment, varying from skyscrapers 10 tunnels under ri vers. Abroad, 100, Dutch contractors have built everyth ing from complete eities 10 infrastructure such as ports and roads. A major aspect of building on soft soil is

expertise in soil mechanics. In the

The Netherland s' situation on very soft ground at the mouth of a num-

Nethe rl and s it is particul arl y important to know the qualit ies of the soi l befare buildi ngs can be constructed. Soil mechani cs had therefore become a Dutc h specialty which is much in demand abroad. Another tradit ional Dutch specialty is dredging. Dutch dredging companies are international leaders both in technology and in market share. T hey were building pons and making rivers navigable all over the worl d as long ago as the last century. They currentl y tackle morc and more difficult projects ranging from crealing artifi -

ber of large ri vers demands specia-

cial islands in aTelie waters to buil-

list experti se in building bridges, roads and buildings. With the help of ingenious techniques. civil eng-

ding bridges between islands and the ma in land across kil ometres of open sea.

Civil Engineering

MAJOR WESTERN EUROPEAN AIRPORTS 1989 Passenger movements (l000s)

I. London 2. Pari s 3. Frankfurt 4. Rome 5. AMSTERDAM 6. Stockholm

62,576

44,958 26,670 16,526 15,668

15,41 9

SOl/ree: Schiphol Airport Amsterdam

occur in the terti ary sector. primarily due to a large rise in the transport sector. In industry one expects th at the strongest effects on producti on will occur in the chemical and metal industri es. By comparison with the chemical industry in the EC, the Dutch chemica I indu stry has na di sad vantages of scale. Finally same remark s about th e factors that will innuence the places where companies set up business. The aboliton of the barriers within the EC will change the siLing pattems. In particular [he restructuring and enlargement of scale in industry and the much sharper competition will innuence decisions about location. The geographical situation of the Netherl ands is indeed somewhat off-center but not reall y unfavorable. Thank s to Schipho l Airport and tbe port of Rotterdam, the starting position of the Netherlands is very favorabi e. The Netherl ands is an attracti ve locati on for companies thal desire good intercontinental connecti ons and good di stribution possibilitics on a European scale.

Expectations It is probable th at the Netherlands, with its very open economy, wil! profi l somewhat more from Europe 1992 than will the average EC coun try. The Dutch market has traditionall y been easi ly accessible fOT foreign competition, sa that a further opening of all EC markets will mean that the Netherl ands has more 10 win than 10 lose. Not all sectors will profit equall y from European integration. The largcst production effects wi ll probab ly

17


The World Economy After "Europe 1992" Interview

Or. W Dekker wos interviewed by Moreel

Ruiter, editor of Joson Magazine.

On 17 December 1990, Jason Magazine interviewed Dr. W. Dekker, Chairman of the Board of the Philips Corporation (and a member of the European Round Table of Industrialists), in his Eindhoven office. A variety of topics was covered, including trade relations vis-a-vis Japan and the United States, as weil as the relations between Eastern Europe and the European Community. DW'ill g tlle conference of European gO\'emmel1lleaders in Rome . Europeall il1legratioll (t he European Political Ullio" mul Europeall MOl/etary Unio,,) was discussed. Tlle questioll arises ij the process of integration follows a certain plalllinked to a time-limit . What is your command 0 11 the time- limit . alld is tlle proces.\' of imegratioll bellind or ahead of selledule? Dekker: "I am nol sure if il is moving according to a time-tab Ie, It is important 10 know thai decisions were made which ex press Ihe willingness la continue the process of European integralion . Experience has learned us that many issues which we thou ght were very difficult la diseuss and la execute, moved faster in praetice than was to be expected. The European Political Union (EPU) and the European Monetary Union EMU) will go the same way. Two different farces affectthis process when il has been made subject of discussion. Farces from the inside: economie and industrial farces which say th at it has to be done, especially for self-prese rva路 tion. The European RoulUI Tahle of Indu.\'trialists says that the European integration has to be completed. And farces from the outside, making it necessary to accomplish the process of integration. The

18

EPU has to be established, because of the developments which take place in the world. An EPU can signal that Europe is ready to take its place in world pol itics. In prac路 tice you can see thai each member of the European Community fo llows its own strategy. But the fact is, they exprcss Iheir willingness la come la an EPU, and that is of great importance. The EM U has la he eSlablished, because of financial and economie reasons, which are also eaused by developmenls from Ihe outside expressing the urgency of the process. But 10 go back to your question, I am very optim isti c and glad it is happenin g." What is )'our opin ion offlle progress ofthe imemal market. and is tlle economie preparation slIffi eiel1t ? De kke r: " Yes. But the internal market, wh iclt must be accomplished on the lirst of January 1993, mUSI not be seen as a date but more as aprocess. Everybody agrees that it is a process which cannot be stopped anymore. We should remember, however, that opinions were different about th is subject only three years ago. Large companies are very weil prepared for 1992. More than befare, they look to their own establishments and reorganization

againstthe background of the entire European deve lopments. Partly because of certain mergers and acqu isi tions which took place in the past by European industries and are sti ll happening. Sa they are we il prepared for the unification of Europe. This only concerns the European side of the story. The advantages unification offer la European industry are also offered to nonEuropean industry, especiall y to the Americans and Ihe Japanese, The Un ited States behave as good 贸 ri:ells on the European market. Japan has a typi cal attitude lowards foreign companies wanting la invest in th eir country. We should reply la Iheir investments in Europe with Ihe principle of national treatment. Confronted as we are with Ameri can and Japanese investments in the European market. we do not have any problems with the United States because of their open market. but we do have proble ms with the access to the (protec ted) Japanese market. Shop keepers and small entre pre路 neurs are. at least in the Netherlands, not weil prepared for the unification of Europe." /s Ihe dale of / .Ia/lllary /993 /lOl a beatifie alle to you? Dekke r: "Of course, you cannot let it go, this date. But do not expect la lind a brand new Europe when you wake up on th at day. But there are measures in force whieh will clearly show lhal European uni ty ex ists. or is bound to exist in a very short time. There will he same unsol ved problems, but in general the resistance is more of a political nature than economie."


