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Power Play

Let’s Dance Together As two large countries with a shared border and a long history of peaceful coexistence, the Governments of China and India have a responsibility towards their own people and the people of Asia. Both can and must work together in the interest of peace, stability and the future prosperity of Asia. ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

In a quarter of a century from today, China may just end up placing its military and diplomatic force to be able to affirm more power and influence than it is today, with a greater propensity to assert itself on issues and project power far beyond its shores Dr Monika Chansoria PAGE 5 The Ultimate Victory While there is a global fascination for China, the supremacy of the US soft power is gradually being challenged Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor PAGE 10 An Unquestionable Act AFSPA is not and cannot be a solution to our internal security caused by ethnic, social and governance problems. With changed political and operational circumstances, it may be desirable to review the Act; more importantly its application Viewpoint By General (Retd) V.P. Malik


Strategic Stability, Tactical Aggressiveness

PLUS Cyber Threat From China Showcasing Advanced Tech Technologies & Systems to Protect the Frontiers Viewpoint: The Elephant is Bumbling Act Fast Avoid Delays First & Exercise News in Brief

7 8 11 12 14 16 18 19

China and India, both Asian giants and emerging world powers, have begun to exercise immense influence in international political and economic affairs. As China’s GDP is much larger than that of India, it enjoys a correspondingly greater international clout at present. Political and economic relations between India and China are much better now than these have ever been since the 1962 border war between the two countries. Mutual economic dependence is growing rapidly every year, with bilateral trade increasing at a brisk pace. Even though it is skewed in China’s favour, bilateral trade has crossed $50 billion (`2,25,500 crore) and is expected to touch $60 billion (`2,70,000 crore) soon. If India’s trade with Hong Kong is included, China is already India’s largest trading partner. However, growth in the strategic and security relationship has not kept pace with the political and economic relationship. De-

spite prolonged negotiations at the political level to resolve the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute between the two countries, there has been little progress on this sensitive issue. China has a clandestine nuclear warheads-ballistic missiles-military hardware technology transfer relationship with Pakistan that causes apprehension in India. Also, in recent years, China appears to have raised the ante by way of its shrill political rhetoric, frequent transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and unprecedented cyber attacks on Indian networks. The security relationship has the potential to act as a spoiler in the larger relationship and will ultimately determine whether the two Asian giants will clash or cooperate for mutual gains. Arguably, while the India-China relationship is relatively stable at the strategic level, China’s political, diplomatic and military aggressiveness at the tactical level is acting as a dampener. In its annual report to the US Congress on China’s military power, the Pentagon has revealed that the Second Artillery, China’s strategic missile force, has deployed

long-range CSS-5 (DF-21) nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles close to the Indian borders. It has also been widely reported that China has agreed to provide two new nuclear reactors to Pakistan in violation of its non-proliferation commitments and in complete disregard of the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines. The “all-weather” friendship between China and Pakistan is in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans”. Under a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourly Relations, signed during Premier Wen Jiabao’s 2005 tour, China has guaranteed Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Had it not been for the cover provided by its nuclear shield, an internally unstable and economically failing Pakistan would have been in no position to wage a proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere through its mercenary terrorists. The Chinese are engaged in building ports, roads, gas pipelines and even dams in Pakistan, including in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Chinese also have plans




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C H I N A F O CU S COV E R STO R Y It was quite amusing to read recent media reports on the Air Chief’s statement that 50 per cent of the Indian Air Force (IAF) systems and equipment were obsolete. A newspaper report termed this as a “startling revelation”. Either our honourable fourth estate is totally ignorant about matters military or their comprehension is weak because what the Air Chief revealed is known to the strategic community for the past nine years or so. The request for information (RFI) for the so-called 126 aircraft deal was issued in 2001 and even today it is not known by when this deal will be finalised and by when will the combat aircraft start coming into the country. The strength of the IAF has been reduced by more than eight strike squadrons, at a time when the operational challenges and threats in India have increased exponentially and this news has been in circulation for many years. The inefficiency of our current procurement system will ensure that at least another decade will go by the time the new aircraft are absorbed in the IAF. The Indian Navy is in a better position than the rest though their submarine fleet stands diminished. In this context, the

state of procurement for the Indian Army is quite startling. The army air defence systems are either obsolete or on the verge of obsolescence. No new system has been introduced in the past 20 years. As far as the artillery is concerned, no new gun has been introduced in the army since the last 30 years. The mechanised forces, which will be at the forefront of the battles in the plains and deserts, ostensibly seem better off, but detailed scrutiny reveals that the modernisation of the T-72 tanks which constitute the largest number of the existing tank fleet, and their overhaul, are both way behind schedule severely affecting the operational efficiency of the equipment on the battlefield. Moreover, they are virtually devoid of any night fighting aids which will cripple their operational effectiveness. The infantry combat vehicle, the BMP II, the mainstay of the army’s mechanised infantry, is also blind at night and thus will be severely handicapped in operations at night. The infantry, the “Queen of Battle” is also handicapped by the existence of obsolete small arms which have no night sights, and other equipment, which is on the verge


of obsolescence. There is nothing new, except fervent hopes, aspirations and plans which never seem to fructify. An industrial age army is expected to fight information age conflicts. So how startling is this revelation? Let for a change, the spotlight shift from Commonwealth Games to the inertia of the political leadership, the bureaucracy, and the military in securing the nation. Let the slothfulness of India’s defence procurement system which is preventing timely modernisation of the armed forces to prepare for future threats, be exposed.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor


to build a rail link through the Khunjerab Pass to link up with the main railway line in Pakistan so as to gain access to Karachi port. It was recently reported by Selig Harrison in the International Herald Tribune that 7,000 to 11,000 Chinese People’s Liberation Army soldiers are deployed in the northern areas of Gilgit-Baltistan. They are perhaps there for counter-terrorism activities to prevent Islamist terrorists from moving into Xingjian through the Karakoram Range. The military presence in PoK, the denial of visa to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C), Northern Command and the issuance of stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) clearly indicates that China has discarded the charade of neutrality between India and Pakistan over the status of J&K.

Strategic Relationship: Competition or Cooperation On April 11, 2005, China and India announced a new “strategic and cooperative partnership” after a summit-level meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. International analysts were quick to note that the prospects of a more cooperative relationship between these two growing economies had significant global implications. A meaningful strategic partnership will lead to mutually beneficial synergies between Chinese and Indian economies. India is rapidly emerging as a leader in software development. Its knowledge-based industries are attracting the interest of major information technology (IT) enterprises from all over the world. China is now a leading base for the manufacture of IT hardware. Synergising India’s software capability and China’s hardware strength will produce an unbeatable combination. The rapidly growing appetite of both the countries for energy and their high dependence on oil and gas imports is forcing both to secure oil equity abroad. Chinese and Indian oil and gas companies have often been in competition with each other to invest in overseas fields and have driven up prices by outbidding each other. A strategy based on cooperation rather than competition will help both the countries secure better terms and will enable them to share their risks. They could follow a consortium or joint venture approach for bidding and invest in sharing infrastructure costs such as building joint pipelines. So far, cooperation in this field has been extremely limited. China and India’s coordinated approach in international negotiations is proving to be mutually beneficial to both. When two countries that represent more than a third of the global population speak in unison, as has been seen in their coordinated approach in the Doha round of WTO negotiations and on environmental issues, particularly in the

Indo-China Joint Excercise in Belgaum, 2008

2009 World Climate Summit at Copenhagen, the world has no option but to sit up and take note. China and India played a calming role in the 2008-09 global financial meltdown that has now begun to peter out. They are likely to work together towards the long-pending reform of the international financial architecture. As both the countries hold substantial foreign exchange reserves, they will increasingly play a greater role in decision-making in the existing Bretton Woods organisations. The reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is yet another area for cooperation. Just as India had played a very positive role in China’s membership of the UN and its subsequent inclusion in the UNSC, India expects China to support its aspiration for a seat in an expanded UNSC. This will quite naturally increase Asia’s clout in world affairs. However, so far such explicit support has not been forthcoming. In Asia, China and India should work together for peace and stability and broader regional economic integration to make the 21st century truly Asia’s century. Counter-terrorism is another area in which China and India can cooperate for mutual benefit as both countries are victims of panIslamist fundamentalist terrorism emanating from across their borders. In this context, Exercise Hand-in-Hand series of joint military exercises, conducted at Kunming in 2007 and at Belgaum in 2008, were steps in the right direction. Both also need to work together to counter the menace of narcotics trafficking from the Golden Crescent on one side and the Golden Triangle on the other.

Once the long-standing territorial dispute is resolved, there is no reason why the dragon and the elephant cannot dance together Areas of Concern In the Indian perception, there are several major areas of concern that are limiting the growth of the bilateral relationship. The foremost among these is the “all-weather” friendship between China and Pakistan i.e. in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans.” China’s military aid has considerably strengthened Pakistan’s warwaging potential and enabled it to launch and sustain a proxy war in J&K and in other parts of India. Therefore, by implication, it is also China’s proxy war. Other contentious issues include China’s continous opposition to India’s nuclear weapons programme; its deep inroads into Myanmar and support to its military regime; its covert assistance to the now almost defunct Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka; its increasing activities in the Bay of Bengal; its attempts to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

while keeping India out of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; and its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Nepal and Bangladesh. China’s efforts to develop port facilities in Myanmar (Hangyi), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Maldives and at Gwadar in Pakistan are seen by many Indian analysts as forming part of a “string of pearls” strategy to contain India and develop the capacity to dominate the northern Indian Ocean region around 2015-20. Though at present the Indian Navy dominates the northern Indian Ocean, a maritime clash is possible in future as the PLA Navy begins operations in the Indian Ocean—ostensibly to safeguard its sea lanes and protect its merchant ship traffic. In an article, “Warning to the Indian Government” (posted on the website of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies on March 26, 2008), Zhan Lue, a Communist Party member, warned India not to “walk today along the old road of resisting China” as the People’s Liberation Army is now well-entrenched in Tibet and will not repeat its mistake of withdrawing after a border war as it did in 1962. He extolled the virtues of the PLA’s newly developed capabilities and went on to advise India “not to requite kindness with ingratitude.” Another Chinese scholar advised his government to engage India’s neighbours to break India into 26 parts. These surprisingly sharp attacks in scholarly journals do not appear to be isolated pieces of writing. Analysts in India believe that such scurrilous writings could not have been published without the express sanction of the Chinese authorities as almost all Chinese media are state controlled. This type of rhetoric sets back efforts at reconciliation and mutual understanding. China’s moves are seen by Indian analysts to be part of a carefully orchestrated plan aimed at the strategic encirclement of India in the long-term to counter-balance India’s growing power and influence in Asia, even as China engages India on the political and economic fronts in the short-term. As two large countries with a shared border and a long history of peaceful coexistence, the Governments of China and India have a responsibility towards their own people and the people of Asia. Both can and must work together in the interest of peace, stability and the future prosperity of Asia. Healthy competition for markets can have positive spinoffs as long as it is conducted in a spirit of cooperative security. China must not hold resolution of the territorial dispute hostage to its successful integration of Tibet with the national mainstream. Once the long-standing territorial dispute is resolved, there is no reason why the dragon and the elephant cannot dance together. Gurmeet Kanwal is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.




