Ideas Conference Papers, Volume III

SIFTING AND WINNOWING The Ideas Conference Papers Volume III, Fall 2020

All inquires may be directed to: Sifting & Winnowing Foundation C/O Howard Schweber North Hall, Bascom Mall Madison, WI 53706 sifting@polisci.wisc.edu Sifting & Winnowing Foundation Board of Directors Howard Schweber - Faculty Director Signe Janoska-Bedi - Managing Director and President Elissa Koppel - Permanent Director and Vice President Luke Georgiadis - Permanent Director and Treasurer Christopher Thone - Acting Director Adam Dedobbelaere - Acting Director Ben Keeler - Acting Director The views expressed by the authors do not represent those of Sifting & Winnowing or the WI Ideas Conference.

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SIFTING AND WINNOWING The Ideas Conference Papers

The Ideas Conference Papers Volume II, Fall 2019 Volume III, Fall 2020

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Table of Contents 8 American Transparency and Accountability with Military Decisions Nilay Bhadra 13 Nuclear Energy and Its Role in Clean Energy

By Seap Bhardwaj

46 Improving Coastal Disaster Response Capabilities Without Diminishing Military Readiness

By Jamey Kane

20 Campaign Methods and Government Allocation

By Cody Richard Byers

53 Enhancing and Integrating Army Civil Affairs Capability

24 A Proposal To End Gerrymandering via Independent Commissions

By Simon Fischer

59 Making Election Day Accessible

By Julia Kessel

31 Disabled Students of Color Are Facing Disparate Treatment in Chicago Public School

By Alanna Goldstein

66 Improving Attorney Access in Wisconsin through Investment in the Public Defender’s Office

By Spencer Lindsay

36 How a Lack of Reentry Resources Contributes to Recidivism

By Ali Jackson

73 Wisconsin Redistricting: A case for switching to “Iowa Model”

40 Approaching National Service in Milwaukee County

79 Implications for National Security and UKUSA with Huawei’s Role in UK 5G

By Signe Janoska-Bedi

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By Benjamin Keeler

By Kati Kons

By Kelly MacGarrigle

86 Make Housing Affordable Before Students Are Priced Out

By Matthew Mitnick 94 De-escalation of Tensions Between the United States and The Islamic Republic of Iran

By Sarah Niemann

115 Dynamic Detection of Urbanisation Rate from Satellite Imagery

By Smrithi Sharma & Parth Khare

98 How Inadequate American Responses to Cyber Attacks Impair Foreign Policy

By Nils Peterson

118 Reducing the Shortage of Affordable Housing in the State of Wisconsin

By Amy Shircel

102 Explanatory Economic Factors in Femicides

By Montserrat Ponce-Parra

125 Accountability over the Government Language

By Hannah Sohn

110 Adapting the TSCTP to Mali’s Needs

By Anitha Quintin

130 How LIFO Acts as a Tax Loophole for American Corporations

By Jeff Wang

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“I

Letter From the Staff shall never be content until the beneficent influence of the University reaches every family of the state.”

Charles Van Hise, Chancellor of the University of

Wisconsin, discussing the Wisconsin Idea in 1905

It is our pleasure to present the third volume of the Sifting & Winnowing Ideas Conference Papers. Its contents were drawn, like past volumes, from the policy memos written by participants at the WI Ideas Conference. We hope that this conference serves as a forum for policy discourse and helps our participants build a vocabulary to discuss and solve future challenges together.

We believe that, by focusing on policy over politics, we can lay the groundwork for people to work together on the challenges of government despite their differences. In turn, this cooperative mindset empowers students to emerge through collective action as a new generation of American policymakers.

Sifting & Winnowing began as a student journal affiliated with the University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of Political Science and has since grown into an organization that plans an annual academic conference, publishes student academic writing, and works to foster student involvement in the policy-making process.

Our organization embodies the twin traditions of truth-seeking and service to community, and we believe that Wisconsin’s historical commitment to academic freedom makes it an ideal place for students to share and refine their ideas while keeping our state at the forefront of civic dialogue.

Finally, we’d like to extend a special thank you to the University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of Political Science, Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, and the La Follette School of Public Affairs for their partnership in this event.

Sincerely, The Ideas Conference Team Sifting & Winnowing

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The 2020 Wisconsin Ideas Conference Team Chris Thone Ben Keeler Hannah Sohn Ryan Thiele Benjamin Olneck Brown Grace George Will Henkes Emma Morales Ally Couture Zeb Patek Hannah Stewart Parker Conover Mary Morris Adam DeDobbelaere Noah Rochlin Thomas Demonte

Fall 2020 Edition Staff Adam DeDobbelaere Jeff Wang Benjamin Olneck-Brown Signe Janoska-Bedi Elissa Koppel

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American Transparency and Accountability With Military Decisions

By Nilay Bhadra

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Why are the decisions we are taking incorrect?

The United States’ role in foreign matters has increased so much since the framing of the constitution that the method through which decisions are taken is ineffective. One of the biggest drawbacks of our present system is the principal-agent problem, which occurs when the elected representatives of a nation are not acting out in the best interests of the people. Most decision making in the United States is divided across the government to prevent this problem. However, when it comes to foreign policy decisions, the executive branch of the government has considerable influence. One of the biggest examples of this is the widespread skepticism of military intervention among the American people. (Real Clear Politics 2017) While opinions vary on the issue based on polling methods, it can be observed that there has been widespread disagreement between the population and the executive branch since the early 2000s. From the graph below, it can be inferred that most Americans do not support most forms of intervention unless it is to prevent a global crisis.

Figure 1: What Issues Justify Military Intervention?

Source: What Issues Justify Military Intervention?, Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy, CATO Institute

Even after this many political leaders continue to support American interventionism and other policies like regime-change due to a perceived “responsibility” to intervene. This approach is flawed for several reasons.

First, the world is filled with bad actors. A Reuters poll in 2018 ranked India as the worst country for women’s rights. (Goldsmith 2018) Bahrain, Myanmar, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and China are some of the leading nations for cases of journalist arrests. (Santhanam 2016) Saudi Arabia has been acknowledged by many as a nation with some of the most oppressive laws towards women, foreign nations, journalists, and migrant workers. (Al Jazeera 2018) Somalia and Nigeria consist of some of the leading terrorist organizations: Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, respectively. (Dudley 2018) None of these nations, however, have been

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a target for American interventionism like Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan have been.

These examples barely scratch the surface of human rights violations by other nations. If America truly applied its moral responsibility consistently, nearly every part of the world would require military intervention.

Second, America is not one of the most morally progressive nations. America has committed genocide against their indigenous populations. (Blakemore 2019) Do Americans believe that another country’s intervention would have helped better this case? Also, is military intervention better than economic intervention when trying to influence another nation? Iraq, Syria, and Yemen gained colonial independence relatively-late in the 1900s, and they haven’t been given anywhere as much time as the U.S. to become morally good nations. Additionally, the U.S has taken very few attempts at diplomacy over intervention in these cases. Some lesser/ more recently known instances about bad morality are the U.S. funding the Saudi-Arabia led coalition in Yemen (Bazzi 2019) In the same Reuters poll that ranked India as the worst nation for women’s rights, the United States is ranked tenth. (Goldsmith 2018)

Why is the system through which we make foreign policy decisions not working?

Now that the general arguments for military intervention have been understood, let’s try to understand why the process and accountability of the United States’ government is broken. The founding fathers put certain limitations of power on the three branches of government while making foreign policy. However, it can be clearly noticed that this balance of powers has not been efficient as nearly every major foreign policy decision has been either carried out or approved by the executive branch of the government.

Also, it can be easily inferred that the U.S. has too much power in international organizations such as the U.N. (Borger et al. 2015)

Policy proposal to fix the decision making system 1. Reconstructing executive action and truly giving the legislative the power of the purse The President is the dominant actor in American foreign policy. The President not only has the power to persuade while making foreign policy decisions, but also has significant power in defining and implementing policy options. Additionally the executive branch has gained even more power since the start of the 21st century. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) policy passed after 9/11 became a medium through which executive action could be taken with less accountability from other branches of the government.

(United States Congress 2001) The power of the executive has become so deeply rooted in foreign policy decision making that the President’s power to persuade has become the power to threaten. Executive action and the ability to send troops allows the President to take initial initiative without Congress approval. Hence, Congress lost significant influence over foreign policy because they would rather see a decision that they disagree with passed than see a military failure where American lives are at stake. Presidents should not be allowed to send troops of the armed forces to another country without a definite majority of Congress. A two-thirds majority would seem most reasonable for decisions that focus on regime change as that would overcome ruling party biases in most cases and make the President’s power to

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persuade a stronger requirement to make decisions. The only exceptions to this rule should be crisis situations. Also, any military situation that is later found to clearly not have been a crisis situation should be grounds for impeachment under abuse of power/war crimes.

2. Limiting bureaucracy influence in executive decision making: Foreign policy decisions are very complex and consist of many details that Presidents can not take care of individually. As a result, there are too many unelected bureaucrats with goals that conflict with those of the common people. The existence of agencies like the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland security, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency complicate the field of foreign policy, and these agencies act too independently from the President. The use of torture can be considered another example of bureaucratic overreach in foreign policy.

Here, both the CIA and DOD, operating independently, believed it appropriate to identify aggressive techniques that they could lawfully use to overcome detainee resistance to interrogation and sought legal counsel to do so. (Miles 2018) One possible solution to this would be for the head of these organizations to be nominated by Congress (some form of a compromise majority) and confirmed by the President rather than vice versa. This way, bureaucracies would have to look out for the interests of both the President and Congress. If a bureaucracy directly opposes the executive or legislative branch, the incentive to limit their power to an advisory role would increase.

Figure 2: how permanent member powers can be rotated while maintaining a general permanence in the UNSC

3. Breaking the permanent five of the UNSC/restricting the veto of the UNSC: The UNSC veto is NOT an unjust privilege for the permanent five members to enjoy.

It restricts majority rule and unnecessary coalitions from forming in international affairs.

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However, if the same five nations are given this power indefinitely, the voting behavior of the organization may be skewed. This has been a cause of frustration for many member states. (United Nations 2018) In decisions where one or two nations of the permanent five are involved in the problem, the other nations of the permanent five should be allowed to restrict their veto if they unanimously agree upon it. Additionally, the permanent members should be expanded to six and two randomly selected members of the permanent members should step down on a term basis. The way this works would involve bunches of two members stepping down at a time as a permanent member for a 2 year term and being replaced by one of the 10 temporary members. See figure 2 above. This way each nation of the new permanent six will have no completely permanent position, but will maintain a general permanent presence in the permanent six. It should be noted that this proposal is very difficult to achieve. However, if America proposed this policy as the superpower they are, it would open up many doors for similar discussions in the U.N.

Bibliography “Americans skeptical of U.S. military interventions.” Real Clear Politics. 2017.

Bazzi, Mohamad. 2019. “America is likely complicit in war crimes in Yemen. It’s time to hold the U.S. to account.” The Guardian.

Blakemore, Erin. 2019. “California slaughtered 16,000 Native Americans. The State Finally Apologized For the Genocide.” History Channel.

Borger, Julian, Bastien Inzaurralde, Cath Levett, Chris Newell, Finbarr Sheehy and Phil Maynard. 2015. “Vetoed! What’s wrong with the UN security council – and how it could do better.” The Guardian.

Dudley, Dominic. 2018. “The Deadliest Terrorist Groups in the World Today.” Forbes.

Goldsmith, Belinda. 2018. “Which are the world’s 10 most dangerous countries for women?”, Thomson Reuters.

“Member States Call for Removing Veto Power, Expanding Security Council to Include New Permanent Seats, as General Assembly Debates Reform Plans for 15-Member Organ”, United Nations General Assembly Report. 2018.

Miles, Anne Daugherty. 2018. “Perspectives on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques.”

Congressional Research Service.

Santhanam, Laura. 2016. “Which nations jail the most journalists?” PBS NewsHour.

“Saudi Arabia grilled over human rights record at UN council.” Al Jazeera. 2018 United States Congress. Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States. Public Law 107–40. Washington, DC. 2001

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Nuclear Energy and its Role in Clean Energy

By Seap Bhardwaj

Problem - Nuclear Energy is Not Given Enough Credit Nuclear energy, when compared to other nonrenewable sources of energy, is a clean and sustainable source. Compared to coal, oil, and gas, nuclear energy cuts out harmful negative externalities such as carbon dioxide and pollution, making it a source of energy that can completely change the energy market, as well as our environment, when fully utilized.

Nuclear energy, however, is not given enough credit and has a bad reputation. While there are serious concerns with nuclear energy, relating to its safety and expense, it is the only form of dispatchable low carbon energy. The benefits nuclear energy can bring to the energy market, especially through our existing reactor fleet, are immense and worth considering.

Nuclear Energy: What it is And How it Compares to Other Non-Renewable Source Nuclear energy is made in nuclear power plants, and these plants generate electricity just like any other type of power plant. The main difference is what is being used: simply put, instead of coal, oil or gas burning to heat the water and create electricity, heat (and thus, electricity) is created through a self-sustaining chain reaction in uranium atoms. This cuts out harmful negative externalities such as carbon dioxide and pollution that other nonrenewable energy sources create.

Nuclear energy presents many positive benefits for society. When utilized it can completely change the energy market, as well as our environment, for the better. Nuclear energy is easily adjustable: if energy demand is high (for example, in a natural disaster), production can be easily increased. On the flip side, if nuclear generation is not needed (for example, if there are optimal conditions for renewable sources such as wind and sun), production can be slowed. Compared to other non-renewable sources, nuclear energy is a green source of electricity. Nuclear energy is created without the harmful byproducts that coal, oil, and natural gas emit, such as nitrogen oxide (NOx) and carbon dioxide (CO2).

According to the National Energy Institute, without nuclear power, NOx and sulfur dioxide (SO2) would increase by more than 26 percent, and every year nuclear-generated electricity cuts out more than 528 million metric tons of CO2 (Nuclear Energy Institute).

Nuclear energy is also more efficient than fossil fuels. One kilogram of uranium-235 will produce about 2 to 3 million times more kilowatt-hours (kWh) of heat than one kilogram of coal (OVO Energy 2018). According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), coal contributes 31 percent of all the CO2 in the atmosphere, making it the largest source of CO2. Coal mining is the second-highest emitter of methane (attributing to greenhouse gases) and coal mining releases more radiation than nuclear plants. According to one author, “the fly ash emitted by a power plant - a by-product from burning coal for electricity - carries into the surrounding environment 100 times more radiation than a nuclear power plant producing the same amount of energy” (Hvistendahl 2007). Nuclear energy also has a higher capacity factor than natural gas, coal, hydropower, wind, and solar power. This means that nuclear plants produce “maximum power more than 92 percent of the time during the year,” which is one-and-a-half to two times more than natural gas and coal. This can be attributed to nuclear plants requiring less maintenance and being able to operate for longer periods before refueling, compared to natural gas and coal plants (World Nuclear Association 2020).

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Current Policy In the United States, the private sector is more involved in nuclear energy than in any other nation, but the federal government is involved through safety and environmental regulations, research and development funding, and setting energy goals (World Nuclear Association 2020). At the beginning of the 21st Century starting with the Bush administration, nuclear energy became more prevalent. This period consisted of attempting to build more nuclear power plants, passing more legislation and regulatory policies intended to grow the use of nuclear energy. Examples of this legislation are the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which promoted nuclear reactor construction. This was a time of proposed growth and movement towards more nuclear energy, but the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident in 2011 completely changed the worldwide perception of nuclear energy.

With a greater emphasis on alternative sources of energy such as natural gas, as well as historical accidents, there has been a reduction of nuclear energy facilities and programs throughout the country in recent years. Many of the license applications and programs for new nuclear reactors have been suspended or canceled, and it is estimated that by 2025 the number of existing operational nuclear reactors will fall from 99 to 89 (Shellenberger 2018). These ten reactors closing would equal a loss of 23 percent more than all of the solar electricity generated in the United States in 2017 (Shellenberger 2018). This depletion would be disastrous for the energy market. Furthermore, if the loss of nuclear power were to continue, the use of fossil fuels would increase, causing further carbon emissions. Examples of loss of nuclear power leading to increased carbon emission abound. When the Kewaunee plant in Wisconsin closed in May of 2013, Wisconsin lost about 5 percent of its energy supply, and greenhouse gas emissions from an increase in fossil fuel usage rose to more than 50 million tons, marking their highest level in eight years for the state (Content 2014).

Removing nuclear energy leads to severe consequences because renewable sources cannot keep up to meet the demand, therefore fossil fuels once again enter the equation.

Recommendations The reduction of nuclear energy facilities is concerning considering it is the cleanest non-renewable energy source. The costs of nuclear energy are another concern, considering that construction costs estimates for new nuclear power plants vary and have increased in recent years. In the years 2000-2002, the range of estimated total plant construction costs was between $2 and $4 billion per nuclear unit. By 2008, the range rose to $6 billion and $9 billion (Schlissel & Biwald 2008, 2). As expensive as it is to build a nuclear plant, it is also expensive to dismantle one. It is estimated that the cost range of decommissioning a US reactor is from $544 to $821 million (World Nuclear Association 2020). The Kewaunee plant in eastern Wisconsin anticipates decommission costs of nearly $1 billion and estimates that the deferred dismantling process will not be completed until 2073 (U.S. Energy Information Association 2017). Sustaining our current fleet of facilities, rather than focusing on building new plants, both makes sense economically and is of utmost importance in preserving our nuclear energy capacities. With this fact in mind, I recommend that the Office of Nuclear Energy creates a focus towards standardizing nuclear plants and that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency extends our existing plants’ operational licenses to 2040.

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Recommendation One: To reduce costs and increase efficiency, the Office of Nuclear Energy should work towards standardizing the designs and construction of future reactors, as well as operations and training in the current fleet of nuclear reactors.

On June 27th, 2019 the U.S. Department of Energy announced $49.3 million in “nuclear energy research, facility access, crosscutting technology development, and infrastructure awards for 58 advanced nuclear technology products in 25 states” (Office of Nuclear Energy 2019). Investment in research and development is necessary for nuclear innovation and finding new and economically efficient methods of producing nuclear energy.

Even with this investment, however, nuclear energy plants are still closing and new production has been stalled because of costs. Compared to building a combined cycle gas plant and a coal plant, building a nuclear reactor takes on average four to seven more years (Berthelemy & Rangel 2015, 119). While investment in research and development is necessary to grow our nuclear energy capabilities, there should also be more of a focus towards standardizing methods to reduce construction time and costs.

By first focusing on our current fleet and standardizing practices, we can then address the issue of adding new reactors.

A significant concern in the United States regarding our ability to continue nuclear energy use is the “perversity of the ‘customization’” of our nuclear power plants (David & Rothwell 1996, 190). From the beginning, nuclear reactors in the U.S. have been diverse but as time went on they have diversified further and become more complex which has affected both the monetary and time costs of building plants. For example, average times to complete construction doubled from one year in 1968 to two years in 1980; today it can take up to 7 years to construct a nuclear plant (David & Rothwell 1996, 190). This may very well be due to the complexity of reactor designs which have driven up costs as well as the regulatory review process.

A simple comparison can be made between the United States and France’s nuclear industry, and how standardization has affected the latter. In a study by two French economists examining the causes of nuclear plant cost escalations in France and the United States, the authors concluded that the “standardization strategy adopted in France was successful in reducing construction costs and avoiding the longer lead-times” experienced in the U.S. (Berthelemy & Rangel 2015, 119). Contrary to patterns seen in other energy technologies (specifically competing low carbon technologies), these economists also suggested that the innovative practices and research into nuclear power increase construction costs (Berthelemy & Rangel 2015, 129). A specific example of France’s standardization is its nuclear Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) program, considered the “most successful scaling-up of a complex and capital-intensive energy technology system in the recent history of industrialized countries” (Grubler 2010, 5174). This can be attributed to France’s “central planning model”, with regulatory stability and a nationalized principal agent, compared to the United State’s decentralized, market-oriented and multi-layered regulatory system (Grubler 2010, 5185). By standardizing the designs and construction of future reactors, as well as operations and training in the current fleet of nuclear reactors, the U.S. can reduce construction time and costs for nuclear power plants.

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Recommendation Two: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission should conduct second license renewals for the existing nuclear fleet to extend the current fleet’s Operational Licenses to 2040.

Nuclear plants in the United States are licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). These licenses expire after 40 years, but plants can extend these licenses for 20 years at a time. The license renewal process is designed to ensure the safety of every plant in question. The NRC makes sure that each plant requesting renewal operates safely by subjecting the plant to inspections, environmental impact reviews, and safety testing as well as risk assessments. These evaluations are made to ensure that the plant is up to code.

Once this is established, the plant can receive a license renewal (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2018).

According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, over the next 20 years over 50 nuclear plants’ operational licenses will expire: “if even half of these plants are forced to retire and are replaced with fossil fuel power plants, we’d lose one-quarter of the environmental benefits already gained” (Nuclear Energy Institute). The NRC’s involvement is imperative for these nuclear facilities to obtain their renewal licenses and stay afloat for 20 years after this expiration. To see how standardization could affect nuclear energy capabilities, we need more time and concentration on routine practices. Renewing these licenses would accomplish this and allow for the possibilities of economies of scale for nuclear energy reactors, thereby reducing costs and allowing nuclear energy to become competitive with natural gas.

An Important Note There are some concerns regarding nuclear energy and its ability to compete with other sources of energy. While nuclear power is the only form of dispatchable low carbon energy, it competes with much cheaper and simpler renewable energy such as wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass energy, many of which are already subsidized by the federal government. It seems it will be difficult for nuclear energy to keep up without some kind of further subsidy from the federal government. For example, the wind and solar power industries have argued that the “markets will fail to build and operate wind and solar power capacity without support from tax credits, mandates, and other support” (Szilard, et al.

2016). It is questionable, therefore, whether nuclear energy can survive without this kind of government intervention in the future. Our current nuclear fleet, even with extended operational licenses, may not be able to hold for another 20 years while competing with other government-secured sources in our ever-changing energy market. Some ideas to attack the market failure being experienced in the nuclear industry are tax credits, direct compensation to the plants, or mandates (Szilard, et al. 2016, 14). These are meant to address the positive externalities nuclear energy brings while making it economically feasible.

Government bailouts, however, can only last so long. Nuclear energy can fulfill our energy needs in a clean and low-carbon way but the industry needs to find a way to decrease costs and increase efficiencies on its own, or at least without continuous government intervention. Nuclear energy, with the recommendations listed above, could prove to be a necessary component in our energy market. It could also, due to economies of scale from overall standardization, become competitive with other sources. Costs must come down, and I believe standardizing our current fleet is the best way to achieve this.

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Bibliography Berthélemy, Michel, and Lina Escobar Rangel. 2015. “Nuclear Reactors’ Construction Costs: The Role of Lead-Time, Standardization and Technological Progress.” Energy Policy 82 (July 2015): 118–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.03.015.

Content, Thomas. 2014. “Kewaunee Closing Makes Wisconsin’s Task to Meet EPA Rules Tougher.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 14, 2014. http://archive.jsonline. com/business/kewaunee-closing-makes-wisconsins-task-to-meet-epa-rules-tougherb99289865z1-263176971.html David, Paul A, and Geoffrey S Rothwell. 1996. “Standardization, Diversity and Learning: Strategies for the Coevolution of Technology and Industrial Capacity.”

International Journal of Industrial Organization 14, no. 2 (1996): 181–201. https://doi. org/10.1016/0167-7187(95)00475-0.

Grubler, Arnulf. 2010. “The Costs of the French Nuclear Scale-up: A Case of Negative Learning by Doing.” Energy Policy 38, no. 9 (January 9, 2010): 5174–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.05.003.

