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VA N O R A B E N N E T T, P RO S P E C T

I S B N 978-0-141-99328-7

Date: 5 July 2022

PENGUIN History

05/07/2022 15:12

P E N G U I N B OO K S

NUCL E AR FOL LY

‘An enthralling account of a pivotal moment in modern history . . . startling revelations about the deception and mutual suspicion that brought the US and Soviet Union to the brink of Armageddon’ Martin Chilton, Independent ‘The story is extraordinary and Plokhy is an accomplished narrator . . . as authoritative a version of the Soviet side as we are likely to ever get’ Max Hastings, Sunday Times ‘A fascinating and meticulously researched history of the Cuban Missile Crisis . . . riveting reading’ Ethan Pollock, TLS ‘A dramatic story, compellingly told’ BBC History Revealed ‘A magisterial work based on a bevy of US and Soviet archival sources, including previously classified KGB documents. The perspective Plokhy provides exposes the perverse incentives that fuelled dangerous nuclear power plays during the Cold War and, he suggests, beyond’ Andre Pagliarini, New Republic ‘A gripping narrative about the most dangerous Cold War crisis . . . Plokhy brings this turning point to spinechilling life – it reads like a thriller’ Tablet ‘Nearly sixty years after the Cuban missile crisis, Serhii Plokhy, the author of multiple groundbreaking books on Soviet history, once again uses newly released KGB archives to offer a new perspective: in gripping, granular detail, he shows us just how close the United States and the Soviet Union came to Armageddon. At a moment when nuclear technology is still spreading, Nuclear Folly reminds us of the danger we all still face’ Anne Applebaum ‘It is a story of intelligence failures, misperceptions and miscalculations on both sides that had the potential at almost every step to lead to disaster . . . What makes this the definitive history is Mr Plokhy’s telling of the tale in gripping detail from the Soviet perspective . . . It is the picture Mr Plokhy paints of the complete failure of the key decision-makers to get inside the minds of their counterparts that is most telling . . . With his masterly book, Mr Plokhy has sounded a warning bell’ The Economist

‘Plokhy provides fresh and horrifying new details . . . Finishing this sobering account, I could not help but think of the dangers that exist today from nuclear standoffs involving Pakistan, India, China, North Korea and the United States’ Max Boot, Washington Post ‘With access to recently declassified KGB material, this is the most detailed and dependable account of the crisis. It will be gladly plundered by students and scholars and highlighted until its pages are damp with neon yellow’ Julie McDowell, The Times ‘Serhii Plokhy’s book is remarkable and troubling, especially for the insight it gives into Khrushchev’s thinking. But it is when the author turns to the present day that the writing becomes most urgent’ Jay Elwes, Spectator ‘If you think the story of the Cuban missile crisis has been told so often that nothing remains to be learned, think again. Drawing on KGB documents preserved in Ukrainian archives and Soviet military memoirs, as well as American documents and Cuban materials, Serhii Plokhy’s almost hour-by-hour account freshly illuminates mistakes by the Kremlin and the White House that triggered the crisis, and snafus at sea and in Cuba that almost sparked a nuclear war’ William Taubman, author of Gorbachev ‘An excellent overview of the Cuban missile crisis. Serhii Plokhy has mined previously untapped Soviet archives to shed new light on the thirteen days that brought the world closer than ever before to nuclear destruction, and the pivotal roles of John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev. A thrilling read that justifies his sobering conclusion: we may not be so lucky next time’ Michael Dobbs, author of One Minute to Midnight ‘A fresh examination of the historical milestone . . . Plokhy keeps the pages turning, and he includes far more Soviet material than earlier scholars . . . superbly researched and uncomfortably timely’ Kirkus ‘Paints a clearer picture of the behind-the-scenes machinations, the motivations, the politics, and the errors in judgment that almost brought about a nuclear holocaust. Plokhy pulls it all together with sober yet accessible prose that reads like a suspenseful thriller. For anyone interested in the Cold War, this is an indispensable read’ Booklist

A B O U T T HE A U T H OR Serhii Plokhy is Professor of History at Harvard University and a leading authority on the Cold War and nuclear history. His books include the Baillie Gifford award-winner Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy, Nuclear Folly, The Gates of Europe and The Last Empire.

Se r hi i P l o kh y Nuclear Folly A New History of the Cuban Missile Crisis

PEN GU IN B O O K S

First published in the United States of America by W. W. Norton & Company 2021 First published in Great Britain by Allen Lane 2021 First published in Penguin Books 2022 001 Copyright © Serhii Plokhy, 2021 The moral right of the author has been asserted Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A. The authorized representative in the EEA is Penguin Random House Ireland, Morrison Chambers, 32 Nassau Street, Dublin D02 YH68 A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978–0–141–99328–7

www.greenpenguin.co.uk Penguin Random House is committed to a sustainable future for our business, our readers and our planet. This book is made from Forest Stewardship Council® certified paper.

To those who had the courage to step back

Today,Today, everyevery inhabitant inhabitant of this of planet this planet must must contemplate contemplate the the day when day when this planet this planet may no may longer no longer be habitable. be habitable. EveryEvery man,man, woman woman and child and child lives under lives under a nuclear a nuclear swordsword of Damocles, of Damocles, hanging hanging by thebyslenderest the slenderest of threads, of threads, capable capable of being of being cut atcut at any moment any moment by accident by accident or miscalculation or miscalculation or by or madness. by madness. — John — John F. Kennedy, F. Kennedy, September September 1961 1 1961 1

Of course, Of course, I wasIscared. was scared. It would It would have been have been insane insane not tonot be to be scared, scared, I was Ifrightened was frightened aboutabout what could what could happen happen to myto counmy country and tryall and theallcountries the countries that would that would be devastated be devastated by a nuclear by a nuclear war. Ifwar. being If being frightened frightened meantmeant that Ithat helped I helped avert avert such such insan-insanity, then ity, I’m thenglad I’mIglad was Ifrightened. was frightened. One of One theofproblems the problems in thein the worldworld todaytoday is thatisnot thatenough not enough people people are suffi areciently sufficiently fright-frightened ened by danger by danger of nuclear of nuclear war. war. — Nikita — Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev, December December 1962 2 1962 2

CONTENTS

Prologue

I. NEMESES 1. Apprentice

2. Master of the Game

II. R ED GA MBLE 3. Triumph of Communism

4. Rocket Man

5. Going Nuclear

6. Operation Anadyr

7. High Seas

I I I. AG ON Y OF DE CISION 8. Prisoner of Berlin

9. Tip- Off

110

10. Honeymoon

120

11. “Wipe Them Out”

132

12. Quarantine

145

I V. M I V. OM MEONMTE O NF TT ORFUTTRHU T H 13. Moscow 13. Moscow NightNight

161 161

14. Blinking 14. Blinking in theinDark the Dark

172 172

15. Wooden 15. Wooden KnifeKnife

187 187

16 The 16 Americans The Americans Are Coming! Are Coming!

199 199

V. B V. L ABCLKASCAKTSUARTDUARYD A Y 17. Turkish 17. Turkish Quagmire Quagmire

213 213

18. Losing 18. Losing Control Control

223 223

19. “Target 19. “Target Destroyed!” Destroyed!”

234 234

20. Secret 20. Secret Rendezvous Rendezvous

246 246

21. Bermuda 21. Bermuda Triangle Triangle

257 257

VI. R V I S. IRNI G SIN F RGOFMR O TM H ET D HEEADDE A D 22. Sunday 22. Sunday ScareScare

275 275

23. Winners 23. Winners and Losers and Losers

289 289

24. Indignation 24. Indignation

302 302

V I I . VSIEI T . STELTETMLEENMTE N T 25. Mission 25. Mission Impossible Impossible

319 319

26. Back 26. Back at theatBarricade the Barricade

336 336

27. Thanksgiving 27. Thanksgiving

349 349

Epilogue Epilogue

359 359

Acknowledgments Acknowledgments

365 365

NotesNotes

367 367

IndexIndex

427 427

Patrol boats

Intermediate-range ballistic missile Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)(IRBM) sites under construction sites under construction

(MRBM) sites

Medium-range ballistic missile Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) sites

IL-28 bomber airfields

MIG-21 fighter airfields

Ground forces

lo of F

(UK)

Cayman Islands Cayman (UK)Islands

Caribbean Sea

Camagüey

CUBA

THE BAHAMAS

JAMAICA JAMAICA

CUBA

Camagüey

Remedios IRBM

Remedios IRBM Sagua la Grande MRBM

Sagua la Grande MRBM

Caribbean Sea

Havana

Guanajay Havana IRBM

a rid

FLORIDA

lori of F Straits

Straits

Guanajay IRBM

Surface-to-surface (SSM) cruise missile sites Patrol boats

Surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites sites Surface-to-surface (SSM) cruise missile

Surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites

San Cristóbal MRBM

Gulf of Mexico

Soviet Armed Forces on Cuba

50 mi

S 50 mi

HAITI HAITI

Guantanamo Bay

Guantanamo NavalBay Base Naval Base

Cuban Missile Crisis on the Sea

Greenland

Arctic Ocean ICELAND

SWEDEN FINLAND

NORWAY

IR B M

CANADA

Ra n

IRELAND

UNITED KINGDOM

New York Washington Cincinnati

PORTUGAL

Qua

Miami

ine e L

JAMAICA Br. Honduras GUA. HON. SLV.

HAITI

MAURITANIA

P.R.

Cape Verde

Caribbean Sea

NICARAGUA

Port. Guinea

PANAMA VENEZUELA

N W

E S

ECUADOR PERU

BRAZIL

250

500 mi

Conakry SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA

UPPER VOLTA

IVORY COAST

SYRIA LEB. ISR.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

CHAD

SUDAN

IRAQ JOR. SAUDI ARABIA

NIGER

NIGERIA DAHOMEY TOGO

COLOMBIA

Br. Guiana Suriname Fr. Guiana

GUINEA

MALI

GHANA

COSTA RICA

SENEGAL Gambia

CYP.

LIBYA Spanish Sahara

Atlantic Ocean

DOM. REP.

CUBA MEXICO

Black Sea TURKEY

Mediterranean Sea

TUN.

ALGERIA ra

Havana

SOVIET UNION

GREECE

MOROCCO

n ge

Gulf of Mexico

Moscow

POLAND

ALB.

Atlanta New Orleans

E. GER.

SPAIN

Houston

Memphis

Dallas

NETH.

CZE BEL. W. CH. GER. AUS. HUN. FRANCE SWI. YU ROMANIA GO SL AV IA BUL. ITALY

Montreal

UNITED S TAT E S

Leningrad

DEN.

Toronto Chicago

Baltic Sea

ETH.

Soviet movement across the Atlantic Nuclear-armed submarines Nuclear warheads Ballistic missiles The Soviet air route to Cuba

PROLOGU E

obert McNamara could not believe what he had just heard. According to a witness, he “had to hold on to a table to steady himself” after he absorbed the news. It was January 9, 1992, and McNamara, the seventy-five-year-old former secretary of defense under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, was now in Havana attending a conference on its history, in which he had been a key participant. In attendance were Fidel Castro and some other prominent participants in the events from the United States, Cuba, and the recently defunct Soviet Union. At the podium was General Anatoly Gribkov, the former commander of the Warsaw Pact military forces and, before that, one of the key planners of the Soviet deployment in Cuba in 1962. What shocked McNamara was Gribkov’s matter-of-fact remark that the Soviets had managed to deploy forty-three thousand men on the island in the summer and fall of 1962. McNamara and his military experts had been sure that there could be no more than ten thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. That was the number on which they were basing their decision whether to strike the Soviet installations and invade the island. But that was only the first shocking revelation. Gribkov also calmly stated that apart from their huge troop concentration, antiaircraft weapons, bombers, and medium-range missiles capable of striking the United States with nuclear warheads, the Soviets had on the island tactical nuclear weapons that the Americans knew nothing about. There were six Luna (US designation “Frog”) missile launchers with nine

2 n2uclear n uclear folly folly

missiles missiles and nuclear and nuclear warheads. warheads. TheseThese were were short-shortrangerange missiles missiles that that couldcould not reach not reach Florida Florida but could but could have have been been used used against against an American an American invasion invasion force force with with devastating devastating consequences. consequences. Each Each nuclear nuclear warhead warhead had an had explosive an explosive powerpower of 6 toof12 6 kilotons to 12 kilotons of TNT, of TNT, only slightly only slightly less than less than the 15-the kiloton 15-kiloton nuclear nuclear bombbomb dropped dropped on Hiroshima on Hiroshima in August in August 1945.1945. On On top oftop that, of that, as McNamara as McNamara learned, learned, at oneatstage one stage of theofcrisis the crisis it wasitup was toup to the Soviet the Soviet commander commander in theinfithe eld fi toeld decide to decide whether whether to usetothe useLuna the Luna missiles missiles or not. or1 not.1 “We “We didn’tdidn’t believe believe therethere were were nuclear nuclear warheads warheads in Cuba,” in Cuba,” com- commented mented McNamara McNamara a fewadays few later. days later. “There “There was no was evidence no evidence of nuclear of nuclear warheads.” warheads.” Arthur Arthur M. Schlesinger M. Schlesinger Jr., a former Jr., a former special special assistant assistant to Presto Presidentident Kennedy Kennedy and McNamara’s and McNamara’s fellowfellow participant participant at theatconference, the conference, was equally was equally takentaken aback. aback. He recalled He recalled that Gribkov’s that Gribkov’s revelations revelations had had startled startled and appalled and appalled the Americans. the Americans. “Incredible,” “Incredible,” wrotewrote Schlesinger, Schlesinger, remembering remembering his own his reaction own reaction to thetonews. the news. “I had“Iearlier had earlier believed believed that that we had weoverestimated had overestimated the dangers the dangers of theofcrisis— the crisis— that Khrushchev, that Khrushchev, well well awareaware of USofoverall US overall nuclear nuclear superiority superiority as well as as well of as USofconventional US conventional superiority superiority in theinCaribbean, the Caribbean, wouldwould nevernever have have riskedrisked war. But war.Soviet But Soviet forces, forces, we are wenow are told, now were told, were readyready to firetotactical fire tactical nuclear nuclear missiles missiles at an at an 2 2 invading invading force.” force.” A fewAhours few hours earlier earlier McNamara McNamara told the toldconference the conference that the thatactions the actions of theofthree the three mainmain actorsactors in theinCuban the Cuban missile missile crisiscrisis “had “had been been distorted distorted by misinformation, by misinformation, miscalculation, miscalculation, and misperceptions.” and misperceptions.” But even But even he he had not hadrealized not realized the depth the depth of those of those misunderstandings misunderstandings and mispercepand misperceptions.tions. “That“That was horrifying. was horrifying. It meant It meant that had thatahad U.S.a invasion U.S. invasion been been car- carried out, riedifout, theifmissiles the missiles had not hadbeen not been pulled pulled out, there out, there was awas 99 percent a 99 percent probability probability that nuclear that nuclear war would war would have have been been initiated,” initiated,” McNamara McNamara told told 3 3 a reporter. a reporter.

