SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL
VOLUME 21 . NUMBER 3 . SEPTEMBER 1967 230 PARK AVENUE¡ NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
MILITARY OCCUPATIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE: A CONfERENCE HELD IN NEW YORK, APRIL 20-22, 1967* by llobert E. YVard POLITICAL change, especially under the rubric of "political development," has become a constant and urgent concern of governments and scholars in both developed and developing societies throughout the world. Although academic studies of the processes involved are increasing in number and improving in quality, for the most part we still lack a sufficient range of reliable data, properly distributed over the spectrum of relevant problems, to permit the formulation of any generally accepted theory of political change or development. This problem is being attacked from various angles, however. The specific interest of the conference was the postwar military occupations of Germany and Japan as major examples of a particular type of planned political change. The concern of the participants was primarily with the United States' role in planning and bringing about this sort of change. The principal question posed was: "What can a comparative study of these two cases contribute to our general knowledge of the process of planned political change?" RESEARCH ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE TWO CASES Viewed from this standpoint, the German and Japanese cases possess both advantages and disadvantages for • The conference was conducted by the Council's Committee on Comparative Politics. Its organization and agenda were described briefly in Items, June 1967, page 17. A selection of papers prepared for the conference will be published in the 1968 issue of Public Policy (yearbook published by Harvard University Press), edited by John D. Montgomery. The author of this report is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan, a member of the board of directors of the Council, and of the Committee on Comparative Politics.
research. On the negative side, for instance, at least the following points should be taken into account: The circumstances of both occupations were unusual, and it is questionable that they are likely to recur in substantially similar conditions. In studying them, therefore, we are dealing with an extreme rather than a central type, with what might be called in theoretical terms "a limiting case." In both instances, furthermore, it is very hard to distinguish the effects of causes endogenous to the two occupations' planned endeavors to democratize these societies from the effects of exogenous factors. We have in mind particularly questions as to how many of the political changes that emerged in postwar Germany and Japan were the result in whole or in part of indigenous initiatives and causes rather than of planning or action by the occupying forces. In both the German and Japanese cases, also, the complex and overlapping quality of the planning process, the diffusion of actual as opposed to formal responsibility for planning and implementation, and the generalized terms in which goals were frequently expressed make it difficult to assess the relationship between advance or central planning and what actually occurred. One suspects that a good deal of what happened was more the result of individual or local initiative and ad hoc experimentation than of any over-all planning process. Again, the German and Japanese cases do not really represent an adequate sample of the universe concerned, that is, of major exemplars of experiments in planned political change conducted under the auspices of military occupations. The two cases are biased in considerable part toward the democratic variant of this type.
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