Hvistendahl, Mara. 2007. “Coal Ash is More Radioactive Than Nuclear Waste.” Scientific American, December 13, 2017. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/coal-ash-ismore-radioactive-than-nuclear-waste/ Nuclear Energy Institute. “Air Quality.” Nuclear Energy Institute. https://www.nei.org/advantages/air-quality Nuclear Energy Institute. “Second License Renewal.” Nuclear Energy Institute. https://www.nei.org/advocacy/preserve-nuclear-plants/second-license-renewal OVO Energy. 2018. “Nuclear power explained.” OVO Energy. Last modified February 28, 2018. https://www.ovoenergy.com/guides/energy-sources/nuclear-energy.html Schlissel, David, and Bruce Biewald Biewald. 2008 “Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs.” Synapse Energy Economics Inc., July 2008. https://www.synapse-energy.com/ sites/default/files/SynapsePaper.2008-07.0.Nuclear-Plant-Construction-Costs.A0022_0. pdf.

Shellenberger, Michael. 2018. “If Innovation Makes Everything Cheaper, Why Does It Make Nuclear Power More Expensive?” Forbes, June 21, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ michaelshellenberger/2018/06/21/if-innovation-makes-everything-cheaper-why-does-itmake-nuclear-power-more-expensive/#2e2becf72d7d Shellenberger, Michael. 2018. “Nuclear Plant Closures Show Why, When It Comes To Energy, Small Is Expensive.” Forbes, August 1, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ michaelshellenberger/2018/08/01/nuclear-plant-closures-show-why-when-it-comes-toenergy-small-is-expensive/#7711f57d71a2 Szilard, Ronaldo, Phil Sharpe, and Eugene Grecheck. 2016. “Economic and Market Challenges Facing the U.S. Nuclear Commercial Fleet.” Energy Systems Strategic Assessment Institute, September 2016. https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/sites/sti/ sti/7246982.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy. 2019. “Energy Department Invests Nearly $50 Million at National Laboratories and Universities to Advance Nuclear Technology.” Office of Nuclear Energy, June 27, 2019. https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/energydepartment-invests-nearly-50-million-national-laboratories-and-universities

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U.S. Department of Energy. 2018. “Nuclear Power is the Most Reliable Energy Source and It’s Not Even Close.” Office of Nuclear Energy, February 27, 2018. https://www.energy. gov/ne/articles/nuclear-power-most-reliable-energy-source-and-its-not-even-close U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2017. “Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors is a Long-Term and Costly Process.” Today In Energy. Last modified November 17, 2017. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=33792 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2018. “Backgrounder on Reactor License Renewal.”

NRC Library. Last modified October 1, 2018. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/fact-sheets/fs-reactor-license-renewal.html World Nuclear Association. 2020. “Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities.” Information Library. Last modified June 2020. https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/ nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-wastes/decommissioning-nuclear-facilities.aspx World Nuclear Association. 2020. “US Nuclear Power Policy.” Information Library. Last modified January 2020. https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/countryprofiles/countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-power-policy.aspx

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Campaign Methods and Government Allocation

By Cody Richard Byers

Problem - Competing political candidates offer opposing views, leading to confusion, fatigue, and misallocation The issue of interventionist government spending is nothing new to policy discussion. An intense topic of debate in the current presidential race is whether to implement a number of government programs spanning from universal health care, nationwide minimum wage, or various initiatives to combat climate change. There are essentially two groups of candidates: those who are generally in favor of spending in these areas, and those who are against.

These groups typically agree that there exists a need for policy intervention, but tend to disagree whether stimulus policy is the solution or not. This then implies two problems for any political candidate running for office on a platform of stimulating government spending in various industries: 1) which (if any) spending programs will actually net benefit voters, and 2) how can the candidate convince voters that their proposed policy platform will produce the predicted benefit?

Research on misallocation suggests that government “favoring” of relatively inefficient firms over other, more efficient firms (or industries over other industries) would lead to a drop in productivity for the economy (Hsieh et. al 2009). This research suggests that, were the government to treat different firms equally with regards to taxes, stimulus, etc., overall productivity in the economy would grow.

Recent research, however, takes a different approach: it suggests that the government must favor some industries over others as a way to cater to public opinion (Byers 2020).

In other words, it is necessary for the government to misallocate stimulus to some degree.

Otherwise, a populace of voters would be incentivized to remove the current administration in favor of one that would allocate government stimulus to the industries “passed over” by the previous. Thus, while a candidate must propose to allocate resources as efficiently as possible, they must also convince the public that this allocation will be an overall benefit to avoid alienating voters. While this research is oversimplified to a significant degree, the simplifying assumptions serve to more clearly demonstrate the main argument: that, should a political candidate wish to change the allocation of government resources, they must find some way to avoid incensing public opinion against themselves.

This research suggests that there are two ways for political candidates to do this: make it more “costly”, in terms of public opinion, for the administration to stimulate the incorrect industries, or make it less “costly” to stimulate the correct industries. An example of the former could be a candidate producing “attack ads”, criticizing unproductive industries directly or attacking opposing candidate platforms that advocate for stimulus in such industries. An example of the latter would be a candidate instead promoting their own platform, citing benefits and positive aspects of their own platform.

Empirical analysis conducted by John Sides suggests that positive promotion (i.e. lowering the opinion cost of productive stimulus) of a policy platform can be more effective than typical negative promotion (Sides 2016). Indeed, a myriad of studies suggest similar results. Some research suggests voters opinions of the producer of a negative political ad were reduced after viewing said ad (Carraro et. al 2010), while other studies suggest that independent voter turnout is damaged by negative campaign tactics (Lau et. al 2001).

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Source: Pew Research Center, Survey conducted among U.S. Adults June 3-17, 2019.

Americans are growing extremely tired of politics. 85% of Americans surveyed say that they believe that American politics have grown overall more negative in the past several years, and the same number say that politics have become less respectful over the same time period (Pew Research Center 2019). Negative campaigning has become the norm, and it is driving voters to ambivalence and fatigue. With this in mind, the following are two recommendations to combat this.

First: Identify productive industries and plan policy platforms around them Advocating for a policy platform that is detrimental to the United States economy amounts to nothing more than pandering, and should be avoided completely. An evidence based approach should be taken to draw up policy platforms that will increase productivity (and consequently, incomes). This approach would include analyzing existing domestic and foreign programs that are similar to proposed policies and identifying costs and benefits. In addition, growth-accounting methods should be utilized to identify those industries that may be overall a detriment to the U.S. economy and those that increase productivity the most (Byers 2020).

Second: Utilize positive campaigning methods to increase public support of the proposed policy platform.

Fact and data driven campaign messages have an equal effect on public support of policy, and are more often used positively for one’s own platform than to attack another (Sides 2016). As such, when creating campaign advertisements and messages, candidates should provide factual information about their proposed platform, ranging from information about who would benefit to how funds would be raised to pay for the proposed platform.

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Emotionally-driven stories about persons affected by similar programs should be kept uplifting, espousing the benefits of a candidates policy platform instead of denigrating another.

Conclusion American politics have grown murky with an extreme increase in negative campaign messages and conflicting policy platforms. The voting base—especially valuable independent voters who suffer from the “swing-voter’s curse”, a proclivity to abstain when presented with policy uncertainty (Feddersen et. al 1996)— is growing increasingly fatigued, and turnout is beginning to be affected. For any candidate seeking to win office amid this confusion, a clear and precise policy platform of productive government stimulus, backed by positive, evidence-based reinforcement, is a necessity to convince voters and overcome the negative atmosphere produced by political rivals.

Bibliography Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Peter J. Klenow. “Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in China and India.” The Quarterly journal of economics 124, no. 4 (2009): 1403-1448.

Sides, John. “Stories or science? Facts, frames, and policy attitudes.” American Politics Research 44, no. 3 (2016): 387-414.

Byers, Cody. “A model of Industry and Public Opinion” [unpublished research], 2020.

Brigham Young University.

Carraro, Luciana, Bertram Gawronski, and Luigi Castelli. “Losing on all fronts: The effects of negative versus positive person‐based campaigns on implicit and explicit evaluations of political candidates.” British Journal of Social Psychology 49, no. 3 (2010): 453-470.

Lau, Richard R. and Gerald M. Pomper. “Effects of Negative Campaigning on Turnout in US Senate Elections, 1988-1998.” (2001) Journal of Politics 63 (3).

Pew Research Organization. “Americans say the nation’s political debate has grown more toxic and ‘heated’ rhetoric could lead to violence”. (2019) Pew Research Center. https:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/18/americans-say-the-nations-politicaldebate-has-grown-more-toxic-and-heated-rhetoric-could-lead-to-violence/ Feddersen, Timothy J., and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. “The swing voter’s curse.” The American economic review (1996): 408-424.

Garramone, Gina M. “Voter Responses to Negative Political Ads.” (1994) Journalism Quarterly.

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A Proposal to End Gerrymandering via Independent Commissions

by Simon Fischer

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T

he practice of gerrymandering has become a growing issue in our electoral politics. The concept itself has existed for centuries, but given the United States’ winner-take-all system and the polarization in Congress, gerrymandering has had a profound, yet understated effect on the political landscape of our country. It has drastically reduced the fairness of congressional elections, and has been a major contributor to the hyper-partisan climate that has swamped Washington. One way our country can take a step towards undoing many of the entanglements that partisan gerrymandering has created would be to ensure that all states have an independent commission in place to draw congressional districts.

What is Gerrymandering?

Gerrymandering is a method of redistricting that intends to create an advantage for one political party by manipulating district boundaries in order to create a discrepancy between the amount of seats the party holds in comparison to the amount of registered party voters in that district. It has a negative connotation, and is associated with corruption of the democratic process. Gerrymandering is most commonly applied in two different methods, “packing” and “cracking”.

Source: BillTrack50

Packing “Packing” is a strategy of placing a bloc of voters in a small area in order to reduce the competitiveness of elections throughout multiple districts. This causes the bloc to be overrepresented in a concentrated district. That group will be represented by someone that mirrors their views, but they only have that representative to speak for them, which marginalizes their overall influence on the state’s political makeup. As the above graphic demonstrates, this can also be done by distributing groups of voters across districts in a way that makes them a slight minority in all of those districts, preventing them from being fairly

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represented. Packing is commonly deployed to dilute the influence of a minority party, but is also used to target certain demographics. One example of this is Florida’s 20th congressional district. Located in the northern Miami area, it is a minority-majority district with a high number of Black voters and is represented by a Black congressman. But by looking at maps of the underlying predominant racial and ethnic groups, it is clear that the district represents most of the Black voters in North Miami (Payne-Riley 2017). Instances of packing have also been heard before the Supreme Court, such as the 1993 Shaw v. Reno case which challenged unusually-shaped districts in North Carolina that were no wider than the interstate highway in some spots and heavily comprised of African-Americans (Oyez 1992).

Cracking “Cracking” is a strategy of dividing a bloc of voters into separate districts in order to dilute their votes and prevent them from comprising a majority in a set of districts. It serves as an opposing alternative to packing, as it spreads out a demographic rather than condensing them while concurrently reducing that demographic’s influence. It is commonly used by a party that faces an ideological deficit in an area, yet controls the state legislature, to create more seats for themselves by splitting the majority party into many different districts, as the graphic shows.

It is also effective in dividing “communities of interest” (Blake 2011), which form around issues of social, cultural racial, ethnic and economic interests. Cracking splits up these potential communities and removes their ability to elect advocates that champion relevant issues and concerns to those communities (Payne-Riley). “Cracked” districts are often defined by their bizarre shapes and size, as these creatively-drawn maps allow the party in charge to achieve these imbalanced layouts. An example of such a layout is the Philadelphia metro area. Montgomery County, located just outside of the city, is large enough to make up its own congressional district yet is split up amongst five other districts (Payne-Riley). The area’s 7th district, pictured above, stretches from the city into Amish country and has been ridiculed for resembling a “cartoon moose” and is frequently mentioned as one of the most gerrymandered districts in the country (Bui and Cohn 2018).

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Source: Brennan Center for Justice

Why is Gerrymandering Important?

As the usage of unfair redistricting practices has continued to rise, so have the levels of public scrutiny and pressure regarding the issue. Polling conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice from 2017 and 2019 showed over 70 percent of voters from all parties agree that the Supreme Court should place limits on gerrymandering, and the 2019 poll also revealed that over 55 percent of all voters who have a partisan affiliation have unfavorable views of the practice (Brennan Center for Justice 2019). Politicians from both sides of the aisle have echoed these concerns as well. Presidents from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama have vocally condemned the practice, and legislation has been introduced regarding gerrymandering in the House of Representatives, but to no avail. Rep. Alan Lowenthal (D-CA)’s “Let the People Draw the Lines Act” introduced in 2013 advocated for nationwide independent commissions and was an important step in the right direction, but ultimately was not signed into law. In the absence of national legislation, though, states have taken matters into their own hands.

A growing number have taken it upon themselves to create independent commissions, and they have implemented a variety of committee structures in order to ensure fairness for their districts. Voters and lawmakers alike agree that gerrymandering must be addressed. Unfair redistricting undermines the goal of a representative democracy.

What can be done about Gerrymandering?

The most prominent solution to the problem of gerrymandering has been implementing these independent commissions at the state-wide level through state legislatures or a referendum. Ten states have passed laws that task an independent commission with redistricting, including swing states like Michigan and Colorado. These commissions have varying numbers of members and processes of appointing members of the commission, but all of them limit the involvement of elected officials and have been upheld by the Supreme Court in accordance with the 2015 Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission case (Ballotpedia). However, not everyone has agreed with the Court’s ruling. Organizations such as the National Conference of State Legislatures have argued that independent commissions violate the Constitution and unfairly exclude state

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legislators from the process. They additionally filed an amicus brief in the Arizona State Legislature case claiming that independent commissions give legislators “no substantive involvement” in the redistricting process and that commissions violate the Elections Clause (Ballotpedia). Other detractors have stated that commissions reduce the transparency of the process in that they are led by unknown bureaucrats rather than elected officials that can be held accountable. None of these critiques, though, address how those same elected officials they want to see included have been the ones responsible for the gerrymandering problem or how involving legislators in the process makes elections any more democratic.

What should be done about Gerrymandering?

My recommendation is a federal statute that would require each of the 40 states that do not currently have one to implement an independent redistricting committee, similar to Rep. Lowenthal’s previously proposed bill. The commissions would be composed of an even number of members from the two largest political parties in the state, who would be selected by the Majority and Minority Leaders of the state legislature, as well as members that do not belong to a political party. Commission members would not be picked from the legislatures and would be barred from participating in any political activity, such as attending rallies or making campaign donations. All maps created by the commission would need to be approved by a supermajority of its members, and would then be reviewed by the state supreme court to ensure they are geographically contiguous and compact, and as equally populated as possible (Lowenthal 2013).

Conclusion Instituting nationwide independent commissions is a feasible solution that takes the important job of redistricting out of the hands of legislators with ulterior motives and instead makes it the responsibility of a bi-partisan committee. It directly addresses an issue that is universally agreed upon as being problematic for our democracy and brings an added level of fairness into our congressional elections. This issue has become even more important with the Supreme Court recently declining to take a stance on gerrymandering in the Gill v. Whitford case, making a national solution even more urgent. Independent commissions can help work towards fulfilling the Founders’ vision of equal representation and a fair democracy, and truly “letting the people draw the lines.”

Bibliography Ballotpedia. “Independent Redistricting Commissions.” ballotpedia.org/Independent_ redistricting_commissions#cite_note-9. (web content) BillTrack50. “Redistricting in Ohio & Other Places before the Midterms.” October 10, 2018. www.billtrack50.com/blog/social-issues/redistricting-in-ohio-other-places-before-themidterms/. (web content) Blake, Aaron. “Name That District Contest Winner: ‘Goofy Kicking Donald Duck’.” The Washington Post, December 29, 2011. www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/ post/name-that-district-contest-winner-goofy-kicking-donald-duck/2011/12/29/ gIQA2Fa2OP_blog.html (news article)

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Brennan Center for Justice. “Americans Are United Against Partisan Gerrymandering.”

March 15, 2019. www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/americans-areunited-against-partisan-gerrymandering. (web content) Bui, Quoctrung, and Cohn, Nate. “Adventures in Extreme Gerrymandering: See the Fair and Wildly Unfair Maps We Made for Pennsylvania.” The New York Times, January 17, 2018. www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/17/upshot/pennsylvaniagerrymandering.html?em_pos=small&emc=edit_up_20180117&nl=upshot&nl_ art=0&nlid=75798939&ref=headline&te=1. (news article) Lowenthal, Alan. “H.R.2978 - 113th Congress (2013-2014): Let the People Draw the Lines Act of 2013.” Congress.gov, 13 Sept. 2013. www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/housebill/2978.

Payne-Riley, Lauren. “A Deeper Look at Gerrymandering.” PolicyMap, August 7, 2017 www.policymap.com/2017/08/a-deeper-look-at-gerrymandering/. (news article) Oyez. “Shaw v. Reno.” www.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-357. (web content)

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Disabled Students of Color Are Facing Disparate Treatment in Chicago Public Schools

By Alanna Goldstein

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Problem

Given the standard policy to segregate school classrooms by ability, disabled students of color in Chicago public schools are not receiving equal access to public education. Thus, recommendations to improve the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in the context of racial segregation in the Chicago public school district are necessary. Overall, public schools in Chicago have adopted distinct school policies that have made efforts to improve education for disabled students of color. Conducting a Racial Equity Impact Assessment (REIA) is necessary before Chicago School District 299 adopts new policies that affect disabled students of color.

In America’s public education system, all students are guaranteed access to public education. IDEA has been instrumental in helping to improve educational standards for disabled students. However, research has shown an over-representation of students of color in public school special education programs. The Civil Rights Data Collection has confirmed that Chicago public schools have a significant student population of disabled students of color (Civil Rights Data Collection 2015).

To look at whether minority students were treated differently than white students in special education programs in the Chicago Public School District, I obtained data on 3,390 programs in 642 schools. First, I determined for each program whether the majority of the students in each program were minorities (Native American, Asian, Hispanic, Black, and Two or More Races). Then, I compared these “minority” programs with programs in which the majority of students were white. I then determined the number of minority programs in which students spent less than 40 percent of time in the regular classroom to white programs. This was calculated at three levels: less than 25 percent of students, between 25 and 50 percent of students, and more than 50 percent of students.

As Table 1 shows: ● Very few white program participants spent more than 40 percent of their time outside of the regular classroom. ● Minority disabled students are more likely to spend more time out of the regular classroom. 12.5 percent of minority programs, compared with less than 1 percent of white programs, had between 25 percent and 50 percent of their students spend the most time out of the regular classroom. ●The same disparity exists for the programs in which over 50 percent of students spent the most time out of the regular classroom: virtually all of the programs in this category are minority programs.

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Having a disproportionate number of students of color in special education programs presents a pressing problem. Table 1 demonstrates that disabled students of color receive proportionally less time spent in the regular classroom as compared to disabled white students. Spending time in the regular classroom has been linked to increased student success (McGovern 2015). Thus, the Chicago Public School system must work to address the systemic inequality disabled students of color face in the classroom.

Chicago, as the third-largest public school district in America, presents a unique challenge.

Many of the public schools directly serve a student population with a majority of students of color (City of Chicago 2020). This means it is critical to look at the intersection of race and disability in the Chicago public school district. Taking an intersectional lens allows for an analysis that understands the unique experiences of those with overlapping identities of race and disability in the context of disabled students of color.

Recommendations

Chicago public schools have a variety of school policies that directly impact disabled students of color. School policies will be evaluated as successful if they can address the racial harms by preventing racial segregation of Chicago public schools by ability.

The recent recommendation for a New Education of Students with Disability Policy in the Chicago Public Schools provides an opportunity to improve education for disabled students of color (Chicago Board of Education 2019). Chicago Public Schools should adopt an REIA of any proposed policy changes that will impact disabled students of color (Lightfoot 2019).

An REIA will identify which Chicago Public Schools have implemented successful policies that increase disabled students of color having equal access to quality public education.

An REIA is an approach to identifying how different racial and ethnic groups are impacted by proposed or existing systems. “The REIA can be a vital tool for preventing institutional racism and for identifying new options to remedy long-standing inequities… REIAs are used to reduce, eliminate and prevent racial discrimination and inequities. The persistence of deep racial disparities and divisions across society is evidence of institutional racism––the routine, often invisible and unintentional, production of inequitable social opportunities and outcomes. When racial equity is not consciously addressed, racial inequality is often unconsciously replicated.” (Keleher 2009).

There are several important steps to conducting an REIA that Chicago Public Schools should follow: ● Include students, families, teachers, and school administrators in the process. All should

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be empowered equally to contribute. ● Collect quantitative and qualitative data on the outcomes of disabled students of color in Chicago Public Schools. ● Determine the potential causes of existing inequalities for disabled students of color. ● Develop new approaches that can address these disparities. ● Sustainably implement new approaches and continuously engage stakeholders, evaluate changes, and report outcomes.

Other cities have found REIAs to be successful at improving racial inequalities in their public school districts. For example, in Minneapolis, they began using REIAs in 2008. The school board has since made REIAs mandatory as the community found REIAs help engage a diverse population and identify underrepresented issues (The Annie E. Casey Foundation 2016).

Conducting an REIA to evaluate the Chicago Public School District in the context of disabled students of color is necessary. This will analyze the existing policies in place in the Chicago Public School District and find if policies correlate with the disparate treatment of disabled students of color. Future policy changes should undergo an REIA process before they are implemented.

Conclusion

If Chicago Public Schools continue to ignore the education of disabled students of color, this will have a detrimental effect on their education. Table 1 and Figure 1 demonstrate many disabled students of color are losing time spent in the regular class environment in Chicago Public Schools. Research has also shown that disabled students of color face disproportionate rates of discipline in Chicago Public Schools (Civil Rights Data Collection 2015).

By adopting REIA in all Chicago Public Schools for policies that affect disabled students of color, disabled students of color will have increased equal access to quality public education.

References

The Annie E. Casey Foundation. “Tools for Thought: Using Racial Equity Impact Assessments for Effective Policymaking,” 2016. https://www.aecf.org/resources/tools-forthought-a-race-for-results-case-study/ Chicago Board of Education. “Education of Students with Disabilities Policy.” Chicago Public Schools Policy Handbook. December 11, 2019.

City of Chicago. “Chicago Public Schools - School Profile Information SY1819.” City of Chicago Data Portal. Last modified 2020. https://data.cityofchicago.org/Education/Chicago-Public-Schools-School-Profile-Information-/kh4r-387c/data Civil Rights Data Collection. “Students with Disabilities, by Disability Categories (2009+).”

City of Chicago School District 299. Last modified 2015. https://ocrdata.ed.gov/flex/Reports.aspx?type=school Keleher, Terry. “Racial Equity Impact Assessment.” The Center for Racial Justice and Innovation. 2009. https://www.raceforward.org/sites/default/files/RacialJusticeImpactAssess-

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ment_v5.pdf Lightfoot, Lori. “A Plan to Transform Chicago Public Schools.” January, 2019. https://lightfootforchicago.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2019_LEL_Education_Policy.pdf McGovern, Megan. “Least Restrictive Environment: Fulfilling the Promises of IDEA.” Widener Law Review 21, no. 1 (2015). https://widenerlawreview.org/ files/2015/02/10-McGovern-1.pdf

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How a Lack of Reentry Resources Contribute to Recidivism

By Ali Jackson

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Background - Past Policy and the Current State of Recidivism

As of 2011, Wisconsin had an average of 31.3% of ex-convicts reoffending and being sentenced a second or third time. Still, the state spending on corrections has increased significantly. On February 28th, 200219 Governor Tony Evers and the State of Wisconsin Department of Administration (WI DOA) released its 2019-2021 Executive Budget that outlined the budget of the DOC specifically. Within this report, it outlined the goals and actual numbers from 2017-2018 and the goals for 2019, 2020, and 2021. The top goal listed is “Reduce Recidivism” and the top Governor’s Budget Recommendation is “Opening Avenues to Reentry Success Expansion.” The budget allocated for “Opening Avenues to Reentry Success Expansion” is $3,926,500 for Fiscal Year 2020 (FY20) and $3,901,600 for FY21, sourced from General Purpose Revenue (GPR) for “support[ing] statewide expansions of the Opening Avenues to Reentry Success program” (WI DOA 2019) This program, Opening Avenues to Reentry Success (OARS), supports the reentry of “inmates living with a serious and persistent mental illness who are medium-to-high-risk of reoffending”. Their goal is to provide ex-prisoners with the stability and skills needed to integrate successfully into the community. The OARS team focuses on the individual and what they specifically need. OARS accomplishes this by “connecting the participant with locally-based supports for health care, housing, education, employment, and transportation. Each participant’s support is different depending on their individual needs” (La Vigne, et al. 2008). It is vital that the state provide these resources for facilitating the reentry process and reducing the likelihood of recidivism.

