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August-September 2015

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Volume 12 No. 4


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The ONLY magazine in Asia-Pacific dedicated to Land Forces

>> Cover story

In This Issue

photograph: Indian Army

Page 5 Capture of Haji Pir – Crowning Glory of 1965 War

The capture of Haji Pir by 1 Para (now Special Forces) during the 1965 Indo-Pak War was a great setback to Pakistan’s morale, particularly her army. Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) Page 6 Equipping Infantry and SF Units – Current Weaknesses For our policy planners, an essential basic that must be kept in mind is the level of sophistication that the terrorists and insurgents have achieved and likely to advance to in times to come. Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) Page 8 Drone Terrorism Today’s conflict situations are more and more at the sub-conventional level witnessing more and more employment of irregular forces, and consequent use of drones against such forces. Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) Page 9 China’s White Paper on National Military Strategy At the global level China is concerned about the US which is carrying on its ‘rebalancing’ strategy and is enhancing its military presence and its military alliances in this region. Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd) Page 10 DSEI 2015 – Continued Focus on Air, Land, Naval and Security DSEI is acknowledged internationally as the market leading exhibition for land, sea and air applications of defence and security products, technology and services. R. Chandrakanth Plus One Rank One Pension Imbroglio Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd)


The Manipur Ambush – and Beyond Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)


News in Brief


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Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri flanked by Lt General Dunn and Major General Sparrow on a tank in the Sialkot sector

An Overview of 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict Strategic and Operational Insights Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri wanted to ensure that the world understood that the conflict was started by Pakistan and wanted a ceasefire without conditions 4/2015   SP’s Land Forces



>> Cover Story

Till recently there was no public document which articulated China’s ‘Grand Strategy’ or national strategy though China’s military strategists define grand/national strategy as the “overall strategy of a nation or an alliance of nations in which they use overall national strength to achieve national political goals, especially those related to national security and development”. For the first time China has articulated its national military strategy in the White Paper published in May 2015. However, to

understand their national military strategy one has to look at their economic development from the global economic perspective. From this perspective China’s rise has brought both opportunities and challenges. But from the military perspective China’s rise is seen by Asian nations as well as major powers of the world as potential challenge / threat. This has resulted in conceptualising ‘China’s Threat’ which has led the Chinese leadership to re-evaluate its strategy and modify its geopolitical approach to achieving its aim of ‘comprehensive national power’ in order to recover its longed for geopolitical pre-eminence. The new objective of its national strategy would be to ensure the continued growth of its power by affirming their permanently peaceful intentions, emphasise on good neighbourly policies designed to wean states away from coalitions, use their

growing strength as leverage to increase dependency on the part of potential rivals and neutrals, present China’s arrival on the global stage as a developing great power to forge friendly relations with far-flung states, secure stable access to natural resources critical to its uninterrupted growth, export Chinese culture to show its legitimacy and ‘soft power’, and express willingness to appease the reigning hegemony, the United States, until she can cope with American power independently. The doctrine of ‘Peaceful Rise’ advanced by China since 2003 asserts that as compared to the warlike behaviour of previous rising powers, China’s ascendancy will be entirely peaceful. It is an antidote to the fears of a ‘China threat’. We must read their well articulated white paper on national military strategy in this backdrop to understand their overall mili-

tary concepts and intentions. An article explaining the essentials of their White Paper on National Military Strategy is included in this issue of SP’s Land Forces. The past two months have also been full of activity in the defence procurement/modernisation field, though a very late response to an area which was so badly neglected by the UPA I and II regimes that it will take many years to undo the harm done by the previous regime. Some of the issues which have picked up pace include the fitting of integrated fire control systems in the T-72 tanks, the acceptance of the procurement of 145 ultra light howitzers 155mm from US BAE Systems, in a government-to-government deal; progress by the Ordnance Factories Board to produce a 45-calibre 155mm howitzer called Dhanush; the acquisition of 814 truck-mounted 155mm howitzers, which has been approved

photographs: Indian Army

 LT General Tejinder Singh Shergill (Retd)


ndia’s defeat in 1962 encouraged the Pakistani troika comprising Field Marshal Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Foreign Minister and General Muhammad Musa the Commander in Chief, to perceive that Indians were not fighters. Field Marshal Ayub Khan had stated that one Pakistani soldier was equal to three Indian soldiers. The troika were convinced that once the new military hardware was received from the United States as members of SEATO and CENTO, and was absorbed by its armed forces, Jammu and Kashmir could be wrested from India. They also appreciated that in addition if an important city like Amritsar were captured by the Pakistani Army, India would have to agree to the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. Moreover Pakistan saw China as an ally who could be counted upon for their devious plans against India. From 1954 to 1963, Pakistan received a variety of armament from the US for its army, navy and air force. The army received 650 Patton, M 36B2 Tank Busters, Chaffee and Walker Bulldog tanks, 200 M113 Armoured Protected Carriers (APCs), 105mm and 155mm artillery guns, anti-tank recoilless rifles (RCLs) and Cobra anti-tank missiles and a large quantity of small arms and machine

The Pakistani troika were aware that with modernised armed forces Pakistan was in a militarily strong position to defeat India particularly since India was in a precarious position on the subcontinent with a Chinese threat to the north and Pakistani threats from east and west


SP’s Land Forces   4/2015

by the government recently, will be undertaken under the ‘Buy & Make (Indian)’ category with transfer of technology (ToT). However while some positives are discernible, action is pending in virtually every arm of the army for replacements of outdated and obsolescent weapons and equipment. Coinciding with the Golden Jubilee of 1965 war, the cover story of this issue is ‘An Overview of 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict’ providing an overview of the strategic and operational objectives of India during the war. We also have a special feature on the Capture of Haji Pir Pass, considered to be the crowning glory of 1965 war.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

new equipment was far superior to Indian artillery both in range and firepower. The firepower with Pakistani infantry was also much greater than that in the Indian infantry unit. In the air, the Pakistani F-104 Starfighter and F-86 Sabre Jet outclassed Indian combat aircraft. Pakistan by modernising its armed forces had achieved technical and organisational superiority and surprise. Pakistan knew Indian military weaknesses and Bhutto who had visited China assured the President of Pakistan and its Commander in Chief that in the event of a conflict in the subcontinent, China would ensure that India would be unable to move forces from the eastern theatre. However, there was still a need to test the mettle of Indian Army and India’s will before moving on to Kashmir and a wider contest of arms.

Pakistan Launches Operation Desert Hawk in Kutch

(Clockwise from Top Left) Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan with jawans, Lt Col A.B. Tarapore, PVC, captured weapons in Lahore Sector, Patton tanks destroyed in battle of Asal Uttar

guns of various types. The air force was equipped with two B-57 bomber squadrons, one F-104 supersonic squadron, nine F-86 Sabre jet squadrons, one C-130 transport squadron, six other squadrons of various aircraft, 30 helicopters, Falcon Sidewinder missiles and many types of bombs and rockets. The navy was modernised with one cruiser, five destroyers, eight minesweepers, one water tanker, one submarine and three tugs. All these weapon systems were front line equipment of NATO forces and to ensure interoperability, the Pakistani armed forces were suitably trained. Following its defeat in Indo-China conflict of 1962, India expanded its defence budget from `300 crore in 1962 to over `800 crore in 1965. Most of this defence expenditure went towards raising additional mountain divisions to face a threat from China. It needs to be remembered that the defeat in NEFA in 1962 involved only 4 Infantry Division in the Kameng Division of NEFA and one infantry brigade further east at Walong in the Lohit Division. The Indian Army had given a good

account of itself in Ladakh and along the Indo-Tibet border. The major weapon systems of India were mainly those that had been employed during World War II. For the land battle the Pakistani M 47 and M 48 Patton tanks completely outclassed our main battle tank, the Centurion Mk VII, in mobility, firepower and protection, at least in theory. Pakistan Army (GHQ) taking a calculated risk by not keeping any tanks as war wastage reserves, raised eight pure Patton regiments and three mixed regiments in which there was one squadron out of three of M 36B2 Tank destroyers. The M 36B2 had the same gun as the Patton tank and cleverly, the GHQ, had installed the Patton gun on their Sherman Mk II fleet creating four armoured regiments called Tank Delivery Units that were essentially armour available to its infantry divisions. Pakistani Patton tanks, M 36B2 and Sherman II upgunned tanks could destroy any known Indian tank whereas India had only four Centurion Mk VII regiments that could compete against Pakistani armoured regiments. The Pakistani artillery with its

On April 9, 1965, Pakistani 51 Infantry Brigade with 24 Cavalry (Patton tanks), crossed the international border in the Kutch area by arrogantly claiming that India was in occupation of Pakistani territory! To the Pakistani higher command, the Indian reaction by its Kilo Sector to the intrusion in Kutch seemed to prove that India was on the defensive. Air Chief Marshal Asghar Khan of Pakistan surprisingly called his counterpart in India, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh and suggested that air forces of the two countries should not contribute to the escalation of the situation. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was informed about the message from Pakistan and on asking Arjan Singh his views, was told by the Chief of Air Staff that air forces of both countries should not be employed. General J.N. Chaudhuri, Chief of Army Staff, suggested that the Kutch area was not suitable for large scale employment of forces and it would suit India not to escalate the conflict there. If required, India could escalate war at a place of own choosing.

Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar – Infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir The Kutch operation was actually the first phase of Pakistani strategy while the second phase had already started in tandem. Pakistan believed that there was considerable unrest against India amongst the population in Kashmir and all that was required was a spark to set off a conflagration and Kashmir would fall to Pakistan. A ‘Gibraltar Force’ was raised by Pakistan for infiltration into

Cover Story >> photographs: Indian Army

Pakistan by modernising its armed forces had achieved technical and organisational superiority and surprise Kashmir and Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, General Officer Commanding 12 Infantry Division, a follower of the Ahmadiya Muslim sect, was named commander of this force. On May 26, 1965, four centres were opened in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) to train the force in guerrilla operations. The entire force of 30,000 was organised into eight sub-forces with five companies each that had 110 men in a company. Pakistani Army brigadiers commanded each sub-force while its officers commanded companies and Junior Commissioned Officers and Non Commissioned officers provided the stiffening in lower commands. On August 1, 1965, Major General Malik received the ‘go-ahead’ from the GHQ and on August 5, armed infiltrators crossed the ceasefire line (CFL) between Jammu and Kargil into Jammu and Kashmir.

Counter Offensives Planned by the Indian Army At the start of the conflict in Kutch, the Indian Army had moved to the western border against Pakistan under Operation Ablaze. The army remained in place even after the IndoPak agreement of Kutch and plans were made for the different contingencies that might arise if there were a conflict with Pakistan. In April

by the government. It is only on May 15, 1965, that General J.N. Chaudhuri stated the objectives of XI Corps. These were: to protect Indian territory from Pakistani aggression and occupation, to pose a threat to Lahore by securing the Ichogil Canal and destruction of enemy forces, particularly his newly acquired armour. No part of these objectives called for the capture of Lahore however the destruction of enemy forces was an imperative. The objectives of the new I Corps involved crossing the International Border between the Road Jammu-Sialkot and Basantar River and secure a bridgehead in Area Pagowal (Bhagowal)-Phillora-Cross Roads with a view to advancing towards Marala Ravi Link Canal and eventually to the line of Dhalewali-Wuhilam-Daska-Mandhali. However the destruction of enemy forces remained a constant. The Western Army Commander’s plan for a launch of the I Corps across Ravi River into Pakistan was not accepted and neither was he called for a conference to Army Headquarters when the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) decided the objectives for I Corps. This created a breach between the COAS and the Western Army Commander. This wound continued to fester to the disadvantage of I Corps throughout the war. (Clockwise from Top Left) Destroyed Patton tank in battle of Phillora, Indian troops on Ichogil Canal, Lt General Harbaksh Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command in 1965 War, INS Vikrant

1965 the Indian Army created a new formation, I Corps, that was to be a strike corps to operate in the plains, a concept new to the subcontinent. I Corps was to carry out swift, flexible and devastating operations into Pakistan however the means to do so were limited. 1 Armoured Division was the only formation

capable of carrying out mobile operations whereas India’s infantry divisions that were to be part of this Corps did not have matching mobility. At this stage there were no higher directions of war issued by the government to its armed forces. Thus army and theatre plans emerged as the war objectives were defined

Pakistan’s Operation Grand Slam and Indian Reactions On launching Operation Gibraltar on August 5, Pakistan had hoped for the benefit of surprise but a shepherd in Gulmarg reported strange people in the area and very soon an Indian Army response was set in motion. To the astonishment of Pakistan the peoples of Kashmir did not welcome the infiltrators and rather gave them up to the Indian Army.

