SP's Land Forces October-November 2012

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October-November 2012

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T h e ONL Y j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

In This Issue

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ROUNDUP

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Page 4 Lessons Learnt and the Way Forward India’s national security framework and its antiquated civil-military relationship have not grown in step with the needs of new security challenges.

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Interview Photographs: Anoop Kamath / SP Guide Pubns

General (Retd) V.P. Malik Page 6 China’s Military Modernisation By most accounts, the PLA is on track to achieve its goal of building a modern, regionally-focused military by 2020.

Dr Monika Chansoria Page 8 Managing Battle at the Cutting Edge

With both China and Pakistan hell-bent on stoking insurgencies within India, our cutting edge forces will need to be equipped with the requirements to cope with the 21st century threats.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch Page 10 Preparing Soldiers for Future Wars We must be prepared for short, intense, high-tech wars; in addition to expanding terrorism, asymmetric and fourth generation wars where the soldier faces the brunt at the cutting edge.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch Page 12 Siachen Surrender: An Expensive Affair Without a national security strategy we may find solace in non-alignment, but the political bungling in agreeing to withdraw from Siachen will surely be remembered as the gravest strategic blunder of the 21st century by India.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch Plus Future Wars in India Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

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Indian Army in Disaster Management Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

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News in Brief

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‘Net-centricity will usher in profound changes in operational concepts and organisational changes’ Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor, Editor, SP’s Land Forces, interviewed Lt General Sunit Kumar, Director General Information System (DGIS), Indian Army. The DGIS gave out details about the transformation initiatives of the Indian Army to adapt to network-centric operations including battlefield digitisation.

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): What is the status of the Indian Army with regard to networkcentric warfare (NCW) capability? How soon would this capability be acquired?

What are the problem areas we are facing in acquiring this capability?

Director General Information Systems (DGIS): NCW capability is an enabler to revolution in military affairs (RMA) and encompasses a seamless domain of computer networks, applications, process re-

engineering and decision support tools aimed at attaining information and decision dominance in the battlefield. The Indian Army has clearly identified the focal areas for evolution of net-centricity and has come a long way in this journey during the last two decades. The projects initiated to be achieved are currently at various stages of development and fielding. Phase I (Test Beds) of various operational information system projects have already been successfully fielded.

Management information system (MIS) automation projects, with pan-India coverage, are also on track and are likely to be completed by December 2013. Important MIS projects, i.e, human resource management system (HRMS), automation of Record Offices, military information support operations (MISO) and integrated quartermaster package (IQMP) would be completely fielded and integrated with MISO application by 2013-14. MIS projects for the automation of work flow in the field

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>> Interview The month of October this year marks the completion of 50 years of the Indo-China conflict 1962. This war of one month has been analysed by all categories of people. Depending upon an individual’s proclivity and area of expertise, the focus has varied from observations at strategic levels, bearing in mind the bigger picture to a purely political analysis or a tactical analysis of the battles in various sectors. The general impression of the public which persists till date is that the country was humiliated and the political leadership of the country, at that point of time, brought upon this humiliation on an ill-prepared and ill-equipped Army which was called upon to throw out the aggressor by a Prime Minister who was out of touch with reality and who had neglected the defence preparedness of the country since independence and had demoralised the Service Chiefs. To top it, all there was a Defence Minister whose egotistic temperament far exceeded his management skills. His interference in matters of promotion of senior officers had upset the senior leadership of the Army because the Generals put in charge were incompetent for the assignments given to them.

Air Power which may have made a material difference was not used. While the present Air Chief, with hindsight intelligence, has made a reference to this as per media reports, I have always wondered why the Army and the Air Chiefs in 1962 did not insist upon the use of air power

as professionals. The reluctance to use air power was evident even in the run up to the Kargil War in 1999 where the conditionality of political clearance was put forth by the IAF, after receiving the Army’s request, instead of obtaining it and getting on with the job. What was the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) doing?

Wars are national undertakings and should be fought with all resources at the disposal of the nation, hence it is obvious that even the highest military leadership did not acquit themselves with honour in 1962 and were browbeaten by a shortsighted and highly conceited political leadership, who chose to take the advice of the Intelligence Bureau Chief over the Service Chiefs.

Single service planning and execution of operations has been the bane of Indian armed forces with the exception of 1971 war with ­Pakistan where, due to the personalities involved, joint planning led to a spectacular success. Should we continue on the basis that in the next war, the Service Chiefs will shed their turf differences and come together to plan and execute the operations jointly? The sooner we put institutional mechanisms into place which provide for periodic joint briefings, say quarterly, to the political leadership (Cabinet Committee on Security) by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Service Chiefs, in peace and in war, and implement the appointment of a CDS or a permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, as recom-

mended by the Naresh Chandra Committee, the better it would be for the defence of the nation.

Mandatory service in joint staff appointments by senior officers of the three services, and integration of key operational commands are also vital requirements for the future. Political directives are essential to achieve this state.

An article by the former Army Chief, General V.P. Malik has been included to provide a backdrop to what went wrong in 1962. An overview of the type of challenge we are likely to confront in the future, as far as China is concerned, is offered by an article on “China’s Military Modernisation”

by Dr Monika Chansoria.

This issue also carries the interview of the Director General Information Services. The Indian Army aspires to be a network-centric force in the near future and so we have tried to understand how near is the acquisition of this capability. Additionally, there are articles on “Conceptualising Future Wars”, “Siachen Dispute”, “Soldier Modernisation”, “Battle Management System” and “Indian Army in Disaster Management”.

Photograph: SP Guide Pubns

www.spslandforces.net

Army is also on the anvil. It is visualised that the Indian Army is well on track to transform into a network-centric force. The challenges impeding the desired evolution of automated scheme of Indian Army have been identified and are under resolution.

SP’s: How is the Indian Army visualising the transformation to this type of warfare?

What is the type of framework (intra and inter-service) involved and what are the types of projects initiated in this regard?

How is partnership with the private industry functioning in the field?

DGIS: Advancements in the field of ICT during the past over a decade mandates transformation of Indian Army into a network-centric force. The overall concept of a net-centric Indian Army envisages conver-

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gence of ‘shared situation awareness’ and ‘decision support tools’, aimed at shortening our observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) loop. The Army is currently in the process of enhancing net enablement, and the frameworks needed to integrate disparate projects have already been accomplished. In the Indian Army, besides automating the operational aspects, greater effort is now directed towards the training to enhance exploitation of the net-centricity in our peacetime functioning as well.

The private industry is actively involved; directly (in MIS project) and indirectly through development agencies (OIS project) and greater association from industry is on the cards with the categorisation of certain important automation projects in ICT domain, as ‘Make’ projects.

In order to realise the full potential of netcentricity, the entire force from soldier and weapons upward needs to be networked. We are moving in that direction through operational information systems at different levels.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

SP’s: What is the current status of Indian Army’s command, information and decision support system (CIDSS) which involves the development of the artillery command and control, and communication system (ACCCS); air defence control and reporting system; electronic warfare system; battlefield surveillance system (BSS); battlefield management system (BMS); and futuristic infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS)?

DGIS: As brought out in Question No 1, automation of operational information system is currently at various stages of development and fielding. Automation of operational system is being concurrently pursued right from soldier level upwards to strategic level. Moreover, all these systems are being evolved in an integrated manner. As a result, fully integrated operational information system is expected to be fielded as per the priorities w.e.f. 2015.

SP’s: What are the various sub-systems of the BMS? DGIS: The proposed BMS is being designed to automate operational functioning at the execution level in the tactical domain. The solution would call for a family of systems depending upon the type, role and hierarchy of the entity. The proposed BMS solution would essentially consist of communication sub-system, non-communication hardware in terms of computing devices, display units, navigation sub-system, software component, etc, to run the required functionalities and power management system.

SP’s: The military instrument of NCW will have to be forged on suitably integrated organisation, induction of new technology, joint operational concepts and doctrines, and joint training. How far have we progressed in this field?

DGIS: Net-centricity will usher in profound changes in operational concepts and organisational changes. The former would be a natural process as we imbibe netcentricity; the latter is already under way.

The human resources to drive the NCW apparatus is being created by a training mechanism at cat ‘A’ and ‘B’ institution to build the IT capability across the spectrum of Indian Army. Apart from this, adequate exposure in IT and NCW is being imparted at unit and formation level by means of

Interview >> through the Army Software Development Centre (ASDC)? How far have we progressed in this field?

DGIS: ASDC has worked out a comprehensive MIS automation framework for the Indian Army, based on a contemporary model. This pervasive framework penetrates all echelons

Net-centricity will usher in profound changes in operational concepts and organisational changes.

The former would be a natural process as we imbibe net-centricity; the latter is already under way.

of the Army from units, upwards to Directorates at Army Headquarters. This framework is the bedrock of unit peacetime MIS functioning; all other activities are oriented towards achieving this goal. ASDC is intimately involved in all stages of software development life cycle and ensures that holistic and compre-

hensive packages are developed and fielded in the Indian Army. Based on the user feedback, it fixes bugs and develops upgrades which are disseminated to the users. The present efforts at ASDC are to develop a fully-integrated MIS for the Army, useable across all the units and through all hierarchies. SP

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various training capsules, cadres and integrated firing, employing integrated Tac C3I systems at a formation level rather than at individual unit level.

SP’s: Have we been able to digitise the border area maps including the territory beyond the border in the case of our likely adversaries? What is the progress in this regard?

DGIS: Accurate geospatial data forms the bedrock of operational automated system; the essence of tactics is the interplay of ground and weapons. The requirement is being met through a bank of geospatial data which is being gradually built up through inputs from various related agencies in the country.

SP’s: How is India’s advanced software capabilities being exploited by the Army?

DGIS: India has immense Information Technology (IT) skilled human resources (HR) which has propelled it globally as an IT superpower. Necessary handshake between the industry and the services has been an ongoing process. During the past five years, industry has been involved in the development of major MIS projects (with pan-Army footprints) and their results would be visible in the environment within next three to six months. As far as the capital projects are concerned, some of the recent mega projects have been categorised as ‘Make’, thereby creating an avenue for further enhanced participation by the industry in the development of information systems. We are sanguine that similar engagements will help us to harness the potential of Indian industry towards our goals.

SP’s: Is the Indian Army planning to network all weapon platforms for ‘situational awareness’ or is this going to be done selectively? Can you give us an idea of the costs involved?

DGIS: In order to realise the full potential of net-centricity, the entire force from soldier and weapons upward needs to be networked. We are moving in that direction through operational information systems at different levels.

Networking legacy equipment is expected to be a challenging process. However, we are taking measures to ensure that all the equipment scheduled for induction/development in future, is also data-enabled, so that their integration does not pose any challenge later.

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>> Indo-China War 1962

Lessons Learnt and the Way Forward India’s national security framework and its antiquated civil-military relationship have not grown in step with the needs of new security challenges. We need to change our mindsets and attitudes and look beyond the narrow boundaries defined by turf and parochialism.

Photograph: PIB

 General (Retd) V.P. Malik “Relations between great powers cannot be sustained by inertia, commerce or mere sentiments.”

—Aaron Freidburg in New Republic, August 4, 2011

T

he India-China war in 1962 was independent India’s most traumatic and worst ever security failure which left an indelible impression on our history and psyche.

This October marks its 50th anniversary: an appropriate occasion to reflect on its strategic lessons and our current politicomilitary status vis-à-vis China.

Background It all started with China’s occupation of Tibet, and their surreptitious construction of a strategic road through Aksai Chin, joining Tibet with Sinkiang. The Government of India took two-and-a-half years to confirm the road construction and another one year to disclose it to the Parliament on August 31, 1959.

The uprising in Tibet caused further worsening of relations. In March 1959, the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet and took shelter in India. China suspected that India was helping the Khampa rebellion and had enabled Dalai Lama’s escape to India. This, alongside skirmishes on several border posts, resulted in the hardening of attitudes. India adopted a strategically flawed ‘forward policy’ of erecting isolated check posts without taking any measures to improve border infrastructure or the armed forces’ capabilities. Failure of the government policy put Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru under intense domestic pressure. He ordered the military to throw out the Chinese from intruded Indian Territory– a task that was well beyond its capability.

In October 1962, the Chinese military launched pre-meditated and calibrated punitive attacks in India’s northwest and northeast sectors of Ladakh and North-East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh). India suffered its worst ever military defeat, and a geographic surgery that continues to fester in the form of line of actual control (LAC) till date.

There are many lessons. My emphasis is on strategic thinking and planning, civil-military relations and capability-building to tackle potential security threats.

www.spslandforces.net

Grand Strategy According to a Pentagon historical study paper on the Sino-India Border Dispute, de-classified in 2007, “Developments between late 1950 and late 1959 were marked by Chinese military superiority, which, combined with cunning and diplomatic deceit, contributed to New Delhi’s reluctance to change its policy toward the Beijing regime for nine years.”

