Page 1

September 1982, 7ejaargang nummer 3-a

Special Issue

Introduction. What is JASON? Dutch foreign policy The future of West-West relations A letter from a Transatlantic friend

~lil5Dn Secretariat and Editorial Office: Van Stolkweg 10,2585 JP The Hague The Netherlands Telephone: 070 - 52 28 50 Postal cheque account: 3561025 Bank account: (Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank, in Scheveningen) Rate of Subscription to JASONmagazine /25,- per year (6 issues. except for the publications of a double issue).

Advertisement On request, the treasurcr of JASON wiJl give information on advertising charges.

Executive Committee Chairman

Deputy chairman Secretary Ch ief editor Members

Piet- Heyn Goedhart Dick Zandee Manicn de Groene Maurits Dolmans Eveline Muusers Maarten Derks

The lay-olll oJ JASON has changed recently.

General Board A. Bouter P.R.C. Lameijer drs. A.F. van Leeuwen

drs. M.T. van der Meulcn drs. P.J. e. Mulder mr. W.H.A .M. van den Muijsenbergh R.D. Praaning Prawira Adiningrat drs. M. Roemers M. Vcrweij drs. G.W.F. Vigeveno

Advisory Couneil 'Is Ihis the perceptioll we have oJ each-other?' dr. W.F. van Eekclcn H .J.M. Abcn H . GabriĂŤls dr. A.M.C.Th. van Heel-Kasteel

c.c. van den H euvel

dr. L.G.M. Jaqucl R.e. Spinosa CaneJa drs. E.J. van Vloten

Editorial Staff of JASON-magazine Ch icf Editor Members

Maurits Dolmans Hans Fortuin Geert van Loon Peter Mulder Evert-Jan Raven Gen Timmerman G uido Vigeveno

Cover page: This cartoon appears by counesy of E. Adsera Riba, and was printed before in NRCHandelsblad, 5-5- 1982.

Introduction This may be the first time you have ever heard of JASON and perhaps your first reaction is to think of Greek mythology. You will remember the Argonauts who, led by Jason, risked their lives and undertook an expedition through the then-known world to capture the Golden Fleeee. However, the only similarity between Jason and JASON is the international feature . Our name does not indicate that we are leaders of a group of heroes travelling around the world performing heroic deeds, but instead is the abbreviation of "Jong Atlantisch Samenwerkings Orgaan Nederland", which means "Association of Young Dutch for Atlantic Cooperation" .

Our aim can be deduced from our

name: ... "Ta study Atlalllic problems (in the widest sense of the expression), 10 enable other young people 10 do so, as weil as 10 organĂŽze aClivities in

order fO conrribwe 10 international cooperation ... " We try 10 stimulate interest in, and knowledge of the often complex problems of international polities by giving background information. The founders of our organization had a comman inte-

rest for international issues, especially in

the field of Atlantic cooperation. Other-

wise it was a miscellaneous group of students, university people and young persons working for governmenl or industry. Before JASON was founded seven years ago, a youth organization called AJCON (Atlantic Youth Committee of the Netherlands) already existed. Because of its strong bonds with lhe Atlantic Commission, the Committee had no possibility to operate independently, furthermore it did not lead an active life. The idea to set up a new organisation (whkh was LO be a foundation) was conceived during a trip to Poland. A daily board, chosen by a general board

of twenty members, organizes the activities and an editorial staff takes care of JASON-Magazine. All of these are volunteers who put their spare time at the disposal of JASON. JASON laid contacts with nalional and international organizations, particularly with politieal organizations. At ftrst some of these seemed somewhat distrustful when they heard of "Atlantie Cooperation", but JASON 's effons in paying attent ion LO different views and opinions, and in being a platform for discussion instead of a pressure-group or a propaganda-organization helped

much 10 QvcrcQmc initial reservation. Political Youth Meetings are now regularly organized to discuss international and Atlantic problems with young people of different polilical backgrounds, in order 10 learn to appreciate each other's views. JASON also has good contacts with foreign youth organizations in the same fteld (although

differences somclimes exist in characler and aim), and visits arc made 10 congresses and study-meetings in France, Belgium, The Uniled Kingdom, etc .. Since 1975, mllch has been done. A National Conference features on the agenda eaeh year. The ftrst conference was held in Leyden and dealt with the question "North-SaUlh Dialogue, Stimulus or Threat 10 Atlall/ic Cooperation?" lt was opened by Mr. L.J. 8rinkhorst, Undersecretary of State for Fo-

reign Affairs. Since then, the conference has often been adressed by Undersecretaries of State, or even by Cabinet Ministers. In 1979, Mrs. Gardeniers (then Minister for Social Affairs) delivered a speech on "Press and Ill/ernational Polities". The Minister of Defence, Mr. W. Scholten, opened the ftrst School Conference (another activity organized by JASON) on "NATO for the Sake of Peace?". Mr. van Eekelen (at the time

An impression of 0 JASON-conference in (he Rolzoulof Ihe Parliament buildings: dr. Vall Eekelen speoking on /Jllilaterol disarmomell'.

Undersecretary of State for Defence) delivered a speech at the third National Conference on "Armed Inlervenlion ". Then Foreign Secretary Mr.van der K1aauw spoke a word of welcome at the conference on "Dテゥlenle ajler Kabui". At each conference speakers of renown provided for the continuation of the high level with which the day was opened. Panicipants were thoroughly prepared for the discussion afterwards by means of the so-called "Mini-JASON", which gave information on the matter,

and has funhermore been used for distri but ion at secondary schools (as in the case of the issues "NATO-Strategy" and "Unilateral Disarmament: Example or Delusion?"). A good many leclures and brietings were held for JASON-audiences by prominent spe.akers, such as ex-Foreign Secretary Mr. M. van der Sloel, professor

of economics and Nobel-prize winner prof. J. Tinbergen, Russian ex-general and dissident Pjotr Grigorenko - lO which much auention was lent by lhe press - and lhe spokesman of the German government Dr. L. Rテシhl. JASON-subscribers panicipaled in

study-weeks. which were sometimes organized by lhe Defence Sludy Center, or in simulalion games, set up by JASON ilself. We will not lire you funher with a lengthy enumeration of all our activities,

bUL a word muSl be said aboul JASONmagazine. The tirsl J ASON-magazine was published in December 1975. Il was weil received and lhe minislry of Foreign Affairs, having seen Ihe tirst issue, decided la make a yearly contribution sa as lO cover pan of lhe expenses of J ASON. Ever since, an issue of JASON-


Dr. Lorhar Rahl. spokesman of Ihe German governmen/.

of lhe Netherlands, the U.S. Secretary of State wrote him a leuer from which I quote: " ... you have kepI inlacl your remarkable abilily lOIeli us whal is righl and whal is possible ... ". One could condude that on the part af the U .S. a cenain imponance was attached to Dutch opinion . Or do we perceive a trace of mockery? Dutch foreign policy aims, of course, at looking after lhe interests of the cauntry and of its inhabitants. But there

Center for Peace Problems of Nijmegen University) put into words the opinion of those who believe lhat the Netherlands should try ta be a guide far other nations. In this issue of JASON-

magazine a summary of these (WO artides is given. Mr. J.L. Heldring (chairman of the

magazine has eome out every two

in our interest. There is consensus aboul

Dutch Society for International Affairs NGIZ) candudes th at a more critical attitude lOwards the Dutch "guiderole" is needed. Mr. M. van der Sloel (twiee Fareign Secretary of the Netherlands) point tawards the importanee of NATO and prefers a more pragmatic approach lO foreign policy. The text of a lecture he delivered for JASON can be found in

months, la which many expens, profes-

these aims for Dutch foreign policy.

this issue.

sors, clvil servants, politicians and stu-

There is, however, disagreement as 10 the means with which 10 realize these aims. When making a choテ残e bet ween the available means, ane must also reckon with economie, military and politi-

1982 on "West-West Relations" we mdude the text of a speech by prof dr. jhr. F.A .M. Alling von Geusau, which

dents have contribuled lheirs. In lhe lhirty issues that have appeared lO dale, a cenain lheme is handled each time, either a regional problem (as in lhe issues "East Germany", "Indo-China" ,

"Spain" and "Revival of the Islam") or a more general sublecl ("Military Tech-

nology and Western Security", "Eastern and Western Military Strategy", "European Foreign Policy" and "PressureGroups and Nuclear Armament", 10 name just a few) . In this special issue you will tind same examples of what JASON has to offer: three anides from JASONMagazine and the repon of a lecture about the Dutch concept ion of its role in international polities, held for a JASON-audience.