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To stem the influx of infiltrators the Indian Army felt free to also step over the CFL and plug the routes of infiltration. With the capture of the Haji Pir pass on August 29, a link up was effected between Uri and Poonch. It was evident to Pakistan that Operation Gibraltar was a failure and a large number of troops of Gibraltar Force were trapped in Kashmir. Pakistani high command felt the only expedient available was to launch an immediate attack into the Chhamb Sector with the object of capturing Akhnoor and then Jammu and hoping that since the attack was in Jammu and Kashmir, India would react only in that state and not across the International Boundary (IB) elsewhere. Should India react across the IB, Pakistan GHQ had plans for attacks by 6 Armoured Division and 15 Infantry Division towards Jammu, Samba and Sialkot; and 11 Infantry Division and 1 Armoured Division to encircle the city of Amritsar through Khem Karan by capturing Harike and the Beas River Bridge. This was named Operation Grand Slam. Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik of 12 Infantry Division was given the task of attack in Chhamb Sector in addition to the actions of Gibraltar Force. With troops hastily given to him from 6 Armoured Division and 7 Infantry Division and some from his own division, he attacked across the CFL and parts of the International Boundary, into the Chhamb Sector, on the morning of September 1, 1965. The initiative having been seized by Pakistan, India could only react. The COAS was in Srinagar when the attack was reported to him and he immediately informed the Prime Minister. On landing at Delhi the same afternoon, the COAS went to meet the Prime Minister and requested for the air force to intervene in Chhamb and by 1719 hours the air force went into action there. On September 2, the Prime Minister met the COAS and it was decided that in order to defend Kashmir it was essential to make a diversionary attack on West Pakistan which would force the Pakistanis to give up their venture in Kashmir and defend their own territories. The same evening a conference was held at Army Headquarters chaired by the COAS and attended by Lt General Harbaksh Singh, VrC, the Western Army Commander, Lt General P.O. Dunn, General Officer Commanding I Corps, Major General Rajindar Singh ‘Sparrow,’ MVC and staff officers and a provisional date for the offensive was set for September 4/5, 1965. On September 3, 1965, the Prime Minister called a meeting with Y.B. Chavan, the Minister of Defence, General J.N. Chaudhuri and Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh and the following war objectives formulated: to defend against Pakistan’s attempts to grab Kashmir by force and to make it abundantly clear that Pakistan would never be allowed to wrest Kashmir from India; to destroy the offensive power of Pakistan’s armed forces and to occupy only minimum Pakistani territory, necessary to achieve these purposes which would be vacated after a satisfactory conclusion of the war. The Indian Navy was not to take part in the conflict and keep within the 200 mile limit from the Indian coast. The war objectives were a reaction to Pakistani offensive in Chhamb Sector, and were designed to force the Pakistan Army to pull out forces from that sector to meet Indian threats elsewhere. The Pakistani offensive in Chhamb Sector was halted along Fatwal Ridge on September 5, both by narrowing of terrain between the hills and Chenab River; and the dogged defence by 28 Infantry brigade.

Indian Army’s 11 Corps Counteroffensive in Punjab The strategy in XI Corps Zone was to advance after last light from Ambala, Ferozepur and Amritsar, on axes Amritsar-Dograi-Lahore with 15 Infantry Division, Bhikkiwind-BarkiLahore with 7 Infantry Division and Khem Karan-Kasur-Lahore with 4 Mountain Division, secure the line of Ichhogil Canal by last


SP’s Land Forces   4/2015

XI Corps Zone and repeated requests by GOC 1 Armoured Division and GOC 1 Corps for move of additional armour to Sialkot Sector failed to elicit a response by Western Command. By September 23, 1 Armoured Division had destroyed 162 enemy tanks and I Corps had captured 200 square miles of Pakistani territory. Had the Western Command agreed to the move of 2 Independent Armoured Brigade to Sialkot Sector, the progress of Indian offensive could have brought Pakistan to its knees.

Building World Opinion

Army Chief J.N. Chaudhuri with Lt Col Desmond Hayde, MVC at Ichhogil Canal after its capture

light on September 6. 4 Mountain Division was to move the longest distance, into sector predicted to be the sector of the launch of Pakistani offensive but had only six battalions and a mountain artillery brigade that did not have the punch of artillery in other sectors. 7 Infantry Division advanced steadily on the central axis and by 2030 hours on September 10, captured Barki on the Ichhogil Canal. 15 Infantry Division advanced on the northern axis and after an initial success of reaching the Ichhogil Canal with some troops across it on September 6, had to fall back and it was only on September 22 that Dograi was captured and the east bank of the Ichhogil secured. On the southern axis, there was some success towards Kasur on the Rohi Nallah short of the Ichhogil Canal and at Theh Pannuan however a counterattack by 11 Infantry Division of Pakistan forced the division back to the Chima-Assal Uttar area where it went into defence. Pakistan 11 Infantry Division and parts of 1 Armoured Division launched a series of attacks on 4 Division and 9 Horse at Chima-Assal Uttar between September 8 and 10. Indian 2 Independent Armoured Brigade arrived in sector by the evening of September 8 and 3 Cavalry equipped with Centurion Mk VII tanks changed the balance of forces in favour of India. In a brilliant offensive-defensive battle by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, 9 Horse and the pivot of 4 Mountain Division defences at Chima-Assal Uttar, all attacks by Paki-

The Western Army Commander’s plan for a launch of the I Corps across Ravi River into Pakistan was not accepted and neither was he called for a conference to Army Headquarters when the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) decided the objectives for I Corps. This created a breach between the COAS and the Western Army Commander.

stani forces were defeated with a loss of 97 tanks of which most were Patton tanks. With a major victory by Indian 1 Armoured Division at Phillora on September 11 in the Sialkot Sector, Pakistan pulled out 1 Armoured Division from Khem Karan and sent it to Sialkot Sector. Henceforth there was no armour threat to the XI Corps Zone.

Indian Army’s 1 Corps Counteroffensive in Sialkot Sector I Corps began its advance into the Rachna Doab—the area between the Ravi and Chenab Rivers—on September 8 by when unknown to our formations, the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division had moved into the sector and placed a strong combat command of two Patton regiments and one motorised battalion 45 minutes away from Phillora, the main objective of 1 Armoured Division. 26 Infantry Division of the corps that had been tasked to contain Sialkot successfully established bridgeheads on two axes to Sialkot by the morning of September 8. Two brigades of 6 Mountain Division established bridgeheads for 1 Armoured Division that broke out from one of them at Charwa at first light on September 8. Post monsoon the area was thick with sugarcane, paddy and maize fields and the soil was soft making the ‘going’ for tanks tricky. 16 Cavalry advanced too rapidly and came to a meeting engagement with two Patton squadrons and suffered casualties. 17 (Poona) Horse also contacted a squadron of Patton tanks. The brigade commander decided not to continue frontal attacks that day and the division commander, taking over the battle, felt reconnaissance was essential to make a plan to get to the flank of the enemy and destroy him. Having made a plan, the division commander decided to keep no reserves and attack with three Centurion regiments simultaneously from a flank on September 11, to destroy the enemy and capture Phillora. Although there were two Sherman tank regiments also in the division, they could not be employed in an offensive against Patton tanks. The attack on Phillora was launched on September 11. By 1130 hours 11 Cavalry Patton tanks were decimated; there followed a counter attack by 10 Cavalry (Guides) Patton tanks and this was severely mauled. By 1530 hours Phillora was captured and 51 Patton and M 36B2 tanks had been destroyed. The myth of the superiority of Patton tanks had been shattered by the courage and professionalism of tank crews of 1 Armoured Division. Pakistan now realised that the strategic centre of gravity had shifted to the northern plains of Pakistan with the threat to Sialkot. At this stage there was no credible threat to

While the battles were going on the Prime Minister was engaged in building world opinion in the favour of India and accepting a ceasefire only if it suited the war objectives of India. He sent a governmental team headed by M.C. Chagla to the United Nations in New York. Simultaneously he hosted the visit of U. Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, on September 7. The Prime Minister wanted to ensure that the world understood that the conflict was started by Pakistan by launching first Operation Gibraltar and then Operation Grand Slam. He also wanted a ceasefire without conditions that Pakistan wanted by including a resolution of the Kashmir issue. It was through his patience, intelligence and perseverance that dates to ceasefire kept shifting from September 14 to September 16 and then finally, without pre-conditions, to 2200 hours GMT on September 22 corresponding to 0300 hours on September 23 in India and 0330 hours in Pakistan.

India Administers a Defeat Historically the Indo-Pak War of 1965 was started by Pakistan on April 9, 1965, Pakistan launched the attack in Kutch to test the mettle of Indian forces. Even while Kutch agreement talks were in process, Pakistan was training 30,000 infiltrators led by personnel from the Pakistani Army to infiltrate into Jammu and Kashmir. On the failure of Operation Gibraltar, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam to capture Akhnoor and Jammu. The Prime Minister took an enormous decision fraught by risk, to open a second front in West Pakistan that Lt General Harbaksh Singh later termed, “the biggest decision by the smallest man!” The plan of XI Corps to secure the line of Ichhogil Canal relying only on surprise and without establishing adequate firm bases was faulty, as was the staggered launch of I Corps later on September 8 after strategic surprise was lost. With 4 Mountain Division digging in its heels at Chima-Assal Uttar and 2 Independent Armoured Brigade with 3 Cavalry and 9 Horse executing an armour offensivedefensive battle, 97 tanks of Pakistani 1 Armoured Division were destroyed. The very next day, on September 11, 1 Armoured Division won a classic armour battle of manoeuvre at Phillora that changed the centre of gravity of the whole campaign. With no credible armour threat to XI Corps Zone, the Western Command should have shifted maximum of armour into the Sialkot Sector to secure a strategic victory there. Considering the war objectives given by the Prime Minister and despite lack of modern weaponry as compared to Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir remained secure and many sensitive areas captured across the CFL, Pakistani offensive capability was crushed, and minimum territory was captured. Thus all war objectives were met. India and its armed forces had risen to unprovoked aggression by Pakistan and administered a defeat to Pakistani arms.  SP The author took part in 1965 war as a troop leader of 9 Horse (The Deccan Horse) in the Khem Karan Sector. He with Amarinder Singh, the former Chief Minister of Punjab, have written a book on 1965 war which is to be released on September 20, 2015.

Special Feature >>

Capture of Haji Pir – Crowning Glory of 1965 War The capture of Haji Pir by 1 Para (now Special Forces) during the 1965 Indo-Pak War was a great setback to Pakistan’s morale, particularly her army photograph: Indian Army

  Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)


hough many heroic battles were fought by Indian troops during 1947-48 Indo-Pak War hastily inducted into Jammu & Kashmir, no other action by Pakistan hurt India so much strategically and economically than the capture of the Haji Pir. The fact that Pakistan was able to hold on to 78,114 sq km of the state of J&K with her subconventional experiment set the course for future blueprint against India. In 1964 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, visited Pakistan and suggest to President Ayub Khan that Pakistan should prepare for prolonged conflict with India instead of short-term wars, and raise a militia force to act behind enemy Indian lines. In such backdrop, the capture of the Haji Pir by 1 PARA (now 1 PARA (Special Forces)) during the 1965 Indo-Pak War was great setback to Pakistan’s morale, particularly her army. The Golden Jubilee of capture of Haji Pir was on August 28, 2015.

Strategic Importance of Haji Pir Haji Pir Pass, at a height of 2,637 metres, is located on the western fringe of the Pir Panjal Range, which divides the Srinagar Valley from Jammu region. Through this Pass a wide, metalled highway connected Srinagar to Jammu via Uri-Ponch–Rajouri, over which bulk of passenger and trade traffic used to ply to and fro. This road is of strategic importance as it connects Uri with Ponch but since major portion of road is in Pakistanoccupied Kashmir (PoK), it cannot be used. Trained Pakistani militants have been sneaking into Kashmir Valley, Ponch and Rajouri districts through this avenue. One of the most pressing operational objectives of the Northern Command, if India were to enter into a conventional battle with Pakistan, would be the strategic pass of Haji Pir which severes the Ponch-Uri route and can provide access to much of PoK.