The study records that the Chinese diplomatic effort was a five-year masterpiece of guile, planned and executed in a large part by Chou En-lai. The Chinese Premier deceived Nehru several times about Chinese maps and carefully concealed Beijing’s long-range intentions. He played on ‘Nehru’s Asian, antiimperialist mental attitude, his proclivity to temporise, and his sincere desire for an amica-

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Defence Minister A.K. Antony, Marshal of Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, the Chief of Army Staff, General Bikram Singh, the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral D.K. Joshi and the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne paid tribute to war heroes at Amar Jawan Jyoti on the occasion of 50th anniversary of 1962 War, in New Delhi

ble Sino-Indian relationship’ and strung along Nehru by creating an impression through equivocal language that (a) it was a minor border dispute, (b) Beijing would accept the McMahon Line, and that (c) old Kuomintang period Chinese maps would soon be revised.

The Pentagon study claims that the Chinese and even Nehru saw the use of diplomatic channels as the safest way to exclude the Indian public, press, and Parliament. They used these channels effectively for several years till it became a military fait accompli for India due to the Chinese forces exercising actual control of the area. The study concludes that “in the context of the immediate situation on the border where Chinese troops had occupied the Aksai Plain in Ladakh, this was not an answer but rather an implicit affirmation that India did not have the military capability to dislodge the Chinese”.

Many researchers have pointed out that the then raging Sino-Soviet ideological war played a role in the Chinese decision-making, leading to the Sino-Indian 1962 war. Chinese leaders were also concerned that the US might use a Sino-Indian war situation to unleash Taiwan against the mainland. They used diplomatic subterfuge to obtain reassurance on both these fronts before the war.

India’s Security Policy During this Period?

It is evident that despite Sardar Patel’s prophetic advice to Nehru on Tibet, China and Indian security issues on November 7, 1950 (contents of this letter were kept secret for 18 years), the Indian Government showed no strategic foresight or planning. When Chinese forces reached Changtu on their way to Lhasa, the Indian delegation in the United Nations blocked consideration of a proposal to censure China. In December 1950, Nehru publically supported the Chinese position on the grounds that Tibet should be handled only by the parties concerned i.e. Beijing and Lhasa. The government even allowed Chinese food material to

go through Calcutta and Gangtok to reach Chinese troops in Yatung. In September 1952, India agreed with Chinese authorities to withdraw its military-cum-diplomatic mission in Tibet.

In the decade preceding 1962, the Indian ruling elite was convinced that having woven China into the Panchsheel Agreement, it had managed to craft a sound ‘China policy’.

It was neither alert to the Chinese military developments in Tibet nor to the construction of Sinkiang-Tibet road which began in March 1956. Even after 1959, when China displayed its aggressive designs, Indian leaders were profoundly affected by the remoteness and difficulties of Aksai Chin and Tibetan terrain, forgetting that Zorawar Singh, Macdonald and Colonel Younghusband had led Indian troops to these very areas for strategic reasons in the past. Primarily due to ideological and emotional reasons, the Chinese geostrategic challenges and threats were either not accepted or underplayed till the Parliament and public opinion forced the government to adopt a military posture against China for which it was never prepared.

Military Strategy Towards the end of 1961, Mao convened a meeting of China’s Central Military Commission and took personal charge of the ‘struggle with India’. Mao asserted that the objective was not a local victory but to inflict a defeat so that India might be ‘knocked back to the negotiating table’. By early September 1962, China started warning that if India ‘played with fire’; it would be ‘consumed by fire’. On September 8, 1962, 800 Chinese soldiers surrounded the Indian post at Dhola. Neither side opened fire for 12 days. The dice was cast for a showdown.

The Chinese had conveyed their intention but we still thought that they were bluffing.

On October 6, 1962, Mao issued a directive to his Chief of Staff Lou Ruiquing, laying down the broad strategy for the projected offensive. The main assault was to be in the

eastern sector but forces in the western sector would ‘coordinate’ with the eastern sector.

The Chinese Military Command appreciated that the Indian Army’s main defences lay at Se La and Bomdi La. The concept of operations was to advance along different routes, encircle these two positions and then reduce them. Marshal Liu Bocheng outlined the military strategy of concerted attacks by converging columns. Indian positions were split into numerous segments and then destroyed piecemeal. The speed and ferocity of the attacks unhinged the Indian defences and pulverised the Indian command, resulting in panic and often contradictory decisions. Politico-military decision not to use combat air power was an unforgivable error of judgement.

Deception and surprise are enduring elements in the Chinese military strategy and Sino Indian 1962 war was a classic example.

The Indian debacle was primarily the result of a failure of India’s strategic foresight and military capabilities.

Beijing justified the invasion as a “defensive act”. It must be noted that China, involved in the largest number of military conflicts in Asia, has always carried out military pre-emption in the name of strategically “defensive act” with no forewarning—Tibet invasion, entry into Korean War, 1962 conflict with India, border conflict with the Soviet Union in 1969, and attack on Vietnam in 1979.

Strategic Thinking In his book, On China, Henry Kissinger treats the India-China border war of 1962 as an important illustration of the Chinese statecraft wherein “deterrent coexistence” and “offensive-deterrence”, defined as “luring in the opponents and then dealing them a sharp and stunning blow”, are important components. According to him, the confrontation triggered the familiar Chinese style of dealing with strategic decisions “thorough analysis; careful preparation; attention to psychological and political factors; quest for surprise and rapid conclusion”. He empha-

Indo-China War 1962

>>

sises on the difference between the Chinese “comprehensive approach” to “segmented policy-making” by other nations. Kissinger concludes that behind the façade of “principled” ideological firmness/political toughness/historic civilisational patience, the Chinese leadership is capable of extreme elasticity and pliability, as seen in the physical contortions of a Chinese circus gymnast.

Two other important lessons that emerge from this episode are: political realism versus ideological wish thinking, and interlacing of grand and military strategy.

India’s Military Capabilities Prior to the 1962 war, there was a steep erosion of every aspect of India’s military capabilities: civil-military relations, military leadership and morale, force levels and armaments.

Throughout the 1950s, the Indian Government paid scant attention to the requirements of the armed forces. This neglect led to a gradual yet steady deterioration of their fighting capacity, skills, and like any other rot within, remained hidden till these were brutally exposed by the war in 1962.

This period also saw Nehru’s contemptuous and Defence Minister Krishna Menon’s acid-tongued, acerbic wit and rude behaviour with senior military leadership. There were incidents like General Thimaya’s retracted resignation, Lt General S.D. Verma’s disagreement over Nehru’s misleading statement in the Parliament on the situation in Ladakh, leading to the former’s supersession and resignation. Political patronage allowed General B.M. Kaul’s elevation and arrogant behaviour amongst senior officers. These events sent the message down the line that one could stand up only at one’s own peril. It also affected their leadership and performance on the field.

Looking at the present state of the armed forces, it appears that we have not learnt from that experience. The armed forces are not in any major strategic consultations and decision-making loop; not even on issues that seriously affect the welfare and morale of soldiers. There are visible signs of dissatisfaction amongst serving soldiers and veterans over status, pay and pension anomalies. There is mounting discontentment over the political leadership’s inability to set things right.

One of the cornerstones of democracy is a healthy politico-military relationship. A major reason for the fragility of India’s politico-military relationship is that instead of maintaining ‘political control’, it practises a unique system of ‘bureaucratic control’ over the military. With bureaucracy ensconced in between, there is hardly any discourse.

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The Way Forward On the face of it, India and China have a cordial bilateral relationship with burgeoning economic cooperation. But the deep strategic fissures cannot be ignored. In recent years, China has been more vocal and assertive on its claim over Arunachal Pradesh. China is non-committal over nuclear arming of Pakistan and induction of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). By issuing stapled visas to Indian passport holders from J&K, Beijing is virtually questioning the status of the state, providing support to Pakistan’s position on the issue, and ensuring greater security to its occupied territory in Aksai Chin.

Some Sinologists say that China does not

We have weak strategic culture and thinking.

Despite several foreign aggressions in our postindependent history, we seem to lack realism.

ANN L F INDIA 09 12.indd 1

nurse extraterritorial ambitions. But there are many who feel that China never gives up its border claims. The problem is that most of China’s neighbours do not know which Chinese era is its territorial benchmark. What exactly is the Chinese territory? China recognises the McMahon Line as its boundary with Myanmar but not with India. Till date, it has not revealed its perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) which will reduce frequent local tension and allow implementation of confidence building measures envisaged in Article 3 of the ‘Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC-1996’. China’s refusal to indicate its version of the LAC points towards a larger ploy; of progressively building up a case of its claims over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Its inroads in India’s neighbourhood and assertive maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean echo its long-term strategic motives. These developments will soon give it a wide array of options, including military coercion, to resolve impending disputes in its favour while bargaining from a position of strength.

China now has the benefit of an extensive military-oriented infrastructure in Tibet

which provides capability for rapid build-up of forces and a smooth chain of supply, supplementing its power projection capacity. Lack of infrastructure on the Indian side creates huge logistic difficulties and restricts military deployment and manoeuvre.

India is not capable of fighting a two-front war (Pakistan and China) in the foreseeable future. This must be avoided diplomatically.

However, such a scenario in Gilgit-Baltistan area cannot be ruled out. We must prepare ourselves; develop military infrastructure along the Northern border, put in place synergised border management operations, and build greater surveillance (satellite, aerial and ground level), night fighting and rapid deployment capabilities for the mountains. We must modernise our armed forces and be able to convince the other side that any aggressive move will invite countermoves.

Need for a Realistic Strategy Strategy and diplomacy in international relations is based on the art of possible and the advancement of national interests. At strategic level, we require a long memory and a longer foresight and vision. We have

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weak strategic culture and thinking. Despite several foreign aggressions in our post independent history, we seem to lack realism.

There is a sense of self-righteousness and singular faith in words, without looking for underlying falsehoods and incompetence.

India’s national security framework and its antiquated civil-military relationship have not grown in step with the needs of new security challenges. We need to change our mindsets and attitudes and look beyond the narrow boundaries defined by turf and parochialism. It is high time that we ask ourselves (a) Does our political leadership demonstrate critical understanding of larger strategic issues, constraints, effects and implications of military strategic and operational employment and its institutional conduct? (b) Does our military demonstrate critical and creative understanding of the strategic purposes and contributions? Does it demonstrate a willingness to speak up and when necessary? (c) Are the civilian authorities who oversee the military adequately competent in military strategy and defence planning? Objective answers to these questions will lead us to a correct strategic path. SP

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>> Neighbourhood

China’s Military Modernisation Much of the PLA’s success over the next decade will be determined by how effectively it integrates emerging capabilities and platforms into the force. Over the past decade, China has benefited from robust investment in modern hardware and technology, which makes the decade from 2011 through 2020 even more crucial. By most accounts, the PLA is on track to achieve its goal of building a modern, regionally-focused military by 2020.

Photograph: Wikipedia

 Dr Monika Chansoria

www.spslandforces.net

T

he relentless debate surrounding the military rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) only seems to get more vociferous with each passing day. With exhibition of consistently higher stages of economic growth, the military spending power of China is only bound to increase, thereby implying rapid and expanding prowess and influence within Asia and beyond. The military modernisation programme initiated formally by the Chinese leadership in December 1978 has entered its 34th year.

The Chinese leadership is prioritising on fostering a positive external environment to facilitate economic growth by virtue of expanding its diplomatic influence to gain greater access to markets and resources, and simultaneously maintain stability along its periphery.

Ever since the reign of Mao Zedong, maintaining the very existence of PRC and being led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has been the top objective of the national security strategy of China. Specifically, at that given point, the said strategic objective was that of the PRC being able to survive the coming war, irrespective of whether the war was conventional or nuclear. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chose military planning policy as its focal objective from 1949 onwards since ‘survival’ was no longer the primary pressing concern.

For almost half a century now, Asia’s tectonic plates of power shift have accepted the possibility of China returning to its traditional role as the central actor in Asia.

To achieve this end, Beijing is diligently working towards attaining ‘comprehensive national power’ (zonghe guoli) and accruing traditional attributes of power, resulting in perpetuating rule of the CCP, sustaining economic growth and development, maintaining domestic political stability, defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity and securing China’s status as a great power.

The most proverbial components of the Chinese way of war and diplomacy are bingyizha li (war is based on deception), chu-qi zhi-sheng (win through unexpected moves), yin-di zhi-sheng (gain victory by varying one’s strategy and tactics according to the enemy’s situation), hou-fazhi-ren (fight back and gain the upper hand only after the enemy has initiated fighting), sheng-dong ji-xi (make a feint to the east but attack in the west), in addition to many more.

China’s current military strategy continues to attach importance to the building of the Army; however, it has accorded priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force in order to achieve a balanced combat force structure. This is aimed at strengthening the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air, as well as conducting strategic counter strikes.

A major component of Mao Zedong’s military thought centred on “active defence” (jiji fangyu), is often referred to as China’s “military strategy” or “strategic guideline”.

The fundamental rule of “active defence” asserts that China will strike only after the enemy has struck. However, the line between accepting the enemy’s first strike and the

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use of pre-emption to defend China from an immediate attack critically remains blurred.

In the March 2009 speech to military delegates of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC), President Hu Jintao urged the military to concentrate not only in building core military capabilities, but also the ability to carry out military operations other than war (fei zhanzheng junshi xingdong). China’s long-term, comprehensive military modernisation is aimed at improving the PLA’s capacity to conduct high-intensity, regional military operations—anti-access and area denial (A2AD) operations. The PLA is giving priority to the development of tactical missiles, surface-toair missiles and special operations forces, to increase its capabilities for land-air integrated operations, long-distance manoeuvres, rapid assault and special operations.

