Logical system of madhvacharya by dr s srikanta sastri (www srikanta sastri org)

Logical System of Madhvacharya

Dr S. Srikanta Sastri

Logical System of Madhvacharya by

S. Srikantha Sastri, Mysore If psychology is a science of mental phenomena, characterised by the pursuance of future ends and of the choice of means for their attainments, it is the special function of logic to concern itself with the problems of truth and error. The realistic schools admitting enduring objects and cognitions hold that all knowledge is intrinsically right, except in the case of contradiction or deficiency. The extremely idealistic schools however assert that all knowledge is intrinsically unreliable and only subsequently by re-cognition becomes reliable1. As perhaps the last great exponent of realism and theism in India, Sri Madhvãcãrya's system of logic as expounded in his Pramana laksana may be compared with other systems.

Madhvãcãrya starts with a definition of Pramana as "corresponding to the object" 2. This terse definition implies the reality of the object, a cognition corresponding to the object and a valid means of attaining such cognition. Thus it can be distinguished from doubt and otherness. As a contrast the Buddhist definition of Pramana as efficacious knowledge 3 applies to the ultimate reality which is momentary (svalakshana, ksana). The Buddhists stipulate that uncontradicted experience is the source of right knowledge, and this right knowledge depends on sensation, not conception4. The Mimasaka definition of pramana5 as a means of right knowledge is from Madhva's point of view also defective. The Bhattas urge that in the cognitions "this is a pot", "the pot is known", and "the pot is revealed" there is a sequence and hence the first leads to the second. Since such cognition of the thing is primary, there are no defects of illusion. But Madhva urges that right cognition is knowledge only and does not exclusively depend upon the object. In the statement “the pot is known", the pot was manifest, but, it is the knowledge alone that is revealed due to the attribute of the object cognised.

Therefore we arrive at the statement "the pot is known" and such a proposition is not valid regarding the cognisability which is an attribute of the object. Therefore knowledge alone becomes manifest as the object's quality and hence is not different as another thing like right knowledge.

Another Mimamsaka view of right knowledge is that it is the knowledge of the object hitherto undetermined and the means of obtaining such right knowledge is pramana6. This definition is also defective because the right knowledge of the known is excluded and there is no evidence for the assertion that valid knowledge of the previously cognised object is invalid and its means also as invalid. Then if it is objected that all memory which depends upon the previously cognised object should be accepted as valid, it is not so, because of selectivity. The Prabhakaras assert that experience alone is valid knowledge and do not accept the validity of memory7. Knowledge is of two kinds: experience and memory, the latter is born of the previous experience 8 and since error is possible, the view that experience alone constitutes right knowledge cannot stand.

If we accepted the Naiyayika view of pramana as the means to the best experience (samyag anubhava9), God's knowledge will be excluded as it does not depend on experience. To determine the www.srikanta-sastri.org

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Logical System of Madhvacharya

Dr S. Srikanta Sastri

validity of knowledge, valid means is necessary. This is the witness (Saksin) without which all knowledge would become false. If however it is urged that all knowledge is not necessarily false, because some other means might be accepted, it leads to infinite regress. In this witness-revelation the nature of experience is as "I know myself ''. This witness-knowledge is knowledge only and not its means. If memory is rejected as leading to error, then a statement like "this was experienced by me" will be futile.

If it is further urged that the validity of memory depends upon the mark (linga) due to previous experience and becomes a means for future experience and hence a statement "this was experienced by me" does not become useless, there arises the fault of too much assumption10. Memory is taken as the mark in experience and experience is taken as the mark in previous experience.

Further, sense-perception will cease to be a separate means of valid cognition. If the existence of the mark is indispensable for the validity of memory, because of the same mark, validity should be asserted of sense-perception also. But is memory is classed as inference, sense-perception also should be classed as such.

To get rid of this absurdity P.ra1a!-.l should be defined as "corresponding to the (defectless) object". This implies two aspects "' just as it exists" and "as manifesting the object of cognition"11.

Therefore knowledge is not of only two kinds (memory and experience), since there are also doubt, other-ness etc. experienced by us12.

