Issue 1 • 2008
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In This Issue
SP’s
A SP GUIDE
LandForces T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s
Procuring Ultra Light Howitzer heralds the beginning of artillery modernisation plans for the Indian Army. But efforts at indigenous manufacture remain shrouded in doubt.
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P U B L I C AT I O N
LT GENERAL (RETD) RANJIT ? NAGRA
EEddiitorial torial Potentially destabilising developments in India’s immediate neighbourhood demand a close scrutiny. Assassination on December 27, 2007 of prime ministerial candidate Benazir Bhutto, who had promised to neutralise extremist elements in Pakistan, followed by large scale violence and postponement of elections to February 18 convulsed the nation. Inconclusive election results, thereafter, have failed to win public confidence as it threw up a coalition of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) with former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s party PML-N. The only ostensible reason for the unlikely camaraderie between the duo would be to oust President Pervez Musharraf. They might even restore the judiciary, thereby reinstating the functions of the Supreme Court. Among the priorities of the new government would be the onerous tasks of improving upon the economy, restoration of media’s freedom and negotiating peace with tribal leaders to restore a semblance of a stable democracy in a feudal nation. It would be pertinent to keep in mind that Islamabad has in the past encouraged growth of the radical variety of Islam and the terrorist groups holed up in the western provinces bordering Afghanistan and in the east in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Evidently, the strategy of a calibrated proxy war against Afghanistan and India through sponsored non-state actors will not work any longer as the State stands exposed internationally. India’s larger neighbour in the Northeast is faced with an ironical situation over the violent uprising in Tibet Autonomous Region. Latest reports indicate the fighting has now spilled over from Tibet into neighbouring provinces, with the Dalai Lama issuing a warning that the region is facing a cultural genocide and appealing to the world for help. The satire shines through when viewed in the light of Beijing’s oft repeated claims on the neighbouring Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. For China, the timing couldn’t have been worse. Violence erupted even as the nation has been gearing up for the start of Olympic celebrations due in two weeks with the commencement of the torch relay which is to pass through Tibet. China’s communist government has been harbouring hopes of boosting its popularity at home and abroad by hosting the Olympics from August 8 to 24. The turmoil in Tibet, however, has put a cloud on its aspirations.
LT GENERAL (RETD) (Retd) PRAN V.K. PAHWA Lt General Kapoor
Finance Minister P. Chidambaram’s assurance that needs of the Indian armed forces would be provided for has come under a cloud as defence allocation for 2008-09 dipped below 2 per cent of the GDP.
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Prosj epcetc tRi veep o r t Per
Left-wing extremism, alternatively termed as Maoist insurgency or Naxalite violence, has emerged as a grave threat to India’s internal security, undermining the process of nation building.
LT GENERAL (RETD) ? V.K. KAPOOR
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? KUMAR SINGH AMIT
Photographs: Sharad Saxena
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Main Battle Tank
Hard Lessons
T-90s out in full force at the Republic Day parade
Lack of coordination and understanding between the Army, the DRDO and other agencies concerned continues to beset the Indian Army leading to inefficient resource management RAHUL BEDI
T
he Indian Army’s (IA) ambitious main battle tank (MBT) programme is in a state of flux. Military planners believe this present state-of-affairs to be impinging adversely on the country’s operational preparedness. All components of the MBT programme—be it the overall MBT acquisition, development and modernisation to equip 59 armoured regiments—continues to be riven by indecision, insensitivity, bureaucratic delays and inefficiencies. All it reveals is inferior strategic planning, poor coordination between the Army, Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Director General Ordnance Factories (DGOF), apart from inefficient resource management.
Flawed Policies
Not surprisingly retired senior army officers
are questioning the army’s flawed equipment policies, which they claim are not only uneconomical and inefficient, but largely neglected as well. “Given the army’s emphasis on low intensity conflict, its long term armour induction policy and related modernisation programmes have been neglected at the highest levels and have slipped badly” says Brigadier Arun Sahgal, a former armoured corps officer who is presently Deputy Director, Research, in the United Service Institutions Centre for Strategic Studies in Delhi. India, he declared, had the ‘rare distinction’ of concurrently running three separate MBT production lines but that an honest assessment of their efficacy augured ill for the fighting capability of the army’s armoured units. Fact is, our army at present lacks the night fighting capability and so it’s a matter of great
urgency that our armoured regiments, some of which still operate retrofitted T 55’s and the older vintage T-72s are promptly replaced with T90S’s and upgraded T72M1’s. Besides, they must also be equipped with full and partial solution fire control systems (FCS’) that would give them the night fighting capability they sorely need. Currently, the army operates two types of Russian-origin MBTs-the ‘Ajeya T72M1 built locally under licence by the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi near Chennai and the ‘Bhishma’ T90S series of which 310 were imported in 2001 for around $700 million (Rs 2,830 crore). Of these, 124 T 90S MBTs-of which the Indian army was the first overseas customer-were acquired in completed form and the remaining 186 were assembled by the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi, Chennai.
EDITOR
1/2008 SP’S LAND FORCES
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