When the intema/ market ftnally has come info being, will {here be Gny consequences for tlle eeonomy of El/rope in the shape of mergers, changing seales, fJOSilions of competition between large industries? Dekker: "Undoubtedly. Why has European industry worked sa hard 10

accomplish a European intemal

market? Ta work on a larger scale for themselves (economies of scale, ed.). Not only the production of the industrial sector, but

also distribution is very important. It gives European industry an advantage and they want to go in that direction. It also farces industry in tWQ directions. Firstly, all activities not principal to the company will he abandoned. You see it happening at Philips these day s. Co-makership, which is a highly developed production model in the United States and Japan, becomes more important in

Europe toa. Companies are seekin g cooperation with ather com-

panies, which leads to mergers and acquisitions."

Japan WhOl will be the consequencesfor DutelI companies in Iheir competitive relations with the United Stares and Japan. when fhe Nelher/ands are a part of the internal marker? Dekker: " In my opinion, the competitive strength of Dutch campanies wilJ be reinforeed by a European unification. It is the background of a huge European market that gives these companies this advantage. We are not worried about our re!ations with the United States, although there are trends to perceive which point to protectionism. Japanese investments in the United States make them worry about their own economy (Japan taking over typical large American companies, ed.). American legislation is being prepared to make investments in the US much more difficult. Thi s also concerns Europe, because we get the same treatm ent as the Japanese. That is the reason why the European Commission and the European Round Tab/e of InduSfrialisfS are tryin g to come to

a dialogue with the us about how to react to the protected market of Japan. Japan is free to invest all over the world, but there are limited oppot1unities for foreign companies investment in Japan. If the United States plan to regulate foreign investments, it might lead to a conflict with Europe. Thi s must be prevented at all times. That is why a dialogue with the US is vital. Such a dialogue is al most impossible with Japan. With regard to Japan , the US and Europe are in the same position."

Do yOlt rOf/sテ仕er it possible rhar lhe Ullited States and Europe will face Japan with harsh demands eoneerning fhe opening ofthe Japanese markel? And, when Japan does not reaet, wil! we alld the US adopt restriclive measures against Japan ? Dekker: " In theory yes, in practice no! The Japanese have always succeeded in going their own way. They never give up any oftheir regulations. Gradually the Japanese market will open up, but they will never reach the openness we know in Europe and the United States. Por Europe ir is important to look at the US in their relation to Japan, and ask ourselves whether we want the same thing to happen in our relation 10 Japan . You have to take into account a certain dependence bet ween Europe, Japan and the United States. Obtaining mutual interdepende ncy is a good thing."

Dekker: "Same changes yes, but not enough to solve our problems with Japan. Take for example the call for a four-days working week in Europe, which is highly in fashion. The Japanese will talk about Ihis too, even if it is on ly to show the world th at they think about these issues to. But certainly not seriously! I do not think they will introduce the four-day s working week. But if they do, I will take back all my theories about Japan; and there are a lot of them."

The Nether/ands are heavi/y investing in rhe US. The Americall economy is plagued by a recession. In how far wil! this developmeflf affecl Dwch investmellls?

"Do not ex peet to find a brand new Europe when you wake up on 1 January 1993" Dekker: "Weil, the Netherlands are cet1ainly not benefited by a weak American economy. Thai implies that astrong American economy is a bene fit for the Netherlands. Let us take a look at Philips: Philips has large scale activities in the US. If we can calculate our business with a dollar-rate of 3,60 guilders, for sure it looks different than when we have a dollar-rate of 1,60 guilders. I experienced both."

Is tlle Dll/ch eeol1omy fao dependelll 011 fhe Ameriean ecol1omy ? Dekker: " I think the Dutch econo-

During the past year we reeeived informarion that the economie miracle of Japan is shmving cracks at the seams. Do you consider these stories fo be lrue? Dekker: "Nothin g is unchangeable. I think that even in Japan things can change, but the pace of change is far behind ours.

my gets more profit from astrong, healthy European economy, than it will gel from the American economy. In my opinion, a weak American economy has a detrimental innuence on the development of the world economy."

The compulsion and the pressure to work, produce and achieve (looking at a collective national happening) is as strongly present as when I was in Japan for the first time in 1958."

The American markei is very important 10 fhe world economy. Could rhe European marker take over (his positioll ? Dekker: UI do not expect to see

So, you do not expecf any changes in lhis attitude in lhe near juture?

Philips selling more telev ision sets in 1993 in comparison with 1990. The American market remains very important; for some articJes,

19


it is 50 per cent of the world market. The American industry is a150 important, bUI America as a center

of technology is becoming less important. Europe and Japan are taking over this aspect." Eastern Eu ro pe

Tlle European market is now in the process offormatioll. What happells ij we pull Eastern Europe fowards the European Community? This would enlarge fhe EC with afactor !Wo. Dekker: "No, not with a factor two. It depends on what you consider to be Eastem Europe. For exa-

"If the Japanese introduce the four-days working week, I will take back all my theories about

mie means,"

Dekker: "Hungary or Czechoslo-

Because rhe development of Eastem Europe requires a 101 of investmelllS of the European Community, it is also on enormous limitation for the EC. Dekker: "That is true. Vou have to be very careful in what you are planning to do. It wou ld be unwise to slaeken Dur interest in the European unification because of the advent of Eastem Europe. I think it is obvious that we should look at Eastem Europe and help them too,

vakia, these are countries wich have remainders of the aid infrastructure. Thi s is an important aspect to keep in mind. The biggest problem, also in those countries,

but we must not forget to set ri ght our own system first. There is na

doubt that Eastem Europe is important to us. There are, of course, differences between the various countries in the East. The situation

in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia is total!y different from the situation in Roumania, Bulgaria

mple, if you consider the Soviet Union to be a part of te EC, than

and the Soviet Union. In my opinion, the approach to this problem

the enlargement is enonnous. In

would have to concentrate on those countries where there are reasonable chances of success. The Soviet Union is, unfortunateIy, not first in line."

number of people Eastem Europe is important, but the purchasing power is low. There is a lot to be done in Eastem Europe and in the relation bet ween West and East

before you can say; this gives me possibilities to expend my econo-

Is it perhaps more realistic 10 (hink of a coumry like Hungary?

is whether the population of these countries have the flexibility and the endurance to survive thi s diffi-

cult period."