Pakistan’s Gibraltar Force and Op ‘Grand Slam’ History repeated itself in J&K in 1965 when Pakistani regulars along with Lashkars and Mujahids again infiltrated into the state. Ayub Khan had created a climate of overconfidence that India could be dislodged from J&K through guerrilla operations. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister, assessed that once trained Pakistani soldiers entered Kashmir, people of the Valley would rise in revolt while fear of China would prevent India from provoking all out war. So the plan was drawn up for Operation ‘Gibraltar’. Interestingly, Ayub Khan while approving Op ‘Gibraltar’ wrote, “As a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of blows delivered at the right time and place. Such opportunities should, therefore, be sought and exploited.” The task assigned to Gibraltar force was warfare in enemy’s rear with a view to create conditions of armed insurrection leading to liberation of Kashmir or at least parts of it. Additionally, Ayub wanted 12 Division to capture Akhnur under codename Op ‘Grand Slam’ because Akhnur had a single Class 18 bridge on the fast flowing Chenab River which was the key to Indian communications from

Haji Pir Pass

Jammu and a group of valleys lying south of the Pir Panjal Range and West of Chenab River, the bridge being the lifeline of Indian forces defending Ponch, Rajouri, Jhangar, Naushera and Chhamb-Dewa.

War Breaks Out Gibraltor Force commenced infiltration in early August 1965 with five subdivisions tasked for specific areas; Srinagar Valley; Mendhar-Rajouri area; Dras-Kargil area; Naushera-Sundarbani and; BandipuraSonarwain. The Salahuddin Force for Kashmir Valley had separate task forces specifically tasked for Qazinag-Naugam, Tithwal-Tangdhar, Gurais and Kel-Minimarg. Each of these task forces was commanded by Captain level officers of the SSG or Pakistani Army. Chhamb, Naushera and Rajouri were subjected to artillery fire to support infiltration. On August 19, Pakistani guns moved close to the ceasefire line (CFL) and began shelling Indian positions near Tithwal, Uri and Ponch. India’s response was quick capturing areas up to Kishenganga River in Tithwal Sector; Rishmar Ridge, Pir Sahiba feature, Sunjoi feature, Ring Contour overlooking Mirpur bridge and then Point 9013 giving our troops complete domination of the Mirpur area right up to the bridge at Jura on River Kishenganga cuting off the routes for further infiltration into the Gurez

The task assigned to Gibraltar force was warfare in enemy’s rear with a view to create conditions of armed insurrection leading to liberation of Kashmir or at least parts of it

Valley and Tithwal Sector. Simultaneously, Point 13620 was captured in Kargil Sector. Next was the capture of Haji Pir Pass.

Battle of Haji Pir Haji Pir Pass was dominated by three neighbouring hill features; on the East by Bedori (3,760 m), on the West by Sank (2,895 metres) and Ledwali Gali (3,140 m) to the South-West. It was considered essential to seize these posts before proceeding to the Haji Pir Pass (2,673 m). Bedori was situated 14 km south-east of the CFL and Haji Pir Pass 10 km south-west of Bedori. It was apparent that capture of the Haji Pir Pass would necessitate large-scale pincer movement capturing these features without giving time to the enemy to regroup and bring reinforcements; one thrust along general axis Uri-Haji Pir Pass, in combination with second thrust from the South via the PonchKahuta approach. It was appreciated that the link-up between these forces would cut off all routes of approach into the crucial area of the Haji Pir Bulge. The responsibility for the northern thrust along axis Uri-Haji Pir Pass was given to 19 Infantry Division with 68 Infantry Brigade under command for this task, latter built up to five infantry battalions; 1 Para, 19 Punjab, 4 Rajput, 6 Jak Rif and 4 Sikh Li. The Brigade had five artillery fire units. 68 Infantry Brigade operation was codenamed Op ‘Bakshi’ after the name of the Brigade Commander, Brig (later Lt General) Z.C. Bakshi. The southern thrust along axis Ponch-Kahuta approach was assigned to 25 Infantry Division with 93 Infantry Brigade to undertake the operation under codename Op ‘Faulad’. Brigadier Bakshi assessed enemy opposition totalling some three-and-a-half battalions in well prepared defences having coordinated MMGs and LMGs. He decided on a two-pronged simultaneous attack; left prong along Uri-Sank-Ledwali Gali-Haji Pir Pass and right prong along Uri-Bedori-Kuthnar Di Gali-Kiran-Haji Pir Pass. The operations of

the left and right prongs were entrusted to 1 Para and 19 Punjab respectively. The entire operation was planned in three phases with H Hour as 2200 hours on August 24. In Phase 1, 19 Punjab was to capture Ring Contour and Pathra by 0100 hours on August 25, while 1 Para was to capture Sank Ridge upto Ledwali Gali and Sawan Pathri by 0500 hours on August 25. In Phase 2, 19 Punjab was to capture Bedori and Kuthnar Di Gali by 0600 hours on August 25, while securing the ring contours and capturing Haji Pir Pass was to be undertaken by 4 Rajput by 1200 hours on August 25. Phase 3 required mopping up of the area by 19 Punjab with under command one company of 4 Rajput. 4 Sikh Li and 6 Jak Rif were to provide troops for the fire bases for the operation and 6 Jak Rif was also tasked to hold captured territory. The time schedule for Op ‘Bakshi’ was delayed by 24 hours due to bad weather and relief of attacking troops. Tasking 4 Rajput was changed to move behind 19 Punjab along the right prong instead of the original plan to move behind 1 Para in the left prong. 1 Para under Lt Colonel Prabhjinder Singh, was to attack along the left prong to capture three intermediate features namely Sank (also known as Point 9591), Sar and Ledwali Gali, while 19 Punjab was to advance along the left flank and capture Bedori, the prominent feature east of Haji Pir Pass. Once the latter was taken, 4 Rajput was to pass through and make for the final objective, of Haji Pir Pass while 6 Jak Rif was to hold captured territory. The operation commenced at 2150 hours on August 25 on schedule as per the new plan preceded by shelling enemy positions. 1 Para launched the pre-dawn attack on Sank Ridge with two company strength reaching the base of Sank but the approach to the ridge was very difficult and the heavy rains of the previous night had made it very slippery. The progress became very slow because of which the attack got daylighted. Sank stood on the enemy’s axis of communications from Bagh to Bedori and was held by a Company of Rangers supported by mortars. The enemy held fire till the leading troops reached within 45 metres of the perimeter fencing and then opened up with all his weapons. The battle continued close to the fenced trenches of the enemy till 0930 hours when the effort was called off. The second attack by 1 Para was pressed home at 2230 hours on August 26. ‘B’ Company led by Major (later Lt General) Ranjit Singh Dyal charged up the slopes of Sank followed by ‘D’ Company, supported by artillery fire. Enemy troops rushed forward from their trenches and opened fire with MMGs, LMGs and other small arms but effective fire from the attackers forced the enemy to fall back to his trenches. By 0430 hours on August 27, ‘B’ Company had reached within 450 metres of the enemy positions, where they formed up in front of the enemy positions at Sank and charged frontally. In a daring platoon attack, enemy MMGs and LMGs were silenced as closing up troops showered enemy emplacements with grenades and bullets. The enemy withdrew to Sar and Ledwali Gali features leaving 16 dead but managed to evacuate about Continued on page 11...

4/2015   SP’s Land Forces


>> Modernisation

Equipping Infantry and SF Units – Current Weaknesses For our policy planners, an essential basic that must be kept in mind is the level of sophistication that the terrorists and insurgents have achieved and likely to advance to in times to come   Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)


ndia has been subjected to proxy war for past three decades by Pakistan. China has actively supported not only of Pakistan’s anti-India activities, but actively supports insurgencies in our North East, as well as helps the Maoists. The foot soldier has been bearing the brunt of this sub-conventional conflict, countering insurgencies and terrorism with infantry in the forefront. Despite this, the modernization of the infantry has been grossly neglected. That we have not even been able to give the infantry soldiers with appropriate small arms, protection against small arms fire, night vision etc is indeed a matter of shame.

Infantry For our policy planners, an essential basic that must be kept in mind is the level of sophistication that the terrorists and insurgents have achieved and likely to advance to in times to come. This aspect is obviously skipped, one example being that while infiltrating Pakistani terrorists are equipped with GPS devices but in our case even Special Forces units are deficient of GPS. A lackadaisical approach to equip the infantryman has a direct bearing on overall combat efficiency in coping with threats to our national security, and in terms of avoidable loss of lives. Irregular forces having emerged with greater strategic value over the past decade plus, our infantry must be prepared to cope with expanding terrorism, asymmetric and fourth generation wars simultaneous to short, intense, high-tech wars. For the foot soldier, the most important object is his personal weapon. In this context, the quest of the Indian Army for a state-of-the-art assault rifle has been long and continuing. The four-year hunt for a new generation assault rifle has got extended as the global tender floated in 2011 for new generation assault rifles with interchangeable barrels for conventional warfare and counter-insurgency operations has been scrapped. Provision of a new generation assault rifles for the 382 infantry battalions had been termed ‘Priority I’ project to address the festering neglect of the infantry and the void of a state-of-theart assault rifle. Foreign firms like Colt (US), Beretta (Italy), Sig Sauer (Europe), Ceska (Czech) and Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) had participated in the trials for the doublebarrel rifles; 5.56 x 45mm primary barrel for conventional warfare and 7.62 x 39mm secondary barrel for counter-terror operations. At the time of floating the tender in 2011, much was said about why an assault rifle with interchangeable barrels was being sought but this obviously was a conscience decision taken by the Army, which had approval of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The plan was to go for direct acquisition of 65,000 of these new generation assault rifles at an estimated cost of around `4,850 crore, to equip the 120 infantry battalions deployed on the western and eastern fronts. The Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) was to then subsequently manufacture over 1,13,000 such rifles after getting transfer of technology (ToT) from the foreign vendor or go for joint venture (JV). The new genera-


SP’s Land Forces   4/2015

tion rifle was to weigh around 3.5 kg with advanced night-vision, holographic reflex sights, laser designators, detachable underbarrel grenade launchers and the like. The foot soldier generally is forgotten in the race of big-ticket weapon systems; fighter aircraft, helicopters, ships, tanks, missiles, artillery and the like. Though the direct procurement of 65,000 new generation assault rifles has been scrapped, it is not the first time that the infantry will be suffering such setback. In 1980, 17 x 5.56mm assault rifles from 11 countries were imported by the MoD, aim being to equip 3 x parachute commando battalions and 3 x parachute battalions (latter part of the Parachute Brigade), funds for which had been reserved in the Sixth Army Plan. The Army completed comprehensive trials in 1980 in accordance with the trial directive issued by Army Headquarters. However, the case went into cold storage. It emerged that an anonymous letter was received by the then Defence Minister alleging $10,000 had been paid to place a particular rifle at the top. Then, in 1985, the MoD floated a query as to why the AK-74 assault rifles had not been tried out. The army replied that these 17 weapons were imported by MoD without reference to the army and the AK-74 in any case was of 5.45mm bore whereas the entire Indian Army was planned to be switched to 5.56 mm assault rifles. In this war of red tape, the Sixth Army Plan lapsed and so did the funds for the six battalions that were to be equipped. So, seven years after the above trials of these imported rifles were completed in 1980, the parachute commando and parachute units went to Sri Lanka under the IPKF carrying the unwieldy 7.62 SLR rifles to battle the LTTE armed with AK-47 assault rifles. It is later that the IA would import one lakh AK-47 rifles (then costing only $300 apiece) and give some 100 per infantry battalion in the IPKF. Meanwhile the abovementioned 17 x 5.56 mm imported rifles were handed over to the DRDO-OFB to develop an indigenous version, and after 15 excruciating years emerged the 5.56 INSAS which was nowhere close to the top 10 assault rifles of the same category available globally. Frankly, the DRDO-OFB should have gone in for an AK-47 with a matching night sight, which with double strapped filled magazines gives enough firepower to the soldier. Even today, soldiers guarding the frontline on Siachen Glacier keep a loaded AK-47 next to the personal issue INSAS because there is no guarantee that the latter would not jam at the critical fleeting moment. Since we failed to indigenously produce a state-of-the-art assault rifle and other

The basic rucksack provided officially is as inferior as the basic web equipment that was supplied to the army with much fanfare

small arms, even the PMF, CAPF (BSF, CRPF, ITBP), SPG and even special units like Force 1 and Greyhounds resorted to imports. An AK-47 with a night sight would be an ideal assault rifle for the infantry but whether this would happen with the ‘improved INSAS’ under development by the DRDO past several years is a question mark.