The growing expanse of China’s military reach has firmly been demonstrated in 2011 with the successful testing of two weapon systems/facilitators in the realm of military hardware — the fifth generation J-20 radar-evading stealth fighter rolled out in January 2011, followed by Beijing’s first aircraft carrier, the Varyag, of Ukrainian origin in August 2011.

Furthering this reference, the military capabilities being accentuated include advancement of cruise missiles including the groundlaunched CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile (LACM), and the ground- and ship-launched YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM).

Besides, the focus on short- and mediumrange conventional ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs), continues unabated, and this can be read in correlation to creating military pressure against regional players, including India. The variants of China’s DF-21 (CSS-5) MRBM with a range of more than 1,750 km hold a potential to target India. Besides, China has also confirmed developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the DF-21 MRBM. China’s Second Artillery Corps—the strategic missile force which controls both nuclear ballistic and conventional missiles—is modernising the SRBMs by fielding advanced variants with improved ranges and payloads. The Pentagon has asserted that the PLA is fielding greater numbers of conventional MRBMs to conduct precision strikes against wider ranges on land targets,

naval ships and aircraft carriers operating from beyond China’s first island chain. This chain is an invisible line stretching from the Japanese Archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines; stretching till the South China Sea. China’s emphasis on its missile force capable of launching standoff precision strikes will get strengthened by 2015, when the PLA is expected to field additional road-mobile DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and enhanced silo-based DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBMs. China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of about 50-75 silo-based, liquid-fuelled and road-mobile, solid-fuelled ICBMs. According to the latest 2012 report submitted by the US Department of Defense to the US Congress, China is expected to display and press for a continuing pattern of military modernisation. The Pentagon’s report delves into assessing the current and potential future course of technological military advancement of the PLA. Terming the declassified report released by the Pentagon as a “Cold-war style practice”, China’s official Xinhua news agency rebuffed the findings by terming them as “speculative descriptions”.

However, as a matter of fact, amidst wide speculation that inherent economic pressures could become a primary driver for a

China’s current military strategy continues to attach importance to the building of the Army.

However, it has also accorded priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force in order to achieve a balanced combat force structure.

slowdown of the PLA’s modernisation campaign, China chose to signal its intent to the world by announcing a plan to boost defence spending to 11.2 per cent in 2012. This implies that military spending shall cross the $100 billion mark officially for the first time to approximately 670 billion yuan ($106.4 billion). At this rate, it is estimated that China’s defence budgetary investments will race ahead at 18.75 per cent and is likely to touch $238.2 billion by 2015.

More significantly, the central premise in Chinese military thinking is that if the country ever has to defend itself, it should be prepared to conduct “warfare beyond all boundaries and limitations”. Perhaps the most crucial among the ‘beyond rules’ criteria is manifested in the form of Beijing’s attempts to sharpen its campaign of ‘informationisation’, and asymmetric capabilities are visible as it has unleashed its cyber war and space potential.

China’s resolve to “fight and win local wars on its borders” poses a challenge to regional stability. China’s conventional and strategic forces coupled with efforts at joint operational training and improvements in logistics are likely to continue, thus resulting in the enhancement of the military capabilities of China. An instance of Beijing’s long-term objective regarding the future of Tibet, which is read in correlation to the larger concept of Chinese national integration, can be seen in the rapid buildup of military infrastructure in the Tibet Autonomous Region. After conducting its first live military exercise in Tibet in 2010, the PLA recently rehearsed capture of mountain passes at heights beyond 5,000 metres, while conceding that “conduct of military operations on plateau with an elevation of more than 4,500 metres is an extreme challenge”. By means of an official report from the Chinese Defence Ministry, the exercise was described as the “first joint actual-troop drill of the PLA air and ground troops under information-based conditions in frigid area with a high altitude,” the joint drill involved the Chinese Air Force, ground troops, armoured columns and a range of support entities. PLA planning from thereon assumed that future military contingencies could erupt without much warning. Therefore, rapid reaction forces had to be ready at a moment’s notice.

Much of the PLA’s success over the next decade will be determined by how effectively it integrates emerging capabilities and platforms into the force. Over the past decade, China has benefited from robust investment in modern hardware and technology, which makes the decade from 2011 through 2020 even more crucial. By most accounts, the PLA is on track to achieve its goal of building a modern, regionally-focused military by 2020. Asia’s geostrategic paradigm would continue to get eclipsed by security dilemmas flowing out of lack of transparency and limited dissemination of military information by China. In light of the increased focus and investments in military capabilities by the PLA, interpretations of power projection capabilities that could depose any/all regional and global strategic calculations remain galore. SP The writer is a Visiting Scholar at the Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, USA

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Managing Battle at the Cutting Edge With both China and Pakistan hell-bent on stoking insurgencies within India, our cutting edge forces will need to be equipped with the requirements to cope with the 21st century threats including high-tech terrorists and insurgents wielding modern weapons, communications, and equipment and providing fleeting targets.

Photograph: US Air Force

streaming and imageries. It should be scalable to ensure its availability to all elements and range from being man-portable to being fitted in combat vehicles. The earlier the Army acquires the BMS, the better will be its capacity in network-centric warfare.

Communications

Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron Raven operators viewing images transmitted from an RQ-11 Raven during a recent mission

 Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

T

echnology has poised commanders to see their areas of responsibility in depth and in real near time. It is possible to develop an accurate common picture and share it both horizontally and vertically. Precisely locating, identifying, tracking and attacking targets by appropriate means and monitoring effects is a reality. Operating in joint environments and mature capability to conduct multi-dimensional simultaneous operations is facilitated. Success in future military operations will require a telescoped decision-action cycle and the ability to conduct operations simultaneously within an all arms group.

www.spslandforces.net

Requirement The Army wants the objective of the system to provide a command, control and information (C2I) integration tool supporting every level of military users ranging from individual soldier to battalion group/combat group commander in the tactical battle area (TBA), which will provide in near real time an appropriate, common and comprehensive tactical picture by integration of inputs from all elements in a battle group. The integration will include inputs from command and control elements, detachments, supporting arms, surveillance devices and headquarters, thereby providing a distinct edge in the successful conduct of operations and optimisation of resources.

Capabilities The capabilities required of the battlefield management system (BMS) are: to provide a command and control system spanning the TBA spreading across individuals, detach-

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SP’s Land Forces 5/2012

ments, combat platforms, sensors, subunits, units to the battalion commander/regiment commander; achieve faster reaction capability and flexibility in command and control by providing information automatically at the right place and in the right time, thereby compressing the observe orient decide and act (OODA) loop; providing a strong foundation for making decisions based on near real time, consistent and well-structured information, thereby enhancing the information handling capability of commanders at all levels; strengthening information exchange by having a strong messaging and replication mechanism; improving and modernising presentation of information in near real time; integrating with other command and control system.

Areas of Interest There are numerous areas of interest that include developing a suitable application on an intuitive operating system, geographic information system (GIS) suitability customised to meet military requirements, voice and data communications that should always

The BMS sought by the Army will perform a variety of operational situation awareness and decision support functions at the battalion/combat group level

remain up, computer hardware which is rugged and non-obtrusive, retro-fitment maintaining platform integrity and system integration to include application software, data links with radio systems, integration of battalion/regiment level sensors battlefield surveillance radar (BFSR), thermal imagers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) data, satellite imagery, etc. The BMS being looked at will perform a variety of operational situational awareness and decision support functions at a battalion group/combat group level.

The lowest level to which the system will be connected is individual soldier/combat platform and the highest level will be the battalion/regiment commander. The system will be further integrated to the tactical command, control, communications and information (Tac C3I) system through the command information decision support system (CIDSS). The BMS will comprise a tactical handheld computer with individual soldiers and tactical computers at Battle Group Headquarters and combat vehicles. Computers will be integrated employing application and database servers connected on a dataenabled communication network. The system will enable generation of common operational picture by integrating inputs from all relevant sources within a battle group by integrated use of GIS and global positioning system (GPS). The BMS will be a highly mobile system which is able to network itself by integration of components and provide a high data rate. The communications should not interfere with the legacy communication equipment and should easily be retrofitted into combat platform. The communications system should optimally utilise the bandwidth available for military communications involving voice and data including video

The BMS sought by the Army will perform a variety of operational situational awareness and decision support functions at a battalion/combat group level. The lowest level to which the system will be connected is individual soldier/combat platform and the highest level will be the battalion/regiment commander integrating to the Tac C3I System through the CIDSS, enabling a common operational picture, integrating all sources through integrated use of GIS and GPS, will be a highly mobile and with high data rate. The communications should not interfere with the legacy communication equipment and should easily be retrofitted into combat platform. Communications should optimally utilise the bandwidth available for military communications involving voice, data, imageries and video streaming. It should be scalable to ensure its availability to all elements and range from being manportable to being fitted in combat vehicles.

When pitted against the future requirements, the legacy communication devices are physically incompatible, follow different link protocols, have issues of address, reach and quality of service (QoS). The legacy of existing combat net radios (CNR) are with fixed frequency (analogue), are capable of limited communication and data rates besides the requirement of a modem for data transmission, are not secure and have no data encryption facility. In effect, the present family of radio sets does not meet the requirements of a NCW Force that would facilitate transmission of voice, video and data simultaneously. For BMS to be successful; there is a need for a reliable, robust, resilient and efficient communication system that assures that the network is always functional. Net-centricity warrants a paradigm shift from voice-centric to datacentric systems and networks eventually enabling NCW capabilities. For BMS communications, the Indian Army would be looking for long-range high bandwidth data transmission (live streaming), facilitating messaging, including voice mail, quickly deployable, self-configuring and self-healing networks, easy to customise, rolling coverage and interoperability. The focus will have to be on change in network topology, non line of sight communications, spectrum management, network management systems, QoS (including latency, assured delivery, jitter), security of communications, networks and storage, robustness and authentication. Deployment of new technologies like software defined radios (SDRs) that can also communicate with CNRs to offset growth in demand for spectrum needs serious thought. Compression technologies for passage of information must be capitalised. Test bed for the BMS should be Continued on page 13

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>> Modernisation

Preparing Soldiers for Future Wars We must be prepared for short, intense, high-tech wars; in addition to expanding terrorism, asymmetric and fourth generation wars where the soldier faces the brunt at the cutting edge. Delay in modernisation has a direct bearing on combat efficiency in coping with threats to national security and lives of the infantryman.

We need to act and act fast.

Photograph: SPSC

 Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

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he importance of the man behind the machine or weapon requires no debate. Conflict situations like terrorism, asymmetric and fourth generation wars have heightened their importance much more.

At the same time, rapid advances in information technology are revolutionising methods of fighting. Situational awareness, information dominance, jointness, net-centricity and stand-off precision weapons are the buzzwords, requiring a transformed soldier capable of dealing with high-tech war that will be short and intense plus contending with fleeting opportunities including by terrorists/non-state actors/state-sponsored non-state actors, who are getting more and more sophisticated. Today’s soldier must be a man-machine-technology mix, a weapon platform with adequate firepower, self-protection, night-fighting capability and mobility. He should have the ability to ‘see’ the enemy much before he himself gets spotted and be networked to the required level, enabling him to effectively respond to any situation in real/near real time. Time magazine voiced concerns of the US Army’s slow soldier modernisation in the haze of big ticket defence acquisitions, a few years into Iraq and Afghanistan. Same has been the case with soldier modernisation in India.

It is only in recent years that the future infantry soldier system (F-INSAS) has gathered pace albeit the timelines announced initially have not been met, as is the case of almost all the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) projects. There is need to not only hasten up this project but also holistically review whether there is a need to go beyond F-INSAS to meet the soldier modernisation needs of the Indian Army per se and the security sector.

www.spslandforces.net

F-INSAS The F-INSAS programme, which is to ensure a dramatic increase in lethality, survivability and mobility while making the infantry soldier “a self-contained fighting machine”, is based on the land warrior system of the US Army and future soldier programmes of other nations. With the intent to retain its strategic autonomy, self-reliance and indigenisation of the programme is being emphasised. Most of the equipment is being indigenously developed by DRDO independently, as the prime developer and the system integrator, as well as with private partnership. F-INSAS is being developed in three phases; Phase 1 (originally scheduled to be completed by 2012) comprising weapons, body armour, clothing and individual equipment, Phase 2 comprising the target acquisition system and Phase 3 comprising the computer sub-system, radio subsystem, software and software integration.

F-INSAS will provide the infantryman with latest weaponry, communication network and instant access to information on the battlefield. It will include a fully-networked all-terrain, all-weather personal-equipment platform, enhanced firepower and mobility

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SP’s Land Forces 5/2012

Infantrymen during Exercise Sudarshan Shakti

for the digitalised battlefield of the future.

The Infantryman will be equipped with mission-oriented equipment integrated with his buddy soldier team, the subunit, as also the overall command, control, communications, computers, information and intelligence (C4I2) system. Complete fielding in all infantry and RR units (some 465 battalions) is planned to be completed by 2020 or so.