II NNEEMMEES SEES S

1 A PPR ENTICE

ohn Fitzgerald Kennedy cut an impressive figure on the cold Washington day of his inauguration, January 20, 1961. Tall and erect, despite his back problems, dressed in a tailcoat as everyone around him wore a winter coat, he projected youth, energy, optimism, and determination. The youngest person ever elected president of the United States—he was only forty-three years old—left no doubt by his looks and words that he was ready to chart a new course for his country and the world, not just for the duration of his presidency but for decades ahead.1 Leadership was passing from one generation to another, the transition captured by cameras as the gray, balding, and warmly dressed outgoing president, Dwight Eisenhower, accompanied his young successor to the ceremony in the same automobile and then shook his hand after the swearing-in. Eisenhower, a war hero and one of the most successful presidents in American history, was seventy at the time. But he was not the oldest man in attendance. To greet the new president and pass the torch of moral leadership came the eighty-six-year-old dean of

6 n6uclear n uclear folly folly

American American literature, literature, Robert Robert Frost.Frost. Kennedy Kennedy wanted wanted him him to take to take part part in theinceremony, the ceremony, and Frost and Frost accepted accepted the invitation: the invitation: “If you “If can you bear can bear at your at your age the agehonor the honor of being of being mademade president president of theofUnited the United States, States, I I oughtought to be to able beat able myatage mytoage bear to the bearhonor the honor of taking of taking somesome part in part your in your 2 2 inauguration.” inauguration.” FrostFrost appreciated appreciated the challenges the challenges that Kennedy that Kennedy wouldwould face as face presias president but dentcounted but counted on hisonyouth his youth as anas asset, an asset, envisioning envisioning a glorious a glorious age for age for his country his country modeled modeled on the onera theofera theoffithe rst Roman first Roman emperor, emperor, Augustus. Augustus. It would It would be anbeage anofage peace, of peace, tranquility, tranquility, and an andalliance an alliance of power of power with with culture. culture. In a dedicatory In a dedicatory poempoem he wrote he wrote specifi specifi cally for cally the forinauguration the inauguration but never but never read, read, as heas was heblinded was blinded by light by light reflected reflected from from the snow the snow that that had fallen had fallen on Washington on Washington the previous the previous night,night, FrostFrost heralded heralded “The“The gloryglory of a next of a Augustan next Augustan age / age Of a/ power Of a power leading leading from from its strength its strength and pride and pride / Of young / Of young ambition ambition eagereager to be to tried be tried / Firm / Firm in ourinfree ourbeliefs free beliefs without without 3 3 dismay dismay / In any / Ingame any game the nations the nations want want to play.” to play.” If Frost If Frost had ahad bold a bold visionvision but lacked but lacked good good eyesight, eyesight, the much the much younger younger Kennedy Kennedy possessed possessed both.both. His inauguration His inauguration speech speech became became one of one theofbest the known best known texts texts in American in American political political history, history, making making its its way into way elementary into elementary school school classrooms classrooms all over all the overcountry. the country. According According to thetowebsite the website of theofJFK the Presidential JFK Presidential Library Library and Museum, and Museum, the most the most memorable memorable line of line theofspeech, the speech, “ask not “askwhat not what your your country country can do canfordo for you—you— ask what ask what you can you do canfordoyour for your country,” country,” “inspired “inspired children children and and adultsadults to seetothe seeimportance the importance of civic of civic actionaction and public and public service.” service.” Indeed, Indeed, it did.it But did. public But public service service at home at home was not wasatnot theatcenter the center of Kennedy’s of Kennedy’s attention. attention. Sacrifi Sacrifi ce abroad ce abroad in theinpursuit the pursuit of Robert of Robert Frost’s Frost’s Augustan Augustan age was. age “[W]e was. “[W]e shall shall pay any payprice, any price, bear any bearburden, any burden, meetmeet any hardship, any hardship, support support any friend, any friend, oppose oppose any foe anytofoe assure to assure the survival the survival and success and success of of liberty,” liberty,” declared declared Kennedy. Kennedy. His speech His speech was largely was largely dedicated dedicated to world to world politics. politics. The great The great socialsocial turmoil turmoil of theof1960s the 1960s was still wasahead; still ahead; the curthe current preoccupation rent preoccupation was the wasscare the scare caused caused by thebySoviet the Soviet Sputnik Sputnik and comand com4 4 munist munist advances advances in Asia, in Asia, Africa, Africa, and, most and, most recently, recently, in Latin in Latin America. America. Kennedy Kennedy warned warned his fellow his fellow citizens citizens and the andworld the world at large at large of theof the possibility possibility of what of what he called he called “mankind’s “mankind’s final fiwar.” nal war.” The nuclear The nuclear armsarms race and race its and consequences its consequences were were on his onmind. his mind. A keyApart key of part theofspeech the speech

ApprAppr entice entice 7 7 was addressed was addressed to thetoSoviet the Soviet leader, leader, NikitaNikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev, though though neither neither his name his name nor that nor of that hisofcountry his country was mentioned. was mentioned. Kennedy Kennedy referred referred instead instead to “those to “those nations nations who who wouldwould makemake themselves themselves our adversarour adversaries.” ies.” He called He called on his onunnamed his unnamed adversary adversary to “begin to “begin anewanew the quest the quest for peace, for peace, before before the dark the dark powers powers of destruction of destruction unleashed unleashed by science by science engulf engulf all humanity all humanity in planned in planned or accidental or accidental self-destruction.” self-destruction.” BorrowBorrowing a ing phrase a phrase from from the Harvard the Harvard economist economist John John Kenneth Kenneth Galbraith, Galbraith, who who advised advised him on himthe onspeech, the speech, Kennedy Kennedy declared: declared: “Let us “Let never us never negotiate negotiate out ofout fear. of But fear.let But uslet never us never fear to fear negotiate.” to negotiate.” Kennedy Kennedy was promising was promising the rise theof rise a new of a America new America in a new in a world. new world. It would It would be based be based on liberty on liberty and brought and brought into being into being through through the dedithe dedicationcation and sacrifi and sacrifi ce of ce American of American citizens. citizens. He promised He promised LatinLatin AmeriAmerican countries— can countries— “sister “sister republics,” republics,” as heascalled he called them— them— to “convert to “convert our our good good wordswords into good into good deeds” deeds” and form and form a “new a “new alliance alliance for progress” for progress” against against poverty. poverty. “But “But this peaceful this peaceful revolution revolution of hope of hope cannot cannot become become the prey the of prey hostile of hostile powers,” powers,” continued continued Kennedy. Kennedy. “Let all “Let our allneighbors our neighbors knowknow that we thatshall we shall join with join with themthem to oppose to oppose aggression aggression or subversion or subversion anywhere anywhere in theinAmericas. the Americas. And And let every let every otherother powerpower knowknow that this that this 5 5 Hemisphere Hemisphere intends intends to remain to remain the master the master of its of own its house.” own house.” The Pax TheRomana Pax Romana inaugurated inaugurated by Augustus by Augustus at theatturn the turn of theofcomthe common mon era was eratowas be to emulated be emulated by Kennedy’s by Kennedy’s Pax Americana. Pax Americana. But was Butthat was that visionvision achievable? achievable? And could And could it be it implemented be implemented by a young, by a young, inexperiinexperiencedenced president? president? Robert Robert FrostFrost believed believed it could. it could. The test Theof test hisofvision his vision and Kennedy’s and Kennedy’s talents talents and determination and determination still lay still ahead. lay ahead. It came It came sooner sooner than than anyone anyone expected expected and closer and closer to American to American shores shores than than couldcould have have been been predicted. predicted. The name The name of theoftest thewas testCuba. was Cuba.

◊◊◊ ◊◊◊ In the In the t wentieth t wentieth century, century, CubaCuba bec ame bec ame a symbol a symbol of of America’s America’s failure failure to livetoup live to up thetohigh the high standards standards of its of own itsantiownimperial anti-imperial calling calling and the andexpectations the expectations raisedraised by anticolonial by anticolonial revolutions revolutions around around the world. the world. A former A former Spanish Spanish colony, colony, CubaCuba had played had played a catcha catchup game up game with the withrest theofrest theofregion the region whenwhen it came it came to liberation to liberation from from colonial colonial rule. rule.

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Neighboring Neighboring HaitiHaiti freedfreed itself itself from from French French overlordship overlordship in 1804, in 1804, and and Mexico Mexico declared declared its independence its independence from from SpainSpain in 1821, in 1821, the year thein year which in which Simón Simón Bolívar Bolívar won independence won independence for Venezuela for Venezuela in a bloody in a bloody war with war with the Spaniards. the Spaniards. Cuba,Cuba, though, though, remained remained loyal loyal to Madrid to Madrid throughout throughout the the first half first of half theofnineteenth the nineteenth century. century. The Cubans The Cubans first rebelled first rebelled against against their their Spanish Spanish rulersrulers in 1868, in 1868, but the butrevolt the revolt was crushed was crushed after after a ten-ayear ten-year struggle. struggle. TheyThey rebelled rebelled againagain in 1879, in 1879, and yet andagain yet again in 1895. in 1895. This This time time 6 6 they had theyahad powerful a powerful ally, the ally,United the United StatesStates of America. of America. American American troops troops landed landed on the onbeaches the beaches of Cuba of Cuba in June in June 1898.1898. The The US government US government entered entered the confl the confl ict partly ict partly in response in response to public to public demand demand to stop to Spanish stop Spanish atrocities atrocities against against the Cubans, the Cubans, widely widely covered covered and often and often exaggerated exaggerated in theinAmerican the American media. media. But behind But behind the move the move was also was the also the implementation implementation of theofdecadesthe decadesold Monroe old Monroe Doctrine. Doctrine. Back Back in 1823, in 1823, in in the midst the midst of Latin of Latin American American revolutions, revolutions, President President JamesJames Monroe Monroe had had declared declared that his thatcountry his country wouldwould treat treat any European any European interference interference in thein the region region intended intended to establish to establish control control over newly over newly independent independent statesstates as a as a “manifestation “manifestation of anof unfriendly an unfriendly disposition disposition toward toward the United the United States.” States.” The Monroe The Monroe Doctrine Doctrine was born. was born. In 1898 In 1898 it acquired it acquired a newa meaning: new meaning: the Americans the Americans were were readyready not only not to only protect to protect the independence the independence of Latin of Latin American American countries countries but also but to also bring to bring it about. it about. The Spaniards The Spaniards foundfound themselves themselves obliged obliged to withdraw to withdraw and renounce and renounce their their claims claims to Cuba. to Cuba. Cuban Cuban independence— independence— received, received, unlike unlike mostmost sovereignties sovereignties in the in the region, region, from from American American hands— hands— was proclaimed was proclaimed in 1902. in 1902. In 1820 In 1820 Thomas Thomas Jefferson Jefferson had regarded had regarded CubaCuba as a potential as a potential new US new US state.state. In 1902, In 1902, therethere was no was appetite no appetite in Washington in Washington to extend to extend American American borders borders to include to include Cuba,Cuba, but neither but neither was there was there muchmuch desiredesire to make to make it it fully fully independent. independent. The Platt The Platt Amendment Amendment to thetoUS theArmy US Army AppropriaAppropriationstions Act ofAct 1901, of 1901, named named after after its principal its principal author, author, Senator Senator Orville Orville H. H. Platt,Platt, limited limited Cuban Cuban sovereignty sovereignty by giving by giving the US thegovernment US government the right the right to have to have military military basesbases on the onisland the island and intervene and intervene in Cuba’s in Cuba’s internal internal affairs afffor airsthe forsake the sake of “good of “good governance.” governance.” The amendment The amendment established established CubaCuba as a de asfacto a de facto American American protectorate protectorate and served and served as a rallying as a rallying pointpoint for Cuban for Cuban rebelsrebels and revolutionaries, and revolutionaries, of whom of whom therethere wouldwould be nobe shortno short-

