SP's Land Forces February - March 2013

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February-March 2013

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Page 4 Requirements of Indian Army Aviation Corps

>> Review Photograph: PIB

MBT Arjun MK-1 tank passing through the Rajpath

The Army Aviation needs to play a vastly enhanced role in land operations in the coming years.

Lt General (Retd) B.S. Pawar Page 8 Network-Centricity for the Indian Military The evolution of a joint structure will necessitate specifying a doctrine and addressing specific issues of sensor architecture, weapon architectures, interoperability levels and command and control structure.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch Page 9 Indian Army’s Mini Air Force

Mini Air Force, or the Army Aviation Corps, is the arm of the future and will play a decisive role in any future conflict.

Lt General (Retd) B.S. Pawar Page 10 Peace Process Devoid of Strategy Our policy-makers and security experts must first formulate a comprehensive security strategy and thereafter the diplomats and others should work out an entirely fresh negotiating plan.

Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi Page 12 Three Decades of Status Quo Army Air Defence (AAD) is holding systems of varying vintage ranging from 49-year-old (L70 gun) to the youngest being 17-year-old (Tangushka).

Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Plus Army Day 2013 News in Brief

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Equipment Profile of Indian Army Considering the lack of implementation of the Eleventh Five Year Plan, the Army’s modernisation plans, both Eleventh and Twelfth Five Year Plans put together, may create a $25-$35 billion (approximately `1,25,000 to `1,75,000 crore) opportunity. It seems unlikely that over the next five years, this quantum of funds will be utilised.  Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

W

ith its experience and expertise in fighting in almost all types of terrain including the Thar Desert in the south-west, the plains of Punjab in the West, the mountains and high-altitude areas of Kashmir and Ladakh in the North and Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh in the Northeast, and the jungle and riverine terrain opposite Myanmar and Bangladesh, in battlefields beyond its shores in Sri Lanka, and peace-keeping and stabilisation operations globally, the Indian Army ranks tall amongst armies across the world in terms of professionalism.

Currently, a substantial part of the Indian Army is involved in fighting insur-

gencies in Jammu and Kashmir and the North-eastern states. The Chinese infrastructural activities along the Indo-TibetBhutan borders and north Sikkim have triggered the necessity for increasing the manpower ceiling of the Army. Thus it has been reported that a total of four additional divisions have been sanctioned for the Eastern theatre out of which two have already been raised. The remaining two divisions will be for a part of the Strike Corps proposed to be raised for offensive operations in the Eastern theatre.

Army’s Equipment Profile Eleventh and Twelfth Five Year Plans Indian Army’s 600 odd modernisation schemes amounting to more than `70,000

crore in the Eleventh Five Year Plan (200712) alone continue to be encumbered with elaborate bureaucratic procurement processes. It is in this context that we should view the letter written by General V.K. Singh, the former Chief of Army Staff (COAS), to the Prime Minister. It highlighted the lack of some types of ammunition critical for the Army and obsolescence of weapons and equipment and the stagnation in the process of military modernisation aimed at winning the conflicts of the 21st century. Moreover, the gap between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China is apparently widening day by day in favour of the latter. Faced with a two-front challenge, India needs to accelerate considerably the pace of modernisation of the Army.

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E D I T O R I A L

>> rEview The line of control (LoC) with Pakistan has continued to draw the attention of our people since the killing of the two Indian Army soldiers in the Poonch Sector of Jammu and Kashmir on January 8, 2013. The tension flared up because of the brutal manner in which they were killed and their bodies mutilated. And one of them, late Sepoy Hem Raj, was beheaded. This gruesome incident led to intense media coverage and fierce discussions in the electronic media. The tension between the two countries became palpable with zealous and impassioned statements being made from both sides. What got overlooked in the bargain was the poor political leadership in the times of crises.

It was refreshing to read renowned columnist C. Raja Mohan’s op-ed article in the Indian Express on January 14, 2013, appropriately titled “A Call to Leadership”. At the end of his piece, after analysing UPA’s political leadership, in the light of the stand-off between the Pakistan and Indian Armies on the LoC, he laments: “Finally, the government needs to act decisively on the long overdue reform of the higher defence organisation in the country. The civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defence (MoD)—at the bureaucratic and political level—has never been as weak as it is today. The MoD’s utter inability to lead the armed forces, formulate and implement strategies for national security, has been repeatedly exposed in the last few years.”

Strategic and military analysts have been saying it for a long time now that our political leadership has failed to create a balanced structure of the higher defence organisation in India. It is devoid of integrated planning at the apex which demands the dovetailing of political/diplomatic strategy with military strategy. This is absent in our context. We function in watertight compartments and fail to appreciate and utilise each other’s strengths.

At a somewhat lower level let me illustrate the point. I recollect that in November 1994 when I was a Brigadier, posted as the Deputy Director General Military Operations, I was sent on duty/ deputation to the Permanent Mission of India (PMI) in New York for liaison with the Military Advisor at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Op-

erations by the then Chief of Army Staff. I was told that my role was to liaise with the UN Headquarters to ensure an orderly and peaceful withdrawal of our Infantry Brigade Group located in Somalia who had completed their tenure. On reaching the PMI, I was greeted with extreme hostility which I later learnt was because the diplomatic community felt that I would take away an important vacancy of a Deputy Permanent Representative from the IFS cadre, if I stayed put in New York. This even resulted in one of the Deputy Permanent Representatives (there were two in New York) telling me that they could render the advice required and a military officer was not necessary. When I asked them whether they would be able to make a fighting withdrawal plan from the current location of the brigade in Somalia to the coastline for embarking on the ships made available and whether they would be able to recommend the type of assistance required to make the entire operation safe for the Indian Brigade Group as there was an ongoing civil war in Somalia and Indian troops had already suffered a few causalties during their peacekeeping stint; there was a pregnant silence.

The trouble with us is that because of the nature of bureaucracy, every bureaucrat feels that he can render all military advice and the politicians unfortunately do not assert themselves when it comes to matters military. Thus currently at strategic levels, the quality of advice rendered is of a general and theoretical nature devoid of professional inputs. The situation in which despite having one of the largest armed forces in the world our Service Chiefs remain outside the strategic policy-making loop within the country, is unique to our country. Our higher defence organisation, a legacy of the British Empire, has been systematically whittled down so that the administrative and financial powers of service headquarters have been taken away and the position of the Service Chiefs has been deliberately downgraded in protocol and importance.

The Defence Procurement Procedure, despite all the amendments and updates, is so convoluted that introduction of any new weapon system or associated equipment has to pass through as many as 18-20 different MoD departments or

agencies before acceptance and that too if everyone is on board with the decision. A procurement process which should take 24-36 months period takes 8-10 years or more. A case in point is the 197 light observation helicopter deal which has failed to fructify despite a lapse of nearly nine years from the time that the RFP was issued.

Even critical fast-track procurements (FTPs) directed to be cleared in 12-18 months may take two or three times longer to secure.

Indian Army is struggling to transform and modernise itself to face the future conflict settings. The threats and challenges that India faces are far greater than what is faced by any other country today. Hence we would imagine dynamic planning and implementation machinery putting the necessary capabilities and deterrence in place to have strong counters to both types of conflicts. On the other hand what we are seeing is vacillation in decision-making by the MoD which while being wholly responsible for the force’s continually-postponed modernisation is floundering as it does not understand the direction that has to be taken. The answer lies in truly integrating MoD with the armed forces which despite the post-Kargil reforms, has not happened.

This is the area in which the three Chiefs should intervene and convince the political leadership of the wisdom of reform. The Service Chiefs should spend more time in handling the politico-military issues facing the country and the political and bureaucratic environment in Delhi and let the respective Commanders–in-Chiefs handle military strategic, and operational issues affecting the Army with politico-military advice, if any, from the Service Headquarters from time to time.

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The T-90, the improved T-72 M1 tanks and Arjun tanks will constitute India’s armour might in the future till a new MBT is chosen or designed indigenously The government it seems has now sanctioned the 12th Five Year Defence Plan as a result of the severe criticism over delays in the past. However, considering the lack of implementation of the Eleventh Plan, the Army’s modernisation plans, both Eleventh and Twelfth Plans, together may create a $25-$35 billion (approximately `1,25,000 to `1,75,000 crore) opportunity. It seems unlikely that over the next five years, this quantum of funds will be utilised. It does however indicate that the accumulating voids in our capabilities in various arms will adversely affect the Army’s fighting formations in future wars. The main features of arm wise modernisation and the steps being taken in acquisition of equipment are as follows: Armour The Army has already equipped two regiments with Arjun tanks out of the 124 Arjun main battle tanks (MBTs) ordered by it earlier. An additional 124 Arjun Mark

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tive armour (ERA) panels which will provide protection against kinetic energy as well as tandem warhead, chemical energy projectiles, for better protection, along with a laser warning system and new radio sets for better and more secure communications. A new power pack is also under consideration to further enhance mobility. The modernisation of the T-72 is way behind schedule due to complicated procurement procedures exacerbated by delayed decision-making and in-house disagreements.

The T-90, the improved T-72 M1 tanks and Arjun tanks will constitute India’s armour might in the future till a new MBT is chosen or designed indigenously. Meanwhile, light tanks for the Eastern theatre are also being debated.

T-90 battle tank

II tanks have now been ordered subject to satisfactory development of the Mark II version of the tanks for equipping two more regiments. These tanks will have substantially upgraded capabilities of firepower, mobility and protection. These are likely to be delivered by 2013. As regards the T-90 tanks, a total of 647 T-90 tanks have been inducted into service.

