SP's Land Forces August-September 2010

August-September l 2010

SP’s

Volume 7 No 4

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>> C O V E R S T O R Y

Interview with Lt General J.P. Singh, DCOAS

The Misunderstood Act Those opposed to the AFSPA call it a draconian law that needs immediate repeal. Those who want it to continue are convinced that it is essential if insurgents and terrorists are to be tackled successfully.

In an exclusive interview to SP’s Land Forces, Lt General J.P. Singh who is the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Planning & Systems) spoke on various aspects of the procurement procedure of new weapons and defence systems.

PHOTOGRAPH: www.army.mil

PAGE 7 The Asymmetric Battlefield Special Forces need officers who are out of the box thinkers with high initiative, have sharp intellect, high on adaptability, ready to give/accept blunt advice and techno savvy to exploit technology.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch PAGE 10 For Speedy Command & Control Considering that terrorism is here to stay and insurgencies can hardly be wished away, we need to be prepared against these threats compounded by asymmetric warfare being waged by our adversaries.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch PAGE 17 The Pervez-Parvez Factor Viewpoint By P.C. Katoch

n LT GENERAL (RETD) VIJAY OBEROI

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PLUS Delayed by Red Tape Power of Information Protecting the Nation with a Cohesive BMS Thirsting for Killer Drones Terror Reigning Business Rendezvous First & TechWatch News in Brief

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ately, there has been a wide debate in the media about the pros and cons of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, (AFSPA). The passing of the Act, over five decades back, was necessitated as the Army did not have police powers and without these powers, it is not possible for the Army to operate against insurgents and terrorists.

The Army is designed and structured to fight external enemies of the nation. Consequently and rightly, they are not given any police powers. However, when the nation wants the Army to conduct counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations, they must be given legal authority to conduct operations without impediments of first getting clearances from higher authorities. If this is not done, they would be unable to function efficiently and therefore would not be able to defeat the insurgents and terrorists at their own game.

On account of the pressure mounted by various groups and individuals for the re-

peal of the Act, the government has been considering the issue in its totality. However, the relentless campaign for its repeal continues. The Defence Ministry and Home Ministry, as well as the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) have been considering various facets of the Act, as terrorists, insurgents and their supporters on the one hand and human rights organisations, non-government organisations and individuals on the other, have launched a sustained campaign for the repeal of the Act. They have variously termed the Act as a tool of state abuse, oppression and discrimination; the provision for immunity of security forces urging them to act more brutally; provide impunity for human rights abuses and fuels cycles of violence; and dated and colonial-era law that breaches contemporary international human rights standards.

There are two schools of thought.

Those opposed to it call it a ‘draconian’ law that needs immediate repeal. Those who want it to continue, specifically the Army, which is deeply involved in the conduct of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist

operations, is convinced that it is essential if insurgents and terrorists are to be tackled successfully. We need to look at both the views dispassionately and not jump to conclusions without considering all the aspects.

The rationale for bringing the Act on the statute books on September 11, 1958, needs to be understood without emotions clouding the issue. When the Army was first employed in counter-insurgency tasks in Nagaland in 1950, it became apparent that fighting insurgency was quite different from maintaining law and order, wherein the Army is called out when the police is unable to handle the situation. It is termed “aid to the civil authorities for the maintenance of law and order”.

Such assistance is for the purpose of restoring normalcy in a particular area at the earliest. In these cases, action is taken against unruly mobs, rioting and targeting life and property, and the police being unable to restrain them. In such situations, the Army uses minimum force, acts in good faith but in a deliberate manner with adequate force.

Such actions are taken in conjunction with

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C O V E R S T O R Y << India faces formidable security challenges, both external and internal. This statement has been repeated so often in the past that it now fails to incite the passion it evoked earlier. The convergence of interests of our mighty neighbour in the Northeast and our thorny neighbour in the West has compelled the political leadership to consider a simultaneous military threat from two directions. For the first time we are realistically considering a national military strategy of a two-front engagement in a future conflict. This naturally implies a matching capability of being able to conduct offensive and defensive operations in two widely separated threatres of war. Added to this are the Indian Army’s gruelling counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-eastern region which had achieved stability from time to time, but lack of strategy, poor governance and slack political responses have wasted the opportunities for conflict resolution. Hence these operations are persisting.

India, in the 21st century, instead of reaping peace dividends, is facing serious challenges to its integrity and sovereignty than ever before. In this

the available police who identify the ring leaders and step back for the Army to complete its actions. On most occasions, a magistrate is also present and the actions of the Army are for a limited period and in a limited area. If any arrests are to be made or searches are to be carried out, these are conducted by the police who have the necessary powers and are backed by the presence or orders of a judicial person.

The situation in countering the insurgents is quite different. The insurgents are not a visible mob and they are better armed and trained for the type of operations they carry out. They adopt hit-and-run tactics and disappear after their speedy attacks, either in the adjoining jungles or hide among the local populace. There are neither magistrates nor any police personnel present and if the Army does not take expeditious action, the insurgents would melt away and attack with impunity repeatedly. The insurgents of today, 50 years after the AFSPA was enacted, are robust in every way, thus making the task of the Army even more difficult. They are heavily armed, act speedily, commit heinous crimes, and disappear. With terrorism, including the suicide variety, now added to the repertoire of the insurgents, the Army has had to develop new concepts for tackling them. Unless the Army counters such actions fast without waiting for orders from higher authorities, it would not be possible to conduct efficient counter-insurgency/terrorist operations.

Speedy actions by the Army are not confined to visible activities of the insurgents and terrorists. Areas where the insurgents are likely to hide or take shelter are required to be searched, with no or minimum warning to the insurgents; the terrorists, insurgents and their followers are to be disarmed immediately, lest they inflict more casualties; and unless the captured terrorists are immediately confined (arrested in police parlance), there is the danger of innocent civilians being taken as hostages or being killed. In such cases there is neither the time to call the police, nor wait for orders from superior authorities.

The second and equally important aspect considered while formulating the Act was that soldiers and officers of the Army needed

Owner’s pride: recently, SP’s Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal presented a copy of SP’s Military Yearbook 2009-2010 to Defence Minister A.K. Antony in New Delhi

backdrop, we should have expected a surge in building new military capabilities and capacities.

However, what we are observing is a military modernisation process plagued by inordinate delays with no accountability, supported by a convoluted defence procurement procedure which no one understands. An apt example is the procurement of 155mm howitzers for the artillery. Despite four sets of trials and blacklisting of two vendors till date, no

to be protected from prosecution for consequential actions taken against insurgents in ‘good faith’, as part of their counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist operations. While AFSPA provides such protection, the Act also contains the important caveat that Army personnel can be prosecuted with the sanction of the Central government, if their actions warrant it. There is therefore no blanket immunity from the laws of the land. Over the years, some Army personnel have indeed been prosecuted where a prima facie case existed. However, it is also true that due to the exceptional care which all Army commanders take when their troops are employed against insurgents, such cases are few and far between.

The Act initially covered the geographical area where counter-insurgency operations against the Naga insurgents were first

new artillery gun has been inducted in the Indian Army since the mid-1980s and the Army’s quest for long-range guns continues to be held hostage to delays and indecisions. The government’s penchant for transparency, honesty and virtue in all dealings is being exploited by the unscrupulous vendor to his advantage. The net result is endless series of conferences and meetings but to no avail.

Modernisation of the Indian military is being crippled by its own procedures and by the fears and dilemmas arising out of these procedures.

This issue carries the interview of the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Planning & Systems) and a number of incisive articles on Armed Forces Special Powers Act, artillery modernisation, battle management and net-centricity, information assurance, among others.

launched. After the initial employment in Nagaland, the employment of the Army in counter-insurgency tasks continued increasing, till it was progressively employed in all the North-eastern states for such tasks.

Along with such employment, AFSPA was also invoked in all affected states. When the insurgency erupted in Kashmir Valley, Jammu & Kashmir in 1990, the Act was extended to the Valley. Later, as the activities of the insurgents spread, first to the PoonchRajauri area, then to Doda and Bhadarwah and finally to the whole state, the entire state was brought under the purview of the Act in stages. It can thus be seen that AFSPA was invoked progressively, only when the situation required the employment of the Army.

Having explained the rationale for the enactment of the Act, let me now go into some

EDITOR’S COMMENTS The ongoing debate on the validity and legitimacy of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1990 (AFSPA) in Jammu and Kashmir, always tends to evoke emotional and wrathful responses by the bleeding hearts intelligentsia, least informed about the facts regarding the AFSPA. The essence of the AFSPA is briefly given in the ensuing subsequent paragraphs.

Important sections of the Act are as under: Section 3: It lays down the authority which has power to declare areas which are disturbed. These authorities are the Union government and state governments.

Section 4: Its gives the Army powers to search premises and make arrests without warrants, to use force even to the extent of causing death, destroy arms/ammunition dumps, fortifications/shelters/hideouts and to stop search and seize any vehicles.

Section 6: It stipulates that arrested persons and seized property is to be made over to the police with least possible delay.

Section 7: It offers protection of personnel acting in good faith in their official capacity.

Prosecution is permitted only after sanction of the Union government.

Scrutiny by Supreme Court The said Act in general and Sections 3, 4 and 6 in particular came up for scrutiny before a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the ‘Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights vs UoI’ case. The five-judge Constitution Bench elaborately dealt with the challenge to the legality of development of the Armed Forces Act in aid to civil power. The Court unambiguously ruled that AFSPA cannot be regarded as a colourable legislation or a fraud on the Constitution. The Apex Court considered and opined that conferring of powers vide Section 4 of AFSPA could not be held arbitrary or violation of Article 14, 19 or 21 of the Constitution. In fact, having considered the role and circumstances under which the armed forces have to operate, the Supreme Court extended the scope of powers vested vide 4 and 6 of AFSPA so as to include by implication the power to interrogate the person arrested. It also allowed the armed forces to retain the weapons seized during the operations in their own custody rather than to hand over to police authorities.

CrPC versus AFSPA

Soldiers and officers of the Army need to be protected from prosecution for consequential actions taken against insurgents

A perusal of the various powers available to the police authorities under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) vis-à-vis those available to the armed forces under AFSPA would reveal that the police authorities still enjoy more encompassing and wider powers relating to arrest, search, summoning of witnesses, preventive detention, etc, than the powers enjoyed by the Armed Forces.

Section 45 of the CrPC disallows arrest of public servants and Section 197 provides impunity against prosecution which is similar to Section 7 of the AFSPA. The Supreme Court has mandated a government sanction prior to initiating prosecution against personnel for excesses or killings committed during the maintenance of law and order.

The applicability of Section 45 of the CrPC is not allowed in the laws of the state of Jammu and Kashmir where the Ranbir Penal Code is applicable and ipso facto the personnel of armed forces can be arrested for any perceived excesses.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

specific details so that the reader can judge the necessity for the Act to remain in force, wherever the Army is employed for counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist operations.

The AFSPA has only seven paragraphs.

Sections 1 and 2 merely deal with the titles and definitions. Section 3 delineates the various entities which can declare an area as ‘disturbed’. A declaration is mandatory before AFSPA can be applied.

Sections 4 and 5 are the substantive sections, as they spell out the special powers to be conferred and the circumstances that must prevail for the conferring of such powers. There are a total of four special powers that the Act permits to specified personnel of the armed forces. The persons are commissioned officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers or their equivalents.

The four powers conferred on these personnel are–enter and search, arrest without warrant, destroy arms dumps or other fortifications, and fire or use force after due warning where possible.

Section 5 stipulates that the arrested persons are to be handed over to the police with the least possible delay, together with a report of the circumstances occasioning the arrest. Section 6 gives legal cover to the troops for any consequential action resulting from their actions while fighting the insurgents and terrorists. This paragraph also lays down the important caveat that Army personnel can be prosecuted with the sanction of the Central government, if their actions warrant it. There is therefore no blanket immunity from the laws of the land. The last paragraph is about repeal.

Let me conclude by emphasising that the Army has no desire to get embroiled in counter-insurgency tasks. It is not the job of the Army. However, despite over 50 years of insurgency in our country, the state police as well as the Central police organisations (CPOs) have not been made capable of tackling insurgency. Consequently, in each case, the Army was inducted to carry out counterinsurgency/terrorist operations. This is likely to be the norm in future too. If the national leadership tasks the Army for conducting such non-military operations, then it is incumbent on the leadership to also provide the legal wherewithal so that the Army is not constrained by lack of appropriate laws. It is only then that the operations will be conducted in the usual efficient manner of the Army and would be result-oriented. They must also be legally protected. It is because these two aspects have been covered in the Act, the Army has been neutralising the insurgents and terrorists, and has been able to restore a high degree of normalcy, enabling the political leaders and civil officials to restart governing in earnest.

The writer is a former Vice Chief of the Indian Army

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>>

INTERVIEW

‘Efforts are on to design and develop indigenously as also acquire transfer of technology’ Lt General J.P. Singh is the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Planning & Systems) and is responsible for equipping and developing the capability of the Indian Army. In an exclusive interview to SP’s Land Forces, General Singh spoke on various aspects of the procurement procedure of new weapons and defence systems.

PHOTOGRAPH: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns

www.spslandforces.net

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): How has your tenure in the Integrated Defence Staff helped you in comprehending the problems in the assignments of DCOAS (P&S)?

Lt General J.P. Singh: As the Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), I was heading the Policy Planning & Force Development Branch. The Branch was responsible for drafting long-term integrated perspective plan (LTIPP) of the three services, supervising overall budget analysis, and management of acquisition, procurement and technology related functions.

As the Chairman of the Services Capital Acquisition Plan Coordination Committee (SCAPCC), I was responsible for detailed vetting of all procurement cases of the three services at the inception stage and thereafter as the member Secretary of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), I recorded the acceptance of necessity (AoN).

This experience covers over 50 per cent of my current job content. Further, through the experience in my previous tenure, I bring forth the best practices of the other services to my current assignment.

SP’s: The procurement of new weapons and other defence systems takes an inordinately long period of time. What are the measures being taken within the services and within the IDS/MoD to overcome this drawback?

DCOAS: The Defence Procurement Procedure 2008 (DPP 08) (Revised) states at Appendix C to Chapter 1 that the normal time taken from accord of AoN to signing of contract will be 24 to 30 months, i.e., if there are no slippages in major steps. This is an ideal timeframe for procurement under ‘Buy’ and ‘Buy & Make’ categories, whether ex-Global or Indian.

