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Terror Never Sleeps

Interview with gen. John Allen Re-access Southeast Europe Energy Tactics The Art of Diplomacy 1/2015

in this issue

headlines

interview general John Allen

in depth EU, Russia re-access Southeast Europe energy tactics

Turkey and Greece are becoming the new partners of Russia in terms of gas transit.

General John Allen currently holds a position of the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.

Munich Security Conference Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger gestures during his opening speech at the 51. Security Conference in Munich, Germany, Friday, Feb. 6, 2015.(AP Photo/Matthias Schrader)

Huge Kurdish ﬂag during a demonstration against the Islamic State.

by Kostis Geropoulos The Challenge of Deterring ISIS by Thomas M. Sanderson The Wounded Bear: Louder and More Harmful by Péter Krekó Historical Choices after the Massacres in Paris by Yves Pascouau

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Published by Slovak Atlantic Commission

Terror never sleeps. The title of this magazine’s second issue may arguably sound a little bit like a stale, vacuous expression often employed by campaigning politicians, yet its truth has sadly become a part of the 21st century reality. For long, the word “terrorism” used to feel distant to the regular people on the both sides of the Atlantic. The 9/11 attacks, however, along with the later bombings in Madrid and London, changed a lot. The response came soon: both the US and EU took an active stand against the global terrorist threat. A relatively long time has passed since these attacks and the topic of terrorism has eventually faded away from the public domain, limiting itself to the discourse of politics and international relationships. Following the outbreak of the economic crisis, the focus of public attention shifted far from the potential threat of terrorism. As a period of Euro-Atlantic idealism ensued, people regained the feeling of safety from the attacks that for the time seemed to take place thousands of kilometres away from their homes. Despite raucous moments caused by the terrorists around the world, Europe had lived its own life, and with gaze fixed upon the Ukrainian crisis all the other threats seemed to be rather insignificant. The image of safety from terrorist attacks has been, however, disrupted after the recent events in Paris. The Charlie Hebdo attack was not an attack at a mere publisher of a satirical daily – it was an attack at the European democracy and at the western values. Democracy is a system which invites every voice, with no regard as to whether we like what it is saying or not, into a free, non-violent discussion. Whenever we disagree with our opponents, we should remind ourselves of the famous quote often misattributed (although justifiably) to Voltaire: I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it. Although the attack has woken Europe up, we must not bind our sights exclusively to the local affairs, as a new threat looms on the international scene: The Islamic State. This terrorist organization has been around for more than one or two years, but it has only recently grown into dimensions at which it can be easily considered the global threat number one. Attempting to establish a caliphate on the territories of Iraq and Syria, ISIS permeated into Europe’s consciousness mainly after its savage decapitations of journalists and humanitarian workers who were held hostage for enormous ransoms. There are more than enough reasons for this threat not to be treated lightly. Financially, ISIS sustains its growth selling oil from the occupied territories, and with its well-organized, trained, and armed military

structures it is easily capable of further destabilizing an already unstable region. Another dangerous issue which calls for an immediate reaction is its widespread propaganda, thanks to which it manages to enlist support inside Europe. Recruiting sympathizers from within does not only mean that Europeans leave in order to join the ranks of ISIS in the Middle East, but also raises the possibility of emergence of sleeping terrorist cells or lone wolves on the inside. This is, in any case, a threat to be recognized and approached responsibly by the European leaders. There is already an impending necessity to discuss on the highest levels between politicians and experts from both governmental and non-governmental organizations the question of how to approach and re-integrate persons who have fought for Islamic State in the past and have consequently returned back to Europe. The terrorist state is a challenge to be faced with resolution, but also with sensitivity, wary of reductive labelling and oversimplification - pitfalls which sadly seem to be burgeoning lately. It is necessary not to wage war on Islam per se, but rather attempt to recognize malice where it truly lies. A better understanding of connection between religious fanaticism and political radicalism is called for in order to prevent militant extremists from exploiting religious concepts. If we were to ask ourselves whether Europe is safe from the threat of terrorism today, we would definitely have to consider the lesson of Charlie Hebdo. This lesson, however, should not be misused to justify blind self-interest. Several terrorist attacks were perpetrated all around the world in the last few months only. Taliban attacked a school in Peshvar, leaving behind more than 130 victims, and while we mourned the losses in Paris, Nigeria bore witness to the atrocious massacre of Baga, where Boko Haram killed over 2,000 people in a single raid – both of these events remained almost unnoticed by the mass media. The human life, though, has the same value in Europe, Asia or Africa. As we live in a globalized world where terrorism knows no boundaries, and an event happening on one hemisphere can influence lives on the other in a matter of minutes, let us not neglect our duty to face contemporary threats responsibly, and to critically reflect upon and beyond our immediate surroundings, always analysing our sources. Dear readers, I am happy you found your way back to the pages of our webzine, and wish you enjoy the time spent reading articles the editorial board of Euro-Atlantic! think.act.lead. did not neglect to prepare for you.

MIKULÁŠ VIRÁG Editor-in-Chief 2015 • 3

headlines

Havoc in Nigeria During the last few weeks militant Islamist group Boko Haram has caused havoc in Nigeria. Through a wave of bombings, assassinations and abductions Boko Haram is fighting to overthrow the government and create an Islamic state. Its followers are said to be influenced by the Koranic phrase which says: "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors." The group was founded in 2002 and it’s official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". The group was initially focused on opposing Western education. It launched its insurgency in 2009 in order to create Islamic state. In 2013, the US designated it a terrorist organisation, amid fears that it had developed links with other militant groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, to wage a global jihad. In August 2014, Mr Shekau declared a caliphate in areas under Boko Haram's control. On the eve of Nigeria’s presidential elections, which were supposed to be held on 14 February, officials decided to postpone them to 28 March. The decision was officially justified by the worsening Boko Haram-inspired insecurity in the north-east, and the military’s refusal to guarantee the safety of the poll.

4 • 2015

Eurogroup Negotiations over Greece

Hamas (Not) Out of the List of Terrorist Organizations

Meeting of Eurogroup on 16 February finance ministers ended without an agreement on an extension to Greece's bailout package. The current positions are that the Eurogroup wants Greece to accept a program extension while they negotiate a longer term deal. On the other hand, Greece wants to establish the principle that the current program has to be modified fundamentally – hence, no program extensions. Again, a somewhat worrying trend is emerging in which Greece seems to have a very different version of events than almost everyone else after these meetings. The urgency of Greece’s financial situation was underscored by a report from JPMorgan Chase indicating the Greek banks were losing deposits at the rate of 2 billion Euros, or $ 2.27 billion, a week. If that pace continued for the next 14 weeks, the banks would not have enough reserves to issue new loans, according to the report. Meanwhile, Greece has suggested that it could turn to Russia or China for help if it stalks on debt relief and a rollback of austerity measures breaks down. American officials have expressed concerns about the implications of any breakdown in the discussion since that could propel Greece further from Europe.

By a quirk of fate, 17 December 2014 was also the date on which the European Union Tribunal decided to remove the Palestinian group Hamas from the list of terrorist organisations. The judgment on Hamas followed the decision by the general court of the European Union – the EU’s second highest court – that the original listing of the group that governs Gaza had been flawed and based on conclusions derived from the media and internet, not sound legal rulings. The court added in a statement that decision was based on procedural errors and did "not imply any substantive assessment of the question of the classification of Hamas as a terrorist group". Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said he was not satisfied with the explanation that the delisting was only technical, and called for Hamas’s immediate re-designation. Later on, foreign ministers from the 28 member states decided at their January meeting to appeal an EU court decision ordering the Hamas removal from the EU terrorism blacklist. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini noted in a statement that - as a result of the appeal - Hamas will remain on the EU's terrorism list and its assets will remain frozen pending a judgment by the Court of Justice, the highest legal authority.

headlines

Brittle Ceasefire after Minsk Peace Talks Leaders of France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia met in Minsk to seek solution for stabilising the grave situation in Donbas. The talks in Minsk were held in response to the failure of Minsk Protocol, during January and February, which was supposed to halt the war in Ukraine´s South-East. After sixteen hours of tough negotiations, leaders had come with the 13-point agreement, which provides a ceasefire from 15 February as well as withdrawal of heavy weaponry and foreign millitary troops from current front line. Among other measures, the agreement requires from Ukrainian government to adopt new constitution granting special constitutional status to some regions in Donbas, particularly in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. The new truce is criticised for being extremely fragile and for being quite similar to the Minsk Protocol, signed in September. Fragility of this agreement has been demonstrated very soon, when separatist’s leaders insisted to withdraw their troops from Debaltseve. Alexander Zakharchenko claimed his forces will not withdraw from Debaltseve, since this important railway hub is not on the front line. Only week after Minsk talks, Ukrainian soldiers, after long heavy fighting, had to flee from the city and separatists thus gained another important territory. Therefore, situation remains very unstable and hardly predictable, since the OSCE observes were not allowed to entry war zone.

OSCE Eminences Seek New Security Architecture for Europe OSCE Troika (Germany, Serbia, Switzerland) recently announced their joint initiative of establishing the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project. They decided to engage the 15 distinguished individuals, who will draw recommendations how to reconsolidate European security as a common project. This platform will serve for inclusive and constructive dialogue across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions. The panel will reﬂect on how to rebuild trust among the OSCE member states ensure more effective adherence to the Helsinki Principles and to bring common solutions to the perceived threats in the OSCE area. Ivica Dačić, Serbian Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairperson-in-Ofﬁce claimed “we should do everything possible to reverse the trend of growing distrust and polarisation in Europe, by bringing together personalities from all OSCE regions with a broad range of different background and experiences”. The panel is chaired by Amb. Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of the Munich Security Conference. Among other important personalities, the panel include Emma Bonino, former Italian foreign minister and EU commissioner, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, former Latvian president, Jane Harman, president of Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Sergei Karaganov, Russian political scientist, Malcolm Rifkind, former UK Secretary of State or Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former Polish foreign minister.

Palestine to be Recognised Last October, Sweden became the biggest Western European country to make the official recognition of the state of Palestine. Concurrently, parliaments in Spain, UK, Portugal, Luxembourg, France and Ireland also backed non-binding recognition resolutions. The latest moves have emerged out of a growing sense of frustration in Europe over continued settlement building by Israel in the West Bank and a lack of progress in the peace process. Sweden's Foreign Minister Margot Wallström said her government's decision was aimed at supporting the Palestinian Authority (the governing body based in the West Bank and controlled by Fatah) and its President Mahmoud Abbas, thus those who believe in negotiations and not violence. She claimed that this decision would put each party on a level playing field and help move peace talks forward. On the EU level, the European Parliament voted in favour of a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. The resolution to recognise the state of Palestine, was passed on 17 December 2014, with 498 votes in favour, 88 against and 111 abstentions. The EU and its member states together have long been by far the largest donors to the Palestinian Authority.

2015 • 5

interview

General John Allen: Coalition Must Seize This Critical

Opportunity To Address the Underlying Frustrations Which Have Fueled Rise of ISIL interviewed by KATARÍNA SCHWERTNEROVÁ • Euro-Atlantic! think.act.lead. What are the root causes underlying the sudden rise and success of the Islamic State (IS), also known as ISIS or ISIL? The emergence of ISIL, or Da’esh (as I often refer to them when I am in the Middle East) is due to a confluence of factors, some intensely local and political, and others more ideological and global in nature. Da’esh’s emergence is most directly related to the ongoing civil war in Syria. Asad’s campaign against his own people has only intensified over the course of the conflict to include his use of chemical weapons and barrel bombs. The regime’s approach has served to empower the most extreme elements among the opposition as a catalyst for a nihilistic group like ISIL to emerge and strengthen. Da’esh itself emerged from the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq, but has since morphed into a completely unique, organized menace. While in the first two years of Syria’s civil war the conflict was largely contained within its borders, starting in late 2013, we began to see Da’esh’s reach extend across Iraq’s border into Anbar Province. In the months leading up to their invasion of Iraq ISIL had assassinated key political, religious, and civil society leaders across the country, essentially hollowing out much of Iraqi society and reducing its capacity to resist. And when Da’esh came streaming down the Tigris in the summer of 2014, they encountered a demoralized and under-resourced Iraqi military that had been neglected under the Maliki regime. The good news is that in the span of several months, we have worked to support and professionalize the Iraq Security Forces so that Da’esh’s momentum in Iraq has now been blunted and is starting to be reversed. We are beginning our second stage of the campaign, which is to turn back ISIL forces and take back territory. Da’esh control of populated areas has decreased considerably. Kobane has been liberated. This will be a 6 • 2015

long campaign, but we are encouraged by such positive markers. Eventually, the region and Coalition partners will have to address underlying economic and cultural issues that have contributed to Da’esh’s attractiveness, especially for young men with limited choices. This is also the result of larger demographic challenges in the Middle East and North Africa where there are growing youth populations but not a growing number of opportunities to match. There also exists a strain of extremist thought among radical religious leaders who seek to prey on these disenfranchised youth. To remedy these underlying causes, we must work with and help to empower the moderating forces within these societies who represent the vast majority of their populations. And we must also seize this moment’s promise: to create a rising tide of opportunity, to propel this young generation forward in dignity. We must work with clerics, religious leaders, and teachers so that Da’esh is ultimately defeated as an idea. Only then will Da’esh be truly defeated. What sets the IS apart from the other similar groups in the region? While other extremist groups have expressed elements of Da’esh’s dark agenda and nihilistic ideology, no group has been so eager to attempt to apply that vision within the construct of a proto-state.