The T-72 M1, Ajeya MBT, modernisation programme under Project Rhino will extend the service life of the MBT by 20 years; enhance the accuracy with new fire control system (FCS) whose trials are under

way. This will give night-fighting capability through a thermal imager integrated with the tank‘s FCS. Three hundred T-72 tanks of the Army have been fitted with thermal imaging stand-alone sights (TISAS) while 300 more are in the pipeline bringing the total to 600 TISAS. Thus about 1,000 remaining T-72 tanks will be fitted with more modern integrated fire control systems. However, the overall night-fighting capability of India’s armour is currently inadequate and operationally unacceptable. The tanks are additionally being equipped with new type of explosive reac-

Mechanised Infantry The mechanised infantry is currently equipped with the BMP-2 infantry combat vehicle (ICV), named Sarath. Over 1,000 of these have been manufactured since 1987.

The variants include 81mm carrier mortar tracked, a command post, an ambulance, armoured dozer and engineer and reconnaissance vehicles. The ICVs are being equipped with thermal imaging night sights and image intensifiers. The ICV BMP-2/2K is being modernised by upgrading its existing NBC system, fire detection and suppression system, ERA panels to provide extra protection and a new power pack. The scheme to fit environmental control for ICV BMP-2 is in an advanced stage of procurement.

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wheeled vehicles are also being procured.

Indian Army has planned for a futuristic infantry combat vehicle (FICV) to replace the BMP-2 with key operational and performance parameters envisaged in the Indian context. The project is a pioneer in ‘MakeHigh-Tech’ category where for the first time the defence industry has invited participation by private established agencies.

Arty Firepower As part of its more than `20,000 crore Artillery Modernisation Plan, the Army is looking at inducting several types of howitzers through inter-governmental pacts and global tenders. The last major acquisition of towed gun-howitzers was that of 400 pieces of 39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers with a range of 30 km from Bofors of Sweden in 1987. After about 25 years of neglect, the Army still awaits the procurement of about 1,500 howitzers of 155mm, 52 calibre. Out of these, 400 are to be procured outright and 1,100 manufactured indigenously with transfer of technology (ToT). The request for proposal (RFP) for these guns was issued in the beginning of the year 2011 and it is expected that the evaluation process would have been completed by now. Additionally, 145 ultra-light howitzers are being procured from the US through the foreign military sales (FMS) route from BAE Systems.

This deal has been cleared by India’s Cabinet Committee on Security. The Army also needs 120 tracked and 180 wheeled 155mm howitzers for its armoured and artillery divisions respectively, for use in offensive operations, the fate of which is unknown.

Indian Army’s 600 odd modernisation schemes amounting to more than `70,000 crore in the Eleventh Plan (2007-12) alone continue to be encumbered with elaborate bureaucratic procurement processes It is now reliably learnt that when the Bofors 155mm howitzers were procured in 1987, transfer of technology had taken place and it has now been revealed that the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), which had been sitting on these designs for the past 25 years, have now accepted to manufacture prototypes of 155mm/ 39 calibre and 45 calibre guns for trials by the Army.

UAVs The Heron, a medium-altitude, long-endurance UAV from Israel, has been acquired in addition to the Searcher I and II UAVs. Four troops of Herons will become operational. Medium-range battlefield surveillance radars (BFSRs) have been introduced into the inventory of the Army’s surveillance and target acquisition (SATA) units

for enhancing the medium-range ground surveillance capability of the Army. The long-range observation system (LORROS) provides day and night surveillance capability up to a range of about 11-13 km.

Development of Nishant remotelypiloted vehicle, designed by the DRDO, to undertake battlefield surveillance, reconnaissance, real-time engagement of targets by artillery fire and laser designation has been successfully completed. It has been approved for induction through limited series production.

The Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS) have been successfully developed and have been deployed in a large number of Corps.

Air Defence Artillery The corps of Army Air Defence has a large variety of guns and missile systems. It has 40mm L/70, Zu-23-2 Twin gun, ZSU-23-4 Schilka, Tanguska, Kvadrat (mediumrange missile system), OSA -AK (shortrange missile system) and Igla shoulder fired missile system in its inventory. The 40mm L/70 which is about four decades old needs immediate replacement. Considering the high costs of new weapon systems, the Army is going in for weapon upgrades for L-70, ZU-23-2 Twin gun, and ZSU-23-4 Schilka. Meanwhile, the Army is looking for successors to L-70 and the ZU-23-2. Successor to Schilka (ZSU-23-4) already exists in the form of Tangushka, but in limited numbers. A request for information (RFI) has already been issued to find a replacement for Schilka.

For air defence of mechanised units, it has been planned to acquire mediumrange surface-to-air missile (MRSAM) and quick reaction SAM (QRSAM) systems. RFP for QRSAM is being issued and there is a joint development venture of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Israel for MRSAM for all the three services. Successor to Igla has been shortlisted and will go for trials shortly.

Shortlisted systems are SAAB RBS-7O, MBDA, Mistral, a Russian SAM system and South Korea’s LIG Nex1.

Infantry The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has approved of a new assault rifle, 5.56mm calibre and a new generation carbine.

The Army awaits a complete overhaul of its basic weaponry for soldiers. Seeking to arm its infantry soldier with a lethal and sophisticated assault rifle, the Army has started the field trials for procuring more than 60,000 assault rifles in a deal worth `13,000 crore. The assault rifles which were under consideration as reported by the media include Beretta, IWI, SIG Sauer, Colt and Ceska Zbrojovka. The Army wants its latest rifles to be equipped with detachable under-barrel grenade launchers, nightvision devices, laser designators and so on.

Sources said, “The trials have begun and considering the requirements of the force, the guns will be tested in deserts, extreme cold weathers, high-altitude regions and so on. The Central Paramilitary Force and Continued on page 7...

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>> Army Aviation

Requirements of Indian Army Aviation Corps The Army Aviation needs to play a vastly enhanced role in land operations in the coming years. This is only possible if the arm grows both quantitatively and qualitatively. The gap between desire and reality is currently not very large and is likely to narrow down further provided the acquisitions proceed as planned.

Photographs: US Army

 Lt General (Retd) B.S. Pawar

T

he operational diversities of the Indian Army have to be viewed with the variety of terrain existing on our borders and our extensive deployment in mountains/high-altitude areas. This requires assets that are capable of operating across this environmental spectrum. The present force structure of Army Aviation Corps (AAC) inhibits it from being able to perform the roles envisaged. The arm has been unable to grow to its natural size due to numerous evolutionary factors, the constant opposition of the Indian Air Force (IAF) being one of the major reasons. The growth plan formulated for 2027 also does not fully address the requirements of an operational AAC, which would be capable of fighting and supporting the Army in future conflicts.

To make the Army Aviation a potent force it must have a mix of both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft with the helicopters being available in larger numbers.

The helicopter fleet should consist of attack and armed helicopters, heavy-, mediumand light-utility (lift) helicopters and lightobservation helicopters. There also would be a need for specialised helicopters suitably modified for special operations. The aim is to make the force a capability-based organisation rather than an equipment and inventory-based structure, implying commensurate induction of man, machine, with the organisational and infrastructural requirements. New dimensions in tactical operations at night as a direct result of sensor and avionics capabilities, with the ability to operate at low levels at night will yield great dividends. The broad requirements of the Army Aviation and what it should possess to make it a potent arm are as follows:

Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopter

Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopter

Reconnaissance and Observation There is a requirement for a dedicated Reconnaissance and Observation unit for every division to cater for reconnaissance of commanders, direction of artillery fire and casualty evacuation from inaccessible areas. The present Cheetah/Chetak fleet is vintage and needs immediate replacement. The trials for their replacement have been completed with the French Eurocopter (Fennec) and Russian Kamov (Ka-226) in fray. Both helicopters being evaluated are night-capable and modified for fitment of sensors for transmitting real-time information to ground stations during reconnaissance missions.

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Utility/ Lift Helicopters The Army needs to develop capabilities for lifting up to a company at the Corps level, a battalion at the Command level and a brigade at Army level. Light, medium and heavy helicopters as well as some light fixed-wing aircraft are required for these tasks. In the light-utility category, four units of advanced light helicopter (ALH) have already been raised and are operational including one in high altitude, while the fifth is currently under raising. A total of eight such units are planned for induction, each having 10 helicopters. This gives the capability to a field

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force commander to move within the TBA up to a company level force at the critical juncture of the battle without having to look over his shoulders. The ALH is an all-weather, night-capable, twin-engine machine with state-of-the-art avionics. The availability of this resource will give additional tactical capability to the commanders in planning and execution of their operations. The ALH has also been test evaluated for high-altitude operations with a more powerful engine ‘Shakti’, being produced by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in collaboration with French Turbomeca. This will give a major boost to enhancing the load carrying capacity while operating in high-altitude areas, especially the Siachen Glacier. In the medium-lift category, the Air Force continues to stonewall all attempts of the Army

to acquire a suitable helicopter in the 10 to 12-tonne class. This capability is basically required for intra-theatre move of reserves and equipment including ammunition and

The Army needs to develop capabilities for lifting up to a company at the Corps level, a battalion at the Command level and a brigade at Army level

for special operations. HAL is looking at the feasibility of a joint venture with a foreign vendor for a 10 to 12-tonne class multiplepurpose utility helicopter, but very little progress has been made in this regard so far. The Army needs to pursue this approach more vigorously to acquire this class of helicopters, which when suitably modified, will be the Army’s mainstay for special operations.