ApprAppr entice entice 9 9 age inage theindecades the decades to come. to come. The new The masters new masters against against whom whom the Cubans the Cubans 7 7 rebelled rebelled were were American, American, not Spanish. not Spanish. In allIn but allname but name CubaCuba became became a colony a colony of theofUnited the United StatesStates in thein the Caribbean. Caribbean. MostMost of theofassets the assets in theinagricultural the agricultural sector, sector, mining, mining, utili- utilities, and ties,fiand nancial financial services services endedended up inup American in American hands. hands. To safeguard To safeguard American American strategic strategic and economic and economic interests interests on the onisland, the island, the United the United StatesStates mademade alliances alliances with with the local the local landowning landowning elite elite and the and milithe military. By tary. farBythe farmost the most trusted trusted American American ally inally theinpresidential the presidential officeoffi in ce in Havana Havana became became General General Fulgencio Fulgencio Batista, Batista, who served who served as president as president of of CubaCuba between between 19401940 and 1944, and 1944, returning returning to power to power in 1952 in 1952 as a result as a result of a military of a military coup.coup. He developed He developed closeclose ties with ties with the two themost two most powerful powerful American American economic economic forcesforces on the onisland, the island, the agricultural the agricultural corporations corporations and the andMafi the aMafi clans. a clans. Gambling Gambling and prostitution and prostitution catering catering to American to American 8 8 tourists tourists became became thriving thriving industries. industries. UponUpon his return his return to Cuba, to Cuba, Batista Batista canceled canceled the impending the impending presidenpresidential elections. tial elections. His corrupt His corrupt rule antagonized rule antagonized not only not the onlypoor the poor but also but also the middle the middle class.class. WithWith elections elections canceled canceled and democracy and democracy underunder attack, attack, dissatisfi dissatisfi ed young ed young people people took took up arms. up arms. On July On 23, July1953, 23, 1953, a group a group of of young young revolutionaries revolutionaries staged staged an attack an attack on the on Moncada the Moncada Barracks Barracks in in Santiago. Santiago. The assault The assault was repelled was repelled and its and leaders its leaders arrested. arrested. Among Among the the latterlatter was awas twentya twentysix-yearsix-old yearlawyer old lawyer and descendant and descendant of a wealthy of a wealthy land-landowning owning family, family, FidelFidel Castro, Castro, who was whosentenced was sentenced to a fito fteena fifteenyear term. year term. His younger His younger brother, brother, Raúl,Raúl, and twentyand twentyfour four moremore participants participants in thein the attackattack were were also imprisoned. also imprisoned. Luckily Luckily for the forCastro the Castro brothers brothers and their and their coconspirators, coconspirators, they were they were released released in May in May 1955 1955 as Batista as Batista sought sought to improve to improve his international his international image. image. Fearing Fearing a newa arrest, new arrest, the Castro the Castro brothers brothers left Cuba left Cuba for Mexico. for Mexico. The Moncada The Moncada Barracks Barracks story story seemed seemed to betoover. be over. Batista Batista had survived had survived the assault, the assault, conducted conducted fraudulent fraudulent elections, elections, and got andthe gotrebels the rebels out ofout of the country, the country, all toall thetosatisfaction the satisfaction of hisofAmerican his American allies,allies, who wanted who wanted to safeguard to safeguard their their assetsassets without without turning turning American American and world and world publicpublic opinion opinion against against themselves. themselves. To the Tosurprise the surprise of many, of many, the Castro the Castro broth-brothers were ers were back back in Cuba in Cuba by November by November 1956,1956, with with FidelFidel leading leading a group a group of of

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Cuban Cuban and Latin and Latin American American revolutionaries. revolutionaries. TheyThey arrived arrived illegally illegally on a on a leakyleaky yacht,yacht, the Granma, the Granma, to start to start a newa revolt. new revolt. The guerrilla The guerrilla warfare warfare that would that would eventually eventually bringbring downdown Batista Batista beganbegan with with a major a major setback. setback. Government Government troops troops attacked attacked the Granma the Granma rebelsrebels soon soon after after their their landing, landing, forcing forcing themthem to seek to refuge seek refuge in theinSierra the Sierra Maestra Maestra mountains mountains of Oriente of Oriente province, province, in southeastern in southeastern Cuba.Cuba. Of the Of the initialinitial groupgroup of eightyof eightyone rebels one rebels only only nineteen, nineteen, including including FidelFidel and and Raúl Raúl Castro Castro and their and their closeclose ally, the ally,Argentinian the Argentinian doctor doctor Ernesto Ernesto “Che”“Che” Guevara, Guevara, mademade it to the it tosafety the safety of theofmountains. the mountains. It wasItawas diffiacult diffibegincult beginning,ning, but the butsmall the small groupgroup beganbegan to grow to grow in ranks, in ranks, recruiting recruiting new memnew members among bers among dissatisfi dissatisfi ed Cuban ed Cuban urbanurban youthyouth and local and local peasants. peasants. Batista’s Batista’s regime regime used used ever more ever more brutalbrutal tactics tactics to suppress to suppress the rebthe rebels, but els,that but only that only increased increased the number the number of fighters. of fighters. ThoseThose measures measures also also tarnished tarnished the image the image of theof regime the regime abroad, abroad, turning turning US public US public opinion opinion against against the Cuban the Cuban dictator. dictator. The US Thegovernment US government was obliged was obliged to to recallrecall its ambassador its ambassador to Havana to Havana and impose and impose a trade a trade embargo embargo on Cuba, on Cuba, whichwhich stopped stopped the sale the of sale arms of arms to Batista to Batista and gave and agave huge a huge boostboost to theto the rebels. rebels. The year The 1958, year 1958, whenwhen armsarms sales sales ceased, ceased, became became a turning a turning pointpoint in theinCastrothe Castroled revolution. led revolution. AfterAfter suffering suffering a major a major defeatdefeat at theathands the hands of government of government forcesforces in theinsummer, the summer, Castro Castro managed managed to regroup to regroup and and launch launch his own his own offensive. offensive. On December On December 31, the 31,diverse the diverse rebelrebel groups groups camecame together together in a battle in a battle for Santa for Santa Clara,Clara, taking taking the city theand city causing and causing enough enough panicpanic in Havana in Havana to make to make Batista Batista flee the fleecountry. the country. WithWith the dictator the dictator gone,gone, resistance resistance to thetorevolutionary the revolutionary forces, forces, whichwhich had been had been all but allwiped but wiped out only out only half ahalf yeara earlier, year earlier, collapsed. collapsed. Castro Castro staged staged a victory a victory march march on Havana, on Havana, already already in rebel in rebel hands, hands, and entered and entered the city theon city January on January 8, 1959. 8, 1959. He was Henot wasabout not about to repeat to repeat the mistakes the mistakes of of Batista, Batista, who had who released had released him from him from prison prison underunder international international pres- pressure. sure. Enemies Enemies of theofregime the regime wouldwould be punished be punished mercilessly, mercilessly, whatever whatever the world the world mightmight say about say about it. Hundreds it. Hundreds of oldofregime old-regime officials officials were were dismissed dismissed and put andon puttrial, on trial, and close and close to two to hundred two hundred were were executed executed by firing by firing squad. squad. Leading Leading figures figures of theofnew the regime, new regime, Raúl Raúl Castro Castro and and Che Guevara Che Guevara conducted conducted purges purges and persecuted and persecuted enemies. enemies. A corrupt A corrupt and and

ApprAppr entice entice 11 11 highly highly unpopular unpopular dictator dictator was gone, was gone, replaced replaced by a by presumably a presumably incor-incorruptible ruptible and charismatic and charismatic new one. new one. The Cuban The Cuban revolution revolution had succeeded, had succeeded, but what but what that meant that meant was not was not yet clear yet clear eithereither to itstoleaders its leaders or to or itstosupporters its supporters and opponents, and opponents, both both in Cuba in Cuba and abroad. and abroad. Direct Direct American American investment investment increased increased during during the the first year first of year Castro’s of Castro’s rule, rule, but that but changed that changed quickly quickly as theasgovernment the government embarked embarked on badly on badly needed needed agrarian agrarian reform. reform. In May In 1959 May 1959 Castro Castro lim- limited the itedsize theof size agricultural of agricultural estates estates to onetothousand one thousand acres;acres; the rest thewere rest were to be to confi be scated confiscated and redistributed and redistributed by thebygovernment the government without without compencompensationsation to thetolandowners. the landowners. In July In1960 July 1960 the government the government nationalized nationalized all all US-owned US-owned businesses businesses and properties: and properties: sincesince the revolutionary the revolutionary governgovernmentment needed needed resources resources and lacked and lacked money, money, no compensation no compensation was off was ered offered for the forconfi the scated confiscated properties. properties. In response In response President President Eisenhower Eisenhower closed closed 9 9 American American markets markets to Cuban to Cuban sugar,sugar, by farbythe farisland’s the island’s mainmain export. export. The United The United StatesStates foundfound itself itself in a situation in a situation akin akin to thetoone the that one that the old theimperial old imperial powers, powers, Britain Britain and France, and France, had faced had faced in their in their AsianAsian and African and African colonies colonies and dependencies. and dependencies. ThereThere was also was the alsoprospect the prospect of rising of rising communist communist and proand communist pro-communist movements movements in Cuba in Cuba and and directdirect SovietSoviet involvement involvement in theinregion— the region— a pattern a pattern that repeated that repeated itself itself throughout throughout the former the former colonial colonial world.world. In April In April 1959,1959, on a on visita to visit theto the United United StatesStates at theat invitation the invitation of theof American the American Society Society of Newspaof Newspaper Editors, per Editors, Castro Castro mademade a statement a statement distancing distancing himself himself from from com- communism. munism. “I know “I know the world the world thinks thinks of us,ofwe us,are weCommunists, are Communists, and of and of course course I haveI have said very said clear very clear that we thatare wenot areCommunists; not Communists; very clear.” very clear.” But things But things were were changing changing rapidly. rapidly. In February In February 1960,1960, CubaCuba was viswas visited by ited one byofone theoftop theadvisers top advisers to Nikita to Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev, the old theBolshevik old Bolshevik and seasoned and seasoned politician politician Anastas Anastas Mikoyan. Mikoyan. He urged He urged his boss his boss in Mosin Moscow to cow provide to provide economic economic assistance assistance to thetoyoung the young revolutionary revolutionary regime. regime. In May, In May, Khrushchev Khrushchev mademade a public a public statement statement threatening threatening the United the United StatesStates with with nuclear nuclear armsarms over Cuban over Cuban independence. independence. It wasItthe wasMonroe the Monroe Doctrine Doctrine in reverse. in reverse. The Soviet The Soviet Union Union was prepared was prepared to protect to protect the indethe independence pendence of Latin of Latin American American countries countries from from the United the United States. States. As far Asasfar Eisenhower as Eisenhower was concerned, was concerned, American American interests interests were were at at

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stake,stake, and communism and communism was on wasthe onmarch the march in Cuba, in Cuba, whether whether Castro Castro was awas communist a communist or not. orLuckily, not. Luckily, the president’s the president’s advisers advisers had ahad plana to plan to deal with deal with the crisis. the crisis. Only Only a fewayears few years earlier, earlier, in June in June 1954,1954, the CIA the had CIA had executed executed a successful a successful coup coup in Guatemala, in Guatemala, wherewhere land land reform reform threatthreatened ened the interests the interests of theofUnited the United FruitFruit Company. Company. In March In March 1960,1960, with with agrarian agrarian reform reform in Cuba in Cuba already already underway underway but confi but scation confiscation of Ameriof American commercial can commercial properties properties not yet notannounced, yet announced, Eisenhower Eisenhower decided decided to to bringbring aboutabout regime regime change change in Cuba. in Cuba. Castro Castro was to was betoremoved be removed from from powerpower in theinsame the same way he way had heacquired had acquired it: through it: through a popular a popular uprising uprising initiated initiated by political by political exilesexiles returning returning to Cuba. to Cuba. The CIA The prepared CIA prepared a plan, a plan, but Eisenhower but Eisenhower did not didhave not have time time to carry to carry out the outproject. the project. It wasItpassed was passed 10 10 on instead on instead to thetonew the president, new president, John John Kennedy. Kennedy.

