Stanford Journal of International Affairs | Volume I, Issue I | Spring 2023

Stanford Journal of International Affairs

Volume I, Issue I

Spring 2023

Jour nal of Inter national Af f air s

Our Mission

Established in 2023, the Stanford Jour nal of Inter national Af fairs (SJIA) is a student-r un publication managed under the Society for Inter national Af fairs at Stanford (SIAS). Echoing our par ent or ganization’s mission, the Jour nal seeks to pr omote awar eness and facilitate discussion about global politics, cultur e, and r elated topics SJIA is committed to pr oviding a platfor m which ele vates under graduate student voices with a di verse range of perspecti ves to hel p our r eaders na vigate the complexities of moder n for eign af fairs.

Dear Reader,

We present the inaugural issue of Stanford Jour nal of Inter national Affairs at a turbulent time in global politics. In Ukraine, President Zelensk y is readying his troops for a much-anticipated counteroffensive ag ainst Russia. In the Indo-Pacific, tensions between the United States and China continue to build, as the latter has not only drawn closer to Russia, but also refused communication with the West. In Sudan, violence between opposing militar y factions has sparked a humanitarian crisis. And across the globe, authoritarian leaders have g ained popularity, leading many academic scholars and institutions to question the effectiveness of the liberal world order.

In such a political climate, we feel it is imperative to bring awareness to critical global affairs issues, and foster an inclusive and diverse space for the production of relevant commentar y. T his publication seeks to highlight not only the top inter national relations headlines, but also a broad rang e of topics including historical and cultural forces, security, economics, g over nance, and leg al issues. After a rig orous submission, review, and editing process, we are excited to share six outstanding pieces which delve into globally relevant subject matter.

While the origins of this Jour nal are humble, with a staff of eight editors, we are proud of the work we have put into SJIA in the past year From reviewing submissions and providing detailed feedback, to eng aging in community outreach and designing g raphics, this publication would not have been possible without the significant contributions of our team. Our g roup’s dedication and passion have shaped the Jour nal from its early stag es, and we acknowledg e and applaud their hard work.

We are pleased to present our inaugural issue this spring, and hope that SJIA will continue to develop into a f lourishing platfor m for elevating g enerations of Stanford student voices.

Best Reg ards,

Yoo Ra Sung

Lindsay Wu Co-Editor in Chief Co-Editor in Chief Stanford Jour nal of Inter national Affairs Stanford Jour nal of Inter national Affairs

Contributor s

We would like to recognize and thank all of our content and design editors for their hard work this past year in putting tog ether this jour nal

Co-Editor s-in-Chief

Yoo Ra Sung

Lindsay Wu

Content Editor s

Sita Antel

Fiona Clunan

K aushik Sampath

Sachin Singh

Noah Tan

Avinash T hakkar

Design Editor s

Bella Raja

Mu Hsi Hsi

Ca tegories

Global Peace & Security

Taiwan’s Semiconductor Fabrication Industr y Monopoly: Analyzing Attempts At Market Diversification

The Role of the Global South in the Ukraine Situation—Inter view with Professor Richard Gowan

Wor ld Economy, Energ y & Environment

Airbnb and the Housing Crisis: Establishing the Need for Shor t-Ter m Rental Market Regulations in Cape Town

Comparative Gover nance & Development

Fake It Till You Make It: Militar y Professionalization Amongst Resistance Movements in Nazi-Occupied Europe

Inter national Histor y & Culture

T he Overlooked Revolution: Gandhi’s Constr uctive Prog ram and Nonviolent Resistance

Chinese Restaurants in Accra, Ghana: Re presenting Chinese Culture in a Globalized African Metropolis

Endang ered Tongues: T he Root Causes of Igbo Languag e Loss

Human Trafficking in Brazil: What Explains the Lack of Data About Trafficking in Women in the Countr y?

Taiwan’s Semiconductor Fabrication Industr y Monopol y: Anal yzing Attempts At Mar ket Diver sification

Bailey Nicholson

As economies around the world g row in production and consumption capacity, reliance on semiconductors also increases. From kitchen appliances to hand-held electronics to motorized vehicles, semiconductors are more prevalent than most comprehend. Unlike other booming industries however, semiconductor and microchip markets present an interesting puzzle to economists and policymakers; the majority of semiconductor fabrication occurs in Taiwan, where volatile g eopolitics threaten global supplies A number of attempts have been made to address this issue, although it is cr ucial to contextualize this problem to understand how to stabilize the industr y. T his essay will evaluate Taiwan’s historical success as a microchip fabricator, explaining how Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. (TSMC) became a prominent figure in the industr y. T he paper will subsequently analyze Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” in the context of national security concer ns, and evaluate market diversification attempts, par ticularly by the United States.

TSMC has a monopoly over the microchip industr y that is cr ucial to analyze, given the push for more market diversification. AnnaLee Saxenian from the University of Califor nia, Berkeley ref lects on Taiwan’s g rowth post 1980. IT industrial output at the beginning of this period totaled less than $100 million USD, jumped more than $5 billion by 1989, and has g rown 20% annually since the 1990s.1 As countries like the United States fund domestic production to address security concer ns

1 AnnaLee Saxenian, “T he Urban Contradictions of Silicon Valley: Regional Growth and the Restr ucturing of the Semiconductor Industr y, ” Inter national Jour nal of Urban and Regional Research 7, no 2 (1983): 237–62, https://doi org/10 1111/j 1468-2427 1983 tb00592 x

reg arding microchips in the Re public of China (ROC), amounts of capital, prospective timelines, and available resources are all impor tant contextual factors to consider in understanding potential transferability of TSMC’s g rowth process to other fir ms

Taiwan’s industrial g rowth following TSMC’s successful investment retur ns on technolog y required for the development of microchips was strategic and planned. Even after the development of this technolog y, entr y into the market remained difficult; microelectronics have always been relatively capital intensive, which on a competitive level is inaccessible to many new market entrants.2 In the decades that followed the development of nano-technolog y, the g over nment provided manufacturing subsidies and focused on strong market subsidies T his larg ely created a decentralized economic ecosystem that also fueled the downstream development of tech star tups, fur thering the monopoly on research & development in the global IT industr y 3 T his was also suppor ted by technolog y transfer between the United States and Taiwan. In this reg ard, a foundational element of TSMC’s g rowth as suppor ted by Taiwan’s developmental state is the inter nationalization of TSMC business and technolog y. A strong relationship between TSMC and Silicon Valley suppor ted the entre preneurship that allowed Taiwan to consistently remain the founders of break-through technolog y. Feig enbaum

2 Jared Monschein, “Securing the Microelectronics Supply Chain: Four Policy Issues for the U S Depar tment of Defense to Consider,” RAND Cor poration, 2022, https://doi.org/10.7249/pea1394-1.

3 Feig enbaum, Evan A. “Historical Context of Taiwan’s Technological Success ” Assuring Taiwan’s Innovation Futur e Car negie Endowment for Inter national Peace, 2020 http://www jstor org/stable/resrep20992 6

describes this relationship: “Taiwan, in effect, discovered Silicon Valley decades before the rest of the world. T hat discover y—and the process of “brain circulation” of Taiwan-bor n but U.S.-educated and -trained engineers and entre preneurs—in tur n drove a wave of entre preneurial g rowth in semiconductors, PCs, and other hardware-related industries.” 4 T hrough this relationship and in the symbiotic nature of technological exchang e between the United States and Taiwan in the 1980s, Taiwanese manufacturing shifted from centralization of low-cost imitators to high-speed, high-quality, and extremely competitive electronics at competitive market prices Cer tain elements such as cheaper labor contributed to Taiwan’s g rowing advantag e in semiconductor fabrication. American market founders such as Fairchild, National Semiconductors, and Intel established the semiconductor market, but soon lost their comparative advantag e as Taiwan’s labor advantag e combined with quality, specialization, and production capabilities contributed to cheaper Taiwanese semiconductors on global markets.

T he development of the foundr y model around this time is also cr ucial in understanding the role TSMC played in the global semiconductor industr y TSMC was designed to only manufacture Integ rated Circuits (ICs), and was the first company to do so Rather than fir ms that design and manufacture their own ICs, TSMC contracts with other fir ms including Apple, Intel, and Broadcom to fabricate the designs of those companies with technolog y specific to TSMC, such as EUV lithog raphy and analog processing. At the time TSMC star ted operating with this business model in the 80s, the semiconductor industr y was almost entirely ver tically integ rated, but the foundr y model allowed for fir ms to only focus on chip design or manufacturing, and thus developing

4 Feig enbaum, Evan A. “Historical Context of Taiwan’s Technological Success ” Assuring Taiwan’s Innovation Futur e Car negie Endowment for Inter national Peace, 2020 http://www jstor org/stable/resrep20992 6

advanced technolog y explicitly for that cer tain par t of the semiconductor supply chain.5 As previously mentioned, TSMC is the main manufacturer of many prominent companies, and the world is larg ely reliant on the company’s fabrication capabilities. However, there are numerous security issues per taining to g eopolitics in light of this issue.

Recently, Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” has been increasingly analyzed and evaluated. As security concer ns have brought to attention the CHIPS and Science Act of August 2022, inter national consumers of microchips are calling for g reater market diversification and subsidies for domestic production. In understanding this relationship, it is impor tant to recognize the semiconductor supply chain implications.

While TSMC actively par ticipates in most par ts of the supply chain, the company maintains a propor tionally higher par ticipation ratio in the market for fabrication. Other countries, including the United States, have attempted to counteract this in numerous ways, including an increase in subsidies for domestic production of semiconductors, so as to create a more self-sufficient supply of ICs. Growing concer ns sur rounding the risk of an annexation attempt, among other things, between the People’s Re public of China (PRC) and ROC have increased these uncer tainties. T he United States is home to many fir ms that de pend on Taiwanese microchip production, such as Apple, Intel, NVIDIA, and Broadcom, which contribute to domestic economic g rowth, foreign direct investment, and employment. T herefore, protecting these fir ms politically is in the United States’ best interest. A ROC confrontation with the PRC, even in the event of a par tial naval blockade, could hinder Taiwan’s ability to ship microchips elsewhere in the supply chain, which could hold serious

5 J H Chen, “A System Dynamics Model of the Semiconductor Industr y Development in Taiwan,” Jour nal of the Operational Research Society 56, no 10 (2005): 1141–50, https://doi org/10 1057/palg rave jors 2601958

ramifications. Taiwan as of 2021 was the 16th larg est trading economy, with impor ts and expor ts of $922 billion in g oods and ser vices. While larg ely impossible to predict the scale of consequences this blockade could have, estimates from the Rhodium Group consider primar y expor ts and impor ts and sug g est that around $2 trillion in economic activity could be affected, even before taking into account secondar y effects and sanctions.6 As such, the United States should protect Taiwan economically, thus giving Taiwan a “Silicon Shield.”

A number of global attempts at diversification have been made, notably the CHIPS and Science Act, signed by the U.S. Cong ress in August 2022, which includes $280 billion for research, development, and manufacturing for semiconductors in direct funding and subsidies. Much of this funding is funneled into the industr y as a whole, rather than funding fir ms directly. Growing concer ns over this act include wor ries that timelines for g rowing the American semiconductor industr y are unrealistic and that the semiconductor industr y g rowth models per taining to Taiwan are the product of many decades of technological developments and research. Additionally, there are a number of other countries including Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea, that incentivize domestic production with more strategic planning, par ticularly related to microchips in mass consumption and weapons systems.7

To increase political and economic security, the PRC has attempted to decrease its reliance on the ROC for semiconductors. While much of this is accomplished through increased incentives for domestic production, other sources of semiconductor inde pendence have

involved technological espionag e. T he ROC maintains a ban that prevents PRC chip design companies from par tnering with ROC manufacturers for fabrication. T his ban is parallel to the United States banning the PRC from chips made anywhere in the world with U.S. equipment, preventing the PRC from sourcing chips from anywhere in the supply chain with US technolog y or resources.8 T hese initiatives ref lect effor ts to prevent PRC inde pendence from the inter national semiconductor market, which would both render the“Silicon Shield” obsolete and exacerbate ROC security concer ns

T he “brain drain” to the PRC from the ROC has threatened Taiwanese technological talent and technolog y for decades. T he PRC has consistently offered better wag es, scholarships, and benefits, which has attracted many engineers trained in the ROC with knowledg e of semiconductor capabilities to move to the mainland and work for those fir ms. Salaries in the PRC can reach three times those in the ROC.9 T he ROC has made this increasingly difficult for the PRC; while it is not illeg al to hire Taiwanese engineers, re-employment in the ROC after working in the PRC is considered traitorous 10 Additionally, PRC investment in cer tain par ts of the supply chain, such as design and packaging, are illeg al and make it difficult for PRC fir ms to commit technological espionag e or ship technolog y back to the mainland.11 To circumvent this business

8 Greg or y C. Allen, “Choking off China’s Access to the Future of Ai,” CSIS, 2022, https://www csis org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-fut ure-ai

9 Sarah Wu Yimou Lee, “‘Tip of the Iceberg’: Taiwan’s Spy Catchers Hunt Chinese Poachers of Chip Talent,” Reuters, April 8, 2022, https://www reuters com/world/asia-pacific/tip-icebergtaiwans-spy-catchers-hunt-chinese-poachers-chip-talent-2 022-04-08/

7 Jared Monschein, “Securing the Microelectronics Supply Chain: Four Policy Issues for the U S Depar tment of Defense to Consider,” RAND Cor poration, 2022, https://doi org/10 7249/pea1394-1

10 Erin Hale, “Taiwan Cracks down on China Poaching Tech Talent,” Technolog y | Al Jazeera, May 4, 2022, https://www aljazeera com/economy/2022/5/4/taiwanis-tr ying-to-thwar t-chinas-effor ts-to-poach-tech-talent

11 Jared Monschein, “Securing the Microelectronics Supply Chain: Four Policy Issues for

6 Charlie Vest, “T he Global Economic Disr uptions from a Taiwan Conf lict,” Rhodium Group, May 12, 2023, https://rhg.com/research/taiwan-economic-disr uptions.

the U S Depar tment

obstacle, the PRC has been known to create puppet companies, or offshore fir ms that hinder ROC and American personnel effor ts to detect intellig ence stealing. Much of this has been done in low-income countries, off of the ROC’s radar of suspicion for technological espionag e, par ticularly in attempts to hire Taiwanese engineers, or “poach Taiwanese talent”.12 T he challeng e for the ROC in this context is to limit this “poaching” without completely limiting foreign direct investment, which is prevented with stricter controls on inter national investments in fir ms and inter national shareholdings T his, however, is suppor ted by multilateral semiconductor expor t controls between other prominent countries that par ticipate in the supply chain.

Some of the most effective attempts at preventing the PRC from accessing Taiwanese technolog y and semiconductors have been joint ag reements between countries with semiconductor fabrication capacity to discourag e g ap re placements in the market after the United States implements expor t controls on semiconductors. As previously mentioned, the United States bans Taiwan from semiconductors and American technolog y that has been made with American resources, labor, or materials Given that this g ap in the market leaves room for other producers to fill in with their own capital, joint ag reements have been signed to more effectively collectivize ag ainst the PRC having free access to global semiconductor markets and technolog y. An example of this is the multilateral semiconductor expor t control that was established between the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands; the details of the ag reement specify that Japan and the Netherlands will not allow their technolog y to

re place U.S. industr y sales to the PRC.13 T his ag reement as a whole has the power to prevent the PRC from g aining semiconductor production self-sufficiency, which has the potential to under mine the ROC’s “Silicon Shield.” T his ag reement in par ticular ref lects changing interests; previous stances include Japanese and Dutch fear of PRC retaliation given the event of a multilateral expor t control ag ainst the PRC, but recent threats of retaliation have been damag ed by the PRC’s stance and involvement with the Russian-Ukraine war 14 In this way, it is apparent that the inter national community is attempting to diversify the semiconductor fabrication industr y while maintaining national security interests and fair practices However, initiated attempts at this push for domestic production should be evaluated in the context of their potential to be effective relative to their strategies.