In the heavy-lift class, the resources are almost non-existent with only one unit of Russian Mi-26 helicopters currently held with the Air Force. The induction of the ultralight howitzer into the Army (trials completed—induction likely soon), for deployment in the mountains has triggered the requirement for suitable heavy-lift capability, with helicopters capable of carrying these howitzers under slung in the mountains. The process for acquisition of this class of helicopters has already commenced under the aegis of the Air Force. In fray are the American Chinook CH-47 and the Russian Mi-26. The requirement is to have four to five such units with 10 helicopters each at command level to give the capability to the Theatre Commander to move up to a battalion, as well as for transporting/lifting heavy equipment/light guns, including logistical support. The operational tasks and roles of this class of helicopters leave no doubt with regards to their ownership. Here we also need to look at the concept of the tilt-rotor technology wherein the aircraft can operate both as a fixed-wing and a helicopter. Boeing’s V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor which is already operating in Afghanistan in support of the US marines. This type of aircraft is ideally suited for the mountains where infrastructure in terms of landing grounds/ airfields is almost non-existent—ideally suited for our eastern borders.

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>> Army Aviation There is an urgent requirement to build suitable infrastructure and have it in place to absorb the new equipment and organisations

able to operate at high altitudes (16,000 feet), a distinct advantage over other attack helicopters and an asset for our mountain formations. Unlike the ALH, the LCH will have tandem seating cockpit and stealth features, but will carry the same weapons package as the ALH-WSI. The helicopter is expected to enter service by 2014. The LCH/attack helicopter units will be the main punch of the land force commander and will form part of the Army Aviation Corps.

Organisations and Infrastructure Attack/Armed Helicopter Mechanised warfare in the plains and desert terrain requires the integration of the third dimension with the mechanised forces in terms of attack and armed helicopters.

These helicopters would also be required to undertake operations in the mountains.

The available Mi-25/Mi-35 is not capable of operating at those altitudes. There is a requirement for each strike corps including in the mountains to have a dedicated, stateof-the-art attack helicopter unit. The Pivot/ Holding Corps in the plains and deserts should have armed helicopters/gunships as part of their aviation assets. This will provide a formidable capability to the force commander to be applied in the TBA.

Armed ALH The armed version called the ALH Weapons Systems Integrated (ALH WSI) is at an advanced stage of development and is likely to enter service by the end of this year.

Though not a typical attack helicopter, it has an array of comparable weapons systems to include gun, rockets, air-to-air and airto-ground missiles (ATGM). Integration of the weapons systems less the ATGM is currently going on at HAL. However, the main weapon in the arsenal of the armed/attack helicopter, the ATGM, has so far neither been developed nor acquired. The indigenously produced NAG anti-tank missile (air version ‘Helina’) which is stated to be a third-generation fire and forget missile, is not ready and not likely to be available in the near future.

As an interim measure, the Army is planning to equip its initial armed ALH units with a suitable air-to-ground missile ex import. Trials for the same have been completed—in fray are the French PARS-3 and Israeli Spike ER. Thereafter, it is expected that the ‘Helina’ would be ready for induction into the armed forces. The armed ALH units would be part of the key Pivot /Holding Corps, ideal for employment in the “cold start” strategy.

Army Aviation needs to develop organisations that enhance aviation capabilities and are suitably tailored to meet the evolving operational requirements. Each Corps should have an Aviation Brigade to provide proper command and control and ensure optimal utilisation of all diverse aviation assets located within the Corps. In fact unlike the Air Force which operates out of their bases during war, Army Aviation units will require to operate from Forward Composite Aviation Bases which would cater to

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The Army Aviation needs to play a vastly enhanced role in land operations in the coming years. This is only possible if the arm grows both quantitatively and qualitatively. The gap between desire and reality is currently not very large and is likely to narrow down further provided the acquisitions proceed as planned. Most of the modernisation plans for replacement/induction of new equipment are in the final stages. The biggest advantage the AAC has is the indigenous capability of the HAL to meet the bulk of its requirement in terms of helicopters and supporting systems like the ALH, ALH-WSI, LCH, etc. For majority of the equipment to be inducted ex import, the trails have been completed and decisions awaited—case in point is the light observation attack and heavy-lift helicopters. However, if any of these projects gets stalled, especially the replacement of vintage Cheetah/Chetak helicopters, the modernisation plans will take a nosedive with disastrous consequences. SP

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Conclusion

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Attack Helicopters Today this is the weakest link in the capability of the AAC. The meagre resources held— two units of attack helicopters Mi-25/ Mi-35, though under the operational control of Army, are in fact manned, controlled and operated by the Air Force. These helicopters of Russian origin are vintage, though a certain amount of upgradation has been carried out to make them night capable. The trials for their replacement have been completed and the American Apache Longbow AH-64D is likely to be inducted in the IAF. Apache 64D is a state-of-the-art modernday attack helicopter with an array of lethal weapon sub-systems to include guns, rockets, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles as well as helmet-mounted targeting systems and advanced self-protection suite. The Apache has been extensively used in both the Iraq wars as well as Afghanistan. As per reports, the induction will commence soon.

In this context, the development of the light combat helicopter (LCH) by the HAL is a milestone achievement. The LCH aims to gatecrash the exclusive club of the state-of-the-art light-attack helicopters which includes Eurocopter’s Tiger, Bell’s AH 1Z Super Cobra and China’s ultra secret Zhisheng 10 (Z-10). The LCH is a derivative of the ALH and the weaponised ALH. The LCH is being designed to be

the security of helicopters as well as provide essential maintenance, fuelling and arming facilities. There would also be a requirement of some forward armament and refuelling points to be established in the forward zone for helicopters operating on specific missions, to cater for their replenishment in terms of fuel and ammunition.

There is an urgent requirement to build suitable infrastructure and have it in place to absorb the new equipment and organisations. Support services like airfields, air traffic control, met equipment, maintenance equipment, etc, would also need upgradation and refurbishment. Lastly, the most important facet, the training facilities for the training of aircrew and ground crew need modernisation. The importance of simulators for this purpose cannot be overemphasised. Keeping in mind the vast expansion plans of the AAC in the coming years and induction of sophisticated stateof-the-art equipment, the simulators will be vital for future training as these are low-cost and time saving.

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Equipment Profile... Continued from page 3 Photograph: BAE Systems

state police undergoing modernisation programme would also be able to procure the same. According to the Indian Procurement Policy, the selected vendor will have to transfer the technology to the state-owned Ordnance Factory Board, which will then manufacture the guns under licence within the country.

New bullet proof jackets, ballistic helmets and boots anti-mine which were also to be procured, have not materialised so far. The infantry is also looking for a manportable third-generation anti-tank guided missile under barrelled grenade launchers, 60mm mortars, enhanced-range 81mm mortars and thermal-imaging night sights for assault rifles. Incidents like 26/11 have underlined the need to equip all infantry battalions suitably for rapid reaction. This is being achieved by procuring specialised items for the Ghatak Platoons (Commando Platoons) of Infantry Battalions. Multimode grenades have been indented with the Ordnance Factory Board while ammunition of the Rocket Launcher Mark III is

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also to be procured. The infantry is also being provided with multi-purpose vehicles (MPVs), light-bullet proof vehicles (Lt BPVs), light-strike vehicles (LSVs) and additional snow mobiles.

BAE Systems's M777 lightweight howitzer

Special Forces Equipping of Special Forces (SF) is lagging woefully. “Packaged equipping” of subunits has not taken off and critical equipment like laser target designators is yet to be provisioned. The Army’s emphasis has been on expansion, ignoring the universally acknowledged four Special Forces global truths:  Humans are more important than hard-

ware  Quality is better than quantity  Special Forces cannot be mass produced  Competent Special Forces cannot be cre-

ated after emergencies arise.

It would be prudent to first consolidate the existing seven Special Forces battalions and fully equip them before adding more.

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SP’s Airbuz, SP’s

conveying gratitude to

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The future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS) has been initiated to make the infantryman a weapon platform with situational awareness, increased lethality and sustainability in the digitised battlefield.

F-INSAS is to be effected in three phases: Phase-I includes weapons, body armour, clothing and individual equipment; PhaseII is the target acquisition system and Phase-III comprises the computer sub-system, radio sub system, software and software integration. F-INSAS will be a part of the battlefield management system (BMS) of the Army.

Engineers: Equipment has been procured to assist in de-mining operations and to improve the engineers’ capability for disaster management. Protective equipment, to enhance the fighting capability of the Army in the nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) scenario has been procured. Protection against improvised explosive devices (IED) in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations is being constantly enhanced through procurement of a sophisticated range of counter IED equipment. The capability is also being strengthened by replacing existing bridge systems with state-of-the-art indigenous bridges, which will enhance tactical mobility of our field formations. Procurement of new earth-moving plants and material handling cranes is also being done to reduce the fatigue factor for troops.

Signals: The Corps of Signals has assimilated all types of technology from mobile cellular, satellite, microwave and fibre-optic communication and are today on the verge of ushering in a next-generation network, based on futuristic technology. As far as radio communications are concerned, a number of promising technologies such as software defined radio (SDR) and cognitive radio (CR) are being closely analysed for their effective military usage.