◊◊◊ ◊◊◊ Allen Allen Dulles Dulles was was a graaygr haired, ay- haired, pipe-pipesmoking smoking veter veter an an of USofespionage US espionage and aand holdover a holdover from from the Eisenhower the Eisenhower administration. administration. Director Director of theofCIA, the CIA, he first he presented first presented his plan his for planthe forinvasion the invasion of Cuba of Cuba to Kennedy to Kennedy on January on January 28, one 28,week one week after after the inauguration. the inauguration. The CIA The deputy CIA deputy director director for plans, for plans, Richard Richard M. Bissell, M. Bissell, the former the former administrator administrator of theofMarshall the Marshall Plan Plan in postwar in postwar Germany, Germany, was the wasprinthe principal cipal author author of theofplan, the plan, whichwhich proposed proposed to land to land on Cuba on Cuba hundreds hundreds of of guerrilla guerrilla fighters fighters recruited recruited from from the ranks the ranks of Cuban of Cuban exilesexiles and trained and trained in CIA in camps CIA camps in Guatemala. in Guatemala. Bissell Bissell recommended recommended the establishment the establishment of a beachhead of a beachhead on Cuban on Cuban territory territory with with accessaccess to thetosea theand seaan and airstrip an airstrip that could that could serveserve as a base as a base of operations of operations for the forfuture the future Cuban Cuban governgovernment.ment. He hoped He hoped that the thatinvasion the invasion wouldwould inspire inspire a popular a popular uprising uprising against against Castro’s Castro’s regime regime but did butnot didcount not count on that. on Bissell that. Bissell envisioned envisioned the the next stage next stage of theofoperation the operation as “anasovert, “an overt, openopen US initiative US initiative to institute to institute a a military military occupation occupation of theofisland the island by a composite by a composite OAS OAS [Organization [Organization of of American American States] States] force force in order in order to puttoaput stopa to stop thetocivil the war.” civil 11war.”11 The last Thepart lastof part theofplan the made plan made somesome of Kennedy’s of Kennedy’s advisers advisers nervous. nervous. General General Lyman Lyman Lemnitzer, Lemnitzer, the chairman the chairman of theofJoint the Joint Chiefs Chiefs of Staff of ,Staff, suggested suggested that the thatforce the force of some of some six tosix eight to eight thousand thousand men men currently currently in in

ApprAppr entice entice 13 13 training training was inadequate was inadequate to achieve to achieve the goal, the goal, givengiven the Castro the Castro governgovernment’s ment’s continuing continuing military military buildup. buildup. He suggested He suggested that “fi that nal“fi planning nal planning will have will have to include to include agreed agreed plansplans for providing for providing additional additional support support for for the Cuban the Cuban force— force— presumably presumably such such support support to be to US.” be US.” Lemnitzer Lemnitzer knewknew that the thatAmerican the American military military wouldwould have have to intervene to intervene and wanted and wanted clar- clarity onity the onmatter. the matter. Secretary Secretary of State of State DeanDean RuskRusk had diff haderent different concerns, concerns, predicting predicting an international an international backlash backlash against against the invasion. the invasion. His people His people foresaw foresaw “grave “grave political political dangers dangers to ourtoposition our position throughout throughout the Western the Western hemisphere hemisphere in any inovert any overt military military actionaction not authorized not authorized and supported and supported by thebyOrganization the Organization of American of American States.” States.” Kennedy Kennedy sent his sentadvisers his advisers back back to thetodrawing the drawing board. board. The Defense The Defense Department Department was ordered was ordered to make to make a military a military assessment assessment of theofoperathe operation and tionthe andState the State Department Department to work to work on getting on getting the Latin the Latin American American countries countries on board. on board. It wasIt “agreed was “agreed that the thatUnited the United StatesStates mustmust makemake entirely entirely clear clear that its that position its position with with respect respect to thetoCuban the Cuban Government Government is is currently currently governed governed by itsby firm its opposition firm opposition to Communist to Communist penetration penetration of of the American the American Republics, Republics, and not andby not any byhostility any hostility to democratic to democratic socialsocial revolution revolution and economic and economic reform.” reform.” How How to distinguish to distinguish support support for demfor democratic ocratic socialsocial revolution revolution from from opposition opposition to communism to communism in theinCuban the Cuban 12 12 situation situation was not wasentirely not entirely clear.clear. Kennedy Kennedy continued continued to meet to meet with with his advisers his advisers in theincourse the course of Febof Februaryruary and March and March 1961,1961, tryingtrying to figure to figure out whether out whether the invasion the invasion plan plan submitted submitted by thebyCIA thewas CIAindeed was indeed the best theway besttoway deal towith deal the withproblem. the problem. The president The president was caught was caught between between a number a number of confl of confl ictingicting agendas. agendas. He was He determined was determined to stop to the stopspread the spread of communism of communism to thetoWestern the Western Hemisphere, Hemisphere, but he but was he also was eager also eager to present to present a newa face new to face theto“sister the “sister republics” republics” in Latin in Latin America, America, staying staying away away from from the use theof use American of American military military might. might. Also Also at stake at stake were were US-Soviet US-Soviet relations, relations, whichwhich Kennedy Kennedy wanted wanted to improve. to improve. He was Hetold wasthat toldtime that time was running was running out, that out,he that had he had to act,toand act,he and probably he probably felt that feltthe thatonly the way onlyto way reconcile to reconcile his confl his confl ictingicting agendas agendas was to was take to clandestine take clandestine actionaction in Cuba. in Cuba. At a meeting At a meeting with with his advisers his advisers on February on February 8, 1961, 8, 1961, Kennedy Kennedy sug- suggested gested the infi theltration infiltration of theoftask the force task force in small in small groups, groups, with with their their first first big operation big operation to betoconducted be conducted from from Cuban Cuban bases,bases, not “as notan “asinvasion an invasion

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force force sent by sent thebyYankees.” the Yankees.” Neither Neither the CIA the nor CIAthe normilitary the military liked liked that that idea. idea. On March On March 11, the 11,CIA’s the CIA’s Bissell Bissell presented presented a memorandum a memorandum that that effectively effectively rejected rejected Kennedy’s Kennedy’s idea of idea infiofltration infiltration of small of small groups, groups, argu-arguing that ingwithout that without air support air support and tanks and tanks guerrilla guerrilla groups groups had little had chance little chance of making of making it from it from the beaches the beaches to thetomountains. the mountains. Bissell Bissell recommended recommended instead instead “landing “landing in full inforce.” full force.” Kennedy Kennedy was not waspleased. not pleased. OnceOnce again,again, he sent he the sentCIA the back CIA back to thetodrawing the drawing board, board, asking asking for a plan for a that planwould that would 13 13 makemake the US theinvolvement US involvement “less “less obvious.” obvious.” Four Four days days later, later, on March on March 15, Bissell 15, Bissell proposed proposed an alternative an alternative plan.plan. He still Heinsisted still insisted on airon support air support but suggested but suggested that the thatplanes the planes to be to used be used in theinoperation the operation be camoufl be camoufl aged aged as Cuban as Cuban ratherrather than than American. American. To To makemake the claim the claim work,work, an airstrip an airstrip on Cuban on Cuban territory territory wouldwould be needed be needed to serve to serve as theasbase the base of operations of operations for alleged for alleged anti- Castro anti- Castro rebelsrebels in thein the Cuban Cuban Air Force. Air Force. Thus,Thus, suggested suggested Bissell, Bissell, the invasion the invasion force force wouldwould immediately immediately have have to take to take over over an area an area with with a landing a landing strip.strip. Besides, Besides, givengiven that deployment that deployment wouldwould take place take place in anin “endocuticular an “endocuticular manner,” manner,” the territory the territory captured captured by thebylanding the landing force force wouldwould have have to be to suitable be suitable for for prolonged prolonged defense. defense. Bissell Bissell proposed proposed the beaches the beaches of theofBahía the Bahía de Cochide Cochinos (Bay nos of (Bay Pigs), of Pigs), whichwhich were were surrounded surrounded by marshes. by marshes. The location The location was was far from far from the mountains the mountains but had buttwo hadairstrips two airstrips suitable suitable for landing for landing B-26 B-26 bombers bombers and could and could be defended be defended effectively effectively by a by relatively a relatively smallsmall task task force.force. Kennedy Kennedy approved approved the new the plan new with plan with one caveat. one caveat. To ensure To ensure deni-deniabilityability he wanted he wanted a night a night landing landing on the onisland, the island, with with the ships the ships carrying carrying the task the force task force to be to removed be removed from from the area the by area dawn. by dawn. Kenned Kenned y decided y decided to approve to approve the invasion the invasion during during the Easter the Easter break,break, following following discussions discussions with with his father his father and his anddecision his decision to accept to accept Khru-Khrushchev’s shchev’s offer off of er a summit of a summit meeting meeting at Kennedy’s at Kennedy’s earliest earliest convenience. convenience. WithWith the invasion the invasion planned planned for Sunday, for Sunday, AprilApril 16, Kennedy 16, Kennedy decided decided to to spendspend that weekend that weekend away away from from the White the White House House at hisatfamily his family retreat retreat in Glen in Glen Ora, Virginia. Ora, Virginia. SinceSince the media the media knewknew his whereabouts, his whereabouts, this was this was one more one more ploy to ploy deny to deny involvement involvement in theinplanned the planned invasion invasion not only not on only on the part the of part American of American forcesforces but also but on also that on of that theofpresident. the president. Far from Far from relaxing relaxing at hisathideaway, his hideaway, Kennedy Kennedy wouldwould be onbe and onoff and the offphone the phone againagain

ApprAppr entice entice 15 15 and again, and again, following following with with growing growing anxiety anxiety the launch the launch of theofoperation, the operation, 14 14 whichwhich was codenamed was codenamed “Zapata.” “Zapata.”

◊◊◊ ◊◊◊ The The ships ships c arrying c arrying Brigade Brigade 2506, 2506, a force a force of close of close to to 1,4001,400 Cuban Cuban exiles, exiles, left the leftshores the shores of Nicaragua of Nicaragua and headed and headed for Cuba for Cuba on the onnight the night of April of April 14. At14. 6:00 At 6:00 a.m. a.m. on April on April 15, eight 15, eight B-26 Bbombers 26 bombers painted painted in theincolors the colors of theofCuban the Cuban air force air force and piloted and piloted by Cuban by Cuban exilesexiles took took off from off from airstrips airstrips in Nicaragua in Nicaragua and headed and headed for Cuban for Cuban airfields airfields with with the task the of task destroying of destroying Castro’s Castro’s air force air force whilewhile it wasit still was on stillthe on the ground. ground. The raid The was raid declared was declared a success, a success, with with the attackers the attackers unaware unaware 15 15 that quite that quite a fewaoffew Castro’s of Castro’s planes planes had remained had remained undamaged. undamaged. FidelFidel Castro Castro fought fought back back in theincourt the court of public of public opinion. opinion. That That day day Raúl Raúl Roa, Roa, the Cuban the Cuban foreign foreign minister, minister, who who happened happened to betoinbeNew in New York,York, managed managed to convince to convince the UN theleadership UN leadership to convene to convene an emergency an emergency meeting meeting of theof Political the Political and Security and Security Committee Committee to discuss to discuss the airthe airstrikes, strikes, whichwhich he characterized he characterized as a prelude as a prelude to antoAmericanan Americanbacked backed invasion invasion of theofisland. the island. The American The American representative representative in theinUN, the Adlai UN, Adlai Stevenson, Stevenson, repeated repeated assurances assurances givengiven by President by President Kennedy Kennedy threethree days days earlier earlier that there that there wouldwould be nobe involvement no involvement by thebyAmerican the American military military or or American American citizens citizens in theinCuban the Cuban crisis.crisis. Countering Countering Roa’sRoa’s claims claims that itthat it was US wasplanes US planes that bombed that bombed Cuba,Cuba, Stevenson Stevenson produced produced a photograph a photograph of a plane of a plane that had thatlanded had landed earlier earlier that day thatatday Miami at Miami airport airport in Florida. in Florida. It wasItawas B-26 a Bbomber 26 bomber painted painted in theincolors the colors of theofCuban the Cuban air force, air force, and and its pilot its pilot had told had reporters told reporters that he thathad he taken had taken part in part a bombing in a bombing raid raid organized organized and executed and executed by antiby Castro anti- Castro officers offiin cers hisincountry’s his country’s air force. air force. Unbeknownst Unbeknownst to Stevenson, to Stevenson, the landing the landing of theofplane the plane was part was of part a CIA of a CIA 16 16 operation operation aimed aimed at misleading at misleading international international publicpublic opinion. opinion. WithWith shipsships in the in water the water and planes and planes in the in air, the the air, CIAthe trained CIA-trained teamsteams still needed still needed a final a fi gonal ahead go-ahead fromfrom President President Kennedy. Kennedy. His deadHis deadline for linethat for decision that decision was noon was noon on Sunday, on Sunday, AprilApril 16. The 16. day Thebegan day began on on a soura note. sour note. Articles Articles published published that morning that morning in some in some of theofleading the leading US US

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newspapers newspapers exposed exposed the CIA the operation CIA operation involving involving the plane the plane landing landing at at Miami Miami as a coveras a coverup ofup a USof abacked US-backed attackattack on Cuba. on Cuba. Reporters Reporters noticed noticed that the thatgun the on gun the onB-the 26 Bhad 26not hadbeen not been fired fiand redthat and the thatairplane the airplane was was a diffaerent different model model fromfrom thosethose used used by thebyCubans. the Cubans. Kennedy Kennedy was vacilwas vacillating. lating. He and He his andwife, his wife, Jacqueline, Jacqueline, went went to Mass to Mass at theatlocal the local Catholic Catholic church church and then and then had lunch had lunch with with family family members. members. AfterAfter that, that, the presithe president dent went went off tooff play to golf. play The golf. noon The noon deadline deadline for his fordecision his decision had long had long passed, passed, but he butcould he could not make not make up his upmind. his mind. Finally, Finally, he returned he returned to to his house his house around around 1:45 p.m. 1:45 p.m. and called and called Bissell Bissell at theatCIA: the CIA: the invasion the invasion couldcould go ahead. go ahead. Late on Latethe onnight the night of April of April 16, the 16,landing the landing of Brigade of Brigade 25062506 beganbegan at multiple at multiple locations locations on the onisland. the island. In theInearly the early hourshours of April of April 17 four 17 four transport transport shipsships approached approached PlayaPlaya GirónGirón in theinBay the of Bay Pigs. of Pigs. It wasIt an was an isolated isolated placeplace and, with and, with no Cuban no Cuban military military unitsunits around, around, the exiles the exiles eas- easily overwhelmed ily overwhelmed the local the local militia militia fighters. fighters. But they But were they were in forina for major a major surprise: surprise: the remote the remote location location of theoflanding the landing failedfailed to ensure to ensure its secrecy. its secrecy. A Cuban A Cuban radioradio operator operator managed managed to broadcast to broadcast newsnews of theofinvasion the invasion before before his unit his was unitovertaken was overtaken by thebybrigade. the brigade. WhenWhen Castro Castro was alerted, was alerted, he ordered he ordered the airplanes the airplanes that had thatsurvived had survived the initial the initial attackattack (including (including Lockheed Lockheed T-33 fiT-33 ghter fighter jets and jetsBand 26 Bbombers) 26 bombers) into action. into action. The invaders The invaders had little had little air cover: air cover: the surviving the surviving Cuban Cuban planes planes out- outnumbered numbered the six the aircraft six aircraft provided provided by thebyCIA theto CIA support to support Brigade Brigade 2506.2506. TheyThey wouldwould soon soon lose two lose ships, two ships, the USS the USS Houston Houston and the andUSS the USS Rio Rio Escondido, Escondido, whichwhich carried carried their their supplies supplies of fuel, of ammunition, fuel, ammunition, and mediand medicine. cine. Besides, Besides, the coral the coral reefs reefs that CIA that scouts CIA scouts had mistaken had mistaken for seaweed for seaweed prevented prevented the rest the of rest theoftransport the transport shipsships from from reaching reaching the beaches, the beaches, and the andexiles the exiles had to had usetoboats use boats to gettothere, get there, losinglosing somesome of their of their weap-weapons and onsammunition and ammunition in theinhigh the high water.water. WhatWhat they managed they managed to save to was save was wet and wetoften and often inoperable. inoperable. ShortShort of weapons, of weapons, supplies, supplies, and ammunition, and ammunition, they they were were also outnumbered also outnumbered and outgunned and outgunned once once Castro’s Castro’s reinforcereinforcements ments beganbegan to arrive to arrive at theatBay the of Bay Pigs— of Pigs— altogether altogether closeclose to twenty to twenty thousand thousand policepolice officers, officers, soldiers, soldiers, and members and members of local of local militias. militias. TheyThey 17 17 were were assisted assisted by crews by crews in Sovietin Sovietmademade T-34 tanks. T-34 tanks. The CIA Theasked CIA asked Kennedy Kennedy to authorize to authorize the use theofuse USofairplanes US airplanes to help to help