Shock and Awe Watching the infantry alighting from huge vehicles during the recent terrorist attack in Dinanagar, a veteran General Officer observed they did not create the feeling of ‘Shock and Awe’. Supposing one saw soldiers alighting from few APCs, it would create a different impression altogether. He observed that as a school-going child in Lahore in 1946, he saw three APCs plying the road during violent riots and felt the shock and awe. Post-Independence, our Infantry Battalions too on Modification ‘P’ had tracked vehicles called Bren Carriers. There is no denying the fact that centralised Mechanised Infantry is needed for operating with the armour. However, the bulk of infantry is foot bound, has no cross country mobility and shock and awe! This has adversely affected the operational functioning and above all tactical thinking of bulk of our officer corps. Given a few APCs to infantry battalions in plains and in deserts can bring in a sea change in combat capability. Infantry is the backbone of Indian Army and it must have integral cross country mobility as well as ‘shock and awe’ when deployed in the plains. In the mountains, the infantry can continue hitherto fore.

Miscellaneous The infantry also is woefully short of bullet proof jackets, surveillance equipment for day and night, GPS, even updated maps and communication equipment. Army’s Tactical Communication System, Battlefield Surveillance System and Battlefield Management System are all years away without which the infantryman cannot receive real time / near real time information so necessary in modern conflict situations.

Special Forces Planners need to understand that Special Forces equipping must be ‘packaged’. The concept of ‘packaged equipping’ simply implies that equipping cannot be piecemeal. For example, if an assault squad is authorized ‘X’ weapons and ‘Y’ equipment, all of them have to be provisioned together if the expected mission outcome and combat capability is to be achieved. For example, hand-held laser target designators have been authorized to army’s Special Forces since last 10 years but have not been provisioned yet. The army has also had the problem of re-supply / replacement of imported special equipment since concurrent action of ‘introducing’ the equipment into service has not been taking place. There is apparent lack of forethought and standardisation of equipment as well, leave aside measures like centralised special equipment procurement for the military and similarly for the non-military Special Forces. The absence of corner shots with the NSG employed during the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack was conspicuous although this equip-

ment was held with the Special Group of the SFF for past few years. Surveillance, communications and night vision equipment though authorised can be improved both in quality and quantity. Presently, equipping voids exist from the very basic to bigger operational requirements. The basic rucksack provided officially is as inferior as the basic web equipment that was supplied to the army with much fanfare. The material was so inferior and the stitching thread so inferior that first time a soldier went through the obstacle course, it ripped open in places. Special Forces units are presently using their own funds to buy good quality rucksacks. Similarly, no worthwhile rappelling gloves and rappelling ropes are officially supplied, both in quality and quantity. A major void exists in the provision of a battlefield information system that would enable multiple Special Forces detachments operating wide spread over long distance and deep inside enemy territory communicating with a special operations command post at the parent battalion headquarters, Corps level FMCP and directly to the air force for calling airstrikes including armed UAVs. Existing equipment voids and shortages the worst hit is the holding of Tavor Assault Rifles and the ammunition as replacements are not forthcoming. So each Special Forces unit has shortages of Tavor assault rifles, made up with AK-47s in some case. But the worst problem is severe shortages in supply of training. Due to ammunition for this rifle which is entirely dependent on import and not even 50 per cent of the annual requirement is being met. There is also a total void against authorised quantities of hardware, major ones being: heavy machine guns; underwater rifles; 60 mm mortars, disposable anti-tank rocket launchers; disposable flame throwers; satellite phones; airborne SAR systems; VHF repeaters; solar panels for charging; light strike vehicles; GP delivery system (GPADS) 2-tonne category; GPADS 4-tonne category; underwater cameras; underwater driver propulsion vehicles; digital compasses; GPSs; laser target designators; video cameras for HX transmission; still cameras for HX transmission; night scope with adapter; remote detonator transmitters; remote detonator receivers, and; radio controlled detonators. In addition, major deficiencies exist in: assault rifles with night sights; GPMG with night sights; AGL with night sights; 40mm UBGL; pistols; ATGM with TI; SAM with night sight: carbines with night sight; tactical computers; ground to air LUP; radio transmitter beacons; combat military free-fall parachutes and compatible oxygen equipment; high resolution binoculars; passive night vision binoculars; night vision binoculars with communication and range finder; HHTIs, and; passive night vision goggles.

Conclusion There is much talk of establishment of Special Forces Command but have we looked at the equipping of our Special Forces? In this age of sub-conventional and irregular warfare, the foot soldier must not be neglected either. It has often been said that for the price of a mere squadron of tanks, the entire infantry can be armed to the teeth. Let us do it.  SP

>> Technology

Drone Terrorism Today’s conflict situations are more and more at the sub-conventional level witnessing more and more employment of irregular forces, and consequent use of drones against such forces photograph: US Air Force

  Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)


ow old are drones? That may be difficult to answer. But then epics like Ramayan mention the use of ‘Udan Khatolas’ and Ramayan was hardly a fairy tale with ample ground proofs it was no fiction, to include undersea photos of the Ram Setu. Whether these ‘Udan Khatolas’ were all powered or some were drones may be a matter of debate. As per records, the Australians had attacked the Italian city of Venice in 1849 with unmanned balloons loaded with explosives, launched from a ship. But the first pilotless aircraft were built during and shortly after World War I, some used as flying bombs. But coming to later times, the raid to liberate Mussolini during World War II was conducted by the raiding force using gliders. That may be perhaps the first use of drones in actual combat.

Drones in Countering Terrorism Today’s conflict situations are more and more at the sub-conventional level witnessing more and more employment of irregular forces, and consequent use of drones against such forces. In 2014, 25 x US drone strikes in Pakistan reportedly killed between 114 and 183 individuals (including two civilians and two children) while 44 to 67 were reported injured. Interestingly in the decade 2004-14, Wikipedia describes 357 x Obama strikes and 408 x total US strikes since 2004 killing between 2,410 and 3,902 individuals (including 416 to 959 civilians and between 168 and 204 children) while injuring between 1,133 and 1,706 individuals. This shows the intensity and effectiveness of use of drones in irregular conflict situations. But while US bloggers have been talking of use of drones to knock out terrorists within US homeland, an American (US development expert Warren Weinstein) and an Italian aid worker (Giovanni Lo Porto) hostage got accidentally killed in January this year when a US drone attacked an Al Qaeda compound in Pakistan where they were being held captive for past several years. This has sparked a lot of questions about drones being used in this type of conflict situations, especially when the intelligence that underpinned the said drone strike was incomplete. But just as drones are being used for countering terror, these are also available to the terrorists. For example, where Israel is using drone strikes effectively to eliminate radicals, Hamas too reportedly has access to Iranian origin drones.

Drones in Terrorism During 2009, an attempt was made to deliver drugs to prisoners using a drone in a UK prison guarded by a 50 feet high electric fence. In 2011, Rezwan Ferdaus, an Al Qaeda affiliate, planned to launch an attack on the Pentagon and Capitol buildings using a remote-controlled drone laden with explosives but the plot was intercepted by the FBI. In 2012, criminals piloted a $600 remote-controlled quad-copter over a Brazilian prison to deliver cell phones to the prisoners. For the past one year, the New York Police Department (NYPD) had been increasingly concerned about a potential terror attack from the air by a drone armed with a deadly weapon. But now NYPD has openly expressed concern that drones could become tools for terrorists as potential weapons; technology having advanced enough


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MQ-1 Predator in flight

that someone could use them to carry out an air assault using chemical weapons and firearms. So, NYPD wants to develop technology which will allow them to take control of drones as well as scan the skies for them before major events, and stop potential attacks. The spurt in NYPD’s concern about drones has come about because: one, increase of drone incidents in New York City by 40 per cent in one year; two, in Germany during 2014, a drone hovered over a crowd of people when German Chancellor Angela Merkel was delivering a speech – the drone flying towards the podium and landed in front of her, three, this summer, an NYPD night patrol helicopter flying at an altitude of 800 feet above ground level was suddenly confronted by a drone and; four, most significantly the ambiguity in deducing the payload and intention of a flying drone. The NYPD is presently consulting with the military and has members of its counterterrorism, bomb squad, emergency services and aviation units working on a plan to counter weaponised drones. In January this year, a drone crashed on the White House grounds, raising questions over how commercial and consumer drones can be used safely in the US. But there were bigger concerns in Japan in April 2015 when a drone with traces of radioactive material, a bottle with unspecified contents and mounted with a camera was found on the roof of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s office in Tokyo on April 22. The 50-cm diameter drone was decorated with a symbol that warned of radioactive material. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshihide Suga, said the incident was a wake up call to the potential dangers of drones including possible terror attacks. It may be recalled that during 1995, post the Sarin gas bombing of Tokyo subway it was found that the Aum Shinrikyo cult responsible for the attack had two remote controlled helicopters that had luckily crashed during trials. The cult otherwise had enough Sarin gas to kill one million people. Significantly, Japanese aviation laws have no restrictions for unmanned drones flying at or below 250 metres above ground except along flight routes. But now with a drone landing on the rooftop of the

Japanese Prime Minister’s office, it is obvious that a review would be underway.

Indian Scene As per media reports, India is the world’s top drone importer after UK and France; 22.5 per cent world’s UAVs were imported by India from 1985 to 2014. Drones are being used in the country for shooting concerts and movies, filming private parties, by police organisations for surveillance and monitoring traffic, and for surveillance and intelligence gathering by armed forces. Last year, media reported that an eatery in Mumbai had delivered food items to consumers using a drone. Interestingly, while Amazon has successfully conducted test bed for delivery of items at the customer’s doorsteps, it cannot make it operational in the US unless the regulations for use of drones are revamped and promulgated. In October 2014, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) had announced that till proper rules and regulations are formulated, use of drones in the country is “illegal”. But a mere announcement may not be enough. Last year, four individuals were caught filming the Ganga Arti in Varanasi using drone cameras without permission. They admitted they had already done similar filming using cam-copter for a travel channel at Allahabad, Varanasi, Shimla, Manali and Agra, and that the filming team included four foreigners. The camcopter at Varanasi was observed and so the persons could be apprehended, but at other places such filming was unhindered. During Republic Day Parade of 2015 where President Barak Obama was to be the Chief Guest, intelligence agencies had warned that terrorists may attempt drone strikes, even using a glider. More rently post the drone landing atop ofiice of Prime Minister Abe, Delhi Police was alerted by intelligence agencies of possibility of terrorist organisations planning a similar action in the capital; intelligence inputs that groups like LeT and Jaish-eMohammed (JeM) have been planning drone attacks. Interestingly, the NDRF used drones during the recent earthquake relief in Nepal.

The Issue It is reported that for the US to come out with comprehensive regulations for use of

drones it may take years. So, while DGCA indicates that rules and regulations are being formulated in this regard, we can expect a long gestation period. But the formulation of rules and regulations is one part and promulgating them the real issue. The problem is more complex if cam-copters are used at night with IR cameras, detection being difficult in hours of darkness. A terrorist organisation could use drone (s) by night to deliver chemical or radioactive payloads. Even by day, the problem can be viewed in backdrop of the weapons at Purulia which were discovered only after the airdrop had been executed, and drones come in all sizes. Then, we have multiple manufactures in India marketing drones, even as remote controlled toys for children, camcopters for surveillance and private clubs indulging in drone flying adventure, like elsewhere in the world. Monitoring such equipment in a populous country like ours is a herculean task, and yet it must be done. It amounts to tracking the manufactured equipment, its sale and locations by incorporating the population into reporting possible misuse; institutionalizing the ‘billion eyes on ground’ concept in concert with the intelligence agencies. Compared to larger UAVs, small drones are much more difficult to detect as they need little space to take off. Over and above detection, would also be the problem of intercepting and bringing down a terror drone including the method of bringing down without activation its lethal load. Hamas has been known to be using armed drones.