Information Systems The objective of the Director General Information Systems is to vigorously pursue the establishment of the Command Information Decision Support System (CIDSS) for the Army to link together all other automated communication and information systems such as the battlefield surveillance system (BSS), the artillery combat command and control system (ACCCS), the air defence control and reporting system (AD C&R) and the battle management system (BMS), in an effort to present a holistic picture to a commander and his senior staff officers to ease the decision-making process. This will also link the communication system at strategic, operational and tactical levels and enable the Army to fight “network-enabled warfare” in the future. SP

F 50 YEARS 23/01/13 12:23 PM

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>> Technology

Network-Centricity for the Indian Military The evolution of a joint structure will necessitate specifying a doctrine and addressing specific issues of sensor architecture, weapon architectures, interoperability levels and command and control structure. A phased implementation as well as war-gaming the concept would be desirable to absorb the new systems and concepts smoothly and in a graduated manner.

Photograph: SP Guide Pubns

 Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

T

echnology and warfare have all along had a symbiotic relationship. This also relates to network-centric warfare (NCW), albeit some mistakenly think it is purely a technological issue. NCW is only an aid and not the end in itself; a manifestation to synergise resources and bring them to bear concentrated onto the enemy. NCW is not technology alone but encompasses the gamut of emerging military response to the information age. Tenets of NCW comprise a robustly-networked force that improves information sharing, enhancing the quality of information and shared situational awareness, enabling collaboration and self-synchronisation, and enhancing sustainability and speed of command, and finally, all of these, dramatically increasing mission effectiveness. Technology, therefore, will have to be matched with a requisite vision, doctrine and structures to implement on ground. Logically, NCW would also impact the hierarchal organisational structure that we have got used to in military organisations. Shaping an organisation to meet new challenges is tough. Even with visionary leadership and motivated people, unexpected problems and even crisis can erupt. The challenge to the defence forces is thus immense and we would have to address these head on.

www.spslandforces.net

NCW Concept Typically, in the platform-centric force, shooters do not inherently own sensors and decision-makers do not inherently own shooters; platform owns weapon systems and weapons have their organic sensors. Therefore, in this type of traditional approach to warfighting, there is always disconnect between the shooter, sensors and the decision-maker. Conversely, in NCW, the decision-makers, sensors and shooters work collaboratively in response to the dynamics of the battlespace to achieve the commander’s mission. The most visible part of NCW is the focus on intelligence-based warfare, which occurs when intelligence is fed directly into operations rather than used as an input for overall command and control.

As sensors grow more acute and reliable, as they proliferate in type and number and as they become capable of feeding fire control systems in real time and near real time, the task of developing, maintaining and exploiting systems that sense the battlefield assess its composition and send the results to shooters, assumes greater importance.

NCW focuses on the combat power that can be generated from the effective linking of maximum warfighting entities. It is the ability of geographically dispersed forces to create a high level of shared awareness that can be exploited for effective and efficient execution of operations. NCW has the potential to merge the tactical, operational and strategic levels of military hierarchy leading to the cohesive employment of disparate inter-services resources.

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Integrated Network Platform

NCW Model NCW implies a change in the pace of warfare. This paradigm involves shrinking of the decision-cycle which would exert additional pressures on almost all other components of the war machine, whether operational or administrative; the buzz words being self synchronisation, information dominance, information superiority, shared awareness, increased operational tempo, reduction of the observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) loop and the like.

With respect to command and control setup in the military (encompassing command and control (C2) framework, C2 process, info management, IT and telecommunications), data bearers, information bearers and the knowledge bearers will require restructuring. Establishment, maintenance and availability of the network infrastructure, backbone communication network, seamless interaction and security will be important. Establishment, maintenance and updating of data centres will be a critical component. Specific structures for handling issues of data integrity and confidentiality with clear-cut accountability and responsibility are major challenges. Change management will be critical with respect to knowledge bearers which is the domain of commanders.

The experience of the corporate has resulted in reduced levels of management, workers empowered to take decisions and few differences in responsibility due to the need for speed, lesser need for communication and control function of middle managers and the impact of globalisation. However, in the military, strategy and planning proceeds in a linear top down manner through development and then to implementation and a flat organisation that fundamentally

changes the present structural paradigm.

This may not be easily palatable to the traditional military. For the military, the changes as mentioned above in the corporate sector, translates into dynamic liaisons adaptively forming from operational assets without the overarching presence of higher HQ. Myriad questions like levels of autonomy, levels, amount of information to be fed, security and the like will continue to be raised.

Integration of sensors in the battlefield requires definition of the sensor architecture as it will have a bearing on hardware procurement as also the command and control structures. The definition of the architecture is essential to address issues of data fusion, especially if systems of the three services are to be integrated. Operational interoperability as also procedural issues for exchange and control of information will require addressing in case of a collaborative architecture. There would be many such practical problems that need to be looked into.

The organisational structure to manage the sensor grid will have to be evolved, based on the sensor architecture that is adopted and addressing issues of command and control of these sensors. Similar issues will emerge while integrating the weapon grid. A viable option for interface between sensor and shooter platform would have to be found from a fast and responsive decision-support system. Interface yet segregate operational tactical and strategic level will pose major challenges during restructuring. The level of interoperability across the services and even within a service too needs to be defined.

Indian Military Net-centricity in the Indian military has mushroomed bottom upwards. Lack of an NCW philosophy/doctrine has resulted in

an ambiguous NCW architecture, which has still not been defined. Though we have doctrines for command, control, communications, computers, information, intelligence (C4I2) and information warfare (IW), these two spheres are components of NCW and do not constitute NCW by themselves.

NCW must also encompass policies, strategy, concepts, military organisations and adjustments. To transform the Indian military into a NCW-capable force, we need a NCW philosophy/doctrine as the start point.

Concepts of individual services should flow from a joint doctrine. This will facilitate development of coherent tri-service networked architecture. Non-integration of Headquarters Integrated Defence Services (HQ IDS) with Ministry of Defence (MoD), limited authority/operational responsibility with HQ IDS and void of a CDS have all contributed towards this.

At present, networks of the three services are not interoperable. Neither voice nor data networks nor our radio communications are interoperable to the desired degree. Each service develops networks on its own and starts thinking of interoperability at a much later stage. The defence communications network (DCN) is coming up but little progress has been made for achieving services handshake.

Common standards and protocols for the three services have not been evolved. Finalising and adoption of standards and protocols, mutually compatible database structures, development/deployment of interfaces between systems using disparate platforms and commonality of hardware are challenges which need to be overcome. No single unifying secrecy algorithm for the three services has been developed. Bringing the standards and protocols of the three services on the same plane is a gigantic task that can only be solved through outsourcing, given the levels of expertise available within the services. This process is way behind and there is absence of knowledge management. In our context, this collaborative working needs to be looked at closely, not only across the services but also within each service. The command and control structures will have to cater to this collaborative working. A network-enabled environment for Indian military would be available down to operational level in a few years time.

However, it is the change in mindsets and absorption of technology that is likely to take up most of the time.

Requirement To transform the Indian military into a NCW-enabled force, the essential steps would be: to evolve a network-centric operational concept to achieve a mission; define the level of interoperability across the services and within the services that is feasible/desired; define the type of architecture that is appropriate for the sensor and weapon grids; evolve a tri-service doctrine for NCW; define command and control structures designed for the network-centric environment; restructure a brigade sized Continued on page 13...

Attack helicopters

>>

Indian Army’s Mini Air Force Mini Air Force, or the Army Aviation Corps, is the arm of the future and will play a decisive role in any future conflict. It is a legitimate requirement of all professional armies the world over and the Indian Army is no exception.  Lt General (Retd) B.S. Pawar

E

ver since the decision of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to hand over attack helicopters to the Army, there have been a spate of articles in the media focusing on their misplaced perception of the Army getting its own “Mini Air Force”. The recent decision of the Army on the creation of a permanent cadre for the Army Aviation Corps seems to have further fuelled this perception. The latest article on this subject appeared in a leading daily on December 3, 2012, with a sensational title, “Now Army to Get Own Mini Air Force”.

The protagonists of these views obviously do not understand the connotation of the term Mini Air Force or they would not use it in the context of actions being taken by the Army/ MoD towards the planned modernisation and transformation of the Army Aviation Corps.

They fail to understand that the world over army aviation has a separate philosophy/ concept of employment and roles/tasks visà-vis the air forces. This fact has been amply demonstrated by the employment of such forces in the two Iraq wars and their present employment in Afghanistan.

The Indian Army today has the largest number of helicopters in its inventory (270 to be precise) consisting mainly of the light observation (Cheetah and Chetak) and light utility (ALH/Dhruv). These assets are nowhere near what had been envisaged in 1963 by the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General J.N. Chaudhuri, to have a full-fledged air arm of the Army which would include all classes of helicopters including attack and light fixed-wing aircraft of the Dornier class. It is worth noting that it took nearly 23 years for the Army to finally break away from the Air Force and form its own aviation corps in 1986. It has taken another 27 years for the Government to take the decision on the issue of the ownership of attack helicopters in favour of the Army. However, the Defence Ministry has failed to resolve the issue in its entirety as the medium- and heavy-lift helicopters have been kept out of the government decree and continue to be held with the Air Force, whereas the issue of fixed-wing aircraft for the Army is not even on the MoD radar.