ApprAppr entice entice 17 17 the invasion the invasion force,force, but he but refused. he refused. DeanDean RuskRusk of theofState the State Department Department was furious was furious that by that withholding by withholding information information aboutabout the alleged the alleged Cuban Cuban planeplane that had that landed had landed in Miami, in Miami, the CIA the had CIA put hadAdlai put Adlai Stevenson Stevenson in in the position the position of lying of lying to a world to a world audience. audience. RuskRusk was now was determined now determined to to kill CIA kill plans CIA plans for any for airstrikes any airstrikes that could that could not be notcredibly be credibly attributed attributed to thetoplanes the planes taking taking off from off from airstrips airstrips in Cuba. in Cuba. Kennedy, Kennedy, with with whom whom RuskRusk had spoken had spoken by phone by phone after after 9:00 9:00 p.m. p.m. on April on April 16, was 16,of was theofsame the same opinion. opinion. As far Asasfarheaswas he concerned, was concerned, he had he never had never authorized authorized such such strikes strikes and now and gave now gave an order an order to cancel to cancel thosethose already already planned planned by the by the CIA. CIA. The CIA The had CIAto had accept to accept the president’s the president’s verdict, verdict, but, as but, theaslanding the landing beganbegan in theinearly the early hourshours of April of April 17, General 17, General Charles Charles Cabell Cabell of theofCIA the CIA calledcalled RuskRusk at home at home and asked and asked him to him reconsider. to reconsider. He made He made the same the same plea to plea thetopresident. the president. But the Butorder the order remained remained in force: in force: invasion— invasion— yes, yes, air support— air support— no. The no. invaders The invaders floundered floundered on the onbeaches the beaches of theofBay the Bay of Pigs, of Pigs, fighting fighting now for nowtheir for their lives,lives, not for nota for chance a chance to break to break out and out and 18 18 launch launch a nationwide a nationwide uprising. uprising. On Monday, On Monday, AprilApril 17, Kennedy 17, Kennedy was back was back at theatWhite the White House, House, keep-keeping his ingregular his regular schedule schedule of offiofcial offimeetings cial meetings and meals and meals whilewhile tryingtrying to to figurefigure out what out what to doto next. do next. Bruised Bruised politically politically but not butyet notmilitarily, yet militarily, he he refused refused a CIAa request CIA request to usetonow use camoufl now camoufl aged aged American American bombers bombers to to support support the struggling the struggling troops troops on the onCuban the Cuban beaches. beaches. But in But theinearly the early hourshours of April of April 19, with 19, with things things goinggoing from from bad to bad worse, to worse, he yielded, he yielded, allowing allowing the use theofuse camoufl of camoufl aged aged planes planes piloted piloted by Americans by Americans in supin support port of theofinvaders, the invaders, but the butpilots the pilots were were not allowed not allowed to fight to fienemy ght enemy aircraft, aircraft, and their and their mission mission was limited was limited to a few to a hours. few hours. The military The military commanders commanders seized seized the opportunity the opportunity but failed but failed to take to take advantage advantage of of it. Because it. Because of theoftime the time difference difference between between Nicaragua Nicaragua and Cuba, and Cuba, the the planes planes arrived arrived later later than than expected. expected. Two of Two them of them were were shot down, shot down, and and four four American American pilotspilots went went missing. missing. RadioRadio Havana Havana declared declared that the that the Cubans Cubans had recovered had recovered the body the body of one of of one theofAmericans. the Americans. By now By the now the 19 19 venture venture had turned had turned into ainto complete a complete disaster. disaster. Kennedy Kennedy wouldwould nevernever againagain authorize authorize even even limited limited use ofuse theofUS the US Air Force. Air Force. By Thursday, By Thursday, AprilApril 20, it20, wasitall was over. all over. The invaders The invaders had spent had spent two and two aand halfa days half days resisting resisting the inevitable. the inevitable. Lacking Lacking air support, air support, low low

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on ammunition, on ammunition, outnumbered, outnumbered, outgunned, outgunned, and increasingly and increasingly demoraldemoralized, ized, they they surrendered. surrendered. The casualties The casualties included included moremore than than 100 dead 100 dead and more and more than than 360 wounded; 360 wounded; closeclose to 1,200 to 1,200 were were takentaken prisoner. prisoner. Cas- Castro’s losses tro’s losses were were greater, greater, but itbut diditnot didmatter: not matter: neither neither he nor hehis norarmed his armed forcesforces surrendered. surrendered. It wasItawas stunning a stunning victory victory for Castro for Castro and his andregime his regime 20 20 and an and astounding an astounding defeatdefeat for Kennedy. for Kennedy. Kennedy Kennedy had lost hadon lost both on both fronts, fronts, militarily militarily and politically. and politically. Political Political victory victory turned turned out toout be to impossible be impossible without without a military a military one. In one. theIndays the days and months and months that followed, that followed, analyzing analyzing what what had gone had gone wrong wrong with with the the Bay of Bay Pigs of Pigs invasion, invasion, Kennedy Kennedy blamed blamed himself himself first, fibut rst,then but then went went on on to blame to blame the CIA the and CIAthe andmilitary, the military, not the notState the State Department Department and those and those who had whoadvised had advised him against him against an overt an overt US military US military operation. operation. As farAsasfar as Kennedy Kennedy was concerned, was concerned, the CIA the and CIA the andmilitary the military had promised had promised him him something something they could they could not deliver not deliver and set anda trap set ato trap force to force him into himainto milia military operation tary operation that he thatdid henot didwant not want to authorize. to authorize. “In a“In parliamentary a parliamentary government, government, I’d have I’d have to resign. to resign. But in But this in government, this government, I can’t, I can’t, so you so you 21 21 and Allen and Allen [Dulles] [Dulles] have have to go,” tohe go,” told heBissell. told Bissell.

◊◊◊ ◊◊◊ Before Before the the end end of the of the year, year, bothboth Bissell Bissell and and Dulles Dulles were were gone.gone. The chairman The chairman of theofJoint the Joint Chiefs Chiefs of Staff of ,Staff General , General Lem-Lemnitzer, nitzer, who who had kept had kept insisting insisting on anoninvasion an invasion of Cuba, of Cuba, was removed was removed from from his post his in post September in September 1962.1962. Even Even though though somesome of theofkey theparticikey participantspants in theinBay theofBay Pigs of debacle Pigs debacle left the leftscene, the scene, mistrust mistrust and suspicion and suspicion between between the president the president and the andgenerals the generals remained. remained. Each Each side blamed side blamed the other the other for the fordisaster. the disaster. If theIfgenerals the generals wanted wanted to go to back go back to Cuba to Cuba and and carrycarry out the outinvasion the invasion properly, properly, rectifying rectifying their their humiliating humiliating defeat, defeat, the the president president did his didbest histo best deny to deny themthem that opportunity. that opportunity. ThereThere was one waskey one key benefi benefi ciary ciary of theofAmerican the American blameblame game:game: NikitaNikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev.

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o world leader watched John Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban invasion more carefully and was prepared to draw from it more far-reaching conclusions than the sixty-sevenyear-old leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev. Fat, bold, full of energy, prone to bravado, theatrics, and often bluff, Khrushchev cut a very different figure from that of the young American president. Born to poverty and low social status, he was also Kennedy’s complete opposite in upbringing, career trajectory, and political ideology. If the young Kennedy’s ambitions were driven by a desire to live up to the expectations of his strong-willed father, Khrushchev’s were inspired by his mother’s desire to see her son succeed in life, unlike her weak husband, considered to be the failure in the family. If Kennedy received the best education his country could provide, Khrushchev never graduated from college. If Kennedy’s only experience of managing people was limited to his command of PT-109, the patrol torpedo boat during the war, Khrushchev had spent most of his life overseeing big projects and huge numbers of people. If Kennedy had prepared

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himself himself his entire his entire life for lifeinvolvement for involvement in international in international politics, politics, Khru-Khrushchev shchev was fiwas rst exposed first exposed to highto highlevel level diplomacy diplomacy after after he turned he turned sixty.sixty. ThereThere was also was aalso great a great age diff ageerence difference between between the two themen. two men. The RusThe Russian Revolution sian Revolution of 1917 of was 1917the wasturning the turning pointpoint of Khrushchev’s of Khrushchev’s life and life and career. career. Kennedy, Kennedy, twentytwentythreethree yearsyears younger younger than than his Soviet his Soviet countercounterpart, part, was just wasborn just born in that in year. that 1year.1 Khrushchev Khrushchev and his andadvisers, his advisers, who were who were unhappy unhappy with with the secret the secret U-2 overfl U-2 overfl ightsights of Soviet of Soviet territory territory ordered ordered by Dwight by Dwight Eisenhower Eisenhower and and his administration, his administration, first noticed first noticed John John Kennedy Kennedy in July in 1960, July 1960, whenwhen the the young young senator senator from from Massachusetts Massachusetts won won his party’s his party’s nomination nomination for for president president of theofUnited the United States. States. To many To many in Moscow in Moscow he seemed he seemed less less toughtough than than Richard Richard Nixon, Nixon, whom whom Khrushchev Khrushchev had had had ahad chance a chance to to size up size during up during his visit his to visit Moscow to Moscow the previous the previous year, year, and more and more suscepsusceptible to tible Khrushchev’s to Khrushchev’s subterfuge subterfuge and intimidation. and intimidation. Kennedy Kennedy appeared appeared to believe to believe in a missile in a missile gap between gap between the Soviet the Soviet Union Union and the andUnited the United StatesStates favoring favoring the former— the former— a notion a notion fed not fedonly not by only thebySoviet the Soviet success success with with Sputnik Sputnik but also butby also Khrushchev’s by Khrushchev’s own fi own ery fi rhetoric, ery rhetoric, and one andthat one that Eisenhower’s Eisenhower’s U-2 spy U-2flspy ights flights were were threatening threatening to debunk. to debunk. Khrushchev Khrushchev wanted wanted to help to Kennedy help Kennedy win the winelection the election and ordered and ordered his KGB his KGB aidesaides to doto alldo they all could they could to achieve to achieve that goal. that goal. The KGB The KGB com- complied,plied, setting setting up a number up a number of meetings of meetings that in that today’s in today’s parlance parlance wouldwould qualify qualify as nothing as nothing less than less than “collusion” “collusion” between between Kennedy’s Kennedy’s presidenpresidential campaign tial campaign and the andKremlin. the Kremlin. SoonSoon after after Kennedy Kennedy had won had his wonparhis party’s presidential ty’s presidential nomination, nomination, YuriiYurii Barsukov, Barsukov, a KGB a KGB officer offi posing cer posing as a as a reporter reporter for the forSoviet the Soviet newspaper newspaper Izvestiia, Izvestiia, knocked knocked on the onoffi theceoffi door ce door of noof less noaless figure a figure than than Robert Robert Kennedy, Kennedy, who was whorunning was running his brother’s his brother’s electoral electoral campaign. campaign. He asked He asked Robert Robert what what Moscow Moscow couldcould do to do help to his help his brother. brother. According According to thetomemoirs the memoirs of theofchief the chief of theofKGB the KGB station station in in Washington, Washington, Aleksandr Aleksandr Feklisov, Feklisov, Robert Robert drewdrew asideaside the curtain the curtain cover-covering the ingmap the map of theofUnited the United StatesStates with with projected projected numbers numbers of potential of potential Democratic Democratic and Republican and Republican votesvotes in every in every state.state. He invited He invited Barsukov Barsukov to write to write downdown the numbers, the numbers, whichwhich the KGB the KGB officer offidid. cer Robert did. Robert then then suggested suggested that the thatbest the strategy best strategy for Moscow for Moscow was neutrality: was neutrality: once once his his 2 2 brother brother won the wonelection, the election, betterbetter relations relations couldcould be established. be established.