>> C H I N A F O C U S D I P L O M A C Y

Power Play It is highly plausible that in a quarter of a century from today, China may just end up placing its military and diplomatic force to be able to affirm more power and influence than it is today, with a greater propensity to assert itself on issues and project power far beyond its shores n DR MONIKA CHANSORIA


s the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gears up for a meeting of the Asia-Pacific region’s security architecture, much heed is being paid to the fact that India and the United States have been extended an invitation for the meet— translated by many as a potential sore point for China. Given that China reaffirms that it would commit itself to becoming a force for peace and stability in Southeast Asia— maintaining and enhancing relations with ASEAN so as to achieve its regional objectives appears to be assuming prime importance in the Chinese policy-making process. There is a growing sense of apprehension and unease especially among nations

China Sea is known for containing valuable and unexploited reserves of oil and natural gas and is home to fishing grounds as well. As these nations vie for their share in the South China Sea, it stands to pose as a symbol of realist power play as far as achieving goals in national interest for all contending nations are concerned. In what could be described as a prudent move by China is that it has chosen to adopt a cooperative and lithe approach towards the Southeast Asian nations. This can be read as an effort by the Chinese leadership to keep the US involvement in the region at bay or at least keep it restricted to minimalistic levels as a large section within the Chinese policy making views the US’ motives in the region to contain (ezhi) China. This can be seen in light of the US Pacific Command

a growing realisation that developments in the Asia-Pacific do in fact, impinge upon Indian interests. The Chinese campaign strategy notes that striking only after the enemy has struck does not mean waiting for the enemy’s strike passively. The strategy affirms not to give up ‘advantageous chances’ in campaign or tactical operations. China is likely to use the argument in order to justify use of force including offensive and pre-emptive strikes as defensive in nature. The fact that China’s gradual rise to power has ushered in benefits even for the ASEAN member-states cannot be denied. However, an equally reinforcing reality of Beijing making strident efforts to augment that political, economic and military influence in the region, more so to resolve the outstanding


Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh meeting with Prime Minister of China, Wen Jiabao, during his visit to the United States, in New York on September 24, 2008

within Asia that with its rapidly expanding military reach and prowess, coupled with higher stages of economic growth, the military spending power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is only bound to increase— thus furthering its intent to chip away at claims of other nations through mechanisms of coercive diplomacy. A question in the foreseeable future that seems pertinent is whether Beijing is keeping a wide array of options available including that of military coercion following diplomacy so as to press for politico-diplomatic advantage as it stands to resolve impending disputes in its favour while bargaining from a position of strength. China asserts its sovereignty over sections of the 1.2 million square miles of the South China Sea and finds itself in contention with Taiwan and other ASEAN members including Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines. The South




mission statement which reiterated, “… ready today and preparing for tomorrow, the US Pacific Command promotes security and peaceful development in the Asia Pacific region by deterring aggression, enhancing regional security cooperation, responding to crises and fighting to win.” Therefore, the invitation extended to the US and India withholds geo-strategic and political undertones as well. In that the ASEAN has taken note of India’s rising geo-political importance and its potential to emerge and establish itself as a potential challenge to China’s growing clout within Asia. Hence, the presence of the US and India in forums such as the ASEAN is sure to suffice as a counterbalance to China. India is uniquely placed to play a significant role in the Asia-Pacific balance of power. The recent times have witnessed a rapid growth in Indian interests— economic, political and strategic—as well as

The rise of China, economically and its consequent policy of engaging the region, by no means can take the light away from the military-security dimension given the apprehensions of the ASEAN states vis-à-vis China’s quest to seek regional hegemony

maritime territorial disputes in its favour, can also not be annulled altogether. Therefore, even if the ASEAN nations advocate active engagement with China, the possibility of ongoing economic engagement and collaboration in the regional security architecture will not provide long-term answers/solutions to the existential disputes. Any sense of drawing complacency regarding China’s lack of certain technological capabilities owing to which it will be difficult for it to translate its ambitions into reality, would likely prove to be an impetuous option. The fact is that Beijing is circumspectly working towards bridging these existential gaps. As China’s regional influence in Southeast Asia rises, a critical reality that stands to be taken cognizance of, is that China has completed its task in what is described as the ‘first island chain’— primarily coastal operations. Thereafter, the ‘second island chain’ strategy aims to develop the capability to project power beyond the second island chain starting from the arc from Japan through Guam, Northern Australia and Indonesia. Moreover, as the Sino-Russian gap in nuclear naval forces is narrowing. By 2030, China is expected to have more nuclear assets at sea as compared to Russia. The ASEAN nations are wary of the fact that the power projection capabilities being built up by the PLA shall indeed intimidate ASEAN countries in the backdrop of the impending maritime disputes in the region. Laying added emphasis on the PLA Navy, the 2008 Chinese White Paper on National Defence had stated that in line with the offshore defence strategy, the PLA Navy has chosen to take informationisation as the orientation and strategic priority of its military modernisation drive. The PLA Navy has deepened reforms and innovations in training programmes and methods, and is focusing on maritime integrated joint operations to further enhance the integrated combat capability in conducting offshore campaigns. Additionally, the PLA Navy has stepped up building of ship bases, berthing areas, supply points, docks and airfields. It is in this context that the new Chinese naval base at Sanya, on Hainan Island, capable of housing a large fleet of surface warships and also of serving as an underwater naval base for submarines, including nuclear SSBNs will allow China to extend its influence in the South China Sea and command superior naval presence closer to important sea lanes. Eventually, the PLA Navy aims to operate and sustain itself in the northern Indian Ocean Region by about 2015. For that reason, it is highly plausible that in a quarter of a century from today, China may just end up placing its military and diplomatic force to be able to affirm more power and influence than it is today, with a greater propensity to assert itself on issues and project power far beyond its shores. The formulation that Beijing’s economic expansion has offered and will likely continue to offer positive trade-offs to the Southeast Asian region has a flip side to it as well. The rise of China, economically and its consequent policy of engaging the region, by no means can take the light away from the military-security dimension given the apprehensions of the ASEAN states vis-à-vis China’s quest to seek regional hegemony. The author is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.




The Ultimate Victory

While there is a global fascination for China, the supremacy of the US soft power is gradually being challenged. Read through the article to know more about the success of China’s national strategy, which has flowed from its evolving military strategy. n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR


n the article ‘The Rise of China’ published in the November-December 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs, Nicholas D. Kristoll, the former New York Times columnist stated that China’s economy would surpass that of the US to become the world’s largest by the middle of 21st century. He predicted that China’s economic growth would have a certain negative influence on the world’s economy. He declared that if there were to be a power vacuum in the Pacific and Far Eastern regions, China would take advantage of it as an opportunity to expand its regional sphere of interest. His observations have turned out to be prophetic. Today, while there is a global fascination for China, gradually the supremacy of the US soft power is being challenged. The success of China’s national strategy employed so far and flowing from that their military strategy needs to be studied and analysed so as to establish the veracity of global concerns regarding China’s conduct and stance in the future. As a first step, strategic and military thinkers need to study the evolution and development of China’s military thought through the ages which would indicate the trend of China’s military strategy and their military conduct in the future, and also give an insight into the mental condition of China’s military leadership and their soldiery. This article briefly deals with the evolution of China’s military thought in the following context: l The warring states era l Maoist military thought l People’s war under modern conditions l Active defence

l l

Local wars under high-tech conditions Local wars under conditions of “informatisation”

The Warring States Era Chinese have their own unique perceptions, which may be difficult to appreciate without an examination of their ancient military thought and ancient statecraft. Recent Chinese writings about the future security environment have referred to “the warring state era” in Chinese history which pertains to the period from 475 BC to 221 BC. During this age, the classics of Chinese statecraft were produced and it was also the time when multi-state competition to become powerful, featured schemes and plots, small wars, interstate conferences, treaties, and anarchy emerged. China’s military authors have called the future multi-polar world quite similar to the warring states era and declare that the future security environment resembles the warring states era in many ways. The Director of Research at the General Staff Department of the PLA has published six volumes of studies on ancient statecraft in 1996 that contained specific advice of how to comprehend the current and future security environment. In this context, China’s concept of comprehensive national power and the influence of Sun Tzu’s “art of war” are also important driving factors. Comprehensive National Power: The current Chinese concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) was invented in 1980s but stems from Chinese traditional military philosophy. By CNP, it generally means the sum total of the powers or strengths of a country in economy, military affairs, science and technology, education and resources and its influence (China Insti-

tute of Contemporary International Relations 2000). In a more abstract manner, it refers to the combination of all the powers possessed by a country for the survival and development of a sovereign state, including material and ideational ethos, and international influence as well (Huang Shuofeng 1999). Ancient Chinese strategists also attempted to help their country to achieve dominance through war avoidance strategies. The Chinese are of the view that a calculating CNP can aid a nation for war as well as in coordinating a political and diplomatic offensive during crisis in peacetime. Sun Tzu’s Art of War: This was written 2,000 years ago. It throws light on general principles of how the PLA may fight in the future. Another source frequently referred to by Chinese military thinkers is the 36 military strategies or stratagems, the last of which is—“Running away as the best choice. Evade the enemy to preserve troops. The Army retreats: No blame. It does not violate the normal practice of war.” The other stratagems include deception, ingenuity and stealth—the characteristics which are found in the “art of war” and later in the works of Mao Zedong. These ancient and modern texts constitute the military heritage that is imprinted on the soldiery before they enter service and then throughout their profes-

Active defence is sometimes called China’s military strategy or strategic guideline

sional military education experience. The art of war begins by proclaiming “war is a matter of vital importance to the State…. It is mandatory that it be studied thoroughly.” PLA demonstrates this idea by the degree of planning it undertakes prior to any military operation, or an exercise. Sun Tzu’s main contribution can be attributed in the field of military strategy where he argued that “the best policy is to take a state intact” and “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”. While overt military strength is important, other aspects of national power are essential to waging war.

Maoist Military Thought Mao wrote on every aspect of the military— the philosophy of war, strategy, tactics, organisation, logistics, the importance of man in warfare, the relationship between the army and the society, between the party and the army and so forth. Most of Mao’s writings, the published ones, belong to the era between the Zunyi Conference of 1935, when his military ‘line’ became party’s ‘line’ and the end of civil war in 1949. During that period, he developed several concepts of war as a social product; war as a form of politics with bloodshed; the necessity for the weak to engage in a protracted war with a powerful enemy; the establishment of ‘red’ bases where the entire population could be mobilised for a total war; the concentration of a superior force to attack the enemy’s weaknesses; treating the enemy as a supplier of weapons; treating the soldiers humanely and giving them political education; party control of the armed forces which were geographically scattered; the three strategic phases of protracted war—strategic defensive to conserve one’s strength, strategic




>> C H I N A F O C U S M I L I T A R Y S T R AT E G Y PHOTOGRAPHS: China MoD website

consolidation to build up strength, and finally the strategic offensive to annihilate the enemy and achieve victory—and he prescribed the style of war for each phase i.e. guerrilla wars for the phase of strategic defensive, conventional war of movement or mobile warfare during the consolidation phase and then stand-up warfare by divisional strength and above during the strategic offensive phase. During all these phases, Mao emphasised the importance of man over machine (weapons) which he was later to call the ‘spiritual atom bomb’. The belief in the ultimate victory of the people despite an adverse balance of forces meant that for China all wars would become protracted wars in which the peoples’ power would ultimately prevail. Another implication of the belief in the ultimate victory of the people was regarding the concept of defeat. Total destruction did not mean defeat and Chairman Mao believed that so long as the Marxist-Leninist ideology survived in the human mind, military forces could be built up from the scratch to continue the struggle. Mao’s political goals and strategic doctrine was therefore derived from the Marxism-Leninism- Mao Tse Tung thought and these in turn determined China’s military capability.

People’s War under modern conditions was preached as a doctrine of necessity rather than a move welcomed by the military ditions. Mao’s basic military princi ples were updated to conform to military developments and new technologies of the late 20th century. After issue of the new regulations, the National Defence University published a book, On Military Campaigns, to be used to instruct PLA officers on their new warfighting doctrine. The book provides detailed insights as to how PLA intends to conduct operations at the operational level of war at army group and higher levels in the future. The book addresses itself to larger principles but some tactics can be inferred. Based on the existing military regions to command forces from all services in their respective regions, in times of war or national emergency, war zone headquarters will be established. War Zone HQ are “joint” organisations as are military regions, but the boundaries may be redrawn based on the strategic missions. Within a war zone, there will be a direction of main effort as well as supporting directions (to achieve secondary missions). Under the overall war, zone commander would be the commanders for the main direction along with the commanders from the services participating in the operation. The smallest level organisation in the ground forces is the Group Army or what we call a “Corps”.