As Mr. Luns (now Secretary-General of NATO) resigned as Foreign Secretary 2

are other aims: we seek 10 promote peace, security and respect for human rights. This is based on idealistic motiyes and on the belief thaI a stabie situation in other parts of the warld is a1so

cal considerations, as these panly determine the conceptian we have of the role of our country. There have been a lal of times when the role of Dutch in the coneen of nations has been questioned. Some say that we would be a good conductor, or that we can play the tirst tiddle very weil, others doubt th is and feel that we should rest riet aurselves to the accompaniment of the great soloists. This brings us to the concept ion of

the "guide role", which aften underlies Dutch foreign policy. JASON originally hand led this problem in the May-issue of 1980. At the time Dr. H. Wallmans (MP for the Radical Party PPR) and drs. L. Wecke (direclOr of the Study

From JASON-magazine of January

served as an introduction into that subject. With this special issue of JASONmagazine we will lry to give you an impression of what JASON normally does and what subjects it deals with. It is, however, nol possible ta give a complete view. As you will have read, we orga-

nize quitc a lot of different activities, publish many artides, varying in subject as weil as in the way they are dealt with, and these are just a few examples. We hope you will be ab Ie to get acquainted with JASON by direct contact with members of our Board or Editarial Staff, or by participating in our activi-



The Netherlands as a Guide A few years ago, a group of political scientists of the Politicological Institute of. Nijmegen University visited the Grono of Valkenburg, a weU known anraction for tourists. The municipal guide there had a hard day: nOl only did the party not listen to the man's explanations, the serious way in which he described 'places of interest' was considered by them to be rather amusing. FinaUy the guide declared angrily that the group was to find the exit of the grono by itself, in IOtal darkness, which even more contributed 10 hilarity. However, after a while certain notions of decency prevailed and the company followed its guide 10 daylight. Ths linIe incident shows that when one anempts 10 play the röle of the 'Guide', it is necessary 10 have authority and to have a public willing to follow.

Gidsland The word 'Gidsland', in which the röle conception of the 'Guide' is laid down, was used for the first time in the advisory opinion of the 'Committee of Six' 10 the Labour Party (PvdA), Democrat Party (0'66) and Radical Party (PPR) on the occasion of the elections of 1972. It was used to describe the röle The Netherlands should in their view play in international polities: it should set examples to OIher states. It ought 10 develop new views and attitudes lowards foreign-, defence- and development policy, and to disseminate these ideas among other nations. In the international field our country has to unfold activities that contribute

ponant: 14th on the list when measured its GNP. I fits share in international trade is considered it is even on the 7th place. It is the biggest foreign investor in the U.S ... All in all, especially when economy and geopolitical siLUation are taken into consideration, The Netherlands has enough potential power to be able to exert intluence on international politics, specifi10

It is 'the man in the streel' , active in

pressure groups that intluence OIher people, who reaUy guides and points out the way for his own and for ot her people's governments. Outstanding exampies are the activities of the 'AntiNeutronbomb Comminees' and those of the 'Interdenominational Peace Council' (IKV), or the work of nonpolitical organisations like Amnesty International or even the World Wildlife Fund. Thc actions of the IKV deeply affect public opinion on peace problems, at home as weil as abroad. This process does not only take place in the 'parliamentary democracies' in the

West but also in the 'peeple's democracies' in the East.

cally in regional international organisa-

When analysing Outch foreign policy in the last decade, it can be coneluded that

tions (EEC, Council of Europe, NATO).

it is worth while lO try to 'guide'.

. --- -=-==-=-". =-----

- -


10 an other economie order. in which

prosperity is shared fairly, and poverty, hunger and fear_are fought. It is also necessary 10 use all means at our disposaI to combat the armament race, pollution, and the exhaustion of natural resources. All these problems are interdependent. We therefore need 10 deve/op a coherent policy, which is, in fact, offered by i.a. the lefti st parties .

Potential sources of influence To give effect to a certain policy one needs intluence. Often it is said that The Netherlands, being only a small country, lacks the sources of intluence, and this excuse is then used 10 escape from our responsibility. It is true that, from a geographical point of view, curs is a small country. With its surface area of ± 37.(XX) squa-

re kilometres it is ranking low on the list with 116 countries th at are larger. However this tiny bit of land is in the centre of a crossroads of international communication lines and is often called the 'Gateway to Europe'. In comparison to OIher countries The Netherlands

have an extensive diplomatie machinery, active everywhere and enjoying responsiveness, nOl in the least in Third World countries. A1though the country is one of the most densely populated in the wor/d, it is on the 47th place only, when ranked according to population. However, from the viewpoinl of economy it is rat her im-

An example oJ Ou/eh injluenee INRC-Honde/sb/ud. /8-10-/979).

Who is the actor?

1l1e Netheriands contributed lO disar-

One might, wh en discussing the röle conception of the Guide, put the question 'Who are The Netherlands; who exert the intluence?' It seems to be easy to say that the Government is meant. But is it so self-evident th at governments are the only ones 10 bring light in the darklless of state-anarchy? UsuaUy

mament talks, such as the UN Conference on the Prohibition and the

[he government lacks 'vision' , and is

only reacting instead of acting. lts foreign policy is running behind facts and events without being able 10 get fire un d~r and 10 influence what is going on.

This is what happened for instanee during the debates on nuelear arms modernization.

Restrietion of the Use of certain Con-

ventional Weapons (1979 and 1980), during which a Outch proposal to prohibit pure fire-weapons (napalm etc.) was accepted after extensive negotiations. As concernes action, pressure groups and

peace movement s have been rather effective in spreading HoUanditis, the name of which illness is now more or less secn as an honour to pacifist groups. In questions of human rig/lIS, the DUleh government has always been very active, and takes many a diplomatie initiative. for instanee concerning human rights vi-


The moin building of [he DulCh Foreign Office.

olations in IsraĂŤl, South-Africa or the

USSR. However, more action is needed, because governments usually give priority to the interests of the establishment. Organizations such as Amnesty International have co-o rdinated many efforts of individuals, less troubled by the necessity to 'prOleet national interest'. Development co-operation is another subject for the realization of which The Netherlands endeavours. About I "10 of Dutch GNP is spem on Developmem Lel'5 gel nuc/eor on115 Dur of Ihe wor/d 10 begin wilh fhe Ne/her/atlds .


policy, which is - comparatively seen quite a large amoum of money. This is one of the reasons why many Third World countries are responsive to Dutch foreign policy.

Pressure groups Nevertheless - once again - the government 's possibilities are limited. AuthQrity of pressure groups seems to grow. In a country such as The Netherlands, where the churches have been very important throughout history , one cannot dissociate oneself from views of the Interdenominational Peace Council (lKV). The Churches have authority, at lea'\t on moral issues. And the opinion of some churches th at nuclear arms should be rejected is one deeply rooted in moral convictions. A peace movement Iike Pax Christi, headed by a cardinal or a bishop, is heard by all catholics, if not obeyed. Contra propaganda may try to prove that those peace movements are in Moscow's grip, but such imputations do not injure their credibility, on the contrary . Finally, one has to realize that expert knowIedge, which used to be a monopoly of the foreign policy elites and the government, has now spread among the people, especially knowledge on nudear

arms and energy. It is also recognized that the authoritics do not fulfill their promises, and that in spite of all intentions uttered, arms control does nol lead to disarmament. All trus results in a decrease in authority of the government and the attribution of the Guide-rĂśle to pressure groups . Many of these do nol con fine to only call attention to a problem, but they also study questions and bring their adapted knowledge to the people. Above all with regard to nudear arms

problems, environment, and energy questions it is quite dear that strong forces in public opinion at home and abroad are guiding and intluencing the public. They can bring pressure on the government and are able to point out the way to other governments and publies, far better than the government, whoever constitutes it. Without the IKV activities Belgium would not have taken its stand on nuclear arms modemization, and many 'BĂźrgerinitiative' in Germany as weil as elsewhere would have failed to appear.

A Guide belongs to a Group 'Gidsland ' is a ncw word, but an old idea. It has a lo ng history, although those who invented the word pro ba bly do not realize this. IdC'dS seldom appear out of the blue, and they are rarely accepted in public opinion if they do not link up with no· tions alrcady existing, whether onc was aware of Ihem or not. A few months before our country was drawn into the 5e<:ond World War the then Minister·President sung the praises of Dutch neutrality by calling The Ne· therlands' foreign policy a 'beacon light in a dark world'. We were supposcd to be a light house, the beams of which showed the way out of darkness to the others, the belligerents. This was rather presumptuous, one might say! At least Britain and France, whatever their ffiOlÎves may have been, fought against national·socialism which a lso threatened The Netherlands. Obviously, a pragma· tic justilication of its foreign policy did not last Dutch public out. It had to be given a missionary aureole.