But Da’esh does not provide a viable path forward politically, religiously, economically, or socially. They respect no tradition, desecrate the faith of Islam, and reject completely a pragmatic approach to governance which is necessary to rule in any diverse society. And Da’esh atrocities against Sunni tribes in Iraq made clear that Da’esh cannot tolerate any structure or leadership other than its own. In the squalid conditions of Da’esh-ruled Mosul, in their frequent executions in Raqqa, and in the widespread desertions of Da’esh fighters across the battlespace, we see that many of the qualities that made Da’esh appear so fearsome at the beginning are now hastening its demise; the same ambitions and delusions that make ISIL so different from its extremist peers are also proving to be its undoing. Who has contributed what in the coalition against the Islamic State? How useful has NATO been in this conflict? Since I was asked by the White House in September to be the President Obama’s Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, we have brought more than 60 nations and international organizations together in the effort to degrade and defeat Da’esh. Coalition partners are working together across five lines of shared effort: military efforts with ground partners to defeat Da’esh in battle, stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, cutting ISIL off from its sources of financial support, providing humanitarian aid to Da’esh’s victims, and contesting Da’esh’s false ideology in the information space. While NATO has no official role within the coalition, every NATO ally is a member of the Coalition and there are several NATO partners who are taking leading roles in these five lines of effort. NATO members comprise the majority of nations taking part in airstrikes over Iraq and in training, equipping, and building the capacity of the Iraqi security forces which

interview will ultimately take back their country from Da’esh. NATO nations, and all European nations, also have a special role to play for the long term on account of the power of their example. European global leadership in the 21st century is in large part defined by a commitment to shared values and an ability to overcome the divisions of the past. From the ruins of the Second World War, and even more recently, in working to repair frayed societies in the Balkans, European nations have come together to promote reconciliation and heal deep wounds. Those lessons and that same commitment will be required in the parts of the Middle East that have been riven by ISIL. What can be done to stem the recruitment of fighters from Europe and to prevent terrorist attacks at home? As the horrific attacks in Brussels, Sydney, Ottawa, and most recently, Paris, remind us, Da’esh’s toxic ideology and the flow of foreign fighters are threats that can come home to all of us. Because of this present and future danger, stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters is one of our global coalition’s main lines of effort, one where we have made important gains. Over the past several months, 13 nations have made legislative and security changes to make it more difficult to fight in Iraq and Syria. We are working with countries like Tunisia, where hundreds of foreign fighters have come from to provide legal and technical support to manage this threat. The EU, a coalition partner, has also invested 20 million EURO in outreach to clerics, teachers, and parents in at risk communities. All of these efforts, however, can only be the beginning. The challenge of foreign terrorist fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria and their eventual return home is truly a generational challenge which must be met with a generational and global commitment. How would you define "victory" in this campaign? When I think of what success looks like against Da’esh, I think of a world my young grandson will inherit. Now that the enemy is beyond my own personal reach, I ask myself, “Who will protect him?” I have spent the better part of my adulthood at war or preparing for war. If we do

not use the challenge of Da’esh to come together and address many of the root problems that are responsible for its emergence, our children and grandchildren will confront much of the same and potentially far worse consequences. When I think of success, I consider not just Da’esh’s forces on the battleﬁeld, which we will have fractured, but Da’esh’s victims whom we will have rescued and communities which we have helped to rebuild and reconcile with one another. This Coalition must also seize this critical opportunity to address the underlying frustrations which have fueled Da’esh’s rise, among them, the need for jobs, recognition, empowerment, opportunity, and community. We remember the millions of young people across the region who gathered in their capitals to raise their voices in support of change and reform just a few years ago. We remember how effectively they used technology to share their story and struggle with the world. To destroy Da’esh as an idea and eliminate its false appeal, we must work to ensure that these young people are brought together by opportunities to innovate, create, and integrate with their peers across the world. What is your advice to the next generation of young leaders? No matter your nationality, your ﬁeld of study or chosen profession, I encourage each of you to consider how you can serve your country. There is no greater honor than serving one’s nation and to serve alongside those who have committed

themselves to selfless sacrifice. After my family, serving my country has been the greatest joy and reward of my life. What does a military officer value most in civilian leaders? After nearly four decades of service as an officer in the United States Marines, I now find myself in a civilian leadership role within the State Department - and I appreciate the opportunity to better understand both sides of the civilian-military relationship. But even from my first days at the United States Naval Academy, I have learned how vital civilian control of the military has been to the strength of the United States and to the success of any democracy. As Samuel Adams, one of America’s Founding Fathers, once wrote: "Even when there is a necessity of military power ... a wise and prudent people will always have a watchful and jealous eye over it." A military is meant to be a protector of liberty and a government’s authority, not to be their source. It is because elected leaders derive their authority from the consent of the people and make decisions on their behalf in consideration of an entire landscape of social, political, and economic factors, that military officers take strategic direction from civilian leaders. In keeping with the oath they take to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, members of the military trust the judgment of civilian leaders. This is a sacred trust, one upon which the strength and security of the United States are built.

General John Allen currently holds a position of the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. He was appointed by President Barack Obama on September 16, 2014. Allen is a retired U. S. Marine four star General and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and U. S. Forces in Afghanistan from July 2011 to February 2013. Prior to being the Special Presidential Envoy, he was nominated as the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Defense on Middle East Security. During his nearly 38-year military career, Allen served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Marine Corps. Before being dispatched to Afghanistan, he was the principal director of Asia/Pacific policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for three years. He was involved extensively on policy initiatives involving Mongolia, China, and Southeast Asia, as well as the Six Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Between 2007 and 2008 he was also assigned to the Operation Iraqi Freedom. Allen is also involved in a number of professional military educational programs such as Marine Infantry Officer Program of which he is the director or commandant of midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy just to name a few. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and is on a leave of absence from the Brookings Institution where he is co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. Allen holds a Bachelor of Science in operations analysis from the U.S. Naval Academy, a master’s degree in national security studies from Georgetown University, a Master of Science in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College and a Master of Science in national security strategy from the National Defense University. He is a recipient of an Honorary Doctor of Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University

2015 • 7

in depth

EU, Russia Re-access Southeast Europe Energy Tactics KOSTIS GEROPOULOS • Energy and Russian Affairs Editor of the New Europe newspaper Turkey and Greece are becoming the new partners of Russia in terms of gas transit.

Following the scrapping of the Russian-backed South Stream gas pipeline and Gazprom’s announcement that natural gas exports to Europe will bypass Ukraine entirely and go via a proposed new pipeline to Turkey, strengthening EU energy security, especially in Southeast Europe, has become an even bigger priority for the European Commission. ice President of the EU Energy Union Maroš Šefcovič said recently in Riga that the Energy Union will not stop at the bloc’ borders but will work in close cooperation with EU neighbor countries. The time has come to not only consider the creation of the single energy market, but also to implement the ambitious project declared by the European Commission as one of its top priorities. Russia surprised Brussels when it said in January that Gazprom plans to deliver gas to Turkey’s border with Greece and “it’s up to the EU to decide what to do” with it further. Šefcovič has said Russia’s new plan won’t work. The Commission warned Gazprom not to jeopardise its reputation as a reliable gas supplier and respect existing contracts. It called on the Rus-

8 • 2015

sian gas monopoly to stay engaged with the EU at early stage and explore all supply options in the southeast region. In an effort to bypass Ukraine, Gazprom wants to build a new pipeline rou-

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le reaction from the European authorities, which didn’t make any attempts to open the door for Russian gas from that perspective, and now Turkey and Greece are becoming the new partners of Russia in terms of gas transit. The decision to drop South Stream is positive for the shareholders in Gazprom, investor advisors have said. The cost estimates had been climbing steadily since the project was first announced and were more recently estimated at $40 billion and climbing. That was a bad use of Gazprom resources and a poor investment for the company’s minority investors. There was no need for the pipeline when all that was required — as far as investors were concerned — was a better deal with Ukraine to continue using the transit pipe and avoid further payment disputes. The company is better off using that cash to either reduce existing debt or divert it to projects, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), which would create better longer term diversification in its business mix and customer base. Increasing the dividend payout would be even better. However, the situation in Ukraine is very unpredictable and Gazprom wants

Vice President of the EU Energy Union Maroš Šefcovič said recently in Riga that the Energy Union will not stop at the bloc’ borders but will work in close cooperation with EU neighbor countries.

te through Turkey that would carry Russian gas to Europe. Moscow and Ankara have started the technical work on Turkish Stream. The gas could then potentially be pumped through Greece. Russia no longer considers South Stream seriously after the relative hosti-

to avoid any risks associated with Ukraine as a transiting country. At the same time Gazprom needs to deal with Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation Botas regarding the equity stakes and the onshore section of the pipeline.

in depth It’s not quite clear who is going to buy the gas from Turkish Stream. Russia is currently in negotiations with Turkey to deliver 63 billion cubic meters of gas annually there. There are also talks about building a regional distribution hub near the Greek-Turkish border to supply the rest of Europe. From that perspective Europe needs to run its own infrastructure and so far we have seen only the relatively warm reaction from Hungary. Budapest has said it is ready to negotiate on delivering Russian natural gas through the new pipeline via Turkey. Meanwhile, relations between Athens and Moscow are improving at a time when Russia’s role in Eastern Ukraine has driven relations between Moscow and the West to post Cold War lows. Just days after being elected prime minister, Alexis Tsipras said he didn’t support expanding EU sanctions on Russia even though at the end Greece stepped back into line with Brussels policy. The good Russian-Greek ties could help Turkish Stream. But the key role of that pipeline is not Greece but rather the central parts of Europe where most of the gas consumption is concentrated. Therefore, the agreement of Greece and the friendship with Greece is not enough to make that project happen. Russia needs to continue negotiating with other potential buyers of Russia gas. Basically those European countries which are located along the ex-South Stream route. For its part, the EU is trying to reduce its reliance on Russian gas. Energy security in Central and South East Europe is a top priority for the Juncker

Commission. Therefore, Šefcovič has convened a high level group with EU Member States from the region concerned to discuss infrastructure challenges and project options “after South Stream”. On that note, Greece and Bulgaria are proceeding with the 183-kilometre Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB Pipeline). The project, which will have an initial capacity of 3 billion cubic metres

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ITGI could transport gas from the East Mediterranean basin – Cyprus and Israel – to Europe. After ITGI was excluded from the Shah Deniz selection in 2012 it was still named a Project of Common Interest by the European Commission and was placed on Greece’s fast track list in June 2014, following a bi-ministerial meeting. The ﬁndings in East Mediterranean ba-

It’s not quite clear who is going to buy the gas from Turkish Stream.

a year with the possibility for an upgrade to around 5 billion cubic metres, can serve as a northern link from Greece to Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, elsewhere in the region and even Baltic countries. IGB is proposed to connect with the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will transport gas within the second stage of Azerbaijani Shah Deniz field development to Europe. Baku and Brussels have stressed the importance of the increasing role of Azerbaijan in ensuring the energy security of Europe, and the significance of the Southern Gas Corridor in this regard. But the latest developments in the region may also revive the gas pipeline from Greece to Italy via the Adriatic Sea, known as the Interconnector TurkeyGreece-Italy (ITGI). The pipeline project lost out in the race to carry Caspian supplies to Europe from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field.

Gas pipeline station workers passing the gas pressure engines in Zakarpattia region, Western Ukraine.

sin, Middle East and the Caspian Sea could sources for the pipeline. In particular the IGI-Poseidon pipeline, managed by Italy’s Edison and DEPA, is the most advanced and technically mature project with a secured and fully authorised landfall in Italy. The European Commission has selected Projects of Common Interest which are important for the EU from a diversification, market integration or security of supply angle. All three – IGB, ITGI and the East Med Pipeline (Cyprus to EU) - are on the list. At the end of the day, however, projects must show an economic viability and the market must see a business case in it. There has been an increased effort from Azerbaijan and the EU to move the Southern Gas Corridor project along faster and to have a roadmap confirmed by all the participants for implementation of the project which includes exploration of the huge Azeri Shah Deniz 2 field, the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The EU needs to assess the state of play of the European energy policy and to identify the necessary new paths to ensure the desired European integration. It will also needs to plan pipelines between EU member states. Such interconnectors will allow gas to be shipped between countries, similar to what Slovakia and Hungary have been doing for Ukraine, and cut individual states’ dependence on single suppliers to supply routes. Kostis Geropoulos is the Energy and Russian Affairs Editor of the New Europe newspaper. His weekly column, “Energy Insider,” is available at www.neurope.eu, and he can also be followed on twitter (@energyinsider).

2015 • 9

in depth

The Challenge of Deterring ISIS THOMAS M. SANDERSON • Senior Fellow and Codirector of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project Fighters from the al-Qaida linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) marching in Raqqa, Syria.

