The Question of God's Existence in Anselm, Aquinas and Kierkegaard

The Question of God’s Existence Estrella Mountain Community College April 13, 2015 Simon Oswitch, Presenter

ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY (1033-1109) ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274) SØREN KIERKEGAARD (1813-1855)

Anselm’s ‘Ontological Argument’ for God’s Existence  Found in Anselm’s Proslogion (1077-1078)  A remarkably short argument with premises that are purely

definitional/conceptual and do not rely upon experience or observation of the world.

• The argument begins with the definition of God as the greatest being which we can conceive: “that… which nothing greater can be thought” – a definition that even “the fool” (the atheist) must understand.

• From here, Anselm offers two possibilities: “it is one thing for an object to exist in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists.”

Anselm and the Ontological Argument (continued)  Which possibility is greater – which has greater reality? “… surely that

than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the understanding alone. For once granted that it exists, if only in the understanding, it can be thought of as existing in reality, and this is greater.”  Consider the mental image of a cold, refreshing glass of water here in July versus an actual glass of water; the latter obviously has greater reality.  Thus, if God only existed in the mind, He would not be greatest as He would be limited to mere mental existence which contradicts the first premise that He is the greatest being – we could conceive of something greater: “… if that than which a greater cannot be thought exists solely in the understanding, it would follow that the very thing than which a greater cannot be thought turns out to be that than which a greater can be thought; but this is clearly impossible.”  Thus, God must exist twofold: “… something than which a greater cannot be thought undoubtedly exists both in the understanding and in reality.”

Critical Responses to Anselm’s Argument

The 11th century Benedictine monk Gaunilo of Marmoutier posits the

mythical lost island of Oceana … blessed with all manner of priceless riches and delights in abundance… and… superior everywhere in abundance to all those other lands that men inhabit. Now, if anyone tell me that it is like this, I shall easily understand what is said, since nothing is difficult about it… But if he should then go on to say, as though it were a logical consequence of this: You cannot any more doubt that this island that is more excellent than all other lands truly exists somewhere in reality than you can doubt that it is in your mind; and since it is more excellent to exist not only in the mind alone but also in reality, therefore it must needs be that it exists… If, I say, someone wishes thus to persuade me that this island really exists beyond all doubt, I should either think that he was joking, or I should find it hard to decide which of us I ought to judge the bigger fool – I, if I agreed with him, or he, is he thought that he had proved the existence of this island….

Critical Responses to Anselm’s Argument (continued)  Anselm’s reply: the argument only applies to a greatest

conceivable being and not a relatively perfect entity as would be the island: “…this being that which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived not to be, because it exists on so sure a ground of truth… for if it could be conceived not to exist, it could be conceived to have a beginning and an end, but this is impossible.”  God is eternal, an island is contingent, transient – we could conceive of it coming into and passing out of being and thus the comparison is wholly inappropriate.

Critical Responses to Anselm’s Argument (Continued and Completed)  Immanuel Kant: existence is not a predicate or a property that we

can attribute to a thing: ‘‘Being’ is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment.” (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781)  John Cottingham: “... even if we grant that Anselm has shown

that whatever qualifies for the title greatest thinkable being must exist, is it not still an open question whether here is anything which does qualify for this title in the first place?” (Western Philosophy: An Anthology, 1996)

St. Thomas Aquinas’ Five Proofs for God’s Existence  In his enormous and immensely influential Summa

Theologica (1265-1274), Aquinas offers five empirically-based proofs for God’s existence that largely draw upon Aristotelian thought.  The first three are regarded as cosmological arguments as they seek to account for the ultimate origins of things/facts that comprise our world while the fifth is concerned with the “ends” or the “goals” of things within our world and is known as a teleological argument.