Does tlle popu/ation in these cOlII/tries have any beneftt from, soy. Dweh eompanies training 0 select group of persons from these cOlmlries as managers? They sure/y have no notion ofWeslern economie coneepts? Dekker: " Absolutely. This would help tremendously. It is already happening on a smal! scale. A program wich was set up by the Europeon Round Table of IndustrialiSIS should have started this year, but was delayed by the Hungarian authorities. We only want to do il if there is any certainty about its chances of success.

Suppose you train twenty managers in the Netherlands, and

send them back to Hungary: They wil! know a lot, but they lack a good infrastruclure to work in.

Obviously, this becomes a longtenn process.

There are many things to keep an eye on. Thai does nol mean you must not do something to help

them. I on ly want to say you have to be careful not to go

10

rack and

ruin in a kind of euphoria. There are more than 2000 joint-ventures registered in th e Soviet Union, and in my view only 200 are working. Do not even ask with how much

difficulty. We have to be sceptical but we must go ahead with il."

Dr. W. Dekker, Chairman of the Board of Phifips, (photo Philip').

20


Development Cooperation: a Dutch Preoccupation By Dr. W. TIms

To a large extent, the economie history of the Netherlands can be described in terms of the geographieal expansion of Dutch trade. The country's trade in herrings and in the salt needed to preserve them, cereals to feed its own population and wool and cloth to clo the them, made the Netherlands a focal point in European trade weil before the country began to acquire nationhood and become politi cally organized. In present-day parlance, the Netherlands was an outward-Iooking economy with export-led growth long before developm ent economists coined these terms. One well-known statement about the Dutch is that they try to produce wh at they know they can sell . Whether this was true at the time it was said, and whether it remains true today, are open questions, but there can be no doubt ab out the owareness of the Dutch th at the Netherlands is a small corner of a large world in whieh it has its own role to play within a n interdependent economie system.

For

a long time the Netherlands. aJthough a small cou ntry. had substantial colonial possessions, and even after they had become inde pendent the colonial heritage continued to exert astrong infJuence on Dutch society. At Qne time there was hardl y anyone who did na t have friends or relatives in the colonies, whether in the colonial administration, the plantations. trade or the churc h. This was particularly true after the Second World War, when a whole generation of young Dutchmen went to the Dutch East [ndies to fight an aborlive war against the lndonesian independe nee movement.

Thinking about assistance 10 developing countri es has come a long way since then: more sober views preva il regardin g the role of development cooperation , its limits in tenns of effectiveness and how it should be implemented. One of the chan ges which has occ urred in developme nt terminology reflects a change in emphasis: whereas we used more eommonl y to speak of development aid. suggestin g a one -way flow of resources, we now often refer to development cooperation, which embraces more than just resource flows and in principle involves a relationship between partners in development.

Against thi s histori cal background. and with the tunnoil and trauma of the decolonization process reverberating in Dutch polities and society until weil into the 196Os. it is understandable that the Duteh

In thi s article a brie f outline wi ll first be given of eurrent develop· ments in Duteh aid to de veloping countries in tenn s of vo lume and direction. Subsequently same of the main aspects of aid policy and its implementation will be descri· bed and placed in the context of the political, social and economie farces which helped to shape them . The final section lists some of the main problems whieh stand in the way of more effective development cooperation . and same of the proposals for overeoming them wh ich are currentl y being d eba· ted.

were on the who Ie weil aware of

the problems faced by newl y independent countries. Same groups look more extreme views than others. emphasi zing the gu ilt of the Dutch as farmer colonial oppressors, which gave ri se ta arguments as to what debt the natian owed ta those who had suffered under the yoke of Dutch

imperialism.

Or. W. Tims is Professor of Oevelopment Eeono· mies at the Free University of Amsterdam and Director of the Centre for World Food Studies.

Historieal Overview Formall y, the Dutch gove mment first began to provide development assistance in 1963, the year in which for the first time a member of the govemment was made responsible for th is area of policy. although the post did not initiall y carry full ministerial rank. In 1965 it was upgraded. but the new minister was not given e ither a department or a budget of his own. Strictly speaking. thi s situation has persisted tiJl the present day. What is called the developme nt coopera· tion budget is in fact a list of development-related ex penditures in the budgets of various govemment departments. Total development ex penditure is limited by the target figure for aid, whi ch has been set at 1.5 per cent of Net National Income (NNI) since 1979. The bulk of development-related expenditure appears in the budget of the Ministry of Fore ign Affairs, and the staff who work for the Minister for Development Cooperation are also part of that ministry. In the late seventies, Dutch development assistance qualifying for inclusion in DAClI] statistics as official development assistance (ODA) on account of its concessional eharacter grew to 0.8 per

21


cent of the Gross National Product (GNP). This inc\udes both bilateral flows and disbursements to mul tilateral agencies. Only Norway and Sweden managed to exceed this figure slightly. Since then there has been a funher increase, to around I per cent of GNP, surpassed only by Norway. In absolute term s, the Netherlands is the sixth largest donor in the world, after the United States, Japan, France, Germany and Italy. In term s of total net capital flow s to developing countries (inc\uding flows of private capital) the Netherlands has continuously been

one of the largesl sourees of fun ding, due partly to the fact that same of the largest multinational corporations in the world are based in the Netherlands. Development assistance has enjoyed continuous and broad support in the Netherlands. This partly reflects the outward-looking character of a small country with a long colonial past. After 1945 a substantial number of well-trained and experienced people retumed to the Netherlands from the colonies,

constituting both a pool of information and a pool of labour seeking employment elsewhere, preferably in the tropies. Companies

which had left their investments behind in Indonesia looked for other pans of the world 10 resume

or expand their operations, and the search for new export outlets for the products of rapidly growing