T he most recent CHIPS and Science Act has three g oals: reducing the U.S. supply chain’s exposure to foreign shocks, bolstering long-ter m inter national economic competitiveness and creating domestic jobs, and reducing the risk of sabotag e 15 While these objectives should be prioritized, the methodolog y for the g oals has been questioned. Primarily, the discussion sur rounding the issue of semiconductor supply chain diversification has centered around fabrication, without much attention towards design, packaging, testing, etc T he CHIPS and Science Act has allowed for

13 David Shepardson, “U S Official Acknowledg es Japan, Netherlands Deal to Curb Chipmaking Expor ts to China,” Reuters, Febr uar y 1, 2023, https://www reuters com/technolog y/us-official-acknow ledg es-japan-netherlands-deal-curb-chipmaking-expor ts-c hina-2023-02-01/

14 Greg or y C. Allen, “In Tech War with China, the U.S. Is Finding Friends,” Time, Febr uar y 23, 2023, https://time com/6257857/us-china-tech-war-semicond uctor/

of Defense to Consider,” RAND Cor poration, 2022, https://doi.org/10.7249/pea1394-1.

12 Erin Hale, “Taiwan Cracks down on China Poaching Tech Talent,” Technolog y | Al Jazeera, May 4, 2022, https://www aljazeera com/economy/2022/5/4/taiwanis-tr ying-to-thwar t-chinas-effor ts-to-poach-tech-talent

15 Vishnu K annan and Jacob Feldg oise, “After the Chips Act: T he Limits of Reshoring and next Steps for U.S,” Car negie Endowment for Inter national Peace, November 2022,https://car negieendowment org/2022/11/22/after -chips-act-limits-of-reshoring-and-next-steps-for-u s -sem iconductor-policy-pub-88439

investment and funding for these different par ts of the semiconductor supply chain, but does not have any requirements in place to do so.

T here are many par ts of this supply chain that are vulnerable not only to political instability in East Asia, but also g eog raphic factors, such as many ATP facilities existing on the Pacific’s Ring of Fire.16 Additionally, much of the emphasis on TSMC’s fabrication capabilities has drawn US policy maker attention from the ways that the industr y relies on second and third tier supplies of other sources of capital:

“T hese companies produce industrial machiner y, specialty chemicals, cr ystal g rowth equipment, and a wide rang e of other essential products. Japanese fir ms, for example, are dominant producers of semiconductor materials (24 percent market share) and semiconductor manufacturing equipment (31 percent market share); global de pendence on Japanese materials fir ms is par ticularly pronounced in wafer production (56 percent market share) and photoresist (90 percent market share). Supply shocks in those industries, whether the result of natural disasters or malicious interference, can also lead to chip shor tag es Yet, in the r ush to constr uct new fabs, policymakers have paid relatively less attention to these suppliers ”17

In this passag e, it is apparent that focusing on fabrication of microchips neglects the other

16 Vishnu K annan and Jacob Feldg oise, “After the Chips Act: T he Limits of Reshoring and next Steps for U S,” Car negie Endowment for Inter national Peace, November 2022,

https://car negieendowment.org/2022/11/22/after-chips -act-limits-of-reshoring-and-next-steps-for-u.s.-semicond uctor-policy-pub-88439

17 Vishnu K annan and Jacob Feldg oise, “After the Chips Act: T he Limits of Reshoring and next Steps for U S,” Car negie Endowment for Inter national Peace, November 2022,

https://car negieendowment org/2022/11/22/after-chips

-act-limits-of-reshoring-and-next-steps-for-u s -semicond uctor-policy-pub-88439

elements of the semiconductor supply chain that need to be secured and suppor ted. Funding for the semiconductor industr y must address sources of materials and work to g row different elements of the supply chain so as to not create an industrial-wide bottleneck. In addition to funding concer ns in the supply chain, suppor t from the CHIPS and Science Act for only fabrication exacerbates security concer ns. CHIPS and Science Act-funded facilities would be less likely to be vulnerable to technological espionag e, but smaller scale cover t attacks as well as espionag e in other par ts of the supply chain still remain a threat. Protection of the ATP phase is impor tant in this reg ard: Attacks targ eting the fabrication phase, some exper ts argue, “are high cost and require g enerating at least one new mask set, an in-de pth analysis of the device, and a high deg ree of exper tise Additionally, they are imprecise, as attackers can rarely be sure that the altered hardware will make its way into specific end-use products. T his potentially makes the ATP phase an easier and more attractive targ et.”18 In this way, if one of the g oals of the CHIPS and Science Act is to reduce the risk of sabotag e, it is impor tant to consider the most realistic ways this can be prevented.

To counteract issues with semiconductor supply chain bottlenecks, the CHIPS and Science Act needs to work with fir ms on suppor t for different par ts of the supply chain. General funding for industrial g rowth neglects par ts of the supply chain that are necessar y for development.19 T he g over nment in this way must coordinate industr y g rowth in tang ent with fir ms to secure the development of all necessar y par ts of the

18 Vishnu K annan and Jacob Feldg oise, “After the Chips Act: T he Limits of Reshoring and next Steps for U.S,” Car negie Endowment for Inter national Peace, November 2022, https://car negieendowment org/2022/11/22/after-chips -act-limits-of-reshoring-and-next-steps-for-u.s.-semicond uctor-policy-pub-88439.

19 Chun-Yi Lee, “Semiconductors and Geo-Technolog y: 'Know-How' Is Power ” Freeman Spogli Institute Winter Seminar Series 8 Mar 2023, Stanford

semiconductor supply chain, rather than non-specific industr y funding. General subsidies for semiconductor fabrication in the United States might have the potential to allow the United States to manufacture its own microchips, but in reality it is threatened by lack of suppor t for other areas in the semiconductor industr y.

Semiconductors are becoming an increasingly cr ucial par t of our globalized world. From cars to refrig erators to vir tually all phones, semiconductors inf luence our technological reality in many ways. As this dynamic becomes increasingly inter twined with

Taiwan’s monopoly on the semiconductor production industr y, as well as both ROC-PRC and U.S.-PRC security concer ns, it is impor tant to consider different interests and how they are affected by attempts at market diversification.

T he CHIPS and Science Act pushes for U.S. domestic production of semiconductors but lacks the collaboration between fir ms and g over nment needed to suppor t other par ts of the semiconductor supply chain. While there is no obvious best policy to create more economic security in relation to microchip supply, it is cr ucial that we address challeng es and obstacles to continued industrial g rowth.

T he Role of the Global South in the Ukraine Situation—Inter view with Pr ofessor Richard Gowan

Gabriela Reitz

The following is a transcript of an inter view with Richard Gowan conducted on June 6, 2023. Gowan ser ves as the UN Dir ector at the Inter national Crisis Gr oup and Resear ch Assistant at New York Uni versity The inter view discusses the r ole of the Global South in the war in Ukraine.

Reitz: When discussing the war in Ukraine, there's a lot of conversation around how to address the trend of countries in the Global South either abstaining from elections to condemn Russia or taking Russia's side entirely. And a big reason for these countries not siding with Ukraine is that Ukraine is heavily backed by Wester n countries which have historically colonized and mistreated countries in the Global South. A common take on addressing these hesitations is that appealing to these anti-colonial perspectives could be what ultimately brings the region to Ukraine's side. President Zelensk y can appeal to this perspective by pushing the nar rative that, just like countries in the Global South have suffered colonial imperial oppression, Russia is cur rently oppressing Ukraine. I'd like to begin with this idea and just ask you a few questions about what this would mean.

First, what w ould it look like for Pr esident Zelensky to shar e this nar rati ve? W hat r ole does he play as the pr esident of Ukraine?

Gowan: Well, I think the Ukrainians have already been tr ying to do more to g et non-Wester n countries on their side, and Zelensk y's ability to travel has g rown, but remains quite limited. But we've seen other

Ukrainian officials like their foreign minister g o on a tour of Africa, and they're really doing a lot of outreach throughout the continent. But the Russians are also doing their outreach, and so there's sor t of a contest for hear ts and minds. T he Ukrainians and their allies have been using this anti-colonial argument since ver y early in the war T he Biden administration has also talked a lot about the need to fight Russian imperialism. So this sor t of languag e is already there in the discourse from Ukraine and its allies, and we can see that it has some impact. And, there are a lot of African, Asian, and Latin American countries that do suppor t Ukraine, for example in votes at the United Nations But you're also right that it doesn't seem to be having quite the impact that maybe Kyiv and its allies thought that it would because a lot of countries do seem to be resisting this nar rative.

Reitz: In the piece that you wrote for the Inter national Crisis Group,1 published this past March, you discuss these "small moves"— such as the Black Sea Green Initiative—and how African and Asian countries endorse the idea that these moves could g radually open space for more extensive eng ag ement between Russia and Ukraine.

Ar e ther e other examples of these "small moves"? W ho is r esponsible for initiating them? Is it Zelensky, the West, or e ven R ussia?

1 https://www crisisg roup org/global-ukraine/global-south -and-ukraine-war-un

Gowan: I mean, we've seen a couple of humanitarian g estures during the course of the war. So for example, the UN and the Red Cross neg otiated with Russia to g et civilians who were trapped in the sieg e of Mariupol out of the city last spring. It's not only been the UN that has done this sor t of work—Saudi Arabia, for example, has been involved in some prisoner exchang es, and the Emirates as well. And then, of course, you have President [Tayyip] Erdog an of Turkey who, especially in the first par t of the war, did seem to have special access to Russia and was able to work with the UN on the Black Sea Rain initiative So there are a number of non-Wester n countries who have had limited successes in persuading the Ukrainians and the Russians to come tog ether in addition to the UN. I think, though, that even since Febr uar y, when I wrote the ar ticle you refer to, we have seen a bit of a chang e in the way that big non-Wester n countries are approaching the war.

T here's sor t of been a shift from this ver y tentative diplomacy, larg ely around small humanitarian wins, to a series of big non-Wester n countries saying that it is time for at least a ceasefire, and possibly a full scale peace deal. China has tabled a position paper on peace. T he Chinese envoy has toured Moscow, Kyiv, and the European capitals taking soundings President [Luiz Inacio] Lula [da Silva], in Brazil, has been talking a lot about the need for a new g roup of nations to neg otiate a peace settlement. South Africa and a g roup of African countries have said they want to be par t of neg otiating a peace settlement. Indonesia made proposals just last week about a UN peacekee ping force g oing into Ukraine to tr y and bring the countries apar t.

So we're seeing a lot of these big g er, non-Wester n players tr ying a more impactful

approach to ending. T hat's been a real feature of diplomacy through 2023. We didn't quite see non-Wester n countries playing that role in the early par t of the war

Reitz: Would you say that these countries—for example Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who ar e non-Wester n but ha ve influence on the global stage—ha ve mor e ethos in the spher e that Zelensky is tr ying to rally in his suppor t? And is it e ven the goal of these countries to achie ve a global condemnation of R ussia?

Gowan: What's interesting about all the big non-Wester n players that have entered this sor t of peace g ame is that they all display some deg ree of sympathy towards Russia's security concer ns and Russia's arguments about how the war star ted. Look at China, who has always sor t of echoed Russia's argument that NATO expansion was a driver of the war. Fur ther more, Lula, from Brazil, has re peatedly criticized the NATO countries for, in his view, fueling this war by giving Ukraine ar ms. We've heard similar arguments from South Africa. As I said, Indonesia just ste pped up with a proposal for a UN peacekee ping force in Ukraine It also said there should be a UN referendum in the Russian occupied ter ritories about whether they should be par t of Ukraine or Russia.

So from a Ukrainian perspective, I think a lot of these initiatives are dee ply suspect because they appear to be playing into Russia's hands, giving Russia's arguments about the origins of the war and how it ends some credibility I mean, from the Ukrainian perspective, the idea of having a ceasefire is unacce ptable because it would allow Russia to strengthen its g rip on the occupied ter ritories.

While I sympathize with the Ukrainian critiques of all these peace plans, it is interesting to tr y and work out why non-Wester n countries are, in some sense, buying Russia's nar rative And it's also wor th noting that Brazil has consistently condemned Russia's ag g ression. Indonesia has too South Africa has sat on the fence more. So, it isn't the case that all these countries are pro-Russia, but they do seem to be tr ying to take a balanced approach. What are the possible reasons for that? One is that many of their leaders have this dee p suspicion of US foreign policy and NATO's activities in a lot of non-Wester n capitals

T here is also the fact that some of these countries have strong economic ties to Russia, although that isn't always the case South Africa's economic ties to Russia, for example, are ver y limited. And I think there's also a fear that if Russia is fundamentally weakened, it could unleash some quite scar y scenarios, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons And for a lot of these countries, the challeng e now is to put a lid on this war before it escalates to a big g er conf lict. And that means that maybe they're willing to sacrifice some of Ukraine's interests for the sake of peace

Reitz: T hat relates to a question I have reg arding the perspective of the Global South. It's pretty widely known that countries within those regions, specifically countries in sub-Saharan Africa, have economic, developmental, and security ties to Russia. For example, Russia accounted for 39% of Africa's defense impor ts between 2009 and 2018. T hey provide a lot of food and fer tilizer to the region, more recently President Putin wrote off $20 billion in debt amongst African countries, which indicates some sor t of g oodwill between

Russia and countries in sub-Saharan Africa that the West may not like ver y much.

Gi ven this context, is ther e any par t of suppor ting Ukraine that w ould be in the best inter est of these countries in the Global South? Or is ther e just too much at risk for them to completely tur n their backs on R ussia?

Gowan: I think if you look at African views of Russia, you see different factors are at play. And for some African leaders, especially the older g eneration who were involved in anti-colonial str ug gles, there's a sor t of romantic vision of Moscow as an ally from the liberation movements of the 1970's and 1980's. T hat vision, I think, is too dee p seated to shake I don't think there's any point in tr ying to unpick that nar rative. And, you asked at the star t about using the languag e of decolonization in suppor t of Ukraine. My sense is that it does have some resonance when Zelensk y uses it. T he problem is, we've also heard people like Macron from France, and British politicians using similar languag e And as soon as you star t to hear the old colonial powers claiming that they're on the side of an anti-colonial movement, it's almost inevitably g oing to g et a ske ptical response from countries that were on the wrong end of colonialism. So that's par t of the mix.

T he other par t of the mix that you were talking about is that countries just have much more concrete and immediate reasons to side with Russia. Moscow has star ted to play a big role in fighting insurg encies in countries like Mali and the Central African Re public through the Wagner g roup. Moscow has sor t of allied itself diplomatically with g over nments that have been under pressure in countries like Ethiopia. T hese countries do have solid political reasons to, at a

minimum, tr y and avoid criticizing Russia too much.

I think par t of the answer is that wester n countries have directed lots of aid, and tr y to be g ood humanitarians in Africa in par ticular, in recent decades. And Wester n diplomats often say they feel that the amount of aid they have offered is unfairly overlooked. But, the reality is that the politics of the continent is changing. You have not merely Russia, but also China playing a vast role in Africa now. And a lot of African g over nments feel that the US and Europeans take notice of them when they want their suppor t over Ukraine, but that they are not treating African countries' concer ns as a real priority. It's all quite tokenistic. What could you do to address that? Well, wester n countries do have the ability, if they were deter mined about it, to play a g reater role in areas like ag ricultural trade in Africa. We could ag ree that we've g ot to shift the r ules of inter national institutions like the IMF and World Bank to give developing countries a g reater say in how they're r un. We could invest more in security par ts of Africa where g over nments are tur ning to Wagner.