Sense-perception according to, Madhva is of seven varieties depending on the Saksin and the six senses. The witness-perception is of the nature of the self and of knowledge and has for its objects the nature of the self, bliss, nescience, happiness and misery, unmodified space, time etc. The witnessknowledge is always, valid and reveals only the specific and not the causal. Whereas the Naiyayikas divided sense-perception into nirvikalpaka and Sarvikalpaka and the Buddhists recognised nirvikalpaka as the only valid perception. Madhva rejects Nirvikalpaka. He holds that attributes are neither entirely separate nor devoid of particularity, from the substance. Therefore in all perception there is the cognition of the attribute. Since this is perceived by the witness, it should be Sarvikalpa only.

Mental perception is also indirect because memory arises from it. As that memory is due to previous experience it does not directly depend upon the mind. The difference between memory and recognition lies in the fact that the former can sometimes function independently of the five senses and that the latter is due to previous experience functioning through the five senses. But both depend upon the mind allied with previous experience and hence can be classed as sense-perceptions.

The validity of memory is proved by the witness experience. The Prabhakaras deny the value of memory and subsequent statement (anuvada), as means of knowledge. They assert that memory merely manifests what was previously experienced and anuvada is a statement of the meaning previously adduced by other means of knowledge. But Madhva replies that both are corresponding to the object13. If the object does not exist at the experienced time and place, the cognition is not valid.

But if at the time of cognising there is no object, that knowledge is not necessarily invalid. Memory however is related to a qualified object in its previous condition as in the statement. "This object was www.srikanta-sastri.org

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Logical System of Madhvacharya

Dr S. Srikanta Sastri

thus at that time and place�14. That previous condition being real, its remembrance is valid. If it is asserted that memory cognises an object not previously experienced, then all past and future experiences would be futile. In the experience of the sage (Yogi pratyaksa), that peculiar quality born of mental discipline (Yoga) forms the connecting link 15. The mind uniting with past experience 16 cognises the previous condition. Just ai the knowledge of silver arises from the eye associated with colour defect, so also memory arises. Hence memory is proved by the witness experience.

Inference17 may be defined as a process which makes known an object not present, in the past or future; or as that which reveals an if object only according to other means of knowledge ; or as that which has the mark free from defects. Dinnaga defined inference as a cognition of an object through its mark and Vasubandhu as the consequence of a previously noticed inseparable connection between two objects18. Therefore the mark (linga) implies concommitance (sahacarya, avinabhava, vyapti) 19.

To the Buddhist inference is only of the general, that is, it depends upon conception and not upon pure sensation which cognises only the particular and momentary (svalksana ksana). Concommitance may be immediate or mediate. If it is immediate, it has the hetu and sadhya (middle and major terms); if mediate, in its turn it implies the immediate. The Naiyayikas divide vyapti into three, the purely affirmative (kevalanvayi), the purely negative (kevala vyatireki) and concomitance (anvaya vyatireki).

The Mimamsakas and Vedantins reject the purely negative (kevala vyatireki) but accept implication (arthapatti). Madhva also accepts only the purely affirmative (kevalanvayi linga) and concommitance (anvaya vyatirekhi) since Kevala vyatireki (purely negative) is indirect and hence also arthapatti (presumption) may be included in sense-perception and inference.

The validity of inference depends upon two factors, the concommitance between middle and major terms, and upon the minor term delimiting the hetu (paksadharmata) according to the Naiyayikas20. But Madhva contends that whereas vyapti is indispensible, paksadharmata is not, as in the syllogism "the higher region is rainy because the rivers in the lower region are full". Secondly, whereas the older Naiyayikas employed the ten membered syllogism and the later Naiyayikas only the five membered, Dinnaga retained only two, the general rule including the example and the application including the conclusion21. In the inference for others (pararthanumana) the Buddhist says that only two, drstanta and upanaya are enough. Madhva like the Vedantins and Mimamsakas recognises the three, pratijna, hetu and drstanta. But there is no invariable rule that only so many should be employed. In fact as many as are necessary to convince the other person may be employed.