Dutch industries extended

10 CQun-

tries which could initially be described as less developed. The long colonial tradition also left its mark on the Dutch educational system, and particularly on the universities. Same of them had departments or courses leading to employment in the tropics, for example in govemment, agticulture, land and water management or

engineering. When the colonĂ&#x17D;es became independent these were not discontinued but revamped to SUil the new political situation. Indeed, new anes were even instituted for the benefit of students coming to the Netherlands from the newly independent countries. Consequently, there was stron g support for development assistan-

22

ce from academie eireles, as there was from private trade and industry, wishing to ex pand their markets, and within the government, which came under pressure from various international fora to provide support to newly independent countries. At the same time the churches and a number of voluntary agencies having strong, longstanding ties with parts of the develaping world did much to assist a consciousness-raising process which reached a large part of lhe population and generaled a general awareness of the need 10 support develapment aetivities. The strength of thi s support is probably best indicated by the fact that ,he program mes of all the significant political parties call for the aid budget eilher to remain the same or ta he increased. Over the years the three main parties which have participated in coalition gavemments have all provided ministers far develapment eooperation. One of the more impressive features of bath govemmental and private activities in thi s fi eld continues ta be the efforts made to ensure that infonnalion about developrnent issues reaches a very wide public. Clearly these efforts have been sufficiently success ful '0 safeg uard the deve lopment budget from the substantial cuts which have been implemented in same other areas of public expenditure throughout most of the 1980s. But at the same time it should be noted that during this period a number of expenditures which were of doubtful relevanee la development have been incorporated in lhe development budget.

Traditionally, the majarity of Dutch official aid has been provided as direct, bilateral assistance. Multilateral flows have fluctuated between 25 and 30 per cent of the total. Thus the Netherlands has remained close to the DAC average, trying to satisfy widely divergent opinions regarding the channels ta be used. The case for bilaterali sm is pUL relatively strongly by the business community, which supplies goods and services as part of aid-financed transaclions, and by lhose who place a

high value on the dialogue wilh governments of developing countri es conceming their palicies (not only regarding development strategies but also, for exampl e, wilh regard to human ri ghts) and concerning the use of aid to benefit particular population groups within the recipi ent country. Those who atlach greater importance to lhe quality of implementation of development programmes and projects tend to favour multilateral agencies, in addition to which it is sometimes claimed that multilateral institutions are better equipped to conduct an in-depth policy dialogue with the govemment of the recipi ent country. But there are also those who are against multilateral aid, especially through the World Bank, on the grounds th at the institution s eoncemed do not give sufficient priarity to the poor. Another feature of Dutch assistance is that a significant volume of public funds is channelled through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). About 7-8 per cent of official aid funds are disbursed in thi s way. Private NGOs representing mainstream religious and/or political and social groups in Dutch society spend these funds togelher with the proceeds from their own fund-rai sing activities. In the early 1980s a procedure was introduced under which the way in which NGOs use govemment funds is subject only to retrospeclive approvaJ, except in the case of expenditure in counrries where diplomatie relations at government level are considered sensi tive. The NGOs in question are well-known tot the public, are very active on the domestic information front and derive much of their support from Iheir evident concern for the poor and oppressed in developing countries, with whom many of the Dutch public sympathize. As same of the activities of these NGOs are considered by the Dutch government la verge on the intolerable, relations with the govemment from which they receive much of Iheir funding are far from easy. There are 105 names on the DAClist of recipient countries. It has


always been obvious that the Netherlands could not expect lO cooperate effectively with all of them . Fonner colonies were of co urse g iven a measure of priority, but otherwise it was feit necessary to be selec tive. The NetherlandS" own list of target countries chan ged over the years, but targeting has not achieved the desired e ffect. Virtuall y all the deve loping coun路

tTies actuall y receive Dutch aid in onc fonn o r another, and in fact over the past twenty years there has been a tendency away from targeling. This partly reflects the reduction in bilateral aid la f0n11Cr colonies, receiving the lion 's share

of Dutch aid in the early years. and has partly been caused by an incre路 ase in aid 10 smaJl recipients. A similar trend can be abserved with ather DAC donors (e.g. Japan, Canada and the Federal Republic of Gemlany). This is no t necessa路 rily due to leniency on the part of

the donor organ ization: political

expediency and peer pressure 10 participate in aid packages far par路 ticular co unlries or regions may likewise play a part.

Policies and Implementation In the early years na definite poli-

cies conceming development aid were farmulated. Much of the assistance provided was of a technical nature, cnabling the human resources which were available ta be put 10 work in developing counlTies. Such little financial assi stanee as was provided was largely intended to finance exports from the donor country. It wau ld therefare be fair 10 say thai deve lopmenl aid was largely supply-driven, priorities being set pragmalieally in accordance with domestic cons ide ration s regarding employment and export promotion. This is not ta say that the aid provided was necessarily at varianee w ith the priori ties of the recipient co unlTies, but the latter were certainly of less concern. It has been hard far the Nelherlands te shed the image ta whi ch thi s gave ri se, and poss ibl y even harder ta shed the practice, many policy statements to the cantrary natwithstanding. The real di sc ussion abo ut policies -and policy

aptians- began in the 1970s when Jan Pronk, a member of the Labour Party, became mini ster. At a time of international debate about the fai lure of develapment pol icies ta reach the poor, when a search was goin g on for ways to reach them direct ly and basic needs provision was being redi scovered as a devel opmcnt objective, he initiated the de bate in the Netherlands about the abject ives of Dutch aid palicy. His bel ief that aid shauld be an element in a broader package of international measures designed 10 eradicate poverty faund wide support in the country and placed the Nethe rlands in a lead in g position intematianall y as regards development policy.