Problem - What Factors Correlate with Increased Likelihood of Reoffense

Nationally, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, after examining recidivism rates in a 9-year long follow up study, “An estimated 68% of released prisoners were arrested within 3 years, 79% within 6 years, and 83% within 9 years” (Alper, et al. 2018). According to the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (WI DOC), Recidivism is defined as a criminal offense committed following incarceration that results in the offender being convicted of a new offense and a sentence to either Custody or supervision to the Department of Corrections (Tatar & Jones 2016). Recidivism rates released by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections are defined by dividing the number of persons in a defined population who have recidivated by the total number of persons in that population.

In order to see best how time after release from prison affects recidivism rates, the WI DOC measured rates in follow up increments of one, two, and three years after the individual was released from prison. There are eight main factors that influence recidivism rates within a population: gender, age of release, race, time to recidivism event, length of prison stay, risk level, original offense type, and offense type specialization (Tatar & Jones 2016).

For example, in terms of gender, male offenders have a higher chance of reoffending. For a female inmate released between 2000 and 2011 in a 3-year follow up, the recidivism rate was 26.1% whereas for a male inmate it was 35.3%. Another example of one of the eight main factors influencing likelihood of reoffense is in regards to age, in a 3-year follow up study, an inmate released between 20-24 years of age was nearly twice as likely to reoffend than an

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inmate released between 50-54 years of age.

According to the Wisconsin Department of corrections, offenders released in 2009 have a recidivism rate of 30.8% which is the lowest rate in 20 years as compared to a high of 45.4% in 1993. However, despite the significant decline in recidivism rates in recent decades, a person still has on average a one in three chance of returning back into the system - this rate is still too high. This is in part due to a lack of reentry resources: oftentimes prisoners will describe their experience of being released from prison as being left at steps of a church with enough money to buy a bus ticket. This common experience highlights the difficulties ex-convicts experience immediately after release, which only worsen over time. A specific example of the immense lack of resources that the formerly incarcerated have for trying to reduce criminal activity outside of prison is that convicts can’t collect Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) while in prison and they are not automatically eligible after release either. Ex-convicts are being released from prison with no money to support them, which is just one way resources for ex-prisoners lack support upon their reentry (Inmate Aid 2010). In order to best set up the formerly incarcerated for life outside of prison, a reentry program needs to provide the following: transportation, clothing, food, amenities, financial resources, documentation, employment assistance, education, health care, and support systems.

Recommendations - What the WI DOC should do immediately

When incarcerated, inmates have nearly all autonomy stripped from them. To go from an extremely rigid, regimented environment to the outside world is extremely difficult for ex-convicts to adapt to. By providing ex-convicts with resources such as health care, housing, education, employment, and transportation, it becomes much easier for inmates to reintegrate successfully back into society. The increased pressure and strain pushes offenders to reoffend with certain crimes with a high likelihood of arrest due to their lack of resources and struggle for survival. In order for this program to be successful, the WI DOC program must establish easy and automatic-enrollment for ex-prisoners following release with an optional opt-out option. Additionally, WI DOC should fund pre-existing reentry programs that have successful and established reentry programs.

More specifically, in order to work most effectively the WI DOC should evaluate offenders based on the eight main factors previously listed: gender, age of release, race, time to recidivism event, length of prison stay, risk level, original offense type, and offense type specialization. By using these factors to calculate the likelihood of reoffense, the WI DOC can focus their resources on the most promising inmates. It’s important for the WI DOC to learn how to rehabilitate offenders through those who are most likely to adapt from intervention. Additionally, to address the loss of autonomy affecting inmates there should be adaptations within prisons allowing prisoners to have more say in what is happening with their lives. American prison is an extremely structured environment, however, it doesn’t have to stay that way and it doesn’t show that rigidity is beneficial. Increasing autonomy - for example, allowing inmates to choose classes or programs that they want to attend during certain hours - could be largely beneficial, because such a system comes closer to simulating the real world that inmates are being released into. Lastly, I recommend increasing fund-

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ing for both public and private rehabilitations programs. More specifically, these programs should prioritize finding housing and job assistance. These job assistance programs will aid in building skills for the workplace, assist with building resumes, interview training, and the job search process. Ideally, this program will partner with various companies that are willing to hire employees with a record and are actively waiting to hire ex-inmates recently released from prison. These programs would be funded by the state government, as it is in their best interest to address recidivism now to reduce spending on incarceration in the future.

Bibliography

Alper, Mariel, Durose, Matthew R., Markman, Joshua, 2018 Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-up Period (2005-2014) (pdf, 31 pages), Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, May 2018, NCJ 250975.

Craig, Leam, Louise Dixon, and Theresa A. Gannon. What Works in Offender Rehabilitation: an Evidence-Based Approach to Assessment and Treatment. Hoboken: Wiley, 2013.

Inmate Aid. “What Prisoners and Inmates Need to Know from Social Security Administration - Answers.” Inmate Aid: 2020. Accessed March 4, 2020. https://www.inmateaid.com/ information/what-prisoners-and-inmates-need-to-know-from-social-security-administration-answers.

La Vigne, Nancy, Elizabeth Davies, Tobi Palmer, and Robin Halberstadt. “Release Planning for Successful Reentry: A Guide for Corrections, Service Providers, and Community Groups.” Urban Institute: 2008.

Maruna, Shadd, and Russ Immarigeon. After Crime and Punishment Pathways to Offender Reintegration. Uffculme: Taylor and Francis, 2013.

Tatar II, Joseph R., and Megan Jones. “Recidivism after Release from Prison, Recidivism after Release from Prison.” Wisconsin Department of Corrections: 2016.

Wisconsin Department of Administration. Executive Budget 2019-2020. WI DOA: 2019. https://doa.wi.gov/Pages/StateFinances/2019-21-Executive-Budget.aspx.

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Approaching National Service in Milwaukee County

By Signe Janoska-Bedi

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Problem Statement

Complacent policymaking has resulted in declining economic achievement among most Americans. Rates of economic mobility in the United States, measured by the percentage of children earning more than their parents, is lower than any time since the Second World War (Chetty, et al. 2017). Specifically, achievement rates have declined from about 90% for those born in 1940 to 50% for those born in the 1980s, driven in part by an unequal distribution of economic growth across different income groups. For more information, see Figure 1.

Figure 1: Percent of Children Earning More than their Parents, by Year of Birth

Research suggests that the decline in labor market participation in the United States since the Great Recession was driven less by the structural changes of the financial crisis than by pervasive, longer-run causes (Nolan, et al. 2018). These causes result from demographic and behavioral changes in the United States when compared to other developed nations—most notably in educational attainment.

Decreases in American educational attainment versus other countries are not surprising when considered alongside rising costs of university education, dissatisfaction among students with campus cultural climates, and broadening generational gaps in debt and wealth.

The costs of attending a four-year university have more than doubled since the 1980s, after adjustment for inflation (NCES 2019). While median incomes have been steadily growing in the United States since the Second World War, median incomes for young Americans without a college education have decreased (Bialik & Fry 2019). For more information, see Figure 2.

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Figure 2: Median Adjusted Household income for 25- to 37-year olds, in 2017 dollars Economic gloom is reflected in American attitudes and voting behavior. Only 50 percent of young Americans express enthusiastic pride in their government and society—the lowest levels measured since 2001 (Brenan 2019). With the 2018 midterm serving as a visible outlier, voter turnout among young Americans is consistently lower than other age groups (Cilluffo & Fry 2019; Misra 2019). The relative comfort and security of everyday life contrasts with the relatively small proportion of Americans who serve in the military (Reynolds & Shendruk 2018), and many Americans are now able to watch major events unfold from the safety of their living room couch without feeling a personal call to action in enthusiastic service to their nation.

Proposed Solution Ethical Underpinnings A problem of this magnitude requires a solution of equal scale. Programs for service have been proposed and implemented by four of the last five presidents as an instrument for increasing civic engagement and enthusiasm among young Americans while also equalizing opportunities across communities and income groups (Bridgeland & DiIulio 2019). A year of civilian service in support of our nation’s work would bring young Americans from different demographic backgrounds together to mature and form habits of thought that will benefit them for years afterward. Perhaps most importantly, national service has the potential to render young Americans enthusiastic for the cause of democratic values. A program designed responsibly—without political or nationalistic undertones—can help steward American values while fostering a spirit of purpose in younger generations. The philosopher

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William James wrote that national service sustaints “political unity and civic virtue in the absence of war or a credible threat” and “sounds a rallying cry for service in the interests of the individual and the nation” (James 1906).

While programs for national service exist in the form of Americorps, City Year, the Peace Corps, and the Citizen Corps, these programs have more applicants than they have the capacity to support (Sawhill & Bridgeland 2020). Additionally, these programs are not organized or funded for scalability, and a system needs to be devised that can sustain a truly national program for service. In order for a program to succeed at a national scale, it needs the resources to provide pay and benefits like college tuition to its participants, and needs to develop a balance between a centralized headquarters for administration, and a decentralized field presence to build relationships with local partners in public works and civil services.

Additionally, even a program that is designed to eventually include every young American cannot begin at that scale. It needs to be built through voluntary participation in order to refine its underlying organizational structure.

Pilot Program Service may provide the greatest benefits in communities with the lowest economic mobility, and such a community would serve as an effective place for a pilot program for national service. In the United States, areas of low economic mobility can typically be found in the Southern and Midwestern states and includes the city of Milwaukee and its surrounding commuting zone (Chetty, et al. 2018). See Figure 3 for more a map of economic mobility in the United States.

Piloting a program for national service in Milwaukee would require strong partnerships with local civil services like Milwaukee Public Schools, Milwaukee County Transit System, and the Department of Public Works. The program’s early work includes establishing formal relationships with these organizations and building buy in around the idea of a service program. This includes the drafting of written agreements around the status of the program in managing those recruited to participate in a year of service. In addition, the program should dedicate its time to building its financial and administrative support from Wisconsin-based organizations like the Greater Milwaukee Foundation, the Evjue Foundation, and the Morgridge Center for Public Service. The program should dedicate resources toward developing internal controls and planning for its long term needs in order to ensure scalability to other areas of the United States.

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Figure 3: Household Income for Children of Low Income Parents Long Term Vision The program’s long term objective should be to succeed in producing broader labor market participation among young Americans, and to eventually win the investiture of the federal government. In order to win government support, the program’s structure should be modeled off of federal standards of internal control to ensure that it effectively accomplishes its mission while assessing and managing risks, establishing bureaucratic controls, ensuring communication of key information, and monitoring internal activity (GAO 2014).

In addition, by piloting the program in various American commuting zones and demonstrating a proof of concept, the program increases its chances of gaining recognition by the government. Finally, as the program grows in size and scope, it should work to establish relationships with lawmakers and increase public recognition of its mission. Finally, it should patiently continue to refine its organizational structure until a moment arrives when the nation needs it, at which point it might easily be incorporated by Congress as a public authority.

The cost of a program for national service with broad participation initially appears prohibitive but can feasibly be drawn from a pool of resources already employed to support similar—albeit less efficient—programs like the Corporation for National and Community Service, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security. In addition, the costs of the program will be offset in part by economic benefits in the long run by subsidizing college costs, increasing labor market participation, and reducing debt held by young Americans.

An underlying question for consideration is the extent of bureaucratic authority within the organization that should be held by a centralized administration versus a decentralized group

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of field offices. In addition, it bears further consideration whether the program should be mandatory or optional—the latter of which increases its short term feasibility while perhaps undermining its long term effectiveness.

Bibliography

Bialik, Kristen and Richard Fry. 2019 “Millennial life: How young adulthood today compares with prior generations.” Pew Social Trends.

Brenan, Megan. 2019. “American Pride Hits New Low; Few Proud of Political System.”

Gallup.

Chetty, Raj, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca, Jimmy Narang. 2017. “The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 22910.

Chetty, Raj, Friedman, John, Hendren, Nathaniel, Jones, Maggie R., and Porter, Sonya R. 2018. “The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood Roots of Social Mobility” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 25147 Cilluffo, Anthony, and Richard Fry. 2019. “Gen Z, Millennials and Gen X outvoted older generations in 2018 midterms.” Pew Research.

DiIulio Jr., John J. and John M. Bridgeland. 2019. “Will America Embrace National Service?”

Brookings.

“Green Book: Standards of Internal Control in the Federal Government.” U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2014.

James, William. 1906. The Moral Equivalent of War. Misra, Jordan. 2019. “Voter Turnout Rates Among All Voting Age and Major Racial and Ethnic Groups Were Higher Than in 2014.” U.S. Census.

Price of Attending an Undergraduate Institution. National Center for Education Statistics.

2019.

Rappaport, Anna, 2019. “Generational Differences and Debt.” Wharton School Pension Research Council.

Reynolds, George M. and Amanda Shendruk. 2018. “Demographics of the U.S. Military.”

Council on Foreign Relations.

Richiardi, Matteo, Brian Nolan, and Lane Kenworthy. 2018. “The US labour force participation debacle: learning from the contrast with Britain.” ISER Working Paper Series 201812. Institute for Social and Economic Research.

Sawhill, Isabel V. and John Bridgeland. 2020. “Here’s a cost-effective national service proposal that could bridge our deep divisions.” Brookings.

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Improving Coastal Disaster Response Capabilities Without Diminishing Military Readiness

By Jamey Kane

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Introduction

The United States faces a growing threat from Coastal Disasters (CDs). CDs, which include tropical cyclones (hurricanes) and tsunamis, are also an increasing threat to other countries. Research indicates climate change will increase the frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones (IPCC 2018). In addition, a trend of growing population density means more people and property will be in harm’s way (Neumann 2015). In the past, the U.S. military has brought its unique capabilities to bear in assisting with relief operations for the most severe CDs, both in the U.S. and internationally; as the threat increases in the future, this responsibility will become a growing drain on military readiness. Our status quo approach to CD response is for the military to be involved on an ad hoc basis in the worst CDs here and abroad, but my analysis indicates this will become unsustainable in the future.

To improve U.S. CD response, I propose the creation of a Coastal Disaster Relief Force (CDRF) within the Department of Defense (DoD). The CDRF will be centered around the USS Nassau (LHA 4) and the USS Peleliu (LHA 5), two amphibious assault ships currently in inactive reserve (U.S. Navy 2016). These would be forward deployed bases of operations for helicopters, supplies, and personnel, and provide medical facilities and communications that would greatly increase the effectiveness of CD relief operations. An alternative would be the creation of the CDRF as a civilian force that partners with the DoD, including using military bases. Although this would seem to avoid militarizing disaster relief and the accompanying concerns (cf. Harris 2002; Pugh 2002), my analysis indicates the DoD option is more cost effective, as the military already possesses the personnel, equipment, and culture that will make the CDRF successful.

Background

CDs are a large and growing threat to Americans and others around the world. 2017 was a particularly bad year, with three hurricanes causing a combined $265 billion worth of property damage (NOAA 2018). Hurricane Maria, now considered the deadliest hurricane to affect the U.S. in living memory, caused an estimated 2,975 deaths in Puerto Rico (Kiely 2018), Hurricane Katrina’s death toll was 1,833 across five states (CNN Fast Facts 2018), and the 2004 Asian (or Boxing Day) Tsunami “kill[ed] more than 230,000 people across 14 countries” (Australian Broadcasting Company 2014). In addition to the high cost in lives and money, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s 2018 special report finds “trends in intensity and frequency of some climate and weather extremes have been detected over time spans during which about 0.5°C of global warming occurred” (IPCC 2018).

The military has a history of being involved in responding to CDs. While Coast Guard and National Guard units are regularly involved, the Navy and Marine Corps are also called upon to assist in the most serious emergencies. The Navy committed 16 ships and 63 aircraft to relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina (an amphibious assault ship, similar to the Tarawa class ships proposed for the CDRF, served as the headquarters for the relief effort) (DiRienzo III 2015). They were joined by over 1,000 Marines and another 15 helicopters. The military’s response to the 2004 Asian Tsunami, a disaster which unfolded over a wider area, was even larger, with 25 Navy ships, over 100 aircraft, and 15,000 troops (Dille 2005). This operation also included an amphibious assault ship, the USS Bonhomme Richard. Utilizing the military in this way is an attractive option for policymakers as the military’s engineering expertise,

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global facilities and forward deployment, mobility, experience with search and rescue, communications, medical capabilities, professionalism, and training to operate in the absence of infrastructure are both well suited to CDs and are also a nearly unique combination. Current policy involves utilizing military capabilities for CD relief in an ad hoc fashion and only as need dictates, which presents a tradeoff with military readiness. This raises the question of whether institutionalizing a military—or military style—CD response force would be an effective way of improving disaster relief efforts while not compromising military readiness.

This analysis will consider creating the CDRF with an Atlantic/Caribbean unit constituted around the Nassau and an Indo-Pacific unit constituted around the Peleliu, or an analogous civilian force using the same equipment.

Figure 1: Tropical Cyclone Formation with Mean Tracks Source: National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2015.

As the above image demonstrates, the forward deployment of the CDRF at U.S. military bases in the southeastern U.S. for the Nassau and in Guam for the Peleliu would place them in close proximity to the areas most likely to be affected by tropical cyclones. Other U.S. Navy bases could be used on a temporary basis in support of a relief operation, or if one of the home bases faces a direct tropical cyclone threat. Nassau would also be responsible for tropical cyclones affecting the eastern Pacific, transiting the Panama Canal. Outside tropical cyclone season, the Nassau could be deployed to a Navy base in the Pacific to better prepare

for the threat of a tsunami along the Ring of Fire.

Analysis

The status quo of ad hoc military responses to the worst CDs has proven cost effective in the past, as extreme CDs have been rare events. As such, investment in a dedicated force for CD response was unnecessary, and devoting resources to ad hoc responses only rarely posed any threat to the U.S. military’s readiness However, Elleman (2007) includes descriptions from officials of the high cost of U.S. tsunami relief operations, which came at a time of rising expenditure and troop requirements for the Iraq War. He also notes the accelerated pace of relief operations relative to a normal deployment, and the increased stress on the personnel. Given the increasing risk and cost of CDs described above, I estimate that the

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status quo will become increasingly costly and have a greater and more regular impact on military readiness.

Alternatively, creation of a CDRF using Nassau and Peleliu would significantly improve CD response, as the CDRF would be able to rapidly respond with trained personnel, necessary equipment, and an organizational culture that is designed to operate in conditions where infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed -- for example, Krouse (2018) describes how hurricanes damage cell phone service. The lack of these resources hampers CD responses, as seen from the comments of volunteer emergency responder Sherry Fox in McCammon (2018). Nassau and Peleliu can each carry 35 helicopters (Sherman 1999), which Elleman identified as being a significant contribution of the Navy’s response to the 2004 Asian Tsunami, particularly for search and rescue and delivery of supplies (Elleman 2007). In addition, their well decks can accommodate various types of landing craft used by the Marines, which provide another option for water rescues and delivering relief supplies. Sherman (1999) also notes the ships’ satellite communications systems, supply storage rooms, and well-equipped medical facilities, which he describes as “equivalent to the nation’s finest local hospitals.”

These are crucial capabilities in disaster zones, as cell networks are often down, hospitals may be damaged or inaccessible, and food, water, and other supplies are urgently needed.

The military’s training, professionalism, and ‘can do’ ethos would also contribute to effectiveness. The specialized skills the military brings to disaster relief, including the engineering skills of the Naval Construction Battalion (Seabees), would also contribute to the high level of effectiveness of the CDRF. Master of Arms (MA) personnel—which function as the Navy’s police force (Navy 2020)—would be employed to provide security for the CDRF and potentially to maintain order in the disaster zone.

The role of MA personnel demonstrates an additional risk of this policy alternative, as use of military personnel for law enforcement functions in the U.S. falls afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act (Larson 2001). This is symptomatic of the general concern about the use of military assets in relief operations that Harris (2002) and Pugh (2002) describe. To resolve these concerns, I recommend DoD seek a legislative change from Congress to provide a narrow exception to Posse Comitatus for the CDRF when it is responding to a CD, in addition to dedicated funding for it. Additionally, the CDRF should only be involved at the request of the local jurisdiction -- domestically, by the state government, and internationally, by foreign governments. Such a request would either mitigate the concern or place the responsibility for CDRF involvement in the hands of the local government. This, in combination with the gratitude of the affected population for an effective response, should resolve the issue.

Alternatively, a civilian force that uses the equipment proposed for the CDRF, as well as adopts the aspects of the military’s ethos appropriate to CD response, could go even further in eliminating concerns about military involvement. This would obviate concerns about impact on military readiness, as it would be separate from DoD. A civilian force may also bring in new recruits eager to assist with CD relief but uncomfortable with military service, expanding the talent pool the CDRF could draw from. However, as the CDRF would still use military equipment and bases, the separation from the military could appear superficial, leading some to see a civilian CDRF response as a military intervention by stealth, which risks implying nefarious intent. Further, and of greater concern, it could not draw on the military’s existing systems for recruitment, budgeting, and training, without compromising its independence -- the very reason for separating it from the military. Duplicating these

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systems for a civilian CDRF would be a significant additional cost in creating and maintaining the force, and it may require a long period to match to the level of effectiveness of the existing system.

Recommendation

I recommend the creation of a CDRF within the DoD and centered around Nassau and Peleliu, as this option increases the effectiveness of CD response and, with Congressional action plus permission from the local authorities, best resolves the accompanying concerns about the militarization of CD relief. The military’s capabilities, training, and ethos are well suited to the needs of CD responders, and forward deployment of a dedicated CDRF allows them to be quickly brought to bear in the event of a CD, without the impact on military readiness that an ad hoc response risks. As Nassau and Peleliu are in inactive reserve, providing them to the CDRF would not affect the Navy’s ability to protect the U.S. against military threats. Though creation of a CDRF would be costly, the increasing cost of CDs -particularly given the impacts of global climate change -- make this a worthwhile investment in protecting Americans and people affected by CDs around the world. Though a civilian CDRF may resolve the legitimate concerns about militarizing disaster relief, I find that a DoD CDRF could do so as well with the right policies, and could do so more cost-effectively.

The fixed costs of creating and maintaining a CDRF may be greater than the financial costs incurred from ad hoc responses, but are justified by the improvement to CD response and the lack of impact on military readiness.

Bibliography

Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 2014. “Boxing Day Tsunami: How the disaster unfolded 10 years ago,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, December 23, 2014. https://www. abc.net.au/news/2014-12-24/boxing-day-tsunami-how-the-disaster-unfolded/5977568.

CNN. “Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts.” CNN, August 30, 2018. https://www.cnn. com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/index.html.

Dille, Patrick. 2005. “U.S. 7th Fleet to Provide Naval Support to Aceh Province.” Navy News Service, January 1, 2005. https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=16477 DiRienzo III, Joe, Chris Doane, Jennifer Zeldis, John Carrier and Frank Hoffman. 2015. “10 Years After Hurricane Katrina: The Sea Service Response.” United States Naval Institute News, August 31, 2015. https://news.usni.org/2015/08/31/10-years-after-hurricane-katrina-the-sea-service-response.

Elleman, Bruce A. 2007. “Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia.” Naval War College Newport Papers. Naval War College (2007). https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a463367.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A556%2C% 22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22FitH%22%7D%2C-69%5D. Harris, Andrew and Peter Dombrowski. 2002. “Military Collaboration with Humanitarian Organizations,” Global Governance 8, no. 2 (Apr. - Jun. 2002): 155-178. https://www. jstor.org/stable/pdf/27800336.pdf

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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2018. “Summary for Policymakers.” Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5 oC. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

October, 2018. https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/summary-for-policy-makers/.

Kiely, Eugene, Robert Farley, Lori Robertson and D’Angelo Gore. 2018. “Trump’s False Tweets on Hurricane Maria’s Death Toll.” The Annenberg Public Policy Center, September 13, 2018. https://www.factcheck.org/2018/09/trumps-false-tweets-on-hurricanemarias-death-toll/.