Through its coalition against ISIS, the West and its local allies are struggling to save a region now teetering on the edge of a geopolitical precipice. he amalgam of coalition forces much of it still notional - is an engineer’s nightmare: composed of countless moving parts of marginal quality, with American pressure and a fear of ISIS as its only lubricants. The U.S.led force also confronts an unpalatable reality: the adversary is undeterrable. Foreign fighters pouring over Turkey’s border to do battle in Syria can make one final stop before gliding through the Bab AlSalam gate. Before a perfunctory wave through by border officials, aspiring jihadists can sell their passports to a wellpositioned café owner who knows these fighters will never again need them. Drawn from a life of marginalization to one of empowerment and eventual salvation, dozens of young men will transform themselves into human bombs at the direction of ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra. Seemingly inexhaustible in number, Sunni boys and men from America to Indonesia and more than 75 countries in between are drawn by the dramatic imagery, fueled by social media, of heroic fighters doing battle against all manner of evil. These young men—many of them illiterate and poor—move from a life devoid of choice, dignity, and respect to an environment impervious to reason and fear. A long-sought caliphate is in pla-

10 • 2015

ce, they are told, and it needs defending at all costs. Willing to die in defense of their religion and the self-declared caliph who interprets it for them, many of these ﬁghters are energized by the promise of a favorable postmortem evaluation of their Earthly deeds. Helping to cleanse holy lands of corrupt, despotic, Western-controlled Sunni governments (and even more detestable Shi’a regimes) is intoxica-

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ver” countries. Soon they could be on an airplane to America— intentions unknown, but quite likely lethal. What can be done about ISIS and its team of motivated, trained foreign fighters and other non-state actors like them? Is the only solution arrest or death, or can those two sanctions prevent them from taking up arms in the first place? Unfortunately, a deterrence strategy, which by definition is based on the threat of consequences, is unlikely to succeed in the fight against ISIS or similarly minded groups. Death is a goal for many jihadists, and one to be celebrated. With few deterrent options, the United States and its partners should support efforts aimed at dissuading would-be fighters before they make the decision to join ISIS. This may include local efforts to engage family members, clergy, community leaders, and law enforcement, who in turn can discourage plans by those most at risk to fight and die in Syria or Iraq. These influences must be brought to bear before an ISIS commander or facilitator makes his mark on the individual over social media or in person. After that point, stemming

The U.S.-led force also confronts an unpalatable reality: the adversary is undeterrable.

ting indeed. The excesses and failures of corrupt governments have thrust them— fearless and energized—to the front lines of a holy war. For some of those who do not perish on the battleﬁeld, their onward movement presents an entirely new threat. At times withdrawing through the same border crossing in Turkey, there is the option of buying a now-repurposed passport for travel to Europe. Chances are, the documents on offer were once held by some of the estimated 3,000 European ﬁghters who journeyed to the region, many hailing from one of 30 U.S. “visa-wai-

the flow of fighters will be much harder and more expensive to achieve. “The Challenge of Deterring ISIS,” by Thomas M. Sanderson, was originally published as a chapter in Global Forecast 2015: Crisis and Opportunity (Washington, DC: CSIS, November 2014). Reprinted with permission. (http://csis.org/files/publication/141117_Sanderson.pdf) Thomas M. Sanderson is Senior Fellow and Codirector of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project, where he investigates terrorism, transnational crime, global trends, and intelligence issues.

in depth

The Wounded Bear: Louder and More Harmful PÉTER KREKÓ • Director, Political Capital Institute, Budapest; Senior Lecturer In this photo taken on Sunday, Oct. 26, 2014, a large TV screen shows Russian President Vladimir Putin as he speaks to political experts at a meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club at a Nakhimov's Square in Sevastopol, Crimea. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)

At the end of last year, when the ruble crisis made it obvious that the Russian economy was in great trouble due to sanctions and falling oil prices, many optimistic observers predicted that this was the beginning of the end of the conflict between Russia and the West. ishful thinkers were happy that the weakening of the Russian economy would force Russia to be more open and to make compromises. The weakening of the Russian economy, they said, could help to consolidate the situation in Ukraine and, even more generally, to improve relations between Russia and the West. As a consequence of it, direct interference in European affairs via diplomatic, economic and propaganda tools would lessen. These optimistic predictions, unfortunately, obviously proved wrong. Russia, as a reaction to the economic crisis, has just become more dangerous, less cooperative and more aggressive in its geopolitical moves (see the intensification of conflict in Ukraine), the tone of its rhetoric and in its propaganda, as well. But this is not really new. The situation is similar to what we observed starting in late 2008, at the beginning of the decline of the economy of Putin’s Russia. In 2009, the Russian economy contracted by eight percent and the growth potential of the Russian economy started to decline. The political consequences were obvious: “postBRIC Russia” became more closed, more illiberal and more hostile to the West. Intensification of propaganda activities were part of this picture. In December 2008, when the Russian government defined the strategic companies that should enjoy priority in governmental support during times of crisis, Russia Today, the international mouthpiece of the Kremlin, was put on the list. And RT is spreading the Eurasian ideology

with increased intensity. The wounded bear acted more hostile and roared louder. Russia, again, tries to compensate for the loss of economic inﬂuence not only with a more intense geopolitical and diplomatic expansion, but also with a quickening of its efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of Europeans. We can be sure that even if there are harsh cuts in Russian expenditures as a consequence of the crisis, Putin will increase spending on weapons and the “weaponization of information.” The three main channels of propaganda are these: 1) The “mainstream” media. Russia is increasingly successful in building up its media empire worldwide. The most important and “professional” piece, Russia Today, right now broadcasts propaganda messages, conspiracy theories and misinformation in English, Spanish, Arabic and German. The launch of French and Serbian services is underway, and there are rumours on a Hungarian service as well. 2) Further support for radical right and radical left parties. Currently, there are around 20 percent of MEPs who are rather hostile to the EU and have friendly relations towards Russia. Most of them are anti-NATO (including the Greek Syriza that just won the elections). They are voting in one block to support Russia and to reject Ukraine’s association agreement with the EU. France’s National Front has been proved to receive funding from Kremlin-tied banks. We can expect that the Kremlin will try to increase

its inﬂuence further with money and diplomatic support. 3) Building up new Internet and social media networks – and exploiting earlier ones. Russia is putting more and more effort into information warfare on the Internet and in social media. In Hungary (a country where we can observe signs of increasing Russian pressure on the whole political spectrum), for example, this has led to some really bizarre manifestations. Hidfo.net, originally the website of an openly neo-Nazi organisation (Hungarian National Front), became a mouthpiece of the Kremlin in the last year. They are combining far-right, nationalist, anti-Semitic messages with hardcore Eurasian propaganda. This voice is ampliﬁed by highly popular Facebook pages as well. The direct, purposeful Russian misinformation is blatantly obvious in this case. In August, this website published a fake story on Hungary selling tanks to Ukraine- misinformation that was quoted in the communique of the Kremlin as well (!). Soon after, this website was put on a Russian server – its current address is hidfo.net.ru. Can it be a mere coincidence? The most striking feature of Russia’s active measures and propaganda activity is the almost “transparent” use of the corrupt, destructive practices. What to do? Suppression of freedom of speech is clearly not an option if Europe and the U.S. want to take up the challenge of increasingly intense Eurasian propaganda. Europe and the U.S., rather, need more knowledge about the channels and messages of misinformation, and more awareness in counter-messaging to be able to counterbalance the destructive information warfare of the Kremlin. The key here is not to downplay the risks: while Russia’s economy is becoming weaker, its destructive potential is becoming stronger. Article was published as a follow up to the Château Béla Central European Strategic Forum organized by the Slovak Atlantic Commission. 2015 • 11

in depth

Historical Choices after the Massacres in Paris YVES PASCOUAU • Director of Migration and Mobility Policies and Head of European Migration and Diversity programme at the European Policy Centre (EPC) The "Je suis Charlie" writing has become a symbol of condolence and non-acceptance of such attacks.

The tragic, unqualifiable attacks committed last week at Charlie Hebdo’s office, in Montrouge and a kosher supermarket, which killed 17 persons, have created an unprecedented reaction from the French population. emonstrations organised all over the country during the weekend have shown the population’s attachment to freedom, in particular to the freedom of expression. While taking place in France, these attacks have resonated across the planet, with spontaneous reactions and support from the major parts of the world including the US. The solidarity of France’s European partners was highlighted by the participation of numerous EU leaders in the Paris demonstration. This should not come as a surprise: what occurred in France is not a national issue, but fundamentally a European and international one. France is not the ﬁrst

12 • 2015

country hit by terrorist attacks and is not the only state on the list of possible future targets. Now that rallies are over, it is time to act. Reaction at EU and national level are required to ﬁght against such terrorist attacks. However, in responding to these crimes, European and national players should strike the right balance between security, liberty and human rights. And this could become a challenging task.

Security high on the agenda The primary response to these killings will, beyond doubt, be security-based, with security issues climbing to the top

of the EU’s agenda. The meeting between 11 EU Ministers of Interior, EU Commissioner Avramopoulos and North American Officials (from the US and Canada) on Sunday in Paris is an illustration of this momentum. As the outcome of the meeting underlines, the months ahead will focus on counterterrorism, freedom fighters and radicalisation on the Internet. In this regard, addressing how to better use existing rules and tools – as well as which new rules and tools the EU should adopt to increase security – will be discussed. Hence, criminal law, cooperation in the field of criminal justice, the modification of the Schengen Borders Code, the creation of an EU Passenger Name Record (PNR), the use of IT systems, interoperability between IT systems, access of law enforcement authorities to IT systems, data protection, the adoption of a new version of the data retention rules (since the previous was cancelled by the European Court of Justice),inter alia, will become key in Justice and Home Affairs meetings.

Remaining in the boundaries of the rule of law and human rights The inclination to strengthen security is understandable given the violence of attacks already perpetrated in the EU and the threat terrorism puts on populations living in the EU and therefore on EU governments. It is also a matter of fact that more cooperation between national authorities in particular regarding intelligence is needed. However, security concerns should not overshadow the EU’s basic values. On the contrary, these values should act as a frame within which future actions should take place.

in depth These values are embedded in Article 2 of the Treaty which states the following: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights (...).” This implies that EU and Member States actions in the security field should remain within the strict boundaries of the rule of law and human rights. Hence, any modification of current EU rules, any adoption of new EU rules and tools any national measures adopted to implement EU rules should respect human rights as protected by the Treaty, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court of Justice, the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. EU and Member States actions will only be legitimate if they respect these rights and principles. National hawkish reactions, fuelled by politicians speaking about “going to war” or politicians tempted to establish a “French Patriot Act”, as well as the plea to establish emergency laws should not lead to overreactions and disproportionate measures which may infringe with human rights. National reactions may echo at EU level and it should be the role of EU institutions to safeguard common principles.

Linking terrorism to immigration or looking beyond? Despite the fact that killers were French nationals, a link between terrorism and immigration has already been establis-

hed. Some politicians have indeed claimed that there is a need to better control or even stop immigration. While this rhetoric is not new, it remains dangerous. It amalgamates foreigners with terrorists. One should keep in mind that terrorists are criminals and fall within the scope of criminal law where foreigners are individuals whose situation are governed by Aliens’ law. In addition, this rhetoric

„

tries, starting with Tunisia and Morocco. The security side of current partnerships should be accompanied with a broader agenda including a true peopleto-people dimension, i.e. the possibly for citizens from these countries to move to and within the Union. Fostering human mobility and therefore the relationship with neighbouring countries will not only be a strong signal from the EU towards

What occurred in France is not a national issue, but fundamentally a European and international one.

does not address the fact that immigration policies concern also legal migration and asylum, i.e. protection granted precisely to people fleeing terrorist regimes. Two links may however be identified with immigration rules. The first one, which has been addressed by the Ministers on Sunday, relates to external border controls, i.e. controls on people entering and leaving the EU territory. In this view, a revision of the Schengen borders code with respect to external border controls could be expected in particular regarding EU citizens. The second rapprochement with immigration would reside in the exact opposite of current policies and possible reactions. The magnitude of the shock felt in France and in Europe should drive decision-makers to profoundly redesign the partnerships with neighbouring coun-

Flowers are laid near the headquarters of magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris.

its neighbourhood but also towards Muslims communities.

Historical choices Contrary to radical views portrayed by terrorists, the world is not divided between one group and others. On the contrary, EU history is an example of a process which has overcome divisions and united human being whatever their differences, their nationality and religion. States have been able to build an area of peace, based on human rights, precisely because the project improved cooperation between institutions, promoted unity instead of divisions and designed a common future. Replicating such a virtuous process with our closest neighbours should become a priority. The countries of the EU are at a critical historical juncture. They could be driven by fear and react accordingly – with the risk of betraying our common values. Or they could believe in a common future with close neighbours and extend the area of peace and human rights. The best legacy which can come out of last week’s atrocities is the strengthening of a tolerant, multi-faith society which takes the necessary steps to protect its citizens but without compromising its values. A prospect that Charlie Hebdo’s cartoonists and journalists would surely have endorsed. “Historical choices after the massacres in Paris,” by Yves Pascouau, was originally published at the European Policy Centre website, January 2015. Reprinted with permission. (http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?pu b_id=5174&cat_id=4) 2015 • 13

face2face

Could the rise of the ISIS mean the dawn of a new epoch of the anti-western resistance in the Middle East?