Old traditions It is, as l a lready said, an old tradition. On the eve of the First World War prof. mr. Cornelis van Vollenhoven, an international lawyer whose views had great power with the small elite which was at thai time interested in foreign affairs, gave it as his opinion that the idea of a League of Nations . in itself a visi· onary idea . would only stand a good

chance of succeeding if The Netherlands were the prime mover. Only then th e ot her states would listen and maybe even follow. The Netherlands were desinterested, weren '( they? And this desinterestedness was above suspicion. Even a statesman as Johan Rudolf Thorbeeke (1798-1872, founder of the Dutch régime) was, in his youth, not free from such ideas. In 1830 (he had then al ready been a professor at Gent University) he wrote: . De Nederlandse slaalkunde, zelve vrij van heerschzuchl, is de billijksle oordeelaarsIer over de heerschzuchl

van anderen . .. (The policy of The Netherlands, a co untry that is itsclf free from lust of power, is the fairest to judge of the ambition ol others). The idea is obviously implied that other countries reeognize the so undness of this claim, and thus accept at least our leadership in the field of moralit y. It would go too far to investigate earlier history but in the age of the Republic of the Seven United Provinces (seventeenth and eighteenth century) one can find numeraus statement s as weil - mostly in broadsheets of clergymen - which destine a Guide function 10 Dur country. This was usually done by comparison with 'The People of Canaan ', the C hosen People. FOT centuries th is image was inculcated on the Dutch, a t any rate on the protestant part of the population.

Mr. J .L. Heldri ng Mr. J.l. Hcldring i~ director of (he NClhcrlands' Sociely for International Affairs.

D1usions In general Dutch diplomats did not care much for this loft y, exalled missio n, and at best only rendered lip-service to it. However, in 1871 the Foreign- and

ColoniaJ Secrclaries wrole to the Kin g in a joint report : ... 11 is not ul1usuai il1 The NeIherlands Ihal people make i/lllsiollS abol/l Ihe coulllry's place and relaliollship 10 powerful Realms and derive from Ihese Ihe opinion Ihal nOlhil/g is easier Ihal1 10 come 10 arrangemel1ls with suc" empires while rhe advonloges renwin all al Ihe side of The Nelherlal/ds . ..

Last century as weil Dur rulers were troubled with public opinion overestimaling our innucnce, an overrating thaI a1so underlies many times the idea of the 'gidslal/d '. But Dutch diplomats had

more cxpericncc in world polities and knew that other nations were nOl waiting for the 'rcdeeming word' - now we say 'signal' - frol11 a sl11all country. The elite, which had a predominant position in foreign poliey making in The Nether· lands tiU lo ng af ter th e 5e<:ond World War, preferred a pragmatic to an ideologically based policy.

Whal are the reasons for the increasing ... G/lides . ..


pressure on the governmenl 10 give more stress to the Guide-rรถ lc o r our country?

Loss of power and democratization In the flrst place The Netherlands' power relatively decreased during the last 15 years. This cannot be imputed 10 a raully policy, but it was caused ahove all things by the ' return' o r Germany in

internaLional polities after an absence since 1945 and ils later restraint. Also, the period or political weakness or France is over now. Bath countries now assen themselves properly, inevitably at the cast or Dutch innuence. This loss or real power is 10 be compensated by belier in Dutch moral innuence. As a consequence of democratization , especially in the sixties, the innuence or the existing elites steadily decreased . This had consequences in the field or roreign policy as weil . Pragmatism, ' Realpolitik ' , is gradually replaced by a policy based on the ideas o r large groups or the population , which are accustomed 10 an ideologically determined selflmage and belier in one's own righteousness . The not ion or the 'Guide' presupposes rollowers. Will The Netherlands be rollowed wh en it constitutes itselr the Guide? The answer is: only ir cenain conditions are rumIled. A guide mUSt never lose contact with his group. And or course he must not go in a direct ion the group does not want to take. From this it rollows that our country can achieve most within the rramework or the European Communities , Atlantic Alliance etc., and that it can only then get anywhere ir it is not too rar ahead.

This means that we must take into consideration all ideas and opinions, however dilTering, within the group or nati-


The hands of M-I Faber, secrelary of rhe peac:e-mo vemelll IKV, pho rograplred d uring a Iec: fllre for JA SON.

ons we are pan or. Ir not, our allies will not understand, and ir they do not understand they will not listen, let a10ne rollow.

,Justifications' There is a danger that the rรถ le or a 'Gidsland ', ir it does not ruim these

conditions, remains without any real engagement. In an anicle in a leading Dutch newspaper (NRC-Handelsblad, 7 april 1979) it appeared that even the leader or the Christian-Democrats in ParIiament , Mr. Lubbers, is not IOtally immune from this danger. He wrote: . .. Difference in fl/nclional responsibilities anables a small country as Ol/rs la siress Ihe Ilecessity of pushing back armament, especially nuclear armamenl . At that, the porties con go fl/rlher Ihall Ihe Parliamenl, and Ihe Parliament con ask more than lhe Ministers con . But even lhe responsible Ministers con have slronger opinions towarcls disafll1ament {han Ihose of Ihe US or Germally .. . In other words: we can easily go ahead, as we have na inOuence. In th is case the guide seems 10 know that he has na rollowers, others will handle the job. Even more amazing was J.N. Schollen. He recognized that an oil-boycotl or

South-Africa, which he propagated, would ruin just independent ZimbabweRhodesia, but he added that th is supposed threat did not constitute a valid argument against the boycolt as it wou ld not have this errect: the amount or oil exponed rrom The Netherlands 10 South-Africa was next to nothing. Here the 'guide' even hopes that he will not be rollowed. Seldom an advocate of a cenain policy sa openly admitted the uselessness or his ideas.

On such 'justifications' and to thai of 'signa!-policy' a so-<:alled guide that does not ruim the conditions I rererred 10 above raUs back , ir it is raced with reality. This confirms once more the statement that the guide-rรถle aften is a cam pensation ror lack or real innuence. AIi or abroad, the image or the Dutch does one measure other people's cloth by one's own yard? - is barn out again : the image or a hypoeritical people.

The RĂśle of The Netherlands in International Polities The role of lhe Nelherlands is a subjecl nOl much syslematically deall wilh (I). We do lake lhe line lhal our country has a cenain role, bUl il is nOl quite dear whal role lhis is and whal possibi-

lities or restrictions exist. Before World War 11 everyone knew we were neutral; apart from our member-

ship of lhe League of Nalions we refrained from foreign entanglemenls. However our foreign policy showed e1emenls of a 'mission' ; moral exaltation was nat absent. We even lhoughl ourselves lO be a 'beacon lighl in a dark world'. Afler lhe Second World War lhe government swilched lO anOlher policy, aimed at aClive participation in internatio-

nal organizations and alliances . This course was kept by various cabinets. In NATO The Nelherlands was known lO be a 'failhful ally'; in all parliannenlary parties it was acknowledged lhal lhe Red Danger could only be countered by accepting US-Ieadership.

However, it is different now. There is no queslion of rel urning lO lhe slaningpoint of 1940 a large majorilY (70"10) of the DUlCh populalion is in favour of

NATO-membership bUl we are nOl a doeile ally any more. More and more The Nelherlands slrive

ta express all own


of view. BUI

lhe queslion of how lO realize ilS ideas is nOl often put.

Mr. M. van der Stoel, Sl!a(!tury DJ SIUle Jor Foreign Af/airs (/973-/977, /98/-/982) al (J JASON-meeling.

The political weight of our country As a rule, The Nelherlands are cOllsidered lO be a small country . As far as ilS surface area or its population are con51dered lhis is lrue indeed. On lhe Olher hand, if we bear in mind economie faclors, our share in world lrade elC . il appears lhal lh is 'small country' belongs lO lhe 25 mOSl important nations. The idea lhal we wou ld be able lO exercise

decisive influence on world evenls as weil as lhe opinion lhal we would nOl be able lO allain much are in my view

misconceptions. We have certain racilities lO exen a limiled yel real innuence

on decision-making within international organizations and groups (0 whieh we belong. However, in lhe lasl lwO of a decade some developments have had a negative impacl on lhe posilion of The Nelherlands. Among lhe mosl important was lhe increase in power of lhe Federal Republic of Germany, which affecled above all our posilion wilhin NATO . Gradually

the polit ical weight of Uermany eomes 10 equate its economie importance. The allilude of lhe government may slill be aimed al selling limils lO German power - Heimul Schmidl was, for inslance, onIy wilting lO accepl nudear arms on German soil on condition lhal al lhe same lime Olher NATO-members would a1so pronounce for modernizing and slalioning - bUl non lhe less Germ any's

increasing importanee led 10 a relative weaking of lhe DUlch position. The expa nsion of lhe number of slales

members of (he international eommunily also leads lO a decrease in Dulch innuence. T he posilion of lhe Nelherlands in lhe European Communilies of lhe Six was more important lhan ilS POSilion in lhe EEC of lhe Ten. IlS impacl on UN-policy was heavier when lhe UN had SiXlY members lhan now, in a UN having 150 members. There is a1so a lhird development lhal did nOl quile benefil lhe posilion of The Nelherlands: lhe leading weslern powers lend lo di,cuss internalional problems on lOp-<:onrerences . This weakens lhe inll uence of lhe smaller countries. The Nelherlands used lO be an innuential member of lhe OECD, also because o f lhe qualily of ilS contribulions lO discussion and decision-making, bul lh is is more and more nullified by lhe imporlance of decisions made by lhe Big Seven on lOp-<:on ferences . The idea has been pUl forward lo add an eighlh lo

Mr. M. van der Stoel This tex! is (hc abridged \crsion of a ~ iX"CCh hcld for JASON by Mr. M. van der Stoel. \wicc &erelary of State (or Forcigll Affiars.

lhe Big Seven, lhe BeNeLux (lhe Union of Belgium, The Nelherlands and

Luxemburg), which, however. seems to be im possible for lWO reasons : firslly beeause lhe US oppose lhe idea, and secondly il will nOl be easy lO reach an agreement with Belgium: anything lhat only seems lO look like strenglhening lhe BeNeLux is viewed al arguseyed by lhe Walloons. It is nOl necessa ry lO explain - as you all know - how lhe F1emish-WaUoon co ntrove rsy dominales Belgium politics. Nevenheless we mUSl not lake a gloomy

view of lhings: adynamie and in vemive policy may neulralize lhese nearly sl ruclural changes. We sho uld , for exannple,

adjusl our tacties instead of eomplaining aboul lhe lendency of lhe Big Seven lO

convene in lop-conferences or aboul the French-German dirCCLOrate wit hin (he EEC, we should concentrale on lhe preliminary slages of decision-making and make lhe necessary bilaleral cont acls during lhe preparalion of e.g. lhe European Council.