For Design & Development (D&D) cases, which involve DRDO and the DPSUs/PSUs, the procurement time depends on the time taken for fructification of the design into a prototype, approval of the prototype in field trials and thereafter, production by the nominated Production Agency (PA). This generally takes a long time. Likewise, acquisitions under the ‘Make’ and ‘Buy & Make’ (Indian), are yet to stabilise.

The measures being taken to compress the time taken in new acquisition cases are as follows: l Till AoN Stage: Request for Information (RFI) placement on the MoD website, formulation of General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR) based on RFI response, approval of Services proposals

by SCAP Committees/DPB/DAC are being implemented on time. l Post-AoN Stage: The process of procurement post-AoN stage is a cautiously measured process and with longer timelines involving issue of request for proposal (RFP), TEC, composite trials, GS evaluation and CNC. Though the process is well defined in DPP 2008, the implementation in many cases gets adversely affected due to lack of multi-vendor par-

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the nodal agency in formulating JSQRs and monitoring indigenous development.

SP’s: What is the state of our battlefield surveillance radars BFSRs at the unit and formation level?

DCOAS: In consonance with the multilayered, multi-medium surveillance policy and design, medium- and short-range BFSRs, in scaled quantity, are available from highest formation HQs in field to unit level.

The coverage of BFSRs in our inventory is notable. With the induction of battlefield surveillance system the gridded information in an institutionalised manner will be available both laterally and horizontally.

SP’s: Recent media reports have given the impression that consequent to the comparative trials of the MBT Arjun with the T-90 tank, the Army has reversed its earlier stand and is now prepared to induct additional Arjuns beyond the figure of 124 which had been contracted earlier. What is their current status and what are the reasons for the change of policy, if any?

DCOAS: Arjun tank and Tank T-90 are two different weight class of MBTs. The two tanks were put through trials for validation of some vital operational parameters. In these trials, the Arjun tanks achieved the operational standards set for the equipment in terms of mobility in the desert area and firepower. Therefore, in sync with our perspective planning for mechanised forces, additional Arjun Mk II, which will have significant upgrades, will be inducted in the Army for operational employment in sectors identified by the Army.

SP’s: Have we identified the type of light tanks we require for the Eastern theatre and what is the status of procurement?

DCOAS: Mechanical forces vision document and perspective planning includes induction of light tanks meant for specific areas. The Provisional General Staff Qualitative Requirements for the light tank exists and will be ratified shortly.

ticipation with most vendors not having the capabilities to produce products in time for trials or disqualification of the certain OEMs under vigilance scan.

SP’s: What is the current status of artillery’s equipment profile which has been adversely reflected even in the print media? What is the status of procurement of 155mm guns and howitzers, both self-propelled and towed variety for the plains and the mountains?

DCOAS: The artillery’s vision translated into a 15 years perspective plan is well constructed.

Plans to enlarge surveillance and target acquisition (SATA) capabilities to procure advanced long-range missiles, rockets, towed and selfpropelled (SP) guns are on track.

Trials of wheeled SP guns are in progress.

Towed gun trials have been put on hold due to emergence of a single vendor situation at trials stage. RFP for mounted guns system is under issue. We are optimistic that artillery’s

field gun modernisation programme will positively stabilise in the near future.

A letter of request (LOR) for trial evaluation of 155mm ultra light HOW for procurement through foreign military sales (FMS) from USA has been initiated. Trials are likely to commence shortly.

SP’s: Does the Army have a policy for UAVs? What are the various types that we are currently contemplating?

DCOAS: Army has a logical vision towards inducting a variety of UAVs to enhance surveillance abilities in strategic, operational and tactical depth. These UAVs depending on the reach and endurance will be operated at different levels of command. However, the data links will be so structured that any significant detection by any UAV will get transmitted in real time to who needs it.

Since UAVs are being acquired by all three services and Coast Guard, HQ IDS is

SP’s: The overhaul of our T-72 tank fleet is behind schedule by many years. How is this issue being tackled? Are we involving the domestic industry in our quest for timely completion of this work?

DCOAS: Tank T-72 M is a frontline battle tank of the Indian Army. The focus is on sizeable upgrades on T-72. In addition, the mission reliability is being ensured through layered OH schedules. To prevent slippages at Base overhaul (D level) schedule, the capacities at HVF and Army Base workshop is being enhanced. In addition, a capability definition document is being prepared to evaluate abilities of domestic defence industry to undertake base OH for T-72s.

SP’s: Reconnaissance and surveillance troops and platoons of armoured regiments and mechanised infantry units respectively can be excellent assets in war, if equipped appropri-

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INTERVIEW

ately. Is anything being done in this regard?

DCOAS: Reconnaissance and surveillance abilities at all levels are being upgraded through induction of suitable platforms, stateof-the-art electronic devices and training of personnel. The GSQR of light armoured multipurpose vehicle is in its final stages of ratification. Reconnaissance troops of armoured regiments and mechanised infantry units are on the priority list of upgradation, some of which exist and some are in pipeline.

SP’s: It seems that the modernisation and growth of Army aviation for current and future requirements is largely on paper at present.

What is our vision in this regard and how far have we progressed in achieving it? What is the state of Cheetah and Chetak helicopters?

When are they likely to be replaced?

DCOAS: Army Aviation, since its inception, is a valued, potent, integral force providing combat and combat service support to the Army through the medium of air. The Indian Army perspective plan defines the Army Aviation enlarged role very logically. The growth of Army Aviation is largely happening.

The Army Aviation began by operating communication and utility helicopters in 1986 and was to grow in phases, with experience. Army Aviation will shortly get replacement of frontline Cheetah/Chetak. It is already operating twin-engine ALHs. In the near future it will be equipped with weaponised ALHs. As it gains experience and simultaneously personnel cadre and servicecum-repair echelons enlarge, more induction of platforms which are vital for integrated battle in tactical area will happen.

SP’s: The Army needs dedicated attack helicopters operated by the Army in direct support of the field formations in war. The present arrangement of operational control is most unsatisfactory. Is anything being done in this regard?

DCOAS: Attack helicopter is a manoeuvre arm of the land forces and is best employed as part of ground operations in tactical battle area (TBA). There is no ambiguity in the doctrine, concept, and employment of attack helicopters as far as the Indian Air Force and Indian Army are concerned.

Army Aviation is gradually enlarging its manpower, support cadre and scope for employment. The experience it is gaining on single engine armed helicopter and soon it will be operating twin-engine armed helicopters, will enable it to operate aerial platforms which enhance the manoeuvre and destruction in TBA. SP’s: What is the status of the project FINSAS? If it is a part of the battlefield management system, why is it being handled by the Infantry Directorate instead of the Director General Information Systems? How will we ensure the compatibility of the two, in all respects, if different directorates are going to handle it?

DCOAS: The FINSAS integrates weapon subsystem, target acquisition sub-system, radio

sub-system and computer sub-system.

Around the world, soldier modernisation programmes are pitched at the Infantry platoon/company level while their BMS carries out integration of assets, especially in a mechanised environment.

BMS being developed by DGIS would ensure net-centricity in the tactical battle area by provisioning of common operational picture (COP) and situational awareness.

FINSAS is being executed in phases and interoperability between FINSAS and the BMS is being ensured. This will truly transform the infantry into a modern and versatile arm.

SP’s: What are the efforts being made for modernisation of Infantry at unit and sub-unit levels with particular reference to firepower, mobility, surveillance and reconnaissance, and night fighting capability?

DCOAS: This aspect is being pursued most vigorously. We are in the process of procuring modern goggles, weapon systems and night sights. For mobility, as per the new B vehicle policy, categorisation of light vehicle GS 4x4 and preparation of GSQR of light specialist vehicle is in progress.

SP’s: It seems that the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) has now been given a mandate which is renewable every five years. What is the modernisation plan of the RR and what force multipliers are you planning to induct in the future which will facilitate greater efficiency in its operational employment?

DCOAS: RR modernisation is keeping pace with the modernisation of Infantry and is in line with operational requirements of CI/CT environment. Their capability development focuses on enhancements in protection and mobility, intelligence and surveillance capability, communication and firepower.

Acquisition of better quality light weight bullet proof jackets and ballistic helmets is being undertaken to improve protection.

Towards better mobility, light bullet proof vehicles and mine protection vehicles are being procured.

Intelligence and surveillance domain focuses on enhancing individual soldier combat effectiveness and survival by providing him optical, TI and holographic sights for personal weapons including automatic grenade launchers in the near future. In addition, upgraded communication means are being inducted.

SP’s: Modernisation of Army Air Defence Artillery has been neglected for a long time.

What is our policy to replace obsolete guns and missile systems of the Army?

DCOAS: Army Air Defence is following a twin approach of sustenance of the existing inventory through qualitative upgradation and induction of modern weapons to counter futuristic threats.

The AD guns are being upgraded with state-of-the-art electro optical fire control system and drive while the associated sur-

veillance, fire control, communication and battlefield management systems are being revamped. Current night blindness is being addressed and new training and target systems are being inducted.

The perspective plan of AAD envisages a layered and tiered defence employing integrated family of weapon systems which include state-of-the-art guns, very shortrange, short-range and medium-range surface-to-air-missiles. Induction of these is gathering momentum.

SP’s: Is the capital budget being provided every year adequate for the modernisation and transformational needs of the Army?

DCOAS: The current allocation of capital budget is adequate. However, once major acquisitions happen and also OFB production lines increase their output, the contractual liability (CL) will increase, warranting increase in capital allocation. I appreciate that this increase in allocation would be required from 2012-13 onwards.

SP’s: Considering the likelihood of employment of the Indian Army in internal security operations in the future, are we equipping our units with surveillance, communications and other systems which would be pertinent for our operational needs in such circumstances? What peculiarities do you foresee in this regard which would require a different focus for the infantry?

DCOAS: Infantry, in particular RR, is deployed in active CI/CT operations. The current modernisation plan is focused on enhancing surveillance, communications, strike and survival capabilities.

Internal security operations necessitate employment of non-lethal weapons, procurement of which is under process. With an aim to improve survival capabilities, mine protection vehicles (MPVs) are already inducted and trials on bullet proof vehicles is in progress. The complete procurement programme has been planned to ensure that the Infantry is well-equipped for the entire spectrum of conflict.

SP’s: Army’s effort at achieving networkcentricity has been adversely affected by the non-availability of the tactical communication system (TCS) at the level of the Corps and below? How far away are we from this capability?

DCOAS: Network enablement will happen through inter-workability within the various existing communication systems to meet our operational requirements.

Future battlespace and asymmetric warfare require a shift from voice to datacentric platforms which allow network-centricity. Indian Army has formalised a framework to develop the same indigenously.

Projects like MCCS, WiMax, DCN, etc are in the process of implementation. Tactical communication system (TCS) for TBA is a development case and IPMT for the same has been convened under MoD (Acqn) in September 2009.

SP’s: Special Forces (SF) have a major role to play in meeting national, transnational and non-traditional challenges to our security and in raising the stakes for our adversaries to meddle in our internal matters. How well is this force equipped?

DCOAS: The force structure of the SF is being augmented keeping future threats in mind.

The force level of SF is being increased and the command and control being reviewed.

Modernisation of the force is under progress and is being undertaken at a very fast pace.

The capability of the SF is being enhanced with the acquisition of the heavy drop platform/equipment, combat free all equipment (CFF), light strike vehicle (LSV), integration of aerial platforms with superior flying capabilities, provision of 100 per cent night fighting capability, better fire support weapons and improved surveillance and designation equipment.

SP’s: What are your views on procuring equipment from the FMS route? What are the advantages of such procurements? Are there any disadvantages in following this route?

DCOAS: FMS is a standard procedure for sale of military equipment by the US to its strategic partners. Its main advantage is that the state-of-the-art equipment which is in service in the US armed forces is available through government-to-government agreement. No trials are mandatory, though due to our terrain and environment conditions we would like to evaluate equipment under our operational conditions. It also caters for maintenance requirements of equipment during its complete life cycle.

This system can be used to fill up our critical equipment voids. The Indian Army has ventured into major equipment purchase through this route in the procurement of weapon locating radar. The Navy and Air Force have very recently concluded same major deals through this route. Challenges with respect to transfer of technology (ToT), for which US is very selective, still remain.

I am hopeful that with relationship between the two countries maturing, the US will respond positively to our requests.

SP’s: Considering the importance of precision munitions in the future, are we planning to have a greater percentage of precision munitions in the artillery?

DCOAS: One of the major issues reflected in RMA is the induction of precision ammunition resulting in decapitation of target without much collateral damage. TGMs, SFM, weaponisation of UAVs and loitering munitions are some procurement that have been initiated and are in advanced stages.

Establishment of UAV bases and acquisition of hand-held target designators is also under way.

Efforts are on to design and develop indigenously as also acquire ToT for such ammunition which would provide a fillip to the technology base in the country and have multi-faceted utility.

Advanced Capability

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Several improvements have been brought about in the design of the Advanced Patriot anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile defence system to enhance its capabilities vis-à-vis the earlier variant n JOSEPH G. GARRETT III Vice President and Deputy Patriot Programs Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) Today’s Patriot Air and Missile Defense System is the result of continual technology upgrades and ongoing modernisation. Contracts for new-build fire units and upgrades to currently fielded systems led to the complete modernisation of Patriot, thereby, improving

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capabilities, eliminating obsolescence and enabling an open, netted and distributed architecture. This created a truly next-generation Patriot.

Some of the significant improvements include Patriot software and hardware components, such as the radar digital processor (RDP), modern adjunct processor (MAP), modern man station (MMS) as well as integration of the Patriot advanced capability-3 (PAC-3) and missile segment enhancement (MSE) missile integration.

The introduction of the new RDP provides the added benefit of digital track via missile (TVM) guidance. It also eliminates obsolete components within the Patriot radar,

provides a twelve-fold improvement in meantime between failure and increases radar processing efficiency over the existing Configuration-3 radar.

The modern adjunct processor vastly improves the computing power of the Patriot system and sets the conditions for future technology insertions.

The MMS replaces current cathode ray tube (CRT) technology with 30 inch colour LCD displays with touch screens and introduces soft keys to enable future switch configurations and tactical screens via software upgradation. This will lead to more rapid and efficient tactical decisions and decrease the probability of confusion and fratricide.