The core systems of F-INSAS comprise helmet with visor, clothing, weapons and accessories. The helmet is an integrated assembly equipped with helmet-mounted flash light, thermal sensors and night vision device, digital compass, video cameras, computer and nuclear, chemical and biological sensors, with audio headsets. The visor is intended to be integrated and to act as a

Soldier modernisation of the infantry must be treated as an ‘emergent’ requirement in consideration of the emerging threats within and surrounding the country, especially considering the rate at which the terrorists are achieving sophistication

head-up display monitor equivalent to two 17-inch computer monitors. The personal clothing of the infantry soldier of the future would be lightweight with a bullet-proof jacket. The futuristic jacket would be waterproofed, yet breathable. The new attire will enable the troops to carry extra load and resist the impact of nuclear, chemical and biological warfare. The uniform will also carry solar chargers for charging palmtop and other attached electronic equipment. It will contain external oxygen supply and respirator providing protection against gas and smoke and will include flame retardant carbonised viscose undergarments, fire proof knee and elbow pads, bullet-proof armoured waistcoat designed to stop a bullet, ceramic armour plates covering the front, back and groin and an armoured helmet capable of stopping a 9mm round at close range. The new uniform will have vests with sensors to monitor the soldier’s health parameters and provide quick medical relief.

The weapons sub-system is being built around a multi-calibre individual weapon system with the fourth calibre attached to a grenade launcher. These include a 5.56mm, a 7.62mm and a new 6.8mm weapon under development for the first time in India. The under barrel grenade launcher (UBGL) will be capable of launching air bursting grenade.

The sub-system includes a thermal weapon sight and laser range finder to provide the soldier with range and direction information.

The global positioning system (GPS) location information will allow the soldier to call for indirect fire accurately. While there are two types of next generation infantry rifles under development indigenously, global tender for the acquisition of new assault rifles and carbines for close quarters battle (CQB) carbines have been issued. As for accessories,

the soldier will be equipped with palmtop GPS device for communicating with other soldiers and locate or generate maps to find location, and for situational awareness. The palmtop will inform the soldiers’ location of friendly forces in relation to their own positions. It will also enable them to transfer messages. Terrain equipment gears for various missions will also be carried. Thermal imaging, sensors and night vision equipment, currently deployed in weapon systems such as artillery and main battle tanks will be customised to make them portable for soldiers to carry in the battle ground. Defence advanced GPS receivers, infrared sensors, thermal sensors, electromagnetic sensors and radio frequency sensors would also be carried.

The battlefield management system (BMS) and F-INSAS programmes are being developed concurrently; BMS under information systems and F-INSAS under the Infantry. BMS was conceived at battalion/ regiment level pan-Army (including for the infantry) and comprises of communication, non-communication hardware and software. The lowest level to which the system will be connected is the individual soldier/ weapon platform and the highest level with battalion/regiment commander. The system will be further integrated with the tactical command, control, communications and information (Tac C3I) system through the command information decision support system (CIDSS). The Directorate General of Information System (DGIS) is charged with facilitating transformation of the Indian Army into a dynamic network-centric force, achieving information superiority through effective management of information technology. Quite logically, Phase 3 of F-INSAS (computer sub-system, radio sub-system, software and software integration) should

Modernisation be part of the BMS. However, the Infantry remains adamant that Phase 3 of F-INSAS should be developed by Infantry and not be part of the BMS. A separate project of software and communication integration by Infantry is retrograde and delaying overall net-centricity pan-Army, would incur additional avoidable costs and defeat the very purpose that DGIS was created for, considerable work in the fields of GIS and applications having already been done by the latter in addition to completing Phase 1 of CIDSS and battlefield surveillance system (BSS).

While the Indian Army required the BMS ‘yesterday’, squabbling on delimitation between the BMS and F-INSAS led to delay of the Phase 1 of BMS by almost a year. The infantry has been haggling that Phase 3 of F-INSAS be developed by them in full or at least till company/platoon level. Since F-INSAS is to incorporate situational awareness and GIS, it amounts to not only ‘re-inventing the wheel’ but also requires yet another project to integrate the F-INSAS with the BMS, implying avoidable additional expenditure and time. We have not learnt from similar situations in foreign armies. In UK, the FIST programme for Infantry was thought of 10 years after the b ­ owman programme. In the latter, the C2 system went down to half squad. The Platoon Commander carries both the Bowman and the FIST. In case the section has to function independently, the Section Commander carries both the Bowman and FIST. Separate F-insas and BMS could lead us to similar situations which should be unacceptable. FBCB2 was implemented in the US Army in 1998. Land warrior was started late,

prototyped in 2005 and foreclosed in 2007, leading to the future force warrior (FFW) programme being started. Land warrior did not integrate with FBCB2. As a result, FBCB2 is being replaced by joint battle command system (JBCS) which goes down to the soldier. Significantly, FFW programme is looking only at the soldier ensemble to include weapon, protection and integrated helmet.

The future soldier programme will not have a radio of its own but JTRS Cluster 5 Radio (soldier radio), common to all US soldiers and a common SA and computer from JBCS. The helmet will have a helmet-mounted display and earphones as well as microphone. System of systems are about integrating systems and empowering the user. The soldier is only a part of the network; he is not responsible for the network. Separate F-INSAS and BMS programmes will lead to issues related to interoperability and integration of systems as the systems may be developed by different agencies using different platforms. Maintenance of disparate systems would be required and it would be difficult to achieve test bed of an integrated combat group or infantry battalion group. It would be prudent for the Infantry to only develop Phases 1 and 2 of the F-INSAS, leaving development of Phase 3 as part of the BMS, especially since the latter also caters for Mechanised Infantry both in mounted and dismounted roles.

Beyond F-INSAS Should we be looking beyond F-INSAS? Prudence demands we should. The reasons for this are as follows:  While Infantry undoubtedly is the

Queen of Battle, soldiers other than from Infantry also contribute to the ‘cutting edge’ as frontline troops. The BMS is catering for the digitised battlefield at regiment/battalion level pan Army but the BMS does not cater to weapons, body armour, clothing and individual equipment, which actually should be part of soldier modernisation pan-Army.  In an environment of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, invariably troops other than infantry also get involved in operations both inadvertently and/or advertently. We should therefore be looking at across the board soldier modernisation concurrent to the infantry soldier. A dispassionate analysis would indicate that the costs involved are miniscule compared to big ticket acquisitions and a minor curtailment of the latter can easily be adjusted against full spectrum soldier modernisation, especially as the payoffs in terms of operational efficiency at the cutting edge would be exponentially enhanced.  Soldier modernisation should also cater to very basic items (like masks, gloves, hoods) for NBC protection for emerging threats in conventional and sub-conventional conflict situations.  We are already some years into asymmetric wars waged by Pakistan and China and by all indications they are leaving no stone unturned to up the ante.

Asymmetric wars are waged on a nation and cannot be countered by the military alone. The entire security sector needs to be energised. The national cutting edge

>>

includes the Paramilitary Forces (PMF) and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) besides others. Therefore, at least those PMF and CAPF units that are engaged or tasked for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency must be part of soldier modernisation.

We must remember that in the 21st century conflict situations, not only will operations be increasingly interagency, involving greater application of “all elements of national power”, our adversaries will also endeavour to employ high-tech irregular forces against us. If we can achieve soldier modernisation within the security sector and network this cutting edge at the national level, we can be sure to win future conflict situations.

Act Fast Soldier modernisation of the infantry has not been given its due in the past decades. This must be treated as an ‘emergent’ requirement in consideration of the emerging threats within and surrounding the country, especially considering the rate at which the terrorists are achieving sophistication. We must be prepared for short, intense, high-tech wars; in addition to expanding terrorism, asymmetric and fourth generation wars where the soldier faces the brunt at the cutting edge. Delay in modernisation has a direct bearing on combat efficiency in coping with threats to national security and lives of the infantryman. We need to act and act fast. SP

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5/2012 SP’s Land Forces

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>> Strategy

Siachen Surrender: An Expensive Affair Without a national security strategy we may find solace in non-alignment, but the political bungling in agreeing to withdraw from Siachen will surely be remembered as the gravest strategic blunder of the 21st century by India Photograph: MEA

 Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

lish think tanks abroad rather than focus on perception management within India, as in the instant case. The line of control between India and Pakistan was originally drawn on a 1:250,000 map with a thick sketch pen without military advice that left a variation of hundred plus metres at any given point besides not always following ridgelines —a source of permanent hostility and acrimony ever since. If the government has set its heart on the Nobel Peace Prize come what may, a flourish of the same thick pen may be used to delineate the line of ground positions, followed by ordering withdrawal.

Arguments of expenses and casualties are irrelevant considering similar positions in Kargil, along the line of control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and defences facing China. Siachen is fully stabilised, compared to some other places. Should we then vacate Kargil? What about the brigade minus worth of casualties in counter-insurgency in J&K—should we run from there too?

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he dye has been cast for another strategic blunder by India in agreeing to withdraw from Siachen, that too without a debate in Parliament.

The difference this time is that public focus may be deflected through expectations/ award of a Nobel Peace Prize, the possibility of which may have been hinted by western mediators—playing their own games that our leadership is too naive to discern. What do you make of Canada-US propping up Pakistan (read Kayani) at India’s expense? Why are the Atlantic Council of Canada, Ottawa University, the Atlantic Council of the US and National Defense University, Washington, intimately involved in India-Pakistan confidence building measures (CBMs) not discussing a ‘Peace Park’ astride the Durand Line, resolving crisis in Middle East and Syria? Has demilitarisation of Korea, decreased chances of conflict? How much do we know about the US-China Committee on India and what they discuss? How much did we know of the secret channel between the US and China through Pakistan, chronicled by F.S. Aijazuddin in his book From a Head, Through a Head, To a Head, wherein he describes Chou En-lai’s advice to Ayub Khan to raise a militia to fight a prolonged war behind the enemy (India) lines—manifested in today’s jihadi terrorists. Without a national security strategy we may find solace in non-alignment, but the political bungling in agreeing to withdraw from Siachen will surely be remembered as the gravest strategic blunder of the 21st century by India.

www.spslandforces.net

India-Pakistan CBM’s – Siachen Story After numerous India-Pakistan military CBM meets at Dubai, Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Palo Alto, the India-Pakistan Track II at Lahore (September 23-25, 2012) signed an agreement to demilitarise Siachen despite grave reservations by some Indian members—a former ambassador, a three star rank officer each from Army and Navy and even a former Special Secretary of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The decision to demilitarise or rather withdraw from Siachen has apparently been taken arbitrarily at the highest political level disregarding strong objections by successive Army Chiefs, including the present Chief. The agreement mainly includes: setting up of a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842; joint authentication of present ground positions; determination of redeployment areas; disengagement and demilitarisation time frame; and cooperative monitoring ensuring transparency. The agreement states that re-occupation cannot be done in a hurry, which is stupid; even discounting India’s lightening heli-borne occupation, some areas of Saltoro have ‘no’ snow during summer and can be reached in darkness, bad weather on foot and remain undetected—are we forgetting Kargil intrusions? Technical surveillance is a misnomer considering the means, terrain and weather. Wasn’t the US with all its technical resources surprised by Pokhran II?

Duping the Nation How has this happened despite serious objections by the Army? The government

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SP’s Land Forces 5/2012

Strategic Advantage

Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai with his Pakistani counterpart Jalil Abbas Jilani in Islamabad on September 7, 2012

briefing to the Track II Team focused mainly on Army’s stand that further talks are taken up after ground positions of both sides get authenticated, which did not imply a total package. Members’ queries as to why we should demilitarise and when does the government want it, were not answered. The strategic importance of the Saltoro Ridge was systematically obfuscated by orchestrating electronic and print media. Government and gullible TV channels and journos (Nira Radia tapes leverages included) were mobilised and selected former uniformed officers (shunted out by Army or given the option to resign or face legal action) put up on TV shows to morph perceptions. A barrage that Siachen has no strategic significance was let loose; a former two star officer even wrote India is holding Karakoram Pass—a blatant lie. National dailies refused to print articles highlighting the enormous strategic disadvantage of withdrawing from Siachen and neither could this be debated by them on TV—government instructions to media houses. Northern Army Commander, an outstanding professional and diehard nationalist opposed to Siachen demilitarisation was proposed to be shifted to Southern Command (to get a pliable replacement) but he refused. Indian team

Why do the CBMs have to start with withdrawal from Siachen? Before taking such a step, wasn’t a discussion in Parliament warranted?

were carefully selected; not one has served in Siachen, no infantry officer (of six Army officers) and the team never visited Siachen despite months of parleys. Political connections of two former uniformed members are well known. They would obviously be rewarded for towing the line blindfolded— possible ambassadorship/governorship to the leader (former Air Force Chief) and a bag of juicy carrots for another former one star of Army. A government official also remarked that the Track II team is as good as Track I. The sole aim appears to be a Nobel Peace Prize at ‘any cost’ showcasing major achievement before elections. The military cannot open their mouths, veterans opposing withdrawal are denied media forums and the gullible public would be too elated with the peace prize. Government officials unofficially say that they never thought Pakistan would agree to authentication of ground positions as this was their earlier stand, which is rubbish since mediators would have sounded Pakistani intentions well in advance. Heading the Pakistani team, Jehangir Karamat, who is an exDGMO and Army Chief, understands the strategic significance of Saltoro. Not only did Pakistan grab the strategic opportunity, they managed the full works. Atlantic Council, Ottawa, promptly put out the news on the Internet. Shuja Nawaz, heading the Atlantic Council of the US fully-networked with Kayani, was in close touch with Atlantic Council, Ottawa and attended most meetings. The Atlantic Council of the US, an extension of Pakistani Military, is well funded and has expanded with additional officers, courtesy Kayani. The Council manages perceptions in the US public domain including the diplomatic and international community. We need to take a cue and estab-

Pervez Musharraf admits in his autobiography that Pakistan was planning to put a battalion on Saltoro Ridge but the Indians pre-empted that move. If Saltoro had no strategic significance, why would Pakistan: attempt occupation; draw imaginary LoC from NJ9842 directly to Karakoram Pass, make repeated attempts to gain footholds, undertake Kargil intrusions to cut off Siachen; and always harp on demilitarising? Pakistan is at a great disadvantage at the Saltoro Ridge and Pakistan’s disregard of Shia dominated Baltistan, enforced demographic changes, subtle but deliberate conversions to Sunni form of Islam and state-sponsored Shia massacres is turning the situation in Baltistan explosive that can threaten sustenance of Pakistani troops in Siachen. Strategic significance of Saltoro should be seen in relation to:  Extension of the line north from NJ 9842 to Dafdar in Taghdumbash Pamir near Beyik Pass (bordering Wakhan Corridor)—north-western extremity of the J&K-Tibet border.  Increasing Chinese footprints in GilgitBaltistan coupled with China’s illegal occupation of Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin and the bridge that Siachen provides to these areas, which will provide further China-Pakistan link up.  Defence of Ladakh post-withdrawal.  Tremendous domination that we enjoy over Pakistani positions.