T he question is, at a time when we're ver y much focused on other priorities, not the least suppor ting Ukraine itself, it's not clear to me that there's really a political desire to make all of those investments g oing forward.

Reitz: You use the word investment, sug g esting it's more of a long ter m thing

Gi ven the str ong pr esence R ussia has in Africa, is ther e an ar gument to be made that Pr esident Zelensky and the West should spend mor e time appealing to countries in Latin America and Asia wher e they ha ve r elati vely mor e suppor t?

Gowan: If you look at the track record of how countries from different regions have treated the war, it is clear that Ukraine enjoys a strong er base of suppor t in Latin America. People like President Boric from Chile have spoken out on the war in extremely uncompromising ter ms, condemning Russia. But, those condemnations come with caveats, and one of the caveats is that for many Latin American countries, it's essential to frame their response to the situation in ter ms of inter national law. We see this from Mexicans, for example, at the UN T hey've always been ver y clear that they will speak in defense of Ukraine's right to sovereignty and ter ritorial integ rity because that is rooted in the UN Char ter, and they have made it ver y clear that they do not want to be seen as necessarily endorsing NATO policy. And to some extent you just have to acce pt that countries are g oing to offer suppor t to Ukraine in their own way.

One complaint I do hear from diplomats, even from countries that are fairly consistent in suppor t of Ukraine, is that they are being affected by the US sanctions on Russia-- those sanctions ripple out into global trade T he countries that feel these effects don't feel they're being consulted about the way Wester n sanctions on Russia may have unintended secondar y consequences for economies elsewhere And actually, that point about sanctions is one that I think is something that we should be listening to a lot more sensitively

Reitz: So it's the West's g oal to g et a unanimous condemnation of Russia, and that's what Zelensk y wants as well. But you mentioned in the piece you published this year that it is the events on the battlefield that are shaping the course of the war, imper vious to the UN papers and the speeches that are given.

In this case, what w ould a unanimous condemnation of R ussia e ven mean? Is it w or th putting all these r esour ces towards convincing these countries to vote against R ussia if what's happening in Ukraine is going to happen r egardless? W hat do these votes mean, in the case of a physical war?

Gowan: T hat's a ver y g ood question and I understand that even Zelensk y himself, as the war has g one on, has star ted to be quite dismissive of these UN votes T hey wanted the UN votes early on. One of the things to understand is that, the Ukrainians at the beginning of the war, felt they were, to some extent, in a position similar to that of the Palestinians T hey feared that they would lose on the battlefield, so they tur ned to the UN because they wanted diplomatic suppor t and legitimacy. More than a year later, the Ukrainians feel a lot more confident about their position on the battlefield. And so, statements of suppor t from the UN do not matter to them as much.

Secondly, I think there was a big hold in the first six months of the war that while it might take time, it would be possible to g et some of the really hefty non-Wester n players finally to come round to Ukraine's side. Ever yone understood that China was always g oing to be a reach, although there was a big effor t by the US last summer to g et the Chinese to at least condemn the idea of nuclear use in Ukraine, which the Chinese eventually did. But, I think there was a hope they could g et India, in par ticular, on board.

After re peated effor ts and re peated votes in the UN, a lot of Wester n diplomats have concluded that those countries are never g oing to come around. And, to be frank, if you're in the US, while it would be nice to have India on your

side over Ukraine, it's more impor tant to have India on your side in effor ts to contain China. Your priority is really sor t of working with the Indians in China rather than Russia. So I think people have realized that we're never g oing to g et to a full global condemnation of Russia, exce pt in the scenario where Russia uses a nuclear weapon. But that isn't a scenario anyone wants to think about.

I think the way people are star ting to look at the initiatives from places like Brazil and so for th is less about condemning Russia, and more about what happens if Ukraine launches a reasonably successful counter offensive. What happens if Putin finally concludes that it is in his interest to talk peace? I mean, Putin is g oing to want to do that in a way that saves face And so when it comes to the cr unch, maybe it would be easier for Putin to g o into peace talks manag ed by Brazil and China, rather than peace talks manag ed by the US. T hat would be easier for Putin politically

What's interesting is that people like Secretar y of State Antony Blinken have been quite frank that they don't think that it is time for a ceasefire. T hey don't think that a lot of these non-Wester n peace plans are g oing to work out in the near future But in all those speeches, the US and others have ke pt open the idea that maybe these peace initiatives could be useful down the road. Zelensk y himself made a point of being sur prisingly complimentar y about the fact that China was coming with a peace proposal, even though it's a peace proposal that doesn't match what Ukraine wants And so, we’re seeing a lot of Ukraine's friends wanting to kee p these non-Wester n countries on board. Less because of the condemnation of Russia, but more because they realize that if you ever want to g et an off ramp out of the conf lict, you

may need these countries there to essentially help Russia out of the mess that it's created.

Reitz: Ok. T hat makes sense. And I think that that aligns with what you said earlier, that countries are g oing to be so suspicious if France and the UK are fully backing these effor ts given their histories of colonization. To wrap up this conversation, do you have any last remarks?

Gowan: What I'd say is, we naturally want other countries to suppor t our vision of what's g oing on in Ukraine. But I think the lesson that we've all lear ned is that individual, non-Wester n countries, just like individual Wester n countries, have a ver y complex mix of national interests and national needs, and they don't want to be sucked into an old school, Cold War style block politics T hey want to have space to maneuver

and follow their interests. I think commentaries that have come out over the last years saying that countries in the Global South not condemning Russia proves that they don’t suppor t the West, is just evidence of a reductionist thinking which is not uncommon. It's easier to sor t of think of the world in ter ms of a few blocks and a few big powers, and judg e ever y countr y by where it sits on the spectr um between the US and Russia or the US and China. But if that's how you see the world, then that's an incredibly bad way of understanding the complex sets of factors that motivate countries to for m. We're all talking about the Global South because it's a helpful shor thand to describe the sense that African, Asian and Latin American countries are expressing their political priorities with a sense of urg ency. But I think ever yone knows that there's a dang er in g etting trapped in the shor t hand.

Airbnb and the Housing Crisis: Establishing the Need f or Shor t-Ter m Rental Mar ket Regulations in Cape Town

Alina Wilson

Intr oduction

Shor t-ter m rentals have g ained increasing prominence in the hospitality industr y. In years past, most travelers stayed in hotels. T he sharing economy, including home-sharing platfor ms like Airbnb, has chang ed this patter n.1 According to Bar ron, Kung, and Proser pio, peer-to-peer markets, also refer red to as the sharing economy, facilitate interactions between demanders and suppliers of various g oods and ser vices on an online marketplace.2 In the past two decades, Airbnb has positioned itself as a leading online marketplace for hosting and renting proper ties.3 However, researchers and exper ts alike have expressed g rowing concer n over the effect Airbnb may have on local communities Cape Town may be par ticularly vulnerable to these issues due to existing housing shor tag es and severe social inequality T his paper will examine the debate about Airbnb’s effects on rental markets Utilizing case studies of Cape Town, New York City, and Berlin, this paper will argue that Airbnb has a differential effect on housing markets, de pending on context and presence or lack of regulation. Ultimately, through this paper, I will argue for the regulation of the Cape Town shor t-ter m rental market, as well as the expansion of social housing and other policy initiatives, in order to guarantee that

ever y citizen in Cape Town has affordable housing options

Backgr ound

Airbnb has experienced tremendous g rowth since it launched in 2008, when two designers hosted three travelers who needed a place to stay.4 Customers use the Airbnb platfor m to access accommodations ranging from single rooms to entire proper ties. Airbnb listings var y in affordability and quality and offer an experience more similar to a guest house than a hotel. As of 2020, Airbnb boasted over a million listings and maintained a presence in more than 100,000 cities across 220 countries and regions, making it the larg est online marketplace for lodging at that time 5

Although Airbnb undoubtedly benefits travelers and hosts, researchers have increasingly focused on the outsized effect of Airbnb on the housing market. Airbnb provides economic benefits for local economies that stand to profit from the increase in tourism facilitated by a wider variety of affordable and available holiday listings Homeowners and landlords also benefit from the revenue g enerated by conver ting their rooms and proper ties into shor t-ter m sublets. However, attention has increasingly focused on the “Airbnb Effect” on local housing markets. In par ticular, researchers have become increasingly

1 Malapit, “T he ‘Airbnb Effect’ on Affordable Housing ”

2 Kyle Bar ron, Edward Kung, and Davide Proser pio, “T he Sharing Economy and Housing Affordability: Evidence from Airbnb,” SSRN Electr onic Jour nal, 2018, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssr n.3006832.

3 Lee, “How Airbnb Shor t-Ter m Rentals Exacerbate Los Ang eles’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations ”

4 “About Airbnb: What It Is and How It Works - Airbnb Help Center,” Airbnb, accessed May 17, 2023, https://www airbnb com/help/ar ticle/2503

5 Gar y Barker, “T he Airbnb Effect on Housing and Rent,” Forbes, October 12, 2022, https://www forbes com/sites/ g ar ybarker/2020/02/21/the-airbnb-effect-on-housing-an d-rent/

concer ned by Airbnb’s effect on housing stock, prices, and communities.6

Establishing the Ef fect of Airbnb on Shor t-Ter m R ental Prices

Recent research reveals that Airbnb reduces affordable housing and contributes to unequal investment patter ns. Raiei-Dastjerdi and Mattews demonstrate that Airbnb enforces existing spatial patter ns of inequality, seg reg ation, and consumption.7 Rabie-Dastjerdi et al. fur ther claim that Airbnb exacerbates uneven development in popular g entrifying or commercialized neighborhoods occupied by privileg ed people 8 Since Airbnb attracts consumers to these popular neighborhoods, prices for typical renters increase as holiday guests can afford to pay more 9 T hese neighborhoods then develop fur ther to meet the needs of the new, wealthier market and draw resources and capital away from lower-income areas. In this manner, Airbnb increases disparities in well-located, recently developed areas by blur ring traditional boundaries between residential and commercial city areas.

To fur ther prove that Airbnb reduces the affordable housing supply, this paper will illuminate two potential mechanisms proposed by the Har vard Law Review that seek to explain the empirical research demonstrating that the shor t-ter m rental market distor ts the housing market. T he first mechanism is the simple conversion of housing units previously occupied by city residents to accommodations listed on Airbnb year-round. T his process removes units from the rental market and adds

6 Barker, “T he Airbnb Effect on Housing and Rent ”

7 Hamidreza Rabiei-Dastjerdi, Gavin McArdle, and William Hynes. “Which Came First, the Gentrification or the Airbnb? Identifying Spatial Patter ns of Neighbourhood Chang e Using Airbnb Data ” Habitat Inter national (2022): 102582

https://doi org/10 1016/j habitatint 2022 102582

8 Ibid.

9 Maar tje Roelofsen, “Perfor ming ‘Home’ in the Sharing Economies of Tourism: T he Airbnb Experience in Sofia, Bulg aria,” Fennia - Inter national Jour nal of Geography 196, no 1 (2018): 24–42, https://doi org/10 11143/fennia 66259

them to an area's supply of guest houses.10 Fur ther more, it leads to a mild increase in city-wide rents concentrated in aff luent or g entrifying neighborhoods in the city's core. T his process directly decreases the supply of affordable housing.

Lee argues that the second mechanism by which Airbnb decreases the affordable housing supply is “hotelization.” T his mechanism posits that as long as a proper ty owner can rent out a room on Airbnb for a cheaper price than a comparable hotel room while ear ning a premium over the residential market or rent-controlled rent, this proper ty owner is incentivized to list each unit on Airbnb rather than rent to residents T herefore, “hotelization” decreases the housing supply and induces displacement, g entrification, and seg reg ation. Fur ther more, cities zone and build residential housing and tourist markets through wholly different processes. By facilitating the inappropriate merging of the residential and tourist sectors, Airbnb induces shor tag es in the housing supply that neither the market nor the public sector can swiftly re place.11 Indeed, researchers have found that Airbnb supply neg atively cor relates with rental supply and the number of owners and rental households.12

Examining the Ef fect of Airbnb on Cape To wn’s Unregula ted Housing Market Research about Cape Town, South Africa reveals historical inequalities that have long affected its housing market. Cape Town occupies a par ticular context due to apar theid

10 Dayne Lee, “How Airbnb Shor t-Ter m Rentals Exacerbate Los Ang eles’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations,” Har vard Law and Polic y Review 10 (2016): 229–53.

11 Lee, “How Airbnb Shor t-Ter m Rentals Exacerbate Los Ang eles’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations ”

12 Keren Hor n and Mark Merante, “Is Home Sharing Driving up Rents? Evidence from Airbnb in Boston”;Miquel-Àng el Garcia-López et al , “Do Shor t-Ter m Rental Platfor ms Affect Housing Markets? Evidence from Airbnb in Barcelona,”

divides.13 T he core of the apar theid policy revolved around land. Building upon colonial policies, apar theid stripped black South Africans of their land and relocated them to racially seg reg ated developments on the city outskir ts.14 With the democratic transition in the 1990s came a new South African constitution that guaranteed South African citizens the right to access housing.15 Yet as of 2022, more than 500,000 households, comprising two million individuals, were registered on the city’s waitlist for g over nment-owned rental homes 16 In this post-apar theid context, Airbnb poses an unprecedented threat to affordable housing in Cape Town.

Since the first listing appeared on the African continent, Airbnb accommodations have g rown rapidly As a top tourist destination in Africa, Cape Town signed the first official city ag reement with Airbnb in 2015. Fur ther more, the number of active rentals in Cape Town has soared from less than 700 in 2013 to over 15,000 by 2017.17 Indeed, South Africa can be considered one of Airbnb’s big g est successes and, in 2016, was the 21st larg est global market for the home-sharing

13 Abel, Mar tin “Long-Run Effects of Forced Resettlement: Evidence from Apar theid South Africa ” Long-r un Effects of Forced Resettlement: Evidence from Apar theid South Africa, 2015. https://scholar.har vard.edu/abel/publications/long-r uneffects-forced-removal-under-apar theid-social-capital

14 Mar tin Abel “Long-Run Effects of Forced Resettlement: Evidence from Apar theid South Africa ”

15 Sophie Oldfield and Saskia Greyling, “Waiting for the State: A Politics of Housing in South Africa,” Envir onment and Planning A: Economy and Space 47, no 5 (May 1, 2015): 1100–1112, https://doi org/10 1177/0308518x15592309

16 Tommy Trenchard, “Inside South Africa’s ‘hijacked’ Buildings: ‘All We Want Is a Place to Call Home,’” NPR, December 24, 2022, https://www npr org/sections/g oatsandsoda/2022/12/2 4/1144336547/inside-south-africashijacked-buildings-all-we-want-is-a-place-to-call-home.