S P E C I A L O P E R AT I O N S <<

The Asymmetric Battlefield We need officers in Special Forces who are physically and mentally tough, out of the box thinkers with high initiative, have sharp intellect with creative intelligence, high on adaptability, ready to give/accept blunt advice, able to learn from subordinates in addition to seniors and peers, courageous as a lion, cunning as a fox and techno-savvy to exploit technology PHOTOGRAPH: Indian Army

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

Conflict Scenario

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he term Special Forces generates considerable ambiguity in large cross-sections in India where even three decades back sloppy security guards stood outside the shops in Connaught Place sporting olive green uniforms, maroon berets, shoulder titles of Commando/Special Forces and brass on their epaulettes. Certain sections of the military, including some senior level officers too fail to differentiate between Special Forces and Special Operations Forces. In recent years and especially following 26/11, a host of paramilitary and police forces have been raised (e.g. Grey Hounds, Cobra Force) that are being loosely referred to as Special Forces, a misnomer. In our context, Special Forces actually are the Special Forces of the Army, Marine Commandos (MARCOS) of the Navy, the fledgling Garud of the Air Force, Special Action Groups (SAGs) of the National Security Guard (NSG) and Special Groups (SGs) of the Special Frontier Force (SFF); the SAGs and SG being 100 per cent Army personnel on deputation to NSG and SFF.

Asymmetric and fourth generation wars are and will continue to be the order of the day. These will invariably be ongoing or will be launched prior to or in conjunction with conventional and nuclear wars.

What needs to be understood is that asymmetric and fourth generation wars are waged against a nation and not against the

military alone and that the response too has to be at a national level. Special Forces have a major role in such type of conflict situations and as India is doing, should not be confined to one’s own territory till the outbreak of conventional war, but should be employed to “shape the asymmetric battlefield” in our favour.

Threats and challenges facing us relate to terrorism (through land, sea and air), border management and maritime security including security of offshore assets, apart from conventional and nuclear threats. Asymmetric forces have emerged with greater strategic value over conventional or nuclear forces. This will continue in the foreseeable future. Our continued reliance on conventional and nuclear forces implies a distinct disadvantage to India. The military is bracing itself for a two-front war (Pakistan and China) in addition to asymmetric threats that are transnational and non-traditional, but plenty of ground needs to be covered for successful implementation of this new doctrine. The changing nature of out of area contingencies (OOACs) and the increasingly important dimensions of cyber and space wars also need to be factored in.

Our faultlines (the biggest created by Maoists/Naxals affecting 180 districts in 17 states), particularly the homegrown insurgencies, are being aided, abetted, exploited and controlled by Pakistan and China, adroitly, advertently and inadvertently.

Notwithstanding the current exuberance of

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>> S P E C I A L O P E R AT I O N S Aman ki Asha with Pakistan and periodic Hindi-Chini camaraderie slogans, our adversaries relentlessly seek ways to mitigate India’s power and status through asymmetric war. We may demilitarise Jammu & Kashmir hoping for Aman (peace) with Pakistan, but while Nobel Peace Prizes may be conferred on both sides, we should be prepared for replication/shifting of the terrorist infrastructure from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) to Jammu and Kashmir with horrendous consequences. That is the precise reason why Pakistan has not dismantled the terrorist infrastructure in PoK and has ceded 5,164 sq km of Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir to China. The jihad factory in Pakistan runs full steam with some 32,000 madrassas producing millions of neo-drones. As per Pakistan’s own media “This is a monstrous experiment in brainwashing and it is on a par with, if not worse than, Nazi Germany’s eugenics.”

Hopefully, the significance of de-militarisation of Jammu and Kashmir before Pakistan dismantles the terrorist infrastructure in PoK and reins in Lashakr e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Taliban and the like and the ISI is understood by the powers that be no matter pressure for dialogue in US national interests.

Special Forces have a major role to play in meeting these transnational to our security and in raising the stakes for Pakistan and China to meddle in our internal matters. We have failed to exploit the potential of our Special Forces and have sought solace in successful hinterland operations like Hill Kaka, something which the regular infantry could have achieved.

Employment and Tasking Special Forces should be employed as force multipliers to complement the tasks performed by conventional forces, entailing high risk and high gain missions having minimum visibility. More importantly, in the non-war period, they should be used to continuously shape the battlefield for asymmetric and fourth generation wars to conventional wars in a nuclear backdrop.

Their employment should preferably be theatre specific. Their strategic tasking should be in concert with national security objectives, which requires control, tasking and coordination at the highest level.

Numerous examples exist of foreign special forces employed as strategic assets.

Selous Scouts raised in Rhodesia in 1973 were responsible for 68 per cent of all terrorists killed in the six-year Bush War at a cost of only 40 Scouts. British SAS has been operating in Iraq, Afghanistan and some African countries. Russia’s Spetsnaz are entrenched in CIS and Eastern bloc countries in one form or another. US Special Forces (USSF) were employed in Afghanistan and in Iraq a year and a half prior to the invasion and are reportedly inside Iran for the past four years. Incidentally, USSF operates in almost 160 countries though fighting only in Afghanistan and Iraq. Core tasks of foreign special forces have been direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defence, unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation of WMDs, civil affairs operation, psychological operations, and information operations.

The USSF too engages in the under men-

India’s Special Forces Indian Special Forces (military, expanded NSG and SFF) total in the region to over 20,000, much more than the uniformed strength of USSF, but not even one-tenth their capabilities. Significantly, during peak hostilities in Iraq, only 900-1,200 USSF personnel were employed simultaneously. Special Operations Command of the US has strength of only 13,000-plus, of which the Psychological Operations Teams and Civil Affairs Teams are not fighting men. Foreign armies expand Special Forces very deliberately. After 9/11, the US expanded its Special Forces only by 750. UK went in only for an addition of a 650 strong Special Forces Support Group. Pakistan has added a fourth SSG unit in recent years.

In our case, the Army already has seven Special Forces battalions and plans to add another two. By rapidly expanding our Special Forces, we have actually diluted their capabilities; sans requisite manpower, train-

PHOTOGRAPH: Indian Army

Special Forces are a vital element of national power possessing capability of enormous freedom of action in methodology of execution in operations and should be employed to meet present and future challenges Role

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tity; third, special forces cannot be mass produced; fourth, competent special forces cannot be created after emergencies arise. India has consistently flouted these global truths.

Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Army went in for unprecedented expansion of its Special Forces adding four Special Forces battalions to its then existing three in a short span of time. Similarly, post-26/11, mass expansion of the NSG has been ongoing which is at the cost of dilution of manpower, shortage of officers, inadequate weapons and equipment and inadequate training.

Stephen Cohen wrote in The Idea of Pakistan, “The task of Special Forces is the proxy application of force at low and precisely calculated levels, the objective being to achieve some political effect, not a battlefield victory.” In contrast, we have been looking at battlefield victories. Special Forces are not tactical tools for conventional war. They have wide applications throughout the spectrum of conflict including facing challenges of terrorism, information, asymmetric and NBC warfare. They can produce high results with no/very low signatures and can be used as a controlled response along the escalatory ladder in the emerging strategic environment. They should be central to asymmetric response that does not equate automatically to physical attack. The key lies in achieving strategic objectives through application of modest resources exploiting the psychological component.

Other than limited employment in conventional wars and routine UN deployments, our Special Forces have been actively employed abroad only as part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka. The ideal response to asymmetric threats is adoption of a proactive strategy ensuring prevention of any attack against Indian assets/national interests, using Special Forces as the spearhead. We have been consistently defensive resulting in being labelled as a “soft state” and boosting our adversaries to bleed us with impunity.

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tioned undeclared tasks: l Conduct proactive, sustained “manhunting” and disruption operations globally. l Build partner capacity in relevant ground, air and maritime capabilities in scores of countries on a steady-state basis. l Help generate persistent ground, air and maritime surveillance and strike coverage over “under-governed” areas and littoral zones. l Employ unconventional warfare against state-sponsored terrorism and transnational terrorist groups globally.

The Special Services Group (SSG) of Pakistan has been gainfully used as strategic assets in Afghanistan, Jammu and Kashmir, Bangladesh and Nepal. Like the SSG, we need to understand that Special Forces do not create resistance movements, but advise, train and assist the resistance movements already in existence. Indian Special Forces should primarily look beyond our borders to nip asymmetric threats in the bud and to control the fault lines of our adversaries.

Their tasks should include asymmetric warfare, unconventional/fourth generation warfare, special operations, reconnaissance, psychological operations, counter proliferation, and the like.

The Truth There are four universally accepted global truths with regard to special forces. First, humans are more important than hardware; second, quality is better than quan-

ing, weapons and equipment. Not only it is not possible to mass produce Special Forces rapidly, not going in for commensurate expansion of requisite training infrastructure makes the situation even worse if we are to waste this strategic asset on counter-terrorist tasks within the country. It will take years of focused effort before the Special Forces Training School catches up with the advance training requirements of the expanded Army Special Forces.

Manpower is the most important ingredient of any Special Force. This is perhaps the reason that comprehensive probationcum-continuation training programmes are established world over. These range from 3-4 to even 12 months. The SSG of Pakistan probates a volunteer over a nine-month schedule in all types of terrain before he is allowed to wear the SSG beret. Following a comprehensive study in 2001, six month probation for all ranks was introduced for our Army Special Forces. However, this was cut down to three months for officers due to rapid expansion and overall shortages; a retrograde step. Describing the SSG of the 1960s, Stephen Cohen writes, “The cutting edge was in Special Forces. This required a new kind of officer, one with good language skills, initiative, and political judgment.”

Apart from regular professional competence, we need officers in Special Forces who are physically and mentally tough, out of the box thinkers with high initiative, have sharp intellect with creative intelligence, high on

adaptability, ready to give/accept blunt advice, able to learn from subordinates in addition to seniors and peers, courageous as a lion, cunning as a fox and techno-savvy to exploit technology. At present, our Army Special Forces have over 60 per cent shortage of officers. This state is unlikely to improve unless the mandatory requirement of commanding officers countersigning the applications of officers volunteering for Special Forces is removed. Equipping of our Special Forces too is very slow and does not follow the packaged concept. Vital equipment like hand-held laser target designators is yet to be procured. Besides the gestation period of equipping being excruciatingly long, by the time the weapons and equipment are acquired, Special Forces expand further resulting in sharing of resources.

Intelligence is the key to Special Forces operations. Employment of Special Forces, particularly in asymmetric and fourth generation war scenarios, requires tremendous inter-agency coordination. Acquisition, collation and timely dissemination of intelligence are major grey areas repeatedly highlighted during various crisis situations including 26/11. Hopefully, the NATGRID and National Counterterrorism Centre will address these aspects. We need to establish the means for automated intelligence gathering and analysis, short-, medium- and long-term assessments supported by an automated decision support system and finally real time online dissemination along with a common operating picture to all concerned, for which information technologies exist.

Training is vital for success in operations. Joint training of all Special Forces particularly joint operations training between the Military Special Forces and the SFF and between Military Special Forces and the NSG needs to be instituted. Such training should be periodic and based on likely asymmetric and non-traditional challenges. Regularising the SFF also needs to be considered seriously.

Strategic employment of Special Forces to counter asymmetric and fourth generation wars would require the express sanction of the Prime Minister himself as in the case of the US where the President authorises such actions. However, we first need a national doctrine and strategy for employment of Special Forces plus an apex organisation to oversee their manning, equipping, training, consolidation, operational intelligence, inter-agency synergy and strategic tasking.

The initiative will have to be taken by the military with adequate safeguards to cross bureaucratic hurdles. Military Special Forces and the SFF should look primarily outwards in response to transnational asymmetric and fourth generation warfare threats.

Silent and Effective Special Forces provide us the tools to address non-traditional challenges to our security by providing an effective medium to achieve security objectives. Success and effectiveness of Special Forces can be multiplied by formulation of a well worked-out strategy for their employment. Establishment of a streamlined command and control structure, streamlining the lines of authority, secure and seamless communication links, enhanced inter-agency coordination for intelligence gathering and sharing and establishment of a national inter-agency database for intelligence are some of the steps which will assist rapid decisionmaking. Diplomacy and conventional war cannot contend with asymmetric wars. We need to develop a deterrent to asymmetric and fourth generation war and the ability to demonstrate it when required. Special Forces are a vital element of national power possessing capability of enormous freedom of action in methodology of execution in operations and should be fruitfully employed to successfully meet present and future challenges.

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F O U RT H O F A SE R I ES O F S I X A RT I C L ES O N BATT L E F I E L D M A N A G E M E N T SYST E M

For Speedy Command & Control Considering that terrorism is here to stay and insurgencies can hardly be wished away, we need to be prepared against these threats compounded by asymmetric warfare being waged by our adversaries ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

An artist’s impression of network-centric warfare

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onflict situations require superior battlefield transparency, handling of information and efficient command and control set-up, all in a telescoped observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) cycle. The side which is more aware will have the decisive advantage. Successful execution of fast-moving operations will require an accelerated decision-action cycle and an ability to conduct operations simultaneously, especially in combined/joint operations. Commanders at all levels particularly at the cutting edge level require requisite information in real or near real time. In order to enhance operational effectiveness of commanders and troops, information technology needs to be harnessed to act as a force multiplier to enable exchange, filtering, and processing of digital information through due integration. The Indian Army has embarked on a project for acquiring a battlefield management system (BMS) that will serve modern battlefield requirements at the battalion/regiment and below pan-Army level with links down to every soldier and weapon platform.

Equipping of all battalions/regiments of the Indian Army with the BMS is expected to be completed by 2017-18. The big question is whether this project of the Army will meet the battlefield requirements of our nation considering that the boundaries of the classic battlefield of yore have blurred long since, and the Army is only one component for responding to asymmetric threats.

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Battlefield Management System At present, situational awareness and battlefield management in the Indian Army are ad hoc, sans integration. No integration tool is available to support military users from individual soldier to battalion group/combat group commander in the tactical battle area (TBA), which can provide in near real time an appropriate, common and comprehensive tactical picture by integration of inputs from all elements of the battle group. In the battlefield, the essential requirement is to pick up the enemy much before he picks you up, see the target, and direct fire in quick time using the best weaponry available plus monitor the post-strike effects. In this backdrop, fielding of the BMS was considered a vital facet of capability building in the Army. Fielding of the BMS will enable faster decision-making by commanders at all echelons, better decision due to reliable operational information provided in real time and the ability to quickly close the sensor to shooter loop.

Project BMS involves integration, testing and fielding a BMS duly integrated with other components of the tactical command, control, communications and information (Tac C3I) system. The concept aims to exploit technology for mission accomplishment in the TBA through rapid acquisition, processing and transfer of information, enhancing situational awareness, acquiring capability to react to information, sharpening ability to synchronise and direct fire, thereby establishing and maintaining operational tempo.