Withdrawal Fallout of withdrawal from Siachen would be as follows:  It will dilute our 1994 Parliament resolution that J&K is an integral part of India.  The new defence line will need many more times additional troops than the brigade currently manning Siachen.  Floodgates of infiltration into Ladakh will open—terrorists also targeting Ladakh and Zanskar Ranges. This will require raising of more formations and battalions—both military and police forces. ISI has been nurturing Shia terrorist outfits with an eye on Ladakh

Technology >>

Managing Battle... continued from page 8 at full scale, down to the individual soldier.

It is prudent to do this and then think of eliminating a particular piece of equipment than adopting the reverse approach. There is a need to review the communication philosophy of the Army. While legacy radios have their limitations, the change management towards fielding of latest technology like SDRs and communication infrastructure will need to be fine tuned. Applications will need to be standardised and adaptable to any communication system including COTS products. Bandwidth requirements for the BMS need to be viewed keeping in mind the incremental requirements that would be required progressively over the years. A conservative approach by the Army at this stage, which is likely due to the limitations of legacy communication equipment, could limit exploitation of future technology. As an indicator, the US Army catered for one 1GB bandwidth for a combat team two years back and plans incremental upgrades. The government needs to examine allotment of a dedicated defence band from the spectrum to meet the bandwidth requirement of the services and keeping in mind threats to national security. This will also adequately address the communication requirements of the BMS. Robust security algorithms must be speedily developed to ensure security of both stored data as well as transmitted information.

The Infantry As the vanguard of cutting edge of the Indian Army are the 400-odd Infantry and Rashtriya Rifles battalions besides other fighting arms. Eventually, this capacity will also be required in the Paramilitary Forces (PMF), Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) and other security forces units employed in counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist

since the late 1990s. When Musharraf said, “There will be many more Kargil’s,” it was with the confidence that he will be able to fool India into withdrawing from Siachen. Courtesy Pakistan, we have already witnessed sporadic communal tension in Ladakh.  The above will entail expenditure of lakhs of crores of rupees that will eat into already meagre modernisation funds of the Army.  Double-crossing by Pakistan is possible in the garb of so-called non-state actors.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the garb of geologists can flood the area.  Recapture is out of question—a former Army Chief gave this in writing to the government.

Trust The public and the Parliament have the right to ask the government what exactly Pakistan has done to earn such a trust. Has the antiIndia terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) been dismantled? Has ‘any’ worthwhile progress been made in punishing the perpetrators of 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks? Isn’t the China-Pakistan nexus arming, equipping and stoking insurgencies in India? Isn’t the ISI hell-bent on reviving militancy in Punjab?

Isn’t the ISI link to assassination attempt on Lt General K.S. Brar adequate proof? Wasn’t the ceasefire continuously breached while Pakistani parliamentarians were discussing CBMs in India recently? Why does every US think tank refer to Pakistan as the most dangerous place in the world?

Way Out A Track II agreement should not be binding on Track I discussions especially with ramifications on our 1994 Parliament

operations, disaster management, border deployment and UN missions. Through the BMS being developed by the Directorate General of Information System (DGIS), the Army wants to provide a command and control system spanning the TBA spreading across individuals, detachments, combat platforms, sensors, subunits, units to the battalion commander/regiment commander; achieve faster reaction capability and flexibility in command and control by providing information automatically at the right place in the right time and compress the OODA loop. The future infantry soldier system (F-INSAS) programme being developed by the Directorate General of Infantry, is to ensure a dramatic increase in lethality, survivability and mobility while making the infantry soldier “a self-contained fighting machine”, is based on the land warrior

The future infantry soldier system programme, being developed by the Directorate General of Infantry, is to ensure a dramatic increase in lethality, survivability and mobility while making the infantry soldier “a self-contained fighting machine”

system of the US Army and future soldier programmes of other nations. This is being developed in three phases; Phase 1 comprising weapons, body armour, clothing and individual equipment, Phase 2 comprising the target acquisition system and Phase 3 comprising the computer sub-system, radio sub-system, software and software integration. F-INSAS will provide the infantryman with latest weaponry, communication network and instant access to information on the battlefield. It will include a fullynetworked all-terrain, all-weather personal equipment platform, enhanced firepower and mobility for the digitised battlefield of the future. The infantryman will be equipped with mission-oriented equipment integrated with his buddy soldier team, the subunit, as also the overall command, control, communications, computers, information and intelligence (C4I2) system. Complete fielding in all infantry and RR units is likely to be complete by 2020 or so. The BMS and F-INSAS programmes are being developed concurrently; BMS under Information Systems and F-INSAS under the Infantry. BMS was conceived at battalion/regiment level pan-Army (including for the infantry) and comprises communication, non-communication hardware and software. The DGIS is charged with facilitating transformation of the Indian Army into a dynamic network-centric force, achieving information superiority through effective management of information technology. Quite logically, Phase 3 of F-INSAS (computer sub-system, radio sub-system, software and software integration) should be part of the BMS. However, the Infantry was adamant that Phase 3 of F-INSAS should be developed by Infantry and not be part of BMS. Lack of understanding of technology and egos led the decision-makers to rule that the DGIS and Infantry would progress both

projects concurrently. A separate project of software and communication integration by Infantry is retrograde, delays overall net-centricity pan-Army, incurs additional avoidable costs and defeats the very purpose that DGIS was created for. While the Indian Army required the BMS ‘yesterday’, squabbling on delimitation between the BMS and F-INSAS cost a delay to Phase 1 of BMS by almost two years. If F-INSAS is to incorporate situational awareness and GIS, then it will amount to not only ‘re-inventing the wheel’ but will also require yet another project to integrate the F-INSAS with the BMS, implying infructuous and avoidable additional expenditure and time. Foreign armies have faced similar situations and we need to learn from their mistakes rather than going through the same mistakes. The Indian Army must take corrective action and let BMS cover the Infantry too, as planned earlier, especially since the BMS being developed will cover Mechanised Infantry, inclusive of dismounted role.

Conclusion Deployment of the battlefield management system will provide a definitive edge in battle. It is equally required for homeland security where the internal security by all indications is likely to get uglier with bulk population in youth bracket, illiteracy, unemployment, influx of illegal weapons and drugs. Mention of “two-and-a-halffront” by the Army is proof enough of this.

With both China and Pakistan hell-bent on stoking insurgencies within India, our cutting edge forces will need to be equipped with the requirements to cope with the 21st century threats including high-tech terrorists and insurgents wielding modern weapons, communications, equipment and providing fleeting targets. SP

resolution of J&K being an integral part of India. We should have only agreed to delineate extension of the LC north of NJ 9842; running north to Dafdar in Taghdumbash Pamir near Beyik Pass (bordering Wakhan Corridor) on the north-western extremity of J&K-Tibet border. This should be our stance for the Joint Commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842. Authentication of ground positions should have nothing to do with delineation of the line beyond NJ 9842. Only after the LC beyond NJ 9842 is established, further discussion on CBM’s with respect to Siachen should progress.

This would be in India’s national interests.

The Real Picture Indians may gloat in sharing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s moment of glory in expecting/receiving a peace prize but posterity will curse him and his government, as they curse Jawaharlal Nehru for 1962 and his China utopia if withdrawal from Siachen be thrust upon the nation.

Defence analyst and former Pakistani Army officer Agha H. Amin writes, “Utopians in India are jubilant that Pakistan has made peace with India. Nothing in reality can be farther from truth….The real picture of true intentions of the Pakistani military will emerge when the US withdraws from Afghanistan. This will be the time when the Russians, Iranians and Indians will have no choice but to support the Northern Alliance against Pakistan-sponsored Taliban who regard all Shias, Ismailis, non-Pashtuns, moderates Pashtuns as infidels who deserve to be massacred.…Pakistani politicians will remain as puppets of the military that they have been since 1977”. Why do the CBMs have to start with withdrawal from Siachen? Before taking such a step, wasn’t a discussion in Parliament warranted? SP Untitled-3 1

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>> CONCEPT

Future Wars in India The types of threats and challenges existing currently and those that are likely to arise in the future are, by themselves, indicative of a threat-cum-capability-based force structure in which the potential adversary’s capabilities and threats can both be countered by acquiring a full spectrum capability but without overstretching the country’s resources Illustration: SP Guide Pubns

 Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

M

any views have been expressed on the subject of future wars. Most observations and assessments depend upon the background, expertise and bias of the individuals concerned.

Martin Crevald, the Israeli military scientist, states, “War will be completely permeated by technology and governed by it.” Andrew Marshall, former Director of the Office of Net Assessments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, states, “A revolution in military affairs (RMA) is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine, operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.” Such an RMA, he says, is occurring.

Colin S. Gray in his book Strategy for Chaos describes RMA differently. He says, “The character of war is always changing, but from time to time, the pace of change accelerates or appears to do so with the result that there is a change of state in warfare. War must still be war but it is waged in a noticeably different manner.” This is what the current information technology driven RMA has accomplished.

While the details of each evaluation and appraisal differ in their content and quality, some conclusions emerge quite clearly and these are:  Future warfare will be highly uncertain.  Technology will play a predominant role in designing the conduct of war.  Weaker states will use “asymmetric warfare” to fight opponents that are more powerful while the more powerful states will use positive asymmetry through technological capabilities to deliver significant lethal and non-lethal effects with precision, speed and crushing power.  Globalisation and interconnectedness will make wars transparent thus challenging the political utility of using armed forces.  Military power is likely to be used selectively, in an integrated and synergetic manner and with increasing discrimination in choosing means as well as ends.  There will invariably be an international pressure on warring parties.  Two or three generations of warfare will coexist.  State-to-state conflict, when both parties act on national initiative, will become a rarity.  Care will have to be taken to work within the limits of international law, including its precepts on the minimum use of force and proportionality of response.

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Existing Threats and Challenges India faces three types of military threats and challenges currently. The traditional variety of threat is from Pakistan and China respectively due to the existing territorial disputes. Considering their growing collusion currently and in the past, a simultaneous two-front threat also cannot be ruled out. This is likely to be in the form of limited wars of mid/high intensity. Internal threat and the contemporary challenges are likely

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to take the form of low-intensity conflict (LIC) like terrorism and insurgencies emanating from traditional adversaries, international terrorist networks, non-state actors, and dissident groups of home-grown variety. The conventional conflicts are likely to be of short duration, which may vary from a few days to a few weeks, due to the inevitable international pressures.

LIC falls under the category of ‘politicomilitary confrontation’ between contending states or groups and are at a much lower scale than conventional wars but are above the routine and peaceful competition among states. LIC ranges from high-grade internal security situations to the extensive employment of Army in counter-insurgency operations. LIC is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational and military instruments. It includes terrorism but excludes purely criminal acts. Such conflicts as opposed to conventional wars may prolong indefinitely because conflict resolution has to be achieved within many conflicting influences.

Future Challenges In addition to the existing threats and challenges, the new threat dimensions and challenges that need to be examined, in the future, say up to the next two decades or so, are:  Security of our national values and purpose, as laid down in the Constitution of India.  Security of our island territories separated by large distances from the mainland.  Security of our resources rich area.  Security of a large and unprotected coastline and the national assets and

infrastructure along the coastline.  Security of sea-routes of communica-

tions which provide passage to our trade.  Internal dissent and claims to auton-

omy and ethnic recognition by subnational entities, who may be supported from outside.  Demographic shifts in the South Asian region.  Non-military threats and their impact on the military (water, energy, etc).  Inimical actions by powerful multinationals which may affect own vital national interests and which may be supported by other states.  The beliefs of one or more powerful states, which view their security as more vital than that of the world.  Overspill of ethnic conflicts in the South Asian region into India.  Out of area contingencies to support friendly states in the region or evacuation of own diasporas from conflict zones.  Global terrorism perpetrated by nonstate actors in our region, which may be aided or supported by other states.  Cyber and space.  Military aid in internal security against:  Terrorist Activity  Narcotics Trade  Antagonistic Paramilitary groups  Large-scale civil disobedience caused by a variety of reasons  Disturbances caused by ideological, ethnic and religious hatred, anarchy, food shortages and absence of governance.