People’s War The doctrine of People’s War was derived and developed during the Japanese War (1913-45) in China. It is a doctrine for asymmetric wars, a recipe for the weak to resist the strong. It is a doctrine of a defensive war to be fought on Chinese territory of fighting one or more invaders with total mobilisation of China’s population. In the worst case scenario, in a nuclear setting, it envisaged the involvement of the following steps: l A pre-emptive nuclear first-strike against Chinese nuclear installations, cities and industrial centres. l The enemy invades the Chinese territory in force. l Other adversaries invade China from other directions. l The PLA opposes the invasion at the borders. While simultaneously the general mobilisation of the people is ordered. l The PLA forces organised in military regions manage their own theatres of war to contain the threat. l When the enemy penetrates deeper, they would encounter the second echelon armies organised in the military districts. l Deeper inland, the People’s Militia will be ready to fight by harassing the enemy, cutting his supply lines, providing intelligence about his movements, laying ambushes, and generally fighting a protracted guerrilla war. l The actions of People’s Militia would give the time for regular forces to be mustered and reorganised in the depth areas for counter attacks and counter strokes. l Even if the enemy were to occupy certain towns and cities, the wide expanse of China’s countryside would be adequate to wage a protracted war. l The doctrine envisages that the enemy will be finally forced to withdraw from the Chinese territory. A similar strategy would be applied in defensive non-nuclear settings. The People’s War doctrine is not for application for proactive offensive settings beyond the borders of China. In any case, two out of the three elements which constituted the land forces during Mao’s time i.e. the Provincial Armies and People’s Militia were designed and equipped to operate locally in their own areas. Only the field armies could be employed beyond the Chinese borders. Some aspects of warfighting can be understood through a series of aphorisms of Chairman Mao who had said, “Our strategy is to pit one against 10; our tactics is to pit 10 against one. And never fight a battled unprepared. And again concentrate two, three, four or even 10 times the enemy forces.” The




Local Wars under Conditions of Informatisation

other aphorisms deal with tactics for guerrilla warfare, the establishment of bases in the countryside, concepts of envelopment and annihilation and so forth.

an invading enemy. People’s War under modern conditions was therefore preached as a doctrine of necessity rather than a move welcomed by the military.

People’s War Under Modern Conditions

Active Defence

It took two to three years after the death of Mao for a clear pattern to emerge. In October 1979, Xu Xiangqian, the then Minister of Defence, wrote, “To master advanced modern military thinking, we must combine Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought with the practice of modern warfare and realistically solve problems regarding the theory and practice of building a people’s army and launching a people’s war under modern conditions.” Modernisation of PLA and the adaptation of new ideas to the doctrine of People’s War were seen as complementary rather than to the detriment of national defence. The dramatic cuts to the military funds in the 1981 budget compelled the PLA to submit to the party’s modernisation priorities. Financial constraint revealed the impossible task of modernising a huge army of nearly 250 combat divisions and 2,800 independent regiments in the main and local forces to acceptable levels. Accordingly, People’s War offered China a way out of the above dilemma as its doctrine relied on the masses to oppose

Active defence is sometimes called China’s military strategy or strategic guideline. Even though active defence advocates that China will strike after the enemy has struck, yet the line between accepting the enemy’s first strike and use of pre-emption to defend China is blurred. In 1936, Mao had defined, “Active defence is also known as offensive defence or defence through decisive engagements. Passive defence is known as pure defence. Passive defence is actually a spurious kind of defence and the only real defence is active defence, defence for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive—militarily speaking our warfare consists of alternate use of defensive and the offensive. In our case, it makes no difference whether the offensive is said to follow or to precede the defensive, because the crux of the matter is to break the encirclement and suppression.”

War under High-Tech Conditions New regulations were promulgated in 1999 to fight wars under modern high-tech con-

China’s Defence White Paper 2008 stresses the need for modernisation throughout China’s armed forces, achievable in part through new acquisition programmes, but more generally and importantly through a process of informatisation, a coordinated, network-centred enhancement programme. The network-centred approach is considered vital for optimising component contributions to both offensive and defensive operations, and particularly critical to success in “local wars”. China is developing new, technologically advanced equipment, using an ambitious and exponential “leapfrog development” programme. In doing so, it notes the importance of previous modernisation in allowing a significant reduction in the size of its armed forces, with the inference that further force reduction may be possible.

US Annual Report to the Congress -2010 The 2010 US Annual report to the Congress mentions about the concept of informatisation and emphasises on the effects of modern information technology on military decisions and weapons employment cycles. The term officially entered the PLA’s lexicon in 2002 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin in a speech before the 16th Party Congress, referred to the concept as necessary for the PLA’s rapid modernisation and for enabling integrated joint operations. Jiang’s address recognised that moving China’s military on a path towards informatisation would require integrating the entire PLA with common information systems as well as a new organisational model for warfighting. The PLA formally institutionalised the concept in 2004. PLA analyses of the US and coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have reemphasised the importance of informatisation and joint operations. Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor is a former Commandant of the Army War College.



Cyber Threat From China We need a parallel defensive and offensive approach. We must develop a credible deterrent, shedding the fear of annoying the dragon, a euphuism that limits our capacity to interpret the signals emanating from China n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH “Thus it is in war that the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat, first fights and afterwards looks for victory” – Sun Tzu, The Art of War


ews about cyber attacks originating from China during the recent Commonwealth Games should not have come as a surprise and neither should Jeffrey Carr’s assessment of China directing Stuxnet at India, including the partial failure of INSAT 4B. To say that the Chinese Government is oblivious to hackers operating from its territory would be the height of stupidity. It is impossible for a country that has a vice like grip on her population and is notorious for incidents like Tiananmen massacre and more recently the spiriting away of some 10,000 civilians during anti-government agitation in Xinjiang. The fact is that cyber attacks emanating from China are obvious parts of a well defined government programme. Racing to achieve greater comprehensive national power coupled with the ambition to be at the top of the world order by surpassing USA, China couldn’t care less if is branded as the top cyber terrorist country in the process. Chinese cyber warfare capabilities are deep, pervasive, and a threat not only to foreign governments and militaries but also foreign corporations and individuals.

South China Sea with scant regard to Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines; wilful, periodic and deliberate incursions into Indian territory, wanting International Offshore Rule (IOR) to be recognised as Chinese sphere of influence and managed by Chinese nuclear submarines and carriers; claiming Arunachal Pradesh as a Chinese territory and labelling it as South Tibet, etc. These are all signs of an exceedingly aggressive nation.

Genesis China today is believed to have the most extensive cyber warfare capabilities in the world and more importantly it has the ruthlessness to use it offensively. The genesis perhaps was suspicion of its own citizens that a communist country like China has nurtured since Mao’s long march. Keeping a grip on the vast population was no easy task and required employing every conceivable measure. Focussed investments was ushering technological advancements at a fast pace. Surveillance of the citizenry required cyber checks as well. Cyber surveillance require-

Set Up China has organised its bots into ‘botnets’ or ‘bot armies’ that form a highly extensive Internet spy network. Enormous amount of computer hardware and communication equipment is also being exported. This provides opportunities to embed malware at the development/manufacture stage itself; the parasite can lie dormant till activated by Chinese masters. Keeping the information infrastructure under tight government control, China leverages its manpower resources to conduct far more direct and holistic cyber warfare operations than any other country. Hacking is a flourishing career and government is known to have been recruiting them through agencies by placing advertisements in Chinese language newspapers. Creation of malware (trojans, trapdoors) for embedded vulnerabilities is well rewarded. According to the US sources, in addition to employing thousands of its own hackers, Chinese government manages massive teams of experts from academia and industry as cyber militias with support and direction of the PLA. The PLA’s network warfare battalion, ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

Psyche An analysis of the behaviour of China over the years brings out three distinct features— ambiguity, deception and ruthlessness. The former two also being vigorously emulated by China’s ardent disciple Pakistan, which has organised its own hackers and is allegedly responsible for originating viruses like ‘sea brain’. What is unambiguous is China’s doctrine of pre-emption and surprise, which belies her facade of being a peaceful nation. Surprise, deception and shock effect are all hallmarks of a bully and China’s super power ambitions are making her erratic and intimidating, disregarding international behaviour and norms, be it the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan or cyber space. Cyber warfare aligns with Chinese characteristics of ambiguity, deception and ruthlessness, especially as it is very difficult to accurately pinpoint the point of origin of cyber attacks. Even if it gets traced in the vast Chinese territory, China blatantly denies any government patronage while artfully orchestrating the same. Vast segments of population employed in this activity will continue their hacking activity behind the iron curtain of communist China. There are numerous examples of China’s arrogance, ruthlessness and vile—overrunning Tibet in 1951, grabbing 38,000 square kilometres of Indian territory of Aksai Chin; death of millions of her own population during what she termed the Great Leap; advising Pakistan to raise a militia (today’s jihadis) to fight India in the hinterland; threatening India during 1971 war with Pakistan; 1979 invasion to teach Vietnam a lesson; brazen nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan, North Korea and Saudi Arabia (Silkworm missile sold to latter) in contravention of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, continuously threatening Taiwan, unilaterally extending maritime boundaries in

ments include deciphering encrypted emails and documents, for which China employs parasite software programmes termed ‘bots’ that allow their users to hijack networked computers. The Chinese have established an Internet spy network, which perhaps is the most extensive in the world. The requirement of keeping tabs on the population for internal security led the Chinese Government to build the Great Firewall with the ability to control total Internet activity within the country. Any traffic on the Internet (coming in or going out of China) can be cut off by the flip of a switch. No other country has such extreme measures in place. China’s spat with Google last year was unprecedented. China would like that even private companies submit their computer security technology for government approval, rendering their computer encryption inside China useless and showing the Chinese how to penetrate their computer systems. Using the current technology, China can hack into most programmes not only by breaking codes but also through capturing information upstream on Internet servers since these are under state control. Tight control over Internet has resulted in better cyber defence capability. However, all this has now been overtaken by China’s global ambitions and today her cyber focus is mostly outwards.

electronic warfare battalions, intelligence and psychological warfare battalions have all been meshed into the cyber warfare conundrum. Web Defacement Groups spearheaded by PLA were formed more than a decade back and national level cyber defence exercises and field exercises have been held over the years. These include simulated attacks on foreign countries like India, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, etc. Such exercises have graduated to ‘offensive computer operations and cyber warfare’ exercises to rehearse pre-emptive cyber strike. Several cyber warfare units have been formed in China by hiring the best IT graduates and culling requisite manpower from some 25,000 software companies. Focussed research is also being done at the State Laboratory for Information Security. Scores of specialists are working at another research facility at Datang since the past six years to take control of national networks of countries like India, Taiwan and Japan.

Cyber Terrorism The Chinese have made cyber warfare a vital ingredient of the country’s war doctrine. China perceives information warfare as a cheap and effective method to reign supreme, match the US and the West and believes that aggressive information warfare improves her stature, which confirms the hallmark of a psychotic bully. Cyber attacks originating from

China, especially the ones integrating IW and EW have definite direction and involvement of Chinese Government and the PLA. China is accused of hacking the Pentagon as well as British and German Government networks. Indian websites of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC), National informatics Centre (NIC), Ministry of Defence (MoD), National Safety Council (NSC), Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Dalai Lama’s office and Indian embassies abroad have been hacked/defaced by Chinese web defacement groups. Data from Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), naval dockyards, nuclear installations, military bases, defence HQs, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and other think tanks has been stolen by the Chinese hackers. Considering the sophistication, finesse and pattern, cyber attacks in India have Chinese Government patronage, though China would like us to believe that these are courtesy criminal gangs based in Sichuan and Guangdong. China not only hacked Google but exploited a previously unknown vulnerability of Microsoft’s Internet explorer browser, hacking into several websites worldwide (now being referred to as ‘Aurora’). Major cyber attacks by China against the US commenced in 2004 hacking into military laboratories, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and World Bank. This was followed by hacking the State Department, missions abroad, systems in Washington, Naval War College and Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security in 2006. In 2008, election campaigns of Barack Obama and John McCain were hacked. Again in 2009, offices of Senators were attacked. This was also the year when “Ghostnet” which penetrated into more than 1,200 systems in 103 countries (including India) was discovered to have been originated in China. Chinese hackers also stole data from Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter programme. The latest global cyber terrorism act has been the deadly virus Stuxnet, which in all probability originated in China. Which other country will be interested to see INSAT-4B impaired? The worm reportedly infected some 60,000, 13,000 and over 6,000 computers in Iran, Indonesia and India, respectively.