Capabilities required of the BMS would be—first, provide a command and control system spanning the TBA spreading across individuals, detachments, combat platforms, sensors, sub-units, units to the battalion commander/regiment commander; second, achieve faster reaction capability and flexibility in command and control by providing information automatically at the right place in the right time, thereby compressing the

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OODA loop; third, provide a strong foundation for making decisions based on near real time, consistent and well-structured information, thereby enhancing the information handling capability of commanders; fourth, strengthen information exchange by having a strong messaging and replication mechanism; fifth, improve and modernise presentation of information, and sixth, integrate with other command and control system.

The BMS will be integrated to the Tac C3I System through the command information decision support system (CIDSS). The infantry is to handle computer and radio sub-systems plus software integration of Project F-INSAS by themselves. This is a folly as this phase of F-INSAS should be part of the BMS which will ensure ab initio army-wide integration at battalion/regiment and below level. The latter approach would also be much more cost saving and reduce the development time as well.

If the Infantry continue on their own, then yet another project would have to be initiated to integrate the F-INSAS with the BMS. The BMS will comprise a tactical handheld computer with individual soldiers and tactical computers at battle group headquarters and combat vehicles. Computers will be integrated employing application and database servers connected on a data enabled communication network. The system will enable generation of a common operational picture (COP) by integrating inputs from all relevant sources within a battle group through integrated use of GIS and GPS. It will be highly mobile with ability to network itself by integration of components and provide a high data rate. The communications should not interfere with legacy communication equipment and should easily be retrofitted into combat platforms. It should have voice and data including video streaming and imaging facility optimally utilising the bandwidth available.

Conflict Dimensions As a counter to powerful states with high technology weapon systems, weaker states in conjunction with non-state actors have chosen the option of asymmetric conflict through a mix of regular and irregular forces, terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla warfare, simultaneously exploiting technology, networks, cyber space, political manoeuvres and media. As far back as August 2001, in a regional conference on Security in South East Asia held in Dhaka, Lt General Javed Has-

san, Commandant of the National Defence College and Dr Shirin Mazari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, both from institutions enjoying Pakistan government’s patronage, vehemently stressed that in today’s world, low intensity conflict and unconventional means like guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, including the use of terror, economic warfare and indirect intervention in the territory of a rival state, were the more viable options to a conventional war.

The focus of wars and conflicts today is more on the achievement of political objectives rather than only destruction of enemy combat potential. The spectrum of conflict can range from conflicts between states to conflict with non-state actors and proxies.

Boundaries between regular and irregular warfare have blurred. Non-state actors/ groups are increasingly acquiring conventional capabilities that were earlier the exclusive preserve of national armies. Today, conventional war may be superimposed on ongoing asymmetric war. Alternatively, conventional conflict could either be preceded or succeeded by a period of irregular conflict that would require low intensity conflict (LIC) and stabilisation operations.

Today’s conflict situations show the most effective response from a state against superior operational power of an opponent, crafty diplomacy, wily espionage, terrorism (including cyber terrorism), low intensity conflict or proxy war, employment of weapons of mass destruction including dirty/chemical/radiological bombs through non-state actors and a host of other asymmetric approaches. The principles of asymmetric war are not to use armed forces to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will but use all means including armed forces, military and non-military, lethal and non-lethal measures to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests. This in the context of the resurrected dialogue with Pakistan, without the latter having dismantled its terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and not even showing serious consideration to punish the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack.

Maoists have created the greatest fault line covering some 220 districts and seriously affecting seven states, a situation exploitable or more candidly being exploited by our adversaries. Despite the ongoing dialogue between India and Pakistan, the latter has no apparent intention of shutting down the terrorist infrastructure in POK and desist from asymmetric war against India. The Maoists have links with the Maoists of Nepal, while the latter draw their inspiration and support from China. Chinese origin weaponry is reaching the Maoists through South and Southeast Asia, while media has also been reporting about ULFA bases and training on Chinese soil.

It requires little intelligence to deduce that in the current state of asymmetric war being waged against India, the battlefield can be anywhere both within and outside the country. It requires even less intelligence to surmise that given our defensive mentality and outdated reliance on conventional response to state-sponsored asymmetric threats, the battlefields largely will be within our own territory. Gloating over an odd US remark against Pakistan will not inhibit the latter sponsoring terrorism against us or even dismantle terror factories in PoK. The current state of Maoist insurgency may just be the tip of the iceberg.

Future multiple 26/11 type simultaneous attacks are a reality. Technology has empowered the individual and today a single terrorist/guerrilla can cause severe damage notwithstanding the fear of non-state actors acquiring WMDs including those of the ‘dirty bomb’ variety. Today’s terrorist is educated, techno-savvy, can exploit cyber space and merge in the urban milieu.

Managing the Battlefield While we have dwelt on the battlefields including the fact that besides occasional chance of conventional conflict most of these battlefields will be within our territory, what forces then will constitute the Indian response? In the North and North-east, we have had a mix of the military, paramilitary forces (PMF) and Central police forces (CPOs) and police forces contending with LIC since the past few decades. Operation Green Hunt against the Maoists saw the combined forces of the Border Security Force (BSF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in action. States have gone in for specific counter-terrorist/counter-insurgency forces of their own, examples being Grey Hounds of Andhra Pradesh and recent addition of a SWAT team in Maharashtra. The National Security Guard (NSG) with its proliferating hubs will invariably come into action whenever a major terrorist attack occurs. The Special Group (SG) of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) too has similar counter-terrorist tasks. In the above backdrop, will the acquisition of a BMS by the Indian Army suffice at the cutting edge for the battlefields in India?

The answer should be a resounding ‘No’.

While the modernisation of PMF and police forces is being given due attention now, courtesy setbacks to CPOs battling Maoists, the aspect of battlefield management too must be given urgent attention as well for the PMF, CPOs and specific counter-terrorist/ counter-insurgency forces.

Battlefield India Besides conventional wars, India has been contending with low intensity conflict and terrorist attacks including through statesponsored non-state actors since the past few decades. While some 30-odd terrorist organisations are operating in the country, the

Required Focus The Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Security Advisor, the Cabinet Secretariat and the Cabinet Committee for Security need to focus on the following : l Examine and establish the need for a BMS

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for non-military security forces to cope with the present/future threats and for ensuring success in battle against terrorists/insurgents.

Identify and prioritise PMF, CPOs and specific police units tasked with anti-terrorist/anti-insurgency tasks that need to be equipped with a BMS. Of the PMF, it would be prudent that BMS for the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and Infantry (TA) is included in Project BMS of the Indian Army while for the Assam Rifles (AR) and the Coast Guard, development be undertaken under aegis of MHA. Overall development and fielding of the BMS in non-military security forces should be under MHA supervision to ensure national level net-centricity least a situation arises where all these forces go on developing their own BMS for the next decade and then think about integrating them, costing avoidable expenditure and more importantly time which is already at a premium, an example being movement of Maoists being picked up but lack of situational awareness in real/near time to CPOs battling them.

BMS in non-military security forces should be a suitable application on an intuitive operating system with GIS suitability customised to meet operational requirements. The voice and data communications should always be up. Computer hardware should be rugged and non-obtrusive with retrofitment maintaining platform integrity. System integration should include application software, data links with radio systems,

We need to accelerate the development and fielding of the BMS as part of essential capability building of the PMF, CPOs and specific police units

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integration of all available sensors plus UAV data/satellite imagery, etc.

Upward connectivity of the BMS of the non-military security forces through their chain of command should be to the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) linked up through NATGRID. State level State Counter Terrorism Centres (SCTCs) as and when they come up, axiomatically as part of the state level Unified Headquarters (UHQs), would need to be networked into this grid.

The NCTC linking all national level intelligence agencies would need capabilities of automated intelligence collection, automated analysis, analyses (short-, medium- and long-term) supported by a decision support system (DSS) and online dissemination of the common operational picture (COP) to all concerned on need to know basis.

With the military also networked through the NATGRID, the advantages that would accrue including the flexibility for com-

bined security forces employment in various combinations for counter-terrorist/ counter-insurgency operations throughout the length and breadth of the country. l MHA will need to be clear on issues like evolution of an enterprise architecture, integration and interoperability, communications, bandwidth and latency, introduction of new technologies, robustness of transmission, message and signal routing, sensor exploitation, management of databases, information security, information overload, integrated logistics, dangers of micro management, commercial influences, strategic initiatives and time for implementation. l Given adequate focus, the aim should be to equip the PMF, CPOs and specific police units tasked for counter-insurgency operations with a BMS by 2020, close on the heels of the battalions and regiments of the Indian Army being equipped by 2017-18.

The Army needs to review its decision of making the Infantry develop Phase 3 of Project F-INSAS; computer and radio sub-systems plus software integration. This should be part of Project BMS of the Indian Army ensuring ab initio Army wide integration at battalion/ regiment and below level, avoiding yet another project to integrate the F-INSAS with the BMS.

Handling the BMS Within a month of 26/11, Indonesia went in for anti-terrorist drills simultaneously employing the military, PMF and police forces on multiple targets. Considering that terrorism

is here to stay, we need to be prepared against these threats compounded by asymmetric warfare waged by our adversaries.

Technology has poised commanders to see their areas of responsibility in depth and in real near time. Precisely locating, identifying, tracking and attacking targets by appropriate means and monitoring effects is a reality.

Operating in joint environments and mature capability to conduct multi-dimensional simultaneous operations is facilitated. Equipping the PMF, CPOs and specific police units with BMS will give us the required net-centricity nationally at the cutting edge. Considerable resistance can be expected in leveraging technology in such manner as was the case with the Indian Army in kick-starting Project BMS, which actually should have been fielded a decade back. The problem is the mental block at the officer level who considers the soldier to be naive. Soldiers using the GPS on mobiles, modern weaponry and equipment are pretty much tech savvy. Given the requisite training, the policeman coming from the same milieu would have little problem handling the BMS. We need to accelerate the development and fielding of the BMS as part of essential capability building of the PMF, CPOs and specific police units tasked for counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency tasks. This will help synergise national effort in tackling future threats, reduce response time at the cutting edge and more importantly result in avoidable loss of life in security forces considering that the BMS will ensure heightened battlefield transparency, updated situational awareness in real/near real time and speedy command and control.

Delayed by Red Tape Artillery modernisation has been plagued by inordinate delays due to many reasons, but the most relevant factor is the convoluted procurement process put into place to prevent corruption and ensure transparency

PHOTOGRAPH: BAE Systems

Archer - 155mm FH-77 B05 L52

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n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

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he Indian Army has once again issued a request for information (RFI) for 155mm/52- calibre towed gun system for the Artillery on July 22, 2010 and asked for replies by August 16, 2010. This is consequent to the cancellation of the existing trials of the two 155mm howitzers belonging to Singapore Technologies Kinetics (STK) (FH-2000) and BAE Systems (FH-77 B05 L52) respectively.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) spokesman claimed that trials had been abandoned due to the non-appearance of STK’s FH-2000 gun. This incident will result in considerable delay in the induction of any new artillery

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gun because the decision-making process of choosing a new artillery gun itself will take another 2-3 years and the cascading effect will further delay the artillery modernisation plan to 2020 as it would take about 8-10 years to manufacture the chosen weapon indigenously. Artillery is looking for an outright purchase of four hundred 155mm howitzers and another 1,180 through local manufacture.

Artillery modernisation has been plagued by inordinate delays due to many reasons, but the most relevant factor is the convoluted procurement process which has been put into place ostensibly to prevent corruption and ensure transparency. The result is that in so doing we have tied ourselves in

knots. Our procedure is not allowing the modernisation process to move forward. It seems that every component of the Army and civil machinery when asked for views can stall the process by a seemingly innocuous remark, sometimes just to emphasise his importance in the decision-making process.

Moreover, the mindsets within the civil and military hierarchies and the bureaucratic file pushing within the MoD has made the situation unmanageable. The ultimate sufferer is the Army whose modernisation is stalled at a time when multifarious challenges facing it have started manifesting themselves.

There is a real danger that we may have to face a conventional conflict on two fronts, in two different theatres of war (eastern and western), simultaneously.

The last major acquisition of towed gunhowitzers was that of about 400 pieces of 39calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers with a range of 30 km from Bofors of Sweden in the mid-1980s. This gun, despite political controversy, proved its mettle in the Kargil conflict.

After more than two decades of neglect, during which many other artillery weapons like the 100mm and 122mm field guns of Russian origin and the indigenously developed 75/24 Indian Mountain Gun joined the long list of obsolete equipment in service with the army, tenders were floated and trials were commenced for a 52-calibre 155mm gun to replace all field and medium guns. Four sets of trials have been done till date and no gun has been inducted. Meanwhile, two vendors were blacklisted, leaving only two vendors in the fray—STK and BAE Systems.

After completing all formalities, fresh trials were once again ordered in 2010 with these two vendors even though a case of cor-

ruption in the ordnance scam was pending against STK, though no charge-sheet had been filed. The result is that once again the trials have been cancelled. An interesting outcome of all this is that the weaknesses of our system have been quite well gauged by some of the vendors and when they see a major deal slipping out of their hands they have become adept at squealing against others or taking advantage of the weakness in the procurement procedure to delay or derail the proceedings. We unfortunately have not been wise enough to see through their machinations or deal with them firmly.

The Way Forward India has the unenviable record of being surprised in nearly every war starting from the 1947-48 Jammu and Kashmir operations.

Let us not wait to be surprised in the next war in which another Army Chief will say “We will fight with what we have”. Let not our armed forces suffer for the incompetence and neglect of a few. The only way to overcome the current impasse is to have a Defence Procurement Agency, an empowered body of experts as in the UK and France, with representatives from all departments concerned. The agency should be given the power and authority to see the process through the entire gamut of its activities, starting from identifying the equipment up to its culmination with the signing of the contract. This body should then be held accountable for all that happens or does not.

This agency should be headed by a Service officer or a bureaucrat with an impeccable record of competence, diligence and honesty and should be answerable to the apex body, the Defence Acquisition Council.

Š 2010 Rockwell Collins, Inc. All rights reserved.

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T EC H N O LO GY

Power of Information The challenges and increasing war fighting capabilities of our adversaries in the 21st century mandate an impetus for providing in-house enablers to conceptualise and gestate state-of-the-art information systems.

Read through the first part of the article to know more about Indian Army’s modernisation efforts. n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

T

he Indian Army (IA) is making concerted efforts to modernise. As part of this drive for transformation, enterprise information system assets and initiatives is a key focus area.

The Directorate General of Information Systems is to ensure that fielding of enterprise level integrated info systems is carried out in line with the laid out doctrine and a strategy that leverages integration as the key enabler for transforming collaboration among people, organisational processes and technology platforms into a cohesive and synergised information age war fighting capability.