17 Alexis Haden, “Cape Town’s Housing Crisis Summed up in an Airbnb Map,” T he South African, May 11, 2017, https://www thesouthafrican com/lifestyle/cape-towns-h ousing-crisis-summed-up-in-an-airbnb-map/

platfor m. According to Henama, Capetonians have quickly adopted and embraced Airbnb; Cape Town possessed the most Airbnb listings of any city on the African continent in 2018.18 Fur ther more, Airbnb increased the demand for f lats in Cape Town, resulting in a 16% increase in sales in Cape Town’s City Bowl District.19 However, Airbnb is cur rently unregulated in South Africa. Since 2018, org anizations like the Federated Hospitality Association of South Africa (FEDHASA) have called for Airbnb regulation in South Africa.20 Fur ther more, Oskam and Boswijk claim that the regulator y void on Airbnb and other shor t-ter m rental options re presents one of the big g est challeng es facing Airbnb and the Cape Town housing market.21

Although little empirical data cur rently exists on the effect of Airbnb on the housing market in Cape Town, this paper will utilize existing literature to analyze the potential ramifications of Airbnb’s cur rent lack of regulation in Cape Town on the city’s existing housing shor tag e and human rights. As outlined earlier in the paper, Airbnb allows homeowners to temporarily rent out their spaces to tourists.22 Indeed, the vast majority (75%) of Airbnb

18 Unathi Sonwabile Henama, “Disr uptive Entrepreneurship Using Airbnb: T he South African Experience,” African Jour nal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisur e 7, no 1 (2018), https://doi org/10 46222/ajhtl

19 “Tourism, Airbnb Growth Boost Demand for Cape Town CBD Apar tments,” Africa Proper ty News.com, accessed May 17, 2023, http://www africaproper tynews com/souther n-africa/32 57-tourism-airbnb-g rowth-boost-demand-for-cape-towncbd-apar tments html

20 Unathi Sonwabile Henama, “Disr uptive Entrepreneurship Using Airbnb: T he South African Experience ”

21 Oskam, Jeroen, and Alber t Boswijk “Airbnb: T he Future of Networked Hospitality Businesses ” Jour nal of Tourism Futur es 2, no. 1 (2016): 22–42. https://doi org/10 1108/jtf-11-2015-0048

22 Lee, “How Airbnb Shor t-Ter m Rentals Exacerbate Los Ang eles’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations ”

guests in South Africa are foreigners.23 Renting to these tourists, who can often afford high rents for shor ter stays, may lead to an increase in housing prices in the area.24 According to the FNB Proper ty Barometer, proper ty prices in Cape Town, the location of over 40% of all South African Airbnb listings, have g rown incredibly over the past five years. T his proper ty price increase has been concentrated in the City Bowl, Atlantic seaboard, and souther n suburbs–tracing apar theid g eog raphies and reinforcing seg reg ation. Tellingly, national proper ty prices have remained nearly f lat, and the proper ty locations facing price increases cor relate with where Airbnb listings are concentrated.25 As this paper has already established that rising prices lead to lower-income individuals moving out of the city center, it is integ ral that Cape Town regulates the Airbnb market and combats rising prices. Fur ther more, the effect of Airbnb in Cape Town, in par ticular, may be exacerbated in its unique context as the city already str ug gles with g entrification: lower-income individuals living closer to the City Bowl District are already being driven far ther from the city center.26 Members of the Cape Town community who move to cheaper regions due to g entrification often endure outsized travel costs and resettle in housing that is less safe, poorly ser viced, and potentially environmentally hazardous.27 By

23 Unathi Sonwabile Henama, “Disr uptive Entrepreneurship Using Airbnb: T he South African Experience ”

24 Lee, “How Airbnb Shor t-Ter m Rentals Exacerbate Los Ang eles’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations ”

25 Steve Kretzmann, “Airbnb and Cape Town’s Rising Rents: An Inter view with Chris Lehane,” GroundUp News, October 23, 2017, https://www.g roundup.org.za/ar ticle/airbnb-and-cape-to wns-rising-rents-inter view-chris-lehane/.

26 Laura Wenz, “Changing Tune in Woodstock: Creative Industries and Local Urban Development in Cape Town, South Africa,” Gateways: Inter national Jour nal of Community Research and Engagement 5 (2012), https://doi.org/10.5130/ijcre.v5i0.2010.

27 Unathi Sonwabile Henama, “Disr uptive Entrepreneurship Using Airbnb: T he South African Experience ”

worsening existing housing shor tag es, Airbnb exacerbates social and spatial inequality in Cape Town.

Using the Case of Ne w York City to Postula te Airbnb’s Ef fect on Cape To wn

Airbnb’s potential effect on existing inequalities in Cape Town merits attention. Henama argues that local beneficiation has been a core challeng e facing the tourism industr y and that Airbnb has improved local destination benefits from tourism, aligning with the principles of sustainable tourism.28 However, it is wor th considering which local Capetonians stand to benefit or suffer the most from the effect of Airbnb Examining the case study of New York City can shed light on this question. In 2015, New York City had a citywide diversity index of 73% yet maintained a neighborhood diversity index of 47%, making it one of the most seg reg ated cities in the United States.29 Similarly, exper ts consider Cape Town one of South Africa’s most seg reg ated cities due to apar theid and colonial-era spatial planning.30 Although New York City and Cape Town are not perfectly analog ous, the high levels of racial seg reg ation in both cities have left both vulnerable to the "Airbnb Effect."

T hus, the “Airbnb Effect” in New York City draws attention to the manner in which Airbnb may be exacerbating wealth inequalities along racial lines in Cape Town.

New York City residents today face displacement, rent and local price g ouging, and acute pover ty rooted in discriminator y housing policies throughout American histor y

29 Nate Silver, “T he Most Diverse Cities Are Often the Most Seg reg ated,” FiveT hir tyEight, May 1, 2015, https://fivethir tyeight com/features/the-most-diverse-cit ies-are-often-the-most-seg reg ated/#:~:text=New%20Yo rk%20also%20has%20a,47%20percent%2C%20which% 20ranks%2049th.

30 Ivan Turok, Justin Visagie, and Andreas Scheba, “Social Inequality and Spatial Seg reg ation in Cape Town,” The Urban Book Series, 2021, 71–90, https://doi org/10 1007/978-3-030-64569-4 4

28 Unathi Sonwabile Henama, “Disr uptive Entrepreneurship Using Airbnb: T he South African Experience ”

Historically, housing policy in the United States has unfairly targ eted Black people and people of color. Great De pression Era policies catapulted millions of white Americans into the middle class by subsidizing housing. However, these policies completely excluded Black Americans. From the 1930s to the 1960s, Federal Housing Authority policies such as redlining ensured that Black Americans were less likely to receive loans for housing and more likely to receive loans with worse interest rates.31

As a result of continued housing discrimination over decades, low-income people and people of color became concentrated in cities such as New York. After the Fair Housing Act banned redlining in 1968, other for ms of housing discrimination persisted. Gentrification has threatened to displace people of color from the New York City center from the 1960s onward.32

T his brief historical backg round demonstrates how New York City’s histor y of racist housing policy has allowed for cur rent spatial inequalities.

T he case study of New York City demonstrates that Airbnb intensifies existing spatial inequalities, and thus may have a similar effect in the city of Cape Town. Airbnb hosts are five times more likely to be white across all 72 predominantly Black New York City neighborhoods. In those neighborhoods, the white resident population stands at 13.9% while the Airbnb host population is 74% white. In New York City, the beneficiaries of Airbnb are, by and larg e, white, as white Airbnb hosts in Black neighborhoods ear ned a total of $159.7 million, compared to only $48.3 million for Black hosts To put that into perspective, 13.9% of the population reaping 73.7% of the income

31 Ter r y Gross, “A ‘forg otten Histor y ’ of How the U.S. Gover nment Seg reg ated America,” NPR, May 3, 2017, https://www npr org/2017/05/03/526655831/a-forg ott en-histor y-of-how-the-u-s-g over nment-seg reg ated-americ a

32 Ing rid Gould Ellen and Gerard Tor rats-Espinosa, “Gentrification and Fair Housing: Does Gentrification Fur ther Integ ration?,” Housing Polic y Debate 29, no 5 (2018): 835–51, https://doi org/10 1080/10511482 2018 1524440

benefits re presents a 530% economic disparity. Fur ther, while income benefits due to Airbnb in Black neighborhoods often affect white residents, the loss of housing and neighborhood disr uption due to Airbnb is more likely to affect Black residents due to their majority presence in these neighborhoods. T he case of New York City clearly shows that–even in majority Black neighborhoods–Airbnb primarily benefits white residents. Yet, the burden of g entrification dispropor tionately falls on Black residents.33 Drawing from New York City, a racially diverse urban center that similarly possesses a long histor y of housing discrimination, this paper hypothesizes that Airbnb’s presence in Cape Town may be exacerbating existing wealth inequalities by allowing white residents to reap dispropor tionate economic benefits while others face the threat of g entrification due to rising prices.

Demonstra ting Tha t R egula ting Airbnb Works Using the Case Stud y of Ber lin

T his paper will now utilize the case study of Berlin, Ger many to illuminate how regulations can limit the “Airbnb Effect” to var ying deg rees. While 85 percent of Berliners rented in 2021, 17 of the 19 Berlin neighborhoods were unaffordable to the averag e ear ner based on the amount of someone’s net salar y that g oes to monthly rent.34 T his housing crisis finds its roots in a multitude of issues. Historically, post-unification Berlin has reckoned with the task of incor porating East Berlin housing stock into the market, contributing to new dynamics in the housing market. Fur ther more, the Berlin housing market has experienced pressure from the inf lux of expats and inter nationals While

33 Cox, Mur ray “T he Face of Airbnb, New York CityAirbnb as a Racial Gentrification Tool ” Inside Airbnb, March 2017

http://insideairbnb.com/research/face-of-airbnb-nyc/.

34 Zoe Dare Hall, “In Berlin 85% of People Rent T heir Homes - and Prices Are Spiralling,” Subscribe to read | Financial Times, October 22, 2021, https://www ft com/content/4f02ecb1-31cf-4125-b482478b031d2e8d

Berlin has rent-controlled public housing available for low-income tenants, this housing requires protection.35 In the last few years, expats and locals alike have experienced the increasingly difficult challeng e of finding accommodation in Berlin, especially in central, trendier areas.36

Recognizing the impact of Airbnb on affordable housing, the City of Berlin imposed regulations on shor t-ter m rental accommodations. In May 2016, the City of Berlin announced an Airbnb ban restricting proper ty owners to only renting out one room for a maximum of two months 37 Named “Zw eckentfr emdungsverbot (Prohibition of Misappropriation),” this law threatened anyone renting an entire f lat with a fine of up to 100,000€ per violation. Fur ther more, any commercial exploitation of housing had to first receive a special per mit from the city. T he ban primarily targ eted commercial users, those who re peatedly rent their proper ty out for shor t stays, rather than “home sharers,” who occasionally and moderately used the platfor m. T his strateg y made sense as commercial users re presented a g reater threat to the housing supply by ag g ravating cur rent shor tag es in long-ter m accommodations for locals.38 However, in March 2018, the Berlin city

assembly over tur ned the Airbnb ban and instituted new regulations.39

Although the ban was only in place for two years, it was, in many ways, ver y successful. T he Berlin boroughs, though impeded by appeals, pursued proceedings ag ainst a small por tion of people on the Airbnb website. Research shows that the Airbnb ban led to measurable decreases in the supply of Airbnb listings. From March 2016 on, many users removed their listings from the platfor m. Two months after the ban went into effect, the supply of Airbnbs in Berlin fell by 40%, leaving about 11,000 listings on the site 40 Never theless, Berlin has experienced an incremental increase in new listings since May 2016. One can conclude that the ban successfully removed users from the platfor m shor tly after implementation, but this dissuasion ultimately faded with time. Despite the declining inf luence of the ban, Duso et al. found that the 2016 ban reduced both the number of Airbnb offers and the number of high-availability listings, defined as listings available for shor t-ter m renting for more than 180 days per year. Due to the dispropor tionate marginal effect of high-availability listings on the housing market, researchers have discovered that the reduction in Airbnb listings following the 2016 refor m led to an increase in rental supply. Researchers have also found that the 2016 Airbnb Ban successfully reduced rents by contracting the long-ter m rental supply.41

35 Juliana Dahl and Malg orzata Góralczyk (2017, May) Recent Supply and Demand Developments in the Ger man Housing Market (Economic Brief 025) European Commission

36 Tomaso Duso, Claus Michelsen, Maximilian Schäfer, and Kevin Ducbao Tran. “Airbnb and Rental Markets: Evidence from Berlin ” CEPR Discussion Paper, no DP16150 (May 2021)

https://papers ssr n com/sol3/papers cfm?abstract id=3 846265.

37 O’Sullivan, Feargus. “Berlin’s Airbnb Ban Is Over, but the New Rules Are Serious ” Bloomberg com, March 23, 2018

https://www bloomberg com/news/ar ticles/2018-03-23 /berlin-s-airbnb-ban-is-over-but-the-new-r ules-are-seriou s.

38 Tomaso Duso, Claus Michelsen, Maximilian Schäfer, and Kevin Ducbao Tran “Airbnb and Rental Markets: Evidence from Berlin ”

In 2018, Berlin re placed the Airbnb ban with strict r ules that aimed to protect the

39 O’Sullivan, Feargus. “Berlin’s Airbnb Ban Is Over, but the New Rules Are Serious ” Bloomberg com, March 23, 2018 https://www bloomberg com/news/ar ticles/2018-0 3-23/berlin-s-airbnb-ban-is-over-but-the-new-r ules-are-se rious.

40 Zeit Online. “Airbnb Kündigt Ver mieter n in Berlin.” ZEIT ONLINE | Lesen Sie zeit de mit Werbung oder im PUR-Abo Sie haben die Wahl , April 27, 2016 https://www zeit de/wir tschaft/unter nehmen/2016-04/ airbnb-berlin-ferienwohnung en-ver mieten-zweckentfrem dung-g esetz.

41 Tomaso Duso, Claus Michelsen, Maximilian Schäfer, and Kevin Ducbao Tran “Airbnb and Rental Markets: Evidence from Berlin ”

housing market but fell shor t of the success of the ban. Star ting May 1 of 2018, Berliners could rent out primar y homes without restrictions, and second homes for up to 90 days per year. T he new policy imposed fir m conditions on vacation rentals and required landlords seeking to rent out their homes to obtain g eneral per mits.42 Landlords leaving an apar tment untenanted were required to apply for a special per mit to maintain a vacant space after three months without having a per manent tenant registered. T he maximum penalty for breaking the r ules increased to 500,000€.43 In contrast to the Airbnb ban, the 2018 refor m mainly led to a decrease in low-availability listings rather than high-availability listings While the 2016 refor m was more successful than the 2018 refor m at reducing professional shor t-ter m renting, both significantly decreased Airbnb supply 44 T hese refor ms found var ying success but both demonstrate that Airbnb’s effects on the rental supply can be successfully regulated. In par ticular, the Berlin case study displays the ability of regulations that targ et high-availability listings to decrease professional shor t-ter m renting and rents. Ultimately, the success of the City of Berlin provides evidence that regulation can combat the “Airbnb Effect” and a potential model for housing policies in Cape Town.

Conclusion

Although Airbnb can spur tourism, it does not do so without consequences. T his paper has argued that Airbnb detrimentally affects housing market shor tag es and exacerbates existing spatial inequalities However, the case study of Berlin has

demonstrated that regulating Airbnb can reduce the number of Airbnb listings in a city and has the potential to counteract rising prices and rental shor tag es caused by Airbnb, if these regulations are properly implemented. To limit Airbnb's effect on g entrification and inequality, the City of Cape Town must regulate the Airbnb market. Cape Town city officials must look toward cities such as Berlin to enact creative legislation before Airbnb continues to amplify the issues within a vulnerable market.

Fur ther more, when addressing the “Airbnb Effect,” Cape Town city officials must not overlook the existing problems in the housing market. T his issue is about more than just regulating Airbnb or other home-sharing policies Other social policies must be implemented to guarantee affordable housing for all Capetonians T he city must mandate the private sector to build more inclusionar y housing options and implement different for ms of regulation to restrict private developments in Cape Town. T he City of Cape Town must meet its constitutionally mandated oblig ation to address spatial apar theid through the constr uction and protection of adequate social housing in well-located areas.