Conclusion India has been subjected to terrorism for almost three decades now. Global radical organisations like Al Qaeda are focusing towards South Asia. We also have both Pakistan and China engaged in proxy and irregular warfare against us. India being an open democracy with the second largest population in the world is more susceptible to mischief by our adversaries. Terrorists, especially the state sponsored ones, are looking at new methods assisted by technology to strike us. We need to focus on drone terrorism, which is already a reality.  SP

Military Strategy >>

China’s White Paper on National Military Strategy At the global level China is concerned about the US which is carrying on its ‘rebalancing’ strategy and is enhancing its military presence and its military alliances in this region   Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd)


he rise of China as an economic superpower and its economic superiority over the West has impacted upon the world in different ways. The whole world is wondering how China will leverage its economic and political power in the future and this will be indeed one of the most important factors in determining the security dynamics of Asia in the 21st century. It is in this context that the China’s first White Paper on National Military Strategy in May 2015 is relevant and vital for a broader understanding of their aims and aspirations, and the thrust and direction of their military modernisation.

China’s Destiny Some western observers seem to suggest that the paper reflects a new Chinese aggressiveness, especially in connection with tensions in the South China Sea. A detailed perusal, however, suggests that the document is not a response to current events, but rather it is a strategic plan which defines their future thrust areas for acquiring new military capabilities. A close reading of the paper reveals many remarkable aspects. Some of these aspects are explained in the succeeding paragraphs. China readily accepts that its destiny is tied to the destiny of the whole world. This is obvious because its economy depends upon the markets all over the world moreover its inordinately high requirement of oil and gas is also dependent upon the energy rich nations of the world which requires a strong healthy political relationship with all concerned. Hence China feels that a prosperous and stable world would provide China with opportunities, while China’s peaceful development also offers an opportunity for the whole world. At the global level China is concerned about the US which is carrying on its ‘rebalancing’ strategy and is enhancing its military presence and its military alliances in this region. It is also wary of Japan which is now overhauling its military structure and policies. It is critical of the countries which have maritime claims in South China Sea. It continues its claims on the reunification of Taiwan and what it calls as national rejuvenation. At the regional level its possessive attitude and aggressiveness about the South China Sea is obvious from the statement: Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China.

Security Challenges China feels that with the growth of its national security it is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue. The White Paper focuses on the new revolution in military technology (RMA) involving long-range, precise, smart, stealthy and unmanned weapons and

equipment, outer space and cyber space issues and the importance of information technology in future wars and therefore refers to the restructuring of military forces and the transformation required. China has spelt out its national aim of a moderately prosperous society by 2021 and a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary.

Tasks for Armed Forces Towards the fulfilment of the aims given above it sees the following strategic tasks for the armed forces: l To deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China’s territorial land, air and sea. l To resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland. l To safeguard China’s security and interests in new domains. l To safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests. l To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack. l To participate in regional and international security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace. l To strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China’s political security and social stability. l To perform such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interests protection, guard duties, and support for national economic and social development.

Strategic Thought As far as its strategic thought is concerned, it continues to advocate the strategic concept of active defence which it states is the essence of the CPC’s military strategic thought. It explains that from the long experience of the revolutionary wars the people’s armed forces have developed a complete set of strategic concepts of active defence, which essentially are: adherence to the unity of strategic defence and operational and tactical offense; adherence to the principles of defence, self-defence and post-emptive strike; and adherence to the stance that “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.” In 2004, the strategic guideline for active defence enumerated in 1993 was modified. PMS which means making preparation for military struggle was modified in 2004 to winning local wars under conditions of informationisation (their term for this era of information technology). China also seems to have accepted that the future wars will demand use of integrated combat forces to prevail in system-versus-system operations featuring information dominance, precision strikes and joint operations.

Capabilities that China Wants to Acquire The capabilities that it wants to acquire service wise are given below: l In keeping with the strategic requirement

of mobile operations and multi-dimensional offense and defence, the PLA Army (PLAA) is looking at trans-theater mobility. It will focus on building small, multifunctional and modular units, and will adapt itself to tasks in different regions, develop the capacity for different types of warfare including joint operations. l PLA Navy (PLAN) is shifting its focus from ‘offshore waters defence’ to the combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection,’ and build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. It is looking at enhancing its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime manoeuvres, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defence and comprehensive support, thus acquiring blue water capability. l The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is shifting focus from territorial air defence to both defence and offense, and build an aerospace force structure that can meet the requirements of informationised operations. l The PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) will strengthen its capabilities for strategic deterrence and nuclear counterattack, and medium- and long-range precision strikes. l The Peoples Armed Police Force (PAPF) will enhance its capabilities for performing diversified tasks centering on guard duty and contingency response in informationised conditions. Maritime Force: It is emphasising on the need to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests including overseas interests, thus it attempting to building itself into a maritime power. Outer Space: It is also keeping itself abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security. Cyber: It is expediting the development of a cyber force, and enhances its capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness, cyber defence to support the country’s endeavours in cyberspace. Nuclear Force Structure: It is optimising its nuclear force structure, improving strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection, with a view to deterring other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. Logistic System: It is also attempting to build a logistics system that can provide support for fighting and winning modern wars, serve the modernisation of the armed forces, and transform towards informationisation. Training: As far as training is concerned China wants to improve institutional education, unit training and military professional education, so as to pool more talented people and cultivate more personnel who can meet the demands of informationised warfare. Advanced Military Theories: It is also focusing on developing theories so as to bring into place a system of advanced

military theories commensurate with the requirement of winning future wars.

Preparedness/Readiness for War In keeping with the complex strategic requirement China’s armed forces are looking at innovative ways of preparing for and achieving readiness for future wars which it calls PMS in both traditional (conventional) warfare and new in security domains (new challenges such as terrorism, space and cyber). Keeping these threats and challenges in mind, it is adapting itself to the upgrading of weapons and equipment as well as changes in organisational structures and doctrines.

India’s Position While the stated position of China is of peaceful development but many countries are not prepared to accept this stated position. India is facing China’s increasing claims on its territory in which they now claim the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as a part of Southern Tibet. While China has resolved its boundary disputes (less maritime boundaries) with almost all its neighbours, there is little progress in the case of India, despite the upgradation of boundary talks to the political level. A distinct hardening of the Chinese position and aggressiveness on the borders with India is discernible. In this context, the rapid integration of Tibet with the mainland, and upgrading of strategic infrastructure in the region are a cause of concern. In China, the current regime’s stability, focused leadership, and sustained economic growth and a double digit growth in their defence budgets for the past two decades so far gives positive indicators for their military modernisation and leads us to believe that they will achieve what they have set out in their White Paper. However, imponderables like social and economic imbalances within China, responses of global powers and players like US, Japan, EU and others and China’s armed forces ability to absorb state-ofthe-art technology will dictate the level of success of such modernisation in future. PRC is dependent on latest acquisitions mainly from Russia and Israel and these account for approximately 60 to 70 per cent of modern weaponary as against 30 per cent indigenous production. In next two decades PRC would like to reverse this trend. China’s continued dependence on foreign military technology does not provide the assurance that the PLA will be able to threaten the global or even Asia-Pacific balance of power in the next two decades or so. However the hardware that China is buying, or seeking to buy, allows us to discern potential capabilities that cannot be ignored. While we can debate regarding the extent of China’s military capabilities in the future, India’s capabilities are indeed at its lowest level currently. In every service and indeed in every department/ arm of every service there are glaring voids. Moreover most of the equipment held especially in the army has seen better days. Our political and bureaucratic leadership have failed to equip our forces to meet the future threats and challenges.  SP

4/2015   SP’s Land Forces


>> Show Preview

DSEI 2015 – Continued Focus on Air, Land, Naval and Security DSEI is acknowledged internationally as the market leading exhibition for land, sea and air applications of defence and security products, technology and services photographs: Rheinmetall, BAE Systems

  R. Chandrakanth


he world’s leading defence and security exhibition – DSEI (Defence and Security Equipment International) 2015 gets underway from September 15 to 18 at ExCel, London. It is the largest integrated defence and security exhibition, focusing on key sectors such as air, land, naval and security. It is acknowledged internationally as the market leading exhibition for land, sea and air applications of defence and security products, technology and services. Organised by Clarion Events, DSEI 2015 is expected to attract over 32,000 visitors, including 150 programmed delegations from over 60 countries, and over 2,800 global VIPs. According to the organisers, DSEI is set to break records in the number of exhibitors going to over 1,500 from a little over 50 countries. The United Kingdom armed forces is backing the show and all the four Ministry of Defence (MOD) Service Chiefs of Staff are attending and will give keynote speeches in the exhibition floor theatres: Admiral Sir George Zambellas, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff of the Royal Navy; General Sir Nicholas Carter, Chief of the General Staff, British Army; Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford, Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force and General Sir Richard Barrons, Commander Joint Forces Command, will speak on days that are themed for their individual Services. DSEI will host around 300 seminar sessions and keynotes across seven theatres and four strategic conferences facilitating knowledge sharing and networking around key topics and technical areas. DSEI’s seminars will address the challenges, developments and future of the defence and security sectors’ ever-changing landscape providing the global platform of choice for key government figures and influential policymakers within the sector. The seven theatres are: Air, Naval, Land, Security and Special Forces, Medical Innovation, Unmanned and Global Partnerships.

Six Themed Zones At DSEI 2015, six themed zones will make it easier for visitors to meet exhibiting companies and view their associated products, either on their stand, in a static display or in a realistic demonstration scenario. Focus areas include, but are not limited to: Air Zone; Land Zone; Medical Innovation Zone; Naval Zone, to include water-borne demonstrations; Security & Special Forces Zone; and the Unmanned Zone. Each zone will have a dedicated theatre area where visitors can attend free educational sessions that are designed to showcase the latest technologies. Visitors to the exhibition can listen to panel and individual discussions on a wide range of subjects including: best practices and innovations within the medical field; future maritime mine warfare and anti-piracy; synergies and lessons learned between defence and the civilian arena reflecting the increased cooperation and partnership between large security companies and defence primes.

Land Zone In the land zone there will be demonstra-


SP’s Land Forces   4/2015

increased importance for DSEI. A record number of first time exhibitors are included among an impressive list of companies showcasing their latest equipment and technology alongside a range of prime contractors. A particularly important topic will be Cyber Security, reflected in the Security & Special Forces Theatre and Cyber Zone. This will include the latest on cyber defence strategies, the most recent types of attack and future threats, and recovering from cyber attacks. The zone itself will contain an array of innovative and ground-breaking companies, including Raytheon; Palo Alto Networks; Smiths Detection; CEIA; International Armored Group; Bergans; H Henriksen Rebs and others. The Special Forces Seminar programme will have keynote address by General Sir Richard Barrons, Commander, Joint Forces Command.

Medical Innovation Zone DSEI’s medical component will provide presentations, capability demonstrations and debates that focus on the advances in clinical care from the point of injury or illness through the entire treatment to rehabilitation. There will be a forum for networking and debating with international medical leaders and industry experts who have developed advances in the field. The Defence Medical Services (DMS) will host a twice-daily demonstration programme on patient care from the point of injury or illness through the entire treatment pathway to rehabilitation.

Unmanned Zone

(Top) Rheinmetall’s Gladius Soldier System; (Above) Q-Warrior see-through display from BAE Systems

tions from major vehicle manufacturers. An exciting new feature for 2015 is the Future Soldier Showcase, where exhibitors will present state-of-the-art current and future capabilities and solutions. It will be an opportunity to discuss new technologies, trends in combat clothing, tactical requirements for national soldier systems and other key issues. About 700 confirmed exhibitors will showcase Land capabilities including General Dynamics; Rheinmetall; Selex; Iveco; Nexter; Patria and a host of others. In the land seminar programme, there is a keynote address by General Sir Nicholas Carter.