Future conflicts are likely to be short, swift and intense, where time and speed of operations will be of prime essence, and in our context these are most likely to occur in the mountains in respect of both the eastern and northern borders. In the above scenario, the Army Aviation assets will play a pivotal role right from the word go and will constitute the key element of the commander’s plans. The Army Aviation due to its inherent characteristics is a game changer and a force multiplier that can tilt the balance in any conflict. It would be pertinent to mention here that both our adversaries, China and Pakistan, have full-fledged Army Aviation Corps having all class of helicopters including attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft as part of their inventory and they do not in any way qualify as a mini Air Force of their country. Hence, in the present state, the Indian Army Aviation corps is nowhere near being a Mini Air Force as is being projected in the print media. In fact without crucial assets like medium- and heavy-lift helicopters, its full potential cannot be exploited in the tactical battlefield and this

Photograph: Indian Army

Rudra armed advanced light helicopter (ALH)

remains a major drawback in its operational capability especially in the mountains. The Army in its long-term plans is looking at an attack/armed helicopter unit, a reconnaissance and observation helicopter unit and a light/tactical battle support helicopter unit with each Corps. This gives a very effective operational capability in terms of firepower and mobility to the field force commander to fight his battle without having to look over his shoulders, especially in the initial phase of the battle where time and speed is crucial.

The heavy-lift helicopters and light fixedwing aircraft would be command assets, for enhancing the logistics and lift capability as well as their utilisation for command and control purposes. In the absence of adequate and suitable infrastructure on our eastern borders this could be a very critical resource. Suitable organisations are required for command and control and coordination of such resources, and hence the concept of Corps Aviation Brigades, the first one being already effective in 14 Corps with three helicopter units under its command.

With regard to a permanent cadre for Army Aviation Corps, there are three distinct categories in its cadre—the aviators (pilots), technicians (EME personnel) and the support staff. The aviators are officers selected from all arms and currently have strength of approximately 280 officers. In this number, almost 30 per cent are already permanently seconded to the aviation corps and form part of the permanent cadre. The first batch of officers was inducted into the permanent cadre in 1999 and thereafter a continuous process of induction of a certain number of officers based on a selection system takes place every year. Recently, the direct induction of officers into Army Aviation Corps has also commenced both from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, and Officers Training Academy, Chennai. It is ultimately planned to have a permanent to support cadre ratio of 40:60 with regards to the aviators, keeping in mind the organisational

and carrier progression aspects. The technicians are already permanently affiliated to the Army Aviation Corps. Their induction is done directly into Army Aviation through the corps of EME with separate career and promotional prospects and they retire on their superannuation from the corps itself.

The support cadre on the other hand consists mostly of personnel required for administration, logistics, security and flying operations.

These involve trades like clerks, drivers, radio operators, air traffic controllers, meteorological staff, fire-fighting personnel, etc. They are currently drawn from all arms/services of the Army and are posted to aviation units on extra-regimental employment (ERE) for

limited tenures, a system which adversely impacts the smooth functioning of these units. In fact the decision to make this cadre permanent had been hanging fire for quite some time, due to the complexities involved in the transfer of these personnel from different arms/units. However, the decision has finally been taken to permanently absorb these personnel into the Army Aviation Corps and to set up a separate records office to manage the administrative requirements of these personnel. This indeed is a welcome step and will help in further streamlining the functioning and operational effectiveness of the Army Aviation Corps and is a far cry from the imagination of some, who consider this move by the Army as a step towards forming a mini Air Force.

Despite all the bottlenecks and impediments, the Army Aviation Corps is continuing to grow, albeit slowly. A significant development is the induction of the Rudra (armed ALH) into the corps by March this year. The replacement of the existing vintage fleet of Cheetah/Chetak helicopters is now imperative, for any slippage on this account will have disastrous security implications, as the maintenance of this fleet itself is becoming a technician’s nightmare. Mini Air Force, or the Army Aviation Corps is the arm of the future and will play a decisive role in any future conflict. It is a legitimate requirement of all professional armies the world over and the Indian Army is no exception. SP

The Army Aviation due to its inherent characteristics is a game changer and a force multiplier that can tilt the balance in any conflict Untitled-3 1

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>> Indo-Pak Conflict

Peace Process Devoid of Strategy Our policy-makers and security experts must first formulate a comprehensive security strategy and thereafter the diplomats and others should work out an entirely fresh negotiating plan.

Photograph: PIB

 Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi

T

www.spslandforces.net

he savage mutilation of two soldiers of the Indian Army on the line of control (LoC) has brought to centre-stage two crucial aspects of our relations with Pakistan. The first is the fragile nature of the so-called peace process with Pakistan and the second is the lack of any long-term plans/policies, without which knee jerk reactions are the norm and several different voices add to the din. Resultantly, persons who have to implement or take action are confused.

The first aspect is the so-called peace process, which our successive governments have been pursuing by bending over backwards for decades to appease Pakistan. The results are that Pakistan as well as other countries perceives us as a soft state; a state that can be coerced into giving concessions without any quid pro quo, and a state that has no understanding of deterrence. Our leaders and their advisors also seem to have no comprehension of what ‘talking from a position of strength’ means. They need to understand that in relations between nations, the phrase ‘the meek shall inherit the earth’ does not apply. It is deterrent capability that is the most important. This translates into a strong military and political will.

The second issue is also of utmost importance. It is obvious that the entire government machinery was taken by surprise at this event, resulting in a number of emotional outbursts suggesting different and varied responses. These have ranged, somewhat predictably, from continuing the policy of appeasement to immediate military action. We will continue to be surprised, shocked and at our wits’ end in this manner, till we formulate well thought out security strategies for situations that we are likely to face. It is unfortunate that even the Army, which carries out continuous contingency planning, failed to anticipate this type of Pakistani attack after the heavy shelling in the Uri Sector two days earlier.

The continuation of the so-called peace process would obviously be unproductive.

It will further reinforce the thinking in Pakistan that it can do what it likes, as the Indian leadership will always select the soft option, harping on restraint, not upsetting the apple cart and similar other clichés that indicate neither personal nor national pride.

Our policy-makers are so lacking in imagination that they seem to think that there are only two options open to them, which are either dialogue or war. One of their main spokesperson, who is seen at most discussions, puts it across as “either ‘jaw-jaw’ or ‘war-war’.” How puerile can one be! Our leaders and their advisors seem to be oblivious of how other nations handle their intransigent neighbours or adversaries. It is high time the government understands that there are innumerable options available between negotiations and war, provided it stops listening to only peaceniks and sycophants and instead takes the advice of professionals.

The India-Pakistan Conundrum Pakistan was carved out of India on the specious ground that Muslims are a separate nation and that they will not get equal status in India as a minority. History has already proved both assumptions wrong.

Soon after its formation, Pakistan adopted a three-pronged strategy consisting of permanent alienation with India; heavy reliance

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Brigadier level officers from India and Pakistan at a flag meeting, at Chakan-da-Bagh, in Poonch

on non-state actors to act as the vanguards to their Army and wanting concessions from India ad infinitum.

Pakistan latched on to Kashmir within two months of the partition of India by sending so-called raiders led by Pakistani Army personnel and since then it evokes Kashmir as the causes belli between the two countries. Its second gambit was to create a strong army by telling its people that India was the villain who was out to grab Pakistan! The result was that the Army soon became the biggest and at times only powercentre in the country, using resources at the cost of the people. Despite this, the Pakistani Army has yet to deliver in any fight against the Indian Army, but this is hidden from the people of Pakistan by the spin doctors telling outright lies.

The third important aspect is that while the Indian Army has remained apolitical and professional, the Pakistani Army soon started toppling elected governments and became the ultimate power-centre of the country. In the process it lost its military qualities and professionalism. It is this that gets reflected so glaringly in this incident of beheading an Indian soldier and mutilating the body of the other.

Dynamics of the LoC The present LoC is the second avatar of the erstwhile Cease Fire Line (CFL), which had come into being on January 1, 1949. After the 1971 war with Pakistan, a fresh line was demarcated, which is the present LoC. A fact not well known is that when the LoC came into being, the role of UN Observers in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) became redundant and India told the UN that they could withdraw. However, in its efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue, Pakistan asked the UN Observers to continue.

Pakistan again attempted to drag in the UN as this event unfolded, but was informed in no uncertain terms that India would not rise to the bait.

Despite the formal demarcation, the Pakistani Army did not honour the sanctity of the CFL, from its very inception. They commenced encroaching and nibbling on our side of the CFL, hoping to either gain tactically advantageous positions or merely to incorporate additional real estate. This was naturally resisted by our troops. Thereafter, eyeball to eyeball deployment, exchange of fire, raids across the lines and similar activi-

ties became the norm. The result was that the CFL became an active and live border, except when a ceasefire was in effect. This state of affairs continued even after the CFL became the LoC. Whenever a new infantry battalion is inducted on their portion of the LoC, the enemy unit opposite them assesses by initiating action. Units that respond with guts and vigour then dominate and assume moral ascendency on the unit opposite.

Subsequent actions on either side thereafter conform to this relationship. One example should suffice. On the first night after a Maratha Light Infantry battalion assumed control of their area, the Pakistani unit subjected its forward posts to heavy shelling. The next morning, the officer at the Maratha post climbed a tree with a rocket launcher and blasted two bunkers of the enemy post. Thereafter, not one bullet was fired by the Pakistanis on the Marathas during their entire tenure!

The present ceasefire has been in force since 2003, the longest among many. Even though an active LoC favours our troops, we had agreed to the ceasefire, so that Pakistan could withdraw troops for conducting operations against the Taliban and other insurgents. However, Pakistan chose not to do so and instead continued to nurture those terrorists. It also continued pushing infiltrators across the LoC. The troops deployed on the LoC have an onerous task as they have to constantly strike a balance between stopping infiltration and observing ceasefire norms. The government keeps insisting that the troops must show restraint without realising that to carry out their twin tasks of maintaining the sanctity of the LoC and not permitting infiltration, some force has to be used. The commanding officers know how to maintain a correct balance between keeping motivational and morale levels of troops high and also implementing the effects of political decisions as they pertain at their levels. They must be given a free hand.