Krouse, Sarah. 2018. “Signal Search: Cellphone Service After Major Hurricanes.” The Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/signal-search-cellphone-serviceafter-major-hurricanes-1539877736.

Larson, Erik V. and John E Peters. 2001. “Appendix D: Overview of the Posse Comitatus Act” in Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options.

Santa Monica: Arroyo Center, RAND Corporation, 2001. https://www.rand.org/content/ dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD.pdf.

McCammon, Sarah. 2018. “The Cajun Navy: Heroes or Hindrances in Hurricanes?” National Public Radio, September 22, 2018. https://www.npr.org/2018/09/22/650636356/the-cajun-navy-heroes-orhindrances-in-hurricanes.

“Nassau (LHA 4).” 2016. Naval Vessel Register. United States Navy Fact File. Last modified October 14, 2016. https://www.nvr.navy.mil/SHIPDETAILS/SHIPSDETAIL_ LHA_4_2388.HTML National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2018. “Hurricane Costs.” Office for Coastal Management (2018). https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fastfacts/hurricane-costs.html.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2015. “Tropical Cyclone Climatology,” National Hurricane Center: (2015). https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/.

Neumann B, AT Vafeidis, J Zimmermann, and RJ Nicholls. 2015. “Future Coastal Population Growth and Exposure to Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Flooding-A Global Assessment.”

PLoS ONE 10, no. 3: (March 2015). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118571.

Pugh, Michael. 2002. “Military Intervention and Humanitarian Action: Trends and Issues.” Disasters 22, no. 4: (December 2002). https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/ pdf/10.1111/1467-7717.00097.

Sherman, Robert. 1999. “LHA-1 Tarawa class: U.S. Navy Ships,” Military Analysis Network, October 30, 1999. https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/lha-1.htm.

U.S. Navy. 2020. “Law Enforcement and Security Careers.” U.S. Navy. https://www.navy. com/careers/law-enforcement-security

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Enhancing and Integrating Army Civil Affairs Capability

By Benjamin Keeler

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Background - What is Civil Affairs?

Modern conflict is viewed within the land, sea, air, and cyber domains. The collection of these factors is referred to in Army doctrine as Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). An increasingly important part of Army MDO practice is engagement and competition in the civil domain. U.S. Army Civil Affairs forces are trained to shape an operational political-military environment by working with regional partners, host nations and local populations. The operations conducted by Civil Affairs forces are an asset to the ground commander and the broader US foreign policy apparatus to engage non military actors and foreign governments.

(Feiler 2003) Civil Affairs forces, both in the active and reserve components, are experts in three areas that shape and influence the operational environment. Field Manual 3-57 in Civil Affairs Operations defines these areas as the following: Civil Reconnaissance. CR [civil reconnaissance] is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment for collecting civil information to enhance situational understanding and facilitate decision making. Potential sources of civil information include areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) assessments.

Civil Engagement. CE [civil engagement] includes those planned and targeted interactions which promote the building of relationships between military forces, unified action partners, IPI [indigenous populations and institutions], and the interagency to reduce civilian impacts to ongoing or planned military operations and mitigate the military impact on the civilian population. … It may be in person or by other means of communication.

Civil Information Management. Civil information management is the process whereby data relating to the civil component is gathered, collated, processed, analyzed, produced into information products, and disseminated. The data is used as civil considerations input into possible courses of action to determine the impact of military operations on the civil component of the OE [operational environment] and to provide updates on the civil component to enhance the commander’s common operational picture (COP).” (Department of the Army FM 3-57) Through these operations, Civil Affairs provides military commanders and their partners with an understanding of the civil component and operational environment. Civil reconnaissance and civil engagement provide an intelligence driven picture of the civil environment and provide context for ground troops. Civil information is collected, analyzed and applied to traditional military intelligence processes to supplement the commander’s tactical decisions. (Raza 2009)

Problem - Why current training isn’t enough

In the status quo, Army Civil Affairs forces are constantly working with interagency partners, especially in response to natural and humanitarian disasters. However, Army CA training is not aligned or integrated with interagency partners, to include the State Department and United States Agency for International Development. This reduces their effective-

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ness on both the battlefield supporting ground commanders and in humanitarian responses when working with interagency partners.

During operations, Civil Affairs units are tasked to operate in areas normally occupied by civil governments. The five Civil Affairs tasks are populace and resource control, civil information management, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, and support to civil administration. Each of these tasks are essential to the accomplishment of a military commander’s mission. These tasks are also sought after by other actors in the space, to include other US Government entities.

The first CA task is populace and resource control. These types of operations are meant to provide security for the population in a given area of operations. Typical populace and resource operations include roadblocks, curfews, and any other type of operation with the intent to control a population and resources Civil information management is the second CA task. It refers to the process of the collection, analysis, and dissemination of all data related to the civil component, which is essential to determining the impact military or unified government actions would have on an area of operations. The third CA task is foreign humanitarian assistance. These operations are directly meant to alleviate human suffering, disease or starvation. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations often share the same goal as interagency partners, especially USAID. Nation assistance is the fourth CA task and is aid and support administered through or with a foreign government. The final CA task is support to civil administration, which involves using the expertise of Civil Affairs units to support and strengthen local and national governance.

Civil affairs operations are an essential component to civil-military operations. In fact, Civil Affairs units are largely tasked with the planning of these operations. Civil-military operations are the activities performed by the military that deal with relationships between the military and indigenous populations and institutions. These operations affect the larger unified action in a given area of operations, which is the, “synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and non governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort� (Joint Chiefs of Staff JP 3-57)

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Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti provides an interesting case study for the use of Army Civil Affairs teams. On July 31st 1994, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 940 which authorized the restoration of democracy in Haiti by “all means necessary” President Clinton ordered the US military to take the lead in “Operation Uphold Democracy” On September 8th, 1994, the U.S. Atlantic Command activated the contingency to invade Haiti.

The US military landed in Haiti on September 19th, and the military junta backed down.

The US intervention was intended to meet three main goals, removing the military junta, restoring President Aristide to power and establishing democracy in Haiti. The presence of a conventional force was able to meet the first two goals, but Civil Affairs assets had the more lofty task of setting the conditions for a stable democracy. Civil affairs units planned to restore essential government services and rebuild democratic institutions.

In order to promote stable and efficient governance, or in the vernacular of civil affairs doctrine, provide support to civil administration, 34 CA officers were assigned to support, advise, and oversee Haitian government ministries. These advisers reported directly to the US ambassador at the time. They were able to streamline the bureaucratic processes of institutions like the customs ministry, promoting more efficient and stable governance Upon the arrival of US forces to the country, electrical supply was sporadic and completely unregulated. The Haitian government’s lack of oversight led to frequent blackouts. Army CA teams led engineering units in repairing the nation’s electrical grid. By the end of their mission, they brought four power plants back on line, quadrupling the capacity of Haiti’s power grid. (Klemens and Slaven 1995) The main failure of CA units in Haiti was the ability to provide adequate medical support

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desperately needed in the country. Most of the medical care was delegated to non-military US authorities or indigenious authorities, both of which lacked the logistical prowess provided by the military. (White 2009)

Recommendation: What the Army should do

In order to deter conflict abroad and protect US national security interests, the US Army should enhance their CA capabilities by implementing a strategy which grows organic Army CA capability while aggressively integrating that capability with joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) partners. Civil Affairs units should conduct joint-training operations with organizations such as the State Department and USAID. Across operational areas and in training, Army CA in both the active and reserve components should seek to facilitate more military-civil engagements which include JIM partners, NGOs, IGOs, and Indegenous Populations and Institutions (IPIs).

Operational integration and cohesion starts with training. Because disaster and conflict can happen at a moment’s notice, Army CA units should hold that purposely and specifically include non Department of Defense actors to include the State Department and USAID. The Army already has facilities for training to include the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, CA and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Ft. Polk, LA. Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, provides a comprehensive framework for how the military should interact with civil actors in an operational area through a Civil-Military Operations Center

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(CMOC). (Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-57) By integrating as many actors in training as possible, the US Army and the Department of Defense as a whole can be more effective in civil-military operations, delivering better results on the ground.

Bibliography

Department of the Army. (2011). Civil Affairs Operations (FM 3-57).

Feiler, Jeremy. 2003. “OFFICIAL SAYS PENTAGON NEEDS TO BOOST CIVIL AFFAIRS PRESENCE IN IRAQ.” Inside the Pentagon 19(24).

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2018. Civil Military Operations (JP 3-57).

Klemens, Darren and Kelly Slaven. 1995 “Task Force Caste: Joint Engineer Operations in Haiti,” Engineer 25(1).

Raza, Assad. 2019. “Order from Chaos Inside U.S. Army Civil Affairs Activities.” Army University Press.

White, Jeremy P. 2009. “Civil Affairs in Haiti.” Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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Making Election Day Accessible

By Julia Kessel

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Problem: Presidential Elections are not easily accessible or available to all eligible voters of the United States.

Currently, our election process is not easily accessible to all citizens of the United States.

Voting is a right, not a privilege and US policy needs to properly reflect that. My proposal is to make voting more accessible to citizens across the country. Some of the biggest issues for voters on election day is that they do not have adequate time to go to the polls due to work, long lines at the polls, distance from the polling locations and voter ID requirements. To diminish these problems, the US should declare voting day a national holiday, create more polling locations and alter the identification requirements for voters. This would allow voters who cannot easily vote to be able to make it to the polls and exercise their right to vote.

Current United States Voting and Election Practices:

In the current voting system, the vote for the Presidential or Midterm Elections take place on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Tuesday is in the middle of the work week making it difficult for working voters to make it to the polls due to the location, availability and time required. Declaring Election Day a national holiday would increase voter turnout, significantly granting working voters access to the polls.

For many, the closest polling location to them can be very inconvenient and difficult to reach on Election Day. While it may be marginally closer in one direction, it may be a large distance from their place of work. A citizen’s polling location is based on their residential address (Joslyn 2020). By voting at a polling location that is close to their job and isn’t the location they are registered at, that citizen’s provisional ballot would not be counted toward the election totals.

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Source: State boards of election In some polling locations, the lines to vote are extremely long and since many people are forced to go vote before work or during a break, these long lines may deter citizens from voting. When a polling location has long wait times, it requires the voter to dedicate an immense amount of time to actually go and vote. In 2018, the lines were anywhere from five minutes long to over 45 minutes.

Source: Bipartisan Policy Center The average wait time to vote in the majority of states increased significantly (Weil 2018), compared to the midterm elections in 2014. This increase in time to wait to vote often leads to many people being unable to vote due to the large amount of time commitment required to be able to vote at a polling location.

In order to be eligible to vote in the State of Wisconsin, one must be able to show a variety of documents to prove their residency within the specific voting district and the state. These documents need to be recent and updated with a correct name and accurate address for proof of residency (Ballotpedia). In many of the poorer areas of Wisconsin, there are people who may be staying with other people which would mean that they typically do not have a bill or official mail addressed to them or possibly even a state issued ID with the correct address. So, on voting day, those without the required voting documents would be unable to vote in the election because they lack the documents required by the state. This policy indirectly leads to voter suppression of the lower class.

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Solutions:

1. Make Election Day a national holiday Making Election Day a national holiday would allow for many more people to exercise their constitutional right to vote. A national holiday would allow most people to get the day off and then they would be able to easily make it to the polls without stress or worry about the time required. For companies and businesses that cannot close for a day, they must give employees half days so that they are able to go vote. That compromise would keep the business running and let the employees vote without hassle. This change would increase voter turnout and make voting more accessible. As a way to regulate this change, employees would work a half day instead of a full shift. This would allow business to continue running and for employees to not lose a full day of pay. The federal government would need to apply this change to all states as well to ensure that all citizens are able to vote.

2. Allow citizens to pick their polling location based on convenience and accessibility for their needs When voting, the assigned polling location is based on a person’s home address (USA. gov). This system does not take into account work or school hours and locations. If a citizen is registering early to vote, then that voter should be allowed to select their polling location based on what is most accessible to them, while staying within their voting district to ensure that they vote in the same elections that they would have in their assigned location. If someone has a long commute to work, this change would give them the opportunity to vote without needing to interfere with work. But, their polling location would have to be in the state that they reside in, even if they work in another state. This would also allow more people to have the option to vote somewhere near their job or near their school, therefore, making voting more accessible for those people.

3. Create more polling locations to shorten the necessary amount of time to vote On average, US citizens face up to a 45 minute wait when voting (Weil 2018). States could significantly shorten this time in two ways. The first way would be to have more spots to vote at each polling location. This would increase the flow of voters in and out of the polling location by allowing more voters to vote at a time. Another way to shorten the amount of time required to vote would be to create more polling locations. By opening up more stations, polling locations would not be expected to receive as many voters and the traffic at each location would be decreased significantly. A realistic way to accomplish this goal would be to find willing volunteers within different communities to help run each station. That way, more stations could be run and people in the local community could get involved in the political process.

4. Change the requirements to obtain a voter ID. In accordance with state regulations, most states require an up to date government issued ID to be able to cast a vote in any election. Under the current system, it is difficult for many eligible voters to obtain a voter ID. The chart below shows the percentage of individuals with a confirmed ID, by race.

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Source: Project Vote By comparing the percentages, minorities disproportionately lack a confirmed government issued ID. This disparity shows the need for a change in the voting identification system. A system that would be effective that many states have already put into place is to not require an up to date state ID and to accept other documents or a binding signature as a form of identification at the polls.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, voting accessibility in the United States is a topic that needs to be discussed and increased. In the current system, there is a large section of voting eligible citizens who are left unable to vote because of time, accessibility and requirements. By making election day a national holiday, allowing citizens to select their polling location, creating more polling locations and changing the identification requirements to vote, my goal of making voting more accessible in the United States can be achieved. Ultimately, more accessible voting would lead to higher voter turnout in United States elections.

Bibliography

Cao, Rachel. “Poll Closing Times for Each State on Election Day 2016.” CNBC, CNBC, 8 Nov. 2016, www.cnbc.com/2016/11/08/poll-closing-times-for-each-state-on-electionday-2016.html.

Joslyn, Nick, et al. “Distance Traveled to Polling Locations: Are Travel Costs Imposed Equally on Party Members?” Taylor & Francis, 27 Jan. 2020, www.tandfonline.com/doi/ full/10.1016/j.soscij.2018.12.006.

Lachman, Samantha. “Over 220,000 Ballots Didn’t Count In The Presidential Prima-

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ries.” HuffPost, HuffPost, 16 June 2016, www.huffpost.com/entry/provisional-ballots-not-counted_n_5761bb92e4b0df4d586f15fe.

Perez, Vanessa M. “AMERICANS WITH PHOTO ID: A Breakdown of Demographic Characteristics.” Project Vote, Feb. 2015, www.projectvote.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ AMERICANS-WITH-PHOTO-ID-Research-Memo-February-2015.pdf.

“State Poll Opening and Closing Times (2020).” Ballotpedia, 2020, ballotpedia.org/State_ Poll_Opening_and_Closing_Times_(2020).

“Voting on Election Day.” USAGov, 2020, www.usa.gov/election-day.

“Voting in Wisconsin.” Ballotpedia, 2019, ballotpedia.org/Voting_in_Wisconsin#Voter_registration.

Weil, Matthew, et al. “The 2018 Voting Experience: Polling Place Lines.” Bipartisan Policy Center, 4 Nov. 2019, bipartisanpolicy.org/report/the-2018-voting-experience/.

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Improving Attorney Access in Wisconsin through Investment in the Public Defender’s Office

By Spencer Lindsay

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Statement of the Problem

The Constitution of the United States guarantees a right to an attorney in all criminal proceedings which may result in imprisonment. The Sixth Amendment reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to...have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence (U. S. Const. amend. IV).” The right to an attorney can also be found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantees of due process (U. S. Const. amend. V., U. S. Const. amend. XIV). The Supreme Court held in its landmark decision Gideon v. Wainwright: “the right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial, and petitioner’s trial and conviction without the assistance of counsel violated the Fourteenth Amendment, (Supreme Court of the United States 1963)” because “Not only... precedent[], but also reason and reflection, require us to recognize that, in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him (Supreme Court of the United States)[.]” This right creates a duty for state governments: they shall ensure that the poorest members of society can have their day in court. For this reason, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have established public defender’s offices to provide legal defense for the indigent (National Center for State Courts 2015).

Too often state public defender’s offices do not go far enough to ensure the right to counsel for low income Americans. Attorney access for low income individuals in the United States remains severely limited. The current structure in the US is only meeting about 20 percent of the legal needs of low income Americans (NORC at the University of Chicago for Legal Services Corporation 2017). Former Attorney General Eric Holder has called the lack of sufficient legal counsel for low income Americans a “crisis (Brennan Center for Justice.

2009).” Lack of proper funding for low income defense has arguably had tragic ramifications for low income defendants facing the death penalty (Douglas 1995) and perpetuated racial disparities in the American justice system (Marcus 1994). To more effectively ensure the US Constitution’s right to legal counsel, states must make serious changes to the way in which or the extent to which they fund public defenders offices.

Wisconsin’s Public Defender’s office certainly has a funding problem, but some say all states have this same problem (Breitenbach 2016). In others it may certainly be worse. I hope to lend insight into the specific issues of Wisconsin, but also that my findings and recommendations may have some generalizability across states. Wisconsin’s Public Defender problem is not unusual. I hope, by addressing it, to lend insight into the crisis as a whole.

The Landscape of Public Defense in Wisconsin

The underfunding of state public defenders’ offices across the US has led to two main issues for states . First, underfunding can lead to caseloads for public defenders that are too large to manage leading to inadequate representation for defendants (Gershowitz and Killinger 2011). Nationwide, individuals who are appointed public defenders are more likely to go to jail and are likely to serve longer sentences compared to their privately represented counterparts (Liptak 2007). Wisconsin is exceptional in this regard. Wisconsin is the only state in the country that constitutionally mandates a maximum caseload for public defenders (Farol 2010). Second, underfunding can lead to inadequate coverage. While the state may be able to ensure legal representation for the absolute poorest members of society, it may not be

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able to ensure representation for those who do not meet rigid income requirements but need free legal assistance nonetheless. While states nationwide do have problems with regards to public defenders having too many cases to cover their entire case load adequately (Taylor 2011), the issue in Wisconsin is one of inadequate coverage. Many poor Wisconsinites are unable to afford an attorney and do not have access to a public defender.

In order to be eligible for public defense in the state of Wisconsin, an individual must have an income under 115 percent of federal poverty level and must have assets totaling less than $10,000 (with the first $30,000 of a home’s value excluded (Wisconsin Administrative Code 1995). Act 32 froze the income cap at 115 percent of the Federal Poverty Level in 2011 (Berkos 2012). This means that individuals cannot be appointed a state public defender if they are members of a single person household and make more than more than $12,523.50 (Department of Health and Human Services 2016).17 Members of four person households are ineligible for public defense if they make more than $25,702 (Department of Health and Human Services). Because these thresholds have been held constant relative to the 2011 FPL, both are slightly below current Federal Poverty Level (Department of Health and Human Services 2020). Individuals who make one dollar over this threshold are ineligible for a state defense. The problem is immediately apparent. The average attorney costs $3,500 for a felony case defense and $1,000 for a misdemeanor defense (Thervo 2020). A felony defense could cost a single individual making $15,000 per year close to a quarter of their annual income and a family of four making $30,000 over ten percent of their annual household income. These incomes would make individuals ineligible for a state public defender. When one considers that the average rent for a one bedroom apartment in Dane County, which is home to nearly ten percent of the state’s population, is over $1,000 per month or $12,000 annually (Rent Data 2020), it inconceivable that all of the state’s residents who are ineligible for a public defender would be able to afford an attorney without risking serious financial hardship. While judges can appoint attorneys for low income defendants who are not entitled to a state public defense attorney at the expense of the county, this process is problematic for a number of reasons. First, rather than being standardized on the basis of income, appointment of an attorney is entirely a matter of judicial discretion. Some judges may be more sympathetic to low income defendants than others. If one is lucky enough to be appointed an attorney at the expense of the county, there is no guarantee of their quality, since they are likely to not be trained in the same fashion as public defenders. This system also pushes costs on to counties rather than the state, funds which may otherwise be used for necessary goals, such as improving school systems.

Estimating the precise number of Wisconsinites who fall into this coverage gap is difficult but given that roughly one in ten Wisconsinites make between $15,000 and $25,000 (Williams 2020, ten percent seems like a reasonable, perhaps conservative, estimate. If accused of a crime, those whose incomes fall between qualifying for a public defense and being able to afford an attorney must choose between financial hardship and putting forth an adequate defense. It is easy to imagine individuals who fall into this coverage gap striking plea deals for crimes they may not have committed to avoid the financial costs associated with presenting a defense. Barbara S. Gillers, the chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, has stated that “Hundreds of times weekly, prosecutors negotiate plea deals with misdemeanor defendants who lack counsel and may agree to unfair dispositions (Malima 2017).”

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The State spends $89 Million on the Public Defender’s office (Plotkin 2020). It has 614.85 Full Time Equivalent employees, 374.20 of whom are lawyers (Plotkin). Between 2010 and 2017, the State Public Defender’s office managed an average of 136,000 cases per year (Plotkin). It should be noted that the state also spends $1.2 Billion per year on corrections (State of Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau 2019) and has 24,000 inmates (Conde 2018).

The Solution

Wisconsin has taken steps in recent years to improve its public defender system. Most notably, the state has increased the hourly rate paid to private counsel in cases where there are conflicts of interest from $40 to $70 per hour (Meyerhoffer 2019). This newly implemented policy will help incentivize private attorneys to take public defender’s office cases. There are also proposals to incentivize lawyers to take public defender’s office cases in rural areas (Malina 2017). This would improve access to attorney services for low income Wisconsinites.

These proposals, however, do not address the income-coverage gap created by Wisconsin state law.

The state of Wisconsin has a moral imperative to act to diminish this income-coverage gap as to better ensure the right to an attorney for the poorest members of society. Given that the eligibility threshold has fallen below the Federal Poverty Line, they may also have a legal obligation to act. Some outside observers may recommend that the state eliminate its constitutional provision limiting the caseload of public defense attorneys. This recommendation is misguided. Though eliminating the caseload limits would allow the state to expand coverage, the quality of coverage for those who are eligible for Public Defense would likely be reduced. The goal should not be to jam as many people into the Public Defense system as possible but rather to provide quality defense for Wisconsinites who otherwise would not be able to afford a defense attorney. This solution may solve Wisconsin’s income-coverage problem but is likely to create a case-management problem.

The best solution to this problem is to invest in the State Public Defender’s office to raise the income (and potentially the asset) cap. Wisconsin should double its spending on the State Public Defender’s office from $89 Million to $178 Million. This should allow the state to raise the income cap from 115 percent of FPL to 200 percent of FPL and roughly double the number of citizens eligible for a public defense. This proposal effectively doubles the infrastructure of the State’s Public Defender office, enabling the state to greatly expand coverage. This is not an unrealistic proposition. Washington DC, for example, spends five times per capita more than Wisconsin on the Public Defender’s office (Buchanan 2019). Given the large number of law school graduates who do not go on to practice law, there seems to be a necessary supply of lawyers (American Bar Association 2019).

While this may seem like a steep cost to the state, the costs are likely not as great as they appear. Paying for this measure entirely through the income tax code, in a vacuum would mean an average tax increase of just $29 per taxpayer per year or $2.50 per month (Wisconsin Department of Revenue 2018). Even if this proposal were funded purely through tax increases, these tax increases would barely be noticeable. But the proposal almost certainly would not have to be funded entirely through taxes. Some of the costs, perhaps all, would be off-set by savings. Some of this savings would come from corrections. Given that the annual corrections spending per inmate in Wisconsin is roughly $50,000, if the expansion of public defense reduced the prison population could go a long way towards completely offset the

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cost of the expansion. In Missouri, it is estimated that underfunding the Public Defender’s Office may have cost the state as much as $200 million per year in correction costs (Barrett 2016), but due to the particularities of state politics this number is not likely to be generalizable to Wisconsin. It is, however, an indication that savings could be substantial. Exactly how much the cost of expansion will be offset by corrections savings is difficult to tell, but it is likely that a good portion of the expansion could pay for itself. There would also be savings at the county level, because the state would be providing service to some who previously would have fallen under the county’s jurisdiction. The state could also fund the expansion by cutting waste elsewhere or closing tax loopholes.