M aster M aster of the of the Ga me Ga me 21 21 Throughout Throughout the summer the summer of 1960, of 1960, NikitaNikita Khrushchev Khrushchev and the andSoviet the Soviet propaganda propaganda machine machine followed followed Robert Robert Kennedy’s Kennedy’s advice, advice, doingdoing nothing nothing to voice to voice support support for John for John Kennedy. Kennedy. Khrushchev Khrushchev lambasted lambasted the Eisenthe Eisenhowerhower administration administration instead, instead, suggesting suggesting that the thatmissile the missile gap Kennedy gap Kennedy was talking was talking aboutabout reallyreally existed. existed. In September In September 1960,1960, in theinmiddle the middle of of the presidential the presidential campaign, campaign, Khrushchev Khrushchev popped popped up inup theinUnited the United StatesStates to speak to speak at theatUN theGeneral UN General Assembly. Assembly. Going Going on the onattack the attack as always, as always, he asked: he asked: “Do you “Dowant you want to make to make us turn us turn the arms the arms race into race ainto competia competition? tion? We do We not dowant not want that, that, but we butare wenot areafraid not afraid of it. of Weit.will Webeat will you! beat you! Our missile Our missile production production is on is a conveyor on a conveyor belt.”belt.” If anyIfAmerican any American thought thought that Kennedy that Kennedy was mistaken was mistaken in speaking in speaking of a missile of a missile gap, there gap, there was the was the leaderleader of theofSoviet the Soviet state state himself himself conficonfi rming rming the words the words of theofjunior the junior 3 senator senator from from Massachusetts. Massachusetts. The3missile The missile gap rhetoric gap rhetoric helped helped Kennedy Kennedy win the winpresidential the presidential race. race. At 10:00 At 10:00 a.m. a.m. on December on December 1, 1960, 1, 1960, less than less than a month a month after after Ken- Kennedy’s nedy’s election, election, the KGB the KGB agentagent YuriiYurii Barsukov Barsukov once once againagain knocked knocked on on the door the door of Robert of Robert Kennedy’s Kennedy’s office.offi “Mr. ce. “Mr. B, Izvestiia B, Izvestiia Daily,Daily, coming coming in,” in,” read read Robert’s Robert’s calendar calendar that day. that In day.hisInreport his report on the onmeeting, the meeting, whichwhich went went all the allway theto way Khrushchev, to Khrushchev, Barsukov Barsukov notednoted that Robert that Robert was ready was ready to speak to speak on behalf on behalf of hisofbrother, his brother, not just nothimself. just himself. “Kennedy “Kennedy expects,” expects,” read read the report, the report, “to sign “to sign a nuclear a nuclear test-ban test-treaty ban treaty as early as early as 1961 as 1961 if if both both sidessides take atake number a number of steps of steps to accommodate to accommodate each each other.” other.” Robert Robert Kennedy Kennedy also assured also assured the Kremlin the Kremlin emissary emissary that the thatpresident the president “would “would do alldoheallcould he could to reach to reach agreement agreement on the onBerlin the Berlin problem.” problem.” Kennedy Kennedy endedended the meeting the meeting by hinting by hinting at theat possibility the possibility of Americanof AmericanSovietSoviet cooperation cooperation with with regard regard to common to common concerns concerns aboutabout China, China, telling telling Bar- Barsukovsukov that “in thatthe “innext the few nextyears few years the fundamental the fundamental problem problem wouldwould not not 4 4 be Sovietbe SovietAmerican American relations relations but Washington’s but Washington’s relations relations with with China.” China.” Khrushchev Khrushchev couldcould not fail nottofail betopleased be pleased by what by what he read he read in Barin Barsukov’s sukov’s report. report. On January On January 21, 1961, 21, 1961, the day theafter day after Kennedy’s Kennedy’s inauguinauguration, ration, he ordered he ordered the publication the publication of theofyoung the young president’s president’s inaugural inaugural address address in theinSoviet the Soviet media. media. He also Hedid alsosomething did something that he that had herefused had refused to do to fordoEisenhower, for Eisenhower, releasing releasing two American two American pilotspilots then then in Soviet in Soviet cus- custody. tody. Captains Captains Freeman Freeman BruceBruce Olmstead Olmstead and John and John McCone McCone had been had been

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piloting piloting an RBan47H RB-47H Stratojet Stratojet full offull electronic of electronic surveillance surveillance equipment equipment off the offKola the Kola Peninsula Peninsula in theinBarents the Barents Sea when Sea when they they were were shot down shot down by a Soviet by a Soviet MiG-19 MiG-19 (NATO (NATO designation designation “Farmer”) “Farmer”) jet onjetJuly on 1,July 1960. 1, 1960. Now Now they they were were free. free. Kennedy Kennedy announced announced the release the release of theofpilots the pilots on on January January 25 at 25 theatfithe rst presidential first presidential presspress conference conference ever to ever be to televised. be televised. He basked He basked in national in national attention attention and approval and approval whenwhen on January on January 27 he27 he greeted greeted the returning the returning pilotspilots with with their their happyhappy wiveswives on their on their arrival arrival at at 5 5 Andrews Andrews Air Force Air Force Base.Base. Khrushchev Khrushchev believed believed that the thatyoung the young president president owedowed him his himvichis victory and toryexpected and expected something something in return. in return. “We helped “We helped elect elect Kennedy,” Kennedy,” he he declared declared in theinsummer the summer of 1961 of 1961 to a group to a group of Soviet of Soviet political political leaders leaders and scientists. and scientists. “It can “Itbe can said bethat saidwe that elected we elected him.”him.” Khrushchev Khrushchev wanted wanted a summit a summit meeting meeting as soon as soon as possible as possible in order in order to assess to assess his opposite his opposite number number in Washington. in Washington. Instead Instead of toppling of toppling any hopes any hopes of a highof a highlevel level summit, summit, the Cuban the Cuban debacle debacle only whetted only whetted Khrushchev’s Khrushchev’s appetite appetite for it.for it. An inexperienced An inexperienced president president unsure unsure of himself of himself was the wasbest thecounterpart best counterpart he could he could imagine imagine with with whom whom to discuss to discuss worldworld affairs. affairs. Bruised Bruised by the by the Cuban Cuban debacle debacle and seeking and seeking to recover to recover his standing his standing in theininternational the international arena,arena, John John Kennedy Kennedy stepped stepped into ainto trap:a trap: the two theleaders two leaders agreed agreed to meet to meet 6 6 as soon as soon as possible. as possible.

◊◊◊ ◊◊◊ Khrushchev Khrushchev and and Kennedy Kennedy had had the the firstfirst chance chance to size to size each other each other up onup June on June 3, 1961. 3, 1961. The venue The venue was the wasUS theembassy US embassy in Vienna. in Vienna. But itBut wasitKhrushchev was Khrushchev ratherrather than than Kennedy Kennedy who felt whofully felt fully at home, at home, pre- presenting senting himself himself as a senior as a senior statesman statesman meeting meeting his younger his younger and thus and thus inferior inferior counterpart. counterpart. He reminded He reminded Kennedy Kennedy that he that had hearrived had arrived late for late for their their first brief first brief meeting meeting in theincourse the course of Khrushchev’s of Khrushchev’s visit to visit thetoUnited the United StatesStates at Eisenhower’s at Eisenhower’s invitation invitation back back in 1959. in 1959. TheyThey then then moved moved on toon to discuss discuss Kennedy’s Kennedy’s youngyoung age. Khrushchev age. Khrushchev remarked remarked that he that would he would be be happyhappy to “share to “share his years his years with with the president.” the president.” It wasIt awas friendly a friendly beginbegin7 7 ning,ning, but Khrushchev but Khrushchev had already had already established established his position his position of authority. of authority. Back Back in April in April the Cuban the Cuban debacle debacle had seemed had seemed to have to have eliminated eliminated

M aster M aster of the of the Ga me Ga me 23 23 any chance any chance of a summit of a summit meeting, meeting, but Khrushchev but Khrushchev had surprised had surprised Ken- Kennedy nedy by reviving by reviving the idea the in idea early in early May. May. On May On 4, May 1961, 4, 1961, the Soviet the Soviet for- foreign minister, eign minister, Andrei Andrei Gromyko, Gromyko, summoned summoned the American the American ambassador ambassador to thetoSoviet the Soviet Union, Union, Llewellyn Llewellyn Thompson, Thompson, to histooffi hisceoffi and ce told and him told him that the thatSoviet the Soviet leaderleader was prepared was prepared to go to ahead go ahead with with the summit. the summit. The The Cuban Cuban crisis,crisis, argued argued Gromyko, Gromyko, had shown had shown the need the need to build to build bridges bridges between between the two thecountries. two countries. On May On 16 May Khrushchev 16 Khrushchev wrotewrote to Kennedy, to Kennedy, welcoming welcoming what what he suggested he suggested was the waspresident’s the president’s idea for ideaa for personal a personal meeting meeting to ease to tensions ease tensions between between the two thecountries two countries and resolve and resolve inter-international national disagreements disagreements peacefully. peacefully. He agreed He agreed to Kennedy’s to Kennedy’s proposal proposal on on 8 8 the place the place and time and time of theofmeeting: the meeting: Vienna, Vienna, June June 3, 1961. 3, 1961. Khrushchev Khrushchev proposed proposed a discussion a discussion of theofpeace the peace settlement settlement in Laos, in Laos, nuclear nuclear disarmament, disarmament, and the andsituation the situation in West in West Berlin. Berlin. Kennedy, Kennedy, badlybadly needing needing an achievement an achievement in theininternational the international arena,arena, was receptive. was receptive. He He hopedhoped to obtain to obtain an agreement an agreement on Laos, on Laos, wherewhere the two the countries two countries were were backing backing different different sidessides in a civil in a war, civil and war,regarded and regarded a discussion a discussion on dison disarmament armament as a possible as a possible steppingsteppingstonestone toward toward a nuclear a nuclear test-ban test-treaty, ban treaty, whichwhich he had hewanted had wanted all along. all along. West West Berlin Berlin seemed seemed a more a more problematic problematic issue,issue, but there but there Kennedy Kennedy decided decided to limit to limit himself himself to a mere to a mere discussion. discussion. That That proved proved to be to wishful be wishful thinking, thinking, sincesince it turned it turned out that outall that Khrushall Khrushchev chev wanted wanted to talk to about talk about was Berlin. was Berlin. He wanted He wanted the Americans the Americans out out and, and, to that to end, that end, was preparing was preparing a psychological a psychological attackattack on the onyoung the young president, president, who who was shaken was shaken and demoralized and demoralized by the by Cuban the Cuban debacle. debacle. 9 9 Khrushchev Khrushchev intended intended to bully to bully him into him submission. into submission.

◊◊◊ ◊◊◊ WestWest Berlin, Berlin, an isl anand isl and of cof apitalism c apitalism in the in the EastEast Ger-German man socialist socialist sea, was sea,awas legacy a legacy inherited inherited by Khrushchev by Khrushchev and Kennedy and Kennedy from from StalinStalin and Truman. and Truman. The agreement The agreement that placed that placed American, American, Brit- British, and ish, French and French military military unitsunits in theinwestern the western part of part Berlin, of Berlin, one hunone hundred miles dred miles deep deep in theinSovietthe Sovietcontrolled controlled part of part Germany, of Germany, was awas product a product of theofPotsdam the Potsdam Conference. Conference. It wasIt there, was there, in 1945, in 1945, that the thatoccupation the occupation zoneszones in Germany in Germany were were delineated. delineated. The city Theofcity Berlin of Berlin was divided was divided into into

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four zones: four zones: Soviet, Soviet, American, American, British, British, and French, and French, one for oneeach for each of theof the AlliesAllies who had who won had the wonwar the against war against Nazi Nazi Germany. Germany. Superfi Superfi cially,cially, the the division division indicated indicated concordant concordant AlliedAllied policy, policy, but the butactual the actual disunity disunity and and animosity animosity between between the USSR the USSR and the andWestern the Western alliesallies soon soon led toled anto an effective effective bisection bisection of Berlin of Berlin into an into eastern an eastern SovietSovietcontrolled controlled zone zone and and a western a western zone zone controlled controlled by thebyrest theof rest theofAllies. the Allies. In June In June 1948,1948, with with the Cold the Cold War War becoming becoming acute,acute, the Soviets the Soviets blocked blocked the railway the railway and highway and highway transportation transportation corridors corridors leading leading from from the western the western partsparts of Germany of Germany to Berlin, to Berlin, thereby thereby blockading blockading the westthe western part ern of part theofcity. theThey city. They wanted wanted to force to force the Americans the Americans and their and their alliesallies out ofout West of West Berlin, Berlin, leaving leaving the eastern the eastern part of part Germany of Germany underunder total total SovietSoviet control. control. The agreements The agreements signed signed in conjunction in conjunction with with the Potsthe Potsdam dam Conference Conference established established threethree air corridors air corridors for flights for flights to West to West Ber- Berlin and linback. and back. The Americans The Americans took advantage took advantage of that of provision that provision to break to break the blockade the blockade from from the air. theThe air.US TheAir USForce Air Force performed performed something something of a of a miracle miracle for the fortwo theand twoaand quarter a quarter million million people people of West of West Berlin, Berlin, flyingflying in thirteen-thousand in thirteen-thousand tons of tons food of food supplies supplies daily daily and conducting and conducting moremore than than two hundred two hundred thousand thousand sorties sorties over aover twelvea twelvemonth month period. period. The Soviets The Soviets eventually eventually gave up gave and uplifted and lifted the land the blockade land blockade in May in May 1949.1949. In the Insame the same month month the Western the Western alliesallies endedended the occupation the occupation of of their their part of part theofcountry, the country, declaring declaring the creation the creation of theofFederal the Federal RepubRepublic oflic Germany. of Germany. The Soviets The Soviets followed followed suit in suit October, in October, announcing announcing the the creation creation of theofGerman the German Democratic Democratic Republic Republic in their in their sphere sphere of occupaof occupation. tion. Sovereign Sovereign rightsrights were were restored restored to thetotwo the German two German governments governments with with the exception the exception of Berlin, of Berlin, whichwhich remained remained underunder four-power four-power occu-occupation. pation. The main The main problem problem that the thatSoviets the Soviets faced,faced, givengiven the continuing the continuing Western Western presence presence in Berlin, in Berlin, was not wasmilitary, not military, political, political, or even or even ideologiideological but caleconomic. but economic. The United The United StatesStates offered offered the Marshall the Marshall Plan,Plan, a $17a $17 billion billion revitalization revitalization package, package, to wartoravaged war-ravaged Western Western Europe, Europe, resultresulting ining anineconomic an economic miracle miracle in West in West Germany. Germany. As the AsSoviets the Soviets lacked lacked resources resources to revive to revive the economy the economy of mainly of mainly agricultural agricultural East Germany, East Germany, West West Berlin Berlin soon soon became became an attraction an attraction to East to Germans East Germans and an and escape an escape routeroute for those for those who wanted who wanted to leave to leave the socialist the socialist “paradise” “paradise” for the forcapithe capi10 10 talist talist “inferno” “inferno” in theinWest. the West.