MICHAEL STEPHENS, Research Fellow Middle East Studies, and Head of RUSI Qatar Nearly twenty months on from the capture of Syrian city of Raqqa the Islamic State still stands as a defiant and violent opponent of the West and its values. At every turn the ISIS has appeared to be one step ahead of its adversaries, using social media and modern technology to create an image of a strength, competency and righteousness sending out messages to attract supporters to its cause, and to demonize the crimes of the West and the apostates of Shia Islam. The number of sympathizers who have flocked to support ISIS or who merely silently agree with their cause is difficult to estimate. Although in many countries supporting the Islamic State even via tweets or speech is considered a crime, the number of supporters is not insignificant - especially in the Gulf States, Jordan and the Maghreb. What is clear is that there is no regional demographic that can be easily identified to be specifically prone to support ISIS: young and old, rich and poor, people from all backgrounds and walks of life have been drawn towards it. In this sense ISIS has acted as a magnet for those seeking solace in a form of resistance that empowers the Arab and Islamic world at the expense of the West. It is instructive to understand how perceptions of Western behaviour in the Middle East have changed since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Western military interventions have benefitted Kurdish and Shia interests at the expense of Iraq’s Sunni Arab population, leading to tensions within the Iraqi state which erupted in 2014 as ISIS forced its way across north-western Iraq. Many Sunnis across the Arab world have blamed the West for handing Iraq to the Shia on a plate, enabling discrimination against Sunnis and the expansion of Iranian influence. Accordingly, Sunni Arab trust in Western influence in the region has dipped dramatically. And although ISIS’ actions have served to shock the world, many Sunnis believe that it was ultimately Western inconsistency and inaction that allowed ISIS to emerge, which has caused mistrust of Western intentions to grow, particular14 • 2015

ly in the Monarchies of the Persian Gulf. This does not constitute an anti-Western axis per se (the Gulf States are still aligned to the West), but it does highlight that mistakes made in 2003 have caused seismic changes in the region, many of which were not intended, yet opened up potentially irremediable ﬁssures countless Sunnis are still deeply angry about. There is nothing particularly new in what ISIS are doing, nor the sentiments they represent. That the group is good at getting their message out via the Internet, and particularly gruesome in their methods of killing should not detract from the fundamental point that they come from a region which has been emasculated by European and Western powers for centuries. This fundamental imbalance has fuelled a feeling of powerlessness in the Arab world, most notably since Britain and France carved up the spoils of the Ottoman Empire following the end of World War I. Various forms of resistance to both Western hegemony and the Western aligned state of Israel have emerged over the decades; Arab Nationalism, Pan Arabism, the Muslim Brotherhood, Pan Islamism and Jihadism and now ISIS. ISIS has built on historical notions of powerlessness and merged them with a Jihadist ideology and American weapons to form a formidable force that has swept across towns and cities in Iraq and Syria. What is new is simply that unlike previous ideologies before them ISIS have been incredibly successful at changing the regional order and shocking the Western world.

But the actions of ISIS have also served to disgust many Muslims and indeed non-Muslim Arabs, who have often been the targets of ISIS brutality. As such while ISIS purports to push an anti-western agenda, high profile activities such as the burning of Jordanian pilot Lt. Moaz Kasasbeh have enraged local tribes in Jordan, producing a backlash against the Islamic State that it could not have predicted. ISIS’ hopes that it could rally the Sunni Arab world to its cause now appear to hang in the balance. Jordan has responded with airstrikes and determination that would indicate that perhaps this time ISIS has taken on one challenge too many. Additionally, Shia Muslims, who have often been the targets of ISIS’ wrath, have fought back viciously. As an extension of this, the rise of ISIS has brought historic tensions between the West and Iran into moment of realignment. For now at least, while ISIS threatens the stability of Iraq and Syria, and maintains its militant anti-Shia stance in direct contravention to Iranian interest, Iran will find its regional goals converging with Western regional goals. For a nation whose Friday prayers often used to include chants of “death to Israel, death to America” it is an abrupt turnaround difficult to fully understand outside of the realm of strategic need. In its attempts to fight ISIS, the coalition of 62 states comprising of both Western and Arab nations has established a joint front seemingly indicating that ISIS is an enemy of both Christian and Muslim alike, and not just the West and its values. This has gone some way to undercutting ISIS’ ability to pit the struggle as Muslims against Christians, but still allowed it to exploit its role as a plucky underdog fighting against the US-led imperialism. Whether ISIS can maintain this narrative is frankly questionable. They are popular only to a small minority of Muslims around the world, and ultimately may have gone too far by burning a fellow Sunni Muslim to death. That this punishment is deeply questioned in Islam will lead many to conclude that they are no longer a genuine alternative to Western power in the region, and as antithetical to Islam as Western domination is. Their opposition to the West can only get them so far before their lack of strategic vision and nihilism ultimately defeat them.

face2face

ANDREW J. TABLER Senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Programme on Arab Politics The advent and rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been a wake-up call for countries of the world, drawing attention to the dangers creeping out of the “ungoverned spaces” of Syria and Iraq. The horrific execution of Western and regional antiISIS coalition hostages begs the question whether the rise of ISIS is the dawn of a new epoch of anti-western resistance and sentiment in the Middle East. While ISIS often uses the West’s choices in the Syrian war over the last four years as a recruitment tool, the West’s choices on how to deal with the continuing Syria crisis are likely to determine how far this anti-western sentiment will spread and how damaging it will really be. The key to that remains in developing a plan to get rid of ISIS and the Assad regime in parallel. ISIS was born in Iraq, but metastasized in the chaos of the Syrian civil war. ISIS entered Raqqa in 2013 not simply to fill a vacuum in that part of Syria, but supposedly to defend the local Sunni Arabs that dominate the Syrian opposition. The Sunni-Shia sectarian gloves came off in May 2013 with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s speech during the Battle of Qusayr, the Syrian town adjacent to Lebanon which was retaken by Hezbollah on behalf of the Assad regime. Foreign Sunni Jihadi fighters from around the world flooded into Syria. In Iraq, ISIS took advantage of similar sectarian tensions between Sunnis and the Iran-backed government of Nouri al-Malaki, whose pro-Shia sectarian agenda and packing of the security services caused Sunnis to seek security through ISIS forces. How did then ISIS turn the narrative around and implicate the West and then bandwagon Syrians – who before the war were some of the region’s most secular – along with Jihadists? First, Washington’s refusal to provide lethal assistance to the Syrian rebels (other than through a covert programme) caused Syrians to feel that the West’s strategy

in Syria was to convince people to run into gunﬁre until the regime ran out of bullets. During that time, Syrian oppositionists openly talked of being abandoned in the face of slaughter. The second related issue was what is called in government circles the “non-strike incident of 2013” – known elsewhere as Obama’s walking away from his impo-

sed Red Line against the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons. From that time onward, Syrians saw Jihadists, both ISIS and Jebhat al-Nusra, the AlQaeda afﬁliate, as saviours from the Iran-backed Assad regime’s mass slaughter of Syria’s majority Sunni population. By all indications, as well as by US President Barack Obama’s statements, the war against ISIS will be a long one – bad news for Syrians, Iraqis, Middle Easterners and Westerners alike. But this also presents opportunities, particularly concerning the cultivation of much needed Sunni Arab partners in Syria to take over the areas controlled by ISIS. Syrian Sunni Arabs – which represent ISIS’ sectarian base – are around 75% of the Syrian population and make up the lion’s share of the Syrian opposition. What can motivate Syrian Sunni Arabs, as well as their regional sponsors, to destroy ISIS? The answer is a future in Syria without Bas-

har al-Assad. The problem is sequencing the defeat of ISIS in the short run and of Assad shortly thereafter. Achieving this requires formulating a plan and implementing it. First, the West must accept that Syria will be a divided, failed state as long as Assad is permitted to remain in power – not unlike Iraq under Saddam Hussein in the 1990s, when the regime's policies cost it control over the Kurdish north. Second, the West must maintain pressure on Assad by encouraging the ﬁght between his forces and ISIS, weakening both in parallel. Assad often brags about ﬁghting terrorism, so the United States should let him do it on his own dime, hanging responsibility for ISIS around his neck and weakening him and Iran's forces in the process. Key issues for the West to consider include deciding when to ramp up or scale back airstrikes against not only ISIS, but also regime forces -- especially if Assad follows through with recent threats to attack any US-trained moderate forces entering Syria. Third, the West must help the moderate opposition consolidate their lines of control against the jihadists and regime alike, in addition to sharply increasing humanitarian assistance for displaced persons and efforts to protect civilians. The West cannot organize and regiment the entire opposition, but it can back any faction that retakes areas from ISIS. The only way to motivate the rebels to do so is to openly support their justified stance against Assad remaining in power. And last, but not least, the West must develop a strategy to remove Assad via diplomacy, information messaging, and military/economic power. The longer he is in place, the longer Syria will be divided. Once Assad goes, it will be possible to put the pieces of Syria back together again and begin healing the widening rift between the Sunni Arabs and West. His publications include "Syria's Collapse and How Washington Can Stop It" (Foreign Affairs, July-August 2013) and the 2011 book In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria. 2015 • 15

visegrad news

Pegida Spirit Spreads to the Czech Republic At first glance the reaction of the Czech politicians to the attack against the French satirical journal Charlie Hebdo in which 17 people were killed looked normally. Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka condemned the terrorist act and President Miloš Zeman sent condolences on behalf of the Czech people, saying the attack was an assault on the fundamental European values. But in the aftermath of the same incident Czech Minister of Culture Daniel Herman postponed an upgrade of the Muslim community to the level of the 21 officially registered churches and religious societies until at least 2024. For the Muslim community the most frightening is the hostile reaction of the civil society. About 2 thousand people rallied in the centre of Prague against the Islamification of Europe on January 16.

A young man lits a candle in front of the French Embassy in Prague, Czech Republic, on Wednesday, Jan. 7, 2015, to pay tribute to victims of Wednesday´s terrorist attack in Paris at the oﬃces of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo. (AP Photo/CTK, Katerina Sulova)

The crowds held national ﬂags and banners “Islam doesn’t belong to Europe”. Organizers from a group called "We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic," say that terror attacks in Paris pro-

mpted their protest. Martin Konvicka, a leader of the group, says its aim is "to ban spreading and promoting of Islam." He claims having no formal ties with the German PEGIDA, but it clearly is basing on it. In response to Prague rallies a group of 20 Muslim countries with embassies in Prague accused authorities of the Czech Republic of rising Islamophobia. The so-called “Prague group of countries”, member-states of the 57-nation Organization of Islamic Cooperation, said they were "concerned that Islam has been increasingly mixed up with terrorism". “The Czech Republic is one of the most secular countries in the world with only tiny (max. 0.2 %) and very splintered Muslim community. The Czech scepticism towards religion is in the case of Muslim faith magniﬁed by general lowknowledge about Islam.” – says Dr Marek Čejka, a researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Prague.

Orbán Not Loved by the People of Hungary On January 2 big protests against Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán marched through Budapest. Orbán, PM and president of conservative party Fidesz, that holds a two-thirds majority in parliament, in 2013 passed a new constitution allowing him the appointment of the top positions in courts, banks and media. Hungary ranks at place 64 in the 2014 World Press Freedom index published by Reporters Without Borders. It is the fourth lowest in the EU. Orbán’s response to the civil society’s demands for more freedom and tolerance is a call to the EU to restrict access to migrants with “different cultural characteristics”. “Economic immigration is a bad thing in Europe, it should not be seen as having any beneﬁts, because it only brings trouble and danger to the peoples of Europe" - he said in a public TV channel on January 12. Therefore, immigration 16 • 2015

Demonstrators gather in front of the Hungarian Parliament building during an anti-goverment demonstration in Budapest, Hungary, Sunday, Feb. 1, 2015.(AP Photo/MTI,Tamas Kovacs)

must be stopped. That's the Hungarian stance." The only exception, could be made for people claiming political asylum. “While I am PM, Hungary will deﬁnitely not become an immigration destination. We don't want to see signiﬁ-

cantly sized minorities with different cultural characteristics and backgrounds among us. We want to keep Hungary as Hungary” - Orbán said after attending a mass rally in Paris to pay tribute to 17 victims of an attack on Charlie Hebdo.

visegrad news

Slovakia to Obtain Nine Helos from the USA On January 8 the Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel and Defence Minister Martin Glváč of Slovakia discussed issues of mutual concern during a meeting at the Pentagon. According to the ofﬁcial note from the meeting, “Secretary Hagel thanked Minister Glváč for their contributions to NATO and international security. [...] Minister Glváč highlighted that Slovakia committed to spending 1.6 percent of GDP on defence by 2020 and by 2016, they plan to allocate 20 percent of the defence budget for modernization. [...] Secretary Hagel and Minister Glváč discussed deepening their strategic cooperation regarding Slovakia's military modernization plans and a support to Ukraine.” Soon after the visit, USA has offered to broker the sale of Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk military helicopters to Slovakia via the U.S. Foreign Military Sa-

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel host an honor cordon to welcome the Slovakian Defense Minister Martin Glvac at the Pentagon, Thursday, Jan. 8, 2015. (AP Photo/Pablo Martinez Monsivais)

les fund. The price for the ﬁrst nine should not exceed 300 million with training and maintenance. Currently, the Slovak Armed Forces operate a ﬂeet of 14 antiquated Russian helicopters Mi-17. “There’s an offer to purchase Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters according to requirements we’ve arrived at based on a feasibility study, the planned development of Air Force and past bilateral talks attended by experts from both countries,”

Glváč told on the press conference on January 12. “If purchased via the US fund accepted in the EU, the deal would guarantee a lower price than the manufacturer would otherwise give to any other client.” – Slovak Minister of Defence added. Some experts claim 33 million is too much for one helicopter. Eventually Slovak army needs about 18 new choppers. Last year the Slovak Defence Ministry had a budget of 744.7 million.

Poland as a Tutor of Democracy in Ukraine On January 12, after weeks of preparations, Poland finally evacuated over 180 ethnic Poles from the embattled Donbass region. Approximately 4 thousand ethnic Poles lived in eastern Ukraine before the Russian annexation of Crimea. Most of them left, but about 200 stayed. Those, who decided to accept the offer of the Polish Foreign Ministry, will receive a financial support from the state, along with the apartment and language courses. On January 19 Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz flew to Kiev to meet with both Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and President Petro Poroshenko. She discussed Poland’s role in providing advice on creating new democratic institutions in Ukraine. She was accompanied by the heads of Poland's Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA), Supreme Audit Office (NIK), and Office of Competition and

Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, right, and Poland's Prime Minister-designate Ewa Kopacz talk during their meeting in Kiev, Ukraine, Monday, Jan. 19, 2015. (AP Photo/Andrew Kravchenko, Pool)

Consumer Protection. The delegation consisted also of Poland's ministers of ﬁnance, education, culture, science and higher education, as well as infrastructure and development. The visit had al-

so a symbolic dimension. Kopacz laid a wreath in tribute to over 100 victims of the anti-government clashes of February 2014 on Independence Square in the capital of Ukraine. 2015 • 17

opinion poll

Does ISIS Represent a Direct and Imminent Threat to the EU?