Doubling the state’s investment in the public defender’s office is a bold change in policy. There are admittedly several unknowns as to how the policy change affects the state, including its net cost (though it is likely to be low or potentially even lead to a net savings).

Nonetheless, the state faces a moral imperative to act to protect its most vulnerable citizens.

I recommend that Wisconsin double the size of its Public Defender budget to better serve its people and ensure that the right to an attorney is better protected in the state.

Of course, this solution is subject to the political will of the legislature. Any tax increase, even noticeably small ones, always present a political challenge. Any large scale investment in the Public Defender’s office is unlikely, perhaps unimaginable while Republicans control the state legislature. Nonetheless, this is a noble policy goal which the Democrats should push for, even if they must wait until they are in power to implement it.

Bibliography

American Bar Association. “Employment Outcomes as of April 2019 (Class of 2018 Graduates).” Americanbar.org. May 6, 2019. https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2018-law-graduate-employment-data.pdf.

Barrett, Michael. “The Impact of Neglecting Indigent Defense on the Economics of Criminal Justice.” . Louis ULJ 61 (2016): 681.

Berkos, Daniel. “Notice of Revision of Administrative Rules State Public Defender.” Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office. March 30, 2012.

Buchanan, Alvis. “Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional Budget Justification.” The Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia. May 18, 2019. https://www.pdsdc.org/docs/ default-source/default-document-library/pds-fy-2020-congressional-budget-justification-(002)b340fac3c02264be8d48ff00007f1dad.pdf?sfvrsn=91629ed0_0 Conde, Ximena and the Associated Press. “Report Shows Record Number Of Adults In Wisconsin Prisons.” Wisconsin Public Radio. October 31, 2018.

Department of Health and Human Services. “2011 Poverty Guidelines, Federal Register Notice.” hhs.gov. March 14, 2016. https://aspe.hhs.gov/2011-poverty-guidelines-federal-register-notice.

Farol, Donald. “A National Assessment of Public Defender Caseloads.” Justice Research and Statistics Association Annual Meeting, October 28, 2010.

“Federal Poverty Level (FPL) - HealthCare.gov Glossary.” HealthCare.gov. Department of Health and Human Services. Accessed April 5, 2020. https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl/.

Gershowitz, Adam M., and Killinger, Laura R. 2011. “The State (never) Rests: How Exces-

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sive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants.” Northwestern University Law Review 105 (1): 261–301.

Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963), p. 335 Gideon at 372 Holder, Eric. “Attorney General Eric Holder on Indigent Defense Reform”. Brennan Center for Justice. Nov. 18 2009 “Indigent Defense State Links.” NCSC.org. National Center for State Courts, September 23, 2015. https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Fairness/Indigent-Defense/State-Links. aspx.

Legal Services Corporation. 2017. “The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income Americans.” Prepared by NORC at the University of Chicago for Legal Services Corporation. Washington, DC. Legislative Audit Bureau, State of Wisconsin. “Adult Correction Expenditures” Report 9-4.

May 2019.

Liptak, Adam. “Gap Seen Between Court-Appointed Lawyers and Public Defenders.” New York Times. April 13, 2007 Malina, Chris. “Legislation Aims To Address Attorney Shortage In Wisconsin’s Rural Counties.” Wisconsin Public Radio. Nov. 28, 2017 Marcus, Rebecca. 1994. “Racism in Our Courts: The Underfunding of Public Defenders and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 22 (1).

Meyerhoffer, Kelly. “Budget Committee Votes to Boost District Attorney, Public Defender Pay.” Wisconsin State Journal. May 30, 2019.

Plotkin, Adam. “Facts at a Glance.” Wisconsin State Public Defenders. Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office. Accessed April 5, 2020. https://www.wispd.org/index.php/aboutthe-spd/spd-facts-at-a-glance.

Sarah Breitenbach. 2016. “Right to an Attorney? Not Always in Some States.” Stateline.org, 2016.

Tesha, Jason. “Prosecutors must maintain ethical conduct during misdemeanor plea deals, ABA ethics opinion says.” ABA Journal. May 9, 2019.

Thervo. “2020 Attorney Fees: Average Hourly Rates & Standard Costs.” Thervo. Accessed April 5, 2020. https://thervo.com/costs/attorney-fees.

Taylor, Kate. “System Overload: The Cost of Under Resourcing Public Defense.” Justice Policy Institute. July 2011.

Vick, Douglas. 1995. “Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences” Buffalo Law Review 43 (2): 329–460.

Williams, Noah. “Household Income in Wisconsin in 2017.” Wisc.edu. University of Wisconsin. Accessed April 5, 2020 Wisconsin Administrative Code. Chapter PD 3 under s. 13.93 (2m) (b) 1., Stats., Register, July, 1995, No. 475.

Wisconsin Department of Revenue. “Individual Income Tax Statistics Report for Tax Year 2016.” Feb. 28, 2018. https://www.revenue.wi.gov/DORReports/16intxst.pdf “Wisconsin Fair Market Rent for 2020 Accurate Rental Price Data.” 2020 Fair Market Rent in Wisconsin | RentData.org. Rent Data. Accessed April 5, 2020. https://www.rentdata. org/states/wisconsin/2020.

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U. S. Const. amend. IV. U. S. Const. amend. V. U. S. Const. amend. XIV.

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Wisconsin Redistricting: A case for switching to “Iowa Model”

By Kaitlin Kons

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Problem ― Why the current redistricting process needs reform

For decades, the problem of partisan gerrymandering has been a point of contention involving state legislatures, governors, the supreme court and voters. Created and practiced as a ploy for political parties to hold on to power, gerrymandering fits into a category of political actions that cannot be answered any other way except to serve as an electoral advantage.

This category notably includes, but is certainly not limited to, The Three-Fifths Compromise, the creation of North and South Dakota, and modern voter suppression efforts (Kiger).

Gerrymandering is the strategic drawing of district borders in a state so as to artificially produce an election outcome (Duignan). A common practice used to gerrymander electoral districts is called “packing and cracking.” Packing occurs when the victim party’s likely voters are heavily packed into fewer districts allowing for significant victories; cracking occurs in the remaining districts, meaning a sparse array of voters in those districts produce a majority of slim victories for the party in power (Whitaker). Thus the party in power wins most of the seats in one or both houses and gains majority power over the other party.

Drawing maps that create false election outcomes undermines the integrity of a vote and its value in an election. The salience of each vote could be diluted based upon location, demographic, or voting history. Gerrymandering is undemocratic in nature― a parasite which, so long as it exists, democracy suffocates. This results in a loss of trust in government and a misrepresentation of the people’s interests.

Gerrymandering has been challenged in the courts as a result of populational, racial, and political implications. However, the Supreme Court has unreliably and selectively stepped in to make a decision, which was done mostly to take down maps drawn to disadvantage racial minorities or ignore population changes. Even then, that was only after a great amount of time and advocacy. The Supreme Court has had numerous cases of partisan gerrymandering presented to them, of which has never struck down a drawn district map for pure partisan gerrymandering. In 1986, in the case of Davis v. Bandemer, the Supreme Court created the Bandemer test for partisan gerrymandering, which was struck down almost twenty years later for its ineffectiveness (Hladick 2018).

In 2017, Wisconsin’s maps were put to the test against the Supreme Court in Gill v. Whitford (Gill v. Whitford 2018). The Court made no decision, dismissing the case due to the lack of proof of Article III standing. Although the Court has consistently frowned upon the practice, they have generally deemed partisan gerrymandering constitutional because of the absence of a clear ruling or effective test. The inconclusive result of Gill has given legislators in Wisconsin the green light for redistricting how they want.

Most recently, the Court has seen a partisan redistricting case from the state of North Carolina in Rucho v. Common Clause (2019), addressing the questions of the standing of plaintiffs (the disqualifying factor from Gill), the justiciability of a partisan gerrymandering case, and whether or not their map was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority (5-4) opinion― right along party lines― that described the issue as outside the area of justiciability of the federal courts, as it is the job of the state legislature with the responsibility of the federal congress for accountability (Roberts Jr.). But, as stated in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), “the right to vote is too important in our free society for it to be stripped of judicial protection (Wesberry v. Sanders 1964).” Further,

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he argued that there was no “limited and precise” standard for the evaluation of partisan gerrymandering (Roberts Jr., Rucho 2019). Justice Elena Kagan wrote the dissenting opinion that there was danger in the Courts apportioning political power based upon their views of electoral fairness, yet there is a standard largely adopted by federal courts in the last decade that does not rely upon a judge’s views of electoral fairness (Kagan, Rucho 2019). This standard generally aligned with a three-pronged test of a state’s case: first, there must be proof that the party in question in fact had the intent to gain more power through the drawing of the maps; second, the maps had to have had the intended effect of diluting the vote in specified districts; third, the plaintiffs must have a non-partisan plan for redistricting in that state (Kagan, Rucho 2019).

Recommendations - What can be done

Following the “Iowa Model” of redistricting, such as the state of Iowa uses, a non-partisan legislative staff, equally represented by both parties, would be tasked to draw up district maps for the coming decade following the census results (Iowa Code, Sec. 42.4, Ballotpedia).

In Wisconsin’s case, this responsibility would be delegated to the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB). Their mission, as articulated well and purposefully by Arizona’s Independent Redistricting Commission, would be to redraw state legislative and congressional districts in a nonpartisan manner as reflected by the most recent census, from scratch, with consideration of both the one person one vote principle and the Voting Rights Act (Forst). Taking from the Iowa model, this piece of legislation strictly prohibits biases such as considering the addresses of incumbent legislators, specific demographics or political affiliations, previous election results, and the use of partisan data (Rucho v. Common Clause 2019). It also calls for districts to be as compact and contiguous as possible, aiming at making the perimeter as small of a number as they can (Iowa Code, Sec. 42.4). The legislators themselves, where the partisan bias inherently roots, will be taken out of the redrawing process. This leaves their job only to vote upon the results of the redrawing and any amendments (which are left strictly to errors and must be approved by three-fourths vote). This takes the question of partisan bias out of the process completely and does not rely upon the Supreme Court to establish a standard.

Arizona’s Independent Redistricting Commission was put to the test by the Supreme Court in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (ASL v. AIRC 2015). By majority opinion (5-4), the Court regarded the Commission constitutional because it was consistent with the constitution of the state thereof. The state had amended their constitution by electoral initiative, consistent with the idea that since the time of the founding, the state has given some legislative power to the hands of the electorate, in the form of constitutional amendment. Because of this, they share the legislative responsibility of the State of Arizona, allowing for Independent Commissions to operate in the place of the legislature, not unconstitutionally.

It is noteworthy that Justice Anthony Kennedy voted with the majority and no longer sits on the Court, but was replaced with a more conservative-leaning Justice. This leaves it uncertain whether the precedent of the Arizona State Legislature decision will be overturned to favor the power of the state legislature instead of an independent commission, especially if Wisconsin’s proposed redistricting plan were to appear on the Supreme Court in the future.

This question and its answer are more or less irrelevant to Wisconsin’s case. Not only does

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the state of Wisconsin not constitutionally permit ballot initiatives to amend, the proposed amendment for nonpartisan redistricting does not put the map-drawing into an independent commission’s hands, but in the hands of the reference bureau― a legislative service agency― the power never leaving the legislature itself.

This bill would be best as an amendment to the Wisconsin State Constitution, which requires the approval of both houses of the legislature followed by a referendum by the people. A recent Marquette University Law poll uncovered 72% of Wisconsinites supported a nonpartisan redistricting plan, encompassing a majority of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans (Conniff 2019). Additionally, fifty of Wisconsin’s seventy-two counties also support a nonpartisan solution (Hesselbein 2020). Thus, if an amendment were up for a referendum to create an independent redistricting commission under the Iowa model, the people of Wisconsin would support it. The biggest issue that this bill― already proposed as a bill and separately as an amendment, both failing― faces is getting past the legislature that utilized the process of which is being sought to amend.

Conclusion

Gerrymandering is a practice that is undemocratic in nature and dilutes the value of one’s vote by drawing up districts that produce artificial election outcomes. Although the Supreme Court has consistently frowned upon the practice, they have generally deemed partisan gerrymandering constitutional because of the absence of a clear ruling or effective test. Gerrymandering is an actionable issue that can be remedied by removing the power of redistricting from the hands of the partisan legislators into the hands of nonpartisan legislative staff.

This will restore the value of a vote and make Wisconsin more democratic and transparent for the people.

Bibliography

Clover, Benjamin Plener. 2018. “Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering: An Evaluation of the Efficiency Gap Proposal.” Stanford Law Review 70(4): 1131. https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/quantifying-partisan-gerrymandering/ (February 20, 2020).

Conniff, Ruth. “Majority of Wisconsin Wants Non-Partisan Redistricting.” Urban Milwaukee, urbanmilwaukee.com/2019/10/02/majority-of-wisconsin-wants-non-partisan-redistricting/.

Duignan, Brian. “Gerrymandering.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 11 Oct. 2019, www.britannica.com/topic/gerrymandering.

Forst, Buck. “Independent Redistricting Commission.” Independent Redistricting Commission, azredistricting.org/.

“Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. (2018).” Justia Law, 18 June 2018, supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/585/16-1161/#tab-opinion-3916575.

Hasen, Richard L. 2019. “The Gerrymandering Decision Drags the Supreme Court Further Into the Mud.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/opinion/ gerrymandering-rucho-supreme-court.html (February 20, 2020).

Hladick, Beth. 2018. “The ‘Iowa Model’ for Redistricting.” The National Conference of State Legislatures. https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/the-iowa-model-for-redistricting.aspx (February 20, 2020).

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Hladick, Beth. 2019. “Redistricting and the Supreme Court: The Most Significant Cases.”

The National Conference of State Legislatures. https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-and-the-supreme-court-the-most-significant-cases.aspx#Partisanship (February 20, 2020).

Iowa Code. 2016. Sec. 42.4. (February 20, 2020).

Iowa Const. 1857. Art. III. Sec. 34, 37. (February 20, 2020).

Kagan, Elena. “Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).” Justia Law, supreme.justia. com/cases/federal/us/588/18-422/#tab-opinion-4114538.

Kiger, Patrick J. “How Gerrymandering Works.” HowStuffWorks, HowStuffWorks, 3 Nov. 2017, people.howstuffworks.com/gerrymandering.htm.

McCann, Meghan, and Wendy Underhill. 2019. “Redistricting Criteria.” The National Conference of State Legislatures. https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-criteria.aspx (February 20, 2020).

“Redistricting in Iowa.” Ballotpedia, ballotpedia.org/Redistricting_in_Iowa#State_process.

Roberts, John. “Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. (2019).” Justia Law, supreme.justia.com/ cases/federal/us/588/18-422/#tab-opinion-4114539.

Ross, Bertrall. 2018. “Partisan Gerrymandering, The First Amendment, and the Political Outsider.” Columbia Law Review 118(7). https://columbialawreview.org/content/partisan-gerrymandering-the-first-amendment-and-the-political-outsider/ (February 20, 2020).

“Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S.(2019).” Justia Law, 27 June 2019, supreme.justia.com/ cases/federal/us/588/18-422/#tab-opinion-4114540.

Stephanopoulos, Nicholas O., and Eric M. McGhee. 2015. “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap .” University of Chicago Law Review 82(831): 831–900. http://uchicagolawjournalsmshaytiubv.devcloud.acquia-sites.com/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/04 Stephanopoulos_McGhee_ART.pdf (February 20, 2020).

Hesselbein, Dianne. “Hesselbein Advocates for Fair Maps Constitutional Amendment.” Urban Milwaukee, urbanmilwaukee.com/pressrelease/hesselbein-advocates-for-fair-maps-constitutional-amendment/.

Wang, Sam. 2019. “If the Supreme Court Won’t Prevent Gerrymandering, Who Will?” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/opinion/sunday/partisan-gerrymandering.html (February 20, 2020).

“Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).” Justia Law, 17 Feb. 1964, supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/376/1/.

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Implications for National Security and UKUSA with Huawei’s Role in UK 5G

By Kelly MacGarrigle

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Executive Summary

Unless the UK halts the rollout of the 5G telecommunications network provided by the Chinese company Huawei, the US intelligence community cannot continue to share SIGINT within the UKUSA alliance safely. It is difficult to trust and share information in a network partially built by a company with compromising ties to the Chinese government, with a problematic history involving intellectual property theft and unauthorized network access.

Background - Origins and Evolution of UKUSA

In WW2, sharing intelligence between the Allied nations, especially the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK), was crucial to eventual victory and minimizing casualties.

After the war, the UK and US wanted to continue their close intelligence-sharing relationship and developed the UKUSA agreement in 1946. While that agreement was solely between the US and UK, in 1955, the additional members who make up the alliance today were added: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, completing the group that is formally known as UKUSA, and colloquially known as “five-eyes,” or FVEY. (Farrell 2013) The alliance is a “cooperative, complex network of linked autonomous intelligence agencies” with a profoundly “unique” sense of trust that allows for increased efficiency in dealing with the tumultuous and fluid global landscape. (Cox 2012) More specifically, the treaty agrees that the nations will have cooperation in the area of signals intelligence (SIGINT), or intelligence gathering through methods such as eavesdropping, radio intercepts, and phone tapping. While the details of what the members of UKUSA are currently working on are classified, each member is responsible for different regions, allowing the members to have an efficient division of labor. Moving into the latter part of the 20th century, FVEY expanded to include agreements with second and third parties, made up of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and other western allies. The below diagram depicts these relationships between the US and periphery FVEY members, with the sharing of SIGINT in exchange for financial and technological support The alliance has been generally beneficial to the US, as it allows for increased intelligence for organizations within the US intelligence community (IC) to analyze and funnel into policy. However, the US came under fire in 2011 with the massive intelligence leak by former contractor Edward Snowden, which revealed the contradictions over appropriate national security data collection, with some claiming that the general, indiscriminate data collection by the NSA violates the right to privacy. Of the files that were released by Snowden, the majority were marked “FVEY,” for five eyes, which meant that there was a network of allies complicit and aiding in massive data collection. This classification allowed the US to circumvent domestic prohibitions on collecting information on Americans, by having their partners make the connection, with the SIGINT coming from UKUSA. (Walsh and Miller 2016) While this alliance may have been helpful post WW2, today it is facing a potential breakdown of the intelligence-sharing network, due to the influence of the Chinese company Huawei in UK telecommunications.

Relationships of US with Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Intelligence Partners

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Huawei, 5G, and Chinese Governmental Espionage

Before going into the potential implications of Huawei on the future of intelligence sharing networks, it is helpful to both understand what 5G is, and what role Huawei plays in its rollout worldwide. 5G is the fifth generation of mobile telecommunications networks, supporting cellular data networks at higher speeds, with increased capacity and speed at a lower cost. Huawei is a Chinese telecommunications company, central to the construction of fifth-generation 5G mobile networks worldwide. It is the largest seller of telecommunications equipment (including 5G) and the second-largest smartphone manufacturer. As seen in the below image, Huawei is the unambiguous leader in 5G coverage worldwide, with 42 commercial 5G contracts in over $100 billion in revenue, operating in 170 countries. (Maizland and Chatzky 2020) Several members of FVEY have banned Huawei from providing 5G equipment to their nations, including Australia and the US. While this may seem at first like a somewhat trivial matter or anti-Chinese prejudice in these countries, the close ties between Chinese businesses and the government ensure that this is an issue of national security. According to the Chinese National Intelligence and Counter Espionage Laws, any Chinese organization must “support, assist, and cooperate in national intelligence work” regardless of their physical location, and must “truthfully provide” all information requested by the Chinese government.

(Hoffman and Kania 2018) So, while Huawei has claimed that it is an independent organization, and operates outside of the purview of governmental direction, the clear rhetoric of Chinese law directly contradicts their claims.

Huawei is Leading the Race to Develop 5G Worldwide.

Huawei, in the past, has been linked to legally questionable activity involving the security of their 5G networks. One such case regarded the theft of data from the African Union,

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where an unknown actor transferred data over five years to a server in Shanghai with Huawei responsible for the deployment of “all computing and storage resources in the AU’s central data center.” (Cave 2018) While it is unclear if Huawei was accountable for the data transfer, even if they were not, they allowed five years of Chinese access into the systems.

They facilitated one of the “longest-running thefts of confidential government data” in the modern era. In response to these troubling incidents, Australia refused to allow Huawei to help with its 5G rollout, prioritizing the safety of its communications networks over technological potential. (Cave 2018) There is also the consideration that with the murky relationship between the Chinese government and Huawei, the infrastructure could contain backdoor access, allowing Beijing into the mechanisms of telecommunication networks it aids in creating. This access would enable the Chinese to attack at any moment with this backdoor access, or as they potentially did with the AU, transmit classified and critical information. The US House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence argued that equipment from Huawei could undermine core US national security interests, both due to their questionable record and “credible evidence” that they refused to comply with US laws. The report also detailed the explicit connections between Huawei’s leadership and the government, with a “party committee” present in company leadership, remaining “dependent on the Chinese government for support.” (House Intelligence Committee 2012)

Recommendations

The British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, was most likely aware of the risks regarding Huawei and the safety of telecommunications networks, and the international community has responded to his decision with general disapproval. The UK plans to restrict access to only 35% of masts and antennae equipment. Still, it is unclear if this will pass given the

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divisions in the Tory party regarding Huawei’s rollout, which they feel could compromise British security. President Donald Trump has been heavily lobbying the UK to reject Huawei’s technology for years, fearing both the security risks to a critical ally with large amounts of sensitive information and the chance for Huawei to consolidate their market dominance across Europe. According to the written statement from the PM, Huawei would be excluded from “sensitive” parts of the communications network but did not go into further details about protections for general national security or British sovereignty. (Payne, Colson, and Bienkov 2020) The US is strongly opposed to allowing Huawei into such a crucial ally, going so far as to introduce bills prohibiting sharing of intelligence with countries that would permit Huawei’s 5G technology access to their country. (House Intelligence Committee 2020) A cross-party group of US Senators (including the leaders of the committees on intelligence) has come together to protest their decision to allow Huawei into the nation, urging them to reverse course. (Warrell and Hughes 2020) While this a public relations move, the US also has considerable power in the upcoming trade negotiations with the UK. Since the UK has just left the European Union (EU) at the end of January, they now need to renegotiate their trade deals with critical allies, one of which is the US. While the US may have been willing to discuss a free trade agreement (FTA) with the UK pre-Huawei decision, the noticeably frostier negotiations could throw those chances to the wayside. If the UK decides to go through with this deal, it would be challenging to reach a mutually agreeable and beneficial FTA. The US prioritizes national security above all else and allowing free and open relations and exchanges (both goods and information) would be an anathema to decades of American foreign policy prescriptions. (Woodstock 2020) At the end of January, Boris Johnson led the UK out of the EU. Unless he changes his decision regarding allowing Huawei into the country, he will also likely be leading them out of UKUSA. If the UK chooses to enter into business with Huawei, they are allowing a Chinese company with close ties and considerable funding from the government into their telecommunications network, potentially compromising the safety and security of the conversations and transmissions occurring. If this was to happen, the US could not continue to share information with the UK, as it could not trust the safety of the information transmitted. Within this data could be information about Chinese agents, who could be seriously hurt or killed if their identities were to become known to Chinese officials. Additionally, US intelligence officers would be compromising their security and safety while passing information, and an unknown number of operations worldwide could collapse with Chinese insider information.

However, even if the worst-case scenario did not occur, the UK would be sending a clear signal to the rest of the world that they were supporting a country that silences all opposition and is headed by an authoritarian leader.

Conclusion

Unless the US wants to support such a decision, they need to separate themselves from the morally and strategically complicated mess that is a close business partnership with a Chinese company with uncomfortably close ties to the State. The UK’s decision to allow Huawei could inspire other countries, such as Canada and Germany, to follow, increasing the Chinese presence in typically strong Western allies. The UK must decide how much they value the “special relationship” that has developed through decades of cooperation. With upcom-

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ing trade negotiations, this decision could seriously harm the final shape of the Anglo-American relations, with the US less willing to grant preferential treatment to a country that refused to honor their wishes regarding informational security. Unless Johnson decides to ban Huawei, his decision could have lasting effects on the international and domestic stage, as well as for the long-lasting and (previously) strong alliance of five-eyes - which without the US, could fail to exist, leaving critical vulnerabilities in global defense.