Air Zone DSEI 2015’s enlarged air zone will bring together VIP delegations, procurement teams, and the RAF with the world’s leading defence aerospace manufacturers. An outdoor display area will provide the aerospace and rotorcraft industry with an ideal forum in which to showcase their latest innovations to current and prospective customers, with the variety of aircraft on display likely to surpass the 2013 edition. Confirmed exhibitors showcasing aerospace capabilities include Airbus Defence and Space; Boeing; Northrop Grumman; Lockheed Martin; Finmeccanica; Rolls Royce; TAI; Denel.

The air seminar programme will include a keynote address by Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford.

Naval Zone DSEI’s maritime element will include a record number of visiting ships showcasing a greater range of capabilities than ever before. There will be specially conducted tours allowing key industry representatives to view the latest developments and equipment in its natural environment. The water-borne demonstration programme will include high-speed craft for tackling piracy and terrorist threats, unmanned underwater vehicles, and more. The Naval Theatre remains the main meeting point for knowledge-sharing and networking directly on the exhibition floor. Confirmed maritime exhibitors include BAE Systems; Thales; DSME; Babcock; ThyssenKrupp; Kongsberg and more. The naval seminar programme will have a keynote address by Admiral Sir George Zambellas, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, Royal Navy.

Security and Special Forces Zone Amid global uncertainty, the security and special forces zone has more than doubled in size compared to 2013, underlining its

The unmanned zone has taken on greater importance as unmanned systems play an ever-increasing role in contemporary military strategy. Presentations will explore the latest capabilities, technologies and innovations, and there will be demonstrations of ground-breaking unmanned systems taking place outside across the week. Exhibitors confirmed in the unmanned zone include Insitu; Elbit Systems’; Rafael; Uvision; Sagem; Prox Dynamics; DOK-ING and many others.

Riding on 2013 Success The 2013 event was a highly successful event in the backdrop of the global economic gloom and recession. From its previous edition it posted growth ranging from 13 to 30 per cent on various counts. According to the Show organisers, over 30,000 people from 120 countries visited the show. This included 97 delegations. The number of exhibitors stood at 1,500 from 55 countries. Interestingly, this edition also saw participation of DSEI virgins like the Republic of South Korea, which not only had a stand but had brought along two warships for static display on the dockyard. India, which is a major arms importer had its presence, led by the Defence and Research Organisation (DRDO), which had a huge stand. Sharing the space were public sector undertakings (PSUs) like the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL), Bharat Dynamics, Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited and Mishra Dhatu Nigam and others. This year too, Indian presence is strong and keen on looking at partnerships or joint ventures to propel the Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Make in India’ initiative.  SP

Policy / Special Feature >>

One Rank One Pension Imbroglio   Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd)

The OROP Sanctioned by the Government

ne Rank One Pension (OROP) dates back to about four decades ago when in the year 1973 in the Third Pay Commission the soldier who was in receipt of 70 per cent of his pay as pension on attaining the service laid down as eligibility for pension was subjected to new pay commission recommendations in which his pension was brought down to 50 per cent of the last pay drawn when the civilian employees who were only eligible for 33 per cent of the last pay drawn were taken up to 50 per cent. This differential was kept earlier because the soldier retired at an early age, at about 34 to 37 years of age as compared to their civilian counterparts. Even the officers retired earlier based on their ranks. The soldier did not resent the others getting an increase but he was appalled at this biased decision which incidentally was taken after the 1971 War when the Indian armed forces had soundly defeated the Pakistan Army, cut that country to half its size, and liberated a new nation called Bangladesh. The soldiery (all ranks) is convinced that this deceit was especially foisted on the military by the bureaucracy (IAS officers) who has always been against the military establishment. Veterans feel that till the government letter clarifying all issues regarding the OROP is out in the public domain there is a likelihood of dishonesty and trickery on part of the bureaucracy of MoD.

The government on its part has fulfilled one of its major election promises in the run up to the Lok Sabha elections of the BJP. The Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar on September 5, 2015, announced the implementation of the long delayed One Rank One Pension for ex-servicemen. Explaining the details on the cost of OROP to the exchequer, Parrikar on September 5, stated that it would cost between `8,000-10,000 crore at present which would increase in future. The expenditure on arrears alone would be `12,000 crore. Currently the pension bill of the defence ministry stands at `54,000 crore. There are about 2.45 million veterans and six lakh war widows who stand to benefit from the scheme. The aim of this announcement was ostensibly to end the strike by veterans demanding OROP which had been hanging fire for nearly three months. However while thanking the government on its decision to sanction the OROP, the protesting veterans have rejected the ‘unilateral’ announcement as it ‘dilutes’ several core issues from the accepted definition. Parrikar, who has earned the respect of the veterans for the manner in which he has handled the issue of OROP, met the representatives of ex-servicemen later in the day, on September 5-and some understanding it seems has been reached.


Points of Difference The overall situation of the OROP announcement made September 5 by the Government

and acceptance/non acceptance by veterans is as under:  Veterans are happy that at last OROP has been accepted in principle after a struggle lasting more than four decades and they have thanked the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister for this.  The base year for OROP will be 201314. All veterans will be upgraded in their pension as on March 31, 2014, to their respective ranks. This has been accepted.  The point not accepted is that ex-servicemen were to be granted top of the scale of pension on March 31, 2014 in respective ranks, while government is saying it will be average of the max-min pension on that date. This has not been accepted by the veterans and needs resolution.  The interval at which pension will be equalised has also not yet been resolved. The government had stated that it would be done after every five years while the veterans had accepted a two-year period. Veterans have agreed for this to be resolved through a Committee but they have not accepted the “One Man Committee” announced by the government. Veterans want a five member committee which should have three ex-servicemen, one member from the Services HQ (a Serving officer) and one to be nominated by the Defence Minister. They want the Committee to be directly under the Defence Minister. This issue is yet to be resolved.  Government wants to give six months to the Committee to give the report. Veterans want that the report should be sub-

mitted in 30 days and should be implemented in next 15 days. This also needs to be resolved.  While OROP would be applicable for the disabled and war widows, those opting for voluntary retirement and not complementing full service will be out of its ambit. This has raised a new point of disagreement between the veterans and the government. Parrikar has said that the government would give details on the voluntary retirement in the government order. This matter has also been discussed with the veterans and it seems that those who proceed on premature retirement and are in receipt of pension will continue to be in the ambit of OROP.

Further Action Envisaged by the Ex-Servicemen Further action envisaged by the Ex Servicemen is as under:  Fast unto Death has been called off with immediate effect. The persons on fast unto death have very kindly agreed to it. However the Relay Hunger Strike shall continue at Jantar Mantar and all other stations in India and will be called off only after all the pending issues are resolved by the Government.  As per the united ex-servicemen associations, mass ex-servicemen rallies will be held all over India on 12 Sep 2015, and as per current indications the number of cities is likely to be 80. The Relay Hunger Strike will also continue till all issues have been mutually resolved.  SP

Capture of Haji Pir continued from page 5 100 wounded. 1 PARA soon captured Sar and advanced upon Ledwali Gali where the enemy made the last stand to facilitate withdrawal of his troops from surrounding areas by 1100 hours. ‘B’ Company meanwhile had secured Sawan Pathri and Agiwas by 1400 hours in face of minor opposition. ‘C’ Company which had in the meantime reached Sank was ordered to clear area South of Sank including Point 10033, which it successfully did by last light. 1 PARA had thus captured the objectives allotted to it by 68 Mountain Brigade. The progress along the right prong (UriBedori-Kuthnar Di Gali-Kiran-Haji Pir Pass) had not kept pace with the left prong, So, CO 1 PARA requested the Brigade Commander that his battalion be permitted to go for Haji Pir Pass. With right flank of the Pass still not secured, the only chance of success to capture Haji Pir Pass lay in a frontal attack through a re-entrant that ran North of it. The risk was that the advance would be under observation of the enemy but Brigadier Bakshi gave the green signal to 1 Para. A company column was quickly formed under Major Ranjit Singh Dyal and tasked to capture the Haji Pir Pass. The final approach involved a climb of over 1,220 metres by night. The force starting from Ledwali Gali was to infiltrate through Hyderabad Nullah on night August 27/28 and capture Ring Contours 1194 and 1094 to proceed further. Descending into Hyderabad Nullah at 1530 hours the column came under direct enemy fire but silenced it with quick physical platoon action. The troops had been in continuous operations for over two days and further move was in heavy rain and under artillery shelling. By 1900 hours it was completely dark and Major Dyal decided to climb directly to the Pass, capturing 10 personnel of Azad Kashmir militia with weapons along the way. At 0430 hours, the company hit the old Uri-Ponch Road and reached 700 metres short of the Pass at 0900 hours. The enemy

was surprised but opened up with MMG from the Western shoulder of the Pass and with LMG and rifle fire from the Pass itself. Major Dyal ordered two platoons to climb up the spur, assault the enemy from the western side of the Pass and then roll down to the Pass. The enemy could not withstand this daylight daring attack and withdrew in confusion to a feature to the west of the Pass. By 1000 hours on August 28 the formidable Pass fell to the column and Major Dyal radioed back capture of Haji Pir Pass. This remarkable achievement was possible because of excellent leadership, the element of surprise and ability of the Battalion to quickly regroup and continue attacking. Enemy did regroup and launched several counter-attacks but 1 Para pressed on and captured more areas including NR 1092 and Point 8786. Eventually, 19 Punjab linked up on September 1.

Aftermath The capture of the Haji Pir Pass restored the Uri-Ponch road link and the strategic Jammu-Rajouri-Srinagar road, which had been in disuse since 1947, became functional again. Unfortunately, under the Russian brokered Tashkent Accord signed on January 16, 1966, Indian and Pakistani forces withdrew to their respective positions as prior to August 5, 1965 and the Haji Pir Pass was returned to Pakistan. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri signed the accord in good faith. He was scheduled to meet Ayub Khan next day to extract latter’s promise never to use force again, but he tragically passed away during the night, media hinting possible conspiracy at international level. The hero of capture of Haji Pir, Lt General Ranjit Singh Dyal awarded Maha Vir Chakra in 1965, said in an interview during 2002, “The Pass would have given India a definite strategic advantage….It was a mistake to hand it back….our people don’t read maps.”  SP

4/2015   SP’s Land Forces


>> Marketing feature

Orders portfolio of Rosoboronexport for the land forces weapon systems and military equipment exceeds $12 billion At the International Exhibition of Arms, Military Equipment and Ammunition RAE-2015 (September 9-12, Nizhny Tagil, Russia) Russian weaponry special exporter Rosoboronexport, which belongs to the State Corporation Rostec, demonstrated latest Russian weapon systems to the delegations from more than 20 countries.


he portfolio of orders for the Russian weapon systems and military equipment of land forces exceeds $12 billion. For the 15 years since Rosoboronexport was established export turnover in this area has increased tenfold. We steadily compete with the leading manufacturers in the key segments, and can offer integrated, comprehensive solutions for the modernization of weapons and military hardware, as well as equipping the customers’ land forces based on a thorough analysis of the needs of our partners in the field of national security” – Deputy Director General of Rosoboronexport Igor Sevastyanov, heading the company’s delegation at the exhibition, said. During the static display and in the course of a large-scale demonstration program of the exhibition in Nizhny Tagil most of Russian export weapon systems and military equipment of the Land Forces were demonstrated. All in all, in this segment Rosoboronexport is promoting more than 700 units of military products in the international market. Together with manufacturers Rosoboronexport hold presentations and provide technical advice on a variety of weapons and equipment – the T-90MS tank, TigerM modernized armored car, Kornet-EM anti-tank missile system, T-72 upgraded tank, BMP-3 upgraded infantry fighting vehicle, BMPT-72 armored fighting vehicle, TOS-1A heavy flamethrower system, a new 155-mm MSTA-S self-propelled howitzer, Sprut-SDM light amphibious tank, the 1I37E check and test vehicle. “We are closely looking at the trends in the international arms market, comprehensively analyze the needs and demands of our partners, the nature of modern conflicts. So we have a clear vision of what our customers need today and will demand in the future. This serves us to make guidelines and recommendations for the developers and manufacturers. Some of the latest models of the land forces military equipment were developed upon the initiative of Rosoboronexport and with a participation of our experts,”– Igor Sevastyanov said. In particular, the exhibition unveiled the new modernization project of light armored vehicles by the example of the BTR-80 armored personnel carrier (in cooperation with the 81 Armor Repair Plant “81 BTRZ” and CRI “Burevestnik”) and the 57-mm AU-220M automatic weapon (in cooperation with CRI “Burevestnik”). Thus, a unified set of technical solutions for equipping light armored vehicles (BTR60/70/80, BMP-1, BRDM-2), which was implemented in the BTR-80 showcase model, can significantly increase firepower (new remotely operated weapon station), protection and survivability (additional protection elements of the external structure and crew compartment), as well ergonomic, performance, and controllability thanks to the advanced digital communications, satellite navigation, surveillance, and air conditioning. At the exhibition, the 57-mm AU220M automatic weapon system was