It was during the same period that the word s aid and assistanee eame ta be replaced by cooperatian , ta symboli ze lhe partnership between donor and recipienl . Developing eountries whose domestie policies on combaling poverty were regarded as progressive were favoured in the Duteh programme even when po litical relalion s between the eountries were not close. Thus the battlelines were drawn , bath conceming the use of resources 10 promate exports and foreign investment and conceming responsibility far fareign policy. Develapment cooperatian had its own di stinet objectives. ft had 10 beeome a demand-driven aetivity in which due weig ht was given to the develapment strategies of the ree ipient partner countries. Natwithstanding all the vigaur and innovation di splayed in those years, the degree ta which lhe rapidly graw ing naw of funds was diverted in the desired direction remained modest, as the vested interests of the business and diplomatie communities were deeply entrenched. The fac t that na separate profess ional staff ex isted to implement the new policy, and that the mini ster largely had ta opera te wit h borrowed staff, whase layalties were divided, was a major handicap. Under Pronk 's Christian Democratie successor, Jan de Koning , these problems were

aggravated, as hi s staff becarne even more integ rated with those of the Ministry of Fareign Affairs than they already we re, rotalin g bet ween a variety of ove rseas and home assignments and not having any c1ear comm itmenl to deve lopment objectives. At least during thi s period there was a fannal recognition of the ten sions belween developm ent objeeti ves and the domestic suppl y-s ide farces. These were expressed in a twin-track policy, under which the objectives pursued were combating poverty in deve laping cauntries and strengthenin g the ir econami es. The first track probably never represented more than 20 per cent of tOlal reso urce flo ws , whi le the ather track left the door wide open far export promotion. Basicall y, thi s si tuation re mains unaltered ta thi s day. No daubt some progress has been made towards rendering aid softer and less lied to domesti c proc urement , and improving it in other ways. But Ihe programme remain s strong ly influenced by dome stic priori ties, and implementation has eonlinued to suffer from inadequate and inapprapriate staffin g, the prime concern of staff being ta spend budgets in the least controversia l way. Staff rotation makes it imposs ible ta build up asolid knawledge and establish stabie relation ships in the eountri es to whi ch Dutch aid is pravided. On top of this , the aid budget has been eroded in recent years as an inereasingly large part of it has been all ocated te purposes which hardly qualify far inclusian, such as lhe costs of aeeommodating refugees and asylum-seekers in the Netherlands. An unreasanably large proporti on of the casts of averseas diplomatie missions is also charged ta the develapment budget.

Wh at Needs to be Done Over Ihe last ten years Lhe international c1 imate has been unfavourabie ta the develaping ca untries, as growth in the world eeonomy has been slowand developments in trade and debt problems have he lped to ereate an increasingly adverse environment. Polilicall y

23


too . development issues have receded into the background as East-West issues moved more into the limelight and industrial countTies foe used more on their own intemal and mutual economie problems and imbalances. At the same time, the growth of poverty has accelerated , while the international response has been one of apathy rather than action. There is a desperate need for initiatives on the part of the industrialized countries to lead the way towards effective cooperation 10 bring about development and eradicate poverty and hunger. A smal! country like the Netherlands can play an important role in thi s respect, but it needs 10 put its own house in order first.

Jan Pronk, Minister (or Development Cooperatio: (photo Sijthoff Pers).

24

The primary requirement is that a body of professional and motivated staff should be built up, whose prime loyalty should be to development. Loosening the ties between development cooperation staff and foreign affairs staff is the first essen ti al to be achieved by

way of independenee in recruiting and assigning staff to tasks, which should be done primarily in the light of their professional background and experience. Making staff more professional should not only lead to improvements in the quality of implementation but would also be an important step towards greater independenee in planning and executing development policies. This is essential in order to prevent development policy from being dictated by national economie priorities and foreign policy expediency and in order to give demand-side priorities the appropriate weight. Al the same time. the eros ion of the aid budget by means of the inclusion of items of doubtful relevanee must he reversed. A reali slic assessment of trends in developing countries reveals that there are strong grounds for overhauling the Dutch development program me. Whether it is possible to be optimistic about the pro-

spects for progrcss in thi s direction in the present domestic circumstances is another maller. as vested inlcresls are SI rong, and they have their own bedrock of politica! support, in view of which politicians may prefe r to avoid rocking the boat in order to limit public controve rsy. lt wil! take a lot of political courage and perseverance to change the course which has been followed in recent years and 10 divert development cooperation back to the people who most need it. Nole I1 J DcvcJopmcnl Assislanee Commiuec (DAC) of Ihc OECD (Organizalion for Economie Cooperation and Dcvelopmcnt); dala are publishcd a nnually in lhe DAe Review of Devc10pmcnt Coopcr3lion. anicle has previously appeared in the English-Ianguage issue of Ihe Imcmalionale SpectatorofNovembcr 1989. All righls reserved.

Thi~


A World of Difference Between Concept and Reality? By Peter du Lingg The policy paper produced by Minister I.P. Pronk of Development Cooperation, entitled A World of Difference, is not so much an official note as a political statement. Pronk sketches the framework for Dutch development cooperat ion policy up to the year 2000. The paper was presented to Parliament in September and was debated in December. Pronk is known to be an opinio n leader; his showpiece, however, did not emerge undamaged from the de bate. To explain why, this article successively deals with the situat ional context, the contents of the paper, the significance and context of Pronk's ideas as weil as the crit icism on his paper.

bie conclusion: development

Mr P.F.P. du Ungg stu-

cooperation is a must! Togelher

died Communication

with the staff of his DireetorateGeneral of International Cooperation DGIS[I] he has taken the

Science ond is currently

versity with a spedali-

offensive. Pronk even expresses the wish that his Cabinet post will

PubHc Administrotion.

studying at Leiden Uni-

zotion in Comparotive

have beeome redundant in the year 2000. To aehieve this goal. he says, his poliey should fonn an integra l pan of other depanments' policies. Whether this ean be reali路 zed in the spaee of ten years remains to be seen. Pronk seeks sustainable

In the last two decades the NonhSouth debate has eome to a dead end. Interes t in planned world wide

between development cooperation

development, as defined by the

poliey from The Hague and Brussels' trade poliey. For want of a unifi ed European poliey. in this

fonner Norwegian Prime Minister

Brundtland: "A development that caters to the needs of the present

fi eld we can still wi tness an authentic piece of national policy.