Security Strategies The dire need for a security strategy that defines the parameters of our relationship with neighbours, as well as with other nations is an obvious lacuna in our country.

Successive governments have talked about formulating security strategies that would cover anticipated security issues but have

always baulked at issuing formal written policies or even guidelines. The result is that we seem to be caught literally with our pants down when an event with security connotations occurs. We then resort to taking ‘firefighting’ actions in an ad hoc manner.

All stakeholders need to be on the same grid and must be clear as to what exactly is our policy or strategy and what we want to achieve. This will result in coordinated responses and not what we normally do, with individuals and even agencies/institutions speaking out of turn and at variance with each other. This aspect clearly stood out in the present case when all kinds of statements were issued by different individuals, ranging from no disruption of the peace process on the one hand to military response on the other. Consequently, it is imperative to spell out our policies and stances in formalised documents so that leaders and officials dealing with the subject are correctly prepared with their responses. The security strategies must clearly bring out ‘red lines’ and action to be taken if the other side crosses one or more intentionally or by default.

The Peace Process India has been making overtures for peace for decades, yet all we have received in return from Pakistan is violence of many types, including wars and terrorism; hedging and denials; impossible demands; and subterfuges. It is unfortunate that our political leaders have taken a somewhat rigid view that the process should continue, come what may. This has apparently been done at the instance of a few peaceniks and sycophants who have their own agendas, as well as international (read USA) pressure. Unfortunately, our leaders have failed to consult those organisations and individuals who are au fait with and understand Pakistan’s intransigence fully and are clear about how far one must go in trying to befriend this country that is constantly drumming up antagonism against our nation and loses no opportunity to take recourse to violence to achieve its ends.

Our apparent inability to even discern who really is in power in Pakistan is baffling indeed. Although there is an elected government in Pakistan, it is the Pakistani Army that makes policy and strategic decisions in that country and it would be damned if it makes peace with India, then why bother and waste time, money and effort in trying something unachievable? What we need to do is to have routine relations with Pakistan and deal with it on the basis of reciprocity and on a case to case basis. It is only this approach and not the policy of appeasement that may bear fruit over time.

Conclusion It is nobody's case that we should not live peacefully with our neighbours and resolve all problems and disputes by discussion, but this needs give and take on both sides. So far, it has been a one-sided affair and there are no indicators that the future would be any different.

The least what we can do is to apply a brake on the peace process, jettison the “composite dialogue” and wait for a more conducive environment. Our policy-makers and security experts must first formulate a comprehensive security strategy and thereafter the diplomats and others should work out an entirely fresh negotiating plan. SP The writer is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS).

Marketing Feature >>

Antey-2500 Long-Range Air Defense Missile System

T

he mobile long-range air defense missile system (ADMS) Antey-2500 is a very effective air defence (AD) which could become the mainstay of AD of any nation.

When the characteristics are compared to other systems in the world, Antey-2500 is undoubtedly a world leader. The current export version of Antey-2500 has been upgraded extensively from the 1990s version to meet the present and future air threat. It includes modern element base and digital technologies that significantly enhance the performances of the system.

The most significant innovation in the new missile is to increase its firing range up to 350 km with which it can effectively engage and destroy airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.

Earlier such hostile targets were engaged by fighter aircraft. Antey-2500 has a combination of pre-programmed guidance of surface-to-air missile (SAM) with the radio correction and semi-active guidance at the final stage of flight, which provide it a high anti-jamming and accurate firing capability. The effective destruction of the target is provided with the use of heavy warhead weighing 150 kg. Its destructive effect multiplies because of the Russian “know-how” – which is guided blasting of the warhead charge providing fragments spread within the spatial angle of 60º.

When firing missiles which have active radar seekers on the group of targets, they may target the most powerful emitting target, which is almost impossible for “Antey2500” SAM. It is capable of destroying all types of aerodynamic targets, including cruise missiles, as well as the ballistic missiles launched at the ranges of more than 2,500 km. Antey-2500 can easily be integrated into the customers overall AD system but it can effectively operate in autonomous mode, using its own highly effective detection radars.

One of the major advantages of ADMS Antey-2500 is the capability to use its sensors to considerably increase the effectiveness of other air defence means including medium-/long-range and anti-ballistic missile defence (ABMD) systems. Combat batteries or even separate launchers with missiles of “Antey-2500” ADMS might be easily integrated into these systems. Each launcher by itself computes the optimal launch moment for its missiles and its builtin radar provides for missiles guidance to

the target (radio correction of flight programme and target designation for several seconds before its destruction). For this purpose, it is necessary to provide constant transmission of the target coordinates to the launcher from the radar of AD System with which “Antey-2500” launcher has been integrated with. Such integration of

“Antey-2500” ADMS elements into perspective non-strategic missile air defence systems will provide effective protection against a wide spectrum of ballistic missiles at a stage of atmospheric interception as well as the protection of objectives and ABMD means themselves against all types of air assault means.

Antey-2500 ADMS-Performance Killing zone: Against aerodynamic targets: - range, km up to 350 - altitude, km up to 30 Against ballistic targets: - range, km up to 40 - altitude, km up to 25 Radar cross-section of targets engaged, m2 ≥ 0.02 Max. start range of ballistic missiles engaged, km 2500+ Number of targets engaged simultaneously up to 24 Number of missiles: - 9A83MEMLV 4 - 9A84MELLV 2 Launching rate, s: - from different launchers, sec 0 - from one launcher, sec 1.5Reaction time, s 10 In/ out deployment time, min not more than 6

“Antey-2500” ADMS is characterised by very high combat survivability: the deployment/close down time does not exceed 5-6 minutes and the tracked chassis allow to change positions even in cross country and adverse conditions. On the customer’s demand, the ADMS may be supplied on the wheeled chassis.

The command and control over ADMS (ADMC/battalion) is executed from command and control post (CCP). It receives the information from two subordinate radars and/or external sources (higher level CCP, external radars). One of radars executes circular search of space at a distance of 500 km. The second radar (having electronic controlled beam in two planes) operates in the prescribed sector. Its main missions are: the timely detection of ballistic missiles warheads as well as targets detection in conditions of heavy jamming. The automated analyses of the airspace situation is executed at the CCP, after that it distributes the chosen targets among subordinate missile batteries (ADMBat), there are up to four batteries under one CCP. The multi-channel missile guidance radar (MGR) is the main element of the battery; the radar may detect enemy’s targets independently in the prescribed sector, or operate depending on the target designation from CCP. Each MGR tracks up to 12 targets and controls up to six launchers by transmitting the coordinates of one target to each launcher. Depending on the data received from MGR, the launcher provides for the firing on the determined target, guiding radio correction and designation radar antenna on the target. The firing is executed with the use of one or several SAMs, launched from the launcher or loader/launcher attached to it. Every battery may contain up to six launchers and loader/launchers.

There are two type of missiles; the “light” missiles of maximum range up to 130 km are launched by the launcher (up to four missiles on each launcher) and three types of “heavy” missiles, range of up to 350 km, are launched by the launcher/ launcher (two missiles of one type per loader/launcher).

“Antey-2500” ADMS is available in serial production for the Russian Armed Forces and for export as well. The system continuously undergoes development and has vast upgradation potential. (See figures for the composition of the system) SP

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>> army air defence

Three Decades of Status Quo Army Air Defence (AAD) is holding systems of varying vintage ranging from 49-year-old (L70 gun) to the youngest being 17-year-old (Tangushka). However, majority of the remaining guns and missiles are more than two decades old. Considering the vintage, the current AAD picture is rather dismal when reviewed system by system.

PhotographS: SP Guide Pubns, Lockheed Martin

 Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand

Apart from the aspect of obsolescence, there is a factor of shelf life of ammunition and missiles which effects their lethality, accuracy and safety

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rmy Air Defence (AAD) is an important component of modern warfare. The air threat is developing at a very fast rate with better aeronautics, avionics and armament. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have added another dimension to the threat which started with reconnaissance and surveillance, and has manifested into armed platforms. The employment of cruise and ballistic missiles make adversaries’ airpower formidable. The security environment in India’s neighbourhood is always on a dangerous threshold and a short fuse, amply clear by the recent incident on the line of control (LoC) in spite of the ceasefire being in force; thus it is necessary to modernise the Army on a regular basis.

Schilka System: It is a highly mobile system for supporting armour formations and is in service since the early 1970s. Its successor was Tangushka, one regiment of which was procured, but there were many twist and turns for buying additional mounts. The result is that the AAD is stuck with limited equipment which is obsolete and difficult to maintain. The upgradation has been carried out with a new more powerful engine, digital computer, better electro-optical sighting system and a new fire control radar. The four barrel 23mm gun with a rate of fire of 3,400 rounds per minute has been retained and there is a provision for firing shoulderfired missiles. The process should be speeded up for equipping selected regiments with the upgraded mounts. Meanwhile, possibilities should be explored for induction of a better system through ‘Make and Buy’ or ‘joint venture’ route.

Current AD Scenario

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AAD is holding systems of varying vintage ranging from 49-year-old (L70 gun) to the youngest being 17-year-old (Tangushka).

However, majority of the remaining guns and missiles are more than two decades old. The technology, especially in the field of ammunition, missiles, sensors and active seekers has advanced very rapidly, thus it is necessary to upgrade and replace the existing AD weapon systems at least every 15-20 years, so that they remain current. Apart from the aspect of obsolescence, there is a factor of shelf life of ammunition and missiles which effects their lethality, accuracy and safety. Considering the vintage, the current AAD picture is rather dismal when reviewed system by system.