Four possibilities I wou ld like lO conceillrale on lhe important queslions of peace and sec uril y and lO deal with four evenlUal positions lhal co uld be laken by The Nelherlands. I. The Nelherlands give up membership of NATO and rel urn lO pre-wär neulralilY; 2. The Nelherlands rema in member of lhe alliance bUl wilhdraw from lhe mililary o rganizalion of NATO; 3. The Nelherlands remain member of NATO, bUl wilhoUl nuclear arms; 4. The Nelherlands remai n member of NATO, wilhoul removing nudear arms from ilS lerritory, bUl lakes a

critical yet active attit ude. The first option is nOl oflen pleaded. Those who advocale il Slale lhal The Nelherlands, as il would be neulral lhen, co uld perform a bridge-role belween Easl and West. However, if one analyzes lhe ro le o f e.g. Sweden or

Austria - lWO neutral European counlries - il appears lhal lhough lhey are

aetive in the UN or in the Conference on Securil y and Cooperalion in Europe (CSCE), lhey have never laken any ini-

tiative of crucial importance by which 7

East and West came nearer 10 each ot her. The notion of the bridge-role presupposes that East and West are nOl directly in lOuch with each other, but as long as there is a dialogue it is na use 10 adopt this role. And situations do accur in which The Netherlands, though it is a member of NATO, takes initiatives 10gether with neutral countries , notably in the UNo On the one side, therefore, it is an underestimation 10 think that only as a neutral country one can perfarm a bridge-role. On the Olher hand initiatives that imprave the atmosphere between East and West can also be taken by The Netherlands as a NATOmember together with nClilrals, al-

though it wiU aften concern action at a lower level. On IOp of th is it is dear that if our country gives up NATOmembership it will lose any possibility 10 innuence decisions of the Alliance . I condude therefore that it is not at all usefullO choose for the 'Neutrality' option. The second o plio n, which implies a position comparabIe with that of France, is not very 3llractive. We will remain 10

be bound to Nlied commitments but we will lose all innuence we now have in organs such as the Defence Planning Commillee and the Nudear Planning Group. The Ihird option is usually advanced by the peace movements. In (heir opinion a

Dutch example will be catehing: 'Let 's get nudear arms out of the world, and lel's st<ln in the Netherlands' is Ihe 510-

gan of the Interdenominational Peace Council (IKV). Curiously, one is more sceptical wh"n assessing the eventual Eastern-European reaction. Unilateral disarmament would mean a destabilization of East-West relations, and apan from th is it seems to me that the presumption of i.a. the IKV, that WesternEuropean countries would follow our example, is not quite correct. Belgium

may imit3te us, but in France even the left is opposing abolition of the Force de Frappe. In the United Kingdom Labour governments sticked to the British nuclear force, and in Germany the so-

viet threat is still considered to be too dangerous 10 be in favour of denuclearization . The Dutch example will therefore nOl be very catching, but it could lead to the foUowing consequences: a furthcr accumulation of nuclear afms in Germany (and consequently a strengthening of the German position and a step towards a special German-American relationship) and the loss of a good deal

of responsiveness. Remains the fourth option: The Netherlands as a critical yet active member of the Nliance. We will have to pUl forward new ideas 10 limit nudear risks and to set up a warranted nudear planning. This requires us to take action for the realization of our ideas befare decisions are made. The visit of our Premier to NATO countries in december 1979 in order 10 advocate Dutch ideas concerning the modernization of nudear arms did not quite serve a useful purpo-

se. Policy-making had at that time already come to an end , and decisions had been taken. He should have made his tour eight months befare.

Potential supporters The Netherlands do have th e opponunity 10 exercise innuence. lt has experienced people working at its Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, who - when mobilized and mOlivated - can exen far morc influence on international polities

than usually is supposed. Often cenain countrics turn out 10 share our ideas,

and if we can find and activate those potcntial supporters we ean achieve Dur ends by cooperating with them . In th is way we frequently arrived at positive rc-

suIts in the UN or in the EEC , and it should also be possible within NATO . I don 't believe that The Nelherlands can play a decisive role in the Nliance. I do think that there are more possibilities than many people suppose, and that in the case o f nudear arms modernization we did less than we could . We must not return to isolation, by de-

nuclearizing Dur country but we must take a position in the middle of this bad and dangerous world, at Ihe place where decisions are made.

(1) A n excellent treatisc is: dr. ir. J.J.c. Voor-

hoeve: 'Peace Profir$ alld Principfes', A sfUdy of Dil/eh foreign fXJlicy. 1979. M . Nijhoff (fhe Hague/ Boston/ London).

Tlte Nerher/ands are a highly de\'e/oped COUll try, wilh a 101 oJ techno/agical kIlowiedge . .. H anlles Brit/-

ker, p/l!oding againsl ,wc/eor OrlllS proliferatioll: ')/ISI imaginl' IhUl idiot Ghadaffl wilh 011 A-bomb '!

STEL jr VoOR.-




A1bOMBOM ..路



Will cooperation endure? The future of European-American relations This articJe contains lhe lexlof a linal speech deli vered by prof. Alling von Geusau. It is a summing up of discussions lhal LOok place during a colloquium on 'Allies in a turbulenl world ; Will Cooperation endure?' , organized by the John F. Kennedy InstilUle, center for internalional sllldies in Tilburg (11-14 november 1981).

I. The changed context of allied

rclations There is linie doubl lhal lhe world LOday is far more complex and international relalions are more volalile lhan lhey were at the time the alliance was crealed. The allies are facing a world in which various crises, problems, and exlernal interesls are more complexingly linked; and in which neilher the lhreal facing lheir securilY, nor lhe boundaries of their security-cooperation are c1ear any longer. I. Problems of linkage It is no longer sufficiem to restrict 10 attenlion to crises which have occured or could emerge in Easl-Wesl relalions in Europe, nor 10 disregard the impact crises in olher areas of lhe world may have on allied sec urily. Among lhe recent crises we discussed - the Soviet invasion of Afghanislan, inslabilily in lhe Middle Easl and lhe Gulf area in particular, and lhe Civil war in EI-Salvador - all lhree of lhem do affecl allied securilY. Even if one would assume, lhal Afghanistan manifests expansion of Soviet power in Asia and does nOl portend a danger for lhe lerriLOrial Slalus quo in Europe, lhis move is bound LO be linked wilh aClual or pOlenlial Soviel behavior in Europe. Linkage of a different kind is presumed belween Middle-Easl inslabilily, lhe vilal imporlance of Gulf oil for Weslern securily and Soviel effons lO increase ilS inOuence in lhal region . One may - as many Europeans do - rejecl righl wing lerror in EI Salvador , ilS present government and US support. il cannol be denied, however lhal Cuban support for the other side adds a dimension , complicating an acceplable solulion and linking il lO lhe broader problem of a Soviel global challenge lO American securily.

There also appear lo be more linkage between problems facing the allies. Among them are the linkage bet ween defence spending and monetary instability, bet ween defence spending and social securilY, and between energydependence and economie security. The incongruity bet ween defence and monetary relations is hard IQ solve. Delicilary spending by the United Slates does affect European monelary stability and is related IQ Ihe level of US defence expenditure. ft might be reslrained by reducing expenditure for NATO defence, which could be done only in the unlikely case that Wesleuropean states would increase their defence budgets. The \inkage belween defence spending and social security raises profounder problems still. As the present US Administration appears prepared IQ pay in social security for the purpose of reslOring the military balance, Westeuropean governments accept lower defence budgets IQ maintain social security. This divergent response lO that linkage does affect security if only because il undermines mutual trust. Presidel1l Reogaf/ (with the US-budget if/ his hOf/ds): ",ind, we'l/ make a crash路{ofldiflg 011 Europe ,

Prof. Dr. F.A.M. Alling von Geusau ProL Alting von Geusau is hoogleraar te Tilburg en direcleur van het aldaar gevestigde John F. Kennedy Instituut, "Center for International Stu路 dies".