generation , without adversely affecting the needs of future gene-

The Netherlands: a Feather-weight?

rations." The paper goes beyond his four-year term of office. Only years from now will we be able to

development cooperation no lon-

What ean the Minister of a small

assess its fai lure or success. In

ger is self路evident and aid has ceased tot be the exclusive domain of the Third World. A Third World, for that matter. th at does not really exisi anymore. Thc former Seeond World has entered a diffuse stage, while the group of

country do against (he disas trou s circumstances at leas t a billion people are living under? In fi ve

critical reception in Parliamenl.

hundred-odd pages Pronk dese ri -

Pronk has come up with a score of

bes the development issue as a whoie, including historical and socio路economic analyses, culmina-

(new?) ideas, while in Duteh deve-

developing countries has experienced a process of differentialion.

ting in poliey deeisions. In this regard, this Pronkian analysis fall s

growth and a better division of

prosperity has lessened. Today the focu s is on a world order in which

Western va lues prevail (mixed economy, pluralist representative

democraey etc. ). The basis for

into the same class as international

Progress is relative

10

time and not

unequivocal. For instanee. econo-

mie progress during the 70s and 80s was stronger in Asia lhan in Africa and Latin America. But the present rate of popu lat ion growth threatens to undo this result. To most deveJoping countries, world

repons published in 1990, notably the Human Development Repon (UN DP), the World Development Repon (World Bank) and The Challenge of the Sou th (Sou th Committee). It is therefore impossible just to summarize the main

points of the paper.

trade and export eamings are far more important lhan the income from aid. Conceming thi s, (here

eenainl y is a world of differenee

Pronk paints a grim picture of

reality. His belief in the mOIl/da路 bi/ity of society leads to a predieta-

pan. this accounts for the paper's The hea n of the matter is th at

lopment policy there is a constant pressure for consistency and continuity, as weil as for supervision

and transpareney. What exaetly are Pronk 's ideas?

A Wo rld of Difference Beeause of the link with National Ineome, for the time being the total govemment budget is still rising. The 1991 budget nearly totals 6,5 billion gui lders, whieh is about 1,5 per cent of Net National Product. The struetural eombat of poveny is the ce ntral goal of th e new poliey. Flexibility in assistance is a ncw characteristic. The

25


principal instruments for implementing this policy are development program mes and project s, as weil as various fonn s of aid. Within the so-called sec(OI'al assĂ&#x17D;stance, environment, research and technology, women and development, as weil as the lessening of poverty in urban areas are new primary fields of attention. In the selection of countries the emphasis has shifted towards a regional approach. Multilateral and nongovemmental organizations (NGOs) will play a greater pan in policy implementation. Up to now, there were three sectoral programmes: Rural Development, Research and Education, Industrial Development and Training. These are being integrated into the new policy. Ten programme countries had a long-tenn cooperation agreement with the Netherlands and received a fĂŻxed amount of assistance per year. They could ask for extra aid through the sectoral programmes mentioned above. This kind of support was also available to other countries on a case-by-case basis.

26

Countries and Regions Pronk proposes 10 cut the number of programme countries to four: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Staning from 1991, they will have a ceiling and -through intensive policy consultationsflexible access to extra means for the sectors chosen. For these countries th e long-tenn agreement remains in effect. Sector countries China, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka can put in a request for assistance within the framework of the sectoral programmes. The regional approach, which has been successful in bilateral cooperat ion , creates seven region s: th e Andes, Central America, East Africa, Mekong, Nile and Red Sea, Sahel and West Africa, and Southern Africa. The budget for African countries will increase by 50 per cent. Through treaty relations, Surinam retains its special statu s in Dutch development assistance. The rest of the budget is spe nt on care for refu geeSt interest subsidies on certain loans, material and personnel costs

for DGIS and allowances to institules for int.ernational education.

Criteria Recipient countries are selected according to strict criteria. Firstly, there must be a need for assistance, judged by its degree of poveny, balance of payments, international debt, access 10 foreign currency and aid given by other donor countries. The Netherlands will seek international support for cancelling the debts of 41 so-called Least Developed CoullfrĂ&#x17D;es, on the condition that they adopt a sound economie policy. The second criterium is the degree of consensus on economie and social policy bet ween the Netherlands and the recipient country. This concerns the sectors mentioned above, human rights, stimulation of the market, as well as policy with regard to democratization and political panicipation. In shon , development for and by people and support for the developmen! process at grassroot level.


Organization and Execution In general. policy will be more decentr.li zed than before and the role of DGIS will be the coordination and preparation of policy. Between 1991 .nd 1993 DGIS will ex pand with the recruitment of 60 extra personnel, while embassies abroad will be able to contract same 15 additional sector special iSlS.

HIVOS , CEBEMO and ICCO) will receive a share of 7 per cent (weil over 400 million guilders) of the total development budget. SNV[3] will continue to play a significant part in Dutch policy.

Dutch business and trade unions are also involved as actors on the development cooperation stage.

Significanee and Context Does all this impl y a radical depar-

In addition. assistance through

ture from existing development

international organizations will be emphasized. These are the various organizations in the United Nations family (most notabl y UNDP), multilateral financing institutions (the World Bank 's IDA[2] and regional development banks and funds) and European Community institutions for development cooperation (chieO y the European Development Fund). Within the framework of support for autonomous development initiatives more assislance is needed for (Iocal) non-govem mental organizations (NGOs). From 1994 onwards, the muin four Dutch denominationaJ cQ-financing organizations (NOV IB,

policy? The answer is not a simple yes or no. Pronk sees the relative value of national policy. Although within the given budgetary space he does manoeuvre with priori ties and target groups, cenain essential elements remain the same. The system of project financing -developed down to the smallest detailsremains intact, together with Dutch consultancy, supervision and contro!. The structure of compulsory spending will apparent ly di sappear. Flexibility is the catchword: goodwill and ass istance will have to be eamed and so und policy wil! result in a bonus.