Daryna Koryagina Student of Political Science in Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine

Jakub Maloštík Student of Political Science at Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

No, neither direct nor imminent. However, it is important to realize: if we are talking about the threat ISIS poses to the EU, it cannot be measured up with head-on confrontation or even terrorist attacks. The nature of this rogue military group is much more complex and its goals are broader than, for example, those of its predecessor al-Qaeda; while they use actual weapons to conquer territory of the Middle-East, they use propaganda and public opinion to inﬂuence the West. With the cloud of islamophobia that hangs over Europe in the sight of Charlie Hebdo attack, the vicious circle is forming: Europeans grow weary of coexisting with Muslim minorities and Muslims, because of such treatment, succumb to the narrative of ISIS and even, in some cases, eagerly join the “righteous ﬁght”.

No. The cardinal part of activities of the ISIS is bounded on the territory of the Middle East and we shouldn´t perceive the creation of „islamic kalifate“ in the EU area as the main purpose of this radical Islamic organisation. Direct threat of military attacks of the IS to the EU is also unlikely, because the EU doesn´t feel to be jeopardized, forasmuch as it hasn’t implemented any concrete measures in the framework of Common security and defence policy against this terrorist group yet. Very important factor is non-support of the IS activities by Islamic community inside the EU. Not even the individuals, who were engaged in the ﬁghts of the IS, are regarded as a threat of European security. Moreover, ISIS is braving out a large coalition, which is keeping the ﬁghts farther from the EU borders.

18 • 2015

Filip Brenkus Student of Political Y N Ján Science at Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice, Slovakia Yes/No. After January events in Paris we can say for sure that the Islamic state of Iraq and alSham represents a threat to European Union. It does represent a threat in form of coward terrorist attacks which are serious a threat to security of European people. ISIS is not a regular terrorist organization. After they conquered their territory in Iraq and Syria they became more a rebel state than just a terrorist organisation. They dispose with army of their own. This army, however, is not as signiﬁcant as it could be to effectively threat the European Union, but we should not underestimate religious fanaticism which can easily cloud common sense and judgement. ISIS does speak of territorial claims on Balkan and Iberian peninsula, but it will not be able to conquer it. Almost every country of the Union is a member state of NATO. If ISIS chooses to attack EU they would practically attack NATO. This decision would probably mean a verdict of death to ISIS. Therefore we can say that ISIS does represent a direct threat to the security of European people but does not represent a threat to the sovereignty of European Union.

quiz

?quiz 1. _____________was Guatemala’s dictator in 1982-83. His retrial on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity has been postponed in January this year, disappointing victims who want to see him justly punished for the massacre of thousands of Mayan Indians during his regime. a, Anastasio Somoza Garcia b, Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte c, José Efraín Ríos Montt d, Porﬁrio Diaz

3. About 13,000 foreign troops, mostly Americans, will remain in Afganistan under a new, two-year mission named ___________ that will continue the coalition’s training of Afghan security forces to ﬁght the Taliban insurgents, who have killed record numbers of Afghans in year 2014 a, Resolute Support b, Success . c, Frequent Wind d, Addition

4. _______________ is a politically conservative member of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which pushed the country towards independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991. She has become the ﬁrst female president of Croatia. a, Đurđa Adlešič b, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović

c, Željka Antunović d, Jadranka Kosor

5. Who was the second person related to president Obama that did not attend a unity rally in Paris few days after the deadly attack on the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo. a, Hillary Clinton b, Jane Hartley c, John Kerry d, Josh Earnest

6. ISIS was founded in 1999 by ___________under the name Jamā at alTaw īd wa-al-Jihād, "The Organization of Monotheism and Jihad" . a, Jabhat al-Nusra b, Ayman al-Zawahiri c, Abu Ayyub al-Masri d, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

7. The US and _________ have had disagreements for decades in the Middle East over issues like the nuclear program, Syria, and Israel. Yet both want the Iraqi government to beat back ISIS. a, Iran b, Afganistan c, Iraq d, Japan

8. Since ISIS gained bigger power before August 2014, there hadn't been any major ﬁghting between them. In August,

conﬂict's impact on _____________ has dramatically changed after ISIS launched its ﬁrst successful attack on their territory. a, Kurds b, Christians c, the Palestinians d, the Yorubas

9. This conflict is often depicted as a fight between the Iraqi government and ISIS. The Iraqi army has 250,000 troops, plus armed police. Estimated fighting strength range of ISIS is from 10,000 to (at the extreme upper limit) 50,000 combat troops. a, from 5,000 to 15,000 b, from 10,000 to 50,000 c, from 50,000 to 70,000 d, from 80,000 to 90,000

10. The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is thought to be the wealthiest terror group in history. ISIS doesn't depend on foreign aid to survive. The chaos in Syria allowed ISIS to hold this territory pretty ﬁrmly. This is a big deal in terms of weaponry and money. ISIS gains funds through _________. a, selling electricity b, selling drugs c, local businesses d, oil and an extortion racket

Results: 1c, 2c, 3a, 4b, 5c, 6d, 7a, 8a, 9b, 10d

2. A serious tragedy happened in ____________ during New Year's Eve celebrations. A stampede killed 36 people and nearly 50 others were injured after people rushed to pick up fake money appearing to advertise a promotion for a nearby club. However, police denied these reports as it is unlikely to have been the main cause of stampede. a, Tokio b, Bucharest c, Shanghai d, Sydney

2015 • 19

ambassador's advice

The Art of Diplomacy H.E. HELFRIED CARL • Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Austria to the Slovak Republic His Excellency Mr. Helfried Carl

Preconditions: In my view, it is a common mistake to think that being a good diplomat means to be “diplomatic” in the meaning of not making clear statements. After all, the art of diplomacy is, above all, the art of communication. Misunderstandings roo-

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worldwide and that seem pretty outdated sometimes – is to avoid situations where cultural differences could lead to such distortions. Good communication is however not just about wrapping your message in the right way. It starts with a serious understanding of the situation in which your

The art of diplomacy is above all the art of communication

ted in ambigous or opaque signals can cause unnecessary and sometimes dangerous friction, not only between ordinary people, but also between states. Diplomats must make themselves understood. This is not to say that they need not be polite in their messages. This is again a necessity of good communication. If you want to be understood well, you need to make sure your message is not distorted by bad form. What is bad form, however, is culturally deﬁned. One of the most important reasons behind diplomatic “courtoisie” – the rules that govern standardized diplomatic communication 20 • 2015

partner ﬁnds himself in. Hence, empathy is a basic social skill for any serious diplomat. But this is not enough, after

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ding part of our job – and the most humbling one. And in my experience, it is those colleagues who manage best to put themselves into the position of their partners and their adversaries who at the end achieve the best outcomes. Certainly, this means that there is not one field of study that best equips you for the job of diplomat. Hence, there is no good advice to be given with regard to the choice of faculty to any aspiring diplomat. I have a degree in political science and international relations, but I have met most inspiring colleagues who earned a degree in mathematics, philosophy, linguistics or some other field not directly linked to their current job. After all, there is a surprisingly high number of good musicians among the Ambassadors accredited to Slovakia, but it would be wrong to state that those of us not playing an instrument are doing worse in our jobs than those playing one... But it is clear that you have to have an open mind in order to be up to the task.

Conditions: Just as the role and importance of the state has changed considerably over time, so has “the art of diplomacy”. Permanent fora of multilateral diplomacy, like the UN, are still a relatively new invention. The European Union, one of the most important workplaces for any European diplomat, is a creature unli-

Empathy is a basic social skill for any serious diplomat

all we are not psychologists. In order to ﬁnd out what makes states and their representatives take a certain position, it is important to try to understand the social, political, economic cultural and historical circumstances they ﬁnd themselves in. In my view, this constant undertaking is the most intellectually rewar-

ke any other diplomatic body before. Technical know-how has become more important, much is being negotiated among technical experts, not diplomats anymore. But both at the UN and in the EU, it is clear that diplomats are still needed not only in the “classical ﬁeld” of inter-

ambassador's advice national security, but also whenever agreements are difﬁcult to achieve also among technical experts. It is quite interesting to note that those same experts often blame politics to interfere in their otherwise supposedly rational world where reason would easily prevail.

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this is a dangerous misperception of the true nature of globalisation and the growing interdependence in the international system and the challenges posed by them. This seems similar to the misunderstanding of the role of the state in a developed capitalist society for which

There is not one ﬁeld of study that best equips you for the job of diplomat

At the same time, globalisation and the development of modern telecommunication technology has meant that state-controlled international communication – of which diplomacy had always been an integral part - has lost ground fast to international communication between non-state actors, be it NGOs, business corporations or private persons. It is also true that not only foreign ministers, but also all other ministers in the EU meet regularly in Brussels and visit each other much more often than was even possible in the past. Because of this improved capability to communicate freely across borders and to travel distances within hours that would have taken much longer in the past, the nature of diplomacy has undoubtedly changed. After all, even ministers tweet regularly nowadays. Indeed, the necessity for diplomacy is often questioned these days. But in my view,

we have paid dearly in the crisis of 2008. Liberal societies need efﬁcient, legitimized and legitimate state actors governing them. By the same token, a liberalised world order in which non-state actors are more relevant than ever before needs strong global governance. At the same time, the changed nature

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Post(ing)-Conditions: Bilateral diplomacy is part and parcel of this trend. Indeed, the growing interdependence means that there are more aspects of bilateral or even cross-border relations among states, but also non-state actors than ever before that need fostering. Just the fact that these issues are often more technical and less political in their nature does not mean that they are less relevant. Since I have taken up my posting in Bratislava, I have dealt with bilateral issues ranging from energy diplomacy to cross border water sewage treatment. Most of us cannot claim to be experts on any of such topics, indeed I am certainly not. But all of them are relevant to the bilateral relationship between Slovakia and Austria and thus fall into the realm of diplomacy.

But both at the UN and in the EU, it is clear that diplomats are still needed not only in the “classical ﬁeld” of international security, but also whenever agreements are diﬃcult to achieve also among technical experts

of our societies means that public diplomacy – the effort to directly communicate with citizens instead of the old approach to deal only with the political elites - has now become an essential part of our job.

In conclusion, I regard diplomacy as both a very rewarding and very modern occupation: It is an exercise in professional communication and life-long learning at the same time. Blessed is he or she who is a master in this art!

The EU is one of the most important workplaces for any European diplomat

2015 • 21

leadership

Towards Mutual Security: From Wehrkunde to the Munich Security Conference WOLFGANG ISCHINGER • Chairman of the Munich Security Conference Munich Security Conference Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger gestures during his opening speech at the 51. Security Conference in Munich, Germany, Friday, Feb. 6, 2015.(AP Photo/Matthias Schrader)

The Cold War is history, but its spirit stalked this years’ Munich security conference held each winter for the past 51 years. ince its inception in the fall of 19631 the conference we today call the Munich Security Conference has changed in many ways – not just in terms of its name. Yet in some ways, it has not changed at all. What was the main rationale behind the ﬁrst conferences remains true today. Munich was, is, and will hopefully continue to be an important independent venue for policymakers and experts for open and constructive discussions about the most pressing security issues of the day – and of the future. These debates take place both on the podium and, crucially, behind the scenes, at the margins of the conference. Since its inaugural meeting under the name of Internationale WehrkundeBegegnung,the conference has built a unique reputation as a not-to-be-missed meeting for the strategic community, particularly for those from NATO member states. As Ivo Daalder, at the time US ambassador to NATO, remarked last year via Twitter, Munich is the “Oscars for security policy wonks.” The Munich Security Conference has attracted many of the

22 • 2015

West’s leading practitioners and thinkers on security issues. In 2013, more than sixty foreign and defense ministers were in attendance, along with eleven heads of state and government. We have hosted United Nations secretary generals, heads of international organizations, the president of the European Council, vice presidents of the United States, and Nobel Peace Prize laureates such as Tawakkol Karman. Given the limited space at the Hotel Bayerischer Hof – the conference venue in the heart of Munich – and the few spots on the different panels, setting the agenda, inviting participants, and selecting the speakers is not always an enviable task. Yet it is a challenge we happily embrace. Nonetheless, the participation of high-level speakers is not the only feature that makes the Munich Security Conference unique. Most importantly, there is a very special atmosphere that fills the corridors every year when decision-makers and experts from different fields of foreign and security policy invade the Hotel Bayerischer Hof. Where else do you find a

couple of European ministers in a small corner of the rustic Palais Keller restaurant in the hotel’s basement arguing – amicably, I should add – with Cathy Ashton over a beer, without protocol, without staff, without a preset agenda? Where else is the mix of high-ranking participants so diverse, and the physical space so limited, that you can hardly avoid running into ofﬁcials whom you would rather not talk to? Where else can you see, just a few steps from the hotel, a head of government running into another leader right after one of them snuck out to buy a pair of Lederhosen and both having a good laugh about it? We may not spend much time during the MSC weekend celebrating Fasching anymore – as the attendees did in the early Wehrkunde years – but the event continues to be, despite so many ofﬁcial delegations, an informal event featuring Bavarian hospitality, and with the always welcome opportunity to sneak away for an hour or two into downtown Munich, right outside the door. Many of the foreign participants have also enjoyed coming to the conference for these very reasons. In turn, the extraordinary commitment not only of the German government but of every single US administration and of key members of Congress has contributed enormously to the success and the reputation of the conference. For Germans, Wehrkunde, which literally translates as “military science,” is a rather old-fashioned notion, but the fact that our US participants continue to refer to the conference as Wehrkunde underlines the powerful tradition of the institution. Over the years, the annual meeting has built lasting ties across the Atlantic, in many cases personal friendships. I am glad that the US commitment to the Munich Security Conference is as strong as ever.