Again a different sorl of linkage can be observed between energy-dependence and economic security. The more dependent Westeuropean governments tend IQ seek more security through improved political relations with the OPEC. They are reluctant to accepl US military preparations for coping with situations, where the supply of oil mighl be threatened by Soviel military involvement, let alone IQ panicipale in them. The Allies unavoidably have di verging national interests especially outside lhe NATO area. Their nationaJ sec urity inlerests are subjectively perceived rather than objectively delined. Faced with the pressure of a continuing Soviet military build up and a globalising of the EaslWest conOict following lhe global projection of Soviet military power , sec uri'"

Mi/totl, I belie\'f' you 're 100 heav)', BUl don',



ty perceptions tend not to converge but to grow apart. The United States is emphasising the need for a more globalized effort to contain Soviet expansion, Westeuropean governments attempt to proteet the achievements of European dテゥtente against the deterioration of Soviet-American relations.

2. Fading c1arities At the time the Alliance was created, there was virtual unanirnity on the nature of the threat in East- West relations facing the aIlies. It was conceived of primarily as an external military Soviet threat. Today, the nature of the threat external and internaI, political as weU as military - is far less clear. Some would argue, th at the global projection of Soviet military power increases the dangers for aUied security. Others stress that Soviet military expansion into Afghanistan has not increased its politica! influence. lts foothold in that country is not stabie, and it has induced many third world countries to change to a more neutra! stance in Soviet-American confrontation. Another difference is related to the presumed caases of the continuing arms build up. Some emphasize the continued threat exemplified e.g. by the reientiess Soviet military build up, as requiring NATO to modernize its farces in responcc, in order to maintain deterrence. A warning was issued, nevertheless

against the American over~mphasis on a military response and the danger of the associated military rhetoric. Others stress the dangers of the nuclear arms race as such, for which they hold Western technology and the Western military-industrial complex primarily responsible. Another unclarity is produced by the presumed uncertainties of policies and developments in the United States and the Soviet-Union. There are those, who seem lO dismiss the reliability of the US a1ly given the policy.テァhanges foUowing changes of Administration. Others point to the unreliability of the Soviet-Unionツキ as the adversary, given the uncertainties of succession, political crisis and economie weakness. The latter's unreliability if not unpredictability may grow worse, as a possible internal breakdown of the Soviet empire is unlikely to take place without major international turbulences. It can a1so be argued that the consequences of an open and democratie change of government - as in the US - are bound to be intrinsica!ly more predictabie than those of a succession of leaders in the totalitarian Sovietunion. It was a1so remarked, however, that the coming succession in Moscow would not result, most likely, in unpredictable changes of the systeem. 10

In the present world situation, the boundaries of the alliance have become much less c1ear in political and military fact, than they have been delimited in article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Inside the Treaty-area, distinctions could be made bet ween the central area - where the strategy of flexible response applies primarily -; the South-Eastern flanc with Turkey - where conventional defence and crisis-<:ontrol appear more important -; and the Nothern flanc which was said to show a measure of stability as part of the Nordie region inc1uding Sweden even in the absence of an adequate military balance. The c1arity of lhe outside boundaries

was said to have disappeared primarily by two developments: the vital importance of Middle-East oil and lhe collapse of the alliance system promoted by the United States in the area of the Middle-East and South-Asia.

11. The state of the alliance in the eighties Few were willing to dispute lhe opinions expressed during lhe opening session, that the state of the alliance is nOL good, and that allied policies are drifting apart, exacerbating mutual relations. The discussions centered on three braad themes, which will briefly be reviewed.

0 " Ihis p iclllre a bridge does nol symbolil.e Iwily. I/ is a bridging Jor {he Soviet pipe-Iine brテ始ging gas to EI/rope, over file ri ver Vltana in Czecho Slo vakia.

I. Goverments .nd people One of the most serious dangers for a1lied seeurity, no doubt, is the erosion of democratie support for government security policies. During the first period of the alliance, democratie political parlies in the alliance were essentially in agreement on the nature of the political order to be proteeted and the necessary seeurity policies to be conducted. This can no longer be taken for granted for the political parties concerned, nor for their electrorates. Politieal polarization is increasing, and mutua! intolerance risi ng. This erosion of support generally takes three forms: public and party support for widely divergent polieies (e.g . unilateral nuclear di sarmament); resort to and support for extra-parliamentary campaigns to force changes in governmental policies; the deliberate blurring of distinctions be(ween the canc3lUre of historie capitalism, non-democratie right -wing ideologies and democratie conscrv31ism on one side of the political spectrum; and Lhe ideaIs of socialism , the one party totalitarian socialist ideologies, and social democracy on the other side of the politica! spectrum. As the polieies and attitudes of social democratie parties - and their internal divisions - indicate, the pattern and trends are widely different in various Westeuropean countries, and reDeet different national movements of opinion, in particular when comparing LatinEuropean allies with North-Western European aIlies. In North-Western Europe, the erosion is stronger in the British labour party and Lhe Dutch labour party, than e.g. in the German social democratie party. The case of PASOK in Greece is again different , as its attitude reDeets resistance against high defence expendit ure in the past. This erosion of support no doubt expresses a deep seated fear for nuclear war in Europe. As it coincides with a broadly supported Ameriean determinalion 10 restore US strength, it is contributing to the exacerbation of EuropeanAmerican relations. It enhances mutual irritation: over the style of policymaking in the American Administration on the European side, and over the weakness of governments in Europe on the American side. In Western Europe, this erosion is

fostered by two other phenomena. One is the growing popular dis belief in what governments, " the establishment" or the "security-elites" say o n the present East-West military (im)balance and Soviet military doctrine. Another is the a1ienation between peeple and their governments, which have failed to credibly pursue European political unity, the single new political ideal emergi ng from the ruins of two worldwars.

2. Govemments against govemments Under the combined and long-term impact of the Vietnam war and East West détente. allied foreign policies are increasingly diverging. Détente as a source of - too high - expectations in the late sixties, has beeome an objeet of major disagreement in particular bet ween the United Stat es and Westeuropean go-

vcrnments. Attention in this context was given a1so to the need to improve a1lied capabilities to deal wilh crises (crisis-management) or political resolution. Inadequate politica! contingency planning and lack of foresight - e.g. with respect to the Afghanistan crisis - has resuhed in divergent reactions 10 the invasion, and mutual irritation. The reactions to developments in Poland, however, were mentioned as a more promi·

si ng exanlple. Disagreements persist in particular with respect to the use of military force or political means to deal with crises outside the NATO area, a1though some tended to see th is disagreement more optimistically as division of labor. Serious disagreements were accepled to exist at present with respect to crucial aspects of allied securiry policies, in particular bet ween the US and Westeuropean government s (Franee may be excepted). Westeuropean governments are reluctant if not resisting, the Ameriean call for a military strengthening of the alliance, concerned as they are thai may in Ihe process, loose internal support for allied security policies. The US Administration has serious misgivings about the Westeu ropean demand 10 enter into arms-control negotiations with the So.ietunion, before - a t least Ihe crucial decisions are made 10 reslore the military balance. The difficulty in finding a balanced allied approach to maintaining (or restoring) military strength and improving security lhrough arms-control is compounded by the absence of any reasonabie hope that negotiations with the Soviet-Union might produce meaningfu l result s within the foreseeable fut ure. A brief discussion took place on American-Westeuropean disagreements with respect to the lifting of the grain embargo to the Sovietunion and the proposed Soviet-European Gas Pipeline deal . Neither issue was considered of the time to be a major sou ree of friction. 3. Instruments of coordination Among the instruments allies have at their disposal, three groups could be memioned: instrumenl s for foreign policy consultation, such as NATO political consultation and European Po litical

rLe Monde) .... H ello Brezlljev, I have (I problem wil" Olll? of 111)' s(l/elfitl?s .


ALLO . 81Z0,\lEV? :rA l ON PR08 LIöME" OE OIStl P1HJE: AU 5 C. L'U~ OE" HES. SI'ITE" L LI T ES .



Cooperation (EPC); arrangements for consuhation, onee hoslilities have broken out ; and available mechanisms for economie -, energy - and monetary cooperation.