Implications for India Our dependence on China/foreign vendors for hardware, software and telecommunication equipment and parts makes our vulnerability all the more precarious. All these imports would invariably have bots that now are user friendly and difficult to detect since they do not slow down the system, as was the case earlier. Indian companies operating in China should have no doubt that their entire computer systems are or will be compromised. Indians using Internet in China should be equally aware that they have several bots inside their system. Most Chinese websites have embedded bots. Logging on to such a website implies automatic downloading of bots/botnets into your computer. More significantly, China can break into websites anywhere in the world to install bots. Like her satellite industry, Chinese cyber warfare effort has been in place for long and has absorbed foreign doctrines and concepts. The evolution from a defensive concept (monitoring population for internal security) Continued on page 10




>> I N T E R N A L S E C U R I T Y

Showcasing Advanced Tech Indesec 2010 provided an opportunity for Indian and international companies to promote homeland security solutions and latest technologies PHOTOGRAPHS: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns


Northrop Grumman



he third edition of India’s only exhibition dedicated solely to homeland security, Indesec 2010, showcased a range of products and solutions to secure the borders, coasts, aerospace, and to counter the rising internal insurgencies in the country. Organised by the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India from September 6 to 8, 2010, the expo witnessed leading edge technology from across the world including Europe, the US, Israel, France, etc. The expo was inaugurated by the Minister of State for Home Ajay Maken focused on homeland and border security, network-centric operations and maritime security. Several conferences and panel discussions on issues like internal security and cyber security were also organised. For the first time, the Homeland Security Executive Mission of the US India Business Council (USIBC) attended the expo. The delegation was being led by Admiral James Loy, Senior Counsellor at The Cohen Group and a former Deputy Secretary in the US Department of Homeland Security, and Lt General Harry Raduege, Chairman of the Deloitte Center for Cyber Innovation and co-chairman of the Commission on Cyber Security for the 44th Presidency. Loy said, “There are many common areas where the US and India can work together. We can share our practices and technology. Here at the expo, there are 20 companies from the US, displaying solutions developed in a post-9/11 environment. It is an extraordinary effort to bring forward and offer tools helpful to people around the world.” Speaking about cyber security, Rauduege said, “Today everything that we do in homeland security ends with cyber security. We have to develop the right policies and procedures. I feel we need to address this complex area in three ways—people, process and technology.” While many companies seemed upbeat about the Indian defence and homeland security market, few did not seem very happy. Bureaucratic hurdles and delayed decisionmaking seemed to have dampened their spirit. Maurice IDOUX, Vice President, HGH Systems said, “It is extremely difficult to sell in India. It is a complicated process.” But John Gordon, International Trade Sector Adviser Security & Defence, UK Trade & Investment seemed quite satisfied with the Indian market, “Nothing happens overnight. Companies need to understand the market and know how to do business. We advise companies to do the homework first.”

Northrop Grumman Northrop Grumman presented its capabilities in command and control, situational awareness and unmanned ground vehicle systems. Using its critical incident response system (CIRS) together with TouchTable(tm), the company demonstrated the ability to integrate seamlessly a variety of national security solutions into a common situational awareness display for crisis management. Also on display was the integrated tactical command and control services (I-TaCCS) and integrated joint operational command and control services (I-JOCCS). The company also showcased its unmanned ground vehicle systems for remote handling of hazardous threats including bomb disposal, tactical and surveillance operations and the highly versatile heavy duty robot Andros F6A vehicle,

Wallop Wallop Defence Systems demonstrated its ex-




able electronic surveillance solution.

ITT ITT showcased a range of products including night vision goggles, night vision binocular, helmets for ground personnel and aviation helmets. But one of the most striking was the SpearNet, the next generation ultra high frequency (UHF) radio. It is a powerful communication tool that provides a seamless, self-healing ad-hoc networking and multi-hop routing capability, allowing SpearNet to multiply force effectiveness. Mistral

Mistral Mistral’s mobile surveillance van (MSV) was a part of the displays at homeland security expo. The MSV is a unique, custom designed solution for law enforcement agencies, event management companies and private security companies.



iRobots Corporation displayed devices which can be used by security forces to see, hear and evaluate dangerous situations from a safe distance. The company showcased the 210 Negotiator and Packbot 510. The 210 Negotiator is an affordable surveillance robot for public safety professionals. Likewise, the Packbot 510 performs multiple missions like route clearance, explosive hazard identification for surveillance.

OTT OTT’s Puma M26-15

pendable infra-red aircraft countermeasures. The advanced dual-band spectral flares and traditional magnesium teflon viton (MTV) infra-red countermeasures helps counter threat posed by air-to-air and ground-to-air IR-guided missiles. The company’s full-range of innovative expendable IR decoys including spectral flares and traditional MTV flares are compatible with most countermeasure dispensers and are fitted with unique safety and arming mechanisms.

BAE BAE Systems concentrated on discovering hidden networks with its analytical tools such as Detica NetReveal and TxtReveal Analyzer. Through its wholly owned subsidiary Detica, the company unveiled national security technologies at the homeland security expo. Detica’s NetReveal tool enables government and law enforcement agencies to generate intelligence that will identify and counter those who threaten the safety of the public, the security of the state or seek to commit serious and organised crime. Detica’s TxtReveal Analyzer is a search and analysis software solution designed specifically to enable analysts, investigators or field based personnel to unlock the intelligence hidden in volumes of structured, unstructured or free text data.

Cobham At Indesec, Cobham cameras positioned on a dog became a crowd puller, although the company had many more solutions in its kitty. The company also demonstrated the vehicle intercom systems (VIS) that provides the customers with a complete capability across a wide spectrum of platform types and functions, ranging from light vehicles to heavy armour and command centres. Cobham’s family of VIS includes ROVIS (AN/VIC-3), LV 2 and the new TacG2 providing clear, reliable communications in any combat environment. While LV2 has been

built for use on light vehicles, medium armour and heavy armour, ROVIS (AN/VIC-3) is for medium and heavy armoured vehicles.

SRT SRT launched AIS Class B Plus which has boosted transmit power for extended range; integrated satellite for global tracking; alert message transmit and receive options; and anti-tamper and internal UPS system. The device can be configured to send and receive pre-determined messages to provide users and authorities with alerts. The other products included AIS Class A (conforms to IMO AIS Class A specifications); AIS Class (guarantees users best performance in terms of target acquisition and range); AIS Receiver (full dual channel receiver with field range) and AIS Identifier (ultra low cost AIS transmit only tracking device).

General Dynamics General Dynamics showcased three key security and resilience capabilities—protection of critical national infrastructure; deployable infrastructure and urban intelligence. The company’s approach to intelligence, surveillance, targeting and recognition (ISTAR) and its new virtual extra sensory perception (VESPer) system gives security forces a real edge. The company showcased a host of ISO containerised solutions from border security and surveillance units to emergency accommodation, sanitation and medical facilities.

Honeywell Honeywell’s stall at the homeland security expo highlighted on T-Hawk, the unmanned micro air vehicle providing real time situational awareness in critical situations; universal surveillance integration platform, city surveillance, etc. Also on display was the company’s building solutions, universal surveillance (HUS) and the remotely manage-

South Africa’s Offroad Truck and Trailer (OTT) showcased its latest mine protected vehicle—Puma M26-15. It is based on TATA LPTA 715c 4x4 truck and has a maximum gross vehicle mass of eight tonnes. It is protected against mines, improvised explosive devices (IED) and NATO calibre small arms balls fire. The Puma has been manufactured keeping in mind the homeland security market where its combination of mobility, agility, protection and fire power enables security forces to take the battle to the militants with confidence and effectiveness.

French companies HGH Systems showcased its Vigiscan, the panoramic infrared vision system for immediate detection and tracking of intruders even in complex backgrounds. Eurilogic displayed telemetry solutions like trunkey ground stations (antenna to data analysing), on board data acquisition system, flight test centres engineering, debriefing solutions, data link and video link, etc. Proengin products included hand held detectors to detect biological and chemical warfare agents in airports, metros and other vulnerable areas. Lacroix demonstrated its expertise in auto protection, training simulation, defence equipment, pyrotechnic components, homeland security, and law and order maintenance. Aria Technologies offered software packages to evaluate the CBRN releases in the environment.

Indesec 2011 Indesec 2010 saw an increased participation of companies as compared to previous years. And if the organisers are to be believed, the fourth edition of Indesec to be held from June 20-22, 2011 at Pragati Maidan, New Delhi may have a still larger gathering. Brigadier (Retd) Raj Manchanda, Director, Indesec Expo 2010 said,” We have got very good response from the industry and next time we will try to bring in more companies.” (For more information and videos log on to

FLIR Systems opens your eyes to an extraordinary new level of EO/IR performance in handheld sensors for today’s global special operations forces. Our Recon® III family of systems meet long range and medium range needs with compact, lightweight design, modular versatility and the highest resolution in its class. You’ll also find internal GPS, laser pointer and rangefinder capabilities for precise target geo-location. For a first-hand look, go directly to the source. © 2010 FLIR Systems, Inc.



An Unquestionable Act AFSPA is not and cannot be a solution to our internal security caused by ethnic, social and governance problems. With changed political and operational circumstances, it may be desirable to review the Act; more importantly its application.




n early 1990s, I was commanding a division that had troops deployed for counter-insurgency operations in Manipur, Nagaland and a part of Arunachal Pradesh. During the run-up to the Manipur Assembly elections, a leader of a political party in order to garner students’ support and votes, made the removal of the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA), a major electoral issue. When he won the elections and became the Chief Minister, I went to meet him. I asked him about his plans about the AFSPA. He said that in view of the “popular demand”, he would write to the Home Ministry and have it removed from the state. I told the Chief Minister that it was ‘ok’ with me. I will pull out troops from the 60-odd posts, bring them together outside Manipur and train them for their primary role of fighting a conventional war. “But you cannot do that! What will happen to the law and order situation?” he said. I appreciated his concern and told him politely but firmly that I couldn’t help him maintain that without a proper legal cover. I said, “I cannot have my subordinates hold me responsible for giving them any unlawful command.” Then, very respectfully I stated, “Sir, the best way out is to create conditions in the state wherein the AFSPA is not necessary. If you and the Centre do not consider and declare Manipur as a ‘disturbed area’, the AFSPA cannot be applied. Please do not blame the AFSPA for the problems of Manipur. The fact is that despite several elections in the state, we have not been able to create conditions wherein this Act need not be applied in Manipur. The armed forces cannot create those conditions. These are primarily of political, ethnic and socio-economic nature, under your charge now.” In recent months, the Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir, trying to hijack the AFSPA agenda from the opposition parties and separatists, is making the same demand and the same mistake of putting the horse before the cart. However, what we must concede is that in the last 20 years, the national attention and focus of the international community has shifted markedly towards the human rights issues. The media, therefore, is more active in highlighting such issues and tends to look at the AFSPA negatively. The AFSPA was enacted by the Parliament in 1958 for the “disturbed areas” of

the North-east. Later, it was extended to disturbed areas declared anywhere in India. It has four essential paragraphs. Para 3 states that if the Governor of a State/Union Territory or the Central Government is of the opinion that the whole or any part of the State/Union Territory is in such a disturbed or dangerous condition that the use of the armed forces in aid of the civil power is necessary, the government by an official gazette notification may declare the whole or affected part to be a disturbed area. Para 4 states that a commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces in a disturbed area may: l Fire upon/use force, even causing death, against any person contravening law and order or carrying weapons, ammunition or explosives, if in his opinion it is necessary for maintenance of law and order and after giving due warning. l Destroy an armed dump or fortified position or a shelter from which armed attacks can be made or can be used for training by hostiles, if necessary to do so. l Arrest without warrant any person who has committed a cognizable offence and may use suitable force, if necessary to do so. l Enter any premises without a warrant to arrest a terrorist/suspect, or to recover a wrongfully confined person, stolen property, or arms/explosives wrongfully kept. Para 5 of the Act lays down that the ar-

rested persons will be handed over to the nearest police station ‘with the least possible delay’. Para 6 states that ‘no prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done under this Act’. Due to its prolonged promulgation in the North-east and J&K, people often ask as to what has been achieved with the AFSPA. We must understand that the AFSPA is not and cannot be a solution to our internal security caused by ethnic, social and governance problems. It is only a political instrument to enable the armed forces to bring the level of insurgency or terrorism under sufficient control. When such a situation is achieved, it is for the political authority to negotiate a conflict resolution as has been done in some states of the North-east and Punjab. In J&K, it has enabled us to create conditions wherein we could hold free and fair elections and allow the state to be run by its elected people. And what if such military operations had not been possible or successful? The 1958 Act may have been described as a ‘special power’. But those of us who have commanded troops in such situations have always looked upon it as a legal protection to conduct effective operations. What is also quite obvious is the fact that as and when the law and order situation improves in a ‘disturbed area’ and we have elected representatives governing the state, they find it difficult to continue with this Act. The rea-

ures. Protection against cyber threats is a continuous process which needs proactive efforts by specialists to prevent attack and if it does happen, contain the damage and assist in swift recovery. The US is already raising a cyber command to wage digital warfare and bolster defence against mounting threats to its computer networks. It is prudent for us to create at least a dedicated task force for enhancing our cyber warfare capabilities and focus on making ‘cyber dominance’ an essential component of our war doctrine. At the national level, we need to mull that in consideration of the mammoth organisation, infrastructure and investments by China in cyber warfare, what exactly we require. Palming off the responsibility merely to National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) is unlikely to achieve much. Do we follow the Chinese model? Since we are some years behind, a dual approach will be required; instituting defensive measures as well as developing an offen-

sive capability as a deterrent. We must realise that the days of Mahabharata are gone and defensive measures by themselves mean nothing. Cyber warfare threat is no less than a nuclear threat. It is a dirty war that can collapse your economy and security. It requires a commensurate response. We simply have to develop a deterrent to China’s national level cyber warfare offensive plans against us. There may even be a requirement to selectively demonstrate such deterrence to a bully like China if she attacks us. That would be the only way to ensure credibility of such deterrence. If our satellites are being interfered by China, what is stopping us develop capabilities to redirect the Chinese missiles?