42 O’Sullivan, Feargus. “Berlin’s Airbnb Ban Is Over, but the New Rules Are Serious ”

43 O’Sullivan, Feargus “Berlin’s Airbnb Ban Is over, but the New Rules Are Serious ”

44 Tomaso Duso, Claus Michelsen, Maximilian Schäfer, and Kevin Ducbao Tran. “Airbnb and Rental Markets: Evidence from Berlin ”

Fake It Till You Make It: Militar y Pr ofessionalization Amongst Resistance Movements in Nazi-Occupied Eur ope

Ethan Lee

Intr oduction

T he memor y of resistance in Nazi-occupied Europe has often been characterized by imag es of rag-tag par tisans fighting for liberation ag ainst a g enocidal occupying power.1 While this imag er y is accurate in cer tain respects, such nar ratives can limit our understanding of why some resistance movements of the period decided to underg o extensive militar y professionalization, along with the militar y and political consequences that these chang es entailed.2 T here are notable examples of entities with aspirations for statehood underg oing militar y professionalization throughout the Second World War, par ticularly in the context of the Balkans and Wester n Europe 3

For the pur poses of this paper, the ter m “militar y professionalization” is best understood as the larg e-scale imposition of a unique collective identity along with the

1 “Resistance is habitually equated with actual combat, evoking the imag e of the par tisan fighters in the maquis… and the street fighters at the bar ricades during the Liberation ” Paula Schwar tz, “Redefining Resistance: Women’s Activism in War time France” in Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars, eds Marg aret Hig onnet, Sonya Michel, and Jane Jenson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 143. For recent examples of resistance in Nor th American popular media, see Sledg ehammer Games, Call of Duty: Vanguard (2021); Allied, directed by Rober t Zemeckis (Paramount Pictures, 2016); Inglorious Basterds, directed by Quentin Tarantino (T he Weinstein Company, 2009).

2 See Peter Burke, “A New Paradigm” in W hat is Cultural Histor y?, 2nd ed (Cambridg e and Malden: Polity, 2008), 67-72

3 For more context on politics and resistance in Europe during occupation, see Gordon Wright, “Ger man Rule in Occupied Europe” and “Europe’s Response to Conquest: T he Resistance Movements” in The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Har per & Row, 1968), 107-166

existence and maintenance of resistance-specific exper tise in an ar med g roup 4 Attempts by resistance movements to underg o for ms of militar y professionalization should not be nar rowly conce ptualized as a militar y strateg y aimed at improving combat effectiveness. Instead, militar y professionalization should also be understood as an impor tant characteristic of resistance movements vying to utilize the benefits of political legitimacy during war time and in anticipation of establishing postwar g over nance.

T his paper is org anized into five par ts. After this introduction, section two examines relevant literature in political science and sociolog y, outlining and deriving two conce pts of militar y professionalization in ar med g roups

T he first conce pt is based on militar y strateg y, and the second is premised on political relations, i.e resistance g roups’ relations with local communities and org anizational behavior Sections three and four are comprised of historical case studies on resistance in Yug oslavia and France, highlighting the strengths of the political relations explanation and the more limited applicability of militar y strateg y. I end the paper with a conclusion and a quick over view.

R elevant Academic Litera ture and Explana tions for Militar y Pr ofessionaliza tion

Academic discourse concer ning civil-militar y relations—which encompasses the topic of militar y professionalization—is almost always framed in the context of nation-states,

4 Tommy Ross, “Reconceptualizing Militar y Professionalization,” Center for Strategic and Inter national Studies (2018), https://www csis org/analysis/reconceptualizing-militar y -professionalization

with foundational works in the field being for med in capitalist militaries’ transitions to all-volunteer forces.5 Despite this backg round, professionalization—the social process by which occupations become publicly recognized as a profession—has been recognized as not being de pendent on the existence of a traditional nation-state, albeit with the caveats of altered responsibilities between individual combatants and clients as well as the different types of skill sets called into question.6 Scholarship on professionalization is larg ely premised on the conce pt of the professional, i.e members employed in fields requiring distinct types of training, knowledg e, and skills 7 In other words, militar y professionalism and professionalization should be framed as the adoption of professional attributes by individuals eng ag ed in militar y activities, characterized by the constr uction of a collective identity facilitated through consistent

5 Samuel P Huntington, “Officership as a Profession” in The Soldier and the State: The Theor y and Politics of Civil-Militar y Relations (London: Har vard University Press, 1957), 8-19; Mor ris Janowitz, “Professionals in Violence” in The Pr ofessional Soldier : A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), 3-20

6 Patrick Finneg an, “Professionalization of a Nonstate Actor : A Case Study of the Provisional IRA,” Ar med Forces & Society 45 2 (2019), 354; Eric A Nordling er, Soldiers in Politics: Militar y Coups and Gover nments (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 47 With reg ards to nonstate actors, the responsibility to a client (with the client traditionally being the g over nment) can be understood as combatants’ oblig ations to receive orders from the g roup’s command str ucture and/or the local populace, as Nordling er asser ts that responsibility to a client is of “near tautological g eneralizations…when it is used to explain the incidence of coups.” For more on the different manners in which intrastate conf licts can be fought and the skillsets which they require, see Stathis N K alyvas and Laia Balcells, “Inter national System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Inter nal Conf lict,” American Political Science Review 104 3 (2010), 415-428; Evg eny Finkel, “T he Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust,” American Political Science Review 109 2 (2015), 340-342.

7 Tony Watson, “Professions and Professionalism: Should We Jump off the Bandwag on, Better to Study Where It Is Going?” Inter national Studies of Management & Or ganization 32 2 (2002), 93-105

ar rang ements,8 the continuation and advancement of combat-oriented infor mation and practices,9 and the dedication and cor responding discipline of individual combatants to an org anization eng ag ed in the manag ement of violence which they hold membership in.10

In the disser tation Or ganization and Community: The Deter minants of Insur gent Militar y Success, then-Ph.D. candidate Alec Worsnop categ orized five different thresholds of militar y effectiveness in non-state actors: (1) ar med g roups that disperse under combat conditions, (2) those that can car r y out basic coordinated maneuvers in a limited manner, (3) those able to out specific orders in combat situations without direct super vision of high-level commanders, (4) those capable of car r ying out coordinated militar y tasks, and (5) those that can readily car r y out high-coordinated tasks such as combined ar ms.11 While militar y professionalization cannot and should not be directly equated as a proxy for measuring militar y effectiveness, the long-ter m viability of ar med g roups facing Nazi occupiers could be conting ent on cer tain levels of org anization facilitated by professionalization. Perhaps

8 “Tr ue professions have codes of conduct, and the meaning and consequences of those codes are taught as par t of the for mal education of their members ” Rakesh Khurana and Nitin Nohria, “It’s Time to Make Manag ement a Tr ue Profession,” Har vard Business Review (2008), https://hbr org/2008/10/its-time-to-make-manag ementa-tr ue-profession

9 Román D. Or tiz, “Insurg ent Strategies in the Post-Cold War : the Case of the Revolutionar y Ar med Forces of Colombia " Studies in Conflict and Ter r orism 25 2 (2002), 136

10 Anthony King, “T he Persistence of Mass” in The Combat Soldier : Infantr y Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 220; Elizabeth J Wood, “T he Puzzle of Insurg ent Collective Action” in Insur gent Collective Action and Civil War in El-Salvador (Cambridg e: Cambridg e University Press, 2003), 18-19.

11 Alec Worsnop, “Introduction” in Or ganization and Community: The Deter minants of Insur gent Militar y Ef fectiveness, PhD diss (Massachusetts Institute of Technolog y, 2016), 15-18, https://dspace mit edu/handle/1721 1/107534

resistance movements are only capable of sur viving and resisting the T hird Reich’s relentless counterinsurg ency effor ts by utilizing developed command and control networks, unit-level leadership, guidelines and systems for personnel manag ement, instr uction in weapons and tactics, and shared identity among members.12 Only then could they conduct routine activities such as skir mishes, ambushes, sabotag e, and intellig ence collection.13 T his line of thought for ms the basis of the first conce pt proposed in this paper : resistance movements pursued militar y professionalization as a militar y strateg y pursuant to increasing combat effectiveness 14

T here is another compelling explanation for why resistance movements underwent militar y professionalization in World War II: political relations between resistance movements, the local communities they relied upon, and inter national actors. Works of scholarship in the “new institutionalism” methodological approach to sociolog y have established that org anizations often share similar str uctures and processes.15 Within this literature, the homog enization of rational org anizations is refer red to as institutional isomor phism.16 Coercive isomor phic chang e is

12 Worsnop, “A T heor y of Insurg ent Militar y Effectiveness” in Or ganization and Community: The Deter minants of Insur gent Militar y Ef fectiveness, 107-109.

13 Ibid., 83.

14 Scott Sigmund Gar tner, “Decision Making in War” in Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 163 Gar tner defines militar y strateg y as a state’s implemented ideas pursuant to selected strategic g oals.

15 Ellen M Immergut, “T he T heoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," Politics & Society 26 1 (1998), 5-34; Walter W Powell and Paul J DiMag gio, eds , The New Institutionalism in Or ganizational Analysis (Chicag o: University of Chicag o Press, 1991). T he New Institutionalism is a methodological approach exploring how str uctures and nor ms constrain institutions

16 “Professions are subject to the same coercive and mimetic pressures as are org anizations.” Paul J. DiMag gio and Walter W. Powell, “T he Iron Cag e Revisited: Institutional Isomor phism and Collective Rationality in Org anizational Fields,” American Sociological Review 48 2 (1983), 147-158

the specific mechanism resulting from political pressures and, in the context of resistance during World War II, cultural expectations on what makes militaries legitimate.17 After all, local civilians and inter national actors’ decisions of which political actor to suppor t are shaped by their assessments of whether the resistance g roup will succeed.18 Given the challeng es posed by infor mation asymmetries in the fog of war, appearances and readily-obser ved org anizational behaviors can come to play the primar y role in infor ming such assessments, insofar as such obser vations confor m to their expectations of what a legitimate militar y is

The Yugoslav Par tisans, 1941-1945

For mally known as the National Liberation Ar my and the Par tisan Detachments of Yug oslavia, the Par tisans were an anti-fascist resistance movement in Axis-occupied Yug oslavia.19 T he movement, which eventually evolved into a larg e militar y force with a quasi-conventional capacity, was established through Josip Broz Tito’s leadership in the Communist Par ty of Yug oslavia during the initial stag es of the Ger man invasion and occupation.20 T hroughout their development, the Yug oslav Par tisans clearly demonstrated characteristics of militar y professionalization, e.g. its larg e composition and org anization of regular divisions and guer rilla detachments, standardized unifor ms, light and heavy weapons, and training—although the efficacy of the latter is contested in the context of female

17 DiMag gio and Powell, “T he Iron Cag e Revisited: Institutional Isomor phism and Collective Rationality in Org anizational Fields,” 147-150

18 Janet Lewis, “Civilians” in How Insur genc y Begins: Rebel Gr oup For mation in Uganda and Beyond (Cambridg e: Cambridg e University Press, 2020), 125-126; Eli Ber man et al , “Infor mation-Centric Insurg ency and Counterinsurg ency ” in Small Wars, Big Data: The Infor mation Revolution in Moder n Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 55-81.

19 T he Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Par tisan,” Encyclopaedia Britannica (2010), https://www britannica com/topic/Par tisan-Yug oslavian -militar y-force

20 Stoyan Pribichevich, “Tito,” Life Magaz ine (1944)

combatants.21 T his behavior is consistent with the first proposed explanation of militar y strateg y. In fact, the timing of many of these chang es coincides with the ar rival of British militar y advisors facilitating the integ ration of Allied equipment and supplies, along with other for ms of militar y guidance.22

Notwithstanding the applicability of the militar y strateg y explanation, impor tant nuances in the Par tisans’ historical record lend itself well to the second explanation of political relations. In par ticular, politicized decisions with reg ards to women ser ved to reduce combat manpower and effectiveness in and of itself To facilitate the integ ration of women into the Par tisans’ frontline militar y forces, the resistance movement’s leadership had female combatants complete a “political-militar y” course, cementing Tito’s philosophy of political considerations as a fundamental aspect of tactics and operations.23 If the militar y strateg y explanation was the most consistent with the evolution of the Par tisans into a professionalized fighting force, then training would be focused on the application and manag ement of violence in an undiluted manner removed from political distractions. In addition, 1944-1945 saw the withdrawal of women from frontline positions during the Par tisans’ reorg anization into a more

21 Milovan Djilas, “In the Cauldron” in Wartime (New York: Harcour t Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 232 and 277; Jelena Batinić, “T he Heroic and the Mundane” in Women and Yugoslav Partisans (Cambridg e: Cambridg e University Press, 2015), 138-140.

22 William Jones, “Chapter X” in Twelve Months with Tito’s Partisans (Bedford: Bedford Books, 1946),77-84; “William Mor ris Jones, 1895-,” Hall of Valour - Temple Du Courag e, http://www.canadaveteranshallofvalour.com/JonesWM.h tm. For more on converg ence between the militar y development of states and non-state ar med g roups, see William B Quandt, Algerian Militar y Development: The Pr ofessionalization of a Guer rilla Ar my (Santa Monica: RAND Cor poration, 1972), 1, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD0748913.pdf.

23 Batinić, “T he Heroic and the Mundane” in Women and Yugoslav Partisans, 139; Ger vasi, “Tito,” Collier’s Weekly; Djilas, “In the Cauldron” in Wartime, 222

conventional fighting force.24 T he withdrawal of women occur red despite recognition of their “excellent fighting qualities” and some of the heaviest fighting occur ring well into the latter sections of the war.25

T his shift can be attributed to political reasons, namely Tito’s desire to craft a homog enous, traditional nar rative that would neatly fit into the existing national identities of the prior Balkan States and the Kingdom of Yug oslavia.26 In conjunction, the political-militar y nature of training and the withdrawal of women from the frontlines demonstrate what were—in this case—inter twined yet competing mechanisms of militar y strateg y and political relations, along with their respective roles in encouraging different patter ns of org anizational development. T he course of events in Yug oslavia ser ves to highlight the Par tisans’ prioritization of political relations over militar y strateg y.

Another aspect of the Par tisans lending itself to the conce pt of political relations involves the rights afforded to lawful combatants in times of war. As mentioned earlier, the Par tisans beg an distributing standardized unifor ms in a similar manner to other sovereign states.27 T his desire to appear like a professional militar y was at least par tially tied to their claim that Par tisan soldiers were official bellig erents eng ag ed in war and thus entitled to the privileg es afforded to other prisoners of war 28 Ger man troops would

24 Batinić, “T he Heroic and the Mundane” in Women and Yugoslav Partisans, 158-164.

25 Jones, “Chapter X” in Twelve Months with Tito’s Partisans, 79; Wright, “Europe’s Response to Conquest: T he Resistance Movements” in The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945, 150-166.

26 Wolfg ang Hoepken, “War, Memor y, and Education in a Fragmented Society: T he Case of Yug oslavia,” East Eur opean Politics and Societies 13 1 (1999), 191-192

27 Djilas, “In the Cauldron” in Wartime, 232

28 “Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 27 July 1929,” Inter national Committee of the Red Cross, https://ihl-databases icrc org/applic/ihl/ihl nsf/States xs p?xp viewStates=XPag es NORMStatesPar ties&xp treat

frequently apply the ag reed-upon rights of prisoners of war to captured troops from the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK); however, the same could not be said with their respective treatment toward captured Par tisans and other insurg ents operating in Easter n Europe.29 T his hor rific dynamic could be readily obser ved in Milovan Djilas’ recounting of Nazii Ger many’s Operation Schwarz, which saw the deliberate annihilation of thousands of wounded Par tisans and unar med medical workers left behind on the battlefield.30 While the leadership of the T hird Reich never came to acknowledg e the war rights of the Par tisans, with br utal fighting in Yug oslavia continuing well into 1945, appeals for inter national recognition were eventually met by the Allies in the middle of the war, thereby helping the establishment of Tito as the preeminent resistance leader in Yug oslavia.31

Free France and the French R esistance, 1940-1944

T he French Resistance was the collection of entities fighting Nazi authorities in occupied France and the collaborationist Vichy regime.32 A distinct yet related political entity was Free France, the g over nment-in-exile for med in June 1940 that claimed to be the

ySelected=305 T he United States, United Kingdom, and Ger many all ratified the treaty in the first half of the 1930s.