The discussions focused on (he first group. There was braad agreement on the general aspects of the two instruments of foreign policy-consultation, taken separately. NATO political consultation is functioning weil, although its OUlcome leaves much lO be desired. EPC is lO be seen and accepted as a necessary extension of Eu ropean efforts lO achieve unity. Discussions focused more in panicular on the relationship bet ween NATO political consultation and EPe. This relationship - or the absence of it c1early is a source of friction in the alliance and was a subject of heated debate in the discussions. EPC was said lO negatively affect NATO political consultati on, lO undul y burden relations between the US and EC members, and lO

Bundeskanz/er Schmidt in /he US. Schmテ仕l speoking.

be resentcd by allies such as Norway, Canada, Turkey and leeland. As far as procedure is concerned, critici sm was leveled in particular lO the unwillingness of EC members to ab ide by the agreemcnt (0 inform the Secretary-General of NATO o n EPC consultations touching on security issues. This criticsm unavoidably led lO a discussion of the principal source of European-American irritation: the EPC declarations and activities wit h respect lO the Arab-lsraeli connicl. Disagreement focused o n the interpretatio n of the security-aspect and on the policies with respect lO the connicl. Europeans justified EPC activities by pointing to American constraints - the Jewish lobby - lO adequately deal with Arab-lsraeli peace-making. This justification was contested by the argument that EC members were operating under

that lsraeli core-security inrerests rat her than domestic American constraints were cricia!. Some Europeans a1so justified EPC activities as areaction to an American

"unilateral" policy, excluding the Sovietunion and - by implicati on - EC members from joining in the peace-making. American and other participants charged EC members with irritating interference in the - sofar - single succesful effort (the Camp David agreement and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty) at Middle-East peace-making. The issue, however, renects deeper disagreements. EC mem bers consider their declarations on the M iddle-East as example of their distinct political identicy from the US. They refuse lO accept that their unity is loO fragile and their power loO limited lo go beyond joint declarations.

the more severe constraints of oil-

dependence, and that they failed to see

As a consequence, they can thwart

American efforts without themselves being able lo contribute constructively lo peaoemaking. The open disagreement bet ween the US Secretary of State and the British Chairman of EPC (shortly befare the discussions) a1so pointed lo substantive differences of policy, and a European reluctance lo support American peace-making efforts. This being sa, the question - unanswered in the discussians - remains, whether a group of states apparently lacking the power to contribute lo peace-making, should not have shown more restraint in issuing dec1arations, which negatively innuence lhe cohesion of the alliance to which they all (with one exception) belang . Apart from this controvcrsial topic, brief allusions were made to efforts by the larger allies to promate the "principal nations" approach to policy coordination . It was remarkcd thal a "directorate" did in fact function within EPC, whereas similar efforts within NATO (the Guadeloupe Conference) had been a failure.

111. The main issues facing the aJlies Allied cohesion is based on the determination of the allies "to maimain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed auack" and their willingness to consult together "whenever . in the opinion of one of them, the territorial integrity, politica! independence or security of any of the parties is threatened" (art. 3, 4 North Atlantic Treaty). The underlying objective of sustaining a political order, la which allies are committed, has been made more difficult to realise by the more complex world situation, the more complex nature of the threats they face, and the erosion of popular consent to that politica! order. lt was agreed that the main and central 12

issues facing lhe allies in lhis respecl were securilY, defence and arms-<:onlrol.


I. Securily and defence A1lied securilY continues lo be based o n lhe maimenance of a defence-poslUre, capable of delerring an armed auack and of resisting il - if delerrence fails -in such a way lhal escalation lO general nudear war cao be prevenled. The concepl of delerrence - especially lhe role of nudear weapons lherein -has for loO long remained a subjecl for debale among experts, if nOL surrounded by secrecy. The need for adequale explanation of lh is concepl was underlined; it was feit however, lhal lh is lask now is lo be performed under far more unfavorable circumstances. One such circumslance is lhe disappea-






rance of American superiority in nuclear

weapons. The substilUlion of lhe SlTalegy of llexible response for lhe earlier one of massive relaliation has rellecled lh is change . As lhe credibililY of lhis newer deterrence strategy depends on

lhe " usabilily" of a variely of nudear weapons, it contributes to growing

anxiely lhal lhese weapons may aClually be used in Europe. This is all lhe more

BUI/deskan.. ler Schmidl in ,he US, Reagan speaking.

sa in an era in which continuous and

openly discussed nudear modernization programs are underlining lhe difficully of Teaching agreement on arms-control wilh lhe Sovielunion. Another unfavorable circumstance was considered lo lie in lhe combinalion of a new US Adminislralion pressing for nudear slrenglhening and lalking - confusingly - aboul limited nudear war scenario's, Westeuropean governments na

longer able or willing lo inform and explain why nudear delerrenee cannOl be foregone, and Soviet leaders who openIy support lhe nudear disarmament carnpaigns in Weslern Europe. Again anolher difficully resides in lhe facl lhal lhe very planning for nudcar war -'even with the purpose 10 avoid it is hard lo reconeile wilh lhe nOlions of moderation and restraint in a democra-

tie system. This is the more sa, as the Soviel lhreal lends lo become more abslracl and less credible, lhe longer il laslS. h was observed lhal France encountered Icss popular resislance againsl lhe development of a national "force de frappe" . Still, few if any participants argued in favor of a European nudear force, or - allernatively - a nudear free Europe, as ways lO dissociale Europe from lhe lwO superpowers. The former might immeasurably increase tension with lhe SovielUnion; lhe laller would upsel lhe military balance and as such not contribute


the prevention of war.

fence capabilities (e.g. along the Yougoslav model). lt was remarked , however, lhat NATO had been driven imo the need for an early nudear response if deterrence fails - by insufficient Westcuropean willingness to maimain or

SlTenglhen ilS convenlional forces. Such willingness - to be expressed in higher expendilures for conventional defence is unlikely lo be forlhcoming in Western Europe. Still, some participants were confident thal a re-ordening of priorities

loward a forward defence with convenlional forces, could find support in lhe German Federal Republic. Opinions lended lo differ on lhe question, whelher NATO-Warsaw Pact comparisons of mililary strenglh, pointed lo a reasonable balance in mililary forces or Soviel superiorily in Europe. MOSl participants could support the opinion, however. th al it were the respect ive polieies and military doclrines, and the trends in weapons-procuremenl over a longer period, which caused concern for NATO allies . Attention in this conlexl was paid (0 the difficult of asses-

sing Soviet intentions, the reasons behind its offensive mililary doctrine, and lhe offensive characler of ilS polilical tact ics. The military poslUre of lhe SoviclUnion in Eastern Europe, in any case, points (0 a potential use of military superiorilY as a means for exerting political pressure.

Il was argued lhal lhe role of nudear weapons could be reduced in NATO's dctcrrence if more prominence was given lo conventional defence and the

As has been reported already, progress in arms-control negmialions is unlikely

strengthening of territorial and civil dc-


2. Arms-control be achicved in the foreseeable fut ure,

thus making the solution of inter-allied differences all the more difficult lo achieve.

This is the more sa, as governments on the one hand agree lhat modernization of nuclear forces is necessary; and, on the Olher hand, appear to be driven into negotiatio ns by popular pressure (0wards unilateral reductions. An effort lherefore sho uld be made (0 reach consensus among allies on a variely of issues and areas lo be covered. Among them, (WQ general issues were emphasized: the need for engaging in arms-control negotiations in a much

earlier stage of arms-development; and the need lo stress adequate verification. Wilh respect 10 the caming negotiations on LR TN F, consensus was said (0 be

necessary on the weapon-systcms (0 be induded, on the Iinkage with SALT (with respect lo submarine launched nudear warheads) , o n lhe question of focusing on numbers of warheads or launchers, on seeking a regional balance or world-wide Iimits, and o n the indusion or exdusion of French and British syslems. Participants only brielly touched upon the problem of achieving reductions in conventional forces and weapons through negotiotions . It was feit that past experiences and present imbalances did no t augur weil for meaningful progress in lhis respect. 3. Ot her issues Participants also discussed a variety of

economie issues deviding the allies and the impact such divisiveness may have 13

on allied cohesion. Among them were the rising protectionism in trade, European-American dirferences in monetary and tiscaJ politics, and diverging approaches to the problem of dependence on imported energy. It was argued that trade bet ween the US and EC is less important a problem than investment and technologieal

... A coherenl policy .

cooperation .

With respect to energy-dependence, Western Europe messes improved 'political relations wilh OPEC and considers the gas pipeline deal with the Sovietunion as a welcome diversification of energy imports . Americans are seriously

concerned about the impact the latter deal may have on Westeuropean seeurity. As far as Middle-East oil is concerned, they tend to emphasize the need for an ability to proteet the flow of oil against eventual Soviet efforts to disrupt it. Brief attention was given also to the competing interests and divergent approaches with respect to relations with developing countries. It was feit by many, however, that these issues and differences were peripheral rather than central to the problem of maintaining aBied cohesion in the eighties. Still, participants were strongly urged not to underestimate the impact

economie divergences cDuld have on allied cohesion . International economie relations are on-

Iy part of serious eeonomic problems, such as inflation and unemployment, facing the allies . Among them, energy also is related to the maintenance of se-

than of suggesting solutions. Among the approaches to be changed, I would like to suggest them on four levels.