sons could be: l Democratic societies all over the world abhor large-scale and extended deployment of troops in their midst. l Human rightists and the media over the years have dubbed the AFSPA as a ‘draconian’ power given to the military against the civilians. It has become a convenient tool for the secessionists to demand withdrawal of troops or clipping their wings. l Despite strict discipline and training, there are aberrations of human rights violations by troops. Commanders often find difficulties in punishing the guilty due to factors like secessionists’ motivated false allegations, lack of evidence, organisational loyalty and avoiding bad publicity. l The army is not adequately transparent on human rights violation issues like the number and nature of complaints received, investigated, offenders punished, etc. l There are hardly any cases of the Central Government giving sanction to prosecute the accused guilty of human rights violations. The need for the AFSPA to counter insurgency and anti-terrorist operations is unquestionable. However, with changed political and operational circumstances, it may be desirable to review the Act; more importantly its application. My suggestions would be to make more judicial magistrates accompany military patrols, increase joint military-civil police operations so that the police does the house search and arrests, streamline early handover of arrested persons when police does not accompany patrols, the army be more transparent in its dealing with human rights aberrations, and the Central Government explain the reasons whenever permission to prosecute the accused cannot be given. What is even more important is that large-scale and extended deployment of troops for internal security should be avoided. This would be possible when we make the civil/police organisations more effective. Also, the state political leaders in disturbed areas should assess the law and order ground situation in the Unified Command and avoid making the AFSPA a public agenda. (The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the writer.)

Continued from page 7 to the offensive concept has been easy. National level cyber offensive plans may not have fully crystallised yet, but would definitely mature before the end of this decade. Chinese cyber warfare capabilities pose an expanding serious threat to India especially since it is an institutionalised and focussed national effort by the Chinese. Penetration, theft, interference, injecting viruses, and jamming of our networks, C4I2SR, army intranet, UAV data, radio/microwave/cellular/satellite communications/satellite and missile launches/programmes are all possible.

Requirement From the above, there should be little doubt that there is absolutely no scope for complacency. We need to have a sustained institutionalised national effort. Such an effort would need continuous monitoring, review and periodic upgradation least it gets lost in shrouds of secrecy like the numerous intelligence fail-




Defensive and offensive approach China’s cyber warfare capabilities pose a potent threat to India. We need a national effort—a parallel defensive and offensive approach. We must develop a credible deter-

rent, shedding the fear of annoying the dragon, a euphuism that limits our capacity to interpret the signals emanating from China. Though we are late starters, fortunately China’s offensive cyber warfare capability is not fully developed yet. If we do not wake up and get our act together, we will not only lose the asymmetric war but the conventional one as well, and our regional and global ambitions. Additionally, information age multiplication opens up several vulnerabilities. We lack indigenous capability in hardware, critical software and communication equipment and depend on imports largely from China. Vulnerabilities are well known in embedded system commercial protocols, virtual networks and telecommunication infrastructure. We need a fundamental shift from individual entity to central overview, control and assessment of security measures. Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch is a former Director General, Information System, Indian Army.



Technologies and Systems to Protect the Frontiers chan Armour provides excellent protection to the tank and its crew. Arjun MK-II will have explosive reactive armour (ERA) as additional protection against tandem warheads. It will also have additional features such as missile firing capability from the main gun, autotracking, commander’s sight with night vision and ammunition with enhanced penetration. The experience and expertise gained during the process of development of MBT Arjun have been utilised to modernise Ajeya Tanks. These tanks of Russian origin had been the mainstay of Indian Army and the modernisation has given them a new lease of life. A wide range of combat/support vehicles have also been developed by DRDO to meet the land fighting capabilities of a modern army. These include mobile bridging systems like Sarvatra Bridge, BLT-72 and modular bridge, armoured engineered reconnaissance vehicle (AERV), armoured amphibious dozer, counter mine flails and so on. Another area where DRDO has developed considerable expertise involves remotely operated vehicles such as Daksh, disrupter mounted robot (DMR) and gun mounted remotely operated vehicle (GMR). These systems have been designed for applications in conventional warfare as well as homeland security missions. The dedicated efforts of DRDO towards enhancing self-reliance in defence systems have empowered the nation with state-of-theart combat vehicles, bridging systems and combat engineering support systems.

Armoured Engineer Recce Vehicle

Arjun Tank






battle is ultimately won (or lost) on the land. It is the warriors fighting on the land who finally hold or capture the territory. Thus, the effectiveness of the land systems that helps the soldiers to perform to the best of their abilities plays a crucial role in a battle scenario. Mobility, agility, communication, lethality and protection, available to the soldier are vital factors that determine the effectiveness of a land system. Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has pioneered a wide range of technologies and systems for land based applications. MBT Arjun MK-I is the contemporary armoured combat tank that has been developed by DRDO. It has been extensively tested by the Army over a variety of terrain specially hot Indian desert. Weighing little under 60 tonnes, its 1,400 hp engine provides power to weight ratio of 22 hp per tonne and can take it to a maximum speed of 70 km/hr. It can clear vertical obstacles up to 0.91 m and has medium fording capabilities up to 2.1 m. Its excellent mobility in desert has been very well established during extensive trials. The MLC-70 class mobile bridging systems provide MBT Arjun the required reach and deployability in riverine terrains where permanent bridges are not available. The advanced hydro-pneumatic suspension provides excellent ride, comfort and a highly stabilised platform giving it the precision “firing-on-the-move” capability. The thermal imaging system provides night vision and firing capability. The Kan-



The Elephant is Bumbling How does one task intelligence agencies in the absence of a strategy to guard your national interests?


he elephant bumbles through the forest; the mahout atop concentrating on his precarious perch. Instead of guiding the elephant through the maze of thick foliage, he keeps peeking over his shoulder to observe how other mahouts fortify their hold to prevent falling. The elephant has the stamina to carry on for days on end but does not know where to go, often ending up moving in circles. Sensing the master’s preoccupation, he sometimes gobbles up large amount of mahua or such flowers that get him intoxicated. His inebriated amble gives him temporary relief though he keeps hoping his rudderless journey will find direction some day. Why is India referred to as an elephant? Which direction are we going?

Strategic Forethought Successive Defence Ministers have gone on record to say that India’s strategic interests encompass areas from Malacca Straits to Middle East, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and the whole of Asia. These statements including the regional power/emerging global power claims boil down to semantics in the absence of requisite follow up. It is a shame that even 63 years after independence we still do not have a National Security Strategy (NSS). Should someone demand reason through RTI, perhaps we will witness blame game between the National Security Advisor (NSA) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), with the Foreign Ministry sitting on the fence. MoD is yet to create an institutionalised strategic thinking mechanism within itself, individual intelligence being no substitute. Do not confuse this with Headquarters (HQ) Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) that has a separate HQ, denying the much hyped integration with MoD before its creation. Not that there is lack of intellect in the country for strategic thought—a sizeable strategic community exists. HQ IDS, preceded by the Defence Planning Staff (DPS), undertakes excellent strategic planning, but there is no follow up and the papers are gathering dust up the line. The National Security Council (NSC) does strategic thinking but only in advisory capacity. There are a host of think tanks, mostly in the national capital, but these do not have access to requisite government inputs and neither does the government take them seriously. Given that political masters may not be able to coin NSS on their own, what stops them from tasking bureaucracy to produce the draft in say six months, analyse, debate and implement it. The military would readily provide assistance in chalking out the NSS. Councils and committees are no substitute for institutionalised strategic planning. Defining NSS will usher in responsibility. At present, there is blissful ambiguity, sans responsibility and blame of failures can conveniently be put on the military. Hopefully, this is not an incentive for not having a NSS. Having read the Henderson Brooks Report, the CVC (in response to a RTI) observed it is damning on the competence of the generals of that time. What about political and bureaucratic incompetence of forcing the illadvised forward policy; pushing a grossly illequipped and untrained army into alpine warfare despite protests by the Army Chief. Remember the famous quote of the 1950s “you can scrap the army”? All this is amply narrated in books published on the 1962 war. Then why are we scared of bringing out




the official history? Had we defined the NSS coinciding with becoming a Republic, perhaps our subsequent history would be different. Forget our neighbours and our ambitions as regional/global power; the flip side of not having a NSS should be apparent from our internal mess including Jammu & Kashmir, North-east and Maoist insurgency notwithstanding announcements that we will solve the latter in three years. Considering that we permitted the problem to fester and expand for 30 years after using an Army Division to crush the hardcore in Naxalbari, this can hardly be a possible timeframe. In the absence of a NSS, we will continue to grope in the dark and fail to appropriately deal with our main adversaries (China, Pakistan), falling prey to their machinations. Allparty meets or Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS) meets at times of crisis cater at best to fire-fighting. A NSS would enable chalking out short-, medium- and long-term plans for holistic implementation, reviewed on quarterly, and six-monthly or yearly basis.


the incident? With asymmetric warfare having made borders irrelevant, should we not be looking for a single national level intelligence agency, responsible for both external and internal intelligence? With added task of existing NIA, the overall set up can still be called NIA. How come decades after independence and having faced insurgencies for years, we do not have an institutionalised mechanism of intelligence collection, collation and more importantly assessments that result in recommended responses to emerging threats rather than groping around when Maoists raise violence levels or valley youth pick up stones.

Leadership & Governance It is no secret that governance has become the biggest casualty in the last more than four decades with bursting accounts in Swiss banks/Liechtenstein’s LTG Bank, foreign assets, etc. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi observed years back that out of every `1 spent on welfare projects, just 17 paise reach the ground. Today, the figure has gone even ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

How does one task intelligence agencies in the absence of a strategy to guard your national interests? If you do not know what your aims and objectives are, what tasking can you do? That is why it is New York Times that tells us 11,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) members are present in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). We might as well ask the paper how many PLA are building roads and manning three star hotels in Nepal, developing ports, waterways and industrial parks in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The concept of human intelligence appears to have been given the burial. We had little inkling of the massacre and Maoists activities in Nepal, attempted coup in Bangladesh, antiIndia wave in Fiji or more recently how things would suddenly change in Kashmir. Little wonder a former Intelligence Bureau (IB) official pens down in his book that irrespective of who rules at the Centre, the bulk of Indian intelligence is focused on targeting the opposition. No surprises his statement has not been questioned. Our approach to intelligence appears out of sync for coping with emerging threats. Post-26/11, we have established the National Investigation Agency (NIA). Do we need the NIA? Of course, we do, but this organisation gets into action “after” the incident has occurred. How about preventing

below 7 paise, if at all it reaches. A bench headed by the Chief Justice of India observed that benefits of a national scheme like National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) are not reaching the intended beneficiaries. Yet we say that there is no problem of governance. In Nagaland, you find a 500bed hospital and medical college at Dimapur but practically the entire state does not have x-ray facilities. How do you expect the population that is heavily afflicted with tuberculosis to travel to Dimapur for x-ray especially with inadequate public transportation? Travel three hours south from Port Blair and you find stark naked tribal women in pouring rain begging for food with children in tow, never mind the crores for tribal welfare programmes. Every year you see road repair in Kashmir commencing just before snowfall, enabling completion on paper and release of fresh funds next summer on account of damages due to snowfall. Mohan Murti, former Europe Director, CII says that Europeans believe that Indian leaders are too blinded by new wealth and deceit to comprehend that the day will come when the have-nots will hit the streets (their assessment appears outdated—a country ready to tip over the precipice). They question whether the Indian nation is in coma. A German Member of Parliament, recently,