29 “In time of war if one of the bellig erents is not a par ty to the Convention, its provisions shall, never theless, remain binding as between the bellig erents who are par ties thereto.” “Par t VIII : Execution of the Convention Section I : General Provisions - Ar t 82,” Inter national Committee of the Red Cross, https://ihl-databases icrc org/applic/ihl/ihl nsf/WebAR

T/305-430083?OpenDocument While the Kingdom of Yug oslavia did not ratify the 1929 Geneva Convention, a recognition by Nazi Ger many of war time hostilities ag ainst the Par tisans would have leg ally required them to comply with the provisions of the treaty

30 Djilas, “In the Cauldron” in Wartime, 263-271.

31 Winston Churchill, “Marshall Tito and His Gallant Bands,” Repor t to the House of Commons (1944)

32 Wright, “Europe’s Response to Conquest: T he Resistance Movements” in The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945, 144-150

legitimate g over nment of France. While the French Resistance had no for mal overarching leadership figure, the latter was led by General Charles de Gaule, who rejected the Franco-Ger man Ar mistice in a BBC radio broadcast and beg an working as a preeminent leader in the fight ag ainst the Axis powers.33 Relations between the Resistance and Free France were initially cold and disconnected, given the se paration of the English Channel and Free France’s removed nature from the day-to-day activities car ried out by many members of the Resistance 34 Pursuant to establishing a unified fighting entity, de Gaulle worked to overcome these initial challeng es and institute his leadership through fur ther radio broadcasts and discussions with Jean Moulin, the resistance leader neg otiating on behalf of elements of the French Resistance

De Gaulle’s push for a unified fighting movement was—in par t—based on a desire to cultivate inter national suppor t. Free France worked to chip away at Vichy France’s colonial possessions by means of co-option and coercion; de Gaulle also wanted to shift the US’ Roosevelt Administration from its diplomatic over tures to Vichy France pre-1942.35 In order to g enerate confidence in the Free French, de Gaulle’s Free France needed to fully embody its supposed status as the legitimate g over nment of France while also being recognized by French resistance fighters as such.

Pursuant to this objective, De Gaulle convinced Moulin to coordinate the disparate

34 H R Kedward, “Resistance and Refug e, 1942” and “Hunters and Hunted, Summer-Autumn 1943,” in In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Souther n France, 1942-1944 (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1994), 1-18 and 44-72; Wright, “Europe’s Response to Conquest: T he Resistance Movements” in The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945, 144-150.

35 Rober t Gale Woolber t, “Our Vichy Gamble by William L Lang er,” For eign Af fairs (1947), https://www foreignaffairs com/reviews/capsule-review /1947-07-01/our-vichy-g amble

33 Charles de Gaulle, “Nothing is Lost,” BBC Radio (1940)

g roups of the French Resistance.36 Moulin parachuted into France in early 1942 and beg an working closely with Lucie and Raymond Aubrac of Libération, although his role of pulling resistance leaders tog ether came to a br utal end after his and Raymond’s capture in 1943.37 Resistance fighters were able to pull off a daring rescue operation of Raymond, and the Aubrac family was quickly exfiltrated to the UK, where Lucie Aubrac received an unexpected militar y citation.38 Citations and other for ms of incentives are a common characteristic of militar y professionalization.39 However, given that Free France did not have operational control over the conduct of Lucie Aubrac’s cover t activity, the awarding of said citation had little to no utility in improving the effectiveness of the Free French’s militar y forces 40 Rather than being ref lective of procedures aimed at increasing militar y effectiveness and unit cohesion on the battlefield, the professionalization exhibited through the official awarding of the citation should be understood as a means of building political relationships, i.e. the

g over nment-in-exile recognizing and rewarding the activities of Libération as a g esture of par tnership.

Conclusion

Militar y professionalization in the Yug oslav Par tisans and Free France can be understood through two lenses: militar y strateg y and political relations. T he professionalization of Tito’s Par tisans had political aspects focused on female combatants and the r ules of war, and Aubrac’s anecdote ser ves to highlight militar y professionalization as a tool for unity and connection. Given the limited applicability of the militar y strateg y conce pt and the presence of significant political factors, both lenses are needed to more comprehensively evaluate the behavior and refor ms of resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Europe.

36 Jesse Beckett, “Jean Moulin Gave His Life for the French Resistance after refusing to give Intel to the “Butcher of Lyon”,” War Histor y Online (2021), https://www.warhistor yonline.com/war-ar ticles/jean-mo ulin-french-resistance-fighter.html?safari=1.

37 Lucie Aubrac, “Preface” in Outwitting the Gestapo (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 6

38 Aubrac, “Febr uar y 12, 1944” in Outwitting the Gestapo, 12.

39 Finkel, “T he Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust,” 340-341; Román D Or tiz, “Insurg ent Strategies in the Post-Cold War : the Case of the Revolutionar y Ar med Forces of Colombia." Studies in Conflict and Ter r orism 25.2 (2002), 136.

40 Clark R McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Group Polarization” in Friction: How Conflict Radicalizes Them and Us (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 109-124

T he Over looked Revolution: Gandhi’s Constr uctive Pr og ram and Nonviolent Resistance

Khushmita Dhabhai

Intr oduction

Gandhi's nonviolent resistance was a monumental force that g alvanized the Indian masses on an unparalleled scale. Numerous scholars and public figures alike have lauded its moral righteousness1 and its remarkable capacity to unite disparate factions within Indian society.2 However, the prevailing discourse sur rounding Gandhi's satyagraha, often limited to its nonviolent protest aspect, fails to acknowledg e the multifaceted components that propelled and sustained this remarkable movement. Consequently, the cr ucial and frequently overlooked role of Gandhi's constr uctive prog ram emerg es as a paramount factor wor thy of profound examination and appreciation.

T he constr uctive prog ram was an attempt "to begin building a new social order even as the old one still exists," with decentralized cooperatives "functioning inde pendently of the state and other institutions of the old order."

3 Gandhi's plan for the constr uctive prog ram included several inter related activities: the promotion of khadi (hand-woven cloth), the g rowth of villag e cottag e industries like soap and paper production, and improved personal and public

1 Mar tin Luther King, “My Pilg rimag e to Nonviolence,’” in The Papers of Martin Luther King , Jr.. Januar y 1957December 1958 (Berkeley (Calif.): University of Califor nia Press, 2000), https://kinginstitute stanford edu/king-papers/documen ts/my-pilg rimag e-nonviolence

2 Judith M. Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 162.

3 Gene Shar p, Gandhi as a Political Strategist: W ith Essays on Ethics and Politics (New Delhi: Gandhi Media Centre, 1999), 81

hygiene 4 T his prog ram significantly increased connectivity with the masses and fostered g reater par ticipation in events like the satyagrahas. It is widely inter preted, however, as a philanthropic and altr uistic effor t that does not filter into the political realms of nonviolent resistance.5 In this paper, I challeng e popular historiog raphy that overlooks the relevance of the constr uctive prog ram in Gandhi's strategies for mass mobilization for nonviolent resistance. To do so, I evaluate the role of constr uctive work as a political tool and argue that understanding its de ployment is key to understanding the satyagrahas.

Historiograph y

Nationalist-Marxist historians like Bipin Chandra identify Gandhi’s nonviolent resistance as a “str ug gle-tr uce-str ug gle” phenomenon. In this mode of resistance, “phases of vig orous extra-leg al mass movements” were combined with phases of “tr uce ” 6 During this “tr uce, ” the movement paused and reg enerated itself through mass prog rams of constr uctive work to launch another phase of “str ug gle” at a higher level. T he movement would thus kee p g rowing and strengthening itself in an upward-spiraling circle till victor y was achieved.7 While numerous scholars have contributed to dissecting this nature of

4 Shar p, Gandhi as a Political Strategist, 82-83.

5 Anthony Parel, Gandhi's Philosophy and the Quest for Har mony (Cambridg e: Cambridg e University Press, 2006), 62

6 Bipan Chandra et al., India's Strug gle for Independence, 1857-1947 (Delhi: Penguin, 2003), 313.

7 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition: The Er osion of Colonial Power in India (New Delhi: Sag e Publications, 2000), 70-71

Gandhian mass mobilization, they have tended to present the constr uctive prog ram in a manner that under mines its significance in the border nar rative of nonviolent resistance. For instance, although Gene Shar p, a prominent scholar and political theorist known for his extensive research on nonviolent resistance, dwells on the philosophy of Gandhi’s constr uctive work, he does not describe its consequences on mass mobilization and how it worked in practice. Moreover, he situates constr uctive work in the context of a preexisting nonviolent str ug gle, claiming that it is a way to “proceed, accompany and follow nonviolent action.”8 T his casts the constr uctive prog ram in solely a suppor ting role and under mines its relevance in g enerating a fresh non-violent str ug gle on its own.9

While Anthony Parel, a scholar and author who has extensively studied Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence, dwells on Gandhi’s nonviolent philosophy and the satyagraha, he characterizes the constr uctive prog ram in ways that under mine its role in mass mobilization for nonviolent resistance. By refer ring to the prog ram as “par ticularly suited to the the work of NGOs,”10 Parel distinguishes constr uctive work from the deliberate ag endas of the state. Doing so por trays constr uctive work as philanthropic, apolitical, and divorced from the strategic planning that accompanies nonviolent resistance.

Although Allwyn Tellis, a researcher who specifically focuses on Gandhi's constr uctive prog ram, focuses directly on the constr uctive prog ram, he inter prets it as integ ral to Gandhi’s nationalist movement but not as nonviolent action. Tellis examines the constr uctive prog ram as a body of discourse and highlights the symbolism behind Gandhi’s constr uctive prog ram, including the usag e of symbols like salt and khadi. 11 While Tellis is

right to identify the nationalist symbolism of Gandhi’s constr uctive prog ram, releg ating it as ‘discourse’ under mines its significance in nonviolent resistance.

By considering the g aps in cur rent literature, it becomes evident that the constr uctive prog ram plays a significant role as a deliberate strateg y for mass mobilization within Gandhi's comprehensive conce pt of nonviolent resistance. One can argue that constr uctive work is not merely a passive endeavor but a potent political tool in itself To tr uly g rasp the essence of satyagrahas during periods of ‘str ug gle,’ it is cr ucial to understand how constr uctive work was implemented during periods of ‘tr uce ’ In light of this understanding, a challeng e is presented to the prevailing scholarly inter pretations that compar tmentalize satyag raha and constr uctive work into se parate categ ories. Instead, this paper proposes a more holistic perspective, emphasizing their interconnectedness and considering them as mutually reinforcing elements that contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to resistance.

The Politics of Constr ucti ve Work

Gandhi's constr uctive work is often por trayed as non-political by positioning him ag ainst the Indian National Cong ress and its leaders. For example, his retirement from the Cong ress in 1934 is inter preted as a g rowing dislike for the par ty's affairs and a desire to distance his constr uctive work from its politics.12 However, these conclusions are not historically tenable, and scholars like Bindu Matthews have highlighted Gandhi’s attempts at dispelling myths on the antag onistic relationship between the constr uctive prog ram and the Cong ress.13

12 “When Gandhiji

8

13 Bindu Mathew, “Mahatma Gandhi's Constr uctive Prog ram: Some Ref lections,” Pr oceedings of the Indian Histor y Congr ess 73 (2012): pp 597-606

11 Allwyn Tellis, “Mahatma Gandhi's Constr uctive Prog ramme: Building a New India” (disser tation, 2006),

10 Parel, Gandhi's Philosophy and the Quest for Har mony, 62.

9 Shar p, Gandhi as a Political Strategist, 77-86.

8 Shar p, Gandhi as a Political Strategist, 85

Resigned from the Cong ress,” New Delhi Times, March 28, 2022, https://www.newdelhitimes.com/when-g andhiji-resigned -from-the-cong ress/.

In light of this, it is essential to recognize Gandhi's constr uctive prog ram as a politically motivated strateg y aimed at mobilizing the masses for nonviolent resistance. Building upon Matthews' asser tions reg arding the converg ence of the Indian National Cong ress's g eneral policies and Gandhi's constr uctive work,14 it becomes apparent that their effor ts were mutually beneficial and frequently inter twined. Consequently, it is imperative to acknowledg e the inherently political nature of Gandhi's constr uctive work and its profound significance in the larg er context of his transfor mative vision.

Congr ess and the Politicization of Constr ucti ve Work

In a 1937 speech at a public meeting, Gandhi quelled suspicions of se paration from the Cong ress by stating, "But do we (Seva Sangh members) not want to be the re presentatives of the millions as well? And it is the Cong ress which is pledg ed to be the voice of the suffering millions. How, then, can there be any opposition between us and the Cong ress?"15 By re presenting the constr uctive prog ram as par t of the Cong ress's ag endas of connecting with the masses, Gandhi immediately draws attention to its political nature.

Here, it is cr ucial to highlight the location of Gandhi's remarks– the Gandhi Seva Sangh. Since the Sangh was leg ally inde pendent of the Cong ress's jurisdiction,16 he could have easily expressed discontentment with the par ty sans any political or org anizational constraints T he fact that he still chose to emphasize the connectivity of the constr uctive prog ram with the Cong ress indicates their coalitionar y characteristics

On another occasion, Gandhi insisted that constr uctive work org anizations like the All India Spinners Association (AISA) were

"created by the Cong ress."17 T his provision allowed him to "conduct my experiments without being fettered by the vicissitudes of a policy to which a wholly democratic body like the Cong ress is always liable."18 Here, he clarifies his se paration from the Cong ress– it was not the result of a contentious relationship but due to the par ty's broader political strateg y to effectively implement constr uctive prog rams.

Mutually Beneficial ‘Compar tments’

Fur ther more, Gandhi rejected the notion of se parate, “water tight compar tments,” 19 emphasizing the interconnected and mutually beneficial nature of the Indian National Cong ress's political activities and his constr uctive prog ram. He believed in a holistic approach that integ rated both dimensions, recognizing their symbiotic relationship and shared political strateg y for mass mobilization and nonviolent resistance. T he Cong ress unexpectedly winning 159 of 217 seats in the Madras elections of 1937 is the best example of this scenario.20 John Erskine, then g over nor of the Madras Presidency, attributed the victor y to the Cong ress’s org anization and volunteers–who had spread into vir tually ever y villag e through Gandhi’s constr uctive prog ram.21 Here, it is impor tant to highlight that Gandhi realized the paucity of connectivity between the masses and their leaders and utilized his constr uctive work to minimize this g ap.22 The constr uctive prog ram, therefore, facilitated a broader connection of the Cong ress par ty with its electorate and allowed them to launch more effective campaigns than the other par ties contesting elections

17 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 70 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministr y of Infor mation and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, 1989), 425.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid

16 Prabodha Kumar Rath,

Orissa Review, 2011, pp 41-44, 44

20 Christopher Baker, “T he Cong ress at the 1937 Elections in Madras,” Moder n Asian Studies 10, no 4 (1976): pp. 557-589, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x00014967, 1.