I. ehanging the inteBectual approach Underlyi ng European-American divergencies, has been a change in the intelleetual dimate on both sides of the Atlantic. Intelleetuals on both sides have contributed to be con fusion by generalized mutuaJ condemnations and the promotion of negative images of the American politicaJ system or European pacifism. Debates on European-American relati-

ons, dĂŠtente, security or nuclear weapons are increasingly characterised by the persistenee of emotional irritation and intolerance, and the absence of rationality and willingness to change one's mind. Intelleetuals should see it as their primary task to restore rationality of argument and darity of anaJysis. 2. The responsibilities of political parties Basic support for the alliance and for

curity in a more narrow sensc. Econo-

the political order for which it stands

mic difticulties may thus create a dima-

can be maintained only, as long as the main democratic politicaJ parties are willing tO understand and respect the limits to be observed in a democratic order. It cannOt be denied that polarization in political opinions, has led same of them lO treaspass these limits. The emp-


which induces allies to adopt diver-

gent policies towards dĂŠtente, the Middle-East and in times of crisis, th us negatively affeeting their neeessary cohesion. Participants, tinaBy, briefly discussed the divergencies in public attitudes and governmentaJ policies with respect to the promotion of human rights. Throughout the discussion, the Western reactions to developments in Poland ca-

hasis on "ideological differences" in systems tends lO ignore the far more real distinctions between pluralist democracies and politica! parties to help reestablishing essential consensus on the vaJues and Iimits of pluralist democracy.

me up at regular intervaJs. lts was argu-

ed that Western reaction should be flexible and coherent. More priority is to be given to an approach which com-

bines immediate humanitarian assistance, long-range conditionaJ help, and the

dissuasion of military intervention through the threat of eeonomic sanctions if it occurs.

IV. WiJl cooperation endure? The future of European-American relations and the endurance of cooperation

is a maller of choice rat her than a subjeet for academic foreeast. It is, also, more a maller of changing approaches


3. The approaches of govemments With respect lO the need to maintain aJlied cohesion, national governmems have failed in at least two areas. They have failed, in many instances, in their task lO inform their eleetorates adequately about the reaJity of the inter-

national situation and the dilemma's of allied seeurity. They have equaJly failed in their understanding of the psychology of mutual contidence in aJlied relations. The tirst failure and the resulting popular disbelief in the "establishment" can be

overcome only. if governments and

policy-makers muster the courage to inform and explain what they know, rather than seleet or avoid what is Iiked or disliked by some. The second failure can be overcome onIy if governments and policy-makers re-

introduce a measure of self-restraint in public declarations, whenever mutuaJ contidence might suffer from them. 4. The need for a coherent stmtegy The Alliance has been created and re-

mains necessary, primarily for maintai¡ ning collective security. It requires an ongoing discussion aimed at the elaboration of a more coherent strategy tO achieve credible security in the eighties, adequate strength in defence, moderation in policies. initiatives in arms-control negOliations, and broad popular support for these common efforts. In order tO perform these essential tasks, partners should lower their voices on issues - often peripheral - where mutuaJ irritation may undermine necessary allied confidence.

A letter from a Transatlantic friend Allow me to int roduce myself. I am an American professo r of internatio nal relations long interestcd in Atla ntie Alliance amars a nd arms cont rol. I have been in your co untry only th ree times once as a Cl in April 1945; later, du ring the Middle East C risis of October 1973; a nd most recently last month to lcarn more abo ut current Dutch thinking on NATO problems. I have been impressed by certain Dutch characteristics - candor and openmindness, an appreciation of what Ăź means IQ be independent in this world, and a deep commitment IQ the moralhumanist ideals of Western civilization. During my 1973 visit, the East-West negoliations on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) were just starting. My own government pursucd a prudent " Iow-profile" policy lOward Moscow, but the Dutch delegates did not hesitate IQ hector the Soviet Union for its flagrant violations of human right s. Bath then and later in the case of Andrei Sakharov, I admircd your willingness to speak out for freedom. Let me speak to you frankly, confident that you will give me a fair hearing, and nOl charge me with trying ta intervene in your international political process. As democratie allies, you and me must speak candidly to each other. We both realize that the aid dichotomy between foreign policy and domestic polities is less valid than it was formerly. As a cilizen of the Atlantic Alliance, I feel perfectly free to say what is on my mind.

The antinuclear movement in Holland The antinuclear movement in your country is a very disturbing development within the West. It is a movement in the direction of neutralism - the same kind that failcd to protect your security in 1940. You are surely aware that the position of the antinuclearists in your country, especially in the PvdA, has had a definite impact on the Flemish Socialist Party of Belgium . We now see the speetacle of the Low Countries, which originally inspircd the format ion of the Atlantic Alliance in the late 1940s and which have always playcd a pivotal political role within NATO, now impairing Alliance unity by delaying on TNF modernization. Undoubtedly a deep moral conviction undergirds much (but not all) of the Dutch opposition to nuclear weapons . It sterns from religious belief and the teaching of the Churches, and is readily understandable. Every thinking, feeling human being is bound tot be appalled at the prospect of nuclcar war. On this

point there can be na disagreement. Disagreement arises over the best way of minimizing the risk of nuclear catastrophe in a world in which there is na safe policy course, since every policy course involves at least some danger. Ta

my mind, the antinucJear movement constitutes an extremely dangerous proposal. One prominent leader of the Dutch antinuclear movement assurcd me lhat the campaign is aimed "only" at nuclear weapons, not at NATO. Such a distinction is sa subtie as to lose all validity in the case of an alliance which depends hcavily upon nuclcar strategies for deterrenee and defence. The call for the even!Ual remaval of aU nuclear wcapons from The Netherlands is a call for unilateral disarmament on the installment plan. Holland can only make an appropriate comribution of {he military capabilities of NATO by continuing to field farces that are equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons. While in your country I heard na serious calls for a significant incrcase in DUlCh conventional farces to compensate for what would be lost if the nuclear role is redueed to one or at most two tasks, as the PvdA platform prescribes. For years, Holland has resisted the appeals of its NATO allies to place more than one brigade on the Central Front. It cannot be denied that any reduction in the Dutch nuclcar role will weaken the Dutch contribution to NATO, and incrcase proportionately the importanee of the Bundeswehr on the Continent - a development that the present leadership of the Federal Republic certainly does not wish to see eome aboul.

The objections of Mr. Klaas de Vries (P vdA) Fot the most part, the antinuclearists prefer to take their stand on the basis of an aversion to nuclear weapons, whether intuitive, religious or ideologieal, and they do not relish arguments \Vhich employ the kind of technical, stati stica! arguments which are the slockin-trade of strategie theorists. Uno notabie exception is Labor defense expert Klaas de Vries, who engages in a mode of analysis which Arnerican Strategie thcorists can understand even if we do n0t agree with his conclusions. Mr. de Vries offers three principal objecrions to the modernization of NATO TNF: (I) It is unnecessary because NATO already possesses long-range theater nuclcar farces capable of reaching Soviet targets, and therefore the new missiIe farces will add nothing to NATO's capabilities but will mcrely serve to provake the Soviet Union . (2) It wililead 10

Dr. James E. Do ughen y Is a professor of Political Seience at Saint Joseph's UnĂ&#x17D;\ersily Philadclphia. PA and Senio r Staff Membcr of the Instilute fo r Foreign Poliey Analysis in Cam bridge (l\'lass.). After a visil 10 nlC Ncthcrlands and Bclgium he wrat\.' Ihis Icncr for JASON-Magazi nc.

the decoupling of European defense and theater deterrence from the U .S. strategie deterrent farces, and thereby make more likely a nuclear war limited to the soil of Western Europe while the territory of the two superpowers remains immune. (3) Modernization of NATO TNF wiU "Iower the threshold" - a favorite c1iche of antinuclearisls who, unlike Mr. de Vries, use the terminology without comprehending it - and it is presumed that the lowering of the NATO threshold will increase the probability of nuclcar war. I strongly disagree with Mr. de Vries' three principal objections to NATO TNF for the fo llowing reasons. Fi rst, TNF modernization is essential, in my view, as a means of bringing about a greater degree of strategic symmetry in the European theater. Mr. de Vries is correct when he points out that more than one-fourth of the nuclear weapons presently assigned by the United States to NATO are carried by medium- and long-range delivery systems, including FIII aircraft, carrier-based A-7s and submarine-Iallnched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), many of which are capable of reaching Soviet territory. But he has na quarrel with statistics indicating that the USSR has 5,000 medium- and lo ngrange nuclear weapon systems compared to only 2,000 for NATO. NATO ai rcraft systems may be sllbstantially degraded by a surprise attack and by attrition against formidabie Soviet air defenses. NATO SLBMs can be more properly considered to be Eurostrategie systems, but they suffer from an accuracy problem which makes them appropriate only for a city-busting role - a fact whieh has increasingly impaired their credibility as a deterrent. The Soviet Union is deploying, at the rate of at least one SS-20 (\Vith three warhcads) per week, a modern force of mobile, invulnerable and accurate missiles targeted on Western Europe. NATO now lacks a comparabie countercapabili ty a nd would be most unwi se to concede to Moscow a monopoly right to modernize theater nuclear farces, thereby increasing unilaterally the vulnerability of Western Europe. I cannot understand how Mr. de Vries, after fairly presenting the NATO arguments in favor of


deploying 108 Pershing li s and 464 Tomahawk ground-Iaunched cruise missiles (GLCMs) can arrive at the gratuitous condusion that they are unnecessary and wi ll add nothi ng significant to NATO's exisiting capabilities. Actually, they will provide NATO with an enhanced ability to strike second and third echelon Warsaw Pact/ Soviet military targets and also to control escalation in a conflict. NATO badly need th is enhanced ability to give visible reassurance 10 nervous West Europeans. l agree fulIy with Mr. de Vries that the decision taken by the NATO Ministers last December contains an imponant political component, as all Alliance decisions must. But I IOtally disagree with his content ion that TNF modernizations add nothing militarily. If he really believes that, then he should devote more effon 10 reassuring the leaders in Moscow that they have no reason 10 be provoked or disturbed.