References

Cave, Danielle. 2018. “The African Union Headquarters Hack and Australia’s 5G Network.”

Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Cox, James. 2012.“Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community.” Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.

Farrell, Paul. 2013.“History of Five-Eyes.” The Guardian.

Hoffman, Samantha, and Elsa Kania. 2018. “Huawei and the Ambiguity of China’s Intelligence and Counter-Espionage Laws.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

“H.R.5661: To Prohibit the Sharing of United States Intelligence with Countries that Permit Operation of Huawei Fifth-Generation Telecommunications Technology Within Their Borders.” US House Committee on Intelligence. 2020.

“Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE.” US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 2012.

Maizland, Lindsay and Andrew Chatzky. 2020. “Huawei: China’s Controversial Tech Giant.”

Council on Foreign Relations.

Payne, Adam, Thomas Colson, and Adam Bienkov. 2020. “Boris Johnson Defies Trump and Gives Huawei the Green Light to Develop Britain’s 5G Network.” Business Insider.

Walsh, Patrick, and Seumas Miller. 2016. “Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post Snowden.” Intelligence and National Security. 31(3): 345-368.

Warrel, Helen, and Laura Hughes. 2020. “US Senators Urge UK to Scrap Role for Huawei in 5G Network.” Financial Times.

Woodstock, Andrew. 2020. “Trump Could Block Trade Deal With the UK in Row Over Boris Johnson’s Huawei Decision, Pence Says.” The Independent.

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Make Affordable Housing Before Students are Priced Out: Affordable Housing in the City of Madison

By Matthew Mitnick

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SUMMARY

This policy memo offers recommendations for student affordable housing to the Madison Common Council. The challenge of affordability for University of Wisconsin - Madison students on campus is outlined, with an explanation of what types of projects qualify as affordable housing. Solutions that have been implemented across the country, as well as with similar demographics, are shared. A series of recommendations are provided, which demonstrate how the City of Madison should pursue as many outside funding sources as possible, while augmenting local sources, to promote affordable housing projects. This memo details how the creation of a Tax Incremental District (TID) to collect property taxes through Tax Increment Financing (TIF) and Payment In-Lieu of options for developers will provide sources of revenue to augment the City of Madison’s Affordable Housing Trust Fund. This will allow for affordable housing developments that could otherwise not be built. Moreover, the use of Density Bonuses, Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTCs), and Inclusionary Zoning are additional measures that may be used to promote affordable student housing across the city, but particularly in Aldermanic Districts 2, 4, 8, and 13. Finally, a Neighborhood Association can be created, covering parts of Aldermanic Districts 2, 4, and 8, to promote public input in implementing these proposed measures for affordable housing.

PROBLEM - RENTS ARE RISING FOR STUDENTS IN MADISON

It is a minimum of $9,900 room and board fee per school year (roughly $1,100 per academic month) to live in an on-campus dorm at the University of Wisconsin - Madison (University Housing 2020). This is likely why roughly 75% of students choose to live off-campus (U.S. News & World Report 2020). Living off-campus proves to be significantly more affordable in comparison to university residence halls. Off-campus monthly rates are consistently below $1,000 per month for a one bedroom (Apartments.com 2020).

However, the influx of luxury apartments, such as the Hub Madison, The James, and Lucky Apartments, threaten affordability close to campus. As a whole, the median rent price in the City of Madison has increased 23% in the five-year period in which Census data is currently available (Becker 2019). Students in search of housing are being pushed further away to the Vilas and Greenbush Neighborhoods - some even as far as the cities of Monona and Fitchburg. As a result, the already limited public transit system is strained, and residents already living in these areas are displaced.

The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) defines affordable housing as housing that costs 30% or less of a household’s income (HUD 2020).

With very few students working full-time jobs, income is hard to quantify. Subsequently, this makes students ineligible for means-tested entitlement programs that rely on income for qualification, such as Section 8 Vouchers.

Currently, the City of Madison has an Affordable Housing Trust Fund, which “provides loans and grants to for-profit and non-profit housing developers for the acquisition and development of costs necessary for the creation of” low-income housing (City of Madison General Ordinances). It is administered by the City Comptroller and deposited in the Trust Fund Account.

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SOLUTIONS IN OTHER MUNICIPALITIES

The challenge identified above is one that has become a common trend for municipalities across the nation, especially those with increased populations of young people in need of housing. The following are sample solutions other municipalities have taken to counter the affordable housing crisis: ● The Tacoma, Washington Housing Authority partnered with Tacoma Community College to adjust student restrictions on qualification for means-tested entitlement programs. 25 homeless and at-risk students received piloted housing choice vouchers with the stipulation that they be enrolled as full time students (Wachter 2016). ● Many Mansions, an affordable housing provider and the Area Housing Authority, a nonprofit housing authority, develop and administer affordable housing for a variety of cities in the County of Ventura (County of Ventura 2020). ● Texas A&M University partnered with Servatis, LLC to manage a new $360 million, 3,406 Park West apartment project, which is one of the largest public-private partnerships in the nation. Through the initial 30 years of the project, it will be owned by the nonprofit NCCD-College Station. After this period, the university will regain ownership of the property (Wachter 2016). ● Single room occupancy (SRO) units were implemented by the University of British Columbia in the development of a 70 unit building that encompasses just 140 square feet.

These apartments are rented at a value of roughly $250 less per month than the market rate (Wachter 2016). This was funded partially by federal funding through a Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). ● The City of Lincoln, Nebraska utilized $2.6 million in TIF funding toward parking to support a 624 bedroom student housing project (Wachter 2016). ● The City of Thousand Oaks, California, which lies in one of the most expensive housing markets in the nation, allocates a portion of its annual Community Development Block Grant funding from HUD to support the rehabilitation needs of low-income renters in its nonprofit housing authorities (City of Thousand Oaks 2020).

RECOMMENDATIONS - AFFORDABLE HOUSING

The City of Madison should utilize the Dane County Housing Authority to administer the already existing Affordable Housing Trust Fund. Nonprofit management is preferable, as it is a more sustainable model in the long run when dealing with unpredictable public budget cuts, regulations within set jurisdictions, and shifting political climates.

When it comes to building affordable housing units, there is not a one-size-fits-all approach. The City of Madison should explore a multitude of funding sources, including the following: ● Low-Income Housing Tax Credits

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First, to generate an adequate amount of funding into the Affordable Housing Trust Fund, the City of Madison should continue to leverage Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTCs) that are administered by the Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA) (City of Madison Resolution #57594). LIHTCs allow developers to receive tax credits in exchange for pricing specified numbers of units below the market rate. They are implemented through the Section 42 Housing Tax Credit Program, which sets housing rates below market rate housing for income-qualifying renters in private housing (HUD 2017). The City of Madison should lobby the federal and state government to create incentives for private companies to provide direct and indirect funds to the Affordable Housing Trust Fund or housing authorities through various programs, such as 4-9% LIHTCs (Congressional Research Service 2019). If a company is experiencing profits and wishes to avoid paying higher corporate income taxes, then this provides a mechanism to do so - while also improving housing costs for students in future developments that receive local funding assistance. Given that the number of LIHTC projects are limited by federal regulation, the City of Madison should make proposed projects more attractive by leveraging funds from a variety of sources. Federal sources typically require a share of local funds. If the municipality is willing to put in 20% of the costs associated with a LIHTC, for example, then the federal government might more readily provide a greater share to reduce the local cost. ● Tax Increment Financing If the City of Madison had the ability to fund a new affordable housing project, it would be able to issue debt through TIF funds (City of Madison TIF Policy Committee). The Tax Increment Financing Manual details how municipalities consider specific projects and use property taxes from a Tax Improvement District (TID) to fund them (WI DOR 2019).

This type of tax revenue is used to pay annual debt service payments associated with affordable housing projects. TIF revenues capture the future growth in property taxes that would have been used to pay for other municipal services. Capital projects centered around the redevelopment of commercially-zoned areas should not be promoted if they take funding away from budget items related to education and public safety, among others.

In the case of affordable housing, future tax revenues from the TIF should only be applied for this purpose.

The City of Madison’s TIF Policy Committee outlines how student housing developments that are leased primarily by students is considered an ineligible development to receive TIF assistance. However, this does not apply if there is “a significant affordable component” (City of Madison TIF Policy Committee). This component may be achieved through mechanisms, such as “Density Bonus” provisions, Inclusionary Housing Zoning requirements, and Payment In-Lieu of affordable housing development options - which are discussed in detail below. TIF should be used to improve the quality and safety of existing student housing. Thus, the development of future TIDs should be used specifically in support of this. ● Creation of a Tax Improvement District There should be at least one TID in the aldermanic districts of 2, 8, and 13 that are heavily populated by students. Since TIF assistance for student housing requires an affordable

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component, having at least one TID in these areas specifically for supporting student housing will improve affordability. Affordable housing developments should be targeted to high performing TIDs that have the capacity to support affordable housing developments.

To create a TID, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue lists a step-by-step process (WI DOR 2019). I recommend that the TID be opened in the South Campus neighborhood of Aldermanic Districts 8 and 13, encompassing the multitude of businesses present and for the tax increment. ● Density Bonus Certain areas of District 8 have properties in disarray and in desperate need of maintenance. This can be viewed throughout the South Campus neighborhood, particularly on North Orchard Avenue and Spring Street. The practice of single family homes being developed into student rentals is not an efficient use of space, nor does it always lead to the most optimal living conditions. The City of Madison controls zoning and should thus remove regulatory obstacles to prevent future developments that exhibit a density component. There is a risk that high density development will turn into the high priced luxury apartments that have threatened affordability in the first place. Hence, a Density Bonus is a viable solution, as it would result in additional units for a development if a certain percentage of all units are set aside for affordable tenants. Since the City of Madison controls zoning, it would ease restrictions for developers to build in these areas if a portion of the units are considered to be affordable. This is also referred to as an affordable housing setaside (Grounded Solutions Network 2019). ● Inclusionary Zoning An Inclusionary Zoning requirement is often an important affordable housing development tool when it is used effectively. This zoning tool is used to require a certain percentage of units to be deemed affordable (HUD 2012). Although this was challenging in the early 2000’s for the City of Madison, leading the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to overturn this policy, it can be beneficial when the terms are agreeable to all parties. Property owners, developers, affordable housing advocates, and the municipality must all agree on a set rate prior to its implementation. Inclusionary Zoning would be beneficial in areas around campus, where new housing projects, such as the Hub II on Langdon Street, decrease affordability. If a developer would like to supersede inclusionary zoning requirements; however, they could do so with a payment-in-lieu option. ● Payment-In-Lieu option The payment-in-lieu option allows a developer to provide the municipality with a cash payment to be dedicated to affordable housing subsidies for other developments instead of building affordable units in a specific project. These funds will thus be used for affordable housing elsewhere in the community. Additionally, a TIF could be created for payment-inlieu option projects, generating revenue for other future projects. ● Neighborhood Association

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The creation of a Neighborhood Association in Aldermanic Districts 2, 4, and 8 would give residents a voice to advocate for these policies at the city level and generate buy-in from residents. A Neighborhood Association is a grassroots group of neighbors, small business owners, residents, local elected officials, and community leaders that work together to positively impact their neighborhood. They determine what the needs of the neighborhood are, lobby elected officials, advocate for specific projects, make recommendations on developments and public works projects, hold developers accountable, enforce zoning, and maintain city ordinances. The creation of a Neighborhood Association with a board of students, potentially being institutionalized through the Associated Students of Madison, would allow for these measures to continually be advocated for. With such a powerful grassroots body, future District 8 Alders would have to appeal to the Neighborhood Association to get elected, meaning that they would be amenable to its policy directives.

CONCLUSION

Affordable housing for students is complicated. However, by taking into consideration the recommendations in this memo, great strides will be made to improve student affordability. Affordable housing will not only assist students. It will encourage students to stay in Madison post-graduation. Such growth creates positive economic development for the city as a whole.

Works Cited

Apartments.com. “Apartments for Rent Near University of Wisconsin-Madison.” Apartments.com: 2020. https://www.apartments.com/off-campus-housing/wi/madison/university-of-wisconsin-at-madison/3/?bb=3mgg3xn0-JpuhpmH Becker, Abigail. “Is Your Neighborhood Gentrified? Madison Report Identifies Areas of Displacement.” The Capital Times: August 6, 2019. https://madison.com/ct/news/local/ govt-and-politics/is-your-neighborhood-gentrified-madison-report-identifies-areas-of-displacement/article_d935a2db-cd15-50a1-a18c-a869b48e6a8f.html City of Madison. General Ordinances §4.22. https://www.cityofmadison.com/cdbg/toolbox/ docs/mgo4_22.htm City of Madison. Resolution #57594. City of Madison Legislative Information Center: 2019. https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4146548&GUID=D197BD2E990A-4A57-B9FE-15CE81642820 City of Madison. “TIF Goals, Objectives, and Process.” City of Madison TIF Policy Committee. https://www.cityofmadison.com/dpced/economicdevelopment/documents/TIF%20 Goals%20Objectives%20and%20Process%20-%20ADOPTED.pdf City of Thousand Oaks. “Affordable Housing.” City of Thousand Oaks: 2020. https://www. toaks.org/departments/community-development/housing/affordable-housing-program Congressional Research Service. “An Introduction to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.”

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Congressional Research Service: 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22389.pdf County of Ventura. “Residents and Housing.” County of Ventura: 2020. https://www.ventura.org/residents/housing/ Grounded Solutions Network. “The Set-Aside Requirement.” Inclusionary Housing: 2019. https://inclusionaryhousing.org/designing-a-policy/onsite-development/the-set-asiderequirement University Housing. “Billing and Rates.” University of Wisconsin-Madison: 2020. https:// www.housing.wisc.edu/residence-halls/billing/#2020-21-new-students U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. “Affordable Housing.” HUD Community Planning and Development: 2020. https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_ planning/affordablehousing/ U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. “Expanding Housing Opportunities through Inclusionary Zoning: Lessons from Two Counties.” Office of Policy Development and Research: 2012. https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/HUD-496_new.pdf U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. “Welcome to the 2018 HUD Affordable Housing Guide.” Housing Link: 2017. https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/State/documents/2018-Affordable-Housing-Guide.pdf U.S. News & World Report. “University of Wisconsin-Madison Student Life.” U.S. News & World Report: 2020. https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/university-of-wisconsin-3895/student-life Wachter, Matt. “2016 City of Madison Biennial Housing Report.” City of Madison: 2016. https://www.cityofmadison.com/cdbg/documents/2016CityBiennialHousingReport.pdf Wisconsin Department of Revenue. “Tax Incremental Financing Manual.” Wisconsin Department of Revenue: 2019. https://www.revenue.wi.gov/DOR%20Publications/tif-manual.pdf

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De-escalation of Tensions between the United States and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Winter of 2020

By Sarah Catherine Niemann

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Background: U.S Iranian Relations Concerning Oil Sanctions

On January 16, 2016 the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was implemented triggering the removal of crippling U.S, E.U, and UN sanctions on Iran’s economy that were restricting Iran’s oil exports, in return for the termination of Iran’s nuclear program. Oil is the main driver of Iran’s economy making up 80% of Iran’s export earnings. (EIA 2020) In 2011 Iran exported 2.5 million barrels of oil per day. Iran’s economy was drastically improving with the implementation of the JCPOA. Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency

On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump announced that the U.S would be pulling out of the JCPOA agreement. Following that decision, the U.S has implemented more economic sanctions on Iran’s oil exporting industry, aiming to cut Iran’s oil exports to virtually zero.

(Al Jazeera 2019) Following these sanctions, Iran’s economy has suffered greatly, including mass job loss, public protests, and widespread concern in the international community about the conflict between Iran and the U.S. (Goodman 2020) Before the Trump presidency, Iran was slowly increasing oil production in order to increase economic outputs again and better the lives of Iranian citizens. However, as shown in the chart to the left, a negative market shock forced Iran’s oil production to drastically slow.

Tensions between the U.S and Iran escalated further when the U.S ordered an air raid assisination of one of Iran’s top military leaders Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020. This led to even greater tensions between the U.S and Iran, with correspondingly greater social unrest, unemployment, and inflation in Iran (now up to 40%). According to the IMF, Iran’s economy is contracting at a rate of 9.5 annually. (Goodman 2020) As the international community watched the tensions between the U.S and Iran escalate there was widespread concern. The U.S’s ultimate goal should be to avoid a potential armed conflict with Iran and to avoid a possible counter-attack that could be in the form of illegal nuclear weapon use on

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the part of Iran.

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Solutions

Before addressing peace between the two nations the U.S must first address the issue that the U.S does not formally recognize that these social and economic issues are caused

by U.S sanctions. The U.S requests that Iran come to the table for peace negotiations and for them to remain peaceful in the face of social and economic turmoil. In short, the U.S is making high demands from Iran while conceding nothing. In order to schedule a productive negotiation meeting between the U.S and Iran and hopefully resolve this dire situation, the US should adopt the following policies. First, the U.S must offer to lift economic sanctions equivalent to letting Iran export 500,000 barrels of oil per day to China and other oil purchasing states. Iran will not export as much as they did in their peak oil exporting years but it will be enough to jumpstart their economy and defuse protests that are causing social and economic unrest for the people of Iran. The removal of some sanctions will help the citizens of Iran more than it will help the countries high ranking political leaders because it will help industry try to return to how it was in the early 2000’s. The removal of sanctions is also an offer of goodwill from the U.S that will hopefully defuse tensions between the two nations’ leaders. Additionally, since re-implementation of sanctions in 2018 by the U.S Iran has still exported oil to China and other states through illegal channels. (Singhvi, Anjali, Wong, and Lu 2019) Offering the removal of sanctions therefore won’t drastically change the world economy because Iran will now be able to export oil legally instead of through illegal means.

In return for this amount of sanctions being lifted, Iran would have to come to the table for negotiations with the U.S and other P-5 nations and be willing to renegotiate the JCPOA.

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The U.S’s ultimate goal is to prevent a war with Iran and protect the citizens of Iran because a war would be costly for both nations monetarily and in terms of loss of life.

Conclusion and Counterarguments

There would be domestic opposition to this policy prescription because Iran is not a U.S ally and the two have had tense relations for years. Some may argue, why should the U.S care if Iran’s economy suffers? In response, the U.S. should care about stabilizing Iran’s economy in order to reduce the likelihood of Iranian military retaliation against the U.S, which could possibly include nuclear weapon use. Also, the U.S has made a commitment to honor the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and the current situation in Iran has the potential to have extreme human rights abuses against the Iranian people by the Supreme Leaders of Iran if some economic sanctions are not lifted soon. (Iran HRM 2019) Considering that regime change in Iran is a possibly violent and unproductive solution, the short term the removal of sanctions, in order to create temporary peace, is favorable.

A de-escalation of the violence the country is experiencing between its government and citizens is more pertinent than a regime change that would cause more violence among the country’s population. As a long term goal, regime change is ultimately what the U.S wants for the Iranian people. However, the U.S’s ultimate goal is to prevent escalation in the country, protect its own interest in the region, and prevent violence against the citizens of Iran, and this can be achieved first by the removal of sanctions that will allow for temporary economic survival.

References

Goodman, Peter. 2020. “Iran’s Grim Economy Limits Its Willingness to Confront the U.S.” The New York Times.

“Iran Human Rights Monitor, 2019 Annual Report.” Iran HRM. 2020.

“Iran to Sell Oil in ‘Grey Market’ as US Tightens Sanctions.” Al Jazeera. 2019.

Singhvi, Anjali, Edward Wong and Denise Lu. 2019. “Defying U.S. Sanctions, China and Others Take Oil From 12 Iranian Tankers.” The New York Times.

“Sanctions reduced Iran’s oil exports and revenues in 2012” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2020.

“U.S.-Iran Relations.” CQ Press. 2020.

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How inadequate American responses to cyber attacks impair foreign policy

By Nils Peterson

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Problem

In the modern era, warfare goes beyond air, land, and sea to include cyberspace. This new realm of war forms a central part of American military force because computers undergird the United States’ ability to wage war. The ability to use cyberspace to launch attacks against America from a distance also bolsters the United States’s enemies’ capacity for warfare. Hacking that has physical consequences or steals vulnerable information permeates this cyber world, as seen by the 2010 Stuxnet attack, attributed to joint Israeli and American efforts, on an Iranian nuclear facility. (Nakashima and Warrick 2012) Furthermore, the United States’s weak and inadequate responses to cyber attacks by foreign state actors on civilian companies and industrial control systems substantially impair the future efficacy of American foreign policy.

By attacking civilian infrastructure hackers undermine the United States’ ability to secure its data. This hacked data gives future tools to foreign nations to repeatedly interfere in the political process of the United States. For example, in 2017 the Chinese government hacked Equifax and stole sensitive information such as the Social Security numbers of 147 million Americans. (Barrett 2020) China could attempt to blackmail future political candidates with this data. By potentially forcing a candidate to support a different policy or be blackmailed, China could indirectly influence the grand strategy of American foreign policy. China’s ability to leverage the hacked information to recruit spies should not be discounted.

Hacked data also gives future tools to foreign nations to threaten the military-industrial complex, the close association of the government with leading companies who produce armaments, that is central to America’s ability to wage war. Russia turning off the power grid, and thus their industrial control systems, in Ukraine in 2015 (Summers, Walstrom, and Park 2019) demonstrated how to bring life for ordinary citizens to a standstill. If this occurred in the United States, companies like Boeing and Lockheed Martin would not be able to produce necessary military equipment. Furthermore, without power there is no internet. This would be a massive blow to the United States military bureaucracy’s ability to function and decrease its ability to respond quickly to threats around the world. In 2017 the virus NotPetya, created

by Russia, hit the shipping giant Maersk, and almost forced the company to close. (Greenberg 2018) American companies, even giants essential to America’s war effort like Boeing and Lockheed Martin, are not immune to the same type of attack.

Lastly, in 2018 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared a serious cyber attack against a member nation to be grounds for triggering Article 5. He specifically mentioned the level of attack necessary to trigger Article 5 would remain vague so as not to prompt attacks immediately below that threshold. (Stoltenberg 2018) The organization’s reprisal strategy, not necessarily limited to cyberspace, also remains vague for the same reasons.

Notably, it may no longer be possible to limit a cyberattack to cyberspace as seen by the National Security Agency’s (NSA) cyber attack with the Stuxnet virus in 2010 that destroyed Iranian centrifuge tubes used in enriching uranium. (Lauder 2016)

Recommendations

The United States government should invest in research that aims to increase the resilience of civilian and government organizations. Resilience refers to an entity’s ability to regain operational capacity after a cyber attack. Even the most heavily protected data will be

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hacked, as seen by the 2016 hack of the NSA by a group known as Shadow Brokers. (Shane, Perlroth, and Sanger 2017) Increasing resilience and decreasing the incapacitating effects of cyber attacks would decrease the incentive for targeting the United States.

The government’s investment should start by focusing on research in industrial control systems, necessary equipment for power grids around the country. In 2007 a staged cyber hack demonstrated the ability to set a diesel generator on fire. (Love 2017) Since this time, hackers’ abilities to exploit bugs and zero day flaws, which refer to vulnerabilities in a system that give the operators no time to release a patch once exploited, have increased dramatically. The investment focus should be geared toward improving response time to zero day flaw exploitations because these threats are the most dangerous to America’s power grid.

To address the threat of foreign state actors stealing or attempting to destroy data from civilian companies the United States government should partner with companies like Boeing and Lockheed Martin to run annual cyberwar games similar to Locked Shields, an annual international cyber defense competition. This would expose the cybersecurity flaws of the private sector. Furthermore, it would allow the government to intervene during a cyber attack in the most efficacious manner because it knows the same information regarding the attacked vulnerability as the private sector.