Contradictions No matter the words used to describe the intensified policy dialogue between donor and reci pient, basically a true free will and ways for autonomous development seem to be out of the question. This is one of the inescapable paradoxes, namely the drive for decentralization on the one hand, and on the other hand the donor countries' issuing of guidelines to recipient countries. A second paradox: continuous economic growth in a finite ecosystem as one of the main problems versus the remedy; strengthening economic growth as the basis for developmenl! Pronk (on purpose?) does not go easy on himself. In line with the spirit of the times, the focus is on software (human reso urces) rather thun hardware (traditional, complex, technological programmes).

In his concept policy should have its basis in people and be carried out by the very same people. This observation is based on the expe-

Development cooperation with direct effect: an irrigation project in Kenya (phota Het Economisch Dagblad).

27


rience that developmen t has to be instituti onalized and policy has to take root. There must be a social and a human basis if development

is 10 have a lasling effecl. For Ihis reason Ihe va lidily of Ihe concepl can onl y be les led years from now.

Criticism

Can MinisIer Pronk reall y make a

Lasl Decembe r's debales nOLonl y resulted in coneeptual and ideologieal crili eism, bul also in polilieal dispules. The tone of voiee with whieh Ihe Christi an Democ rats have erilicized Pronk portrayed

radical depaT1ure from ex isting

their irritation over the way in

poliey? The queslion is relevanl beeause of Ihe possible gap Ihal

whieh Pronk 's paper deals wilh Duleh developmenl poliey of Ihe 1980s. Weil over len years of solid Christian-Democratie poliey ean,

Continu ity

exists bet ween wanting to and

being able

10.

Here also no c1ear

yes or no can be given.

in their opinion, not be abandoned

Pronk 's posilion wilhin Ihe DUleh

by Pronk. Apan from Sehoo (VVD) and Pronk (pvdA), the

Ministeria] Council is marginal.

Christi an Democrats have always

The hard seelors of Irade, eeonomy and fi nanee are dominant. The

held Ihis Cabinel post. Crilieism by Ihe CDA and lhe Opposilion VVD was put forward in fo ur

Pronk's position wihin the ministerial council is marginal Duleh poslu re in IMF and World Bank meelings falls under Ihe compelence of the M inister of Finance. The M inistries of Finance

and of Economie Affa irs are Ihe main opponenls of Pronk. They trad itionally have nalional inleresl al hean. Ailhough Ihe DireeloraleGenera] of Environmental Control

motions. Pronk has set too many priorities,

Ihey say. He does nOLmake any ehoiees, does not look afler business interests enough, wants more govemment and more market at the same time, has cut his policy

inlo bits. The degree of f1 exibility is so high il impedes parlianlentary control and increases the workl oad of Parliament. Fu rthermore, lhe con neetion between policy intenti on s and implementation is

of lhe Ministry of VROM[4] stands by his side, Pronk 's ideas

ineomplele and Pronk onl y after-

(e.g. a tax in rich countries on activities hav ing an adverse effect on environment) perished earl y on in the negotiating process wilhin the

ling Ihe amounl of assistance reserved fo r eae h co untry. Olherwise, he says, his bargaining positi on vis-a-vis a country will be

Cabinet. New budgel euls are expecled for Ihe neXl years. Is lhe Minislry of Developmenl Cooperation (OO IS) flex ible enough 10 adj ust 10 Ihe new situ -

undennined. In a word , much and far-reaching erit icism of his poliey.

wards re leases infonnation detai-

sueeess of any pol iey is the quality of !he staff. It is a known fael Ih al

The resull is Ihal a thing or Iwo has had 10 be cancelled. Nexl 10 Ihe struclu ral combaling of poverty, eeonomic self-relianee will be lhe eenlral poliey objeelive. The

bureaucracy is well-versed in

conclusion of bilateral assistance

ati on? A key factor in the eventual

ehang ing ils language 10 suil today 's fas hion. The social basis in the Nelherlands has complained Ihal parti eipalion in the fo rmulalion of poliey is impossible. Espeeiall y business

28

and the new framework Pronk wants to create.

relat ions wilh Ihe Mekong-region has been vetoed. lnfonnati on specifying the amount of assistance

ment poliey. a plan Iike Pronk 's cannol be anylhing but incomplete and inaeeuralely refl eel reality. Apart from which, it is diffic ult to

judge a strategic pol iey plan reaching inlo the far fUlure. Reality is elusive. As to what ex tent

presupposilions merely are myths is hard to answer. Is interdependenee really increasing? Is there a growing international consensus

on development strategy for the 90s? Do criteria sueh as human

rights proleelion and the foslering of democratization and participa-

lion reall y advance development? To pUI il more bluntl y, is assistance beneficial, does development cooperation serve its purpose? It is up 10 those eoncemed to fi nd the answers.

Quile clearl y, streams of mi grants and environmental problems do nol SLOp al nalional borders. It is

also elear Ihal developmenl poliey eannol easil y be rid of donor-eentrist intentions, the notion of pure

poliey is ficlion rather lhan realily. The vicar and Ihe merehant both reside in Ihe Nelherl ands and are Ihere 10 slay. This is a fael developing countries will have to come to tenns with. Pronk's choice for diversification of aid is a step in the right direction lowards preventing ineffic iency and waste. For all we know, in due course more

spaee will be allowed for aul onomous deve lopmenl by Ihe countries themselves. At the time of writing, however, thai space is slill frequenll y c1aimed by third parties in Ihe Fi rsl World. No<" [I] The DircclOmle-Gcneral of International Coopcmlion DG IS is an inlcgml pan ofthe Nctherlands' Ministry of Foreign Alfairs. In thwry. the Foreign Minister assumes minislerial responsibilily. In prnclice. oo lS serves as tbc cooroinaling and cxecuting stalT of the Minister of Developlllcnt Coopemtion. 121 Intemmional Developmcnt Association. established in 1960 10 provide assistance in the lower-

reserved fo r eae h co unlry will be supplied 10 Ihe Seeond Chamber

incomc dcvcloping counlries. on more favoumble tCmlS Ihao [he World Bank ilsclf. 131 Stkhting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers, literally

of Parli ament on a confidential

Foundation of DUlch Volunl<..'ers. offically NeIher-

and trade unions are oUlspoken in their critici sm.

basis we il beforehand.

