august-September 2011
SP’s
Volume 6 No 4
AN SP GUIDE
`100.00 (India-based Buyer only)
P U B L I C AT I O N
ROUNDUP
www.spsnavalforces.net
PAGe 3
cover story
Net-centricity to Ne(x)t-Centricity the time has come to ask questions about how to deliver tangible benefits in the context of network-centric operations. these are not technology-related questions but questions about employment of security forces in a network-centric paradigm as opposed to the platform-centric paradigm that they have historically engaged in.
Need for a Comprehensive and
Concerted Approach
PhotograPh: Navantia
Commander (Retd) Devbrat Chakraborty
PAGe 6
Flexible and Long-Range the Barak surface-to-air missile system was designed to replace or complement gunbased close-in-weapon system platforms, such as the Phalanx. the missiles are mounted in an eight cell container, which requires less maintenance and are launched vertically. Rear Admiral (Retd) Sushil Ramsay
PAGe 8
China’s Aircraft Carrier Project there is enough evidence to indicate that china is expected to have an operational carrier by 2015 which will use a ski ramp. there is also a possibility of china building two nuclear powered aircraft carriers though the veracity of these reports is questionable. Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand
PAGe 10
Tension Boils Over the Narrow Waters It is the major route for importing energy and exporting goods for the east Asian countries. singapore and Hong Kong have become major global economic hubs. conflicting territorial claims, piracy, poaching and threat from terrorism have become a matter of concern for all sea-faring nations of the region. It also has large amount of hydrocarbon resources which has also escalated regional conflicts. Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand
PAGe 12
Indigenously Designed Warship
chief of the Naval staff, Admiral Nirmal verma commissioned satpura, the second stealth frigate of the shivalik class, into the Indian Navy.
PLUS First / TecKnow News in Brief
13 14
Scorpene class submarine
No nation can afford a gap of 30 years between inductions of submarines; a weapon platform whose optimum operational life span is about the same. The situation cannot be further compounded by not keeping the available assets combat worthy. n COMMODORE (RETD) C.P. SRIVASTAVA
T
here was a News report in april this year that the Indian Government is in active discussions with Germany to upgrade the existing fleet of four howaldtswerke-Deutsche werft (hDw); also known as the shishumar class submarines. It is understood that this was one of the critical issues discussed during the fifth Indo-German Defence Committee meeting at New Delhi. The same news item went on to elaborate that due to delays in the ongoing Project 75 (scorpene project), the government has decided to upgrade not only the shishumar class but also the russian origin Kilo class, known as the sindhughosh class. while this does indicate that the problem of depleting submarine force levels is well understood by the ‘think tank’ and decision-makers, such realisation though essential, is neither sufficient nor a guaran-
tee that the problem at hand will be resolved. For that we require a ‘do tank’—a dedicated team which is multifunctional, multidisciplinary, suitably empowered and unambiguously responsible for the entire upgradation and modernisation programme and any other step which may be considered suitable to mitigate the enormity of the problem.
Submarine Perspective Plan around 1997-98, the Naval headquarters initiated the process of preparing a comprehensive paper highlighting the need for a long-term perspective towards augmenting and sustaining a submarine force level. Termed as the 30-Year submarine Perspective Plan, it envisaged, among things, two distinct indigenous production lines which were to (at least initially) build submarines which ‘could’ be of two different origins/ designs. The delivery schedule of the new submarines was to be dovetailed with the phasing out of the existing shishumar and
sindhughosh classes of submarines. This would have ensured that the minimum submarine force levels as dictated by the operational planners, was always available. In November 2002, the paper was approved by the Cabinet Committee on security (CCs) and the Navy was assured of budgetary support. The two distinct submarine designs which were to be simultaneously (or at least near-simultaneously) built, were christened as Project 75 and Project 75(I). while the former was to utilise the infrastructure available at the Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL), an appropriate shipyard (public or privately owned) was to be identified and developed for the second production line.
Current Status Project 75: In 2005, the Government of India signed a contract worth $4.6 billion (`21,100 crore) with DCNs, France, for building six scorpene class submarines at MDL. The first submarine was ‘assured’ to
4/2011
1