Lastly, the field of cybersecurity changes rapidly, and given its highly technical nature, threats may not be identifiable to untrained individuals. Thus, a fund to be used for running diagnostic tests during times of emergencies should be set up and made available to all appropriate cyber security governmental personnel. Ensuring the bureaucratic measures to access this fund remain negligible is crucial due to the time sensitive nature of cyber warfare.

Conclusion

The United States government should invest in research that aims to increase the resilience of civilian and government organizations. Specifically, the investment should target improving the security of industrial control systems, which undergird the American electrical grid. To ensure the flexibility of the American response to threats in cyberspace, it is warranted to establish a fund to be used for all necessary diagnostic testing during times of crisis. Previous American responses to hacking were inadequate in discouraging future cyber-attacks. For an efficacious future foreign policy the United States must deter any form of cyber aggression that affects American interests. This mandates investment in developing America’s resilience regarding cyber attacks.

Bibliography

Barrett, Brian. 2020. “How 4 Chinese Hackers Allegedly Took Down Equifax.” Wired.

Greenberg, Andy. 2018. “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History.” Wired.

Lauder, Jo. 2016. “Stuxnet: The Real Life Sci-Fi Story of ‘the World’s First Digital Weapon’.”

Triple J. Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

Love, David L. 2017. “Cybersecurity: Industrial Control Systems and the U.S. Electric Grid.”

MS&E 238 Blog. Stanford University.

Nakashima, Ellen, and Joby Warrick. 2012. “Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials Say.” The Washington Post.

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Shane, Scott, Nicole Perlroth, and David E. Sanger. 2017. “Security Breach and Spilled Secrets Have Shaken the N.S.A. to Its Core.” The New York Times.

Stoltenberg, Jens. “How NATO Defends Against the Dark Side of the Web.” Wired.

Summers, Julia, Michael Walstrom, and Donghui Park. 2019. “Cyberattack on Critical Infrastructure: Russia and the Ukrainian Power Grid Attacks.” The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies.

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Explanatory economic factors in femicides

By Montserrat Valeria Ponce-Parra

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Problem

Gender violence is categorized by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a major public health problem. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that in 2017, 87 thousand women were murdered and that 58% of the homicides were perpetuated by an intimate partner or family member. Homicide is the most extreme expression of violence and the particular killing of women based on their gender has a specific term, femicide. Femicide is defined as “killing of women by men motivated by hate, contempt, pleasure or the assumption of ownership of women� (Caputi, 1992). Femicide is the killing of women because they are women.

Graph 1: Average Number of Femicides in Latin America

As shown in Graph 1, Latin American countries have been experiencing rising rates of femicides over the last 15 years. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) reports on femicides in the region, and Graph 1 is the result of the average of these reported numbers. According to ECLAC in 2018, an average of 12 women are murdered every day in the region. The high murder rates and prevalence of impunity have resulted in various protests and social movements by women who demand that their respective governments take action in lowering the crime rate, prosecuting the guilty parties, believing accusations of assault, decreasing the disappearances of women, stopping the concealment of femicides and classifying femicides as a specific type of crime in the legal code. Femicides are attributed to an unequal power structure that subordinates women to men.

Femicides Analysis

This memorandum will focus on femicides in Latin America from 1990 - 2017 and will broaden the previous definition so that it encompasses any killing of a woman, making the dependent variable intentional female homicides per 100,000 people. This change in definition is due to the diverse legal definitions Latin American countries have for the violent act and the lack of data for recognized femicides. Femicide was only recently recognized by the international community in 2013 in the 57th session of UN Commission on the Status of Women so research and data on it is scarce (Saccomano 2015). Some Latin American countries have just recently modified their laws to sanction and classify this crime as a specific

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offense but there are some in the continent that still do not recognize it in their penal code (ECLAC 2018).

For this study to take place, the rate of intentional homicides of women per 100,000 by country was used as a dependent variable. The economic indicators that will be used as explanatory variables for femicides will be decided based on hypotheses and previous research papers that studied the link between crime and homicide rate. Listed below are the explanatory variables for this model, their symbols, their definitions: ● Intentional male homicides (ihMale): the male homicide rate is per 100,000 and it was used to capture the general “danger level” of a country in a given year and so the magnitude of the remaining effects can be interpreted as their contribution to female homicide specifically. ● Unemployment rate (Unemployment): the rate of unemployed people that are part of the labor force and are seeking employment. ● Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (Parliaments): the percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held by women. ● Rule of Law (Law): measurement ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 that reflects the perception that people have confidence in and abide the rules of society; particularly the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime. ● Infant mortality (InfMortality): the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age per 1,000 live births. ● Life expectancy (LifeExp): the number of expected years a newborn would live if the patterns of mortality at the time of its birth stayed the same throughout its life. ● Education index (Education): the average of mean years of schooling of adults and expected years of schooling of children, both expressed as an index. ● GINI coefficient (GINI): measurement from 0 to 100 that reflects the income distribution between individuals or households within a country. ● GDP per capita (GDP): gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rate divided by the country’s population. ● Urban population (UrbanPop): people living in urban areas as defined by national offices. ● Population density (PopDensity): the midyear population of a country divided by the land area of the same country in square kilometers.

The countries that this paper will focus on are Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Perú, Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Argentina, Cuba and Puerto Rico will not be included in this research because of reasons that will now be stated. However, Argentina

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is excluded in this study due to the risk of misleading statistics. As reported in The Economist in 2011, Argentina has presented inaccurate data in previous years to avoid making payments on index-linked debt. Argentina’s underreporting was so misleading that the country was reprimanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2013. Puerto Rico is also excluded because it is a US territory and as such, its data is merged with that of the US. This means that there is no way of analyzing Puerto Rico as an independent country. And finally, Cuba was excluded from this analysis because of its inaccurate InfMortality. In “Infant Mortality in Cuba: Myth and Reality”, Roberto Gonzalez reported that Cuba’s actual IMR is substantially higher than that reported by authorities (Gonzales 2015, 19). This proved that underreporting is the reason why Cuba’s data was not used in this analysis.

Statistical Analysis

After collecting the data from the World Bank Database, all the excluded values were removed so that they would not affect the model. The log transformation was applied to both the dependent variable and multiple explanatory variables, thus creating a log-log model to allow for nonlinearities in parameters. The only two explanatory variables that were not transformed were Rule of Law, which takes negative values, and GINI coefficient, which already had an approximately symmetrical distribution. Once all variables were standardized and most of them were logarithmically transformed, the model was fit.

Figure 1: Model f1

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Figure 2: Model f2 The full model (f1) created included all variables; their coefficients, standard errors, t-values and p-values can be seen in Figure 1. Given the p-value of Unemployment, Law, PopDensity and Education, they contribute very little to the prediction of femicides. InfMortality and LifeExp were highly correlated and because of this their prediction power cannot be assessed individually. The correlation between these variables is not surprising as both of them measure the general health of the country and it is expected that both yield similar trends. As an alternative approach, a second model (f2) was created in order to see how this relationship between variables would affect the model if only one of the variables would be included in the model as a proxy for the country’s health. The coefficients, standard errors, t-values and p-values of f2 are shown in Figure 2. F2 leads to the same conclusion of disregarding Unemployment, Law, PopDensity and Education as relevant predictors because they are not statistically significant. Because of the correlation between InfMortality and LifeExp, any effect InfMortality had in f1 is attributed to LifeExp in f2. Thus, it can only be concluded in using both variables or none in my final model that it cannot be determined which one is the most relevant. An F test based on a joint hypothesis that both parameters are equal to zero was used to decide that both were not significant predictors. For my final model, reduced model (f3), it was decided to eliminate Unemployment, Law, PopDensity, Education, InfMortality and LifeExp given their p-values. Figure 3 shows f3 statistical values. With an adjusted R2 of 0.893, I can conclude that femicides in the selected Latin American countries from 1990 – 2017 can be greatly explained by f3. IhMale is not interpreted as an explanatory variable as it was used to capture the general “hostility level” and so the magnitude of the remaining variables can be interpreted as their contribution to femicides specifically. From f3, we can conclude that a 1% increase in Parliaments, GDP, UrbanPop will result respectively in a 4%, -22%, 13.63% of femicides in the selected Latin American countries. As for GINI, it is expected that a one unit increase in the variables will result respectively in a -13.43% change in femicides.

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Figure 3: Model f3 Even though these interpretations are correct, given the type of data used in this study and their transformation for statistical analysis as well as how these economic factors interact in the real world, it is better to look at the results from a broader angle. We would achieve this by using the sign and the magnitude of the regression coefficients to identify the socioeconomic factors that are most correlated with female femicides. These are indeed the factors that should drive policy changes in order to reduce femicides; recommendations will be addressed later in the memorandum. A better and more general interpretation of f3 is that GDP has a bigger impact in femicides, followed by GINI and UrbanPop. Parliaments, even though they are statistically significant, they have the smallest effect in explaining femicides in Latin America. In relative terms, that means that wealth and inequality have the largest correlation with femicides in these observational terms when compared to other factors such as Parliaments, education, health, law, and other factors. Also, future policies should consider that the level of femicides are higher in densely populated areas. Note that these conclusions based on the magnitude and sign of the effects do not change when considering the first model either, as this is a strength since the final conclusion is robust to the model selection process.

Recommendations

There are two major recommendations for Latin American countries based on the research done and the data analysis of this memorandum: Firstly, they should have more data and research on femicides. As stated previously, there are multiple legal definitions among the countries for the violent act, and in some cases, they do not recognize femicide as a specific type of violence. This results in a lack of data collection for recognized femicide, if it is not legally defined there can be no data on them and thus no research. All countries, going beyond those in Latin America, should legally recognize femicide as a specific type of gender violence and treat it as a type of discrimination. More specifically within Latin America, once all governments acknowledge femicides in their legal codes, they can finally start gathering data on them. The collection of data should be the responsibility of the governments and should have specific registries to report the number of murders; Argentina and Peru are at the forefront of this by already having femicide registries. Activists can also take part in this data collection solution, like in the case of MarĂ­a

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Salguero Bañuelos. Salguero is a Mexican activist that has been mapping all of the femicides in Mexico since 2013. Her map presents a big contrast from the under reporting of the Mexican government and the problem this underreporting creates despite the legal recognition of this specific crime. Governments have a responsibility of accurately reporting the number of femicides and it falls on activists to pressure governments to do so.

The second recommendation is based on the concluding data analysis. As seen before, the GDP and GINI coefficient play a major role in the number of femicides in a country. It is expected that investing in human capital such as education, particularly for women, can result in an increment of GDP and reduce the income inequality in a country. The GINI coefficient should be the main target of economic policies as its reduction would be reflected in GDP growth. The main recommendation for the reduction of the GINI coefficient in Latin American countries is increasing the minimum wage and raising marginal income tax rates on the highest earners. The Pigou-Dalton principle states that, ceteris paribus, the transfer of some income from a wealthier person to a poorer person (but not so much that the poorer person is now wealthier than the originally wealthy person), will result in a more equal income distribution and this can be achieved through proper taxation.

Conclusion

The trend of femicides in Latin American countries can be explained not only by social and historical factors but also through economic ones and it falls upon governments to target all of these. Defining what encompasses femicide is the first step towards reducing this type of homicide, not only in Latin America but also across the world. Delineating what constitutes as a femicide and what does not, gives a specific target for governmental policies. Then from an economical aspect, the policies Latin American governments should take to reduce the number of murdered women would need to focus on inequality. A redistribution of wealth through proper taxation can lead to better standards of living for the general population, and thus better quality of life for women. This reduction of inequality can lead to a betterment of human capital and in turn GDP growth in the long run. Also, as seen in the previous model, inequality and GDP greatly influence the number of femicides in a country. The purpose of this memorandum is to highlight the economic factors that can explain these heinous crimes and give recommendations to the Latin American governments in order to reduce them.

Bibliography

Carcedo Cabañas, Ana. 2000. Femicidio En Costa Rica 1990-1999. San José: Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres.

“ECLAC: At Least 2,795 Women Were Victims of Femicide in 23 Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in 2017.” United Nations. 2018.

Gonzalez, Roberto M. 2015. “Infant Mortality in Cuba: Myth and Reality.” Cuban Studies 43(1): 19–39.

Radford, Jill. 1992. The Politics of Woman Killing. New York: Twayne Publishers.

Saccomano, Celeste. 2015. “The Causes of Femicide in Latin America.”

Steil, Justin. 2014. Responding to Rising Inequality. Berkeley: Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society.

Global Study on Homicide: Gender-Related Killing of Women and Girls. United Nations

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Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna. 2018.

Widmer, Mireille and Irene Pavesi. 2016. “A Gendered Analysis of Violent Deaths.� Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

World Health Organization. 2017. Violence against Women. Vienna.

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Adapting the TSCTP to Mali’s Needs

By Anitha Marie Quintin

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The U.S War on Terror in the Sahara-Sahel

The Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was created in 2005 as a successor to the Pan-Sahel Initiative (Kieh and Kalu 2013, 89). The TSCTP seeks to continue the mission of its predecessor and defeat terrorist organizations through a combination of military and diplomatic support for countries in a region with a delicate and frequently unstable peace. Despite the obstacles faced by long standing ethnic tensions within Sahelian countries, the TSCTP has found relative success in its initiatives. The U.S military has been able to develop successful Malian military groups to help advance the TSCTP mission; “US-led Joint Combined Exercises and Trainings have built the capacity of Malian mobile units called Echelons Tactiques Inter-armes, and the 33rd Paratrooper Regiment to conduct effective patrols and interrupt the activities of AQIM” (Solomon 2013, 437).

However, in recent years, the U.S’s position regarding its commitment to such initiatives has shifted and become unclear. The 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary raised questions as to whether or not the U.S would continue its involvement in the region, with the summary stating that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S national security” (Mattis 2018, 1) Consequently, American allies such as France are beginning to express their concerns. At the 2020 G5 Summit held in Pau, French President Emmanuel Macron said “if the Americans decided to pull out of Africa, it would be very bad news for us, absolutely. I hope that I can convince President Trump that the fight against terrorism, a fight that he is fully committed to, is at stake out in this region” (Campbell 2020).

The Problem the United States Faces

Given the historic commitment the U.S has made to combatting terrorism and the Sahel’s importance to both American ally France and the global War on Terror, the United States must strongly consider whether it will continue its involvement in the region, and specifically in Mali—a country which has received constant attention from American allies. If the United States decides to maintain its involvement in the region, it must address another issue: despite the seemingly sound established counter-terrorism framework and the relative success of initiatives in Mali in the past, the spread of extremist ideologies in the region have been steadily rising since 2002 (Andre 2015, 28). Given these impediments to state-centric counter-terrorism initiatives, the TSCTP must change its approach in order to successfully combat terrorism in the region.

Recommendations Moving Forward

Working directly with the Bamako government to create a military response has not proven optimal, but as a state existing in an international community, the United States likewise cannot directly support organizations which are actively working to undermine Bamako’s legitimacy. Due to previous instances of the Malian army attacking civilians and colluding with militias and illicit actors, the Malian state is weak and holds little to no legitimacy with northern populations such as the Tuareg. By strengthening local security forces, the TSCTP initiatives can in fact deepen the conflict between the Bamako government and Northern Malians, as the resources are being funneled into security services which could in turn use

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them to “quell domestic opposition” (Boudali 2017, 6).

Furthermore, deterrence solely in the form of threats and application of force can work against the U.S’s goals, as it can drive different dissenting groups together (Trager and Zagorcheva 2005, 121). Ultimately, “Terrorist activity will be unappealing only when the cost of participation outweighs the benefits”, (Boudali 2017, 8) and the current reliance on policies revolving around a government already perceived as oppressive by the people will not shift the balance in favor of U.S goals.

A possible solution would be to divert support to local groups—which hold more legitimacy with the people, and are thus more likely to effectively subvert attempts at converting communities to terrorist causes—rather than continuing state-centric policies. However, as aforementioned, this would mean supporting groups which are also actively working to undermine the authority of the Bamako government. Publicly supporting groups which challenge the authority of the legitimate government can cause turmoil on the international stage and can cause the U.S to come across as meddling with domestic politics.

The U.S may find more success tackling the issue from an alternate angle. Rather than changing the governance structures which it chooses to support, focusing on development policies—administered through the Bamako government—can help alter the image of the Malian state in the people’s eyes. Over the past decades, AQIM has been able to successfully integrate itself into the heart of many northern Malian communities. Through local marriages and selective funding of village chiefs, who had their historical power and traditional forms of governance usurped by the post-colonial Bamako government, AQIM was able to represent itself as a charity rather than a terrorist organization. The money, medicine, and access to communication which AQIM brought with them satisfied a need which northern Mali feels Bamako is not properly addressing (Bøås 2014). Furthermore, the rise to power of important Tuareg figures such as Iyad Ag Ghaly with his group Ansar Dine serves as the recognition and representation which northern Malians have sought and failed to receive through past peace agreements (Pezard and Shurkin 2015).

Past peace accords between the Bamako government and northern Malian rebels see many of the same demands repeated. However, lack of implementation or incomplete implementation has resulted in increasingly growing resentment among northern populations—and, for previously mentioned reasons, makes an allegiance to AQIM or Ansar Dine far more appealing. In order for the U.S to have Mali’s complete support in combatting terrorism, northern and southern Mali must reconcile. Aiding the Malian government to increase representation of northern populations in both peace negotiations and within the Bamako government itself, as well as to distribute more equitable access to essential resources will help to develop a deterrence strategy that is not solely reliant on aggressive actions.

Fortunately, there is recognition of this fact within the American government itself: “the 2011 U.S National Strategy for Counter-Terrorism, for instance, forcefully argues that, U.S counter-terrorism efforts require a multi-dimensional and multinational effort that goes beyond traditional intelligence, military, and law enforcement functions” (Solomon 2013, 440) . Steps have been taken to disincentivize membership in terrorist organizations: the U.S is the leading provider of humanitarian aid to Mali, allocating just over $119 million to help resolve the regional food security crisis (Arieff 2020, 4). If the U.S were to provide more of this sort of aid through the Malian state, the feeling among disenfranchised populations of being forsaken by their government may slowly change to one of trust. Through development and

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outreach programs, and higher representation at the government level, the Malian state can work to improve its image with all of its citizens; only then can state-centric initiatives such as the TSCTP truly succeed.

Conclusion

The U.S Global War on Terror has been costly and drawn out, and the 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary indicates a shift in priority away from it. However, other American allies are reluctant to end their involvement in the matter, and the Sahel region more broadly. Consequently, the U.S must strongly consider whether it will shift its military priorities away from the combat against terrorism.

If the U.S decides to continue its combat against terrorism in the region, in order to avoid inefficient use of resources, it would be advisable to place a greater emphasis on development projects and aid. Mending the relationships between the Bamako government and dissenting populations so that they may work together to combat terrorism in Mali is imperative to developing the TSCTP into the most effective program possible and achieving American goals in the Sahara-Sahel.

Bibliography

Andre, David. 2015. “United States Counterterrorism Strategy in the Trans-Sahara and the Rise of Salafi-Jihadism in the Sahel.” Naval Postgraduate School.

Arieff, Alexis. 2020 “Crisis in Mali.” United States Congress Congressional Research Service.

Bøås, Morten. 2014. “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing Control of Northern Mali” Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel. 7(4): 1-6.

Boudali, Lianne Kennedy. 2017. “The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.” Combating Terrorism Center. West Point, N.Y. Campbell, John. 2020. “France and G5 Sahel Recommit Themselves as U.S. Mulls Drawdown.” Council on Foreign Relations.

Kieh, George Klay and Kelechi Kalu. 2013. West Africa and the U.S War on Terror Mattis, Jim. 2018. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy”, United States Department of Defense.

Pezard, Stephanie and Michael Shurkin. 2015. “Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement.” Rand Corporation.

Solomon, H. 2013. “The African state and the failure of US counter-terrorism initiatives in Africa: The cases of Nigeria and Mali.” South African Journal of International Affairs.

20(3): 427–445.

Trager, R. F. and D. P. Zagorcheva. 2005. “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done.” International Security 30: 87–123.

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Dynamic Detection of Urbanization Rate from Satellite Imagery

By Smrithi Sharma and Parth Khare

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Problem Statement of the Issue

There is a discrepancy in the definition of urban settlements between the various government sources in India. According to Census, towns are categorized by areas with population of at least 5000, density of at least 400 persons per square kilometer and that at least 75% of the male main working population is engaged in non- agricultural activities.

The urban region in India contributes more than 60% to Gross Development Product (GDP). By 2020, share of urban population in India’s GDP is projected to increase to 70-75% (Barclays, 2014). There is immense imbalance in the distribution in burden of development on cities which houses only about 30% of total population in India according to the official measurements. For more inclusive growth in the coming decades, this discrepancy has to be minimized

Overview

India is rapidly urbanizing, but does the census-based definition of 31.2% realistically capture the extent and scale of India’s urban story? Based on density of human activity over built-up area, this paper attempts to redefine the rate of national urbanisation as well as provide a more granular assessment of state and district level urban sprawl.

This paper attempts to postulate a dynamically updated satellite imagery driven definition of urban- isation. By redefining and extending Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL) provided by the Joint Research Center of the European Commission Science Hub, a new contemporary definition of urbanisa- tion can be constructed for India. According to GHSL’s benchmarks, settlements are categorized as,2 a) High-density cluster/urban centre- contiguous grid cells of 1 km2 with a density of at least 1500 inhab- itants per km2 and a minimum population of 50,000; b) Urban cluster: cluster of contiguous grid cells of 1 km2 with a density of at least 300 inhabitants per km2 and a minimum population of 5000. As quantified in this year’s Economic Survey, based on the definition of High Density Settlements, India was 63% urbanized in 2015 which is evidently more than twice the figure of that defined in census 2011.

According to World Bank’s estimates, population density of European Union on which the GHSL classification is set on, was roughly 120 per km2 in 2016 and for India it was 445 per km2, whereas it was 57 for world on an average.3 Therefore, if becomes vital to refine this definition by an additional filter which will be more stringent than the GHSL urban settlements. For this purpose, GHSL built-up layer can be juxtaposed with Night Light VIIRS (Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite) data, which illustrates the degree of economic activity at micro-precision.

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Figure 1: Built-Up Units in India

References

Economic Survey 2016-17, Volume II, How Urban is India? Elvidge, C., Baugh, K., Zhizhin, M., Hsu, F. C., Ghosh, T. (2017). VIIRS night-time lights. International Journal of Remote Sensing, 38(21). Eric, D., Kamala, M-G. (2011). Toward a better appraisal of urbanization in India. Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography. Goldblatt, R., You, W., Hanson, G., Khandelwal. A. (2016) Detecting the Boundaries of Urban Areas in India: A Dataset for Pixel-Based Image Classification in Google Earth Engine Harari, M. (2016) Cities in Bad Shape: Urban geometry in India. Mukhopadhyay, P. (2017) Does Administrative Status Matter for Small Towns in India? Subaltern Urbanisation in India: An Introduction to the Dynamics of Ordinary Towns (Chapter – 17) Schneider et al (2015) A new urban landscape in East–Southeast Asia, 2000–2010. IOPscience.

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Reducing the Shortage of Affordable Housing in the State of Wisconsin

By Amy Shircel

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Background Summary:

In the years 1994 through 2004, before the crash of the housing market and the Recession that followed, Wisconsin issued about 36,000 housing building permits per year (Paulsen 2019). Housing costs have now exceeded pre-housing crisis levels, depicted in the figure below (Paulsen 2019).

With the end of the Great Recession, the number of available jobs increased by 8.2%, at-

tracting a large influx of workers to our state (Paulsen 2019). Since the end of the Recession, the population in Wisconsin has risen steadily, and has increased by 2.2% from 2010 to 2018, with a net increase of 126,286 people (U.S. Census Bureau 2019).

As a result of this constant population growth, the housing supply has not been able to keep up with the ever-expanding workforce, leading to a workforce housing gap in Wisconsin: the economy is growing, while the housing stock is falling behind. Workforce housing is housing that is affordable to households earning between 60 to 120 percent of the area median income (National Association of Realtors). Workforce housing is typically considered housing for public employees such as teachers, firefighters, garbage men, and police officers, “who are integral to a community, yet who often cannot afford to live in the communities they serve�(National Association of Realtors). Workforce housing also encompasses service workers, construction workers, retail workers, and young professionals.