Aquinas’ First Proof: Motion Regarding movement, Aquinas argues that whatever is in motion is put into motion by something other than itself: It is certain and agreed on the basis of what our senses tell us that some things in this world are in motion. But whatever is in motion is moved by something else; for nothing undergoes motion except in so far as it is in a state of potentiality in respect of that towards which it is moved… moving in this sense is simply bringing something from potentiality to actuality; but nothing can be brought into actuality except by something which is itself in actuality. For example, something which is actually hot, like fire, makes wood, which is hot in potentiality, hot in actuality, thereby moving and altering it.

Aquinas’ First Proof: Motion (Continued and Completed)  However, … something else is itself moved, it must in turn be moved by something else, and so on. But the sequence cannot continue ad infinitum, since in this case there would not be any first mover, and hence nothing would move anything else, since subsequent moving things do not move unless moved by an original mover (just as a stick does not move unless moved by a hand). Hence it is necessary to arrive at a first mover which is moved by nothing else; and this everyone understands to be God.

 God is the unmoved first mover of all

Aquinas’ Second Proof: Causality  This argument is similar in structure to the first, however the concern is

observable cause-and-effect relationships: In the world that we perceive around us we find an order of efficient causes, but we never find, nor is it possible that there should be, something that is the efficient cause of itself; for if there were, it would have to be prior to itself, which is impossible. But it is not possible for the series of efficient causes to go on ad infinitum. For in each ordered series of efficient causes, the first item is the cause of the next item, and this in turn is the cause of the final item (though there may be more than one intermediate step); and if any one cause is taken away, the effect will also be absent. Hence if there was not a first item in the series of efficient causes, there will be no intermediate or final items. But if the series of efficient causes stretches back ad infinitum, there will be no first efficient cause, which will mean that there will be no final effect, and no intermediate efficient causes, which is patently not the case. Hence it is necessary to posit some first efficient cause; and this everyone calls ‘God’.

 God is the uncaused, first efficient cause for all subsequent cause and

effect

Aquinas’ Third Proof: ‘Possibility and Necessity’  We observe that some things come into and then pass out of being, thus

“they can both be and not be.”  However, it is impossible for everything there is to be of this sort, since if something has the possibility of not being, then at some time or other it lacks being. So if all things have the possibility of not being, at some time there was nothing at all. But if this were the case, then there would still be nothing now, since what lacks being does not begin to be except through something which is.  Therefore, “not all beings are possibles… there must be something in the world which is necessary. Now everything which is necessary either has the cause of its necessity from elsewhere, or it does not.”

Aquinas’ Third Proof: ‘Possibility and Necessity’ (Continued and Completed)  Yet, as with proof two, “it is not possible that a

sequence of necessary beings having the cause of their necessity elsewhere should continue ad infinitum.”  Therefore, “it is necessary to posit something which is necessary in its own right, and does not have the cause of its necessity from elsewhere but is itself the cause of necessity in other things; and this everyone calls ‘God’.”  It is God’s basic necessity that first creates and then sustains all contingent or perishable being comprising our world.

Aquinas’ Fourth Proof – Degrees of Perfection in the World  This proof utilizes a Platonic type of structure vis-à-vis the

participation of things in their perfect Form: We come across some things which are more or less good, or true or noble than others… But ‘more’ and ‘less’ are terms used of different things by reference to how close they are to what is greatest of its kind (for example, something is ‘hotter’ if it is closer to what is hottest). Hence there is something which is truest and best and noblest, and consequently greatest in being; for things which are truest are greatest in being, as Aristotle says in Book II of his Metaphysics. Now what we call the greatest in any kind is the cause of everything of that kind, just as fire, which has the greatest heat, is the cause of everything hot (as Aristotle says in the same book).

Hence there is something which is the cause of being and goodness and every other perfection in things; and this we call ‘God’.

Aquinas’ Fifth Proof – The Direction and Guidance of the NonRational World

 As stated previously, this proof seeks to account for non-conscious,

empirically-observable entities reaching their goals or ends: We see some things that lack knowledge, namely natural bodies, working for the sake of a goal or end. This is clear from the fact that they always or often act in the same way to pursue what is best; and this shows that they reach their goal not by chance but from directedness. But things which do not have knowledge do not tend towards a goal unless they are guided by something with knowledge and intelligence, as an arrow is by the archer. Hence there is some intelligent being by whom all natural things are directed to their goal or end; and this we call ‘God’.