weapons arc not as usabIe as a prudent military planner would like. They are of too high a yield, too shon a range and too vulnerable 10 being overrun by an advancing army before the order to employ them is likely to be received. These arc the weapons which have given rise 10 the greatest con fusion in NATO's effon 10 develop a coherent strategic doctrine of deterrence and defence during the last fifteen years, largely because they blur the line in theory and practice bet ween conventional and nudear responses to Soviet agression. These weapons have also lost some (but certainly not all) of their credible utility in recent years, as Soviet theater nuclear forces have grown. The NATO deployment of long-range TNF will fill a dangerous gap in the Western defense line. It will enable NATO to shift with confidence IOward a higher nudear threshold. It wiU make more cenain that not blunder into nudear war in Europe by overeslimating ilS prospects for victory

Second, far from leading 10 the decoupling of European deterrence and defence from U.S . strategic forces, the new NATO missile force wi ll tighten the bond of securit y bet ween Europe and America, and every Soviet strategic planner knows it, because all 572 warheads wi ll remain under U.S. control. There is no basis for the fear th at the new missile force will make it possible for the su-

by conventional rncans. On several coums, the Western deterrent to war in Europe wi ll be significantly strengthened, and the probability of nudear war will be reduced. That, I presume, is what we all want to ach ieve in a manner compatible with the continued freedom of Western Eu rope rather than its Finlandization.



wage a nuclear war limited

to Europe. That has always been a rather fanciful notion, which ought to be laid 10 rest for good once TNF symmetry has been achieved and the Russians learn what it feels like 10 be just as vulnerable as the West Europeans . The Soviet Union will than be far less li kely to be led into the temptation of thinking that it could launch an attack westward whilc preserving its Qwn territory as

sanctuary. In my opinion, NATO TNF modernization wi ll diminish both the chance and the fcar of Soviet agression, and make fo r a more stabie, peaceful Europe. Third, TNF modernization will raise the nudear threshold and decrease the probability of nudear war. As the new long-range missiles are deployed, NATO will be in a better position 10 withdraw those shoner-range nudear systems deployed in the 1960s which have become military less useful for both deterrence and defense as Soviet TNF capabilities have grown. NATO has already announced its intemion 10 carry out a unilateral withdrawal of 1000 (or a net of 426) nudear weapons. Funher numerical reductions, cither unilateral or nego-

tiated, will become feasible as the new long-range missiles become operational. I arn not suggesting th at all short-range nudear systems can be eliminated . But I agree wit h your analysts who say th at a substantial number of NATO's nudear 16

Some considerations The political and military dimensions of the current situation are dosely related. This anide has treated primarily the military aspects. In the final analysis, the political factors may be more imponant than the military, because the problems of a successful deterrent alliance of democratic countries are basiscally political, and military defense policies are significant primaril y as evidence of political wi ll. In dosing, therefore, I would like 10 mention brieny four important political considerations: I. If The Netherlands and perhaps Belgium adhere too long to a policy of delay on TNF modernization for NATO, this is likely to grow into a policy of opposition that will increase the danger that the Low Countries, which have always played a cruciaUy significant rol as brokers of sensible compromise among the major Allies, will become politicaUy estranged from the United States, Britain , Germany and Italy, and wil! become sources of conflict rather than consensus within NATO. 2. An antinuelear policy is certain to decrease the opportunity which The Netherlands would otherwise have to play a part in the development of a coherent, reasonable NATO strategic doctrine 10 govem Ihe ncw theater

missile force. lt wou ld be ironic if the Dutch, after working so long and successfully to bring about an end to

the practice of r013tion within the Nudear Planning Group (NPG) which formerly limited the voice of the Smaller Powers, sho uld now find their valuable innuence in that body diminished. This could impair Holland's ability to contribute as fully as possible to the formulation of a sound Alliance approach 10 U.S. Soviet negotiations for TNF arms control. 3. Chancello r Helmut Schmidt, who first publidy assened the need for NATO TNF modernization in 1977, is now engaged in a delicate effon to restabilize detente in Europe by pursuing the "two track " approach of

advocating simuhaneous missile deployment and East-West TNF negotiations. Thus far his effons have met with some signs of success. I hope that the socialist Labor parties in Holland and Belgium will exhibit solidarity with him and his SOP instead of undereutting him in his difficult course of diplomac)'. 4. It is important that NATO at this critical juncture in its history should not project an image of an allianee tom by intemal divisions and disagreements over basic strategy. Some Dutch analysts si ncerely think that it would have been bet ter if the Alliance had waited anat her six months or a year so that it could make its approach 10 the East before taking the decision on TNF. But a majority, induding the United States and the principal European allies, after assessing the strategic and theater military buildup, as well as the behavioral pattern, of the Soviet Union in recent years, decided that the Atlantic Alliance had already postponed a responsive action long enough, and that funher delay could be misinterpreted to mean that the Western allies were wi lling to make a gesture of appeasement because they were afraid to do what was necessary bath 10

enchance their own security and

to acquire the bargaining leverage likely to make East-West negotiations more productive. Rather than presenting Moscow with exploitable divisions within the West, it is now time for the NATO allies to work out a single, unified position on the basis of which it can confidently proceed 10 improve the prospects for stabie peace in Europe.

Index to JASON Magazine 1981 Account of the Natio nal Conference (Nr. 6/ 1) drs. J. van de Velde dr. CA. van der Klaauw prof mr. P.J. Teunissen drs. H. van den Bergh dr. S.I.P. van Campen J.P. Huner

Strips and nuclear armament Détente and illusions Détente and rivalry The order in détente The fancy of US-leadership The UN Conference on the Prohibition of Cenain Conventional Weapons .

Unilateral Disarmament: Example or Delusion? (Nr. 5) dr. W.F. van Eekelen H. Vredeling M.J. Faber mr. M . van der Stoel

Dutch Elections and Foreign Policy (Nr. 2) drs. G.M. de Vries A . Stemerdink D.KJ Tommei drs. A.M. Oostlander A. Ploeg dr. James Dougherty

Parliament and foreign policy: consensus or controversy The Socialist pany program The Democrat pany (D'66) and foreign policy Peace, Security and Co-operation in the Christian-Democrat (CDA) program Unanimity in the Liberal pany (VVD) A letter from a trans-Atlantic friend

Spain: an unstable Democracy (Nr. 3) drs. JA . Fortuin ir. L.S. Egas y Trigo CM. Nigten drs. P.J. C Mulder mr. K VA. van Spronsen dr. Francisco Carrasquer

Historical relations bewteen Spain and The Netherlands The years of Franquism To 'democracy' without adjec-

tives Una Democracia Vigilada: Spain after the coup The foreign policy of the new Spain Nationalism in the Spanish nation

South-Africa: a region apart (Nr. 4) K Maartense

S. Bosgra dr. G. Viljoen drs. P. Terhal M.A. Cageling M .H.L. Breman/ W. C /.M . van Haaien

Inflammable South-Africa Opposition in South-Africa Constitutional Developments Foreign capital in South-Africa Military and strategie importanee of South-Africa South-Africa's nuclear and convemional armament

Annament does not exclude arms-<:ontrol European nuclear power, is the remedy worse than the disease? Superpowers have no interest in disarmament and détente The Dutch role in nuclear disarmament

M .F. LeCoultre

Political posters.

West-West Relation: Partners in Dilemma (Nr. 6) dr. A. Lammers prof dr. F.A.M. Alting

von Geusau mr. drs. CD. de Jong R. ter Beek J.D. Blaauw mr. J.S.L. Gualthérie van Weezei H.A. Schraper William J. Dyess mr. L.J. Brinkhorst

America, Europe and the frustration of history Will co-operation end ure? The future of EuropeanAmerican relations Can economie problems undermine NATO? To a more independent European policy US-Europe: disappointment and vigilanee Living under the same roof but not eating from the same rack Is there a crisis? An interview with the USambassador in the Netherlands Impressions from Moscou

Mini-JASON KA. Neder/of/J. van de Velde Internation-simulation, framework of a simulation-game G. W.F. Vigeveno Unilateral Disarmament

Profile for Stichting Jason

Jason magazine (1982), jaargang 07 nummer 3 a  

Jason magazine (1982), jaargang 07 nummer 3 a