A vital challenge in this endeavour is the attempt to transform a legacy operational framework into an information age e-enterprise. In an e-enterprise, the tight coupling between functional processes and the underlying information infrastructure amplifies the effect of hardware and software security failures and accentuates the need for security management of not only the information infrastructure but the information itself, thereby necessitating comprehensive information assurance measures to ensure that this mission critical resource is available even in the most adverse times.

As part of the modernisation drive including acquiring net-centric warfare (NCW) capabilities, the Army has a number of information systems in various stages and has also felt the necessity to adopt an enterprise level view of all these systems which are deployed, are being deployed or have been proposed to be deployed in the future.

This has necessitated the need to adopt an overarching perspective for the vital aspect of information security not only in the context of environment of the information systems but also the information contained within the systems and the physical assets of the systems.

ties in authorised ways. For example, a user may be authorised to read data from a database but may not modify that information.

Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is proof of the identity of both the sender and the recipient, preserving the responsibility of both the originator and recipient for their actions. For example, validation of a user’s signature by the information owner and validation of the information owner by the user prior to acceptance of an information transaction.

Information Assurance Delivery of information in real/near real time is of extreme importance. Having information perfectly secure but delivered too late to take operationally-critical actions, does not fulfill the mission. Hence, information assurance control objectives are required to complement security control objectives and provide the basis for subsequent reasoning

cure state at all times.

Secure software development management: It is the systemic use of software design principles and processes through a security development lifecycle to ensure that the information system software is secure by design. l Verification management: It is the process of testing and validation used to ensure the system works correctly, i.e., the maintenance of an independent verification and validation programme that includes at a minimum, unit, sub-system and system verification procedures. l

Present Capability The Army established the Army Cyber Security Establishment (ACSE) six years back to enhance security of the Army’s information infrastructure through proactive actions and collaborations. The ACSE issued a cyber security policy in 2007 and various guidelines ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

www.spslandforces.net

Information Security For an information system and the information it contains, certain control objectives provide the foundation for all derivative security requirements. These extremely important security control objectives are: Confidentiality: At times called secrecy or privacy, confidentiality is the protection of the assets of an information system so that the assets are accessible only to authorised parties. For example, protection of privileged information in transit through the information infrastructure with the use of encryption technologies.

Authentication: Authentication establishes the validity of a user’s identity and is fundamentally verified and proven identification of the user to the information system.

It determines that a user is identified to the information system and is authorised for the use of that particular asset of the information system, for example, the validation of identity before acceptance of commands or prior to release of information.

Availability: Availability ensures the information and system resources are accessible to authorised system users. A user of the system can be a person or another system that requires a given asset.

For example, information residing on enterprise servers that is available to mobile users at remote locations.

Integrity: Integrity implies information assets can be modified only by authorised par-

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about system feature reliability. Information assurance refers to the fact that information is made available to authorised users, when requested, with expected integrity. Information assurance encompasses not only the basic system security properties, but also policies, procedures and personnel that are used to maintain the system and its data in a known, secure state.

Information assurance objectives that support security control objectives are: l Personnel management: It refers to the personnel practices that support the administration of the security functions of the info system. l Vulnerability management: It refers to the maintenance of the info system software updates process to ensure all known vulnerabilities are corrected, i.e. the employment of a comprehensive vulnerability scanning and remediation capability. l Configuration management: It refers to that part of the information assurance system that tracks the hardware, software, and firmware configuration of each physical device and allows the info system to be maintained in a known, se-

for desktop users, for audit and for initiating IT projects. Advisories too are issued from time to time and audit security reviews of information bearing networks and systems are being undertaken. Ad hoc computer emergency research team (CERT)-Army has been established with a website on the Army intranet. Advanced skills are being sought for vulnerability analysis of networks. Limited forensic analysis capability has been acquired. A testing and evaluation laboratory is being established for evaluation of security products and solutions. However, classification as a certifying authority for the Army has hit a dead end with non-availability requisite specialists (scientists-mathematicians) and stipulation of no agency below the Scientific Analysis Group (SAG) permitted to certify products of confidential and above classification. ACSE is also engaged in spreading security awareness in the Army and vetting of IT projects.

Relating the existing capabilities to the information assurance control objectives clearly shows that only issues related to personnel management and vulnerability management are being addressed and that too

in limited form. The other information assurance objectives of configuration management, secure software development management and verification management are practically not being addressed in any substantial measure. It is evident from the above that the ACSE in its present form and alignment has a predominant “security of infrastructure” bias rather than a desirable bias towards “information assurance.” The Army should take serious note of this.

What Needs to be Done The primary reason for lack of an enterprise perspective on information assurance has been the inability to view information from the strategic viewpoint and recognising the mission critical nature of this resource which is essential for success in future conflicts. Our capability to meet all information assurance objectives continues to remain fragmented because of our inability to centralise control over such information assurance assets and provide requisite collaboration between various stakeholders such as vendors/agencies undertaking development of information systems, project/programme management offices involved in deployment of information systems and users exploiting these information systems. The US joint lessons learned programme (JLLP) highlights this necessity by saying, “As a mission critical resource, information must be treated like any other asset essential to the survival and success of the forces. The complexity and criticality of information assurance and its governance demands that it be elevated to the highest organisational levels.”

The Army needs to take concerted and early steps to address this gap in capability for meeting all information assurance objectives.

As a first step, an overall enterprise level information security and assurance strategy (ISAS) must be defined quickly. Based on this strategy, the second step of establishing an enterprise level information security and assurance programme (ISAP) should be taken. The third step of vital importance is to agglomerate existing organisations like the ACSE and other envisaged assets to create an Army Information Assurance Agency (AIAA) under the aegis of the Directorate General of Information Systems to aid in implementing the above. The Army has to be ruthless in following such an approach, disregarding protests of loss of turf by others. If we hesitate in taking such a step, the pace of modernisation can hardly be accelerated in the realm of information warfare. Further, stunted growth will imply inadequate cyber security and cyber warfare capabilities severely restricting our combat potential. As part of restructuring of Integrated HQ of Ministry of Defence (Army), the Army would do well to elevate the Director General of Information Systems to a Principal Staff Officer, bringing him directly under the Vice Chief of Army Staff.

The challenges and increasing war fighting capabilities of our adversaries in the 21st century mandate an impetus for providing inhouse enablers to conceptualise and gestate state-of-the-art information systems. The proposed AIAA shall be the “enabling arm” that shall play an instrumental role in making sure that the required information assurance capabilities are provisioned for ensuring that information systems are deployed with the desired quality, at optimal cost and within the desired timeframes.

(To be continued in the next issue)

O E M / I N D U S T R Y <<

Protecting the Nation with a Cohesive BMS General Dynamics UK experience of C4I programmes, and delivering interoperability and integration, is key to the success of India’s Battlefield Management System PHOTOGRAPHS: General Dynamics

n ANDREW BROWNE

I

ndia, as we know, is planning to modernise the communications systems used by its armed forces in order to give it a military advantage. Adding command and control capability through a cohesive Battlefield Management System (BMS) will without doubt deliver this decisive edge. But a debate about BMS is currently growing in India, and it is a debate that I have seen in other parts of the world. These debates centre around two key words—interoperability and integration.

As the tempo of operations increases on a daily basis, soldiers, their commanders and their supporting forces on the ground, in the air or at sea need to be joined up so that all components of the fighting force are aware of, and can respond to any given situation.

Every soldier needs to know where their allies are and what they are thinking, as well as where the enemy is and how to anticipate its next move. They also need to be able to react to the decisions of their commanders at a moment’s notice.

Speed and clarity of communication are key to out-manoeuvring the enemy and protecting one’s own forces and people.

Put in the context of a country such as India, where internal threats are as much of a concern as external threats, this capability would be of benefit not only to the Indian Army but to paramilitary, police and emergency forces around the country. Greater cooperation between such forces would contribute to greater stability and security. For such cooperation to be possible interoperability becomes essential.

But interoperability is not simply about ensuring that friendly military and security forces can communicate effectively with each other to support a defensive action or posture. Interoperability is actually the next major step forward for command and control capability.

Delivering such capability is not as simple as it might sound. Each customer will have their own requirements, standards and doctrine which will have an effect on the ‘shape’ of their command and control system. Yet cooperating forces will also want to be able to share information using their respective systems.

For example, the British Army’s ‘Bowman’ programme differs from the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps NIMCIS programme because of slightly differing requirements and equipment, yet the two systems can talk to each other easily, underpinning the close cooperation and operational interoperability of the UK/Netherlands Landing Force.

But successful interoperability does not simply result from providing a BMS-type system to every unit one wishes to include in a command, control and communications framework. It also results from understanding and successfully integrating that system with already existing legacy systems, vehicles and infrastructure. As General Dynamics UK has learnt from its experience in working with its customers, good integration is a key component of good interoperability.

It is also because of the complexity of getting such capabilities right that many armed and security forces who wish to benefit from command and control capability

look to General Dynamics UK Limited, the company recognised as the leading prime systems integrator with the greatest experience of delivering cutting edge command and control solutions around the world.

General Dynamics UK designs, from scratch, the system that works for the customer. It can do this because it is product independent. The majority of other defence contractors do not understand this factor and attempt to impose their own solutions on the customer by offering a vertically inte-

grated system and equipment package that does not necessarily fit the customer’s needs.

By taking the product independent approach General Dynamics UK can more effectively deliver capabilities such as an integrated mobile tactical Internet offering secure-voice, secure-data, situational awareness and video capabilities throughout the battlespace, to a large user population both dismounted and in vehicles, in units, headquarters and command posts.

A national network-centric programme

would seek to integrate land, sea, air and joint forces; it would provide appropriate information from the operative on the ground, be they soldier, paramilitary or policemen, through platforms up to the joint headquarters. Sensors would deliver data to be processed and fused into a coherent common operating picture (COP) which would then be shared, disseminated and actioned in effective and appropriate ways throughout the force. Such a system of systems would deliver inherent benefits in shortening reaction times, tightening the coherence of data and delivering effect in what is known as the sensor to shooter loop.

Wider coherence would also be achieved when all systems are integrated to operate within a common information domain, empowering all users with improved situational awareness within their area of interest. This can be most effectively achieved when diverse communications types are connected – fixed infrastructure, tactical mobile, airborne and naval datalinks and satcom, for example. Maximising the interoperability and resilience of data over diverse military nets is a specialised skill not appreciated by the commercial world of soaring bandwidths and well established standards.

A key mantra at General Dynamics UK is “Integration, not installation.” Why? Because the introduction of a BMS, or any similar type of complex system, does not simply mean providing new equipment in the shape of a soldier system to each individual soldier – though this is a key part of the hardware provided. It also means adding the system to every vehicle, craft, vessel or other piece of infrastructure used by the customer, and most importantly ensuring it works harmoniously with the equipment around it. This approach provides the network capability to all levels of the military necessary to ensure cohesive communications that deliver a key advantage on the battlefield.

Having delivered the flagship C4I system to the British Armed Forces over the last eight years, and having provided similar capabilities to Dutch, Romanian and Libyan forces as well, General Dynamics UK is the only systems integrator which fully understands the challenges and complexity of delivering such a system, because it has done it.

For example, integrating over 13,500 new and legacy AFVs, including Russian T72, T-90 and BMPs into a bespoke C4I system takes a global level of knowledge and expertise that only General Dynamics UK has the track record of delivering.

Of additional key benefit to the region is General Dynamics UK’s unparalleled track record of working with local partners and developing indigenous capability, bringing its skills together with those of local companies, many of them small or medium enterprises (SMEs). General Dynamics UK has a demonstrable track record of ability to deliver in this area.

As a prime systems integrator, General Dynamics UK brings the best people and equipment together to deliver the best possible solution. In India, General Dynamics UK will partner with local industry to identify a solution to the region’s requirements which will benefit industry and the local armed forces for many years to come.

The author is the Vice President, C4I Systems, General Dynamics UK.

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UAVs

Thirsting for Killer Drones Pakistan laments that US drones have killed more civilians than terrorists, vociferously opposes targeting terrorist hideouts, and yet badgers the US for transfer of drone technology. Why?

A

lthough the US military’s strategy towards Pakistan’s tribal region, which is at present limited to specific drone attacks against hardened Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets, may not have resulted in desired operational success, the Pakistani theatre has proved the combat efficacy of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in counter-insurgency operations. The combat UAVs or the drones, as they are popularly called, have reportedly eliminated dozens of high value Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets and killed a little over 700 lesser value terrorists and traits sympathisers in 2009 alone. According to Long War Journal, a website which tracks US drone attacks in Pakistan, aerial attacks by unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) inside Pakistan increased by 47 per cent to 53 in 2009, with most strikes carried out by Predator, the killer drone which is dreaded the most among terrorists in the Af-Pak region. Among those AlQaeda and Taliban terrorists who killed in 2009 include Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of Taliban in Pakistan.

The drone attacks, which remain the fulcrum of the US military strategy against AlQaeda and Taliban in Pakistan have increased both in frequency as well as lethality under the Obama administration. The strategy of killing terrorists by drones has drawn criticism from Pakistani establishments who describe these attacks as gross violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. However, it is ironical that Pakistan which continues to lament that the US military drones have killed more civilians than terrorists and vociferously opposes the strategy of targeting terrorist hideouts on its soil because of collateral damages, should continue to badger the US for transfer of drone technology.

www.spslandforces.net

UCAVs: Increasingly Popular UAVs were initially developed to gather intelligence and conduct surveillance and reconnaissance over hostile territories or support search and rescue missions in disaster situations. Over the years, UAVs have acquired a certain combat character of their own. The US military’s success with Predator drones firing Hellfire missiles against terrorists in parts of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan in recent years is believed to have spurred research globally in robotic technologies, resulting in ever increasing race among Asian countries for acquisition of military drones. The Wikipedia lists 46 countries which are at present using UAVs for various purposes.

While the military use of UAVs is confined to purposes like gathering of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, these are increasingly looked upon as a potential weapon against insurgents. Besides avoiding loss of human lives on the battlefield, a phenomenon which is fast catching up with most modern militaries, it is also responsible for the growing popularity of UCAVs or combat-capable drones which are now being fitted with laserguided missiles. With intelligent machines marching upfront, a paradigm shift is discernable in the way humans now seek to conduct warfare. Pakistan’s motive for seeking killer drones needs to be viewed from a different perspective driven as it is by its desire to gain conventional parity over arch rival India.