Future Force Structure The types of threats and challenges existing

currently and those that are likely to arise in the future are, by themselves, indicative of a threat-cum-capability-based force structure in which the potential adversary’s capabilities and threats can both be countered by acquiring a full spectrum capability but without overstretching the country’s resources. This can be achieved by utilising national resources i.e. through synergising the resources at national level and not confining the capabilities to the armed forces alone because wars are national undertakings and not the domain of the military alone. Thus we need a joint war fighting doctrine which combines the use of armed forces and other national resources together with modern technology and operational art, evolved contextually into an Indian way of warfighting.

Doctrines and Concepts of Land Warfare Three Generations of Land Warfare Land warfare has witnessed three watersheds in which the change has been qualitative. The first generation of warfare consisted of the tactics of the era of the smooth bore muskets and the linear battle of lines and columns. The second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, machine-gun and indirect fire.

Tactics were based on fire and movement and they remained essentially linear. The third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower. In World War I, the Germans were aware of their strategic weakness because of their weaker industrial base; and hence they developed radically new tactics, which were based on manoeuvre

CONCEPT rather than attrition. The basic concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end of 1918. The advent of the aircraft and tanks brought about a major shift at the operational level in World War II. This operation was named ‘Blitzkrieg’ by the Germans in which emphasis was placed on manoeuvre, speed and tempo, to carry out wide outflanking movements avoiding enemy’s defences, in the front, to strike at his rear areas in order to lead to psychological collapse.

The Americans picked up the ideas of ‘manoeuvre warfare’ from the Germans and the Russians, of simultaneous engagement of operational components of the enemy’s defensive system, to cause ‘operational shock’ by development of an operational momentum far exceeding the relative reaction capability of the opponent. PostVietnam doctrinal reform in the US Army led to adoption of the doctrine of “Active Defense” in the early 1970s. This was followed by a sharp revolution in doctrinal thinking, which led to the second stage of post-Vietnam doctrinal reform and the evolution of the doctrine of AirLand Battle. The tenets of depth, agility, initiative and synchronisation, became the heart of the Airland Battle doctrine. The basic idea, applicable to offence and defence, was to throw the enemy off balance with an offensive from an unexpected direction, to seize and retain the initiative and defeat the enemy. Other significant concepts introduced were of the German Army principle of Auftragstaktik (decentralised decision-making and directive style of command) and the operational level of war. AirLand Battle was expanded in 1986, clarifying the concept of operational level of war, and highlighted the synchronisation of the close, deep and rear battles. The AirLand Battle provided the conceptual basis for the US Army to adopt an initiative oriented readiness posture. The concept developed along with the principle of directing the main strike into the opponent’s principal operational weakness. The doctrinal reform was the symbol and basis of modernisation of the US Army in the 1970s and 1980s.

Fourth Generation of Warfare Military analysts in USA have deliberated on a fourth generation of warfare in which the target is the whole of enemy’s society (ideology, culture, political, infrastructure and civil society). This generation of warfare will be characterised by dispersion, increased importance of actions by small groups of combatants, decreasing dependence of centralised logistics, high tempo of operation and more emphasis on manoeuvre. Concentration of men, materiel or firepower may become a disadvantage, as it will be easy to target. Small, highly manoeuvrable, agile forces will tend to dominate. The aim would be to cause enemy to collapse internally rather than physically destroying him.

There will be little distinction between war and peace. It will be non-linear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. Major military and civil facilities will become targets. Success will depend heavily on joint operations. If we combine these general characteristics with new technology we see one possible outline of the new generation.

The Indian armed forces are neither integrated nor do they possess these capabilities, regardless of some “stand-alone” capabilities existing within each service

Case for Discriminate Force Another viewpoint of the new generation of warfare is the Case for Discriminate Force put forward by Professor Ariel Levite and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall. According to them, Western democracies are facing increasing constraints on the use of their overwhelming military power because the logic of use of force to safeguard national interests is becoming less applicable. State and non-state adversaries who threaten important values and vital interests are no longer deterred by the Western military might. At the same time, globalisation and the growing transparency of the battlefield and changing western value systems are compelling civilian and military leaders to wield military power selectively and to use fine judgement in the choice of the method adopted to achieve the political and military aims. It seems that even in the postCold War era, preventive diplomacy has to be backed by credible threat of use of force and it is acknowledged that classic deterrence is less reliable against asymmetric challenges such as terrorism and insurgencies. It is also seen that non-military means of coercion often fail to change the behaviour of adversaries while military responses have not changed fundamentally despite the new realities and constraints. The authors state that unless the military changes its structures and methods to adapt to the changing nature of war, it will be weakened in three respects. First, it will not be able to repel attack on its territory or its interests abroad. Second, it would not be able to coerce or compel the adversary to cease hostile action and third, it would be weakened as a viable warfighting tool, if diplomacy and deterrence fails. Selective and discriminate use of force will reinforce the three areas mentioned and increase the effectiveness of military action and this can come about through doctrinal and technological innovation. Discriminate force demands a combination of intensity, precision and effect that is versatile and dynamic. It requires fine-tuning of military actions with political objectives and constraints and hence requires a close politico- military interaction throughout the campaign against the adversary who in the face of conventional superiority will make use of asymmetric means to primarily attack civilian targets as well as interests abroad.

In view of the above rationale, apart from acquiring nuanced means, the three doctrinal imperatives advocated for making a successful transition to a discriminate force strategy in order to delicately balance the requirement of resolve and restraint include “pre-emption, image wars” (influencing images and public perceptions in determining the outcome of contemporary military engagements) and “modifying the concept of victory”. The authors recommend that the goal of war has to be redefined as success rather than victory where success is measured as much in avoiding excessive civilian causalities, suffering and destruction as in furthering political goals underlying the military operations.

Use of Integrated Military Capability With the changing nature of war, the logic, legitimacy and effectiveness of employing force to safeguard national interests is becoming more intricate and sophisticated due to a large number of pressures on both political and military leaders. It is accepted that classical deterrence is not reliable against asymmetric challenges such as insurgencies and terrorism. Moreover, future wars will mandate use of higher technology, seek a quick end to war, demand expertise in conventional, unconventional and hybrid forms of conflict, require use of smaller and “tailored” bi/tri-service task forces for integrated operations and characterise “combat power” as a product of smaller, highly lethal, agile and better educated forces. All point towards greater utilisation of an integrated military capability which may be smaller in size but more

lethal and capable of inflicting very heavy punishment when required.

Use of Special Forces for Special Operations Analysis of future wars mandates a larger quantum of Special Forces for Special Operations which can be re-engineered out of our present capability. The Special Forces, more skilled, better trained, organised and equipped to face various types of operational challenges possess special characteristics such as “rapid response, reach, versatility, precision, discretion and audacity”. These characteristics endow the Special Forces with the ability to conduct special operations as well as out of area and contingency missions. They will invariably constitute an important part of the tri-service power projection capability when it is assembled.

India should structure a Special Operations Command to effectively utilise the Special Forces of the three services and to train and equip these forces for future contingencies.

Network-Centric Warfare Network-centric warfare, also known as information-based warfare, is the product of convergence of certain key technologies such as computers, communications, sensors and precision fires and their exploitation to bring to bear maximum combat power at the right time and the right place. NCW uses information for the benefit of the warfighters in peace and in war. The military calls it “situational awareness” which implies awareness regarding terrain, including objectives/targets, enemy, and own forces. This information is passed from the sensors deployed on the ground, at sea, in the air and in the space (satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, aircraft, radars, etc) through broadband digital communication networks to frontline units and the decision-makers in the rear in real/ near real time frame, thus making the battlefield transparent and reducing the response time. Network-centric operations (NCO) is an umbrella term which encompasses the concepts of network-centric warfare. Networkcentric operations have also been described as high tempo, precise, agile style of manoeuvre warfare focused on effects based operations (EBO) that derive their power from robust networking of geographically separated entities, while EBO themselves are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of friends, foes and neutrals in peace, crises and war. This implies timely, appropriate and skilful use of all or selected element(s) of national power which include political/diplomatic, economic, technological, social, psychological, information/media and military among others. The final aim is to achieve strategic (political) objectives of war with the least amount of tactical effort which incidentally is also the essence of “operational art”.

The Indian armed forces are neither integrated nor do they possess these capabilities, regardless of some “stand-alone” capabilities existing within each service. The military instrument of network-centric warfare will have to be forged on suitably integrated organisations, new technologies, joint concepts and doctrines, and joint training.

Cyber Warfare This capability has been defined by the US Government security expert Richard A. Clarke, in his book Cyber War (May 2010), as “actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption.” The Economist describes cyber warfare as “the fifth domain of warfare,” and in the US armed forces, the Pentagon has formally recognised cyberspace as a new domain in warfare which has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air and space. As we automate our systems and connect them through digital communication networks, we will become more and more vulnerable to cyber attacks. In the recent

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times, we have already seen media reports of Chinese cyber attacks on many Indian establishments. India as a nation and the Indian armed forces as an entity will have to acquire this capability for the future wars.

Fifth Generation Warfare Currently, no commonly accepted definition exists for fifth generation (unrestricted) warfare (5GW). However, given the rate at which change in warfare is accelerating, it is reasonable to accept that fifth generation (unrestricted) warfare is already making its appearance.

Fifth generation (unrestricted) warfare includes the appearance of super-empowered individuals and groups with access to modern knowledge, technology, and means to conduct asymmetric attacks in furtherance of their individual and group interests.

Arguably, its first identifiable manifestations occurred in the United States during the anthrax attacks of 2001 and the Ricin attacks of 2004. Both sets of attacks required specialised knowledge, included attacks upon federal government offices and facilities, succeeded in disrupting governmental processes, and created widespread fear in the public. Till date, no individual or group has claimed responsibility for either attack, and neither attack has been solved. The attacks were quite successful in disrupting government processes and creating public fear but so far, their motivation remains unknown.

Today’s computer hackers, capable of disrupting governments and corporations on a global scale by attacking the Internet with malicious computer programmes, may also be forerunners of super-empowered individuals and groups. They have already demonstrated that they are capable of single-handedly waging technological campaigns with overtones of fifth generation (unrestricted) warfare The potential power of fifth generation (unrestricted) warfare was also demonstrated in the Madrid bombings of 2004. On this occasion, a series of mass transit bombings conducted by a networked terrorist group in a single day, on the eve of national elections, resulted in a new Spanish Government being voted into office, and the immediate withdrawal of Spanish military support to ongoing coalition operations against the insurgency in Iraq.

The Future The “realm of uncertainty” is the nature of wars as stated long time ago by none other than Clausewitz himself. Hence let us ensure that the transformation we are seeking will produce a military capability which is able to face all types of situations which policy will throw its way. This rationale points to the conclusions which are both negative and positive in their content. These are:  The approach to wars and warfare must not be divorced from its political, social and strategic context.  Defence planners usually produce impressive solutions to problems they prefer to solve but not the problems that wily and intelligent foes might pose.  Trend analysis and strategic futurology is not very helpful in predicting the future which is guided more by the consequences of the trends that we see today rather than the trends themselves.  We must always be prepared for surprises irrespective of how confident we feel about the future.  Based on India’s security parameters, we need to prepare for a broad spectrum of threats and challenges that may be thrust upon us and our genius should reside in utilising the available budget in building a superior military capability through tri-service synergy and not through exclusive, single service focus.  A Parliamentary Directive to enforce inter-services integration is in fact long overdue. SP

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>> Disaster Management

Indian Army in Disaster Management The role of the Army in disaster management is as essential today as it was earlier, i.e. before the formation of the National Disaster Management Authority. It continues to be amongst the first responders in a disaster situation even before the civilian resources have been deployed mostly by virtue of its location in the entire country, especially in the far-flung border areas or even remote areas where district administration is weak or non-existent.

Photograph: DPR Defence

 Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC) has already been included in the National Executive Committee (NEC). Similarly, at the state and district levels, the local representatives of the armed forces will be included in their executive committees to ensure closer coordination and cohesion.”

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he unique geo-climatic conditions of India make it highly vulnerable to natural hazards.

About 58 per cent of India’s geographical area is earthquake prone. Sixty-eight per cent of the area is drought prone, 12 per cent is flood prone and eight per cent is prone to cyclones.

About one million houses are damaged annually with irreparable losses. Thus there is a need to adopt a proactive approach for prevention, mitigation and preparedness.