SP’s Land Forces   4/2015

155-mm Msta-S self-propelled howitzer

Sprut-SDM light amphibious tank

demonstrated at the BMP-3 infantry combat vehicle. This option to upgrade the military equipment is proposed by Rosoboronexport to the countries, which already have in service these Russian vehicles. The new weapon system can be installed on other armored vehicles and naval equipment of both Russian and

foreign production. High performance characteristics of the AU-220M allow for combating a wide range of armored vehicles and air targets on the battlefield. Equipping the vehicles with this weaponry can greatly increase firepower of the motorized and infantry units. “Rosoboronexport pays great attention

to the modernization and maintenance of previously supplied land forces equipment of the Russian and Soviet production. Our solutions are very effective and economically viable. For many countries this is a real opportunity to significantly improve the combat capability of their armed forces” – Igor Sevastyanov said.  SP

Marketing feature >>

ODU Offers Ruggedized Connector Solutions for Military and Security Market


DU, a worldwide leader in designing and manufacturing high performance connector solutions and cable assemblies, offers its range of advanced ruggedized circular miniature connector solutions designed especially for military and security market. ODU AMC® is an advanced and highly reliable connector solution with ‘Push-Pull’ locking or ‘Break-Away’ function for the next-generation soldier communication systems. This extremely robust metal circular connector series is designed for a large number of soldier modernization applications such as: group voice and data radio, navigation module, soldier control unit, rugged computers and handheld devices, GPS antennas, military night vision devices, unmanned systems and land vehicles. Rugged, watertight and easy to clean, these lightweight, non-reflective connector systems have excellent EMI shielding within a compact housing. Individual contact configurations are available in one integrated connector solution: signal, low/high voltage transmission, coax/triax, compressed air inserts. The ODU AMC® series include 4 different types of connector solutions: ODU AMC® High-Density, ODU AMC® Push-Pull, ODU AMC® Break-Away, ODU AMC® Easy-Clean. ODU AMC® High Density: It is a minia-

high density signal configurations and tailored versions for power (up to 15A) and data transfer (USB 3.0 with 5A power) in a very compact package. The compact and lightweight complete connector solution offers high performance data trans¬mission, high reliability and easy handling. ODU AMC® Push-Pull:

t u r e connector designed for harsh environment applications. It is used extensively in soldier communications and future soldier systems that require significant weight and space reduction such as: field radios, portable computers, night vision and digital scopes. The compact and lightweight connector offers high performance data transmission, high reliability and easy handling. The product portfolio includes advanced miniature USB 3.0 highspeed, USB 2.0 connector solution and an HDMI option. In shell diameters as small as 10mm up to 18.5mm and providing as many as 40 contacts, it includes numerous

The design enables the mating and unmating of the connector with minimal force. Beside the quick and simple mating and unmating option, the connector solution offers an incredibly rugged housing with non-reflective surface, mechanical and color keying, 5,000 mating cycles durability , high-speed data technology, watertight - protection class IP 68 and IP 69 and versatile configurations: signal, power, high/low voltage transfer and coax possible within one connector. The ODU AMC®Break-Away: It has been designed for applications where connectors need to be mated and unmated fast during usage. One pull on the cable is enough to unmate the connection. The plug incorporates a unique locking system with mechanical and color keying options. ODU AMC® Easy-Clean: Its design has been created using a unique spring loaded pin

system that allows for an easy-wipe flat receptacle surface. This plug’s contacts can be easily and quickly cleaned even in the harshest environments. The connector solution benefits of a Break-Away function, watertight – protection class IP 68 and IP 69, 3 sizes, 7-19 positions, mechanical and color keying. The ODU AMC® system solutions include also protective caps that ensure fast and trouble-free handling of the connectors and of the overall system and also integrated cable assembly solutions and overmolding. ODU offers also options for “hot plugging” or hybrid insert configurations. ODU provides the full suite of complementary products and services including innovative options for cable assembly as well as receptacles with star flex termination, overmolding and turn-key system solutions. The shells are keyed and color-coded to ensure reliable and simple handling. Product features include lightweight, compact and easy to use (blind mating is also available), watertight protection class IP 68, 5000 mating cycles durability, maximum safety, rugged & non-reflective surfaces, salt spray resistance, high-speed data transfer capability and an operating temperature range of -51° C (-60° F) to +125° C (+257° F), contacts for solder and PCB terminations.  SP The Business Development Manager for India is Amit Mittal and can be reached via email website:


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4/2015   SP’s Land Forces 28/05/2015



>> Operations

The Manipur Ambush – and Beyond Involvement of China and Pakistan in insurgencies and terrorism pan-India is not new. It has been enhanced and has become more proactive with strategic aim to destabilise India.   Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd)


hen four vehicles of an army convoy were ambushed at 0830 hours on June 4 in Chandel district of Manipur, it was the worst terrorist ambush suffered by the army in past 33 years. 18 personnel of 6 Dogra were martyred when the forward two vehicles were blasted by IEDs and fired upon by RPG rockets and automatic fire. That the radical dynamics of the North East have undergone rapid change in recent years is established but the ambush certainly came as a surprise. The government asked the army to adopt proactive measures as there was volley of comments as to what had gone wrong and what corrective actions were needed to be adopted. While the NSCN (K) and KYKL owned responsibility, there was much more in the backdrop, to include the ChinaPakistan nexus in fanning the North East insurgency and ISI sponsored jihadi outfits.

China-Pakistan Nexus Involvement of China and Pakistan in insurgencies and terrorism pan-India is not new. It has been enhanced and has become more proactive with strategic aim to destabilise India and in the case of China somehow get to the Indian Ocean through the land route via India and Myanmar to establish a second oceanic front. Hence, Chinese illegal claims to Arunachal Pradesh as late as year 2005. China was arming, financing and training Naga rebels as early as 1960s albeit her focus on the North East increased with the progression of years. Simultaneously, Pakistan’s ISI continued to recruit illegal Bangladeshi Muslims in the North East, even as the ISI’s India nexus enacted the infamous Illegal Migrants (Determination of Tribunal) Act 1983 in Assam, making that state Muslim predominant. When the ULFA camps were routed from Bhutan, China gave ULFA shelter on Chinese soil. Some three years back four Chinese nationals were apprehended with fake Indian documents, on mission to reach the NSCN. There is every reason to believe that abrogation of the 14-year-old ceasefire by the NSCN (K) this year was on behest of China. According to recent media reports quoting intelligence sources, nine militant groups including the NSCN (K) and the ULFA faction led by Paresh Baruah, came together to form the United National Liberation Front of WSEA (West South East Asia) in a meeting held at Taga in Sagaing (Myanmar) in April 2015 under active tutelage of Chinese intelligence. Chinese intelligence operatives are active in the Sagaing region and weapons are often shipped to the North-eastern groups through the ChinaMyanmar border. Khaplang, Chairman NSCN is to head the new grouping with ULFA’s Paresh Baruah playing a major role as well. Other groups that participated in the meeting were the Kangleipak Communist Party, Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup, People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, People’s Liberation Army, United National Liberation Front and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Songbijit faction). China has been supplying arms to PLA of Manipur


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and Indian Maoists, as also coordinating their joint training. Significantly, China has created her deadliest proxy in the United Wa State Army (UWSA), more lethal than the LTTE, headquartered in Shan State of Myanmar even arming them with missile fitted helicopters, in addition to assault rifles, machine guns, shoulder-fired air defence missiles and armoured vehicles. The timing of the declaration of the United National Liberation Front of WSEA post the March 2015 abrogation of the 14-year-old ceasefire by NSCN (K) preceding Prime Minister Modi’s visit to China in May was perhaps a signal of unconventional belligerency. The Chinese have reportedly promised to provide weapons and logistics to the new grouping as they want to keep things boiling in the North East in view of their claim on the state of Arunachal Pradesh. If the NSCN (K) and KYKL (read Chinese sponsored United Liberation Front of WSEA) were behind the Manipur ambush against the army convoy, involvement of the ISI-LeT sponsored Islamic groups particularly the PULF (Peoples United Liberation Front) is also obvious since the ambush was planned timing it with Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Bangladesh. In addition to the PULF, other Islamic radical groups active in Manipur are the Islamic Revolutionary Front (IRF), Islamic National Front (INF), United Islamic Revolutionary Army (UIRA) and United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA). At the same time, involvement of the western arms mafia too can hardly be ruled out taking into consideration the Purulia arms drop.

What Went Wrong The easiest part is to put all blame on the unit that got hit. However a deeper analysis is required and must have already been done threadbare by the Army. As per media reports, the unit had completed its twoyear tenure and while the Second-in-Command had proceeded to the new location with the advance party, the CO too was on leave. Both CO and Second-in-Command being away together in counter-insurgency area is unusual but since the CO’s leave is sanctioned by the Brigade Commander, there must have been valid reasons. The ambushed vehicles, as per media, were supposedly carrying personnel proceeding on leave. Yes, the ROP should have been effective but the operations in these areas as compared to in J&K need to be viewed in the following context: quantum of troops available for ROP in order to sanitise areas both sides of the road, who was responsible for the ROP; what time did the ROP come into place considering the ambush was sprung at 0830 hours; are mine protected vehicles (MPVs) moving with the ROP and convoys – appears not; are hand-held metal detectors and IED detection equipment available to road opening parties; what is the surveillance and communication interception capability available to the units deployed in the North East, and the like. The weapons used by the terrorists, according to some reports, had US markings. So in all probability these were supplied by the ChinaPakistan conduit. It is to the credit of the ambushed party that despite the ferocity of

fire from multiple directions, they terrorists left at least one dead body behind albeit the injured managed to escape. The most significant failure was that of intelligence, which always happens in such instances. Despite clear indication of increasingly active involvement of Chinese intelligence and Pakistan’s ISI in the North East, were we adequately prepared and troops forewarned beyond routine RAW and IB warnings? Similar was the case in the Kargil intrusions too. At the higher level, lack of technical cross border intelligence was also deliberately stymied by the previous Central Government, ostensibly under pressure from the arms and narcotics mafia, and even perhaps under pressure from the ISI through blackmail to some political biggies having used hawala to siphon out money, as indicated by some veteran RAW officials. It is for this reason that the Technical Support Division (TSD) of the Army which was giving excellent cross border intelligence was disbanded when the Manmohan Singh Government prematurely retired Army Chief General V.K. Singh under a mischievously contrived date of birth controversy, even as the Supreme Court judgement only left the decision to the Government of India (GoI) and never blamed the General to be in the wrong. In the aftermath of 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, another TSD was to be raised with covert capabilities for counterstrike and effective deterrence, the first TSD having been highly successful; terror attacks, rioting in the Kashmir valley, ambushes in northeast, arms and narcotics through Myanmar were severely curtailed. TSD suddenly became a pain for ISI and western arms dealers. Therefore the enemy within (poiltico-bureaucratic mafia) swung into action supported by the media presstitutes. The TSD was shut down and plans for raising the second TSD scrapped; actions that actually amount to treason against the country. Ironically, the witch-hunt against the TSD officers is still on. Many articles have emerged asking for re-raising of the TSD but the government is yet to act. There is also speculation that it was the fear of loss of business of the narcotics and arms mafia that General V.K. Singh was made to handover the independent charge of North East on some other pretext that may have been conveyed to an unsuspecting Prime Minister.