Pakistan’s Obsession Pakistan, which has witnessed the ferocity of the US military drones with increasing inten-

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Predator type UAVs are capable of taking out high value Indian military targets and critical civilian infrastructure such as power grids, communication networks, military’s command & control centres and hardened military bunkers

Predator Features l l l

Solid-state digital avionics Remotely piloted or fully autonomous SAR and EO/IR providing day/night and allweather operations in one-mission aircraft l GPS and INS l UHF/VHF voice l Extensive combat experience

Capabilities l Expanded EO/IR payload l SAR all-weather capability l Satellite control l GPS and INS l Over 24 hr on-station at 400 nmi l Deployed with the U.S. and Italian Air Force l Operations to 25,000 ft (7620 m) l 450 lb (204 kg) payload l Wingspan 48.7 ft (14.84 m), length 27 ft (8.23 m) Source: General Atomics Aeronautical

sity over the years, considers development of combat UAVs a high priority area for its own military. Persistent requests made by Pakistani officials to the US over the past few years, including Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s repeated pleas to President Barack Obama for transfer of combat drones, however, have met with little success. In an interview with CNN in May 2009, Zardari had said, “I need drones to be part of my arsenal. I need that facility. I need that equipment. I need that to be my police arrangement.” The US, which has transferred billions of dollars worth military assistance to Pakistan over the past few years, however, is reluctant to oblige Zardari with his request over fears of ‘sensitive data’ that the requested technology could be transferred to China for reverse engineering.

The US also fears that UAVs, armed with deadly missiles, could prove to be a potent weapon in the hands of terrorists. Given the linkages that Pakistan’s ISI has with the terrorist organisations such fears are not unfounded. While keeping combat drones off-limits to Pakistan’s military, the US, however, is considering supplying some sophisticated UAVs which could be used for surveillance and intelligence gathering purposes to Pakistan. It is believed that the US might supply Pakistan with 12 units of RQ-7 Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles to support its fight with extremists.

For a country which is so vehemently opposed to drone attacks by the US military on its soil and where the public sentiments run so high against America due to the growing number of reported civilian deaths in drone attacks, it is highly unrealistic to assume that Pakistan’s military will ever use killer drones in internal insurgency situations.

Employment of combat drones against local insurgents who may be dispersed among civilian population will remain a difficult choice for any military.

Though employment of UAVs against these ultras remains one of the options available to the Indian government, the Indian military is not very receptive to the idea of using a disproportionate force against the Maoists who are operating behind human shields. In this backdrop, Pakistan’s request that it needs drones to effectively fight the terrorists on its soil is a hogwash. The use of combat drones by Pakistani military against insurgents operating on its own soil, if it ever happens, would not only make Pakistan more of a target for suicide attacks. The

question therefore remains, why is Pakistan so desperate to get killer drones?

It is, in fact, Pakistan military’s desire to gain conventional parity with the Indian military which is driving it towards acquisition of weapons with high-end technologies.

During the Kargil War in 1999, the Israelibuilt Heron and Searcher UAVs provided crucial intelligence about the Pakistani intruders who were occupying advantageous positions on the treacherous mountains of Kargil. Again, the Indian military had a distinct advantage over Pakistani military in battlefield surveillance in the last major military stand-off between India and Pakistan in 2002 which followed the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament.

Compared to the Pakistani military, the Indian forces had a larger number and wider range of UAVs deployed against them. Ever since, Pakistan has been not only over-zealous to expand the base of UAVs in all the branches of its military, it is also desperate to acquire Predator type UAVs, capable of taking out high value Indian military targets, including critical civilian infrastructure such as power grids, communication networks, military’s command and control centres, hardened military bunkers, etc. While Pakistani military has pre-defined usage for combat UAVs against India’s conventional military and civilian targets, proliferation of this technology to terrorists would mean serious security implications for India, enabling Pakistan-based terrorists to launch attacks against India without any fear of reprisal by the Indian security agencies.

Pakistan’s Alternative Sources Pakistan itself has a robust indigenous UAV development programme and Pakistanmade UAVs are exported to a number of countries, including the US (the US Department of Homeland Security uses Border Eagle surveillance UAVs developed by Integrated Dynamics of Pakistan for border patrols because they are cheaper). Islamabad, however, is seeking support from other countries as well, notably China and Turkey in the development of combat grade UAVs. According to local news reports, Pakistan is focussing its unmanned aircraft efforts on upgrading various older UAVs with Chinese help. Richard Fisher, a senior researcher at the International Assessment and Strategy Centre in Washington, says that Pakistan may choose to produce China’s new CH-3

unmanned attack aircraft.

It is also believed that Pakistan may get access to Israeli drone technologies via Turkey. Turkey and Israel appear to be on track to finalise a long delayed multimillion-dollar deal for the delivery of 10 drone aircraft for the Turkish air force. Significantly, Pakistan and Turkey have an agreement to cooperate on UAV development. Pakistani firms are also said to be working closely with Chinese, Italian and Turkish firms who all are believed to be working with Israeli technologies with a large base of American components. Meanwhile, Pakistan has also begun the production of Falco UAV in collaboration with Selex Galileo of Italy at Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Kamra. Pakistan is also close to producing its first unmanned combat aerial vehicle Burraq, armed with a new laser-guided air-to-surface missile and laser designator. Burraq is understood to have undergone its flight testing in May 2009. Further, Pakistan is also reportedly seeking to upgrade its existing range of surveillance and reconnaissance capable UAVs like Mukhbir, Uqqab, Jasoos, Ubaabeel and others with the help of Chinese technologies.

Indian Reaction Pakistan’s obsession with combat drones is likely to propel India into an unintended arms race with its arch rival. The Indian military has already beefed up its inventory with 100 more UAVs since the Kargil War and is looking forward to induct Israeli Harop ‘killer’ UAVs from 2011 onwards. Following on the successes of Lakshya and Nishant drones, India’s premier defence research establishment, DRDO, reportedly is working on a new range of medium-altitude, long endurance UAVs named Rustom, of which the Army is keen to induct seven troops. India also has recently ordered an Israeli company—Israel Aerospace Industries for supply of Heron drones, a deal worth `700 crore. Clearly, India at present has a distinct edge over Pakistan in the deployment of UAVs. However, with Pakistan acquiring killer drones—the likes of Predator, the balance would tilt unpalatably in favour of Pakistan. But the real threat from Pakistan acquiring predator type drones is its likely misuse by the terrorists.

The author is currently with the Vivekananda International Foundation.

PHOTOGRAPH: US Air Force

n SANJAY KUMAR

VIEWPOINT

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The Pervez-Parvez Factor Hatred for India and obsession that Afghanistan is Pakistan’s strategic depth

P

ervez Musharraf plans getting back home, launch his political party and rule Pakistan again. It coincides with his protégé Aashfaq Parvez Kayani securing a second term as Pakistan’s Army Chief. It would be interesting to watch the two especially during the next elections before the second tenure of Kayani expires. Having nurtured Kayani, Musharraf appears confident of a second win. However, he would do well to read Pakistan’s history where loyalty gets replaced by deceit and violence at opportune moment; remember what Zia-ul-Haq did to Zulfikar Bhutto, Pervez Musharraf himself did to Nawaz Sharif and orchestrating Benazir Bhutto’s assassination? Is Musharraf actually walking into the Line of Fire now or will it be a Pervez-Parvez marriage of convenience since managing Pakistan, keeping US and China in tow and exporting terror are difficult to be handled singly?

Commonality in Parvez-Pervez includes hatred for India and obsession that Afghanistan is Pakistan’s strategic depth.

Both were commissioned from Kakul swearing oaths to avenge loss of East Pakistan.

Both have ‘ruled’ Pakistan (the Military-ISI combine actually does) excelling in exporting terror; hunting with hounds and running with hares. WikiLeaks are not required to gauge their future intentions.

Benazir to let him annex J&K. His refusal to be present at Lahore during the Prime Minister’s Vajpayee’s bus voyage and being master architect of the Kargil intrusions are established facts. During the Kargil War, Over 500 dead bodies of Pakistani soldiers were dumped unceremoniously in the dead of night at the doorsteps of their next of kin in POK just because Musharraf did not want to acknowledge they were Northern Light Infantry. This is explicitly narrated in the Herald published from Karachi. Can there be a more demeaning example of insulting uniform and martyred soldiers and that too by the head of an army?

During the Kargil War, Captain Saurabh Kalia and five other soldiers captured by Pakistani forces were brutally tortured for 22 before being shot and their mutilated corpses delivered to India. Wikipedia says, “The postmortem revealed that Pakistan army had indulged in most heinous acts; of burning their bodies with cigarettes, pierc-

married lady doctor was raped by an army captain, instead of instituting an inquiry into the incident he tells reporters the woman has got herself raped in order to obtain a visa to US. His crowning act perhaps was telling global audiences through electronic media, “There is not a single terrorist on Pakistani soil.” Do you need further proof of hollowness? On numerous occasions he has been described as “the best bet for India”.

It indicates our coloured perceptions, lack of intelligence and inability to read his character. As President, he was pointed in saying, “Even if the Kashmir problem is resolved, Jihad against India will continue.” In his autobiography authored as President of Pakistan, he refers to India twice as “the most devious enemy.” Yet we tend to eulogize him and invite him to India. Full marks to Maulana Madani, who during the India Today Conclave in 2009, gave Musharraf a shut up call; to mind his own business and leave Muslims of India alone.

ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

Military-ISI Combine The Military-ISI has ruled Pakistan since decades. Zardari’s feeble effort to bring the ISI under the Ministry of Interior was cut short immediately by Kayani. US acquiesce to this power equation, no matter face saving chants of strengthening democracy. When invading Afghanistan, US facilitated Pakistani forces including ISI operating inside Afghanistan to be quietly flown out. ParvezPervez know US dependency on Pakistan for safe exit from Afghanistan and for preventing terror strikes on mainland US even after US pullout. Pakistan is the most important strategic partner in facilitating Chinese march to the Indian Ocean through Karakoram Highway all the way to Gwadar Port with a rail link following and keeping Uighurs under check. The China-Pakistan nexus will continue to concentrate on downsizing India.

Pakistani politicians survive courtesy Military-ISI blessings. Benazir’s autobiography admits fighting ISI implies fighting AlQaeda. Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s irrational outburst equating our Home Secretary with Hafiz Saeed and that infiltration is solely India’s problem is on behest Military-ISI. When Gilani as Prime Minister takes hitherto unprecedented step of himself announcing second full term extension for Kayani (four months before Kayani’s present term expires), no further proof of subservience is required.

Pervez Senior (Musharraf) Actions like fixing explosives in his college prefect’s mail box and running away from duty without leave as commissioned officer, mentioned in his autobiography, indicate Musharraf ’s personal traits. As an SSG officer in 1971, he was known to be training terrorists in Chittagong Hill Tracts. As a Lieutenant General, he made a presentation to his MoD on the need to annex J&K citing reduction of per capita availability of water from 6,000 to 1,000 cusecs since Partition.

As Army Chief, he repeatedly exhorted

P.C. KATOCH Musharraf whose personal animosity towards Benazir is well documented! As DG ISI, Kayani was Musharraf ’s emissary to discuss power sharing with Benazir in Dubai before her assassination. Next step of PervezParvez after Benazir refused power sharing is obvious. As DG ISI, Kayani masterminded major regrouping of Jihadis including consolidation and expansion of LeT. It is impossible that A.Q. Khan undertook nuclear proliferation without knowledge of MilitaryISI. Who approved it if not Pervez-Parvez with Kayani as DG ISI. Kayani was present when president Musharraf met Chief Justice Iftikar Chaudhary and suspended him. He played power broker to help Musharraf in forcing Nawaz Sharif to call off the millionman march to Islamabad. Kayani has politically managed to sideline Zardari playing off PPP’s Gilani against Zardari despite latter being President of the PPP. As Army Chief, Kayani’s insisted Pakistan protests UN Committee report on assassination of Benazir indicating complicity of ISI. Should there be a doubt that Pakistan’s failure to bring perpetrators of Mumbai terrorist strikes of 26/11 is on behest Kayani. He engineered inaction against Al-Qaeda and its associates in North Waziristan while striking against East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) that threatens China. Losing no opportunity to display his hatred for India, he obviously approved terror strike on the Indian Mission in Kabul, which he now wants shut down. Within four months of his becoming Army Chief, the four-year-old ceasefire along the LoC was breached and continues to be violated and infiltration increased.

What Should Concern India

ing ear-drums with hot rods, puncturing eyes before removing them, breaking most of the teeth and bones, chopping off various limbs and private organs of these soldiers besides inflicting all sorts of physical and mental tortures before shooting them dead, as evidenced by the bullet wound to the temple.” In another case, Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, whose MiG was shot down over Indian soil on May 27, 1999, was used for target practice by Pakistani soldiers after he bailed out and opened his parachute.

Though India lodged strong protest with Pakistan, forget prosecution, not one Pakistani soldier responsible for these heinous acts were officially identified.

Perhaps Musharraf quietly awarded medals to the perpetrators.

During his presidency when a young

Parvez Junior (Kayani) Kayani may not have factually hoodwinked the West but has prevented them from attacking Pakistan both physically and diplomatically, don’t mind odd statements by Obama, Hillary Clinton and David Cameron.

Dubbed “soldier’s soldier” by US, this buddy of Mike Mullen on becoming army chief directed serving officers to stay away from politicking; winning for himself the title of being ‘apolitical’; a master stroke in obfuscation. Every department and sector in Pakistan has been infiltrated by Military-ISI over the years by 2,000 to 3,000 ex-officers. Asking serving officers to desist from politicking makes little difference.

How ‘apolitical’ when he works with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto as Deputy Military Secretary but ends up a protégé of

Pakistan knows conventional war against India is no go. Chou-en-Lai advised Ayub Khan way back in the 1960s; desist from conventional war and raise a militia to fight the Indians in the rear (today’s terrorists/ jihadis). It is this adventurism of Kayani that India should be concerned with. Stepping up terrorism, inciting insurgencies, politicising Islam in India, assist consolidation and regrouping of terrorists-insurgents including Maoists-Naxals for creating compact revolutionary zones to balkanize India are some examples.

Hafiz Saeed today operates openly from Pakistan. Kayani will continue nurturing Al-Qaeda as essential lever over the West and use it for attacking India in conjunction LeT and others. WikiLeaks and US media point to Pakistanisation of Al-Qaeda; more Pakistanis joining and moving higher up in the organization. Voids in Al-Qaeda due to US action have been filled up by LeT. Planting of armed modules in India had taken recognisable shape in 1992-93. 17 to18 years have passed since!