Role of the Army

Visionary Step The Government of India took a very visionary step in December 2005 by making a permanent arrangement to take care of the multifarious aspects of disaster management and to move away from a response-centric approach, which was the norm till 2005, and partially is even now, to a holistic preparedness, management and mitigation-centric approach. At the national level, the government has set up an authority under the Prime Minister, viz, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and similarly, in the states under the Chief Minister. These organisations at all levels, whether at the national, state or district level, are supported by the existing government machinery. The National Executive Committee (NEC) comprising 13 Secretaries of the Government of India assists NDMA in implementing various projects and issues. Similarly, in the states, all the Secretaries assist the Chief Secretary. At the district level, the District Collector leads the organisation with the elected representative of the people being the Co-Chairperson to bring about a public-private interface at the functional level.

Multi-Disciplinary Process Disaster management is a multi-disciplinary process. All the Central ministries and departments have a key role in assisting the apex body, the NDMA, in the discharge of its functions. The nodal ministries and departments of the Government of India include the Ministries of Home Affairs (MHA), Agriculture, Civil Aviation, Environment and Forests, Health, Atomic Energy, Space, Earth Sciences, Water Resources, Mines, Railways and so on. These agencies will continue to address specific disasters as assigned to them.

Further, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) acts as the administrative ministry for the subject of disaster management.

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NDMA Act 2005 The NDMA Act lays down institutional, legal, financial and coordination mechanisms at the Central, state, district and local levels. These institutions are not parallel structures and will work in close harmony. The new institutional framework is meant to ensure implementation of the national desire for a paradigm shift in disaster management from a post-event and relief-centric syndrome to a regime that lays greater emphasis on preparedness, prevention and mitigation, leading to a more prompt and effective response to disasters.

The NDMA is mandated as the apex body

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Indian armed forces carrying out rescue and relief operations in the flood-affected areas of Bihar

to coordinate the Central Government efforts in prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction for adoption of a holistic and proactive approach to the disaster management.

It will lay down policies and guidelines for disaster management to assist Central ministries, departments and states for drawing up their respective plans. In order to translate the policy objectives into plans, the NDMA has adopted a mission-mode approach involving a number of initiatives with the help of various institutions (administrative, academic, scientific and technical) operating at national, state and local levels. As a policy, the Central Ministries and departments and states, have been involved in developing the guidelines, besides all other stakeholders. These guidelines are based on an exhaustive review of previous disasters and actions taken by various agencies including the Central Ministries and departments, states, academic, scientific and technical institutions and non-government organisations (NGOs) in the past and identifying the felt needs in relation to operational, administrative, financial and legal gaps. The aforementioned data of disasters in the past and themes (such as capacity development and public awareness) provide the basis of preparation of future plans.

Financial Mechanism and Activities The entire Disaster Management Organisation has a financial mechanism in the Centre, known as Disaster Response Fund, which was earlier called Calamity Relief Fund. Now there is a permanent mechanism to make sure that even small things, which have to be done on ground, can be executed quickly.

As far as the various activities of NDMA are concerned, the most important is preparedness for disasters and for which the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF), the most vibrant face of the NDMA, has been raised. There are eight battalions in all, drawn from various Central police forces. These battalions, with various skills are located in different parts of the country based on the kind of disaster threats they are confronted with. One battalion is located in Odisha, in the area of Cuttack. As a matter of fact, during the Kosi

floods in Bihar, this battalion rescued over 1,00,000 people, out of the total of about 2,50,000, who were evacuated.

Role of Armed Forces The Disaster Management Act 2005 is a vital instrument which explains the role and functions of various establishments. It is also a tool to bring in a sense of accountability and responsibility. However, this act mentions the “deployment of naval, military and air forces, other armed forces of the Union or any other civilian personnel as may be required for the purposes of this Act” under the heading “Measures by the Government for Disaster Management”. There is no amplification or mention of the role of the armed forces with a view to offer legal support and backup. The Act is surprisingly silent on the aspect of assigning well-defined role and responsibilities to the armed forces.

The former Vice Chairman of NDMA, General (Retd) N.C. Vij, when asked specifically regarding the role of the armed forces said, “Conceptually, the Indian armed forces are expected to be called upon to intervene and take on specific tasks, only when the situation is beyond the coping capability of the civil administration. In practice, however, the armed forces form the core of the government’s response capacity and have become the crucial immediate responders in all serious disaster situations. Due to their vast potential to meet any adverse challenge, speed of operational response and the resources and capabilities at their disposal, the armed forces have historically played a major role in emergency support functions. These include communications, search and rescue operations, health and medical facilities and transportation, especially in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The air and helicopter lift and movement and assistance to neighbouring countries primarily fall within the expertise and domain of the armed forces. The armed forces will also participate in imparting training to trainers and disaster management managers, especially in NBC aspects, helicopter insertion, high altitude rescue, watermanship and training of paramedics. At the national level, the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff to the

The role of the Army in disaster management is as essential today as it was earlier, i.e. before the formation of the NDMA. It continues to be amongst the first responders in a disaster situation even before the civilian resources have been deployed mostly by virtue of its location in the entire country, especially in the far-flung border areas or even remote areas. Recent examples are of the floods in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh in July 2012 in which the Army had to deploy 122 teams for rescue and rehabilitation.

Similarly, in August 2012, flood relief operations were conducted in Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh. In August 2010, the Army spearheaded relief operations by clearing main supply roads, restoring telecommunication links, evacuating residents, establishing relief camps and distributing aid.

The main point in favour of deploying the Army units to respond to disaster situations is that they are generally available in nearby areas and do not need to restructure to deal with disasters. The present organisational structures are well suited to deal with disasters, both for the planning and the execution stages. They also deal with disasters in the hinterland to provide aid to civil authority which is an important secondary role of the Army. They are so located as to cover almost every state of the Indian Union and depending upon the nature of disasters, they may well be required to be reinforced with combat units and staff for handling a particular disaster. The area and sub-area commanders form part of the state and district executive committees.

It can be said that a pragmatic role for the Army in disaster management would be the one which is primarily focused towards search, rescue and restoration operations.

Conclusion While delivering the Field Marshal K.M. Cariappa Memorial Lecture on “Army’s Contribution to Nation Building—The Way Ahead” on October 12, 2012, the then Minister of State for Defence Dr Pallam Raju had said the military virtues of sacrifice, loyalty and discipline have always remained and must serve as objects of veneration for the rest of the nation. He went on to state that “the military has also always played an intensive role in human assistance and disaster relief in various parts of the nation in the direst of circumstances and at all times…. The Territorial Army has contributed immensely to the task of nation building through the years.

These battalions have assisted in securing vital interests in threatened regions. They have undertaken reforestation initiatives and have transformed large swathes of land which had been ravaged by natural and man-made disasters”. SP

Tecknow / Industry >> TECKNOW

Northrop Grumman Remotec to Begin Delivering Titus Robot in December

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orthrop Grumman Corporation’s subsidiary Remotec Inc. will begin deliveries in December of TitusTM, the newest and smallest member of its AndrosTM line of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).

Northrop Grumman Remotec designed the lighter, faster, stronger and more intelligent UGV for a variety of missions, bringing new capabilities to the small UGV market.

Titus weighs 135 pounds and measures 27 inches long, 16 inches wide and just 23 inches high. It retains the proven fourarticulator design that has given Andros vehicles the best performance for more than 20 years. The system also features a unique operator control unit featuring a hybrid touch-screen and game systemstyle physical controls.

“Titus represents the next-generation Andros,” said Mike Knopp, director, Northrop Grumman Remotec. “When we designed Titus, we challenged our engineers to not only retain certain capabilities but also to innovate and add capabilities – to really make the platform robust, highly functional and easy to use. They responded with a small UGV that was mechanically brilliant and reimagined the entire user experience.”

Photograph: Northrop Grumman

Knopp said feedback the company has received from US and international military and first responders who have seen the system has “overwhelmingly validated that we achieved our objectives.”

The Andros operating system provides much greater information to the operator

while easing user workload through more interactivity with intelligent payloads such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear sensors, along with preset arm positions and the ability to “fly the gripper,” which makes manipulation of objects much easier.

Titus was designed using a modular approach, which allows the robot to be quickly adapted for a variety of mission scenarios. Removable articulators, wheels and tracks provide users with the capability to navigate passageways that are only 16 inches wide or race down range to address a threat at a top speed of 12 kmph. Industry standard interfaces such as USB and Ethernet make Titus easier to maintain and upgrade and to incorporate payloads and sensors.

“We paid a great deal of attention to reducing life cycle costs,” Knopp said.

“Advanced diagnostics for improved maintenance, easily upgradeable features and accessory integration provide great initial value and guarantee that Titus will be a valuable asset to any team well into the future.

“For more than 20 years, Northrop Grumman Remotec has delivered innovative, integrated solutions that reduce the dangers of dealing with some of the most serious threats facing first responders. With Titus, we’re now offering our customers an additional class of unmanned ground vehicles that’s smaller, stronger and smarter to meet a number of new and emerging threats.”

Northrop Grumman Remotec, based in Clinton, Tennessee, is the largest provider of robots to the first responder market. SP

With Tatra Deals on Hold, BEML Revs Up on Other Army Deals

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t has been a turbulent year for defence PSU Bharat Earth Movers Ltd (BEML), with its Tatra truck line coming under the spotlight of allegations, and an ongoing CBI probe into the entire programme. Having risked its relationship with one of its largest customers, the Indian Army, the company has now lined up a raft of programmes it is interested in participating in as a developer and supplier. Many of these programmes are critical to continued modernisation of the Army’s infantry units.

The requirements run into thousands of specialty vehicles for the Army’s infantry and Special Forces units. BEML has invited global expressions of interest to cater to Army requirements for 3,500 light bullet proof vehicles (LBPV), 2,500 infantry mobility vehicles, an unspecified number of light armoured multi-purpose vehicles, 500-600 light specialty strike specialist vehicles and 228 light strike vehicles—a total of over 7,000 vehicles at the very least.

BEML will be looking to acquire technology through a partner and build the vehicles at dedicated lines in country for the Army.

The state-owned firm will, of course, compete against private competitors like Tata, Mahindra and others. BEML requires interested vendors or partners to express interest formally by October 9.

The Army has outlined a requirement of 500-600 light specialist vehicles—basically agile infantry vehicles with protection against small arms fire. The Army is looking for a vehicle with a minimum payload of 1,000 kg, and an unladen weight that cannot exceed 3,750 kg. The vehicle must have ground clearance not less than 250mm fully laden, and powered by a turbo-charged diesel engine with a minimum operating life of 1,00,000 km. BEML is looking for vendors who can field platforms with power to weight ratio not less than 25 kW/tonne fully laden with the airconditioner on, sand and off-road tyres, selfsealing fuel tank with fire suppression features, stowage for 18 belt boxes of 7.62mm belted ammunition or six advanced rifle

StryKer armoured fighting vehicle

grade munitions (ARGMs). The vehicle also needs to be able to store at least 120 litres of water in two tanks. The Army also insists on power steering, automatic 4x4 transmissions with an internal shift mode to 4x2 mode—four forward gears and one reverse.

As with most specialty vehicles, the Army requires independent suspension on all four wheels. The light specialty vehicle will need to be capable of operations in ambient temperatures ranging from freezing temperatures to 40 degree Celsius. The Army wants to be able to push the vehicles to a max speed of 100 km/h on level highways and 60-km/h in desert/off-road conditions, with an acceleration of 0-60 km/h in 12 seconds. The vehicle needs to have a range of operation of minimum 400 km for cross country, and a gradeability of 30 degrees fully laden. Obviously, the Army has stipulated protection—stanag 1 on all sides and bullet-proof glass. Each light specialist vehicle will need to carry five passengers apart from the driver.

The largest requirement in the current list is for 3,500 light bullet-proof vehicles.

With a crew of 2+4 and a payload of 1,500 kg, the LBPV needs to have a kerb weight of not more than 7,500 kg. Operating range of vehicle designs fielded will be similar

to the specialist vehicles, at 400 km. The vehicle will need six kg under vehicle blast protection in addition to bullet-proofing on all sides. The Army would like space to transport six anti-tank guided munitions (ATGMs). Transmission needs to encompass six forward gears and one reverse.

Another larger requirement is for 2,500 infantry mobility vehicles, with a seating capacity of 1+5. This will be a vehicle of not more than 9,000 kg unladen, and a payload of 1,800 kg (including 250 litres of drinking water). Similar bullet-proofing requirements apply to the IMV as well—stanag 1 and bullet-proof glass. Most other parameters run similar to the LBPV qualitative requirements.

The Army is also looking at an unspecified number of light armoured multi-purpose vehicles (LAM). Pre-requisites on this vehicle include mobility, firepower and protection for reconnaissance missions—the LAM need to be equipped with observation, surveillance and communication equipment, and built with a modular upgradable design. Importantly, the LAM needs to have stretch potential to incorporate imperative upgrades and retain functional superiority, according to BEML, which states in its invitation to potential partners, “The future

battlefield will be characterised by fast movements and engagements over all types of terrain with fluid and rapidly changing situations. Real-time surveillance, integrated C4I2 and precision weapon systems will be the mainstay of forces in conflict. Rapid deployment forces transportable by sea and air. The LAM should allow the mechanised forces to operate in such a wide spectrum of conflict.” The LAM will be a six-tonne (plus payload of 1.5 tonne) vehicle with a crew of 4 including the driver. Crucially, the LAM needs to be transportable by air, sea and rail without modifications. For operations, the vehicle needs to have a sensor module incorporating a retractable mast holding a thermal imager and a day camera + GPS equipment. The Army wants the LAM to sport a weapon mount for one 12.7mm machine gun with a 180 degree swivel with front protection for the gunner. BEML has identified critical equipment on the LAM as: automotive systems including engine, drive train and suspension, protection—better metallurgy/armour technology to reduce weight, surveillance—thermal imagerbased observation equipment, retractable/ telescopic mast and controls, electronics— sub-system management, communication, navigation, vehicle diagnostics, etc and their integration, design—inbuilt growth/ stretch potential and upgrades.