M aster M aster of the of the Ga me Ga me 25 25 The The burgeoning burgeoning crisiscrisis over over Berlin Berlin played played an important an important role in role in Khrushchev’s Khrushchev’s rise torise supreme to supreme powerpower in theinUSSR. the USSR. In June In June 1953, 1953, a worka workers’ strike ers’ strike in East inBerlin East Berlin grew grew into ainto popular a popular uprising uprising against against the regime the regime of theofEast the German East German communist communist strongman strongman Walter Walter Ulbricht, Ulbricht, only to only be to be crushed crushed by Soviet by Soviet tanks.tanks. At the Atsame the same time,time, Khrushchev Khrushchev executed executed his his coup coup in theinKremlin the Kremlin by arresting by arresting Lavrentii Lavrentii Beria,Beria, thereby thereby making making him- himself fiself rst among first among equals equals of theofpostthe Stalin post-Stalin leadership leadership group. group. One of One theof the accusations accusations against against BeriaBeria was his wassupposed his supposed readiness readiness to capitulate to capitulate to to the West the West in Germany in Germany by abandoning by abandoning the socialist the socialist experiment experiment in East in East Germany Germany and permitting and permitting the creation the creation of a united, of a united, ostensibly ostensibly capitalist capitalist 11 11 but neutral but neutral German German state.state. Khrushchev’s Khrushchev’s second second crucial crucial step step toward toward the consolidation the consolidation of of supreme supreme power, power, a showdown a showdown in July in1957 July with 1957 with the majority the majority of theofparty the party Presidium, Presidium, was also wasclosely also closely linked linked to thetoGerman the German problem. problem. The opposiThe opposition, tion, led byled thebydiehard the diehard Stalinists, Stalinists, was critical was critical of Khru of Khru shchev’s shchev’s proposal proposal to provide to provide the flthe agging flagging East German East German economy economy with with credits credits worthworth threethree billion billion rubles. rubles. Khrushchev Khrushchev stoodstood his ground. his ground. The defeat The defeat of theof“antithe “antiparty” party” groupgroup and the andremoval the removal of hisofopponents his opponents from from leadership leadership posi- positionstions cemented cemented Khrushchev’s Khrushchev’s hold hold on power on power in theinKremlin the Kremlin and his and his determination determination to save to East save Germany East Germany from from economic economic collapse collapse at almost at almost 12 12 any price. any price. Khrushchev Khrushchev unveiled unveiled his own his plans own plans for Berlin for Berlin in a speech in a speech he delivhe delivered ered in November in November 1958 1958 to a to delegation a delegation of Polish of Polish communists. communists. The The SovietSoviet leaderleader proposed proposed declaring declaring West West Berlin Berlin a freea city, free which city, which wouldwould meanmean the withdrawal the withdrawal of American, of American, British, British, and French and French troops. troops. Khru-Khrushchev’s shchev’s speech speech amounted amounted to anto ultimatum: an ultimatum: if theifWest the West did not didaccept not accept his proposal, his proposal, he was heready was ready to sign to asign separate a separate treatytreaty with with East Germany, East Germany, withdrawing withdrawing from from the fourthe party four-party agreements agreements of 1945 of 1945 and handing and handing over over control control of Western of Western accessaccess routesroutes to Berlin to Berlin to histoEast his German East German minions. minions. That That mightmight easilyeasily lead to lead armed to armed conflconfl ict between ict between the Allies the Allies and the andEast the East Germans, Germans, and many and many fearedfeared further further escalation escalation into ainto global a global military military cri- crisis and siseven and even nuclear nuclear war. While war. While preparing preparing for the forVienna the Vienna summit summit with with Kennedy, Kennedy, he put heBerlin put Berlin at theattop theoftop hisofagenda. his agenda. His plan His plan was to was scare to scare Kennedy Kennedy out ofout theofcity. the13city.13

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◊◊◊ ◊◊◊ Khrushchev Khrushchev began began his his at tack at tack on Kennedy on Kennedy on June on June 3, 3, 1961,1961, with with a Marxism-for-dummies a Marxism-for-dummies analysis analysis of American of American imperialism imperialism and aand declaration a declaration of hisofconviction his conviction that the thatfuture the future belonged belonged to comto communism. munism. Although Although Kennedy Kennedy allowed allowed himself himself to betodragged be dragged into an into an ideological ideological debate, debate, he was hefocused was focused on realpolitik. on realpolitik. Referring Referring to “modern to “modern weapons,” weapons,” he warned he warned Khrushchev: Khrushchev: “if our “iftwo our countries two countries should should mis- miscalculate, calculate, they would they would lose for losea for longa long time time to come.” to come.” His objective, His objective, said said the president, the president, was peace. was peace. Khrushchev Khrushchev was anything was anything but appreciative. but appreciative. “Miscalculation,” “Miscalculation,” declared declared the Soviet the Soviet leader, leader, was awas veryavague very vague term.term. The The United United StatesStates “wanted “wanted the USSR the USSR to sit to like sitalike schoolboy a schoolboy with with his hands his hands 14 14 on hisondesk.” his desk.” Khrushchev, Khrushchev, for his forpart, his part, was ready was ready to misbehave. to misbehave. On June On June 4, the4,second the second day ofday theofsummit, the summit, Khrushchev Khrushchev used used the the president’s president’s concern concern over “miscalculation” over “miscalculation” to threaten to threaten Kennedy. Kennedy. Bilateral Bilateral relations relations wouldwould be greatly be greatly affected affected “if the “ifUS thewere US were to misunderstand to misunderstand the Soviet the Soviet position,” position,” he told hethe toldpresident. the president. He wanted He wanted a comprehensive a comprehensive peacepeace treatytreaty to formally to formally end the endwar, the recognizing war, recognizing the existence the existence of two of two German German statesstates and making and making West West Berlin Berlin a freea city. free The city. Soviet The Soviet Union Union was prepared was prepared to guarantee to guarantee the city’s the city’s free contact free contact with with the rest the of rest theof the worldworld and promised and promised not tonot interfere to interfere in itsin internal its internal affairs. affThere airs. There wouldwould be nobemore no more blockades, blockades, suggested suggested Khrushchev. Khrushchev. The Americans The Americans couldcould even even leave leave their their troops troops there,there, but inbut that in case that the caseSoviet the Soviet Union Union wouldwould also station also station its troops its troops in theinwestern the western part of part theofcity. the He city.expressed He expressed his his desiredesire for an foragreement an agreement with with Kennedy, Kennedy, but ifbut it did if itnot didmaterialize, not materialize, he was he ready was ready to sign to sign a separate a separate agreement agreement with with East Germany. East Germany. Khru-Khrushchev shchev mademade a moral a moral argument argument to support to support his case: his case: the Soviet the Soviet Union Union had lost hadtwenty lost twenty million million citizens citizens in World in World War II, War that II,war thathad wartohad come to come to to an end, an and end,there and there was no was reason no reason to postpone to postpone the conclusion the conclusion of a treaty of a treaty sixteen sixteen yearsyears after after the end theof end hostilities. of hostilities. Kennedy’s Kennedy’s defense defense was rooted was rooted in nothing in nothing but the butright the right of theofconthe conqueror queror and the and importance the importance of greatof greatpowerpower prestige. prestige. “We “We are inareBerin Berlin not lin because not because of someone’s of someone’s sufferance. sufferance. We fought We fought our way our there, way there,

M aster M aster of the of the Ga me Ga me 27 27 although although our casualties our casualties may may not have not have been been as high as high as the asUSSRʼs,” the USSRʼs,” said Kennedy. said Kennedy. He did Henot didspecify not specify the US thelosses, US losses, whichwhich stoodstood at approxiat approximately mately 420,000, 420,000, and were and were well below well below the Soviet the Soviet numbers. numbers. “If we“Ifwere we were expelled expelled from from that area that and areaifand we if accepted we accepted the loss theof loss ourofrights, our rights, no one no one wouldwould have have any confi any dence confidence in USincommitments US commitments and pledges,” and pledges,” contincontinued the uedpresident, the president, ignoring ignoring Khrushchev’s Khrushchev’s suggestion suggestion that American that American troops troops couldcould stay in stay theinfree the city free of city West of West Berlin. Berlin. “If we“Ifwere we were to leave to leave West West Berlin, Berlin, Europe Europe wouldwould be abandoned be abandoned as well,” as well,” Kennedy Kennedy argued. argued. “Our“Our leaving leaving West West Berlin Berlin wouldwould resultresult in theinUS thebecoming US becoming isolated.” isolated.” Khrushchev Khrushchev was furious. was furious. Returning Returning to theto issue the issue of Soviet of Soviet war war losseslosses and recapitulating and recapitulating his earlier his earlier argument, argument, he put heforward put forward another another ultimatum: ultimatum: “The“The USSRUSSR will sign will sign a peace a peace treatytreaty and the andsovereignty the sovereignty of theofGDR the GDR will be will observed. be observed. Any violation Any violation of that of sovereignty that sovereignty will be will be regarded regarded by the byUSSR the USSR as anasact anofact open of open aggression aggression against against a peacea peaceloving loving country, country, with with all the allconsequences the consequences ensuing ensuing therefrom.” therefrom.” WhenWhen Kennedy Kennedy askedasked whether whether a Soviet– a Soviet– East German East German treatytreaty wouldwould affectaff US ect US rightsrights of access of access to West to West Berlin, Berlin, Khrushchev Khrushchev responded responded in theinaffi thermaaffirmative. As tive.the Asunpleasant the unpleasant debate debate continued, continued, he declared he declared that the thatSoviet the Soviet Union Union couldcould not wait not and waitwould and would sign asign treaty a treaty by thebyend theofend theofyear the givyear giving East ing Germany East Germany control control over access over access rightsrights to West to West Berlin. Berlin. The tensions The tensions grew,grew, the two theleaders two leaders soon soon beganbegan to talk towar talkinstead war instead of peace. of peace. WhenWhen Kennedy Kennedy responded responded to Khrushchev’s to Khrushchev’s mention mention of Soviet of Soviet WorldWorld War II War losses II losses that the thatUnited the United StatesStates wanted wanted to avoid to avoid another another war war precisely precisely to avoid to avoid such such losses, losses, Khrushchev Khrushchev responded responded angrily. angrily. “[I]f the “[I]f the US should US should start start a waraover war Berlin, over Berlin, therethere is nothing is nothing the USSR the USSR couldcould do do aboutabout it,” exploded it,” exploded the Soviet the Soviet leader. leader. He turned He turned againagain to thetomiscalthe miscalculation culation theme: theme: “ours“ours is a joint is a joint account account and each and each of usofmust us must see that see that therethere is no is miscalculation.” no miscalculation.” He could He could not get notoff get the offtopic the topic of war: of “If war: the “If the US wants US wants to start to start a wara over war Germany, over Germany, let it let be it so;beperhaps so; perhaps the USSR the USSR should should sign sign a peace a peace treatytreaty right right away away and get anditget over it with. over with. . . . If. there . . If there is anyis madman any madman who who wantswants war, war, he should he should be put be in puta straitjacket.” in a straitjacket.” Kennedy Kennedy was taken was taken aback: aback: Khrushchev Khrushchev was threatening was threatening the president the president 15 15 with with war. war. Kennedy’s Kennedy’s attempt attempt to return to return to thetoquestion the question of Berlin of Berlin in private in private

28 n 28uclear n uclear folly folly

conversation conversation with with Khrushchev Khrushchev later that later day thatbrought day brought no results. no results. Khru-Khrushchev shchev was adamant: was adamant: “force“force will be will met bewith met force.” with force.” Kennedy Kennedy endedended the the 16 16 discussion discussion with with the words, the words, “it will “itbe will a cold be a winter.” cold winter.”