21 Baker, “T he Cong ress at the 1937 Elections in Madras,” 557-589

22 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 15, 161

“Gandhi Seva Sangha and Berboi,”

On a more national level, villag es whose residents directly benefited from constr uctive work in sanitation, khadi spinning, and education showed increased commitment and loyalty to the Cong ress. Speaking to this point in 1939, Krishnalal Shridharani, a for mer follower of Gandhi's, wrote that ag ricultural workers who g ained extra income through the AISA recognized the effor ts of Gandhi and the Cong ress in improving their lives.23 T hus, they eag erly received any infor mation reg arding satyagrahas and nationalist activities from the AISA’s “de pots”.24

Constr ucti ve Work: Gandhi’s Intentions and Stra tegic Outcomes

While scholars like Peter Acker mann and Jack Duvall have acknowledg ed the relevance of constr uctive work in Gandhi’s vision of nonviolent resistance, they have assigned it a suppor ting role– claiming Gandhi never envisioned it as “an end in itself.” 25 T his argument is limited because Gandhi continuously emphasized the impor tance of the constr uctive prog ram, stating, “the constr uctive prog ramme is the tr uthful and nonviolent way of winning complete Inde pendence.”26

T herefore, it is impor tant to note a distinction between constr uctive work’s intention and outcome. It is primarily in its consequences and implementation that constr uctive work took on the additional role of suppor ting mass mobilizations like the satyagraha.

To tr uly g rasp the essence of Gandhian mass mobilization, par ticularly the pivotal 'str ug gle' component of satyag raha, a comprehensive understanding of the periods of apparent 'tr uce' marked by the constr uctive

23 Krishnalal Jethalal Shridharani, War without Violence: Sociolog y of Gandhi's Satyagraha (New York, 1939), https://archive.org/details/in.er net.dli.2015.36471/pag e /n1/mode/2up?q=When+literature+and+infor mation+ reg arding+the+nationalist, 148

24 Ibid

25 Peter Acker man, and Jack Duvall, A Force Mor e Powerful: A Centur y of Nonviolent Conflict (New York, NY: Palg rave, 2000), 72

26 Mohandas K aramchand Gandhi, Constructive Pr ogramme (T he Navajivan Tr ust, 1945), 1

prog ram becomes indispensable. Exploring the constr uctive work car ried out during these phases sheds light on the profound impor tance of ashrams and vidyapiths in actively pursuing swaraj (freedom)ideals and fostering counter-cultural practices. Moreover, an examination of their strategic role as reser voirs of mass political suppor t during satyag rahas fur ther illuminates their significance. It is notewor thy that the constr uctive prog ram's impact often veered from its original intentions, sug g esting that its suppor tive role was not exclusive, but rather supplementar y in nature

Ashrams, Counter cultural Spaces, Reser voir Pr ograms

In the ashrams, Gandhi and his co-residents sought to create a counter-world: a physical space where the inhabitants eng ag ed in acts of self-control and communal labor for spiritual and social liberation.27 By mandating that the ashram residents car r y out daily chores tog ether, Gandhi aimed to dismantle societal bar riers and foster a sense of equality and solidarity across distinctions of caste, class, g ender, nationality, race, and religion. Gandhi also insisted that residents practice swaraj and ahimsa (nonviolence) at all times.28 T his instilled the moral discipline necessar y for their communal life tog ether in the pursuit of the nonviolent resistance ag ainst the British.

T he ashrams played a pivotal role in Gandhi's constr uctive prog ram, evolving into Satyag rahis' camps where people's energ y was channeled into nonviolent channels 29 Gandhi recognized their political potential, utilizing the ashram residents as a reliable, mentally pre pared, and physically ade pt reser ve of suppor ters 30 While not initially intended as laboratories for satyag raha, Gandhi mobilized the ashrams strategically, realizing their political

27 Mohandas K aramchand Gandhi, Ashram Obser vance in Action (Ahmedabad, Gujarat: Navajivan Publishing House, 1955), http://www.g andhiashramsevag ram.org/ashram-obser va nces/index.php, 23-27.

28 Ibid

29 Shridharani, War without Violence, 150

30 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 48, 348

capacity and effectively de ploying them in suppor t of the movement. T heir discipline and commitment became valuable tools in his pragmatic approach to nonviolent resistance, enabling individuals to underg o training, adopt the necessar y mindset, and contribute to the larg er g oals of the movement.

T his is best ref lected in Gandhi prefer ring to recr uit his fellow marchers for the satyagraha from his ashram over de pending exclusively upon volunteers from the Cong ress 31 T his can be attributed to some Cong ress members’ ske pticism32 about Gandhi’s nonviolent resistance, as opposed to the ashram residents who were unequivocally devoted to Gandhi’s mission.33 Consequently, Gandhi recr uited marchers from the ashram, where he could rely on bonds forg ed from tr ust and discipline In fact, the first seventy-two marchers in the Salt Satyagraha were all from Gandhi’s Sabar mati Ashram. 34

Vidyapiths, Education and Volunteer Training

In higher education, Gandhi inspired the establishment of several vidyapiths (indig enous secondar y education institutions).

T he Gujarat vidyapith, star ted in 1920, was a model to counter the educational institutions inspired by Macaulay’s Minute and the aim to create a class of ‘inter preter’ anglicized Indian elites.35 Gandhi’s g oal, therefore, was to train Indians to ser ve India in an education system that “synthesi[zed] the different cultures that

31 Dennis Dalton, Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 175-176

32 Saurabh Bajpai, “Tripuri Crisis: Nar rative of the Political Confrontation between Gandhi and Subhas,” Pr oceedings of the Indian Histor y Congr ess 68 (2007): pp. 875-882.

33 Mohandas K aramchand Gandhi, Bapus Letters to Mira (1924-1948) (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1949), 98

34 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 48, 416

35 Mohandas K aramchand Gandhi, Towards New Education, ed. Bharatan Kumarappa (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Pub House, 1955), https://www mkg andhi org/towrds edu/towrds edu ht m, 76-77

have come to stay in India (and) that have inf luenced Indian life.”36

Given this, it is interesting to note that Gujarat vidyapith essentially suspended its literar y activities for boys over 15, who were expected to suppor t Gandhi during his satyagrahas. 37 In fact, Gandhi himself commended the vidyapith for administering fifteen-day emerg ency training camps to pre pare the boys for joining the resistance and collating data from the villag es he was to visit.38 It is assumed that Gandhi then used the data to tailor his speeches to the location.39 Overall, Gandhi praised the promptitude of the Gujarat vidyapith and recommended other institutions to “copy the example ” 40

It is intriguing that the vidyapiths were used to recr uit and train volunteers for the satyag raha instead of focusing on impar ting a comprehensive for mal education. Post suspending literar y activities over the ag e of 15, the vidyapiths were educating students for fewer years compared to the British schools they intended to counter.41 Indicating, therefore, that Gandhi’s vidyapiths took more of an interest in mobilizing the masses than in educating them. Additionally, that 40 students were already conducting “field work” 42 before the “emerg ency training prog ram” for more volunteers indicates that volunteer training had been a long-ter m scheme– eventually resulting in students leaving their studies to accompany Gandhi for months.

At the same time, considering the context in which Gandhi commended the

36 Gandhi, Towards New Education, 76.

37 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 48, 462-463

38 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 48, 391-393

39 Dalton, Nonviolent Power in Action, 175

40 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 48, 462-463.

41 P. J. Har tog et al., “Interim Repor t of the Indian Statutor y Commission Review of Growth of Education in British India ” (1929)

T he document indicates that the ag e g roup for primar y education is 6-11 years (see section IV, pg V). Since middle and high school take up 6 or 7 years combined, the averag e ag e of the g raduating student is estimated to be 17 or 18 (see section I, pg IX)

42 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 48, 462-463

Gujarat vidyapith, there is an argument to be made that he overstretched the utility of the vidyapiths. Gandhi was addressing his comments to justify the vidyapiths’ benefits ag ainst claims that money spent on them “has been so much waste.” 43 Given this situation, he could have exag g erated praise of the Gujarat vidyapith to strengthen his stance. However, even within the framework of this argument, the suspension of literar y activities and existence of training prog rams and volunteers from the Gujarat vidyapith por tray it as an incubator for Gandhi’s followers and suppor ters

Conclusion

In conclusion, the value and pur pose of Gandhi's constr uctive work in his strategies for mass mobilization cannot be overstated. Its impor tance is often overshadowed by the undue emphasis on satyag raha, which por trays the constr uctive prog ram as non-political and disconnected from the broader framework of Gandhi's nonviolent resistance. However, such an evaluation is unjust, as the constr uctive prog ram ser ved as a strategic and political tool that effectively increased par ticipation in Gandhi's satyag rahas and bolstered the national movement.

Moving forward, it is cr ucial to transcend the notion of rigid compar tments when examining Gandhi's strategies of mass mobilization. As demonstrated throughout this 43 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol 48, 462-463

paper, the success of Gandhi's nonviolent resistance can be attributed to the interconnectedness between the constr uctive prog ram, satyag rahas, and the political ag endas of the Indian National Cong ress. T hese three components frequently overlapped and mutually benefited from each other, creating an environment of resistance that was conducive to mass mobilization.

While this paper has primarily focused on the role and significance of the constr uctive prog ram in mass mobilization, future research can delve fur ther into exploring the evolution of this environment of resistance. Additionally, investig ating Gandhi's unique role as a mediator between the constr uctive prog ram, satyag rahas, and political ag endas would be valuable. T his is especially relevant as India has not witnessed mass mobilization on the scale achieved by Gandhi following his assassination, making it essential to understand and lear n from his strategies in today's context. By comprehensively studying the inter play of these components, we can g ain valuable insights into the enduring leg acy of Gandhi's mass mobilization and its relevance in contemporar y times

Chinese Restaurants in Accra, Ghana: Repr esenting Chinese Cultur e in a Globalized African Metr opolis

Camille Luong

Abstract

Today, Ghana’s capital city of Accra is globalizing at a rapid pace. Accra is a popular destination for inter national and business travelers, as well as mig rants from across the world. T his research paper zooms in on one of the most prominent non-African ethnic g roups in Accra: the Chinese diaspora. Although there is literature on Chinese cuisine overseas, cultural exchang e through food, and globalization in Accra, there is a research g ap reg arding how these phenomena intersect in Accra. To address this g ap, this paper examines two displays at the forefront of Chinese restaurants: signs and menus. How do Chinese restaurant owners choose to re present Chinese culture in a globalizing Accra?

T his paper argues that these Chinese restaurants are actively eng aging in transnationalism, linking tog ether their countr y of origin with their countr y of resettlement. T his process of transnationalism is discussed using three different lenses: Chinese languag e as maintenance of Chinese culture, multiculturalism and fusion in menus, and standardized symbolism of Chinese culture. Ultimately, these findings demonstrate that Ghanaian Chinese restaurants utilize signs and menus to maintain Chinese culture as well as adapt to fit into a globalizing Accra. In understanding this case study, we can better understand diasporic re presentations of culture, processes of transnationalism, and moder n globalizing cities.

Intr oduction

Accra, the capital of Ghana, is a city full of curious urban phenomena: the commercialization of Oxford Street, the infor mal economy of Makola Market, the public

transpor tation system of tr o tr o 1 vans, etc In addition, Accra is also home to a lively food scene on a walk down a busy street, one can find dozens of traditional Ghanaian restaurants, food stalls, and eateries. In addition to these Ghanaian options is also a wide variety of Chinese restaurants.

T hough Chinese restaurants may seem like an anomaly in the context of Accra, a quick look at histor y can explain their presence. Chinese people, mostly from Hong Kong, first came to Ghana in the 1950s primarily to work in the tobacco industr y. 2 In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s gaige kaifang (

, “Refor ming and Opening-Up”) policy opened China to global markets. T his led to more Chinese from mainland China coming to Ghana.3 Chinese restaurants star ted popping up, ser ving both fellow Chinese immig rants and non-Chinese Ghanaians 4 By 2020, the Chinese population in Ghana had g rown to 30,000-50,000 people, constituting one of the larg est non-African ethnic g roups in the countr y 5

Increasing globalization is also apparent in Accra. In 2013, the New York Times listed Accra as the four th most desirable destination out of for ty-six locations. T he ar ticle notes that

1 Tro tro are privately-owned minibus share taxes that travel fixed routes throughout Accra

2 Ho, Conal Guan-Yow “Emerging Chinese Communities in Africa – T he Centre for Chinese Studies.” 2008. http://www0.sun.ac.za/ccs/?p=1439.

3 Ho, “Emerging Chinese Communities in Africa.”

4 New China TV, dir 2022 GLOBALink | Chinese Cuisine Gaining Popularity in Ghana https://www youtube com/watch?app=desktop&v=8 Zi Cmfm3SY.

5 “Ghana: Beijing’s Global Media Inf luence 2022 Countr y Repor t ” 2022 Freedom House https://freedomhouse org/countr y/ghana/beijings-glob al-media-inf luence/2022

Accra has welcomed business travelers and tourists for years. T his is no sur prise, given that Ghana has Africa’s fastest-g rowing economy and is one of its safest countries.6

Prominent African urban studies scholar Ato Quayson studies Oxford Street as a bustling commercial district and primar y example of globalization in Accra. In his research, he focuses on the impor tance of billboards and signs on Oxford Street and argues that their design, imag er y, and messaging point to the “cosmopolitan character of the street itself ” 7 Oxford Street’s cosmopolitan character can also be seen in its increasingly diverse and globalized food culture T he street hosts a wide variety of options, including Lebanese chocolateries, Kentuck y Fried Chicken, Italian pizzerias, and more T his cosmopolitan character appeals not only to native Ghanaian populations, but also immig rants and inter national travelers. A globalized market ref lects the desires of a globalizing city and population.

Although there is literature on Chinese cuisine overseas, cultural exchang e through food, and globalization in Accra, there is a research g ap as to how these phenomena intersect in Ghana’s capital. To address this g ap, this paper examines two displays at the forefront of Chinese restaurants: signs and menus. How do Chinese restaurant owners choose to re present Chinese culture in a globalizing Accra? To answer these questions, this paper examines the signs and menus of four Chinese restaurants with a considerable number of local Ghanaian customers as well as inter national travelers T hese Chinese restaurants are actively eng aging in transnationalism, linking tog ether their countr y of origin with their countr y of resettlement. In

6 Leigh, K aren “Accra, Ghana,” New York Times, Januar y 11, 2013, available at http://www nytimes com/interactive/2013/01/10/travel /2013-places-to-g o.html? r=0

7 Quayson, Ato. “Introduction: Urban T heor y and Perfor mative Streetscapes”, Oxford Street, Accra: City Life and the Itineraries of Transnationalism (Duke: Duke University Press, 2014), pp 1-36

discussing this process of transnationalism, this paper uses three different lenses. First, the inclusion of Chinese languag e and characters are used as a way to re present Chinese culture, creating a unique Chinese space in Accra for locals, immig rants, and inter national travelers to connect with. Second, multicultural and fusion menus re present reworking of ing redients and adaptations to the local food culture. Finally, the use of standardized imag er y of Chinese culture and cuisine increases accessibility for Accra residents Ultimately, these findings demonstrate that Ghanaian Chinese restaurants utilize signs and menus to maintain Chinese culture as well as adapt to a globalizing Accra.