The Riposte India’s riposte through swift surgical strike at two camps inside Myanmar made international news. The raid was conducted by Special Forces supported by the IAF pursuant to credible and specific intelligence about further attacks that were being planned on Indian soil by the same groups that had undertaken the ambush in Manipur on June 4. The army statement reads that significant casualties have been inflicted on the terrorists. While no specifics were given in the army statement, media reports quoting official sources talked of terrorists killed numbering ranging from 20 to 50. The army also confirmed they had been in communication with the Myanmar authorities in this regard, there is history of close cooperation between the two militaries, and Indian Army looks forward to

working with Myanmar Military for combating terrorism. The raid on the terrorist camps across the border indicates the Modi Government’s resolve to deal with cross border terrorism effectively. It is the first time GoI has shown willingness to conduct pre-emptive strikes to curtail operational capabilities of insurgent groups. Some 1,000 of 1,500 NSCN (K) cadres are reportedly based in Myanmar. The existing insurgent camps in Myanmar reportedly number 61 as per latest TV news. The borders are also used for smuggling of arms and contraband by the militants.

Requirement Unconventional warfare and proxy wars having proved their strategic importance over other forms of conflict past decade, we must recognise that China and Pakistan have joined hands and resolved to destabilize India through terrorism and fanning insurgencies as proactively as possible. The China-ISI-Taliban-LeT nexus is targeting Afghanistan, Maldives, North India and South India, latter sitting on a dormant tinder box. North East India is a strategic objective for China to annex Arunachal Pradesh and reach out to the Indian Ocean, in conjunction Myanmar. Our Special Forces raids on terrorist camps in Myanmar no doubt have sent out salutary message on all fronts. But then within Myanmar there are 61 such camps and next time, the terrorists organisations will be on better lookout. Chinese and Pakistani intelligence may even supply these outfits with shoulder fired air defence missiles. To that extent, our tactics for raid would have to be adjusted. While the surveillance, communication interception and IED/mine detection and countermeasure capabilities of units in the area must be enhanced, the government would do well to immediately raise minimum two TSDs covering our land borders. One has to actually walk along the India-Myanmar to realise how rugged, thickly forested and difficult the terrain is, and more importantly the gaps between the posts along the border too have dense undergrowth that facilitates easy infiltration and smuggling especially in hours of darkness and inclement weather. The previous government was planning to replace the AR with BSF along the IndoMyanmar border which mercifully the present NSA has ruled out. But what GoI should consider is to deploy BSF units to beef up the border defence but they should be placed under command the army like the AR, not repeating the mess created in Depsang and Chumar where the ITBP is not under command the army. It is vital for the Modi Government to understand that while the recent Special Forces raids conducted against the two terrorist camps in Mynamar are a good beginning at the tactical level, we have to go all out at the strategic level to establish credible deterrence against unconventional and proxy wars unleashed by China and Pakistan. Threat from across the Myanmar border is just one part of the diabolical plan of our enemies. The call of sub-conventional has already been trumpeted by these countries loud and clear. It will be a folly not to ignore the war drums.  SP

news in brief >> India’s DRDO tests submunition warheads for Pinaka I weapon system

The Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) laboratory has evaluated submunition warheads for the Pinaka I multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) system at Pokhran field firing range in Rajasthan. ARDE Director Dr K.M. Rajan said that the tests form a part of the proof trials for the production lot of Pinaka I, which randomly picks up Pinakas to evaluate the performance standards of a specific lot at regular periods. Rajan said: “Complete systems, subsystems and efficiency for these submunition warheads have been tested.” The successful trials are expected to allow for the use of these submunition warheads in Mark-II version of Pinaka, which will have a 20-km operational range. Designed to replace the Indian Army’s ageing Russian-built BM-21 Grad launchers, the Pinaka is capable of destroying opposition communication centres, air terminal complexes, and gun/rocket locations, as well as solid structures and bunkers. The system features six launcher vehicles of 12 rockets each, as well as two command post vehicles, including a fire control computer, Digicora MET radar, and six loader/replenishment vehicles with a payload of 100 kg. An undisclosed DRDO official told The Times of India: “We have seen Pinaka’s performance during the Kargil episode. Now this thermo-baric ammunition is able to operate from a mobile launcher at extreme temperature ranges of -10°C to 55°C with a quicker reaction time. It also has the capability to carry various kinds of warheads. It has now become more lethal.”

India’s Assault Rifle Project Cancelled Media reported in late May 2015 that the proposed mega project for the assault rifles for its 1.18 million strong army, with interchangeable barrels for conventional warfare and counter-insurgency operations, was on the verge of being scrapped since it had run into major problems. It has now

>> Show Calendar 9-12 September Russia Arms Expo (RAE 2015) Nizhny Tagil, Russia 15-18 September DSEI ExCeL London, UK 28-30 September Integrated Air & Missile Defense (IMAD 2015) DoubleTree by Hilton, Crystal City, Arlington, Virginia, USA 27-29 October Future Mortar Systems 2015 Kensington Close Hotel, London, UK 3-5 November Global MilSatCom 2015 Park Plaza Riverbank London, UK global-milsatcom

been confirmed as per media reports on July 2, 2015. The firms that had participated in the extensive trials-Colt (US), Beretta (Italy), Ceska (Czech) and Israel Weapon Industries (IWI)—have been told that the proposed contract was being retracted. This is a yet another blow to the Indian Army’s urgently required weapons. The basic weapon of the infantryman which is the assault rifle needs immediate replacement. Army has had a long-standing demand for new rifles to replace the 5.56mm indigenous INSAS guns, which have suffered from technical bugs since their induction in 1994-95. As per the now-cancelled project, 65,000 rifles were to be directly acquired from the selected foreign vendor to equip the 120 infantry battalions deployed on the western and eastern fronts. The Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) was to then subsequently manufacture over 1,13,000 such rifles after getting transfer of technology from the foreign company. But the proposal for the new rifles—with a 5.56 x 45mm primary barrel for conventional warfare and a 7.62 x 39mm secondary one for counter-terror operations—was found “impractical“ both in terms of high costs and technical requirements, said sources. The plan now is to either get a foreign arms company to shift some of its manufacturing facilities to India or task the OFB to manufacture the new assault rifles with foreign collaboration.

Procurement of Bullet Proof Jackets for Indian Army Bullet proof jackets (BPJs) are scaled item. They are procured and provided to the armed forces as per laid down policy. The procurement case of 1,86,138 BPJs is at trial stage and the case of 50,000 is at Technical Evaluation Committee stage. This information was given by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar.

Orbital completes first production lot acceptance testing of Precision Guidance Kit Orbital ATK has successfully completed the first production lot acceptance testing of its 155mm Artillery Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) at an undisclosed location. During testing, the kit demonstrated a median accuracy of less than 10 m, in addition to passing all safety and reliability requirements. Orbital ATK Defense Systems Group armament systems division Vice President and General Manager Dan Olson said: “Extensive, rigorous testing continues to prove the maturity of PGK technology in terms of reliability, performance and safety.” Orbital ATK Defense Systems Group President Mike Kahn said: “Our precision guidance expertise is making a difference across multiple platforms for our customers. PGK is a guidance fuse designed to fit within the fuse well of 155mm high-explosive artillery projectiles and can transform existing, conventional artillery projectiles into precision weapons that can significantly reduce dispersion to 30 m or less, enabling accurate targeting.” The company will conduct two additional lot acceptance tests, which will confirm production consistency while populating a reliability database that provides information which leads to product improvements over the course of production. PGK is a guidance fuse designed to fit within the fuse well of 155mm high-explosive artillery projectiles and can transform existing, conventional artillery projectiles into precision weapons that can significantly reduce dispersion to 30m or less, enabling accurate targeting. Compatible with existing 155mm artillery stockpiles, the kit features a fixed-canard guidance and control approach with gunhardened electronics and a self-generated power supply, and also incorporates a ‘fail safe’ option, which prevents PGK-equipped artillery from detonating if it fails to get close

enough to the target. The kit successfully proved its capability to deliver precise fire when it was used by the US Army and Marine Corps artillery units for training and tactical operations in Afghanistan in March 2013.

Australian-New Zealand Task Group train Iraqi soldiers to fight ISIL The combined Australian-New Zealand Task Group have completed training of more than 700 soldiers from the 16th Division’s 76th Iraqi Army Brigade to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants in the country. Undertaken at the Taji Military Complex, north-west of Baghdad, the eight-week training programme focused on the planning and conduct of operations, weapon handling, basic tactical manoeuvre, and integration of intelligence, as well as leadership and ethical behaviour in war. Camp Taji is one of the four US-led building partner capacity (BPC) mission sites across Iraq. The graduation of 76th Brigade soldiers takes the total number of Iraqi Security Forces personnel trained by coalition forces across the BPC sites to fight ISIL, also called Daesh, to 10,000.

Barrett Wins Contract to supply HF and VHF systems to Nepalese Army NVIS Communications LLC, the Barrett Communications North American system integrator, won a $1.4-million contract FRP, the US Army Corps to provide 120 radio systems of various configurations to the Nepalese Army. This contract was to be for both high frequency (HF) and very high frequency (VHF) equipment that would be utilised by the Nepal Army in disaster response and recovery and was a gift from the US State Department to the Country of Nepal. The contract award included Barrett PRC-2090 HF Tactical Manpacks, PRC2091 HF Mobile Vehicle systems, PRC-2081 VHF Tactical Manpacks and PRC-2082 VHF Tactical Mobile Vehicle systems, including accessories and a 10-day comprehensive training programme. The delivery schedule was planned for the end of April 2015, with training to be conducted with the Nepalese Army in late summer 2015. On the day this order was due to be shipped from Barrett Communications factory in Perth, Australia, a magnitude 7.8 earthquake hit Nepal causing significant widespread damage. On hearing of the earthquake, John Rosica, President of NVIS Communications LLC, contacted the US Army Corps to expedite the delivery into Nepal and to make arrangements to travel to Nepal to provide the 10-day training programme so the equipment could be utilised straight away. The 10-day training programme began on May 18, with the theory part of the training, and when the shipment arrived, two days later, they were able to complete the comprehensive ‘hands-on’ training, including field instruction.

Russia adds large-calibre sniper rifles to Ratnik Future Soldier System Russia has reportedly integrated a pair of large-calibre sniper rifles into Ratnik, the country’s domestically manufactured future high-tech soldier system. An unnamed Central Research Institute of Precision Mechanics representative was quoted by Sputnik as saying: “The 6VM7-1 rifle is a more lightweight and shortened version of the 6VM7.” Built by the Degtyarev plant in Kovrov, the 12.7mm 6VM7-1 and the 6VM7 sniper systems have been designed in a bullpup configuration, with magazine behind grip/trigger section. Equipped with a 1-P88-2 variable-range sight, the 11 kg rifles have an effective range of 1,500 m and can also be fitted with a 1PN139 thermal visor. According to the representative, the two rifles have already been evaluated and are set to enter service with the Russian armed forces shortly.  SP

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal Editor Lt General V.K. Kapoor (Retd) Senior Editorial Contributor Lt General P.C. Katoch (Retd) Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General Naresh Chand (Retd) Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd) Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Contributors India General V.P. Malik (Retd), Lt General Vijay Oberoi (Retd), Lt General R.S. Nagra (Retd), Lt General S.R.R. Aiyengar (Retd), Major General Ashok Mehta (Retd), Major General G.K. Nischol (Retd), Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Brigadier S. Mishra (Retd), Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Executive Vice President (Planning & Business Development) Rohit Goel Administration Bharti Sharma Creative Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Research Assistant: Graphics Survi Massey Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia General Manager Sales: Rajeev Chugh SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers. Printed in India by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd © SP Guide Publications, 2015 Subscription/ Circulation Annual Inland: `600  •  Overseas: US$180 Email: Letters to Editor For Advertising Details, Contact: SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD Corporate Office A 133 Arjun Nagar, Opp Defence Colony, New Delhi 110003, India Tel: +91(11) 24644693, 24644763, 24620130 Fax: +91 (11) 24647093 Regd Office Fax: +91 (11) 23622942 Email: Representative Offices Bengaluru, INDIA Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd) 204, Jal Vayu Vihar, Kalyan Nagar, Bengaluru 560043, India. Tel: +91 (80) 23682204 MOSCOW, RUSSIA LAGUK Co., Ltd, Yuri Laskin Krasnokholmskaya, Nab., 11/15, app. 132, Moscow 115172, Russia. Tel: +7 (495) 911 2762, Fax: +7 (495) 912 1260 RNI Number: DELENG/2008/25818

4/2015   SP’s Land Forces


SP's Land Forces 4-2015  

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