LaSI bUI noIleasI, nalional polilies. Recenl debales in Parliament indi eale the infl uenee of party pol ilies on Ihe depanure of exisli ng poliey

Conclusion Because of the nature and amount

of variables involved in the planning and execution of develop-

lands Developmcnt Organization. is a semi-NGO with a slafT intcgrated within DG IS. SNV trains aod posts 'volunleers' 10 almost all countries recei--

ving DUlch developmcnI assislaoce. 14 J(Ministerie van) Volksgewndhcid. Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu. roughly (Minislry of) Public

Health. Planning and Environment. Planning as in Town and Country Planning.


WHAT

IS

JASON?

The jason Foundation for International Affairs was founded in 1975 by a group of students and other youngsters to meet the demand of young Dutch people for unbiased, balanced information on international affairs. jason is not connected to any political party and has no ideological foundation . jason tries to achieve its aim in two ways. Firstly, by organizing all kinds of activities, ranging from lectures and debates to role games and study tours. Secondly, by publishing this magazine, which appears every two months. Recent topics of the magazine include "Will the Soviet Union Make the Year 2000?", "The Middle East: the New Enemy?" and "Europe, Quo Vadis?" (on the CSCE process). Each year, a so-called pupils project is organized. This consists of several lessons on a current international issue, culminating in a role game. For information, write to the following address: jason Foundation Laan van Meerdervoort 96 2517 AR The Hague The Netherlands

For more in formation; your local con tact:

T ilbu rg Hakky Raymakers & Mark Beersmans 013-433200 Rotterda m Amaud Duponl 0 I0-4 1178 12 Breda Ton Lulter 076-22869 1 Amsterd am RUige r Bierens de Haan 020-25 1539 Mrs MaTOna van den Heuvel 020-243659 Eindhoven Erik Jansen 040-5 15324 Groningen Jan-Dirk van Beusekom 050- 128509 Leide n Mrs Margarelha Ravensbe rgen 07 1- 125328


INDEX JASON MAGAZINE 1989-'90 89/ 6 . Cracks in the Iron Curtain

90/ 3 . Will the Soviet Union Make the Year 2ooo?

Drs. H. Rarnkema:

The End of the Honecker Era

Dr. J.H.L. Löwenhardt:

The Soviet Centrifuge

Jason on the Spot I:

Berlin, October 1989

E Kleibrink:

Gorbachev Has to Recogni ze the

Jason on the Spot 11 :

Prague, November 1989

J . Pehe & J. Obrman:

In Czechoslovakia 1968 Dominates

H.P. Andriessen:

An Encounter with Sacharov

Everything

Jason on the Spot I:

Sacharov Conference 1990:

Dr.ir. I. Bársony:

Opposition

1989: Hungary's Silent Revolution

Drs. A.W.M. Gerrits:

Western Openness as a Model for

(interview)

Poland

the Finishing Line Is in Moscow Jason on the Spot 11 :

Clingendael Role Game 1990: Crisis in the Baltic

Dr. K. V.h. Reve:

I Hope lt Will Not Become

90/ 1. US Foreign Policy in the 1990s

(interview)

Another Lebanon

M.D.W. Edington, Ph.D.:

Mr. G.P. V.d. Berg:

Soviet Law Against the Decline

E Kaplan & K. Gradov:

Russian Romantic ism

US Foreign Policy-Makin g

Prof.jhr.dr. EA.M. A lting From Yalta to Ma lta: the United States and the Soviet Union in the

(i nterview)

Post-War Era

T. Atabaki:

Pragmatism and " Peanut s"

(interview)

R. Bos:

The Back-Yard of the White House

90/ 4 . The Middle East: the New Enemy?

Drs. C. Wittebrood:

Self-Confident Europe Forces US

Dr. ).J .G . Jansen:

(interview)

to Adjust

(interview)

von Geusau:

Dr. M. v. Rossem:

NalÎonalism and Perestroika

(interview)

90/ 2 . What Are the limits of Europe? R.B. Dentener:

A.W.L. V.d. Lee:

Dr. E.P. Wellenstein :

Immigratio n Strengthens Israel

Profile:

Hosni Mubarak

Disannarnent Process

G.P.H. Kreijen:

Background of An End less

A New European Order 11: German

Vende tta

Unification, the EC and Eastem

·A. Safieh:

Europe

(interview)

The EC: Broadening or

R.B . Dentener:

w.L. Brugsma:

LiWe Hope for Peace Process

Kuwait Update

90/ 5 . Europe, Quo Vad is?/ jason's 15th Anniversa ry Drs. R.W. Zaagman:

(interview)

(interview)

Drs. R.M. Naftaniël:

and Nonsense in the European

Deepening?

Mr. LJ. Brinkhorst:

Saddam the Magnificent

(interview)

Germany: the Engine of Europe

Drs. V.EM. Wesseling:

K . Smit: A New European Order I: Sense

(interview)

Jason on the Spot:

A Sheep in Wol f's C10thing

AEGEE Conference "Culture

Fifteen Years of CSCE: Balance and Perspective The Gennan House

Clash"

Dr. E Wi elenga:

The EC's New Borders: Greece,

(interview)

Portugal and Spain

A.M . Cremers:

Between Unification and Ballot

European Environmental

Box

Cooperation

Profile:

Will y Brandt

A.W.L. V.d. Lee:

European Sec urity: A Utopia?

Jason on the Spot :

Securi ty and the Green Pany

E Kl eibrink & A. W.L. V.d. Lee:

No Nonsense and Lots of Beer

A.W.L. v.d. Lee:

Fifteen Years of Jason: Balance and Perspective

Mr. EA.M. v.d. Heuvel:

Jason: th e Quest Conti nues ...

Profile for Stichting Jason

Jason magazine (1990), jaargang 15 nummer 6  

Jason magazine (1990), jaargang 15 nummer 6  

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