Finally, the Army is also looking to acquire at least 228 light strike vehicles (LSVs) for its Para (Special Forces) units to “operate in hostile environment as an offensive weapon platform in all terrains”. Configured as a 1+5 crew vehicle, the LSV will be a 3,000 kg vehicle with a 950 kg payload.

The LSV’s range of operations will be 600 km at a cruising speed of not less than 110 km/h. A weapon mount in the co-driver’s seat for a 7.62mm general purpose machine gun and a weapon mount for a MBDA-BDL MILAN anti-tank missile must be included on the platform. The vehicle also needs to be capable of operations at high altitude without modifications. SP —SP’s Special Correspondent

5/2012 SP’s Land Forces

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>> news in brief Army scouts for heliborne AEW

Missile Systems’ Vice President of Advanced Security and Directed Energy Systems. “The agreement also enables our customers to set up local operations for full services, installation and maintenance of cutting edge security technology products, ensuring that customers receive full and long-term value from their technology purchases.”

Rheinmetall Air Defence fights blacklist The Indian Army is looking for brand new eyes in the sky, floating a requirement for an unspecified number of helicopter-borne early warning systems. It is understood that the Army will be looking for a system that can be integrated with the existing ALH Dhruv airframe, though it is unclear if this will be an all-new product on new airframes, or retrofitted on an existing number of Dhruv units already in service.

Principally, a sensor package for full integration with the Dhruv platform, the Army is looking for a system for early warning of aircraft and land units, stand-off surveillance and intelligence gathering. The AEW units will give the Army a valuable tactical battlefield asset, currently missing in its flying inventory. Smaller heliborne early warning units, like the Navy’s Russian-built Ka-31 helicopters, will provide huge flexibility for precise applications. It is understood that the Army would prefer an indigenous solution, and has already begun discussions with companies including the Bharat Electronics Ltd.

Raytheon ties up with MCG Aimed at the Indian security market, the US defence major Raytheon has entered into a distribution agreement with the Washington-based Monument Capital Group (MCG), as part of which the latter will engage potential Indian partners to provide “mass notification and non-lethal systems to solve challenging security problems and emerging safety requirements”, Raytheon has announced.

Applications of these products include highvalue asset and critical infrastructure security, protection against terrorism and piracy, explosives detection, and innovative emergency response solutions for natural disaster management. Security solutions in the Indian context will be aimed at enhancing border, port, maritime and aviation security.

“Our agreement with MCG will help to expand Raytheon’s global reach in homeland security, national defence and commercial security markets,” said Mike Booen, Raytheon

Ruag announces two new UGV ­development projects

Fighting a 10-year blacklist that came into effect earlier on March 5 this year, Rheinmetall Air Defence (RAD), Zurich, has sought legal recourse against the order debarring the company from doing business with India’s Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) for a decade. A writ petition filed by the company came up for hearing in a Delhi court last week. In a statement, Rheinmetall Air Defence said, “The company is determined to prove in India’s courts that allegations which led to RAD’s blacklisting in March 2012 are false and that RAD and its employees acted in full compliance with the law.

Notwithstanding its decision to seek redress through India’s legal system, RAD remains committed to a close dialogue with Indian authorities and is ready to cooperate with them in order to clear its name with regard to the blacklisting. As a matter of principle, RAD binds itself and its employees to strict compliance standards. The company enjoys an excellent track record in meeting these standards in all markets where it operates.”

Indian VSHORADS competition

The massive $6 billion Indian Army very short-range air-defence system (VSHORADS) competition, which looks to ­ contract nearly 1,000 launcher systems and over 6,000 missiles, has progressed into a crucial phase which involves quality assurance tests at Bangalore and a check-out of the electronics systems on the three remaining contenders in Ladakh. The big-ticket bid is currently a three-way fight between the French MBDA Mistral, Sweden’s Saab RBS 70 fire units and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support at an estimated cost of $6.5 billion. The Congress has also been notified of a possible FMS to the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for 48 THAAD missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $1.135 billion.

The principal contractors will be Lockheed Martin Space Systems Corporation in and Raytheon Corporation.

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India and China to resume drills Ruag has announced the start of two new unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) development projects at the seventh European Land-Robot Trial 2012 (M-ELROB 2012), recently held in Thun, Switzerland. The vehicles include an autonomous rough-terrain outdoor robot (ARTOR) and an EAGLE 4x4 light tactical vehicle-based technology demonstrator, developed in collaboration with General Dynamics European Land Systems (GDELS).

US plans THAAD sale to Qatar, UAE The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has notified Congress of a possible foreign military sale (FMS) to the Government of Qatar for two terminal high altitude area defence (THAAD)

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The Indian and Chinese Defence Ministries have agreed to resume bilateral military exercises after a four-year hiatus, in an effort to further expand defence cooperation. Following a 90-minute delegation level meeting with Chinese Defence Minister General Liang Guanglie, Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony informed that the next round of the Army exercise, dubbed ‘hand-inhand’, will take place at the earliest opportunity. Antony added the two countries would be working out a mutually convenient time and venue for the platoon-level exercise. The first exercise was held in 2007 in Kunming, China, followed by the second at Belgaum, India, in 2008, while the third to be held in China in 2010 was put on hold.

NG and Russia’s KBM new generation Igla-S. Field evaluation trials of all three VSHORADS platforms were conducted in May in Rajasthan (hot weather trials), Visakhapatnam (coastal environmental trials) and Ladakh (high-altitude, cold weather trials). All three teams are simultaneously in the country for the critical phases in Bangalore and Ladakh.

Discussions will also be conducted on transfer of technology to default licence manufacturing partner the Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL).

So far, all three systems have performed to specifications and expectations, sources say.

The Army is looking for a system that can be deployed in multiple configurations including man-portable, fitted on a twin-launcher, based on a high-mobility vehicle, ship-based and submarine-based. The weapon systems fielded have so far demonstrated several capabilities during trials, including multiple target detection and tracking by day and night, providing target acquisition to the munitions, engagement of aerial targets, etc.

As things stand, the competition could go either way, and the fight is fierce. Rosoboronexport, which displayed its Igla-S system at Defexpo 2012, is confident that its new generation system is a fitting replacement for the legacy MANPADS Igla currently in service with the Indian Army, and that type commonality could be a game changer.

According to MBDA, “India is looking to replace its old Igla systems. With Mistral MANPADS in their inventory, India’s armed forces would have a system that weighs less than 19 kg, rendering it easily portable by two operators, rapidly brought into action and fired. Being a fire-and-forget system, once the immediate threat has been engaged, attention can then be turned towards other targets, a crucial advantage that man-in-theloop laser beam riding systems do not have.”

Saab contends, “The RBS 70 NG is on offer to the Indian Army to fill a crucial need gap.

The all-new RBS 70 NG VSHORAD system is a versatile battlefield game changer and will offer critical edge in the spectrum of deployment. We believe that the RBS 70 NG meets and exceeds the requirements of the Indian Army for a system that has multiple target seeking and tracking capabilities, multilauncher capability, ability to deploy from high mobility vehicles and ship and submarine naval vessels.”

Indian Army for large IP Radio The Indian Army is in the market for an unspecified number of Internet protocol (IP) radios. Providing prospective vendors

Agni-III successfully tested The Indian Army's Strategic Forces Command (SFC) has conducted the fifth successful test launch of its nuclear capable surfaceto-surface missile Agni-III from Wheeler Island off the Odisha coast. Conducted as part of routine user trials, the test marks the missile's first launch by SFC after its induction into service in June 2011, and follows recent successful test firing of a 4,000-km range Agni-IV advanced surface-to-surface ballistic missile. Launched from a rail mobile launcher, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) built weapon followed its set trajectory during the 15-minute ballistic flight, and reached the predefined target point in the Indian Ocean with two-digit accuracy. According to sources, the test was conducted to evaluate the missile's enhanced performance.

Indian Army test fires Prithvi-II The Indian Army has completed a successful test firing of its domestically developed nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missile Prithvi-II from a launch complex-III at the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur, Odisha. The tests were conducted as part of routine user trials to evaluate the missile’s real-time effectiveness under direction

with the procurement premise, the Army has said, “Security forces have traditionally relied on the need for radio communications for coordination and conduct of operations. These radios have conventionally been used for command and control, primarily for voice communication but with limited amount of data capability while utilising a single channel. Advancement in the field of radio technology and rapid improvements in digital communications coupled with IP networks, etc, have led to traditional single channel radio becoming obsolete. Recent developments in the field of IP networks and the radios have led to the emergence of a new concept of a ‘combat radios with an IP Interface’ for carriage of IP data and voice on the same single channel radio.”

Indian Army floats tender for wheeled self-propelled guns

In its third attempt to procure wheeled selfpropelled 155mm guns, the Indian Army has floated a fresh global tender for 180 guns.

The Army has stipulated that manufacturers must mention if the new guns being fielded are 45 or 52 calibre, capable of firing standard and assisted ammunition in sustained, intense and burst rates of fire. The MoD has held trials on two earlier occasions, last in 2010, but has decided to re-tender the bid.

The Army will be looking for new generation howitzers with high endurance platform vehicles capable of operations at high altitudes. As part of its field artillery modernisation plan, the acquisition of new wheeled guns will serve as a major push, though it still remains dwarfed by the Army’s requirement for towed howitzers which top more than 1,000 guns. Companies likely to participate in the wheeled bid include Samsung Techwin, Konstrukta Defence, Soltam and BAE Systems. SP —SP’s Special Correspondent For complete versions log on to: www.spslandforces.net of the Defence Research and Development Organisation.

Telephonics expands its IFF market Telephonics Corporation has announced that it has been awarded a contract for its AN/UPX-44 identification friend or foe (IFF) interrogator for use in the Republic of Korea. The IFF system will be integrated into ground radar air defence systems.

With the global market for IFF systems growing, Telephonics is establishing itself as the leader in this market space and becoming the partner of choice. Our family of IFF products is providing affordable solutions with high reliability, exceeding all performance standards. “Telephonics is excited about this award. We have a distinguished history of supplying cutting edge IFF technology to users worldwide and look forward to enhancing the security of the Republic of Korea’s airborne and ground forces,” says Kevin McSweeney, Telephonics’ Chief Operating Officer. The Telephonics’ family of interrogators is the only IFF system to achieve All-Mode DoD AIMS certification including MARK XIIA, Mode 5, Mode S, and multi-channel ADS-B and provides users with the capability for timely and accurate display of civil and military air traffic. SP

news in brief >> Show Calendar 7-10 November Indo Defence 2012 JIExpo Kemayoran, Jakarta – Indonesia www.indodefence.com 13-15 November Next Generation Light Armored Vehicles Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, DC www.lightarmoredvehiclessummit.com 27-28 November Armed Forces Modernization Hotel Kubitschek Plaza, Brasília, DF, Brasil www.armedforcesbrasil.com 28-30 November Armoured Vehicles India Hyatt Regency, New Delhi, India www.armouredvehiclesindia.com 10-12 December Counter IED Middle East Oryx Rotana Hotel, Doha, Qatar www.counteriedme.com

Turbomeca (Safran) celebrating 60 yEArs of cooperation with India A major producer of turbojet engines for aeroplanes, Turbomeca envisages that India would be a growing marketplace for helicopters. Presenting the “Indian Market Forecast 2019” at the end of the Turbomeca Operators Symposium held at New Delhi on October 9, Philippe Couteaux, Vice President and General Manager, Airframes, Turbomeca, said that 81 per cent of the global helicopter deliveries between 2012 and 2015 will be in India, China and Russia; and 50 per cent in the 2025 and 2029 period.

Couteaux said that there will be a demand for 700 new helicopters in India in the next seven years, of which 30 per cent will be civil and 70 per cent military. Sixty-six per cent of the military helicopter will be for transport and 34 per cent for specialised attack. The company, he said, is preparing for the future with its Arriel 2+ family; the TM800, which is the future solution for four- to five-tonne helicopters; and Ardiden, the state-of-the-art solution including for six- to eight-tonne helicopters.

Satish Kirtikar, Managing Director, Turbomeca India, gave details of their 50 years of long-lasting cooperation with the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), starting from 1962 when Artouste was licensed to HAL to power Chetak and Cheetah helicopters; partnership between HAL and Tubomeca in 2003, Ardiden 1H maiden flight aboard Dhruv in 2007, Ardiden 1H1/Shakti certification in 2009 and finally Shakti’s entry into service in 2012. Stating Shakti as an Indian engine, Kirtikar informed that there is a firm order of 159 Dhruv helicopters by the Indian Army to HAL, which is likely to enter service this year. “Prototype testing of Shakti has begun,” he said. SP

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