 How does a seed, for example, which lacks a rational guiding mind,

become a plant, flower or tree? Only from God’s supreme direction.

Critical Reponses to Aquinas’ Five Proofs  David Hume: we cannot legitimately compare our understanding of

the cause of the universe with any observable entity: If we see a house… we conclude with the greatest certainty that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely the kind of effect that we have experienced as coming from that kind of cause. But surely you won’t say that the universe is so like a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The unlikeness in this case is so striking that the most you can offer on the basis of it is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption about a similar cause…’ (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 1777).  Though we may have experience with the construction of empirical

objects, the creation of the universe - and the phenomena within it are beyond our experience.

Critical Reponses to Aquinas’ Five Proofs (Continued)  Immanuel Kant: The cosmological proofs are

problematic in a number of ways, not the least of which is: …the transcendental principle whereby from the contingent we infer a cause. This principle is applicable only in the sensible world; outside that world it has no meaning whatsoever. For the mere intellectual concept of the contingent cannot give rise to any synthetic* proposition, such as that of causality. The principle of causality has no meaning and no criterion for its application save only in the sensible world. But in the cosmological proof it is precisely in order to enable us to advance beyond the sensible world that it is employed. (Critique of Pure Reason)

Critical Reponses to Aquinas’ Five Proofs (Continued)  In regard to the fifth proof, Kant argues:

The utmost… that the argument can prove is an architect of the world… not a creator of the world to whose idea everything is subject… The inference, therefore, is that the order and purposiveness everywhere observable throughout the world may be regarded as a completely contingent arrangement, and that we may argue to the existence of a cause proportioned to it. But the concept of this cause must enable us to know something quite determinate about it, and can therefore be no other than the concept of a being who possesses all might, wisdom, etc. , in a word, all the perfection which is proper to an all-sufficient being.

For the predicates -- 'very great', 'astounding', 'immeasurable' in power and excellence -- give no determinate concept at all, and do not really tell us what the thing is in itself. (Critique of Pure Reason)

Critical Reponses to Aquinas’ Five Proofs (Continued and Completed)

Samuel Enoch Stumpf:  With respect to the three cosmological arguments, “there may be no

logical problems with tracing an infinite chain of causes back through infinity.” Also, these arguments “do not lead back to a God who is conscious and personal.” (Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History of Philosophy, 2008)

 In regard to proof four, “its assumption that fire… is the maximum

of heat” would be rejected by modern science. (Ibid.)  Darwinian theory would challenge proof five’s contention of intelligent design via naturalistic explanation: random mutation and natural selection in the struggle for existence are blind phenomena and would preclude a guiding, directive intelligence. (Ibid.)

Kierkegaard: Attempting to Prove that God Exists is Contradictory and Highly Disrespectful As argued in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846): So rather let us mock God, out and out, as has been done before in the world—this is always preferable to the disparaging air of importance with which one would prove God’s existence.

For to prove the existence of one who is present is the most shameless affront, since it is an attempt to make him ridiculous; but unfortunately people have no inkling of this and for sheer seriousness regard it as a pious undertaking. But how could it occur to anybody to prove that he exists, unless one had permitted oneself to ignore him, and now makes the thing all the worse by proving his existence before his very nose? The existence of a king, or his presence, is commonly acknowledged by an appropriate expression of subjection and submission—what if in his sublime presence one were to prove that he existed? Is that the way to prove it? No, that would be making a fool of him; for one proves his presence by an expression of submission, which may assume various forms according to the customs of the country—and thus it is also one proves God’s existence by worship … not by proofs. A poor wretch of an author whom a later investigator drags out of the obscurity of oblivion may indeed be very glad that the investigator succeeds in proving his existence—but an omnipresent being can only by a thinker’s pious blundering be brought to this ridiculous embarrassment.