Conclusion The Pervez-Parvez factor has major implications for India’s national security. USPak mutual dependency will tilt more and more in Pakistan’s favour as US exits Afghanistan and the China-Pak alliance is strengthened further. Military commanders in operational areas essentially study the opposing commander and assess his future actions. As a country we must do likewise for the Pervez-Parvez duo.

The author is a retired Lt General of the Indian Army.

(The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the writer.)

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>> H O M E L A N D S E C U R I T Y

Terror Reigning The way forward to deal with the Maoists will require an enlightened and caring political leadership to institute land reforms, efficient administration, and effective police machinery ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

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ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

he bloodletting by the Naxals (Maoists) is becoming more dangerous and threatening by the day.

The state police and Central police forces deployed in Naxal affected states and districts barring Andhra Pradesh seem unable to deal with the violence.

What is surprising is their inability to even defend themselves. They seem helpless in the face of surprise attacks leading to largescale losses of men and weapons in almost every encounter.

On June 29, less than three months after the Dantewada massacre in which 76 persons including a Deputy Commandant were killed, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) suffered yet another blow in Bastar where 26 of its men including an assistant commandant were gunned down by the Naxals who ambushed a road opening party of about 70 personnel of 39th Battalion of CRPF in Narayanpur district. The attack took place just three km from a CRPF camp in Dhaudhai, on a road leading to the densely forested Naxal-controlled Abhujhmad area.

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Unanswered Questions It has been reported that the CRPF group was on its way back from its mission when the Maoists fired at them from dominating ground on the flanks and in the rear. The loss of lives of CRPF men and others is indeed a grave tragedy. When seen in the larger context, the adversity becomes more crushing as each soldier is often the bread earner of a larger family comprising at least 4-6 other members who are dependent on him.

Another equally tragic aspect of the current misfortune is the astonishing ease with which the massacres of CRPF men and other police personnel are happening in Chhattisgarh. How could the Naxals dare to attack a company strength of force if the latter had taken the necessary precautions while carrying out road opening drills in hostile territory and while moving back after completing the mission?

The following questions would come to the mind of any professional examining the actions of the CRPF company: l How is it that dominating places on the flanks were not secured by patrols with light machine guns? l How did the Naxals spring the ambush if the company while moving had deployed early warning elements in the front, flanks, and rear of the column? l Who all in a CRPF unit are trained for reconnaissance and early warning? l Till the regular CRPF units develop this expertise, why can’t CRPF’s special forces (COBRA) detachments be grouped with units operating in critical areas for such tasks? l What are the protective elements, what weapons are deployed in a firm base on the ground while tasks like “road opening” are performed? l Why were such a large number of CRPF boys gathered in a small area and being a lucrative target for the Naxals who must have been following the movement of the company? l Why was mortar fire not arranged with 81mm mortars from the base camp which was only 3 km away? The fire could have been kept “on call”. l What is the type of leadership being exercised by the company commanders who

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accompany the columns? What were the orders given by the DIGs and IGs in charge of operations in that sector or are they merely administrative adornments? l Why have the senior officers in charge not been held accountable for the lack of leadership and training? What were their roles in the entire operation? l Why was no information available to the police about the movement of a large force of Naxals? l Why is the intelligence not forthcoming?

Surely, the police should know how to operate a network of informers? l Why are the locals not cooperating with the police? Winning the hearts and minds of the local population is one of the basic tenets of counter-insurgency operations.

The ineffectiveness of the state police and Central forces shows the nation’s internal security structure in poor light. What is the point of raising scores of such battalions if they are going to be unequal to the roles and tasks expected of them? Operationally, the fault lies squarely with the overly politicised leadership of the police force. At the macro level, politicisation of police, lack of police reforms, corruption and lack of modernisation have brought about the current impasse.

If no directive is issued, neither the states concerned nor the Central police forces would be clear on what they are required to achieve and how. Individual perceptions would drive disjointed actions.

Principles and Operating Procedures Counter-insurgency environment requires adoption of certain principles and operating procedures with “out of box” solutions.

Hence, apart from good basic military training and excellent physical fitness, it requires a vibrant leadership which is constantly finding solutions for the missions at hand. It requires a type of leadership which wins over the locals, identifies itself with the soldiery, and instills confidence in their hearts and minds, while simultaneously instilling fear in the hearts of the opponents. Some of the principles of this type of warfare are: l Fight the insurgent/guerrilla adopting similar tactics. l Organise and train small teams to infiltrate, reconnoiter, ambush, sabotage, harass and kill the enemy and eliminate their leadership, their sympathisers and those who provide them logistics. l Physical fitness and familiarisation with the terrain is essential. l Deception and surprise are key elements of success against insurgents/guerrillas. l Learn to anticipate the future moves of the adversary through a detailed study of his modus operandi in order to read his mind and deceive him whenever possible. l Win the confidence of the local population through developmental and other work done in the villages. l Protect the locals from the insurgents. l Avoid collateral damage during operations. l Acquire language proficiency. l All movements must be tactically sound. l Movement on roads and prominent tracks should be avoided. l Operate in small groups of trained men led by experienced officers. l Use difficult terrain and night hours for movement to catch the adversary by surprise. l Have a layered warning system, whether static or mobile. l Company commanders and junior leaders (police inspectors) must be capable of exe-

cuting all tactical movement better than the jawan in order to win his confidence. l Follow a buddy system within the organisation. l Some troops, in every unit, must be familiar in handling of explosives, i.e. making IEDs or defusing them and use of mines and grenades.

Areas Requiring Special Attention Force levels: Prakash Singh, former DG, BSF, and DGP UP while speaking at a Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) seminar on June 27, 2010 said, “There are particular problems with the way paramilitary forces function. For almost 15-16 years, while the paramilitary forces have been expanding, they have remained ineffective in dealing with any internal threat.” Impulsive expansion of paramilitary forces without adequate resources or leadership is a futile exercise. Training, equipping the force and developing leadership must be done concurrently. We need to also pay attention to state police forces, the vanguard of anti-Naxal operations.

Specialisation: If CRPF is to be the counter-insurgency force of the Indian Union in the long run, as accepted by the Group of Ministers after the Kargil War, then radical changes are needed to make it an effective force. The force itself could be divided into two streams namely CRPF (law and order- LO) units and CRPF (counter-insurgency–CI) units. About 40-50 battalions may have to be earmarked for the latter role for which they should be specially trained, equipped and modernised regularly.

Training: l Sending in untrained policemen in a counter-insurgency environment as in Chattisgarh and elsewhere is an invitation to disaster. The policemen are likely to lose their lives and weapons as has been happening in the case of CRPF. Hence, no effort should be spared in training the policemen together with their officers. Those who do not measure up must be released from service. Officers

HOMELAND SECURITY Shedding crocodile tears or bickering at this juncture will not be of any help. Let the states and the Centre synthesise, institute police reforms and take political, economic, and social initiatives to develop the backward regions. The Naxals are our own people and their grievances, actual and perceived, have to be resolved. l l

Bullet proof vests Mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance at unit level Use of Helicopters: Currently, the Central government has agreed for the use of IAF helicopters after they come back from the UN peacekeeping missions where they are currently deployed. These would not, however, be used to conduct combat operations against Naxals. They would be employed for logistics, troop lifting, and casualty evacuation duties.

Notwithstanding the above, it makes military sense to employ armed helicopters in critical situations when a large force is surprised by superior strength of the opponent.

Naxals have already imposed heavy costs, in terms of the lives lost and weapons looted.

Even the credibility of the state to manage the internal security is at stake. If the fissiparous groups in the nation perceive weaknesses in the capability of the state to manage things, more groups may resort to armed struggles.

Budgets: The force which fights an insurgency must be given adequate budget for modernisation of its equipment and training including procurement of force multipliers like night fighting aids, surveillance devices, sniper equipment, bullet proof vest, etc.

l l

Sources of their arms and ammunition Hard core armed cadre

Decisions Given by Cabinet Committee on Security Police reforms, training and modernisation must be achieved at the earliest if the fight has to be won. On July 14, the Home Minister said that the states had unanimously approved the eight items passed by the Cabinet Committee on Security earlier, including the Central plan to induct over 20 helicopters for anti-Naxal duty. The Centre, it seems, will also fund the establishment and strengthening of 400 police stations in the affected districts at the rate of Rs 2 crore per police station over a period of two years. The states would have to contribute one-fifth of the projected cost of Rs 800 crore and ensure that at least 40 police personnel are deployed at each such police station. Significant expansion of the list of 35 districts that are treated as high focus districts on account of the level of violence is also being contemplated. These districts will qualify for additional funding from the Centre.

Involvement of Indian Army: During a visit to the Naxal-affected areas on July 6, 2010, the Union Home Secretary said that at present there was no need to deploy the Army. It is obvious that the deployment of the Army has other more serious repercussions which are currently, not politically, acceptable. Hence, the Army should only be used for training the CRPF soldiery and its leadership. Meanwhile, a retired Major General has been included as a member of the unified command structure as accepted by the four states mentioned earlier.

Army intelligence teams must become operational in all states affected by Naxal violence and must continue to collate up to

date intelligence about the Naxals and their activities so that in case the Army is called in, it does not require long time to establish its intelligence grid in the state concerned.

Governance and the Way Forward Maoist insurgency is driven by political, economic and social causes. Corruption and high-handedness of the administration in snatching away the rights of the locals, giving mining rights to multinationals, depriving the tribals of their means of livelihood, and lack of land reforms are some of the major reasons which have been exploited by the Maoists in fuelling insurgency. Weak political leadership, poor administration of the states, politicisation of the police and paramilitary forces and the neglect by the Central leadership are responsible for the present state of affairs. Hence, shedding crocodile tears or bickering at this juncture will not be of any help. Let the states and the Centre synthesise, institute police reforms and take political, economic, and social initiatives to develop the backward regions. The Naxals are our own people and their grievances, actual and perceived, have to be resolved. Thus, while developmental initiatives are being undertaken to remove the grievances, the police forces should be trained, equipped suitably, disciplined and made operationally effective to defeat those who insist on taking up arms against the State. The fear of the police forces in the operational sphere must be felt by the Naxals to force them to negotiate.

Let the authority and writ of the state be obeyed in letter and spirit, in an environment of care and empathy for the locals and the tribals. The way forward will require an enlightened and caring political leadership to institute land reforms, good administration and effective police machinery.

m L .co IA TS ok EC UN LE arbo SP CO AB itarye S IL il DI A sm AV nt@sp ou isc l: d ai Em

must be as tough as the soldiery and in case weaknesses are observed in the officers, men are unlikely to obey them. l Army teams should train and retrain the CRPF units through orientation cadres along with their officers. In the regular Army, even the Special Forces are not allowed to enter operational sectors without being put through CI orientation cadres.

Leadership l CRPF is a large force and selecting younger, tougher and motivated junior leaders (sub-inspectors and inspectors) for operational units deployed in Naxalinfested areas and training them to the required standard should not be such a major problem. Tougher times require imaginative and extraordinary solutions and there should be no hesitation in adopting unorthodox methods to gain success. l Senior leaders (commanding officers and above) apart from being put through orientation courses must stay close to their commands to instill confidence in them and to motivate them. They must learn how to tactically plan CI operations and undertake operational responsibilities instead of shying away from them. l Operating in small groups led by experienced junior leaders for offensive operations mandates decentralisation of command and leadership and mission type orders for which both senior and the junior leadership must be trained and the junior leaders must be mentally prepared to take the initiative when actionable intelligence is obtained.

Unified Commands: For better efficiency, establishment of Unified Commands, on the pattern of Jammu and Kashmir, under the Chief Minister of the states concerned is recommended. All forces operating within the state should come under this headquarters for better coordination of operations. At a meeting of Chief Ministers of Naxal-hit states held on July 14, 2010, which was addressed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Home Minister P. Chidambaram, the Centre asked four of these states to set up a unified command each for Central and state police forces to ensure better coordination in anti-Naxal operations.

Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal have also been asked to include a retired Major General as a member of these unified commands which are to be headed by the State Chief Secretaries. However, making the Chief Secretary of the respective state, the boss of the Unified Command, is a regressive step. Unlike the Chief Minister, he does not enjoy complete authority as bureaucrats by temperament, training and conduct are not known to be decisive.

Intelligence: The CRPF should develop its own tactical intelligence organisation.

These elements should be deployed in its area of operations which should be independent of the state police. This is because the state intelligence machinery would have been penetrated by sympathisers of the Naxal cause and all intelligence emanating from the state may not be completely reliable. Hence there should be at least three layers of intelligenceâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;state police, CRPF intelligence units and Central intelligence agencies. A few CRPF battalions should be converted for this task and the personnel will have to be specially screened and selected. If a start is made now, they would be effective in about two to three years time.

Weapons and Equipment: Some critical weapons and equipment which should be given to the CRPF (CI) units are as under: l 81mm mortars and medium machine guns at unit level l 40mm grenade launchers at company level l 84mm rocket launchers at platoon level with high explosive and fragmentation ammunition l Sniper rifles at company level l Night vision goggles

<<

Indispensible!

Political Directive for Operations

by Security Forces Internal security operation by security forces should be always based on political directives issued by the Home Ministry. It is believed that the Home Ministry has not given any directive spelling out the political aims and objectives of the operations by the security forces. If no directive is issued, neither the states concerned nor the Central police forces would be clear on what they are required to achieve and how. Individual perceptions would drive disjointed actions. In an insurgency or war situation, political aims and objectives form the basis of military plans and hence the current confusion is an outcome of ignorance at all levels. How can a strategy be evolved and tactical operations designed in isolation, if the basics are not clear? Force levels and deployments always follow, in sequence, the planning process of converting the political aim(s) to military strategic aim(s) and objectives to tactical objectives which in turn are achieved through tactical plans designed as such. This type of planning leads to evolution of longmedium- and short-term plans which are essential in countering insurgencies which have a life span of a few decades.

Important Targets: Important targets of the Naxals which need to be neutralised, through covert and overt operations, to break the back of the movement are: l Senior ideological leaders and hard core military leadership l People who provide logistics

For relevant queries please contact us at A-133, Arjun Nagar, Opp. Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 003, India. or send your queries to P.O. Box 2525, New Delhi 110 005, India.

Tel: +91-11-24644693, 24644763 or E-mail us at guidepub@vsnl.com

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P U B L I C AT I O N

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>> SHOW REPORT/EUROSATORY PHOTOGRAPHS: COGES

Business Rendezvous A forum for meeting and interacting with defence players from across the world, Eurosatory helped decision-makers and industry players obtain information about solutions for security forces n SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

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he need for products and systems to secure the homeland from armed conflicts, internal and external insurgencies and the changing threats and operational skills were well addressed at Eurosatory 2010, held at the Viparis Nord Villepinte Exhibition Centre, Paris. From operational medicines to unmanned aerial and ground vehicles for defence of the homeland, the 10th Eurosatory exhibition held from June 14-18 had a diverse range of new products and systems for land and homeland security.