P.C. KATOCH said on television, “If all the scams of the last five years are added up, they are likely to rival and exceed the British colonial loot of India of about a trillion dollars.” In an editorial on India, a German business daily wrote, “India is becoming a Banana Republic instead of being an economic superpower. To get the cut motion designated out, assurances are made to political allays. Special treatment is promised at the expense of the people. So Mayawati, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, the most densely inhabited state, is calmed when an intelligence agency probe is scrapped. The multimillion dollars fodder scam by another former Chief Minister wielding enormous power is put in cold storage. The Prime Minister chairs over this kind of unparalleled loot.” Are we surprised 16 former Chief Justices are being labelled corrupt? Has this not become a national culture? Do we have a plan to check this growing malaise? Quite logically we are critical of the ‘good Taliban’ and the ‘bad Taliban’ concept. Are democracies of two types—soft and hard? If not, then how come we are capitulating to rats of Pied Piper Pakistan in Kashmir? If Sheikh Abdullah could be incarcerated in prison outside Kashmir for so many years, how come Geelani and his cahoots were allowed to wallow in the squalor being directed from across the border and pollute the valley? Were we a hard democracy earlier that has turned soft now? Why are we scared to acknowledge the nexus between J&K’s opposition and Hijbul Mujahideen? Why are we scared to give figures of forcible marriages by Pakistani infiltrators in J&K, the sharp rise in venerable diseases courtesy this unholy rabble and adverse effects on ancient Sufi culture? Why not agree to the hardliners demand of plebiscite with proviso that instead of Kashmir it would be held panIndia—anyone who does not want to be part of India can get out. Why are we hesitant to arrest people flying the Pakistani flag in J&K? Obama favours a mosque on ground zero but why is construction of a Gompa being denied to the Ladakhis at Kargil for the past several decades? Is it because they have not picked up the gun? Why is it that while China and Pakistan have re-written the demography of Tibet and PoK, respectively, we have failed miserably to even rehabilitate thousands of migrants (forced to flee) back into J&K. No doubt we have earned the distinction of a soft democracy having displayed tremendous deficit of national will. Negative arrogance appears to be replacing the need to improve governance — a trend that does not bode well for the country. Observe the raised hackles when the current Army Chief commenting on the Kashmir situation implied we had failed to build on gains over a period of time (the situation brought to a level by security forces) when other initiatives should have been taken. Similar statements by a civilian probably would have evoked no response. Political sensitivity to the military is more perhaps because truth hits harder. No hackles rose when reviewing the sorry state of governance, Narayan Murti, former chairman of Infosys, said, “In areas where public governance is involved, we have hardly made any progress…the politicians and bureaucrats are trapped in a colonial mindset. They feel they are the masters and there is no need to show fairness and transparency…the penalty for corruption is minimal. As a result, Continued on page 18


Design and production of electronic defence systems by ELETTRONICA S.p.A.



Act Fast A reliable and robust ICT network which allows interoperability of the three services within themselves and with the government spanning the strategic, operational and tactical domains is the need of the hour n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH


ith the mention of the word defence, one visualises the wholesome construct of the army, the navy and the air force, but any talk of defence communications simply boils down to project defence communications network (DCN), which is only a very small part of how defence communications needs to be strategised and developed. Defence communications are a neglected sector notwithstanding the hype of information warriors in the making. Not only are communications of the three services mismatched, little thought is being given to the required synthesis of information and communications. The concept of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is yet to take off. In the Second Lebanon War, Special Forces of the three services of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) discovered they could not communicate with each other after being inducted into Lebanon. In the Indian context, such mismatch will be in entirety for our own Indian Defence Forces (IDF). Inter service communications will remain at services Headquarters (HQ) level unless corrective actions are taken. Without such actions, information warrior of one service will talk to his counterpart in another service by going vertically up to his service HQ, horizontally to the next service HQ and then down to his counterpart. Even this will happen only if the inter-service formats are standardised. Any talk of existing jointness in the three services today is a gross misnomer.

Future Scenarios The battlefield of tomorrow will be a nonlinear, multi-dimensional battlespace characterised by nuclear ambiguity, increased lethality, a very high degree of mobility coupled with simultaneity of engagement and increased tempo of operations with compressed time and space, and coupled with high degree of transparency. In our context, the nuclear factor will further limit the depth and duration of conflict which would be short and intense. This would call for a swift and concerted response by the three services coupled with quick decision-making, the framework of which would already have to be in place, with a joint command and control structure to direct the operations. That a single service cannot cope with future scenarios is an acknowledged fact. This is relevant not only to conventional war but spans the complete conflict spectrum plus disaster management, out of area contingencies (OOAC) and the like. For the Army itself, future military operations will be combined and joint comprising of all arms and inter-service elements. These operations will require units and sub-units of other arms to operate subordinately or in cooperation with each other. The mission specific link up with sister services will optimise the combat potential even at tactical levels.

Jointmanship Jointness is essential to military success. Success in war has been contingent on the common sense idea of jointness as seamless integration. Jointness implies achieving higher joint combat effectiveness through synergy from blending particular service strengths on mission basis. In non-traditional terms of military strategy and doctrine, some term it as a response to the evolving nature of warfare. Given the fact


SPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s LAND FORCES


that in future all the services will have to operate jointly, even in smaller contingencies, jointness enhances the increasing synergy of modern military forces i.e. complementary operations built around a key force (instead of a key service). In other words, no single weapon or force reaches its full potential unless employed with complementary capabilities of the other services.



Project DCN Project DCN is still a few years away and will simply link the three services down to Corps HQ and equivalent levels plus a few static entities. Most significantly, the project does not include development of requisite software. The vital handshake therefore is missing without which DCN actually boils down to a highway sans traffic. The three services and HQ of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) are required to develop the software individually with attendant problems of interoperability. This denotes a lopsided approach and indicates the low priority accorded to a strategic communications project like the DCN.




Information and Communication Technology Our military is yet to fully realise the essential requirement of viewing information from the strategic viewpoint and recognise it as a mission critical resource. This requires a synthesis of communications and information. In its concerted efforts to modernise, the military must align with this truth and stop treating the information as just another resource. Communications cannot be planned in isolation anymore. They must be part and parcel of the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and interoperability (C4I2) package in concert with our pursuit of net-centric warfare (NCW) capabilities. Significantly, the planned reorganisation of Pakistan Armyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s General Headquarters (GHQ) envisages merger of the communications branch into the information systems branch. The Chinese PLA is getting informised at a fast pace and Pakistan Army is following suit with focused investments in relevant sectors including communications and information.

Current Status The current status of our military jointmanship in terms of communications or shall we say communications and information can be gauged from the following: l There is no common tri-service communication philosophy. l No policy for tri-service cyber security and information assurance has been evolved. As a result, required information assurance control objectives are not being addressed holistically. l No tri-service policy for data handling and data storage has been defined. Absence of a clear policy has resulted in data centres mushrooming all over. l The DCN is coming up as a strategic highway but individual services and HQ IDS are developing requisite software separately. This will result in serious problems of interoperability. l Little progress has been made towards common standards and protocols for the three services. Tri-service net-centricity is absent. Large number of command and control equipment and networks are being established but lack common standards and protocols. Several interoperability constraints exist within each service. l In the current dispensation, the army

strategic operational information dissemination system (ASTROIDS) under development will not be interoperable with its naval and air force counterparts. There is mismatch between the radio sets of the three services. For certain contingencies, the Army plans to cater to additional radio sets to be given to sister Services as an ad hoc measure. The army intranet which was extended to HQ IDS since its raising was withdrawn some three years back. E-learning in the IA has met a dead end for the time being as Army intranet is yet to be made fully secure and bulk of the course material is classified. Army intranet has not been extended to Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) and College of Defence Management (CDM) since these are tri-service institutions under HQ IDS though some 90 per cent of the students and faculty are from Army. Within the Indian Army, the tactical communication system (TCS), approved by three successive Defence Ministers, has still to see the light of the day, with its void seriously affecting test beds and fielding of sub systems of the tactical command, control, communications and information (Tac C3I). The TCS is only looking inwardsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;within the Army.

Success in war has been contingent on the common sense idea of jointness as seamless integration l


The concept of ICT is yet to be evolved. In the periodic tri-service conferences chaired by the Defence Minister, the ICT plans discussed are different for communications and information systems. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has no institutionalised framework within itself for strategies. That is why we have voids in the National Security Strategy, Roadmap for Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), tri-service NCW philosophy, tri-service ICT/communication philosophy, tri-service cyber security and information assurance policy, tri-service policy for data handling and data storage and the like. Even the initial projections for a defence communications satellite were solely by the Indian Navy.

The Requirement The Government/military needs to take the following steps: l Accept that true jointness in the services simply cannot be achieved in the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Merely defining a joint war-fighting doctrine by the services will not suffice. The political hierarchy needs to thrust down integration and jointmanship as a fait accompli by appointing a CDS without further delay. Sixty-three years down the line from independence our polity must realise that appointing a CDS does not imply facilitating a military coup. The expanding combined threat from China and Pakistan requires that we optimise and enhance our defence potential post haste and a CDS with full operational








powers is a vital link in all this. A tri-service NCW philosophy, ICT/communication philosophy, cyber security and information assurance policy, policy for data handling and data storage should be evolved. The project to evolve common standards and protocols for the services must be accorded top priority. Uniformity of communications and information systems under procurement by the three services should be ensured including new items like software defined radios (SDRs). Communications and information systems planning should be seamless; horizontally and vertically, with adequate safeguards. An integrated communication network that enables requisite standard signal communication support to all the three services needs to be established. Even a project like TCS (which needs acceleration) should cater to parallel links with sister services. The military must evolve and implement an enterprise level information security assurance programme (ISAP). Necessary enablers to provide core competencies for gestating and sustaining the ISAP must be developed as part of capacity building. At present, numerous applications are coming up, some of them without adequate security solutions. The army intranet must be made fully secure and should be re-extended to HQ IDS. It should also connect the DSSC and CDM for which additional funds could be allotted by HQ IDS with approval of MoD. This will enhance jointness and facilitate e-learning of the three services. Indigenous capability needs to be developed against enemy electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) attacks (nuclear and nonnuclear) as also for checking/testing of hardware and software against embedded malware. The Centre for Artificial Intelligence & Robotics (CAIR) needs to exponentially increase the capacity to develop new and varied algorithms in order to keep pace with rapid induction of new systems. The Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) must find ways and means to accord SAG approvals in telescoped timeframe. We need to speedily advance our chip manufacturing capabilities, a sphere in which we are decades behind China and which has serious implications for network and communication security.

Need for a reliable and robust ICT In the jointmanship paradigm, our military has only taken some nascent steps. We are decades away from integration in its true form and spirit. We need to take measures from the existing state of cooperative functioning and patchy jointness to deconflict operations, advancing to joint and finally integrated operations. Unless vital steps are taken and the baggage of legacy thinking is shed, jointmanship will be elusive and our goal of achieving net-centric warfare capabilities will remain utopian. There are certain hard decisions required at various levels and the Government/MoD too needs to take holistic stock and act fast. The requirement is to speedily establish a reliable and robust ICT network which allows interoperability of the three services within themselves and with the government spanning the strategic, operational and tactical domains.



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Avoid Delays India has little defence against embedded vulnerabilities in both hardware and software. We need to get our acts together in order to prepare adequately for the 21st century challenges. The military too must ensure offsetting any asymmetric advantage to the enemy. n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH


apid developments in technology has revolutionised warfare. As armies and nations invest in revolution in military affairs (RMA), the key to success will lie in attaining higher levels of net centricity; effective command and control across the force, an accelerated decision-action cycle and an ability to conduct operations simultaneously within an all arms group. Harnessing information technology will act as a force multiplier to enhance operational effectiveness of commanders and troops at all levels by enabling exchange, filtering and processing of ever increasing amounts of digital information at present available but not integrated. The commanders at all levels require pertinent information in real/near real time in order to enhance their decision-making and command capability. This is very relevant at the cutting edge as well, where decisive contact battles will be fought. A battlefield management system (BMS) is essential in facing present and future conflict situations. Security of such an important operational information system (OIS) like the BMS requires little emphasis. What is the BMS, what security is required and how to go about establishing the same are issues that merits attention. Not only should security solutions be foolproof, they need to be developed, tested and instituted in concert with fielding of the BMS.

conditions. It is only after successful validation of the system in field that the process for equipping will begin. The concept of the BMS is to have an ideal system which should be able to integrate the means of surveillance and engagement through an automated decision support and command and control system. Exploitation of technology would aim at rapid acquisition, processing and transfer of information, enhanced situational awareness, and capacity to react to information and sharpen the ability to synchronise and direct fire, thereby establishing and maintaining overwhelming operational tempo. The objective of the system is to provide a command, control and information (C2I) integration tool supporting every level of military user ranging from individual soldier to Battalion Group/Combat Group Commander in the TBA, which will provide in

improve and modernise presentation of information in near real time; sixth, integrate with other command and control system.