Kierkegaard: The Impossibility of Proving that Christ was God That God became human defies rational understanding – its “absurd”: When the eternal truth is related to an existing individual it becomes a paradox… What now is the absurd?

The absurd is—that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth, precisely like any other individual human being, quite indistinguishable from other individuals.’ (Concluding Unscientific Postscript) Proof is never possible: Can one prove from history that Christ was God? Let me first put another question: Is it possible to conceive of a more foolish contradiction than that of wanting to PROVE (no matter for the present purpose whether it be from history or from anything else in the wide world one wants to prove it) that a definite individual man is God? That an individual man is God, declares himself to be God, is indeed the “offense”…. But what is the offense, the offensive thing? What is at variance with (human) reason. And such a thing as that one would attempt to prove! To “prove” is to demonstrate something to be the rational reality it is. Can one demonstrate that to be a rational reality which is at variance with reason? Surely not, unless one would contradict oneself. One can “prove” only that it is at variance with reason. The proofs which Scripture presents for Christ’s divinity—His miracles, His Resurrection from the dead, His Ascension into heaven—are therefore only for faith, that is, they are not “proofs,” they have no intention of proving that all this agrees perfectly with reason; on the contrary they would prove that it conflicts with reason and therefore is an object of faith.’ (Training in Christianity, 1850)

Kierkegaard’s Solution: Faith 

Faith is defined as: “… the objective uncertainty along with the repulsion of the absurd held fast in the passion of inwardness, which precisely is inwardness potential to the highest degree. This formula fits only the believer, no one else, not a lover, not an enthusiast, not a thinker, but simply and solely the believer who is related to the absolute paradox.” (Concluding Unscientific Postscript)



However, faith is a tremendously difficult, ongoing subjective challenge that requires passionate and total commitment on the part of the believer: Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual’s inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must believe. If I wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding fast the objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep, over seventy thousand fathoms of water, still preserving my faith. (Concluding Unscientific Postscript)

Kierkegaard’s Solution: Faith (Continued and Completed)  The Old Testament story of Abraham, who is willing to sacrifice his

only son Isaac, to demonstrate his love for God, is Kierkegaard’s prime example of faith: Abraham represents faith and that it is manifested normatively in him, whose life not only is the most paradoxical that can be thought but is also so paradoxical that it simply cannot be thought. He acts by virtue of the absurd, for it is precisely, the absurd that he as the single individual is higher than the universal. (Fear and Trembling, 1843)

Presentation Recap  St. Anselm of Canterbury’s Ontological Argument rests upon the definition of God

as the greatest conceivable being; as such, a greatest being must exist in reality to affirm the definition of being greatest.  St. Thomas Aquinas posits five proofs for God’s existence that are drawn from experience and Aristotelian principles:  Motion  Cause-and-Effect  Possibility and Necessity  Perfection of the World  Direction/Guidance of the Non-Rational World

 The first three are cosmological arguments while the fifth is teleological.  Critiques of both Anselm and Aquinas have been registered by Hume, Kant and

contemporary theorists per the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments.  Søren Kierkegaard wholly rejects attempts at rationally proving God’s existence as well as the fundamental Christian notion that God became human; our relationship with God is solely one of faith which is non-rational.

References  The Anselm, Aquinas and Kierkegaard Concluding Unscientific Postscript

     

selections were found in Western Philosophy: An Anthology, edited by John Cottingham, Blackwell, Oxford and Malden (Mass.), 1996.

The Gaunilo of Marmoutier selection was found in Classics of Philosophy, edited by Louis J. Pojman, 2nd edition, Oxford, 2003.

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Blackwood, London, 1907.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, St. Martin’s, New York, 1965.

Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History of Philosophy, 8th Edition, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2007.

Søren Kierkegaard, Training In Christianity, translated by Walter Lowrie, Vintage, New York, 2004.

Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983.