leadership Last year, one full tenth of the US Senate attended the conference. Where else do you ever find ten senators – from both parties – in one room together outside the United States? I very much appreciate the continued dedication by the congressional delegation, especially by its long-time leaders William Cohen, John McCain, and Joe Lieberman, who have all contributed personal essays to this book. Moreover, it is certainly no coincidence that, in 2009 and in 2013, Vice President Joe Biden came to Munich for the Obama administration’s first major foreign policy addresses of both the first and second term, and that Munich was the place Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta attended together in 2012 to try and dissipate European worries about the so-called rebalancing of the United States toward the AsiaPacific. While the transatlantic security relationship will certainly change, US representatives have underscored in recent years that Europe remains America’s most important partner in engaging with the world, which is why the conference will remain an important date in the calendar of our US allies. As Secretary of State John Kerry writes in his contribution to this volume, “President Obama’s plan to rebalance our interests and investments in [the Asia-Pacific] region does not diminish in any way our close and continuing partnership with Europe.” Our participants come to Munich to talk – and to listen. The conference itself does not “produce” any direct “result,” and this is actually a good thing. Since there is no need to agree on a final communiqué, participants are free to voice their views and explore their divergent opinions. This does not mean that the conference does not have an impact. On the contrary, contributions to this volume point out how some of the debates have had a major influence on a number of diplomatic initiatives. In contrast to many other diplomatic events controlled by protocol, the Munich Security Conference is a rather unregulated marketplace of ideas. Here, new or old proposals are floated – sometimes successfully, sometimes not. But if they are uttered here, they will be heard and not soon be forgotten by the community. One example among many: when NATO secretary general Anders Rasmussen proposed his Smart Defence initiative in 2011, he did

so in Munich. The annual meeting also often becomes a hub for diplomatic initiatives and the preparation for important decisions in response to crises. After all, it is hard to imagine a place where it is easier to get as many key players into a single room than here. In 2012, for example, informal UN Security Council deliberations essentially took place in Munich, as many key foreign ministers we-

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ever-increasing number of people. For the ﬁrst decades of the Munich Security Conference, the participants did not hail from as many countries as they do today – and that was entirely by design. Back then, the audience was relatively small, not exceeding a few dozen people. While Wehrkunde was an international conference from the very beginning, it was ﬁrst of all a venue where German parti-

Where else do you ﬁnd a couple of European ministers in a small corner of the rustic Palais Keller restaurant in the hotel’s basement arguing—amicably?

re present, arguing the merits of the proposed Syria resolution both on the podium and behind closed doors. And the essays contributed to this volume by Rudolf Scharping and Klaus Naumann, for instance, provide insight into the decisions relating to Kosovo during the 1999 conference. In addition, the MSC offers protected space for informal meetings between representatives from governments who might not be on the best terms but who may wish to meet informally, behind the scenes. Where else do you have the chance to see so many of your colleagues in one spot? Some ministers have been known to hold up to two dozen bilateral meetings over the span of a conference weekend. Sometimes, foreign and defense ministers even use their joint presence in Munich to agree on and sign important bilateral documents. One particularly noteworthy example could be witnessed during the 2011 conference, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exchanged the instruments of ratiﬁcation for the New START treaty in the Hotel Bayerischer Hof. Increasingly, the conference also serves as a meeting place for a number of nongovernmental initiatives and events. For instance, important Track II initiatives such as the EuroAtlantic Security Initiative or the Global Zero Commission have met in the context of the MSC and presented reports, providing independent food for thought for the decision-makers present in the audience or the wider public. And side events like the “women’s breakfast” or a CEO lunch provide unique opportunities to bring key people together. Today, the debate about security issues involves an

cipants met their counterparts from their most important ally, the United States, but also from other NATO member states. Mutual security at that time meant, ﬁrst of all, shared security among the transatlantic allies. Debates in Munich concentrated on Western policy within the overarching framework of the Cold War confrontation. Long-time participants such as Lothar Rühl, Karl Kaiser, Richard Burt, Sam Nunn, and others describe some of these debates in this volume. The basic idea of Wehrkunde was to bring together decision-makers and experts from NATO member states to discuss and develop a common strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Just like today, these intra-alliance debates were far from uncontroversial, at times even heated. Yet Wehrkunde was an important meeting place where differences could be voiced and mitigated, and where conceptual thinking beyond the urgent issues of the day had a place. As a result, the conference has often been dubbed the “transatlantic family meeting.” It is a testament to the extraordinary work and personality of Ewald von Kleist, who sadly passed away in March of 2013, that it developed and kept such a high reputation. The Munich Security Conference will always be his conference. We will continue to honor his name by each year dedicating the Ewald von Kleist Award to a leader who has contributed to global peace and security. When the Cold War came to an end, both von Kleist and his successor as chairman from 1998 on, Horst Teltschik, built on the unique character of this transatlantic meeting, but they also decided to invite participants from countries that had not been part of 2015 • 23

leadership the Western world before. They made room for participants from Central and Eastern European countries that had begun their transition processes from Sovietdominated state economies to liberal democracies with a market-based economy. As these countries made clear that they wanted to become a part of the West, where they felt they belonged anyway, they also became regular participants of the Munich conferences. But even beyond those states that would soon become members of NATO and the European Union, Kleist and Teltschik reached out to the successor states of the Soviet Union, notably the Russian Federation. They understood that the conference – much like NATO – had to move beyond the confines of one “side” of the Cold War if it were to remain relevant. In fact, it is this ability to transform itself that a number of contributors to this volume see as one of the key reasons that the MSC’s relevance has managed to remain so remarkably high. As US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel writes in his essay, “[t]he Munich Security Conference has stayed relevant for fifty years because of its ability to adapt to a constantly changing world.“ Over the years, as the number and variety of important players in international security has increased, the circle of conference participants has continued to grow wider. At the same time, the core of the conference will always be transatlantic. It is sometimes said of NATO that it is not a global alliance but an alliance in a global world. The same is true for the Munich Security Conference. It cannot and will not become a global conference, but it has to be a conference reflecting a globalized world. Today, we welcome high-ranking participants from key rising powers, such as China, Brazil, and India. They will have an important role to play in any future international security architecture. Moreover, I am glad that, over the past decade, the MSC has evolved into a meeting that allows both NATO member states and prominent representatives from the Russian Federation to address their respective grievances and to attempt to find more common ground. As such, both Vladimir Putin’s speech in 2007 (as well as the reactions to it) and Joe Biden’s “reset” speech in 2009 reflect the role of Munich. In addition, in recent years, both the Arab uprisings and the debate about Iran’s 24 • 2015

nuclear ambitions brought leaders from the Middle East to Munich, sparking both controversial arguments and the opportunity for further dialogue on and off the conference stage. The audience today is not only more diverse in terms of geography, it also mirrors the broader understanding of security itself. Now, when the participants gather at the Hotel Bayerischer Hof, you still see military leaders – and rightly so. But you also see CEOs, human rights activists, environmentalists, and other leaders representing global ci-

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to the Internet to follow the debates in Munich. Increasingly, this will cease to be a oneway street. We have already welcomed input by our friends and followers on Facebook and Twitter and are conﬁdent that these new ways of interacting with the interested public can strengthen the social debate on security policy. In 2013, our hashtag #MSC2013 became trending on Twitter for the ﬁrst time, with participants at the Hotel Bayerischer Hof commenting on the panel debates and interacting with people who followed the

The conﬂict that helped give birth to the conference no longer exists, but that does not mean that the Munich Security Conference’s reason to exist has become any less relevant.

vil society. Munich will not lose sight of its core themes belonging to traditional “hard security.” We will continue to debate traditional topics such as regional crises, arms races, nuclear proliferation, the purpose and role of NATO, transatlantic burden sharing, or European military capabilities. However, current security policy is more than counting missiles and debating military doctrines. When the ﬁnancial crisis hit our economies, I welcomed participants to the conference by saying that we would have to discuss “banks, not tanks” in the opening session. We have also invited specialists who inform our audience about issues such as cyber security, energy, or environmental challenges that affect our mutual security. Moreover, together with the Körber Foundation, we initiated the Munich Young Leaders program, bringing a group of younger experts and practitioners to Munich each year. Another aspect in which today’s Munich Security Conference clearly differs from Wehrkunde is the degree of transparency. The early meetings were held behind closed doors. Security policy, and NATO military doctrines in particular, were discussed by elites and often kept secret. Over time, the conference has become more transparent. For a number of years, the panel debates have been transmitted not only in parts by our broadcast partners, Bayerischer Rundfunk and Deutsche Welle, but also as a live stream on our website. Whereas space in the Hotel Bayerischer Hof itself is limited, this service offers the opportunity to everyone with access

debates online. Of course, the increasing level of transparency does have its drawbacks. High-level speakers who know that their words will be immediately spread across the globe are understandably more careful about what they say. As a consequence, speeches may be less controversial than they used to be. However, given the technological advances, the public interest, and the number of participants, keeping the entire proceedings off the record would today be futile and next to impossible. With that said, we are mindful of the importance of smaller formats, which is why we have begun to introduce breakout sessions during the main conference. Similarly, we have initiated a number of smaller conferences throughout the year: the MSC Core Group Meetings held in a number of capitals around the world, bringing together roughly fifty high-level participants, as well as daylong events such as the Cyber Security Summit in 2012 and 2013 or The Future of European Defence Summit in April 2013. Thus, as it turns fifty, the Munich Security Conference is evolving, and it is as alive and well as it has ever been. Instead of asking you to take my admittedly biased word for it, I would simply point you to the table of contents of this book. I am proud that the conference enjoys such a reputation that not only is it a must for so many to find their way to Munich each year, but that so many also found the time to contribute to this volume. The authors provide unique perspectives on the first fifty conferences held in Munich and on key security challen-

leadership

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is visible on video screens as she delivers her speech at the 51. Munich Security Conference in Munich, Germany, Saturday, Feb. 7, 2015. (AP Photo/Matthias Schrader)

ges that the international community has faced and continues to face. In many ways, this is a book much like the Munich Security Conference, and the essays are much like the debates and speeches. Some are short, others long. Some focus on one or two concrete arguments or events, others span decades. Some refer in particular to the debates in Munich, while others frame a certain issue more broadly. A number of essays mostly look ahead – on key issues such as European security policy, cyber security, the “rise” of the Asia-Pacific, or the future of transatlantic and Euro-Atlantic security. Finally, it is important to note that this is not, and cannot be, a work of history. The conference itself does not have an official archive dating back to the first meetings. The book does, however, aim to illuminate some aspects of the conference’s history. You will be able to read a number of very personal, heartfelt reflections about Wehrkunde and Ewald von Kleist. A number of authors shed light on specific conferences, including the one held in 1999 just before the Kosovo intervention, and, depending on where you stand, highly publicized highlights or lowlights of the conference, such as the transatlantic crisis over Iraq, epitomized by the proceedings in Munich in 2003. I am delighted that former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who came to the

conference for the first time in the midsixties, found the time to reflect on a number of key debates of the Wehrkunde era. When the Internationale WehrkundeBegegnung first took place, mutual assured destruction and zero-sum thinking were the ideas of the time. The term “mutual security” could only be applied within NATO. Today more than ever before, the quest for “mutual security” is a global proposition. National interests will not suddenly disappear, and neither will those instances when states understand them too narrowly. Munich is a place where we can and should define and search for our common interests, understood as enlightened self-interest that thinks in win-win categories. As Poland’s foreign minister Radosław Sikorski puts it in his essay, in the future “what defines a superpower will not be its weapons of mass destruction that can never be used or the ability to conquer and destroy. It will be the ability to combine and build, the power of mass innovation and mass teamwork based on flexibility, tolerance, and inclusiveness.” The conflict that helped give birth to the conference no longer exists, but that does not mean that the Munich Security Conference’s reason to exist has become any less relevant. Quite the contrary: it may well be even more important in an era in which global governance in general, and international se-

curity in particular, is certain to become messier and more difﬁcult to manage, and in which the transatlantic partners will have to both stick together as well as reach out to new partners. Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger took over from Professor Horst Teltschik as chairman of the Munich Security Conference in 2008. His career in the German foreign service included positions as director of policy planning, as political director, and as state secretary (deputy foreign minister), followed by appointments as German ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom. He is currently global head of public policy and economic research at Allianz SE, Munich. The article was originally published in 2014 on the occasion of the 50th conference anniversary in the book "Towards Mutual Security - Fifty Years of Munich Security Conference.” 1

A quick note on why the 2014 meeting is the conference’s ﬁftieth edition, although a 1963 founding might suggest 2012 would have been: a few years after the meeting was founded, one year was skipped when the conference date moved from late fall to early February. Moreover, in 1997, when Ewald von Kleist had indicated his intention to retire as chairman, the conference did not take place. In 1991, the planned and prepared conference was canceled at the very last minute due to the start of the Gulf War, but was always counted.