Throughout the state for the last 10 years, housing construction is on a slow decline, while employment is on a steep incline, engendering a deficit of housing for employees. In the 20 largest counties, there was a net underproduction of nearly 20,000 housing units, shown in

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the figure below (Paulsen 2019)

Clearly, a lack of housing is not confined to the borders of large, urban cities. In 2018, Sheboygan, Wisconsin had 3,000 jobs to fill, but not enough houses to fill these job openings (Mitchell 2018). One man in Sheboygan reported looking for housing for his family for over a year with no success, and as a result, has commuted from North Carolina to Wisconsin every week for work, while also strenuously looking for a place to live (Michell 2018). Sheboygan County is desperate for the construction of more workforce housing: “people would be moving to Sheboygan for work, but our population growth is stunted by our lack of housing,” said Dane Checolinski, director of the Sheboygan County Economic Development Corps (Hess 2017).

This pattern of need for workforce housing is mirrored in Dane County, Milwaukee County, Walworth County, and throughout the state. Employees are either forced to live far from their place of work, to pay unfair prices for housing, or to leave Wisconsin’s workforce all together (Paulsen 2019). Clearly, there is a need for bold bipartisan action from politicians and legislators across the state to address this ongoing and economically destructive housing crisis.

Problem/ Issue Analysis:

Workforce housing is defined as the supply of housing in a community that meets the needs of the workforce in that community, and can include a variety of housing types, sizes, prices, and locations (Paulsen 2019). Madison’s mayor, Satya Rhodes-Conway, emphasizes that workforce housing IS affordable housing, so when housing is not affordable, employers and businesses feel a harsh blow (Rhodes-Conway 2019). Mayor Rhodes-Conway goes on to explain that when cities lack adequate affordable housing, it suppresses economic growth, and creates a ripple effect across the entire state: “This is not just a Madison problem”, she

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stresses, making evident that the need for state-wide bipartisan action is crucial for economic prosperity.

Wisconsin is home to many large business headquarters that require more workforce housing. For example, Sheboygan County is home to Kohler Co., which employs about 8,000 workers, most of them native to Sheboygan County, and planners for the construction of Foxconn Technology Company in Racine, which will employ about 13,000 people, have expressed the need for more workforce housing to staff their facilities (Romell 2019).

Housing growth has not kept pace with need, the price for decent housing is increasing more rapidly than incomes, and the existing housing stock is aging, becoming inadequate and unsuitable for potential renters and buyers (Paulsen 2019). Restrictive zoning regulations, such as minimum lot sizes, excessive parking requirements, and long approval processes also impede affordable housing creation (Paulsen 2019). In Wisconsin, it has become extraordinarily difficult for businesses to recruit and retain employees, sharply decreasing the state’s economic competitiveness (Paulsen 2019)

Options:

Expedite approval processes and reduce zoning restrictions at state levels: The state of Wisconsin in general is restrictive when it comes to zoning and land-use regulations, which in turn raises the overall costs of housing (Paulsen 2019). A study conducted by the National Association of Home Builders found that strict zoning regulations can “drive up the cost of single-family homes by at least 24 percent, and multifamily housing by 30 percent” (Paulsen 2019). Additionally, when building proposals are made to local municipalities, the approval process often takes years to be completed because delays cause cost overruns with contractors, which leads to developers charging more for housing (Paulsen 2019). In turn, the price of new housing units increases.

Wisconsin should pass a law requiring local governments to make an approval decision on housing proposals within 90 days of their proposal to local authorities, which will increase the supply of housing in a shorter period of time, and also facilitate the construction of affordable units for Wisconsin’s increasing workforce population. However, expediting the process may not always translate into meaningful time savings for developers (Inclusionary Housing 2018). Our government is intentionally slow in nature; and local and state governments can only move so quickly (Harrington 2019). With limited staff resources, there is a limit to how quickly housing permits can be approved.

Allow Inclusionary Zoning: Local Inclusionary Zoning (IZ) laws create affordable housing by requiring new housing developments to have a certain percentage of units sold/rented at affordable prices to provide housing to low-income residents that would be otherwise unable to afford it (Murphy 2008). IZ policies have the potential to produce great numbers of affordable housing units by requiring developers to generate new low income housing within each development built. However, IZ was eventually outlawed in Wisconsin, as it was interpreted as a form of rent control (Lubell 2016). Inclusionary Zoning laws throughout Wisconsin could provide affordable housing units for prospective employees and lessen the impacts of the workforce housing crisis. However, other studies have shown that IZ legislation has been found to weaken economic incentives for developers to build new units, decreasing housing supply and increasing housing prices, which could inhibit new workforce housing creation in Wisconsin (Lubell 2016).

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Recommendation:

Expand Affordable Housing Tax Credit (Act 176). Wisconsin has a significant amount of existing housing stock that has the potential to provide affordable workforce housing for places that cannot create supply of housing to meet the demand. However, most of the existing housing stock is outdated and in need of improvement: over 60 percent of Wisconsin’s single-family structures were built before 1980 and are in need of substantial repair, modernization or energy-efficient investments (Paulsen 2019).

Wisconsin Act 176, passed by the Wisconsin State Legislature in 2017, creates income and franchise tax credits for the development of low income housing (Wisconsin State Legislature 2017). The Legislature should consider amending Wisconsin Act 176 to create a distinct pool of tax credits that will go specifically towards renovation, preservation, and improvement of existing single and multi-family units throughout the state. Supply-driven public and private housing development often fails to provide adequate quantity and quality housing, so it is important to emphasize the importance of existing housing to combat Wisconsin’s housing crisis (Gurran 2018). These conversions could allow single family units to become two-flat units, three flat units, or duplexes, increasing the amount of housing available.

In combination with amending Act 176, legislators should consider authoring bills that require an expedited approval process of 90 days for any construction or renovation proposals for affordable units. This shortened approval process should significantly increase the amount of housing that becomes available to Wisconsin’s workforce, while also ensuring a streamlined process that does not engender a rise in housing prices due to years waiting for approval. The combination of these actions would ensure Wisconsin employees have a place to live, boost the numbers of Wisconsin’s workforce, help businesses expand, and elevate statewide economic competitiveness.

Conclusion

Workforce housing is economic development because a home is where a job goes to sleep at night (Paulsen 2019). Clearly, counties around the state, including Sheboygan, Milwaukee, and Dane County, have demonstrated a need for increased workforce housing. Wisconsin has a responsibility to its citizens to act as comprehensively as possible in addressing this crisis to help meet Wisconsin’s growing population. In order to foster economic growth and create an equitable city for Wisconsin’s present and future workforce, leaders must push for bipartisan action to increase workforce housing throughout the state.

Works Cited

Gurran, N., Rowley, S., Milligan, V., Randolph, B., Phibbs, P., Gilbert, C., James, A., Troy, L. and van den Nouwelant, R. (2018). Inquiry into increasing affordable housing supply: Evidence-based principles and strategies for Australian policy and practice. AHURI Final Report 300, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute Limited, Melbourne, http://www.ahuri.edu.au/research/final-reports/300, doi: 10.18408/ahuri-7313001.

Harrington, Eileen. “Lecture in Political Science 272.” University of Wisconsin-Madison: 2019.

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Hess, C. (2017, June 26). “Sheboygan wants hundreds of spec homes and condos built for growing workforce”. BizTimes: Milwaukee Business News. Retrieved from https://biztimes.com/sheboygan-wants-hundreds-of-spec-homes-and-condos-built-for-growingworkforce/ Inclusionary Housing. (2018, January 3). “Expedited Processing”. Retrieved November 30, 2019, from https://inclusionaryhousing.org/designing-a-policy/land-dedication-incentives/expedited-processing/.

Lubell, J. (2016). Preserving and Expanding Affordability in Neighborhoods Experiencing Rising Rents and Property Values. Cityscape 18, no. 3 (2016): 131-150. https://www.jstor. org/stable/26328276?seq=1 Mitchell, R. (2018, August 8). “Sheboygan leaders addressing housing shortage”. Retrieved November 27, 2019, from https://www.tmj4.com/news/local-news/sheboygan-county-leaders-work-to-address-housing-shortage.

Murphy, B. J. Inclusionary Zoning Ordinance Evaluation Study, (2008). Madison, WI. National Association of Realtors. Workforce Housing Overview. https://www.nar.realtor/ home_from_work.nsf/files/PG%20Module%201.pdf/$FILE/PG%20Module%201.pdf Paulsen, K. (2019). Falling Behind. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Realtors Association: 2019. https://www.wra.org/Legislative/Special_Reports/WRA_2019_Workforce_Housing_ Report__Falling_Behind/ Rhodes-Conway, Satya. “Lecture in Political Science 272.” University of Wisconsin-Madison: 2019.

Romell, R. (2019, March 13). “Kohler Co. will end engine manufacturing in Sheboygan County, but employees will be offered other jobs”. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from https://www.jsonline.com/story/money/business/2019/03/13/kohler-co-end-engine-manufacturing-sheboygan-county/3147374002/ “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Wisconsin”. (n.d.). Retrieved November 27, 2019, from https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/WI/PST120218#PST120218.

Wisconsin State Legislature, Wisconsin State Legislature (2018). Retrieved from https:// docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2017/related/acts/176.

“Workforce Housing Overview,” 1–14. Accessed April 5, 2020. https://www.nar.realtor/ home_from_work.nsf/files/PG Module 1.pdf/$FILE/PG Module 1.pdf.

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Government Accountability

By Hannah Sohn

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Statement of the problem:

America renders a message of apparent contradiction -- a nation founded by immigrants yet simmering with discourse concerning whether or not they belong. The immigration narrative continues to evolve as new policies are put in place. The issue of immigration transcends politics and shifts discussion regarding immigrants, discrimination and injustice towards language around minority groups; this conversation pervades throughout a changing America. While individuals identify immigrant-disrespect in government procedures, it leads to manifestation of rank and hierarchical positions that construct their unequal treatment. In an attempt to reverse the rhetoric, it’s necessary for a reform that prompts fair treatment and safety towards immigrant communities to promote the nation’s unity for all people.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has received public scrutiny and criticism in response to mistreatment of immigrants. Recently, backed by a strong social media presence, instances such as family separations at the border call for this agency to be seen as a villain.

In 2003 ICE was created through a merger of the investigative and interior enforcement elements of the former U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The agency is primarily devoted to three operational directorates: including – Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) – to advance the ICE mission of protection.

The mission explicitly states actions against “illegal immigration that threaten national security and public safety” of American citizens” (Immigration and Customs Enforcement).

The ERO identifies its purpose “To identify, arrest, and remove aliens who present a danger “or “are a risk to public safety” as well as “those who enter the United States illegally or otherwise undermine the integrity of our immigration laws and our border control efforts” (Immigration and Customs Enforcement).

However, the existence of many immigrants in our nation does not impose an imminent threat. There needs to be a level of respect regarded in ICE procedures and in the dialogue they incite to address topics of deportation. There should be greater measures made to distinguish those who are “threat to public safety” and those who are trying to gain permanent residence to achieve a better life. These initiatives need to be widely implemented into all aspects of ICE routines. However, the start is by altering the mission statement and word choices around how to address the community. This is a start to deeper reform that will demand respect and humane practices. I hope to lend insight into the specific issues but also that my findings and recommendations may help to improve the immigrant experience.

Proposed implementation and reform:

In attempts to make better the treatment of immigrants, states such as California, New York, Colorado and others have proposed reform in their procedures on how to address immigrants. As California State Senator, Tony Mendoza and other individuals affected acknowledge, the term Alien’ is considered a derogatory address for a foreign-born person.

The term carries negative connotations projected towards the immigrant community as a whole (Foster Global 2019). Recently, California neglected to remain silent in the face of this injustice as the word “alien” will no longer appear in California’s labor code. While this new law that Governor, Jerry Brown (D) signed, is a purpose meant to rectify the word being seen as disparaging to people not born in the United States (Foster Global 2019). Moreover,

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New York City went a step further last September. In an effort to prevent discrimination based on immigration status, it banned the usage of the alien phase (Kelley 2020). These various elected leaders have taken the initiative to create rules that promote a more human image of the immigrant community. The purpose of their action is to “bend social sentiments in the migrants’ favor” (Kelley 2020).

The shift in rhetoric hopes to inspire a positive change within promoting an improved psychological mindset within the immigrant communities. While results of studies examining anti-immigrant political rhetoric and policy, is evidence that these terms negatively impact the mental and physical health of foreign nationals (Roy 2018). The effects of these words: “alien” and “illegal alien” work to demonize and dehumanize the migrant community (Roy 2018). The dialogue used around immigrants creates a common identity that is reflective of the use of “alien” term. Through extension of its use, the community feels like outcasts as the world is reflective of the image of Martians who don’t share human qualities or emotions.

The term “alien” should not be placed in our government’s description of human beings.

Although the term may not fully be categorized as propaganda, it promotes a strong perception. ICE should change its address of “aliens” to a less dehumanizing term. The federal level should set a precedent, followed by other states. The various places in which the ICE publicized procedures the use of this word should be revoked. Instead, they should replace it with a world that is reflective of these individuals being human beings. Further, ICE should similarly make conscious changes in their particular words in an attempt to moralize the community. The current mission statement could be altered “those who” rather than “that ‘’ when deliberating their potential harm and threat to the well-being of society.

This changes the message that all immigrants are harmful to deliberately show that there are instead few. The dialect in which they address the community in other areas should make similar adjustments. While refraining from generalizing the community and specifying the danger present in few people, the rhetoric surrounding the community will adjust to being less hostile. These sentiments can then be further implemented into all procedures.

Conclusion:

These changes are important. The number of immigrants living in our nation has expanded and continues to increase (Radford 2019). Data provides proof that the foreignborn population reached a record 44.4 million in 2017. These numbers continue to expand with each year. Obama addresses DACA-recipients, considered among illegal immigrants, “they play in our neighborhoods, they’re friends with our kids, they pledge allegiance to our flag” (Radford 2019). They live with us and among us. Additionally, Immigrants started 25 percent of the highest-growth companies between 1990 and 2005, and these companies directly employ an estimated 220,000 people inside the United States (Roy 2018). These individuals help our economy and provide job opportunities. They work with us and for us.

Changing the way ICE addresses Immigrants present a bold statement. While ICE has the ability to help frame societal perceptions through the way it handles immigration issues.

ICE needs to change its procedures to better treat immigrants. They should distinguish those who are a threat and those who are not. The change in dialect will not solve these problems. However, through creating a small adjustment, there is hope to inspire change into the system as a whole and into the minds of the citizens. Through creating a more

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positive perception this should encourage better treatment and a better societal view. As citizens of this country, we look to our leadership to set a standard on how to behave (Kelley 2020). Through changing the way they are addressed will create a change in how our society perceives them.

Bibliography

“The Dehumanizing History Of The Words We’ve Used To Describe Immigrants.” Foster Global, 26 July 2019, www.fosterglobal.com/blog/the-dehumanizing-history-of-thewords-weve-used-to-describe-immigrants/.

“Enforcement and Removal Operations.” ICE, www.ice.gov/ero#wcm-survey-target-id.

Kelley, Alexandra. “Lawmakers Battle over Calling People ‘Undocumented Immigrants’ or ‘Illegal Aliens’.” TheHill, 14 Feb. 2020, thehill.com/changing-america/respect/equality/483095-illegal-alien-or-undocumented-immigrant-colorado-lawmakers.

Radford, Jynnah. “Key Findings about U.S. Immigrants.” Pew Research Center, Pew Research Center, 17 June 2019, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findingsabout-u-s-immigrants/.

“Remarks by the President on Immigration.” National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives and Records Administration, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration.

Roy, Avik. “6 Problems With The Way We Think About Income Inequality.” Medium, FREOPP.org, 5 June 2018, freopp.org/6-problems-with-the-way-we-think-about-income-inequality-fa6138c33afa.

“Who We Are.” ICE, www.ice.gov/about.

Wolbrecht, Christina, et al., editors. Politics of Democratic Inclusion. Temple University Press, 2005. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bw1kpt. Accessed 18 Apr. 2020.

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How LIFO acts as a tax loophole for American corporations

By Jeff Wang

Information concerning inventory and its related accounts are required items that need to be reported on financial statements at the end of each financial period. In the United States, governing accounting boards allow corporations to use three different methods of accounting for the cost of inventory.

Each different method produces varying information regarding the financial health of a company, which can be potentially utilized by a company to pay less taxes. The process of recording the cost of inventory should be standardized in order to maintain universal results which do not abuse tax loopholes or misrepresent the financial health of a company.

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Problem: The utilization of different methods in inventory accounting is not appropriate.

In the United States, under securities and commission law all organizations are required to report their most up-to-date financial information at the end of each financial period - be it in quarters, biannually, or annually. As long as an organization deals with financial and business transactions, regardless of its status as a government, not-for-profit, etc., it is required to make these financial reports. The focus of this memo will primarily concern forprofit corporations.

In the United States, under securities and commission law all organizations are required to report their most up-to-date financial information at the end of each financial period - be it in quarters, biannually, or annually. As long as an organization deals with financial and business transactions, regardless of its status as a government, not-for-profit, etc., it is required to make these financial reports. The focus of this memo will primarily concern forprofit corporations.

Under the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the reporting of financial data should follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and must follow U.S. law. Though violation of GAAP does not necessarily breach U.S. law, most corporations follow them as if they were the law. Infringing securities policies typically results in heavy penalties; in 2016, technology manufacturer Logitech International was forced to pay a fine of $7.5 million for inflating its 2011 fiscal year financial results (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2020).

Financial reports can be exceptionally easy to manipulate to misrepresent the health and stability of a corporation. Thus, the Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) and the FASB tend to set relatively strict conditions for accountants to follow. For example, when journalizing and adjusting changes in a notes payable account, accountants are required to only use the accrual basis rather than the cash basis as to not over/understate their assets or liabilities (Tuovila 2020).

The stringency of laws is generally true across the accounting cycle - there is often no more than one acceptable method to record financial information and data. However, an exception does exist in the procedures of recording inventory. GAAP allows for three different methods of accounting for inventory costs: the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) method, the Last-In-First-Out (FIFO) method, and the Average-cost method. These methods are relatively self-explanatory: FIFO assumes that the first inventory to arrive is the first to be sold, LIFO assumes that the last inventory to arrive is the first to be sold, and the Average-cost method assumes that the cost of the inventory sold is taken from a weighted average over all goods sold over the financial period.

Different inventories purchased at different times can have a different cost. That is, if an order of ten toasters was purchased at $400 dollars in January, it would not be uncommon for a corporation to purchase 20 toasters at $900 dollars later on in July. From a basic mathematical standpoint, it is clear to see that the different methods of recording inventory would result in different values: if the company managed to sell 15 toasters by the end of July, under the FIFO method the total cost of goods sold would be $625, as opposed to $675 if the LIFO method was used.

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Clearly, the cost of goods sold is not a static figure. Over the course of a financial period, the cost of inventory sold at different times will rarely be the same; different quantities of inventory may be sold for different prices. Columns 6 & 9 in the table below illustrate this for a FIFO valuation example (Bragg 2005):

When comparing to a FIFO valuation to LIFO valuation, particularly with examples with identical values (Bragg 2005), discrepancies in ending inventory costs become clear (note the comparison between column 9 for the FIFO valuation above with column 10 for the LIFO valuation below):

Assuming the LIFO valuation method typically results in higher costs of goods sold.

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Higher costs of goods sold adds to the total expenses account of a company, reducing gross profits. Profit is calculated by reducing costs expenses from revenues - in this case, revenues are generated through selling inventory. The primary reason for American companies to use LIFO valuation methods over FIFO valuation methods is to represent their financial status as less profitable, potentially lowering the amount of taxes paid (Davenport 2002). The state corporate income tax rate for 2019 with its respective income bracket tax rates can be seen below (Cammengo 2020):

Evidently, the choice to use LIFO evaluation methods can misrepresent financial information to the benefit of a corporation - revenues are understated to reduce taxable profits.

Recommendation: Standardize Inventory Cost Valuation to a Single Method

U.S. companies will continue to use LIFO valuation methods for tax purposes. In periods of inflation, the LIFO method will reduce taxes payable, often making it the clear choice for the benefit of a company. However, by standardizing inventory cost valuation methods to the FIFO method, we can effectively: 1. Prevent abuse of tax policies. Graduated tax policies aim to reduce wealth disparities.

FIFO valuation methods reduce the risk of already affluent corporations from abusing tax loopholes.

2. Provide consistency in a global context. Under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), corporations in most countries outside the United States are required to use the FIFO method (Craycraft 1998). Oftentimes, corporations in the U.S. using LIFO will

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swap to FIFO when operating overseas. By mandating American companies to use the FIFO method, less confusion in international business transactions is created.

3. Lessen risk of outdated costs in inventory (Bragg 2005). As the FIFO method utilizes the oldest costs first to calculate the total cost of goods sold, it is impossible to have outdated costs to accumulate in inventory. Management branches in corporations will not have to worry about outdated prices significantly influencing the cost of goods sold and subsequently, violations of GAAP. Lessen interference with just-in-time systems (Bragg 2005). Just-in-time (JIT) systems are a management strategy which essentially uses raw materials in lieu with production schedules, that is, utilizing resources only when they are needed (Banton 2020). Intuitively, the LIFO method can be problematic when JIT systems are being used. It is important to note that JIT systems are highly efficient and are being employed by increasing numbers of corporations today.

The impact of this policy change will mostly affect a corporation’s operations within the United States as regulations under the IFRS already mandate the FIFO cost allocation method. The standardization of the FIFO method will immediately decrease the reported costs of goods sold and concurrently increase the reported profit of corporations using LIFO cost allocation methods. Government revenue from corporate taxation will consequently increase.

Holistically speaking, unless there is a significant discrepancy of the price of inventory purchased at the start of a financial period as compared to the end of the financial period, this change will not hugely impact a corporation in the long run. Inventory is not a longterm asset, that is, it is expected to be turned over during a single accounting period or a single year, whichever is shorter. Essentially, this policy change does not significantly impact the operations of for-profit corporations while effectively lessening the risk of tax abuse and accounting standards violations. It can also alternatively streamline operations within companies that use JIT management strategies.

A similar policy memorandum was made by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 2013. The CBO proposed to eliminate the LIFO approach to identifying inventory, as well as “lower of cost or market” (LCM) and subnormal-goods methods of inventory valuation. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated an increase of $58 billion in taxable revenues from 2019-2028. CBO estimates that the annual increase in revenues would be “substantially” higher in 2019-2023 than the remaining 10 years; following the completion of inventory re-evaluation, the effect on revenues would be relatively small (Congressional Budget Office 2020).

Conclusion

In consideration of the fact that GAAP generally mandates no more than one method of accounting for financial data, that FIFO is used as an international standard, and that different inventory presentation methods result in potentially misleading and confusing information, inventory valuation methods should be restricted to a single, universal standard. LIFO valuation systems only serve the benefit of reducing taxes payable for companies. Otherwise, using the LIFO method can increase GAAP violation risk through confusion in inventory accounts and does not work well with other systems within the accounting cycle.

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Bibliography:

Bradley, Stephen. Inventory Accounting: A Comprehensive Guide. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2005.

Craycraft, Catherine. “Foreign Operations and the Choice of Inventory Accounting Methods.” Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 7, no. 1 (1998): 81-93.

Davenport, Charles. The Income Taxation of Inventories Under the Last-In-First-Out Method. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002.

Banton, Caroline. Just-In-Time (JIC). Investopedia. Accessed March 9, 2020.https://www. investopedia.com/terms/j/jit.asp.

Tuovila, Alicia. Accruals. Investopedia. Accessed March 8, 2020. https://www.investopedia. com/terms/a/accruals.asp Cammenga, Janelle. State Corporate Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2019. Tax Foundation. Accessed March 9, 2020. https://taxfoundation.org/state-corporate-rates- brackets-2019/.

Repeal the “LIFO” and “Lower Cost or Market” Inventory Accounting Methods. Congressional Budget Office. Accessed April 5, 2020. https://cbo.gov/budget- options/2018/54812 SEC Announces Financial Fraud Cases. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Accessed April 5, 2020. https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-74.html

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