The logical fallacies can broadly be classed as contradictory (virodha) and irrelevant (asangata) or as pramana virodha and svavacanavirodha (including chala or asangati). The Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas had five classes Savyabhicara or Anaikantika, Viruddha, Satpratipaksa or prakarana sama, Asiddha and badhita or kalatita. Madhva divides manavirodha into three varieties according to pratijna, hetu and dstanta. The counter-proposition (satpratipaksa or prakarana sama) may be included in pratijnavirodha. Dinnaga according to the position of the reason worked out nine possible positions, two being right and the seven being the fallacies of the hetu. Out of these seven two are viruddhas and five are sandigdha or anaikantika. Apart from these, Dinnaga recognises satpratipaksa22. Dharmakirti rejected it but introduced two Buddhist dogmas, that of the omniscience of the Buddha and of the soul, which are beyond logic. www.srikanta-sastri.org

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Dr S. Srikanta Sastri

Sva-vakya virodha is divided by Madhva into unproved conclusion (apa-siddhanta) and futile rejoinder (jati). The latter may also be considered as manavirodha. The Naiyayikas recognise twentythree kinds of jati, and each jati has seven parts. But Madhva classifies jatis as opposed to one’s own word or action or self. Casuistry (chala) as usually divided into vak, samanya, and upacara may also be included in svavacanavirodha. The twenty - four nigrahsthanas of the Tarkikas are also included in virodha and asangata.

In katha defeat is in curbing the pride of the opponent by destroying the pratijna, refuting the opponent's argument and establishing one's own thesis (svasiddhisadhanam, para siddherdusanam) 23, Further divisions of inference as purvavat, sesavat and samanyato drsta have been reduced by Madhva to two, Drsta and samanyato drsta.

The third pramana recognised by Madhva is the scripture. It is defined as that which without depending on any other means reveals things; which is the best revealer of objects beyond the senses, which is the word without defect24, The defects of the word are seven: (1) not revealing, (2) revealing a contrary, (3) revealing the already known, (4) useless, (5) useless from one's own point of view, (6) including the impossible, (7) teaching a hard way when there is an easier one. The import of the word is the natural connection between the sound and its meaning26, whereas the Naiyyayikas hold that the import is due to the will of God. Further Madhva thinks that between the universal and the particular, the particular alone is the meaning of the word. Similarity is the instrumental cause, because in this view, though there is no one universal in all particulars, a knowledge of the import is possible in the innumerable particulars.

Madhvacarya does not recognise upamana, arthapatti and anupalabdhi as separate means as these can be included in sense-perception and inference. So also Sambhava and Parisesa can be included in inference.

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Pramanyam paratah.

Yathartham pramanam.

Prapakam Jnanam. pramanam-avisamvadi, arthakriya-samarthya-laksanam-vastu-paramartha-sat Pramakaranam Ajnata parichhitti Anubhuti anadhigatarthadhigantr Manasapratyaksaja smrtih Samyag anubhava sadhanam Lingatvena pramanye kalpana-gauravam Yathavasthita and jneya visayikari Smrti pramana dvaividhya kalpane mithya-jnanadeh Nirasadanubhava Virodhah Yatharthatvanubahavat.

Manasam taddhi vijnanam tacca Sakshipramanakam (Anuvyakhyana) Memory is proved by the witness experience 15. Pratya satti; Sambandha.

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Logical System of Madhvacharya

Dr S. Srikanta Sastri

16. Samskara.

17. Anasanna-atita-anagata-vyavahita-artha-gocaram; pramanantara nu sarane naiva artha pramapakam; nirdosopapattih.

18. Anantariyakartha darsanam tadvido numanam (Vada vidhi).

19. Trirupallingallingani jnanam anumanam (Dharmottara) Anumanan lingadartha darsanam.

20. Paksa dharmatvam, sapakse sattvam, vipaskecasattvam (Nyaya Pravesa) 21. Atmapratyayanartham tu pratyaksanumanam ca dveeda pramane. But the Yogacarya Bhumi Sastra and Abhidharma Sangiti Sastra recognise three. Sthira mati and Haribhadra also recognise three pramanas.

22. TCHERBATSKY: Buddhist Logic.

23. Cp. Sadhanam dusanam caiva sabhasam para samvide Pratyaksam anumanam ca sabhasamtvatma samvide. (Nyaya Pravesa) 24. Svatantryena-asesartha-visaya; samyag-atindriyartha-avagamaka; nirdosa sabda.

25. Svabhavika vacya vacaka rupa sambandha

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