L/70 Gun system: L/70 is the mainstay of AAD and has been the warhorse of AAD since 1964. It was to be replaced but there is no progress. The Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) development effort also kept its replacement at a limb for about two decades. Not many gun systems are currently available but a possible choice was Skyshield of Rheinmetall AD but unfortunately the company has been blacklisted by India. Thus there is no hope even in the distant future for a successor system. Even if a gun is shortlisted, it may take at least five years for the delivery to start. Notionally, if 10 regiments have to be provided with the new guns then at the rate of one regiment per year, it will take 10 years to equip all the 10 regiments provided there is no spill over. That takes it to 2028 and if the gun remains current for even three decades, the time frame will be 2058.

It is most unlikely that the current guns and ammunition will be able to counter the airpower of 2058. Fortunately, the introduction of radio fuse has increased the lethality of L70 manifold, but it is scaled at only 25 per cent of the total authorisation. It will thus be cost effective to increase the scaling to at least 50 per cent which will increase

Schilka is a highly mobile system for supporting armour formations and is in service since the early 1970s 12

SP’s Land Forces 1/2013

Tangushka self-propelled air defense system

Quick Reaction SAM (QRSAM) system:

The current system is OSA-AK which is a highly mobile system for the air defence of armour formations. This system is more than 20 years old and needs to be replaced.

DRDO’s effort to develop Trishul system did not succeed and a RFP has been issued twice. Hopefully, the current RFP will be taken to its logical conclusion.

Medium-Range SAM (MRSAM) system:

Kvadrat is the current system which is more than 35 years old and has the technology of early 1960s, thus a RFP has been issued but later on withdrawn due to poor response. As DRDO’s Akash has not been found suitable for mobile role, a few regiments of Akash have been contracted for semi-static role.

Meanwhile, DRDO has signed a MoU with Israel for the joint development of a missile system of about 70 km. It is meant for Army, Navy and the Air Force. Meanwhile, in the interim phase, the AAD may explore the possibility of importing a few regiments of Patriot Advance Capability-3 (PAC-3) from the US through the FMS route. PAC-3 is the obvious choice as it is war proven; has hit-to-kill technology; can engage aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, cruise and tactical ballistic missiles. It is also deployed with many nations including the US.

Patriot Advance Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile

lethality. It may also be prudent to live with the present system if no replacement is possible in a reasonable time frame and the gun is replaced with a suitable missile system in the future. L70 is also being upgraded with electric power lay and electro-optical sighting system. The electro-optical sighting system is superfluous as it already has fire control radar which is much superior to the proposed system.

Shoulder-fired surface-to-air (SAM) systems: The current system is Igla which is 23mm Twin gun: This is a fair weather

gun system which is more than three decades old. However, its rate of firing is very good (2,000 rounds per minute). It is suitable for mobile role and employment in the mountains. It is being upgraded with a power lay and electro-optical sighting system which will enhance its capability manifold and also provide it with night-firing capability. The upgradation should be implemented at the earliest.

also in service with the Indian Navy and the Air Force. A tri-service request for proposal (RFP) was issued and comparative trials have been carried out. It is understood that many systems were tried out including Saab’s RBS70-NG. The results are awaited.

During the last two Republic Day parades, there has been no AAD equipment on display as there is nothing new to show—a telling comment on the modernisation of AAD. SP

army day celebrations >>

Army Day 2013

PhotographS: SP Guide Pubns

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1. Chief of Army Staff General Bikram Singh during the Army Day parade in New Delhi on January 15 2. Main battle tank Arjun MK-I 3. BrahMos launcher 4. Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher system 5. Indian Army soldiers performing a combat demonstration during the Army Day parade 6. Soldiers of Indian Army with 155mm howitzer gun 7. A soldier with the latest TAR-21, Tavor assault rifle

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Network-Centricity... Continued from page 8 force based on above with appropriate level of jointness with other services; create a network-centric environment for the above force and wargame concepts; redefine doctrine, organisation and command and control structures based on experiences gained; and restructure other formations/organisations once the concept is proved.

What we must acknowledge is that a leaner and flatter organisational structure is required in a network-centric environment. This can only be achieved by breaking down existing hierarchy, reducing manpower content and enhancing the knowledge base. The revised structure must take into account varied conflict scenarios to include short duration conventional wars under proactive strategy, counterinsurgency, nuclear/asymmetric operations as well as operations undertaken as part of out-of-area contingency.

To ensure effective transformation from the platform-centric capabilities to network-centric, a phased shift in the existing technology at the level of all the three services and horizontal fusion in our armed forces at laid down hierarchical structure is necessary. A thorough cultural change is warranted through an aptitude-based selection procedure which should influence the values, attitudes and beliefs of our

future military leaders. We need to pursue development of human resources (HR) vigorously. Requisite emphasis needs to be laid on educating the man behind the weapon, aware of the state of future warfare and how to fight it. All commanders and the men they command will be the focus of transformation and the man behind the machine will continue to be the nerve centre. NCW requires technology, but ultimately reliance is essentially on people and organisations. NCW environment would demand a whole new set of skills and competencies from the information age warriors. These warriors must have a thorough understanding of all the system capabilities present in the battlespace and the ability, initiative and innovativeness to employ the capabilities for best effects. They must have the ability to interpret and make decisions on incomplete data, or when flooded with data (info overload), ability to operate in flatter organisational hierarchies. In addition, the capability to deal with lethality and accuracy of new technologies and adaptability and flexibility to cope with change are required. Although development of automated operational information system (OIS), management information system (MIS) and GIS is currently under way in the services, managing the actual transition

is a major challenge which involves both the technological as well as psychological aspects of change. There is an inescapable need for standardisation and commonality of equipment and protocols so as to achieve integration of the individual modules and systems for an integrated and resilient-networked architecture.

HQ IDS must be empowered to accelerate synergy and seamless interoperability in the services including formulating a suitable joint NCW Doctrine providing an evolving strategic vision of ‘full spectrum dominance’.

Effective management of the transformation and increasing the technical threshold of the users is essential. Cyber warfare technology needs to be nurtured to develop the asymmetry against the adversary by denting his networks and downgrading his fighting ability.

Our inherent strengths lie in the dominance that India possesses in the fields of software.

We need to capitalise on this; strengthen this in-house capability to augment our technologies and enhance the effectiveness of our operations. The last decade has seen significant improvements in sensors, high speed digital data transfer using worldwide space, optical and mobile telephony links, and the ruggedisation of hardware, coupled with greater affordability. Cutting-edge sensor technology has ensured that the results

remain unaffected by bad weather and light conditions. The important thing is that precise data and/or imagery for quick and accurate decision-making is available on call, creating battlefield transparency and situational clarity even under the most trying circumstances. We must make the most of this age of networking, with individual systems plugging into larger systems, thus leading to the ultimate goal of a system of systems.

Scope of NCW NCW as a concept is still evolving but the potential is immense. The challenge to the Indian military is to match what technology can offer with what is desirable on the battlefield. Technology misapplied within an organisation only guarantees failure.

Big changes in military capabilities have taken place when new weapons came into use along with equally pronounced shifts in tactics, doctrine and military organisations.

The evolution of a joint structure will necessitate specifying a doctrine and addressing specific issues of sensor architecture, weapon architectures, interoperability levels and command and control structure. A phased implementation as well as war-gaming the concept would be desirable to absorb the new systems and concepts smoothly and in a graduated manner. SP

1/2013 SP’s Land Forces

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>> news in brief Certified and ready, Indian Army to receive 1st weaponised Dhruv

weapon. A comprehensive self-protection suite would empower the pilot with essential situational awareness of the electromagnetic and laser environment. Any missile launched on the helicopter would be picked up by the self-protection suite and effective countermeasures dispensed automatically.

This makes Rudra practically unassailable.”

Missile men honoured by GOI In a significant milestone for the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), the first Dhruv (weapon systems integrated) -- Dhruv-WSI or Rudra as it has been christened— will be certified and ready for handing over to its primary customer, the Indian Army, during Aero India 2013. While a modified version of the Dhruv airframe— tandem seats— goes into the light combat helicopter that is currently in flight trials, the Army was of the opinion that an armed Dhruv without major modifications to the primary airframe would also be a potent platform, and be available to the customer naturally much sooner.

The Rudra is a result of that. According to HAL, “a Rudra can carry forty-eight 70mm rockets. These rockets can be safely delivered at stand-off ranges of more than eight km.

The turret mounted 20mm cannons can be cued to the electro-optical pod or the pilot’s helmet. This provides Rudra immediate and accurate firepower against ground and aerial targets. The pilot only has to look at the target and fire. Fire and forget anti-tank guided missiles with seven-km range make Rudra an ideal platform for ground support roles.

Rudra can carry four air-to-air missiles.