With more than 1,500 equipment and weapon systems on display and several indoor and outdoor demonstrations, the exposition became a prime place for world technology launches. While there were 1,210 exhibitors in 2008, this year there were 1,331. The top five countries with the maximum number of exhibitors were France, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and Israel. Eurosatory showcased innovations and future technologies. Of the 50 participant countries, there were eight new ones–Australia, China, Estonia, Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, Portugal and Saudi Arabia.

A forum for meeting and interacting with all defence players, Eurosatory helped decision-makers and industry players obtain all information about solutions for security forces. Several seminars to prepare for tomorrow’s defence and security were held during the five-day event, wherein government representatives, regulation authorities, industrialists, defence and security experts from across the world gathered. The business meetings served as a platform for access to world markets.

In order to offer more business opportunities to decision-makers, for the first time, advanced business events (ABE) tied up with Eurosatory to hold European Defence and Security Meetings (EDSM) within the exhibition.

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SHOW REPORT/EUROSATORY <<

(Opposite page) Entrance to the expo; General Dynamics European Land Systems Piranha Class 5 8x8 wheeled armoured vehicle making its debut. General Dynamics had a huge presence at the expo.

(Left top to bottom) Eurocopter’s Tiger grabs eyeballs; Rheinmetall's innovative LANCE turret system – first unveiled at the last Eurosatory fair – features a highly modular design and ensuring maximum flexibility; Oshkosh Defense showcases a sampling of their vehicles; The Italian company OTO Melara showcases its unmanned ground vehicles.

Deals Signed In the backdrop of the exposition, several agreements were signed by major companies. Nammo and Thales Australia signed a letter of intent (LoI) for a planned cooperation on the next generation aircraft ammunition. The agreement was driven by Norway and Australia’s involvement in the F-35 fighter programme and the need for a new ammunition round capable of meeting all requirements and ensuring lethality against both soft and hard targets. The deal included cooperation on the Norwegian ammunition concept, APEX, and a special training round as well as Thales’ frangible ammunition round called APFI. Israel’s technology house Eltics signed a deal with Israel Military Industries (IMI) to combine the Black Fox active, adaptive multispectral camouflage technology with IMI’s explosive reactive armour.

On Display General Dynamics European Land Systems Piranha Class 5 8x8 wheeled armoured vehicle made its debut at the expo.

Although the Piranha Class 5 can be used in different roles, the one displayed at the show was a typical infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) configuration. Also on display was General Dynamics’ next generation Eagle 4x4 light tactical vehicle. The new generation Eagle is said to provide greater levels of lethality with a Bofors Lemur remote weapon station.

Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) unveiled a series of effective and affordable weapon systems at the Eurosatory. IAI showcased the Strikes, a 122mm Precision Rocket’ which can hit targets with a very high rate of precision. Strikes is composed of a 122mm rocket and a guidance kit, which is installed between the head of the rocket and the motor.

Thales unveiled its new Cybels security system, developed for detection of cyber threats. The solution is based around highsecurity tools that feed directly into a cyber security operations centre when a threat is detected. Thales Australia displayed a full scale mock-up of its Hawkei 4x4 Protected Liht Mobility Vehicle (PLMV) for the first time outside Australia. Thales also launched Lynx, a lightweight surveillance radar which can operate as a stand-alone system on a tripod or as a more permanent sensor on a mast, tower or vehicle.

Lockheed Martin showed its expertise in the armoured vehicle domain. The vehicles included two of the three variants being offered for the Spanish wheeled armoured vehicle programme to replace the existing BMR-600 fleet. The solution is based on

Patria’s 8x8 AMV. Elbit Systems introduced a new dual remote weapon station (DRWS) at the expo. The DRWS is a derivative of Elbit Systems’ RCWS-M, a medium-sized remotely-controlled weapon station, in serial production and qualified for service in the Austrian Army.

BAE Systems launched its latest 8x8 addition to the battle-proven RG range of vehicles, known as RG41. As claimed by the company, the vehicle is cost effective and highly versatile wheeled combat vehicle suitable for multiple theatres.

Northrop Grumman highlighted its key capabilities in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) domain, command and control, and in tactical data link technology. The company stall showcased industry-leading capability in unmanned aerial vehicles including the Global Hawk-based solution for the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) requirement and the fire scout, a multi-role vertical unmanned aircraft system (VUAS).

Singapore Technology Kinetics (STK) unveiled a fire support vehicle (FSV) variant of Bronco all-terrain tracked carrier (ATTC).

Rafael’s Iron Dome air defence missile launcher was showcased for the first time outside Israel at the Eurosatory. Along with the Iron Dome were the company’s other layered air and missile defence solutions Spyder and David’s Sling systems.

Sagem (Safran group) announced that it will be in charge of the development and production of the firing post and infrared seeker on the medium-range missile (MMP). For the purpose, the company has partnered with missile manufacturer MBDA. This system is being offered within the scope of the planned replacement of France’s Milan anti-tank missiles. The overall contract would cover 500 systems and 3,000 missiles, as well as significant potential for export contracts. MBDA and Sagem have chosen bi-mode technology for the seeker, with a daytime video channel and a non-cooled infrared channel, including inertial guidance capability to support fire and forget mode, as well as beyond visual range firing capability.

The UVS Forum was dedicated to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) systems, as well as sensors and other related subsystems applicable to either type of system.

The eleventh Eurosatory will be held at the same location during June 11-15, 2011 and is expected to have many new products, launches and deals, and a lot more for the defence industry and armed forces.

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PHOTOGRAPH: BAE Systems

F I R S T

Stealth Overcoat Developed by BAE Systems’ scientists and engineers, it makes military vehicles and equipment in the field harder to spot

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AE Systems has developed a revolutionary stealth overcoat, which would make military vehicles and equipment in the field harder to spot. The three-way material covering is unique as it offers not only visual camouflage, but protection against detection by radar and thermal imaging devices.

The stealthy fabric cover is a combination of radar absorbent material and infrared radiation dampening technology that helps keep equipment hidden from traditional long- and medium-range detection techniques. The development comes in response to the increased avail-

ability of detection sensors, especially those using infrared technology.

All vehicles give off a specific heat and radar signatures. By distorting these signatures vehicles can be made considerably more difficult to detect via the detection equipment available to a potential adversary. Steve Elwell, Director, Business Development and Strategy, BAE Systems said, “We believe that the stealth overcoat could dramatically reduce a vehicle’s infrared signature and significantly reduce its radar footprint to a degree that confuses detection systems. Crucially for soldiers in the field, the covering is light-

weight and ultra-thin and can be fitted to a vehicle in minutes.”

The stealth overcoat is simple to produce and can be created in a range of camouflage patterns to further help the vehicle

blend into its surroundings. The material is also tough enough to withstand harsh combat conditions. To make life more comfortable for operators, the material is also resistant to solar loading.

T E C H W A T C H

Autonomous and Manoeuvrable Development of a snake-like technology is under way at the US Army Research Laboratory PHOTOGRAPH: T’Jae Gibson

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he military may soon have an autonomous system to replace soldiers on search-and-rescue missions in dangerous areas. Development of a snakelike technology is under way for the purpose at the US Army Research Laboratory (ARL) which researchers call the Robotic Tentacle Manipulator.

A developmental project that expands on snake robotics research introduced at Carnegie Mellon University’s Robotics Institute, it is an ARL-funded effort through its robotics collaborative technology alliance initiative. The bases of several snakes is being arranged in a circular array that functions like a team using multiple parts of their bodies to manipulate an object, scan a room or handle improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The snake-robot is scalable and can be

built as a sub-system to a larger platform like iRobot’s rugged system Warrior, which travels over rough terrain and climbs stairs. The number of tentacles or snakes

determines the breadth or scope of its search capabilities. The number of links on each of those tentacles supports each snake’s length or reach into an area, as well as its ability to crawl, swim, climb or shimmy through narrow spaces all while transmitting images to the soldier who is operating the system. The sub-system comes equipped with sophisticated electronic sensors, among them are laser detection and ranging (LADAR) to render 3-D representations of object shapes and physical properties like faces, mass, and centre of mass.

Its touch sensitivity allows the snakerobot to balance objects and feel where forces are being applied as it rotates devices. It can lift and reposition objects, including IEDs, for examination, and do so in a controlled fashion that is unlikely to

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detonate any ordnance.

Researchers predict the technology may one day solve the “opening a door” problem, which has been a consistent obstacle in robotics. High levels of articulation in the manipulator could prove to be effective for grasping and rotating different types of door handles using knobs, handles, levers and bars.

The developmental hardware includes a large screen laptop, which presents a simple user interface. Each 24-centimetre tentacle is directed by a master controller system, which communicates with the motors that are embedded in each of the links found on the tentacles. The motors essentially direct individual tentacle movement and the master controller directs the entire amalgamation of snakes, or tentacles.

News in Brief SAGEM CONDUCTS LATEST PATROLLER UAV FLIGHT TESTS

The Sagem-built Patroller medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has successfully completed its fourth series of flight tests at the Istres Air Base in south-west France. During the tests, the MALE UAV, deployed with a ground control station, successfully demonstrated the performance of its triplex avionics equipment and its imaging system. The UAV endurance exceeded 30 hours and it proved its ability to integrate with air traffic around the base. The 1t-class MALE UAV is specifically designed to meet the long-endurance surveillance mission requirements of both armed forces and joint-ministerial programmes.

RAYTHEON DEVELOPS ENHANCED COUNTER-SNIPER CAPABILITY

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION TO ARMY MEN A function was organised at the RAJ RIF Regimental Centre to acknowledge the contribution made by various agencies towards Indian Army’s Project Samarth on August 20. On the occasion, a satellite link from Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) to Leh was inaugurated. The link will extend the university’s distance education facility to Army troops deployed in remote areas. The Army also announced the setting up of an IT Academy, in association with Microsoft India, for training Army personnel in IT courses of various levels.

The function was presided over by Chief of the Army Staff General V.K. Singh. Prof Rajashekaran Pillai, Vice-Chancellor, IGNOU and Ravi Venkatesan, Chairman, Microsoft India, were also present.

To enhance the capacity and competence of the soldiers, Indian Army has undertaken numerous initiatives aimed at empowering its soldiers. The initiatives have been clubbed under Project Samarth, which also has a number of subsidiary projects under it. More than 68,000 soldiers have been registered and 2,300 awarded diplomas/degrees under Gyandeep, a flagship initiative under Samarth.

The programme recognises the in-service training done by soldiers and makes them eligible for the award of certification by IGNOU. Likewise, the Army has tied up with Microsoft India for imparting specialised skills like information technology and English to soldiers under Kshamta. The vocational training is aimed at arming the soldiers with skills in demand by both the industrial and services sector, thereby equipping them with a viable chance for a second career. The training is backed by certification from reputed institutions. More than 1,0000 master trainers have been trained in the first phase of Kshamta.

CHAIRMAN COSC, RELEASES JOINT DOCTRINES

regions, to boost the defence cooperation between both countries.

INDIAN PARATROOPER ATTAINS MARTYRDOM IN CONGO

Raytheon has developed an enhanced counter-sniper capability by linking its Boomerang acoustic sensor and networkready long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3). Raytheon Combat Systems Vice President Glynn Raymer said that connecting Boomerang and netted LRAS3 was a plug-and-play operation that resulted in a powerful counter-sniper capability.

>> SHOW CALENDAR 24–26 August Small Arms and Cannons The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, Wiltshire, UK www.cranfield.ac.uk 2 September Armoured Vehicles Europe Targi w Krakowie Exhibition Centre, Krakow, Poland www.armouredvehicleseurope.com 6–8 September INDESEC Expo 2010 Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India www.indesec-expo.com 21–22 September International Seminar & Exhibition on Battlefield Management System Hotel Taj Palace, New Delhi, India www.ciidefence.com 4-5 October Defence Exports 2010 Crowne Plaza Hotel - Le Palace, Brussels, Belgium www.smi-online.co.uk

Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Air Staff (CAS) Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik released two joint operational doctrines, namely Joint Doctrine for Perception Management and Psychological Operations and Joint Doctrine for Air and Land Operations. The doctrines formulated by the Doctrine Directorate of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) to create the requisite synergy between the three Services in important military matters, will go a long way towards enhancing joint fighting capabilities of Indian Armed Forces.

Naik Husan Lal attained martyrdom on May 23, 2010, while on overseas duty in Congo.

He was part of the Indian Peacekeeping Battalion. A stray bullet fired by the rebels hit him and while being airlifted to the hospital at Goma after first aid, he succumbed to the injuries. Paradoxically, there were no casualties to the Congolese patrol, due to Husan’s speedy reaction. He is the 10th Indian peacekeeper to be killed, under enemy fire in the UN Mission in Congo since 1999, trying to bring peace and stability in eastern Congo.

FLASH FLOODS IN LEH

DRDO CONDUCTS INTERCEPTOR MISSILE TEST Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) successfully conducted the fourth consecutive Interceptor Missile test in endo atmospheric regime at 15 km altitude off ITR, Chandipur, Orissa, on July 26, 2010. The single stage interceptor missile fitted with directional warhead and other advanced systems neutralised the target. The target ballistic enemy missile was launched from Launch Complex – III, ITR, Chandipur.

ARMY CHIEF VISITS VIETNAM Army Chief General V.K. Singh was on a trip to Vietnam from July 26 to 29, 2010. During this trip, General V.K. Singh called on General Phung Quang Thanh, Minister of National Defence of Vietnam, besides holding talks with Chief of General Staff and Chief of Army of Vietnam. The Army Chief also visited historically important cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh (erstwhile Saigon) and interacted with various commanders of military

The Indian Army is busy with the relief operations at Leh and adjoining areas. Besides deployment of 41 Columns, Army troops are assisting Border Roads Organisation in creating diversions at several damaged bridge sites on NH-1D. Communication requirements of the district administration that were affected continue to be maintained by two INMARSATs provided by the Army.

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Executive Editor Subir Ghosh Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Copy Editor Sucheta Das Mohapatra Assistant Correspondent Abhay Singh Thapa Assistant Photo Editor Abhishek Singh Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Administration & Coordination Bharti Sharma, Survi Massey Senior Art Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia Head Vertical Sales: Rajeev Chugh Sales Manager: Rajiv Ranjan SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

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4/2010

SP’s LAND FORCES 23

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