Security Solution Software systems must be engineered with reliable protection mechanisms, while still delivering the expected functionalities. The principal obstacle in achieving these two different but interdependent objectives is that current software engineering processes do not provide adequate methods and tools to achieve security goals. Despite rigorous use of many preventive measures and protective shields there exist faults and security loopholes, which elude their detection efforts and do not surface until the software is operational. Several studies have shown that no matter how much effort has been put into the early stages of the software development, building fault or vulnerability free ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

Battlefield Management System The Indian Army (IA) lacks an integration tool supporting every level of military users ranging from individual soldier to Battalion Group/Combat Group Commander in the tactical battle area (TBA) that can provide in near real time an appropriate, common and comprehensive tactical picture by integration of inputs from all elements of the battle group. Requirements at these levels are of battlefield transparency through situational awareness and a common operating picture (COP)â&#x20AC;&#x201D;pick up the enemy much before he picks you up, see the target and direct fire in quick time using the best weaponry available, as also monitor the after effects. Situational awareness existing in the Indian Army is currently on ad hoc basis whereas the requirement is of an integrated network system. Most foreign armies including those deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan have situational awareness packages of various types. We require a situational awareness package customised to Indian Army requirements. Fielding of the BMS will be an important facet of capability building in the Army. Operational necessity of the BMS constitutes the vitals for having a faster decision process by commanders at all echelons, better decisions based on reliable operational information provided in real time and the ability to quickly close the sensor to shooter loop. Overall scope of the system is to integrate, test and field a BMS duly integrated with other components of the tactical command, control, communications and information system (Tac C3I). For such a system to be customised to meet Indian Armyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s specific requirements, it will need to be first integrated and tested in a controlled environment in a test bed laboratory followed by validation trials in field


SPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s LAND FORCES


drop of primary security properties like access control, authentication and integrity, security coverage can be improved in products and solutions during the design phases. By defining security assurance indicators, the deployment phases can also benefit from innovative monitoring tools that can provide near-real-time assurance that security policies are effectively implemented. Standard based approaches covering design and deployment and using commercially driven security metrics can help measure and reduce security costs. Key distribution again is an important aspect. Random key distribution provides appropriate solution to the problem of secure key establishment and needs to be considered in resource constrained sensor networks like the BMS. While it is generally believed that guaranteed security can only be obtained at very high communication costs, commercial solutions are available that provide security against adversaries with small additional communication cost. These need to be examined and tested through extensive simulations and trials. Additionally, on line key distribution for vastly deployed OIS like the BMS needs to be examined by the Indian Army. It is important to remember that the BMS is to be part of the Tac C3I network. Therefore, it would be prudent to have a separate security solution, as should be for each component of the Tac C3I, to prohibit compromise of the entire network in case one of the OIS is compromised. A single security solution for entire Tac C3I would be inappropriate no matter the number of firewalls. This is even more relevant in the Indian context where bulk of the hardware and software is being imported sans testing facilities for embedded vulnerabilities.

The Indian Scene

near real time an appropriate, common and comprehensive tactical picture by integration of inputs from all elements in a battle group. The integration will include inputs from command and control elements, detachments, supporting arms, surveillance devices and headquarters, thereby providing a distinct edge in the successful conduct of operations and optimisation of resources. Capabilities required of the BMS would include: First, provide a command and control system spanning the TBA spreading across individuals, detachments, combat platforms, sensors, sub units, units to the Battalion Commander/Regiment Commander; second, achieve faster reaction capability and flexibility in command and control by providing information automatically at the right place in the right time, thereby compressing the OODA loop; third, provide a strong foundation for making decisions based on near real time, consistent and well structured information, thereby enhancing the information handling capability of commanders at all levels; fourth, strengthen information exchange by having a strong messaging and replication mechanism; fifth,

software has proven nearly impossible in practice. These faults may lead to serious software failures, and security loopholes often leave the system vulnerable to attacks and abuse. The requirement is of secure software systems including automated monitoring of software failures and intrusions. Additionally, degradation of privacy in the increasingly digital world has led to the concept of a credential system that allows the construction of privacy-preserving access control infrastructures. However, like with any other technology, there can be risks associated that require mitigation techniques. In addition, adoption of a systems engineering approach can reduce the impact of human nature on information security assurance, by appropriate consideration in the selection of minimally intrusive mechanisms that constrain human errors and yet are able to achieve objectives and support compliance verification. Security is a process. If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it. The requirement is to move from a reactive approach to security towards a more proactive information risk management. In the back-

As per the Cipher Policy Committee (CPC), all security solutions of confidential and above security classification can only be developed by the Centre for Artificial Intelligence & Robotics (CAIR). This policy was drafted decades back. The stipulation axiomatically not only covers all OIS including the BMS, it cuts out commercially available off the shelf (COTS) security solutions and totals up to a gigantic number considering the ever increasing number of security solutions that India requires/will require (including by the security establishment) with increasing digitisation and networking. It is also for such reason that CAIR is in favour of a single security solution for entire Tac C3I, while the Indian Army has been opposing the same for valid reasons. The flip side is that CAIR actually does resort to considerable outsourcing. The stipulation of developing confidential and above security solutions only by CAIR was put in place couple of years back because CAIR being part of Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) is a government organisation, such stipulation discounted dual handling (particularly foreign nationals) and it inadvertently gave a lien or rather a stranglehold to the DRDO over vital information systems individually or in conjunction with the public sector undertakings (PSUs). This left the private industry high and dry albeit dual handling takes a back seat when outsourcing is resorted to. The time factor is also pertinent where the in-

TECHNOLOGY The defence and security establishments in particular will continue to experience avoidable delays, slowing upgradation of NCW capabilities digenous development of confidential and security solutions by CAIR generally takes an exceedingly long period of time. A vital issue connected with the security solutions is their certification and for the purpose, the lone agency we currently have is the Scientific Analysis Group (SAG). SAG started off as a crypto unit many decades’ back, which at some point of time was given the added charter of certification. It has an annual capacity of evaluating and certifying about a dozen security solutions that is grossly inadequate for a developing country like India where vital security solutions by numerous agencies right from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to the lowest rung were required ‘yesterday’. The process of evaluation and certification of individual solution requires a minimum of six months, which may prolong up to three times. Delays occur invariably when the Developing Agency (DA) sends solutions to the SAG for certification with incomplete/inaccurate documentation to avoid being labeled behind schedule by the user. This results in the security solution shuttling between the DA and SAG, with the user suffering inordinate delays in testing, evaluation and eventual

fielding of concerned information system. The limited capacity of SAG is affecting not only the military establishment but also the country as a whole including intelligence agencies, homeland security and the like. Some attempts were made in the recent past to decentralise the certification of security solutions but it was a non-starter. The reason that the proposed decentralisation was to be taken on by government organisations only, meant that certification was below confidential level and the DRDO was unable to provide requisite scientists and mathematicians even for this.


What Needs to be Done The following issues merit urgent attention by the Government and the military: l An overall assessment exercise is required to establish the type and quantity of security solutions that India requires on progressive basis; in the immediate, short, medium and long-terms. l The CPC policy needs a total review in the backdrop of the 21st century requirements. This review must also address the self-inflicted bottlenecks of CAIR and SAG. l For developing security solutions, the policy should take into account COTS solutions (including their possible customisation) and development by specifically chosen and nominated indigenous private industry having administered an oath of secrecy akin to a government organisation. There should be a reason of mistrust as these Indian nationals under oath would be no different from the personnel of CAIR. l Immediate measures are required to enhance the evaluation and certification

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capacity of SAG to perhaps three/ four times within a time bound schedule. This should include nomination of specifically chosen and nominated cells of indigenous private industry, administer an oath of secrecy and functioning under SAG for evaluation and certification of security solutions below secret classification. This is a practice followed abroad and we should have no reservations on the issue considering that the individuals are Indian nationals akin to employees of SAG. SAG should examine the feasibility of cutting down the time for evaluation and certification of individual security solutions from six to three/four months. Where decentralisation of evaluation and certification of security solutions within government organisations is planned, government must ensure this is accompanied with a package of provision of requisite scientists and mathematicians by DRDO on immediate basis

We require a situational awareness package customised to the Indian Army requirements. Fielding of the BMS will be an important facet of capability building in the Army.





and the authorisation should be of secret and below classification. There is a requirement to ensure severe penalty on DAs who submit security solutions for evaluation and certification with incomplete/inaccurate documentation. Prioritisation of the systems being referred to the evaluation and certifying agency (currently SAG) should be done at various levels within the services and eventually at the Ministry of Defence in the backdrop of operational requirements and fielding schedule of various systems. The country at present has little defence against embedded vulnerabilities in both hardware and software. Continued intransigence on the issue has severe national security ramifications. We need to address this issue urgently and holistically.

Avoidable Asymmetric Advantage The increasingly tightening bottlenecks of developing, evaluating and certification of security solutions is restricting India’s capabilities. In the present circumstances, the defence and security establishments in particular will continue to experience ‘avoidable delays’, slowing upgradation of net-centric warfare (NCW) capabilities. This would give an avoidable asymmetric advantage to our adversaries, particularly those that are working post haste on offensive cyber warfare capabilities. We need to get our acts together in order to prepare adequately for the 21st century challenges. The military too must ensure offsetting any asymmetric advantage to the enemy. The author is a retired Lieutenant General of the Indian Army.


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Robots on Patrol


MDARS robot now guarding Nevada National Security Site


he vast desert surrounding the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), which is home to millions of tonnes of low grade nuclear waste as well as Cold War era nuclear weapons, is now being guarded by autonomous robot ve-

hicles. The US Nuclear Security Administration has deployed mobile detection assessment response system (MDARS) robot, a camera on a mini-Hummer, to protect the area. The MDARS roams around in the

desert, alerting a remote operator when it encounters something that shouldn’t be there. At present there is only one MDARS robot on patrol, but NNSA plans to add two more in the next six months. The MDARS is neither completely autonomous nor completely controlled. Equipped with forward looking infrared (FLIR), radio-frequency identification (RFID), radar and light detection and ranging (LADAR) sensors, the MDARS is able to operate a 12-hour shift without being refuelled. On patrol, it can function on its own for up to 16 hours, using its diesel engine to power it at a speed up to 32 kph. It has enough intelligence to

complete random surveillance routes, and enough sensors and cameras to notice anything out of the ordinary. The MDARS can save facilities worth millions of dollars by reducing the need for stationary cameras, sensors and wired connections. The robot provides automated intrusion detection and inventory assessment capability for use in warehouses and storage sites. The programme is managed by the Office of Product Manager, Force Protection Systems at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Overall technical direction for the programme is provided by the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego.


Mission Possible PHOTOGRAPHS: US Army

A soldier from the Indian army fires the Javelin anti-tank missile on November 8 during Yudh Abhyas 2010, an annual bilateral training exercise, at Donnelly Training Area, Alaska.

Continued from page 12 there is no fear of repercussions and there is no accountability.” Murthy recommended abolishing generalised administrators of Indian Administrative Service and replace them with ‘specialists’ under a new Indian Management Service.