These are infrared guided fire and forget missiles with off axis bore sight capability. The pilot can engage the target using the helmet mounted sight or with the electro-optical pod, while manoeuvring.” The HAL brochure on the Rudra also adds, “State-of-theart sensors complement this tremendous firepower. Gyro-stabilised electro-optical sensors work on both visual and IR spectrum. Any type of target will be picked up and tracked at large distances, whether by day or by night. These targets can be handed over to the guided missiles or attacked with rockets and gun. The laser designator can designate the target for any compatible

Indian Military starts search for Tatra truck alternatives India’s armed forces are seeking alternative vehicles to install missile systems in the wake of an impending ban on the acquisition of Tatra all-terrain trucks. It was heard that military officials were analysing trucks proposed by Russian and Belarusian companies, including Volat trucks manufactured by MZKT. A meeting was held recently with all stakeholders under Director General (Acquisition) of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to discuss the proposals. Upon

>> Show Calendar 5-8 February International Armoured Vehicles 2013 FIVE, Farnborough, UK www.internationalarmouredvehicles.com

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25-27 February Military Radar Summit 2013 Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, DC, USA www.militaryradarsummit.com 18-20 March Electronic Warfare 2013 Washington, DC, USA www.electronicwarfaresummit.com 20-22 March Future Artillery 2013 Radisson Blu Portman, London, UK www.future-artillery.com

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SP’s Land Forces 1/2013

In an affirmation for the country’s missile programme, three top missile scientists were honoured this year by the Government with Padma awards. DRDO Chief Dr Vijay Kumar Dr V.K. Saraswat Saraswat, Scientific Adviser to Defence Minister and a scientist best known for his association with the successful Akash SAM programme, has been honoured with a Padma Bhushan. “It is DRDO that has got the award and it is a recognition of DRDOs contribution towards nation building,” said Dr Saraswat. Dr Sivathanu Pillai, DS & CCR&D and CEO BrahMos and Avinash Chander, Chief Control Research & Development (Missiles & Strategic Systems), are the other two eminent scientists of DRDO who have been honoured with Padma Bhushan and Padma Shri respectiv ely. The country’s missile programme has enjoyed an upswing since 2008, with several programmes coming to fruition and new technologies proving themselves.

Indian Army for UAV missile simulator The Indian Army is in the market for a mission simulator to train UAV crews in operating IAI Heron and Searcher Mk.2 surveillance UAVs. The Army has stipulated that the UAV mission simulator should be capable of conducting initial and refresher training of external pilot, internal pilot, mission commander and observer with a separate console available to the instructor.

The Army proposes to use the simulator for simulation of single, air data relay (ADR) mission scenario, maritime scenario, with or without satellite communication (SATCOM)

approval, the trucks will undergo comprehensive field trials and are also expected to be equipped with missiles systems in order to test their efficacy.

Bangladesh Army inducts Eurocopter AS365 N3+ Dauphin helicopters Two Eurocopter-built AS365 N3+ Dauphin multipurpose helicopters have formally entered service with the Bangladeshi Army during a ceremony at Station Headquarters Dhaka Cantonment, in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Representing the first Eurocopter-built rotorcraft to join the country’s Army Aviation fleet, the helicopters were delivered by Eurocopter South East Asia (ESEA) for use during UN humanitarian and VIP transport missions.

Ad hoc Army Aviation Group commander Brigadier General Abdullah Al Azhar said the helicopters would significantly improve the Army’s capabilities to actively participate in peacekeeping missions worldwide.

Boeing test flights unmanned little bird demonstrator aircraft Boeing has conducted autonomous test flight of its unmanned little bird (ULB) demonstrator aircraft at the Republic of Korea Army’s (ROKA) Aviation School in Nonsan, South Korea. As a modified version of the MD 530F single-turbine helicopter, the ULB was tested to check affordability of integration of unmanned aircraft technology into the ROKA’s MD 500 helicopters to boost operational capabilities of the fleet. Supported by Korea Air Aerospace Division, the

for single or multiple payloads, simulation of all phases of UAV mission as well as its payloads and to play prerecorded missions with annotations for analysis, training of internal pilot, external pilot, mission commander and observer in stand-alone mode and as coordinated crew of a mission, training on all types of UAV emergencies and to carry out student assessments.

India’s longest range missile ­debuts at Republic Day Parade

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) Anil Chopra Sr. Copy Editor & Correspondent Sucheta Das Mohapatra Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma

This Republic Day the Indian Government showcased the Agni-V, the country’s longest range nuclear ballistic missile, capable of hitting pretty much any target in China.

With a range of nearly 6,000 km and the capacity to deliver a 1.5-tonne nuclear warhead, the Agni-V was a head-turner at this year’s ceremonial parade on Rajpath.

Footage of the missile trundling down the VVIP avenue were flashed on Chinese state television stations, sparking almost as much interest as the missile did during its debut—and so far only—test-firing in April 2012. While the precise range of the missile remains classified, there has been speculation— including by Chinese thinktanks, that the Agni-V’s range could be in excess of 8,000 km. The Agni-V is likely to be tested once again this year before being officially handed over to the country’s Strategic Forces Command, currently headed

by Vice Admiral S.P.S. Cheema. As far as the Agni-V is concerned; future technologies will include multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and an improved navigation system. SP —SP’s Special Correspondent For complete versions log on to: www.spslandforces.net

demonstration lasted for approximately 25 minutes and successfully validated proven unmanned capabilities available for integration into rotorcraft to support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, resupply and other operations.

Selex’s Gabbiano T-20 radar flight tested on Hermes 450 UAS Selex Galileo’s Gabbiano T-20 radar has successfully demonstrated ground-mapping and target detection capabilities onboard an Elbit Systems’ Hermes 450 unmanned aircraft system (UAS). Conducted at an undisclosed location, the testing was designed to validate the radar’s high-resolution ground mapping, with both strip and spot synthetic aperture radar (SAR) modes, as well as ground moving target indicator (GMTI) capabilities. Groundbased moving targets were successfully detected by the radar at up to 40 nm, while also delivering high quality digital images of the terrain below, during the testing.

BAE Phoenix networking radios validated by US Army The US Army has validated the tactical networking capabilities of BAE Systems-built Phoenix-2C networking radios during exercises recently concluded at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, US. The radios were successful in doubling the Army’s mid-tier network requirement by facilitating communication between soldiers over a 20-km range during testing, which was conducted earlier this month. SP

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SRSAM SYSTEM TOR-M2KM WITH ITS MODULAR COMBAT AND SUPPORT VEHICLES

Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant KUPOL, JSC, being part of the ALMAZ-ANTEY Air Defense Concern, unveils its new surface-to-air missile system Tor-M2KM, which differs from the widely known SAM systems Tor-M2K and Tor-M2E in a modular design of the combat and support vehicles.

SRSAM system Tor-M2KM with its modular combat and support vehicles is designed for air defence of vital public facilities. It is very reliable and effective against high maneuvering targets, guided and gliding areal bombs, anti-radar and cruise missiles, UAVs, aircraft and helicopters within the SRASAM engagement area day and night under adverse weather and countermeasures environment.

Independent combat module (ICM) of the SRSAM system is an autonomous missile launcher which incorporates radar and optical facilities, special equipment, surface-to-air missiles, primary and backup power supply sources and crew. A shelter with unified mount adapters has been specially designed for the ICM, allowing its arrangement on truck, semi-trailer, trailer or other platforms of appropriate load-carrying capacity.

ICMs mounted on various platforms can significantly expand application range and scope of missions carried out by the SRSAM system, besides modular design results in substantial reduction of operational costs.

Being deployed on various platforms SRSAM system Tor-M2KM is capable of accomplishing AD missions of Land Forces, Air Forces and Navy, protecting vital strategic military and civilian facilities against air attack.

Due to modular design, the ICM can be slingloaded beneath a helicopter MI-26T or its analogs.

Helicopter-transported ICM can be deployed in very hard-to-reach places, for example, in mountains and roofs of buildings.

Tor-M2KM is the first system to fully meet air defence needs of the big cities (megalopolises).

The system is fitted with up-to-date computers and radars, making it possible to destroy four aerial targets simultaneously.

Combat operation of the SRSAM system Tor-M2KM is fully automated, operator only needs to select a target to hit from the list given by computer and then press Start button. Surface-to-air missile is guided to the selected target automatically, and SAM warhead blows up in a target impact point. The missile carries irregular shape fragmentations made of special tungsten-nickel-iron alloy, providing high non-ricocheting penetrating efficiency of fragmentations. Radio fuse adaptation to the air target type along with special missile munitions make the system very effective against all types of targets.

Independent combat module provides transportation, storage and launch of four surface-to-air missiles.

Transporter/loader module can be mounted on the automobile chassis similar to the ICM chassis.

ICM is fitted with power supply source ensuring its autonomous operation in any weather conditions irrespective of the platform the ICM is placed on. The ICM has also a backup power source allowing ICM (if deployed without platform) to operate from commercial

network or any mobile power plant generating voltage of 220V 50Hz and power of not less than 80 kW. Maintenance tools and spare parts for the SRSAM system are placed in the unified shelters which can be mounted on any trucks, semi-trailers and trailers.

The maximum weight of the loaded ICM does not exceed 15 tons.

The combat crew is 2 men.

SRSAM system Tor-M2KM can successfully accomplish AD missions both independently and as part of various AD units, and be integrated with Russian and foreign AD systems.

Over 50 years Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant KUPOL, JSC has been manufacturing high quality surface-to-air missile systems. High technologies, skilled personnel and many years’ experience in production and modernization of the military equipment make the company successful in the foreign and domestic markets.

Through creation of air defense missile systems for today’s and tomorrow’s army KUPOL company upholds its reputation as a Russian high-grade weapon manufacturer.

Air Defense Concern ALMAZ-ANTEY, JSC 41 Vereyskaya str., 121471, Moscow Tel.: (495) 276-29-65, fax: (495) 276-29-69 E-mail: antey@almaz-antey.ru

Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant KUPOL, JSC 3 Pesochnaya str., 426033, Izhevsk Tel.: (3412) 90-3211; fax: (3412) 72-6819 E-mail: iemz@kupol.ru

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