Per specti ves on migra tion, food, and transna tionalism

Chinese cuisine overseas: r einvention and r e pr esentation

Before looking at moder n Chinese restaurants in Accra, it is impor tant to first understand the histor y of Chinese cuisine overseas. In the book The Globalization of Chinese Food, David Wu and Sidney Cheung examine the histor y and evolution of Chinese food outside of China. Chinese restaurants have emerg ed across the globe as early as the late 1800s, as new waves of Chinese emig rants from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian countries relocated to Nor th America, Australia, and Europe.8 Wu and Cheung argue that because most Chinese restaurant owners are self-taught cooks rather than professional chefs, “Chinese cuisine overseas demonstrated re-creation, invention and re presentation of cooking, especially in restaurants ” 9 Scholars Eug ene Anderson and Haiming Liu point specifically to the adaptation of ing redients and f lavor profiles as Chinese food is adapted to and fused with local taste

8 Wu, David YH, and Sidney CH Cheung "Improvising Chinese Cuisine Overseas " In T he Globalization of Chinese Food, pp 56 Routledg e, 2014 https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/ser ver/api/core/ bitstreams/a57067b1-f878-4a99-9b6e-6918901657d4/co ntent#pag e=79

9 Wu and Cheung, “Improvising Chinese Cuisine Overseas ”

palates. One prominent example of this adaptation can be seen in American Chinese cuisine. Tsap seui (雜碎, “miscellaneous leftovers”), a dish with meat, eg gs, and veg etables, can be traced back to Toisan, the origin of many early Chinese immig rants to America.10 When chop suey houses became popular in the U.S., chefs maintained the “miscellaneous leftovers” profile found in Toisan while changing the ing redients, f lavor, and method of pre paration in order to fit the American palate 11 As the Chinese diaspora adapts Chinese foods and menu items, Chinese cuisine is recreated and reimagined based on local contexts

Transnationalism: local and global exchanges

Scholarly literature also explores the impact of mig ration on local and global exchang es, specifically using the framework of transnationalism. Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton argue that we should understand immig rants as “transmig rants” eng aging in “transnationalism” as they mig rate to new countries. Transnationalism is the process by which “immig rants build social fields that link tog ether their countr y of origin and their countr y of settlement.” 12 For transmig rants, this often involves the creative reinter pretation of cultural practices.13 Michael Kear ney, an anthropolog y scholar, builds on this by noting that when transnational mig rants move to new countries, they create transnational

10 Anderson, Eug ene, N "Guangzhou (Canton) Cuisine", in Encyclopedia of Food and Culture, ed. Solomon H. K atz (New York: Scribner, 2003), http://g alenet g aleg roup com/ser vlet/eBooks?ste=22&d ocNum=CX3403499999&q=idaho s woodr ms

11 Liu, Haiming 2015 From Canton Restaurant to Panda Express : A Histor y of Chinese Food in the United States. Asian American Studies Today. New Br unswick, New Jersey: Rutg ers University Press

12 Glick Schiller, Nina, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton 1992 “Towards a Transnational Perspective on Mig ration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 645 (Januar y): 1–24

13 Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton, “Towards a Transnational Perspective on Mig ration ”

“hyperspaces” that have global qualities, rather than being strictly tied to the countr y of origin or countr y of resettlement.14 T hese hyperspaces can take the for m of air por ts, restaurants, and production sites where cultural f low occurs between locals, transmig rants, and visitors. As people mig rate to new places, they create spaces that both re present the global and assimilate to the local.

Food diaspora is a prominent example of this local and global exchang e. In the antholog y Food Consumption in Global Perspecti ve, Kowalcyk, Andrzej, and Derek point out that immig ration plays a direct role in the diversification of cuisine Due to mig ration and cosmopolitanism, foreign foods and local foods often interact with each other, making their way into each others’ menus and leading to a rise in popularity for “ethnic cuisines ” 15

Globalization in Accra

Transnationalism and diverse eating cultures can be seen in globalizing Accra. In his book Globaliz ing City: The Urban and Economic Transfor mation of Accra, Ghana, Richard Grant analyzes the effects of globalization in Accra, explaining the ways that inter national, transnational, and local forces shape the urban landscape of the city. Drawing on ten years of inter views and extensive fieldwork, Grant argues that Accra is being transfor med in place-specific ways as transnationalist spaces emerg e.16 Ato Quayson builds on this by focusing on signs, billboards, and inscriptions

14 Kear ney, M. 1995. “T he Local and the Global: T he Anthropolog y of Globalization and Transnationalism.”

Annual Review of Anthropolog y 24 (1): 547–65 https://doi org/10 1146/annurev an 24 100195 002555

15 White, Mer r y I 2017 “Klein, Jakob A & Anne Murcott (Eds). Food Consumption in Global Perspective: Essays in the Anthropolog y of Food in Honour of Jack Goody 230 Pp , Illus , Bibliog rs London: Palg rave, 2014 £68 00 (Cloth) ” Jour nal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 23 (3): 630–31

https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655.12661.

16 Grant, Richard. 2009. Globalizing City : T he Urban and Economic Transfor mation of Accra, Ghana Vol First edition Space, Place, and Society Syracuse, N Y : Syracuse University Press

on Oxford Street, Accra, writing that they are “translations of globalized signifiers onto the local cultural scene. ” 17

T he transnationalist signs that Quayson points out, as well as the transnationalist spaces that Grant describes, can be most prominently seen on Oxford Street. A quick scan of the bustling street will reveal not only cosmopolitan billboard signs and tro-tro inscriptions, but also the restaurant signs of Lebanese, American, Italian, Indian, and Chinese eateries. As diverse and transnational companies and restaurants pop up throughout Accra, their signag e can showcase how they re present global ideas in a local context.

T he next section will focus on signs and menus of Chinese restaurants in Ghana in order to understand the longstanding evolution of Chinese cuisine in the context of Accra’s cosmopolitan food culture. Ultimately, analyzing marketing methods as shown by signs and menus will give us key insight into what Chinese restaurant owners choose to put at the forefront in re presenting Chinese cuisine and culture, as well as how they adapt to the local context.

Anal ysis of Chinese restaurant signs and menus

Pearl Chinese, Tip Top, and Rice Xpress are all located on or near Oxford Street, a street in the most bustling commercial and cosmopolitan district of Accra.18 Tang Garden Restaurant is located inside of Tang Palace Hotel, a luxur y hotel which hosts a series of inter national travelers All of these restaurants are impor tant in this research because they host a diverse rang e of customers: Chinese Ghanaians, non-Chinese Ghanaians, and inter national travelers T his diverse customer base drives transnational motivations by Chinese restaurant owners, and the desire to

17 Quayson, Ato. “Introduction: Urban T heor y and Perfor mative Streetscapes”, Oxford Street, Accra: City Life and the Itineraries of Transnationalism (Duke: Duke University Press, 2014), pp 1-36

18 Ibid

re present Chinese cultures and fit into a globalized Accra in their signs and menus.

T he exhibit analysis will discuss this process of transnationalism using three different lenses: Chinese languag e as maintenance of Chinese culture, multiculturalism and fusion in menus, and standardized symbolism of Chinese culture.

Chinese language as maintenance of Chinese cultur e

In studying the marketing strategies of these Chinese restaurants, this section first identifies the way they use languag e in their signs and menus Languag e is key in understanding cultural re presentations, as it ties tog ether a community of people and set of customs 19 By including Chinese languag e on signs, restaurant owners g enerate and maintain an atmosphere of Chinese culture

Jennifer Leeman and Gabriella Modan have developed frameworks to analyze the use of Chinese languag e in signs, par ticularly as seen in Chinatown. T hey argue that the use of Chinese languag e signs is multipur pose: “for Chinese readers, the signs provide impor tant infor mation about the establishment [...], and for those who don’t read Chinese, the signs add an air of ethnic authenticity.”20

T his phenomenon can be examined in the posters displayed in Rice Xpress. Rice Xpress is a small Chinese fast food restaurant on Oxford Street, where you walk into a square room with tables, chairs, and a counter to order food. On the walls, there are a series of posters with statements about eating and food, with Chinese and English translations One poster has the Chinese messag e, “chi de shi xiang yige dipingxian shang meiyou r enhe xianzhi” (吃的是像

and then right below it, the English translation,

19 Jiang, Wenying 2000 “T he Relationship between Culture and Languag e ” ELT Jour nal 54 (4): 328–34

https://doi org/10 1093/elt/54 4 328

20 Leeman, Jennifer, and Gabriella Modan. 2009.

“Commodified Languag e in Chinatown: A Contextualized Approach to Linguistic Landscape1 ”

Jour nal of Sociolinguistics 13 (3): 332–62

https://doi org/10 1111/j 1467-9841 2009 00409 x

线上，没有任何限制)

“EATING IS LIKE A HORIZON THERE’S

restaurant sign. On a larg e billboard outside, it URANT,”

Chinese restaurant.”

Chinese text, to the translation, it is not to but to authenticity and not only but it is includes sign. acebook

about the impor tance of eating and food, presented in both English and Chinese. Here, Rice Xpress owners could have easily just displayed English-languag e posters about the impor tance of eating and food. However, they intentionally put both English and Chinese in order to appeal to Chinese readers, as well as non-Chinese readers. T he presence of Chinese translations, despite the fact that the majority of Ghanaians do not read or speak Chinese, g enerates an atmosphere of Chinese culture. T his ser ves to maintain a sense of Chinese culture, while also connecting to residents and presenting a unique transnational culinar y experience

We can also see the presence of both English and Chinese on Tip Top Chinese’s

Multiculturalism and fusion in menus

Next, it is impor tant to examine the menu options presented in these Chinese restaurants. Food can offer insight into the adaptation of ing redients and dishes, and showcase how mig rants integ rate elements of their countr y of origin’s cuisine with their countr y of settlement. According to the hybridization theor y, cultural for ms become se parated from existing practices, but rather than completely disappearing they simply recombine with new for ms 21 T hus, hybridization, fusion, and multiculturalism in menu options are a valuable avenue in

呱中国

21 Pieterse, Jan Neder veen 2013 “Globalization as Hybridization ” In Sociolog y of Globalization Routledg e

understanding the processes of transnationalism, especially as seen in this case study.

A g ood example of this is Pearl Chinese Restaurant, which has made considerable chang es to its menu over time When it opened

In the chang e of these signs, we can see the adaptation to the local food culture of Accra, where Indian and Lebanese cuisine offerings are also incredibly popular. It is clear then, that Pearl Chinese not only seeks to present Chinese cuisine, but also provides more multicultural and diverse food choices. T he shift to a more multicultural cuisine can also be obser ved in their menus. In Figure 5, we can see many traditional Chinese dishes like haoyou shengcai (蚝油生菜, “lettuce in oyster sauce”) and fanqie chao dan (番茄炒蛋, “scrambled eg gs with tomato sauce”). In Figure 6 however, there is a clear shift. T he text says “Available At PEARL CHINESE RESTAURANT” and beside it are three imag es of Indian food with the text “Pani Puri,” “Paneer K athi Roll,” and “Chicken K athi Roll.” In these signs and men the wners of Pearl Chinese Restaurant made

Figure sign 2021, text: “PEARL CHINESE RESTAURANT + INDIAN & LEBANESE FOOD ” (Source: Camille Luong)

Figure (Source: pag

When examining Tang Garden Restaurant’s menu, we can see a similar phenomenon, with both non-Chinese offerings and Chinese fusion with other cuisines In Figure 7, we can see the chongcao hua dun lao ya tang (虫草花炖老鸭汤, “Chinese dish duck soup with cordyce ps f lower”), as well as the Chinese dish fish maw soup now offered in tai shi yudu geng (泰式鱼肚羹, “T hai style”).

mono-cultural, but ref lect the food diversity and cosmopolitanism of Accra.

Standardiz ed symbolism of Chinese cultur e

Finally, it is key to look at the standard symbols of Chinese culture present on these menus and signs. David Wu noted that Chinese restaurants utilize their presentation and adver tising to emphasize an imag e of Chinese culture.22 T he use of standardized symbols point to a desire to not only maintain Chinese culture, but also connect with Accra residents and their existing understandings of Chinese culture

In the sign outside of Tip Top Chinese (see Figure 2), there is a picture of four different Chinese dishes: dumplings, noodles, Chinese broccoli, and a type of meat. T he choice to include iconic Chinese dishes on the sign points to a recognizable imag e of cuisine, one that is identifiable by Accra residents. However, when examining the symbols on the Rice Xpress log o, we see a more complicated situation arise. In the center of the log o, there is a man with a conical hat, slanted eyes, and a mustache. Here, rather than just using canonical food options as symbols, they are using stereotypical caricatures of Chinese people.

Overall, the multicultural and fusion options in the menus of these Chinese restaurants showcases an active effor t to not only present Chinese cuisine offerings, but also adapt to the taste palates of their customers in a globalizing city. T hese menus are not

22 Wu, David YH, and Sidney CH Cheung "Improvising Chinese Cuisine Overseas." In T he Globalization of Chinese Food, pp. 56. Routledg e, 2014. https://scholarspace manoa hawaii edu/ser ver/api/core/ bitstreams/a57067b1-f878-4a99-9b6e-6918901657d4/co ntent#pag e=79

Figure 6. 2021 Pearl Chinese Restaurant adver tisement, focusing on Indian food offerings (Source: Pearl Chinese Restaurant Facebook pag e)

Figure 7. Por tion of Tang Garden Restaurant menu. (Source: Tang Garden Restaurant TripAdvisor pag e)

obser ved in this log o have a long histor y, par ticularly of being used in racist and problematic ways A prime example of this would be when the U.S g over nment instituted the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, explicitly prohibiting immig ration from the countr y of

China.23 In the following 1870 newspaper car toon, the car toonist has de picted Chinese people with conical hats and slanted eyes in an effor t to otherize them and emphasize their status as foreigners in the US.

It is impor tant to acknowledg e the histor y and usag e of these Chinese caricatures. However, Michelle Abate argues that while we can and should recognize the racist histor y of these caricatures, we should also acknowledg e that they can be used to communicate a cer tain visual g rammar 24 For Rice Xpress owners, rather than using this imag er y for the pur pose of alienating and ostracizing Chinese people, they are demonstrating a par ticular visual g rammar and drawing on standardized imag er y

23 “Chinese Exclusion Act (1882).” 2021. National Archives. September 8, 2021.

https://www archives g ov/milestone-documents/chinese -exclusion-act

24 Abate, Michelle Ann "T he Yellow Kid and T he Yellow Peril: RF Outcault’s Comics Series, Asian Caricature, and Chinese Exclusion."

https://imag etextjour nal com/the-yellow-kid-and-the-yel low-peril-r-f-outcaults-comics-series-asian-caricature-andchinese-exclusion/

Figure 10. “T hrowing Down the Ladder by Which T hey Rose.” (Source: T homas Nast, Har per's Weekly, July 23, 1870)

of Chinese people, one that is recognizable by Accra residents.

T hus, Accra’s Chinese restaurants include a wide variety of symbols of Chinese culture. Some restaurants choose to standardize the symbolism to a few iconic foods, and other restaurants draw on stereotypical visual de pictions of Chinese people. In both instances, an effor t is being made to present an idea of Chinese culture that is familiar and recognizable to Ghanaians. Subsequently, they are able to connect with Accra residents and adapt to the food scene of Accra.

Conclusion

T his paper seeks to address the research g ap between Chinese cuisine overseas, transnationalism, and globalization in Accra. Using three se parate lenses, this paper produces three conclusions. First, restaurant owners of Chinese restaurants in Accra include Chinese languag e and characters to create a unique, transnational space in Accra, for Chinese locals, immig rants, and inter national travelers to connect with. Second, the presence of multiculturalism and hybridization showcased reworking of ing redients and adaptations to the local food culture. Finally, the standardization of symbols of Chinese culture exhibited an active effor t to connect with local Accra residents and adapt to the food scene of Accra.

Ultimately, these findings demonstrate that Ghanaian Chinese restaurants utilize signs and menus to maintain Chinese culture as well as adapt to fit into a globalizing Accra. T his case study highlights the Chinese diaspora, and how these individuals choose to re present their culture as well as eng ag e in processes of transnationalism. Additionally, this study identifies Accra as a prime example of a burg eoning globalizing city in the world. As Chinese cuisine evolves based on Accra’s local context, so do conce ptions of Chinese culture and the fabric of Accra itself Moving forward, scholars can continue the conversation and future research through ethnog raphy work with restaurant owners and customers

T his case study shows the power of transnationalism in a world where cities are rapidly globalizing and people are constantly moving. Rather than understanding mig rants as actors uprooted from their homeland and painfully tr ying to assimilate, we can star t to understand them as culturally creative, constantly eng aging in reinvention in order to maintain their countr y of origin’s practices while also adapting to their new countr y of resettlement. In doing so, we see that members of diaspora not only re present their own cultures, but also create unique spaces that positively contribute to the cosmopolitanism and character of a city.