2015 • 25

EU insight

The Eurasian Union and the EU Eastern Partnership: Cooperation or Competition? NUNO FERREIRA • Administrator at State Building and Fragility Monitor, Portugal A protestor waves a Ukrainian and EU ﬂag outside of an Eastern Partnership Summit dinner at the Palace of the Grand Dukes of Lithuania in Vilnius on Thursday, Nov. 28, 2013. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo)

fter many years of slow and camouflaged expansion of the EU (and NATO) for East, on the direction of Russian borders (on NATO’s case, in violation of the tacit agreement due of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation), we reached a dead-lock. That dead-lock was due to what was perceived as the entrance (of the EU) in the sphere of influence of Russia, leading to friction between the EU (& NATO) and Russia. Despite the diplomatic fraction, the EU continued with the plans to create the Eastern Partnership (a proposal presented by Poland in 2008). The plan was to move a group of six countries from Eastern Europe (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) away from Russia’s influence. This major association with the EU was supposed to bring security and stability to region. The Eastern Partnership was seen as a declaration of the EU to expand East, with many believing that the signature of the Partnership would act as a prechamber to enter the EU. On the other hand, Russia never forgot its past, when its influence was always bigger (on various levels and on various forms) than its borders; both during the Russian Empire and the USSR. Parallel to this feeling, Kazakhstan seeks a new position in the international community, since its independency. This led to the creation of a new supranational organism: the Eurasian Union (EEU). The EEU it’s a project built in “small steps”, coming from a concept drawn and

26 • 2015

cherished by Russia and Kazakhstan. This concept pretends to be the aggregator of various organizations (and projects of organizations) existing on the post-Soviet space. On the same time, propose itself to be a connection between Europe and the Asia/Pacific region (reflecting the Russian mythology itself), but refusing to resurrect the USSR. These two initiatives (European Union and Eurasian Union) seek to create roots on the same geographic space (that has always been a place of geopolitical clashes), creating security problems to the region and a dynamic of confrontation between the two “blocs” (being the current Ukrainian situation the best example). Although the Eastern Partnership is an EU’s initiative, it has the blessing and support from NATO (and, consequently from the USA), whose foundation was based on opposition to the USSR. This means that a confrontation (of any kind) about the spheres of influence of both initiatives will be a confrontation between Russia (since Belarus and Kazakhstan have fallen for a sort of "cooperating neutrality") and NATO’s members. Even without a formal enlargement, of the number of NATO’s members, the Eastern Europe’s countries have been receiving an increasing support from NATO (principally when its objectives are professedly against Russia), even the non-members (always in the name of European continent’s defence). The Eastern Partnership, and its destabilizing dynamic, has led to the increase of that support.

This made Russia feel threatened; leading to bigger demonstrations of power, to ensure its enemies that it is in position to confront them. It also lead to a feeling of distrust regarding relations with NATO, who is considered to be disrespecting the Founding Act. It is predictable that Russia will react with increasing aggression, causing more aggressive responses from NATO; a situation that needs to be driven by leaders with “cool heads”, to not to spiral out of control in a vicious cycle progressively more dangerous. All of this makes us believe that the real problem for Russia (and what has led to boosting the EEU, in first place, to Eastern Europe) it is the danger that a new enlargement from NATO will result in having its borders surrounded by potential non-allies. The Eastern Partnership (even if represents an affiliation to EU) it is not seen as a real danger (as long as it does not stop the relations between those six countries and Russia). In reality, an affiliation between these countries and the Eastern Partnership (although not exactly with the EU) and the EEU might be the best way to ensure peace on the region. Thereby should be created a bridge between both organizations, in which the overlapping of spheres of influence instead of being a problem would become a solution. In order for this to result, however, military influence on the region (essentially from NATO, but from Russia too) should be reduced and made a (new?) pledge that there would not be a new enlargement from NATO, to the East (regardless of the received requests). Thus, it would be able to become a politically inclusive region, but maintaining itself military neutral. For last, it will be necessary that the Europeans would take the lead of the process, not getting carried away by the North-American discourse. It is Europe who faces the risk (or the opportunity, depending on what is done) on its doors and that will have to live with the consequences. Therefore, only a Euro-Russian relationship (and not a NorthAmerican driven one) can save the situation...

op-eds

Commemorating 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide VALENTINA GEVORGYAN • Senior Researcher at the Turpanjian Center for Policy Analysis, Armenia Teaching Assistant at the American University of Armenia On April 24 2015 the world will commemorate the Centennial of the Armenian Genocide. ne hundred years ago, 1.5 million Armenians perished in Ottoman Empire, in the times of increasing chaos which enabled Ottoman Turks implement the policies of extermination toward the ancient nation. One of the large scale genocides committed in the history of mankind, the Armenian Genocide has been orchestrated under the cover of World War I. The international community felt fine and unaffected about unstoppable executions of the Christian population with a wealth of intellectual and cultural traditions behind. Once you destroy the spiritual elite, annihilation of the rest of population becomes much easier. That was exactly the pre-thought plan executed toward Armenians by Turkish central and local governments of the time. Mass killings and deportations were followed by continuous destruction of Armenian homes, schools, villages, churches and businesses. Up until today Turkey is disrespectful toward the truth by remaining in the state of active denial, and in the process of purposeful dissemination of unawareness to its coming generation. The recognition of their own history is not considered as valuable by the descendants of the perpetrators. The young Turkish population is raised in a complete ignorance toward their own history adeptly put in place by existing educational system, and most probably with the help of a committee established to design lies to be typed into the Turkish history textbooks. Spending amounts of resources to uphold a lie has indeed become an inalienable part of the modern Turkish policy making. An obvious reason for fear of denial is that recognition will entail restitution. Another reason is that recognition means admitting the fact of the

modern Turkish state building to be holding a major wrongdoing at its start. The development of today’s Turkey has been conditioned with the worst of the crimes committed against humanity. Essentially, it is of a no-weak-government task. It takes a leadership with a true power to dare admit that. The Armenian Genocide Centennial activities are organised around the world. These include humanitarian, academic, educational, religious, arts, on-

People marching to the Armenian Genocide Memorial in Yerevan, Armenia

line and other initiatives. The countries having officially recognized the Armenian Genocide include Uruguay, Cyprus, Russia, Canada, Lebanon, Belgium, France, Greece, Vatican City, Italy, Argentina, Switzerland, Slovakia, the Netherlands, Venezuela, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Chile, Sweden and Bolivia. There are indeed other countries that exist in the world. But these so far have remained silent, either due to their political or economic relations with Turkey.

Many countries, organisations, groups and individuals throughout the world work hard to bring closer an opportunity of that very world to become a little better place. Multiple policies are introduced on a daily basis aimed at having whether direct or indirect impact on effective state building and fight against global injustices. The best way to start a fine line within countries’ national and foreign policy making perhaps is to recognise the world’s common past having been unjust toward specific groups of population. People of the world, of course, know the past well. It is important however for every sovereign representative of the world community to officially speak and condemn Genocides. A reverse behaviour means tolerating a consideration of a possibility of other Genocides, to be followed by silence and an overwhelming inaction. Recognition means condemnation. Condemnation means indication of societal norms on which the modern world, hopefully, bases itself on. The recognition of the Armenian Genocide is not an Armenian problem; it neither is a Turkish problem. It is the world’s problem as it is down to the world to condemn Genocides. The history has made Armenians strong. Armenia regained its independence and statehood. Armenia has a huge diaspora, experienced human resources and a talented youth committed to progress. Armenian intellectual and cultural potential is on the rise never to be affected by any external disruption again. The modern Armenian republic is skilled and thrilled to accept the social and economic challenges on the way to its continuous advancement. Apparently, the policies that seemed to be effective to the Turkish ruling administration a century ago were not to be manifested at their fullest potential. Armenians exist, prosper and will remain in the world for a little longer. 2015 • 27

op-eds

Diplomat in South Africa and a Research Associate at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies KATARÍNA KRÁLIKOVÁ • Diplomat in South Africa and a Research Associate at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies and 28% of the global economy (at pursince the scale of lending of the BRICS bank How it all started The former chief economist at Goldman Sachs, Jim O’Neill, was the man who brought the BRICs together. It was almost 14 years ago that he coined the term in his publication Building Better Global Economic BRICs. In late 2010, South Africa joined the group, adding an ‘S’ to the acronym. For some time, it seemed as if BRICS was little more than a sexy acronym of the time, a loose grouping of five countries and just another talking shop. The real game changer was the fifth summit in South Africa in 2013, at which the agreement on establishing the New Development Bank was signed (BRICS 2013). The bank, with its seat in Shanghai, will have a starting capital of $50 billion, increasing to $100 billion over time. Despite big differences in the countries' population sizes and economic weights, each of the five BRICS countries will contribute an equal $10 billion share to the bank’s $50 billion capital base. With the aim of allocating resources among the BRICS members to support their infrastructural development, the bank is supposed to launch its first projects in early 2016. Additionally, the bank plans to support infrastructural projects outside the BRICS, mainly in Africa; therefore, a regional centre will be set up in Johannesburg. In this way all the BRICS countries can buy more influence in a rising Africa and gain a share in its potentially prosperous economies. The creation of the New Development Bank reflects the frustration of the BRICS, and China in particular, with not getting what they want—comprehensive reform of the international financial institutions to ensure a greater role for them. The EU has to learn how to live with these new trends in the development architecture. While the International Monetary Fund will continue to provide short-term balance of payments financing, the BRICS bank will be similar to the European Investment Bank (EIB) in terms of funding long-term investments in infrastructure. If the two choose the path of cooperation and complementarity rather than of pure competition, the BRICS bank could benefit from the experience and expertise of the EIB. Moreover, 28 • 2015

needs to be large, given the major needs identiﬁed, the co-ﬁnancing of projects together with the EIB could contribute to a much more meaningful impact on sustainable development.

What divides them? The BRICS are not a homogenous bloc. They do not share borders, history, culture or values. Their political structures are built on different ideologies, with India,

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chasing power parity), but they have only 11% of the votes in the International Monetary Fund. This uneven distribution of votes and unequal role in the Western-dominated institutions is what binds them. In order to defend their interests, the BRICS have occasionally teamed up to pursue an issue-driven agenda. Over time they have created an institutional setup which allows them to respond in a more coordinated fashion. The BRICS also share similar pro-

The BRICS are faced with problems that are a ticking bomb.

Brazil and South Africa being role models for other striving democracies in their neighbourhoods, while Russia’s and China’s political systems contain many undemocratic features. The silence of the BRICS on the Russian annexation of Crimea and their embrace of Russia is disturbing, especially from the three democracies in the group. The BRICS are also divided on the matter of UN Security Council reform. Some territorial disputes, for example between India and China, occasionally weaken the bloc’s ability to act. In economic terms, their GDP structures are very different, with Brazil ¬specialising in agriculture, South Africa and Russia in commodities, India in services, and China in manufacturing. Moreover, China is known for its low tariffs for manufactured products; India is protectionist when it comes to goods; and South Africa, while relentlessly enforcing its black economic empowerment and local content, is becoming increasingly protectionist, too. The BRICS countries’ GDP growth rates are also very different, with China’s standing at 7.7% in 2013 and Russia’s at 1.3%. The World Bank’s 2013 Doing Business index shows that it is signiﬁcantly easier to do business in South Africa than in the other BRICS.

What binds them? The BRICS are large countries. They make up 42% of the world’s population

blems, such as social inequality, youth unemployment and problems in their education systems, crime and corruption, and environmental challenges.

Conclusion A lot has been written about the great future prospects of the BRICS. However, the BRICS are faced with problems that are a ticking bomb. The economic growth in these countries has been established on the basis of low-cost labour, abundant mineral resources and few technological innovations, with little or no investment in human, social or natural capital. Coupled with problems mentioned above, this kind of growth is unsustainable. Hence the EU should not overestimate the challenge the BRICS pose today, in the same way that it should not underestimate their underlying problems. Despite the negative discourse of the BRICS against Europe, in which the latter is described as a dying continent, they probably need Europe more than they realise. Not only is the EU the BRICS group’s main trading partner, but it has also been trying for many years to help the BRICS resolve their problems. Combined with cooperation between the New Development Bank and the EIB, the BRICS countries’ development model has the potential to become more inclusive and sustainable. A full version of this article is available at www.springerlink.com

op-eds

Dear Mr. Havel MARCOS FARIAS FERREIRA • Director of the Observatory for Human Security, Portugal Lisbon, 26 January 2015 Dear reader, twenty five years after the Velvet Revolution the spirit of Václav Havel still hovers over Europe, confronting each one of us with the Levinasian responsibility towards the other, the care for the soul as the ground for a meaningful European project and the need for transcendence in world affairs. A day after the Greek citizens have decided to rise and curb by the vote the politics of fear which European politics has turned into in the last few years, I think of Havel and his spirit. I was caught in between secondary school and the beginning of college when the Velvet Revolution took place. Today, the moral strength emanating from those men and women fighting in Czechoslovakia against the most petrified and unjust power still is the most potent critical resource making me a human and a scholar. I still remember looking up to Havel and Dubček on a balcony, not certain what their acts amounted to but full of wonder to learn about a new world and new ideas capable of setting fire to my world. Some years later, after finishing my Master’s thesis entitled «Authenticity on the Balustrade: Václav Havel or the dramatic and existential dimensions of an anti-political politics», I decided to try a contact and send him the book that had been published in the meantime alongside the following letter: Lisbon, 24 November 2001 Dear Mr. Havel, “In our offices and factories work goes on and discipline prevails. Efforts done by citizens are paying off and promote the betterment in the standards of living: people are building houses, buying cars, having children, having fun, living their lives”. Twenty six years have passed since you wrote these words in an open letter to Dr. Gustáv Husák. In a different time, and moved by a completely different intent, I pick up the very same words to begin this letter. Your words were motivated by the moral imperative do denounce the distorted and perverted sense of normality produced by a society implicated as a whole in the setting up of the same post-totalitarian mechanisms that subjugated it. Twenty six years have passed and we now live in Western, liberal, democratic societies that many believe to be the end of history. And yet, the same lack of authenticity, the same difficulty of communication, the same self complacency by societies and governments, the same oblivion regarding the fact that responsibility is the axis of human identity. And the same satisfaction with a kind of normality that systematically excludes, producing a heavy drawback that serves the interests of the powerful and ignores the victims and the powerless of the global era. Alas, the same increasing difficulty of concentration to understand the real world as a philosophical puzzle. Dear Mr. Havel, I can tell you I consider myself an heir to the 1989 Czechoslovak Revolution, one of those who witnessed the unassuming condition and solidarity stemming from that movement and went through an irretrievable revolution in their

perception of life and world. In 1989 I was about to reach my adult years, in between lycée and university, while I witnessed the overwhelming demonstration of dignity as political power via the global media. Since then, your words –the words of the dissident but also those you wrote from a power position– have been a reference to me. Ever since they have reminded me that politics –both domestic and global– is above all a commitment to what ought to be, i.e. a commitment towards better worlds, those we must tackle with everything we are –and therefore a commitment towards the fulﬁlment of love, that existential human minimum that was underlined by Josef Safařík.