Military and National Defence Defence preparedness and modernisation of the military is based on the long-term integrated procurement plan (LTIPP). The LTIPP should actually flow from the NSS, which is not defined. Hence, the LTIPP obviously is not based on a holistic appraisal of what India should have in terms of defence. NSS would enable net assessment including simulations, opposition analysis, critical reviews and low-probability high-impact contingency planning. Defence Minister A.K. Antony admitted last year we are lagging in procurement by some 15 years. Who is accountable for this mess and resultant loss of combat capability? Going by past experience of delays prolong into eternity, the future appears bleak both in terms of quantity and quality, especially in comparison to China riding a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The gap is increasing exponentially and is dangerous in the face of growing Chinese aggressiveness. It is no secret that today our military is inadequately equipped. Perhaps Gurmeet Kanwal’s recommendation of a National Military Commission to go into the whole gamut of restructuring and modernisation merits serious consideration. Can there be a greater absurdity than holding crisis meetings to review the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) on account of heightened civilian casualties in the valley when the forces responsible for these large number of civilian casualties are primarily police and CRPF (both not under AFSPA) and not the military. Why do we lack guts to say that AFSPA has been thoroughly debated by Parliaments in the past and can-




not be diluted? The simple truth is that the armed forces are sent in when the State has failed to control the situation. Have guts to admit governance deficit and make visible efforts to improve it. By diluting AFSPA, do you want the armed forces to fail and let the State capitulate? Are we capitulating to Pakistani machinations? How would China and Pakistan deal such stone pelting in their own country? Should such assessment not give us the required clue? National security and national interests simply cannot be diluted. Instead of discussing dilution of AFSPA and working on the next economic package for J&K, we need to take stock of what has been the effect of earlier ‘economic packages’. What is the employment they generated, if at all? On face value, no significant development generating employment appears to have happened over the years other than induction of the railway and hydel projects. Do we have an estimate of the unemployed youth in J&K and a plan of employment? Mere announcements of economic and political packages are not likely to achieve much especially considering what actually reaches the ground. Despite strong recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, the Government has failed to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The reason being cited is that there is no consensus within the services. In UK, after no consensus for 18 years, the CDS was simply thrust down upon the military. Why can’t we follow suit if the requirement is nationally accepted. Even when there was consensus amongst services during 2005, no CDS was appointed. The ploy being used over the years is that an outgoing incumbent is induced with the carrot of post-retirement employment to state that time for appointment of a CDS was not opportune. Today, with combined and heightening threat from China and Pakistan, there is urgent need of a CDS. However, intransigence being the order of

the day, there is little chance of this happening where even NSS and national security objectives remain undefined. Government apathy towards military (advertent and inadvertent) has been on the rise. Order of precedence and consequent prestige of the military is being consistently eroded. Forget the Sixth Pay Commission, approved payments and arrears of Fourth and Fifth Pay Commissions ordered by Supreme Court are being denied by simply going back to the court time and again ensuring decades of delay. Experiencing the inefficacy of regular administrative cadre in border/troubled areas, the British had gone in for a Frontier Administrative Service employing military officers. Despite failure of governance in insurgency areas (which we fail to acknowledge), powers are loath to implement such system. Yet British legacy of ‘divide and rule’ is well adapted in ensuring no consensus for appointing CDS. This was more in evidence during the NDTV programme (September 12) on one rank one pension (OROP) where bureaucrats attempted to draw a wedge between the officers and personnel below officer rank (PBOR) by stating the latter have been giving their due—a mischievous misinformation. Support was garnered through a professor who was equating the military with fire-fighting services. The programme also highlighted the incredibly low compensation being given to disabled veterans. Remember Honorary Captain Bana Singh (PVC of Siachen fame) having had to join a march in Jammu for being paid Rs 112 per month for the Param Vir Chakra? Over the years, the services have been denied membership in the National Pay Commission and the recent order of a High Court to establish a separate Pay Commission for the armed forces will perhaps be swept under the carpet in one pretext or the other. Expressing shock over the payment of a

monthly pension of Rs 70 to a 90-year-old widow of an Army officer, the Supreme Court on September 17 issued a notice to the Centre and the army seeking its response to a PIL filed by her. What an irony that in a country where on one hand successive Presidents have lauded the armed forces for their yeoman service and as the last bastion, they along with veterans (including disabled) are treated in such shoddy fashion. Letters by veterans written in blood and return of medals to the President (the Supreme Commander) are treated as routine and countered through political statements that this is not expected from veterans. Look at the irony. Gujjars or Jats take to violence and destroy crores worth of government property and politicians huddle to find ways how to meet their demands. Some senior veterans have written to the President and Prime Minister of the dangers of such apathy citing isolated case of veterans taking to violence (copies of letters circulating the web). Hopefully, the government realises that abjuring veterans can inadvertently push them to join the Maoists or adopt violence as a livelihood. This would be a hopeless situation for India with 60,000 weapon trained individuals retiring every year from the Indian Army alone.

National Security Requirements World attention, including India, is riveted on assessing which way China is going. While it is important to do so, it is doubly important to chalk out the direction the Indian elephant should take after defining our national security requirements in a systemic institutionalised manner. The mahouts need to do their bit. Without this, we may succumb to the balkanisation intent of our adversaries. (The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the writer.)

News in Brief INDIA OFFERED AMERICAN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT During the visit of Defence Minister A.K. Antony to Pentagon in October 2010, the US has offered defence equipment to India from American companies to help the country proceed with its plans to modernise its armed forces. The US State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said if India was planning to upgrade its defence capabilities then it should buy US defence equipment. India’s procurement of military hardware and the US owning the best hardware was also discussed in the Pentagon talks between the defence ministers of both the nations.

BRITISH ARMY TO DEPLOY PARACHUTE BUGGY The British Army’s special forces regiment, the Special Air Service (SAS), has been testing parachute buggies in dummy runs to check if it could be used to attack militants in Afghanistan. The Rhino Air buggy must be launched from 8,000 ft and can float 40 km at about 16 kph. The Rhino can be driven by two men out of a transport plane, who steer it in mid air onto the ground, and troops that operate on foot after landing behind enemy lines. The buggy’s design is based on a quad bike and can carry half a

>> SHOW CALENDAR 16-18 November Situational Awareness & Combat ID Conference St Ermin’s Hotel, London, UK 17-18 November Counter Terrorism and Security London, UK 22-24 November Armoured Vehicles India Le Meridien, New Delhi, India 23-24 November Military Logistics 2010 Bristol Marriott Hotel City Centre, Bristol, UK 2-3 December Defcom India 2010 Manekshaw Centre, Conference Hall, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi, India 1-2 December Command & Control Conference Sheraton San Diego Hotel & Marina, USA 7 -8 December Military Flight Training Asia 2010 Rendezvous Hotel, Singapore, Singapore 6-9 December SECUREX-LIBYA 2010 Tripoli International Fairground, Tripoli, Libya 6-9 December Countering IEDs Amara Hotel, Singapore 8-9 December Universal Armored Tactical Vehicle Conference Washington, DC, USA

tonne of kit, including ammunition and medical supplies.

INDIA AND JAPAN BEGIN ARMY-TO-ARMY TALKS India and Japan have begun their first fourday army-to-army talks to continue to expand their military ties. Indian Air Force Chief Marshal P.V. Naik, also Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Tokyo, will further discuss the defence relationship between the nations. The Japanese counterpart in India, led by Major-General Koichiro Bansho, will discuss joint combat exercises, anti-piracy patrols to counter-terrorism and service-to-service exchanges with the Indian Army. India is engaged in such talks with eight other countries including the US, the UK, Israel, France, Australia, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Singapore.

US AND ISRAEL SIGN AGREEMENT FOR DAVID’S SLING WEAPON SYSTEM The US Department of Defense and Israel have signed an agreement for the development of the David’s sling weapon system. The agreement will support the efforts initiated under the US-Israel short-range ballistic missile defence project agreement, signed by both nations in 2008. The defence system agreement will support the efforts to develop an Israeli capability against short-range and theatre ballistic missiles, large-calibre rockets, and cruise missiles. The project also includes continued development of the stunner interceptor to provide lower-tier intercept capability for Israel’s multilayered missile defence system. The signing of the project agreement implies continued US commitment to the defence of Israel.

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

warplanes and new command and control systems. The total value of all US arms deals with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman and Kuwait is estimated at $122.88 billion (`5,54,600 crore) over the next four years.

ONLINE PROJECTS FOR DISBURSING PENSION Defence Minister A.K. Antony has stressed on the quick and timely payments to the Armed Forced Pensioners. Addressing the 263rd Foundation Day of the Defence Accounts Department (DAD) Antony called upon the officials to make full use of technology in accounting, pension and audit matters. “Although financial processes are no doubt lengthy and complex, unnecessary delays and superfluous objections must be avoided, as far as possible,”Antony said. Compared to the civil pension structure, the defence pension structure is so complex that it gives rise to a lot of complaints and grievances,” he added. Launching three e-governance projects of the DAD on the occasion, the Defence Minister hoped that this would “ensure quick and accurate disbursement of pension”. The three web-enabled online automation projects are Project Suvigya, Project Aashraya and Project Sankalan.


GULF STATES SPEND $123 BILLION ON US ARMS Arab states of the Persian Gulf have ordered US weapons worth $123 billion (`5,54,900 crore), providing a huge boost to the US military industry. The first phase of Saudi Arabia’s US arms package, worth $67 billion (`3,02,200 crore) , is soon to go before the US Congress for approval. The initial package involves 85 new F-15 jet fighters, upgrading another 70, and a successor contract that involves the upgrade of radar and missile defence systems of the Saudi Navy’s eastern fleet. The UAE had signed contracts worth $35 billion-$40 billion (`1,57,900 crore`1,80,500 crore) to buy military equipment that includes Thaad, a high altitude missile defence system, and upgrades to the Patriot missile defence system. Oman is expected to spend $12 billion (`81,200 crore) for 18 new F-16 jet fighters and upgrades for another 12 jets. Kuwait will be spending $7 billion (`31,500 crore) on replacing and upgrading

Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Sr. Copy Editor & Correspondent Sucheta Das Mohapatra Assistant Correspondent Abhay Singh Thapa Assistant Photo Editor Abhishek Singh Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Administration & Coordination Bharti Sharma, Survi Massey Senior Art Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia Head Vertical Sales: Rajeev Chugh SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

UK SELECTS FORCE PROTECTION LIGHT PROTECTED PATROL VEHICLE The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has selected Force Protection Europe (FPE) as the preferred bidder for the ocelot light protected patrol vehicle (LPPV) programme. The 16,500 lb Ocelot vehicle is designed to allow crew and passengers to be seated in a protective pod, which uses formula one racing technology. The fuel tank and transmission are kept in a V-shaped armoured spine to deflect any potential blast away from the vehicle and to protect the key components. FPE will design, develop and build the vehicles in the UK along with Ricardo under the LPPV programme. The final number of vehicles and the price is yet to be determined, with the initial vehicles expected to be available from 2011. Dunkeswell-based Supacat was also shortlisted along with FPE, which hoped to supply 200 SPV400 vehicles worth £100 m, according to BBC News.

Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth

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India and South Korea signed two landmark memoranda of understanding (MoU) on September 3, 2010 to give a huge boost to the strategic partnership between the two countries. The two MoUs were signed at the end of 90 minutes of intensive discussions, marked by warmth, between the delegations of the two countries, led by their Defence Ministers, A.K. Antony and Kim Tae-young in Seoul. This was the first ever visit of a Defence Minister of India to South Korea. Antony was accompanied by a high-level delegation including the Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar, Vice Admiral R.K. Dhowan, Lt General K.T. Parnaik, Dr Prahlada and Sundaram Krishna. The first MoU signed by Antony and Kim envisages exchange of defence related experience and information, mutual exchange of visits by military personnel and experts including civilian staff associated with defence services, military education and training and conduct of military exercises, exchange of visits of ships and aircraft, as jointly decided between the two countries. The MoU further envisages cooperation in humanitarian assistance and international peace keeping activities. The second MoU was signed by the Chief Controller of Research and Development of DRDO, Dr Prahlada and Vice Commissioner, Defence Acquisition and Procurement Agency (DAPA) of South Korea, Kwon Oh Bong. To be operational under the overarching umbrella of India-South Korea Defence Agreement, the MoU aims at identifying futuristic defence technology areas of mutual interest and pursuing R&D works in both the countries.

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SHOCK-PROOF. VIBRATION-PROOF. AND A ND EVEN EVEN FUTURE-PROOF. Over 115,000 DRS systems have been fielded for Blue Force Tracking and FBCB2. And thanks to a powerful Dual Core processor and flexible architecture, today’s JV-5 is ready Battle Command-Platform and ffor or ffuture uture applications. applications. From From the the JJoint oint B attle C ommand - Platform ((JBC-P) JBC-P) a nd beyond. beyond. Which Which means U.S. joint forces will see returns on this hardware investment for years to come.

Capability C apability For For T Today. oday. And And T Tomorrow. omorrow. T That’s hat’s G Go oT To. o.

SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010  

SP's Land Forces October-November 2010

SP's Land Forces Oct-Nov 2010  

SP's Land Forces October-November 2010