◊◊◊ ◊◊◊ Kennedy Kennedy returned returned to the to the United United States States withwith what what he he believed believed was his wassecond his second majormajor defeatdefeat on the oninternational the international stagestage in less in less than two thanmonths. two months. He felt Hebeaten felt beaten up. “Pretty up. “Pretty rough?” rough?” askedasked JamesJames Reston Reston of theofNew the York New York Times, Times, immediately immediately after after his last hismeeting last meeting with with Khru-Khrushchev. shchev. “Roughest “Roughest thingthing in myinlife,” my life,” camecame Kennedy’s Kennedy’s candid candid response. response. He assumed He assumed that he thathad he been had been treated treated that way that because way because of theofBay the of Bay of Pigs debacle. Pigs debacle. Khrushchev Khrushchev “thought “thought that anyone that anyone who was whoso was young so young and and inexperienced inexperienced as to as gettointo getthat intomess that mess couldcould be taken,” be taken,” speculated speculated Ken- Kennedy.nedy. “And“And anyone anyone who who got into got itinto andit didn’t and didn’t see itsee through it through had no had no guts. guts. So heSojust he beat just beat the hell the out hellofout me.” of me.” Khrushchev Khrushchev did not didboast not boast aboutabout “beating “beating the hell” the hell” out ofout Kennedy of Kennedy in private in private or public, or public, but he but told he told one of one hisofadvisers: his advisers: “This“This man man is very is inexperienced, very inexperienced, even even immature. immature. 17 17 Compared Compared to him, to him, Eisenhower Eisenhower was awas man a man of intelligence of intelligence and vision.” and vision.” Kennedy Kennedy felt destroyed felt destroyed both both physically physically and emotionally. and emotionally. He had He had gone gone into the intosummit the summit with with excruciating excruciating pain in pain hisinback, his back, whichwhich he had he had reinjured reinjured a fewaweeks few weeks earlier, earlier, and relied and relied on a cocktail on a cocktail of drugs of drugs and hot and hot bathsbaths to keep to keep functioning. functioning. Now Now his back his back pain pain was worse, was worse, and he andhad he had to relytoon rely crutches on crutches to move to move even even a fewafeet. few Although feet. Although he tried he tried to smile to smile for the forcameras, the cameras, therethere was no was way noto way hide to his hidechagrin. his chagrin. On June On June 6, Ken6, Kennedy nedy admitted admitted in front in front of a television of a television audience audience that the thatnegotiations the negotiations had not hadproduced not produced the results the results he hoped he hoped for and for that and there that there had been had been no no progress progress on the onGerman the German front— front— the subject, the subject, as heassaid, he said, of “our of “our mostmost somber somber talks.” talks.” Khrushchev Khrushchev returned returned from from Vienna Vienna without without the decisive the decisive victory victory he he had hoped had hoped for, but for,in but a much in a much betterbetter moodmood than than Kennedy. Kennedy. He called He called the summit the summit a good a good beginning, beginning, and his andCentral his Central Committee Committee colleagues colleagues commended commended him on him hisondiplomatic his diplomatic skillsskills and “aggressive and “aggressive spirit.” spirit.” Khru-Khrushchev shchev followed followed up onupJune on June 11 with 11 with a public a public release release of theofmemoranthe memoran-

M aster M aster of the of the Ga me Ga me 29 29 dum dum he had hehanded had handed to Kennedy to Kennedy in Vienna, in Vienna, threatening threatening to sign to asign peace a peace treatytreaty with with East East Germany Germany in sixinmonths. six months. It was It another was another embarrassembarrassmentment for Kennedy, for Kennedy, who did whonot didmention not mention the memorandum the memorandum in hisinown his own address address on the onsummit. the summit. On June On June 15, Khrushchev 15, Khrushchev publicly publicly attacked attacked the the “capitalist “capitalist monopolists” monopolists” for the forlack the of lack progress of progress on negotiations on negotiations con- concerning cerning Berlin Berlin and once and once againagain alluded alluded to war. to “Surely, war. “Surely, it is clear it is clear that that a Cold a Cold War is War a period is a period of preparation, of preparation, accumulating accumulating forcesforces for war,” for war,” 18 18 asserted asserted the Soviet the Soviet leader. leader. The possibility The possibility of war of was war very was much very much on Kennedy’s on Kennedy’s mind,mind, and itand it frightened frightened him. him. WhenWhen Kennedy Kennedy askedasked his military his military advisers advisers aboutabout esti- estimated mated losseslosses in case in case of a nuclear of a nuclear war with war with the Soviet the Soviet Union, Union, he was he was givengiven a number a number of 70ofmillion 70 million people. people. SinceSince the country’s the country’s total total populapopulation as tion of as 1960 of 1960 had been had been slightly slightly moremore than than 180 million, 180 million, that meant that meant everyevery second second or third or third American American couldcould die. One die. nuclear One nuclear missile missile striking striking a major a major city would city would meanmean 600,000 600,000 victims. victims. That That number number was compawas comparable rable to total to losses total losses during during the Civil the Civil War, War, remarked remarked Kennedy Kennedy whenwhen pre- presented sented with with the estimate. the estimate. He then He then added: added: “And“And we have we have not gotten not gotten over over 19 19 that in that a hundred in a hundred years.” years.” Kennedy Kennedy had tohad respond to respond to Khrushchev’s to Khrushchev’s challenge challenge without without increasincreasing tensions ing tensions that might that might produce produce all-out all-war, out to war, which to which the Soviet the Soviet leaderleader had said had the saidCold the Cold War was Waronly was aonly prelude. a prelude. So far, Sohe far, had hefailed had failed to carry to carry through through the invasion the invasion of Cuba of Cuba planned planned by President by President Eisenhower, Eisenhower, sig- signalednaled readiness readiness to compromise to compromise with the withSoviets the Soviets on Laos on Laos against against his prehis predecessor’s decessor’s advice, advice, and suff andered suffpublic ered public humiliation humiliation in Vienna. in Vienna. Kennedy Kennedy had tohad do to something do something to change to change both Khrushchev’s both Khrushchev’s perception perception and, more and, more important, important, that of that hisofopponents his opponents at home, at home, who saw whohim saw as him a weak as a weak presi-president,dent, potentially potentially disastrous disastrous for the forcountry. the country. Resorting Resorting to thetolessons the lessons he he had drawn had drawn from from his Harvard his Harvard thesisthesis on Britain's on Britain's lack of lack preparedness of preparedness for for WorldWorld War II, War theII,president the president mademade a public a public showshow of getting of getting readyready for war. for war. On July On25, JulyKennedy 25, Kennedy mademade his way hison way crutches on crutches to thetoWhite the White House House to deliver to deliver a speech a speech aboutabout the growing the growing Berlin Berlin crisis.crisis. He told He the toldtelevithe television audience sion audience that he that was heprepared was prepared to stand to stand up toup thetoSoviet the Soviet bully.bully. Four Four days days earlier, earlier, Congress Congress had authorized had authorized moremore than than $12 billion $12 billion for new for new aircraft, aircraft, missiles, missiles, and ships and ships that Kennedy that Kennedy had requested had requested earlier. earlier. Now Now

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he called he called for additional for additional defense defense spending spending of $3.25 of $3.25 billion billion and 90,000 and 90,000 moremore recruits recruits for the fornavy the navy and air and force. air force. It wasItawas drastic a drastic increase increase in miliin military spending tary spending and aand dramatic a dramatic departure departure from from the Eisenhower the Eisenhower years.years. Kennedy’s Kennedy’s message message was that wasAmerica that America was not wasgoing not going to sleep, to sleep, as Britain as Britain had done had done before before the war. the It war. wasItgoing was going to arm to itself arm itself to thetoteeth. the teeth. “We “We do not do want not want to fight,” to fight,” declared declared the president, the president, “but “but we have we have fought fought before. before. And others And others in earlier in earlier timestimes have have mademade the same the same dangerdangerous mistake ous mistake of assuming of assuming that the thatWest the West was too wasselfi toosh selfi and shtoo andsoft tooand soft and too divided too divided to resist to resist invasions invasions of freedom of freedom in other in other lands.lands. ThoseThose who who threaten threaten to unleash to unleash the forces the forces of war of on wara on dispute a dispute over over West West Berlin Berlin should should recallrecall the words the words of theofancient the ancient philosopher: philosopher: ‘A man ‘A man who causes who causes fear cannot fear cannot be free befrom free from fear.’ fear.’ ”20 ”20

◊◊◊ ◊◊◊ Khrushchev Khrushchev was “really was “really mad,” mad,” rec alled rec alled JohnJohn J. McCloy, J. McCloy, Kennedy’s Kennedy’s chiefchief negotiator negotiator on disarmament, on disarmament, who visited who visited Khrushchev Khrushchev in lateinJuly late1961 July 1961 at theatBlack the Black Sea resort Sea resort of Pitsunda. of Pitsunda. Khrushchev Khrushchev calledcalled Kennedy’s Kennedy’s speech speech a “preliminary a “preliminary declaration declaration of war.” of war.” He threatened He threatened to to sign sign his peace his peace treatytreaty with with Germany Germany no matter no matter what what and warned and warned that that 21 21 therethere wouldwould be nobe small no small war—war— it would it would be nuclear. be nuclear. For Khrushchev, For Khrushchev, Kennedy’s Kennedy’s bellicose bellicose speech speech and and the military the military buildup buildup he had hejust hadannounced just announced suggested suggested that his thatpsychological his psychological attackattack on Kennedy on Kennedy in Vienna in Vienna had not hadproduced not produced the desired the desired results. results. It looked It looked as if aasweak if a weak president president intimidated intimidated at a summit at a summit submitted submitted to manipulato manipulation by tion hisbyadvisers his advisers uponupon his return his return home. home. For Khrushchev, For Khrushchev, who prided who prided himself himself on having on having helped helped to elect to elect Kennedy, Kennedy, that was thatquite was quite a disappointa disappointment.ment. “Look, “Look, we helped we helped elect elect Kennedy Kennedy last year,” last year,” Khrushchev Khrushchev told atold a groupgroup of offiofcials officials and scientists and scientists on July on 10, July1961. 10, 1961. “Then “Then we met we with met with him in him Vienna, in Vienna, a meeting a meeting that could that could have have been been a turning a turning point.point. But But what what does does he say? he ‘Don’t say? ‘Don’t ask for asktoo formuch. too much. Don’tDon’t put me putinme a bind. in a bind. If I If I makemake too many too many concessions, concessions, I’ll beI’ll turned be turned out ofout offiof ce.’ offi Quite ce.’ Quite a guy!a He guy! He comes comes to a meeting to a meeting but can’t but can’t perform. perform. WhatWhat the hell thedo hell wedoneed we need a guya guy like that likefor? thatWhy for? Why wastewaste time time talking talking to him?” to him?” If thatIfwas thatKhru was Khru shchev’s shchev’s

M aster M aster of the of the Ga me Ga me 31 31 view view on July on10, Julythen 10, then Kennedy’s Kennedy’s speech speech of July of25 July could 25 could only have only have deep-deep22 22 ened ened his pessimism. his pessimism. Khrushchev Khrushchev needed needed a solution a solution to thetoBerlin the Berlin crisiscrisis that would that would not not involve involve the threatened the threatened peacepeace treatytreaty with with East East Germany, Germany, the loss the of loss of American American accessaccess rights, rights, and aand possible a possible military military confrontation. confrontation. SuchSuch a scenario a scenario mightmight lead to lead thermonuclear to thermonuclear war, perhaps war, perhaps moremore easilyeasily with with a weak a weak president president than than with with a strong a strong one. one. Khrushchev Khrushchev knewknew that he that he had nothing had nothing with with whichwhich to counter to counter Kennedy: Kennedy: the “missile the “missile gap” gap” actu- actually favored ally favored the United the United States, States, and he andhad he no hadadditional no additional fundsfunds for his for his military military to match to match Kennedy’s Kennedy’s unprecedented unprecedented buildup. buildup. Nor could Nor could he wait he wait any longer any longer to solve to solve his Berlin his Berlin problem, problem, as East as Germans, East Germans, attracted attracted by by higher higher livingliving standards standards in theinWest, the West, were were leaving leaving the German the German socialist socialist paradise paradise in ever in greater ever greater numbers. numbers. TheyThey couldcould easilyeasily do sodo through so through West West Berlin, Berlin, sincesince therethere was free was movement free movement between between the Allied the Allied and Soviet and Soviet sectors sectors of theofcity. theIn city. June In June 1961,1961, 19,000 19,000 people people used used the Berlin the Berlin loophole loophole in theinIron the Curtain Iron Curtain to go to west; go west; in July, in 30,000 July, 30,000 did so. didThe so. total The total for the for the sevenseven months months of that of year that alone year alone was 130,000. was 130,000. The East The German East German leader, leader, Walter Walter Ulbricht, Ulbricht, had ahad solution: a solution: surroundsurrounding West ing West Berlin Berlin with with a wall. a wall. That,That, however, however, was awas diffiacult diffiproposition. cult proposition. First,First, East and EastWest and West Berlin Berlin constituted constituted a jointa railway joint railway hub without hub without whichwhich the East the East German German economy economy wouldwould grindgrind to a halt. to a halt. Second, Second, the Soviet the Soviet leaders leaders and their and their alliesallies in Czechoslovakia in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Hungary were were concerned concerned that the thatconstruction the construction of a wall of a would wall would be followed be followed by anby economic an economic block-blockade ofade theofwhole the whole Eastern Eastern bloc, bloc, making making their their economic economic situation situation worseworse and necessitating and necessitating greater greater SovietSoviet subsidies. subsidies. Ulbricht Ulbricht did not didcare, not care, and and by May by 1961 May 1961 he had heanother had another argument argument in hisinfavor: his favor: his work his work crewscrews had had completed completed the construction the construction of anof outer an outer ring railroad. ring railroad. West West Berlin Berlin couldcould now be now cutbeoff cut from off from the eastern the eastern part of part theofcity thewithout city without hurting hurting the East the East German German economy. economy. All heAll needed he needed now was nowKhrushchev’s was Khrushchev’s go-ahead. go-ahead. But But 23 23 Khrushchev Khrushchev vacillated, vacillated, hoping hoping to browbeat to browbeat Kennedy Kennedy into submission. into submission. On August On August 1, six1,days six days after after Kennedy’s Kennedy’s speech, speech, Khrushchev Khrushchev told told Ulbricht Ulbricht that he thatcould he could start start building building the wall. the wall. Less Less than than two weeks two weeks later, later, in theinearly the early morning morning of Sunday, of Sunday, August August 13, the 13,East the German East German armyarmy and border and border policepolice sealedsealed off West off West Berlin Berlin and, with and, with the help the of help construcof construc-