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Politics –both domestic and global– is above all a commitment to what ought to be, i.e. a commitment towards better worlds

Your words, dear Mr. Havel, are a crucial motivation for all those who believe, as I do, that politics ought to take an antipolitical quality and that, in the vein of Hannah Arendt, it is not the essence of truth to be impotent nor in the essence of politics to deceive. Your words have led me eventually to other words: those of Komenský, Masaryk, Patočka, Hrabal, Vaculík –to the cosmopolitan and humanist Czech and Slovak tradition that has caught my heart and made me believe in authenticity as a moral imperative worth suffering for. Dear Mr. Havel, it is a pleasure to hand you a copy of my book I entitled Autenticidade sobre a Balaustrada: Václav Havel ou a dimensão existencial e dramática de uma política antipolítica. It is the outcome of the Master’s thesis I presented at the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lisbon, in May 1997, a work in which I reﬂect about your life and oeuvre and the contribution both have had in the broadening of what we understand by politics and what we can expect from it. Dear Mr. Havel, I take this opportunity to send you my warmest regards. Yours sincerely, Marcos Farias Ferreira Dear reader, on a day many across Europe are celebrating the rebirth of political possibilities, Havel’s spirit has just come to my mind. I am aware that the spirit of a good man can be invoked in a lot of occasions and taken to mean a lot of things (even those he himself would never subscribe). More so if such a good man still commands a lot of esteem across Europe and beyond. And yet, it is my conviction Havel’s spirit ought to be invoked anytime we need to carry out a pragmatic endeavour linking the hermeneutics of suspicion to the politics of hope. On behalf of a meaningful and progressive Europe. 2015 • 29

on the map

Kurdistan MARK N. KATZ • Professor of government and politics at George Mason University, United States of America Kurdish nationalism has proven itself to be a strong, durable force. This is so much the case that it is no longer a question of whether there will be a Kurdish national project, but rather what will be its extent as well as what will be its regional and international implications. he Kurds have long been known ISIS, Kurdish forces have played an imas the largest ethnic group without portant role in resisting this movement a state of their own. While Kurboth in Iraq and Syria. dish nationalists a century ago hoped that The US came to value the Kurds in the downfall of the Ottoman Empire Iraq since they were willing and able to would lead to the creation – and internaally with Coalition forces there when tional acceptance – of a Kurdish state, this both Arab Sunnis and Arabs Shi’as wedid not happen. Instead, the predomire often not. While continuing to supnantly Kurdish region was divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria – the governments of which (whether imperial, colonial, or republican) each acted to suppress any Kurdish independence movement within its own borders (though some on occasion supported it in their neighbours, as the Shah of Iran did in Iraq during the 1970’s, in order to weaken them). Ankara in particular has fought a long, hard campaign to suppress Kurdish nationalism inside Turkey. Since the end of the Cold War, Kurdish people wish for an independent state. however, important developments have occurred that have not only favoupress Kurdish nationalism inside Iran, red the Kurdish national project, but haTehran valued the increasingly autonove also increased its international accepmous Kurdish government in Northern tability. First, the 1990-91 Kuwait crisis Iraq for helping it evade international resulted in the imposition of a no-fly zoeconomic sanctions. Though initially ne over the largely Kurdish region of nortfearful that a Kurdish nationalist regime hern Iraq, thus allowing Kurds there to in northern Iraq would aid and inspire establish a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis Kurdish secessionism inside Turkey, AnSaddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad. kara and Irbil achieved a significant deMore significantly, the 2003 interventigree of economic and political cooperaon and subsequent occupation of Iraq by tion. But despite the improvement in Anthe US and some of its allies led to the kara’s ties to the KRG, the role played establishment of a much greater degree by Syrian Kurdish forces in resisting ISIS of Kurdish autonomy, eventually resulthere has renewed Turkish fears of Kurting in the Kurdish Regional Government dish nationalism spreading to Turkey. which has most of the attributes of a truWhile never supporting their indely independent state except for recognipendence before, Sunni Arab governtion as such. After the withdrawal of Coaments (among others) have come to relition forces and the subsequent rise of gard the KRG as well as Syrian Kurds

30 • 2015

as allies against what they see as the twin evils of ISIS and Iran. The Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government, of course, has not been pleased about its inability to control the Kurdish north, or Kurdish oil exports without Baghdad’s authorization. But now that Baghdad faces more immediate threats from ISIS, it has become dependent on the KRG to contain ISIS forces. At present, then, it is not only that Baghdad has limited ability, but also limited interest in acting to weaken a necessary ally against ISIS. Considering the gains that it has already achieved in Northern Iraq, it is clear that Kurdish nationalism is a powerful force, and that the question of an independent Kurdish state in what is now northern Iraq and possibly in north-eastern Syria is increasingly likely to arise. Even though ISIS and Iran serve to check the growth of each other’s inﬂuence, the fact that neither Western nor Arab Sunni governments want either to succeed makes the Kurds attractive partners in checking them both. It will be an important task for Western diplomacy to reconcile Kurdish nationalist aspirations with the security concerns of NATO, and particularly with those of NATO-allied Turkey. The obvious deal to be made is recognition of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq and possibly northeastern Syria, which renounces all claim to Turkish territory. A similar deal might be offered to Iran as part of a broader rapprochement if the current nuclear negotiations with Tehran prove successful. While neither the Baghdad government nor the Assad regime might welcome this, they may have little choice but to acquiesce if the Arab regions of Iraq devolve into Sunni and Shi’a independent or “autonomous” states and if the Alawite-dominated regime in Damascus loses control over signiﬁcant swaths of territory to ISIS or its jihadist rivals. Of course, it is possible that the recent deterioration in Turkey’s relations with Europe and America will continue and/or the effort to improve Western relations with Iran will founder. The occurrence of either scenario could then result in Western cooperation with the Kurds becoming even more important for containing ISIS and/or Iran.

write-up

Oil Prices May Do What Sanctions Alone Could Not NIELS FREDERIK MALSKÆR • Energy Security Specialist Russian President Vladimir Putin.

When the oil prices are high, Russia can afford to be strong and aggressive. ow, with crude oil prices under $60 per barrel, Russia may suffer a fate similar to what the Soviet Union underwent in 1991. While current fuel prices may be a dream come true for many western consumers, they are a nightmare for the Russian economy, which relies on oil and gas exports for 16% of GDP and 52% of federal budget revenues. Putin claims that everything will be back to ‘normal’ within a couple of years, but it looks like the previous decade’s failure to diversify Russia’s economy is catching up, fast. One of the key reasons many observers are predicting problems ahead for both Russia as a country and for Putin’s regime is modern historical context. The current situation does bring to mind the fall of the Soviet Union, where a rigid economic system that could produce nuc-

lear weapons but not consumer goods, finally broke, thus showing the inherent flaw in a system without competition. What many people do not associate with the last days of the Soviet Union, is the one thing that may have pushed it over the edge: Oil. Because, what is happening right now eerily resembles the last years of the Cold War. As the Russian business newspaper, Vedomosti wrote in early January when the price of Brent crude dropped below USD $50 “The fact that the Soviet Union collapsed five years after the oil price started falling should serve as a warning”.

A superweapon Vedomosti are not the only ones to make the connection between oil and Russian foreign policy, Michael Reagan, son of President Reagan, wrote a column back in March of 2014, around the time

the ‘men in green’ surrounded key military bases in Crimea and a local puppet government had been set up and a barrel of oil was 109 dollar. “I suggest that President Obama might want to study how Ronald Reagan defeated the Soviet Union. He did it without ﬁring a shot, as we know, but he had a super weapon – oil. Oil was the only thing the Soviets had in the 1980s that anyone in the rest of the world wanted to buy, besides ICBMs and H-bombs, and they were not for sale. Since selling oil was the source of the Kremlin's wealth, my father got the Saudis to ﬂood the market with cheap oil. Lower oil prices devalued the Ruble, causing the USSR to go bankrupt, which led to perestroika and Mikhail Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet Empire.” While it is very debatable whether the Saudis were inclined to take instructions from the White House, the fact of the matter is that they increased their output dramatically, leading to the complete depletion of Soviet currency reserves by 1991.

Drunk on oil In actuality, one could make a link between the evolution of oil prices and Soviet/Russian power, reading the price curve alongside historic events. As Mikail Overtjenko, foreign affairs editor of Vedomosti, wrote, “Everything has a frightening resemblance to what happened in the Soviet Union”. Throughout the 1960’s oil prices were low and stable, and the Soviet economy grew and grew, extensive growth as opposed to intensive meaning that the economy grew by gobbling up more resources rather than becoming more effective. New factories and large scale industrial projects were undertaken with no regard for the consequences, which in places like the Aral sea became catastrophic, all at the 2015 • 31

write-up cost of more and more cheap oil. Then came the Yom Kippur war of 1973 with the ﬁrst oil crisis, followed by the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and the second oil crisis. The oil exporting Soviets were making money hand over ﬁst. The barrel of oil, which in 1970 cost less than 2 dollars, was in 1980 sold at 36 dollars. Europe was spun tightly into a web of Russian pipelines, the client states in the east were subsidised with cheap oil and the Soviet population was kept in check with imported consumer goods paid for with oil money. And so it was that the leadership in the Kremlin, dulled by plenty and drunk on oil decided to invade Afghanistan.

Lessons forgotten Afghanistan was a military disaster, but it was not Afghanistan that ended the long period of stability, or stagnation depending on who you ask, it was not even Gorbachev, it was oil. In 1986, the Saudis decided to increase oil production, more probably in response to other OPEC countries overstepping the quotas than at Reagan’s request. The result of this was that the price of oil fell to 12 dollars within a few months and the Soviet economy began to dissolve. With the lean times in Mos-

32 • 2015

cow, the Soviets demanded payment from the Warszawa pact countries, which collapsed their economies, and many of their regimes. Then the whole thing started over again with oil prices reaching another low in 1998, whereupon Russia stopped its loan payments. After the turn of the millennium new price increases came with new wealth for Russia, but Putin did not free himself from oil dependence. Those who warned him, ended up in the opposition, like Yegor Gaidar, who in his book “Collapse of an Empire: Les-

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lapse of the Soviet Union should serve as a lesson to those who construct policy based on the assumption that oil prices will remain perpetually high. It would seem that in our country, which has lived through the collapse of the late 1980s and early 1990s, this fact would be evident”. In the last decade oil prices and Putin have been intimately linked. From early 2007 to mid-2008 oil prices doubled and in late 2008, Russia invaded Georgia. Then came another dip in prices, but from 2011 until late last year oil was sold

Afghanistan was a military disaster, but it was not Afghanistan that ended the long period of stability, or stagnation depending on who you ask, it was not even Gorbachev, it was oil.

sons for Modern Russia” from 2007 wrote about diversifying the Russian economy: “Although strategies requiring austerity or sacriﬁce can be politically difﬁcult, Russia needs to prepare for such downturns and restrain spending during prosperous times.” Along with this call to ‘repair the roof while the sun is shining’, Gaidar point out that “The col-

at historically high levels, then Crimea got unwanted visitors. The historical parallels are obvious; maybe a new 1991 is not as far away as Moscow hopes.

Source: Energy Information Administration – Macrotrends.net

calendar

FEBRUARY Presidents’ Day and Washington’s Birthday 16 Washington’s Birthday, also known as Presidents’ Day, is an American holiday held on the third Monday of February. The day honours presidents of the United States, including George Washington, the USA's ﬁrst president.

The Gambia gained its independence from the UK 18, 1965

Founding of The South East Asia Treaty Organization 19 The South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established on February 19, 1955 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the primary objective of preventing further Communist gains in the region.

World Day of Social Justice 20 World Day of Social Justice is a day intended to recognize the need to promote efforts to tackle issues such as poverty, exclusion and unemployment. In 2009, the United Nations General Assembly designated February 20th as the World Day of Social Justice.

MARCH Estonian parliamentary election 1

International Women's Day 8

Struggle for Human Rights Day in Slovakia 25 The Candle Demonstration on March 25, 1988 in Bratislava was the ﬁrst mass demonstration since 1969 against the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. 25 March has become Struggle for Human Rights Day in Slovakia, commemorating this demonstration.

APRIL Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Rwanda Genocide 7 This day commemorates the deaths of 800,000 people who were murdered during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, central Africa.

Battle of Appomattox Court House 9 This battle on April 9, 1865 was one of the last battles of the American Civil War

Finnish parliamentary election 19 33 • 2015

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Issue 1/2015 Publication date: 20 February, 2015

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