Designing Out Crime: A Model for Urban River Corridors

Groundwork South East London June 2006

Designing Out Crime, A Model for Urban River Corridors

Bridget Snaith MLI, Groundwork South East London, June 2006

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CONTENTS

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Executive Summary Theoretical Background to the Tool Kit Tool Kit Methodology

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Tool Kit Application: Ravensbourne River Corridor

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Map1: Study Area Map 2: Crime/Fear of Crime & Anti Social Behaviour Map 3: Routes and Activity Generators Map 4:Visibility Map 4: Routes, Activity, Visibility and Crime ASB Map 5: Recommended Approach

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Recommendations for action

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Tool Kit Application: Chester

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Tool Kit Application: Den Bosch Conclusion Bibliography

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Executive Summary This study is intended to be a practical guide to design techniques that can increase safety along urban river corridors.

For a crime to be committed, there must be someone to commit the crime, (the perpetrator), a target for the crime, and an opportunity for the crime to take place - a moment when there is little risk of detection or intervention by others4. To ‘design out’ crime therefore, action can be taken either to exclude the perpetrator, to defend the target, or to limit opportunity by increasing the likelihood of detection or intervention.

In an urban environment, it is difficult to identify potential perpetrators. The city is full of strangers. In successful city spaces, behaviour is moderated by social conventions, and despite the presence of strangers, we feel safe14. In less successful spaces, we are frightened that social conventions will not operate, that we may become targets of crime, and we moderate our behaviour accordingly.

Much of the work to date in ‘designing out crime’ has focussed on housing areas, which may be more ‘suburban’ than urban in character, with few truly public spaces, and a defined group of ‘legitimate’ users. Techniques include establishing a clear hierarchy of private and public spaces, where private spaces can be defended, and public spaces can be observed.1 Designing out crime in urban river corridors and adjacent green spaces presents different challenges. This space is largely intended to be public and accessible to all, and very often it is hidden or not observed.

This ‘tool kit’ first provides tools that can identify key characteristics of river corridors and adjacent green spaces that can foster criminal or anti- social behaviour, and highlights problem areas, so action can be focussed and prioritised. It is not recommended that spaces be modified where no problems exist. Through this process, the toolkit will identify approaches that are most appropriate to the individual sites circumstances. It will identify techniques which make successful public spaces, where informal social controls operate, and where everyone can feel safe. The toolkit will also identify spaces that are unlikely to achieve informal social control, due to isolation within, or limitations of, the existing urban structure. In these circumstances it will recommend design interventions that will increase safety including restricting access to identifiable user groups, where other techniques are unlikely to achieve safe access for all.

One of the key recommendations of the tool kit is to engage with the local community throughout the process, to check findings and agree priorities. Informal social controls have been found to be greatly enhanced by strong community ‘ownership’.14

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Theoretical Background to the Toolkit The theoretical background to the subject is large, and is represented here only in summary. A bibliography is provided to allow further detailed study of the subject, though this is far from exhaustive.

Approaches to ‘designing out crime’ in public space recommend actions that impact one or more of the three elements required for crime ie • • •

acting to reduce the opportunity for crime, (‘self policing space’) acting to protect the target, (‘target hardening’) acting to prevent the perpetrator from being present. (‘limited access’)

Sociologists, policy makers and designers have identified and measured effective ways to minimize crime in the public arena,2,5,7,9 but conflicts can arise between recommendations where the intended action addresses a different element. This section summarises the different theoretical approaches, groups them according to their targets for action, and offers a critique of their strengths and weaknesses.

The starting point of this study is the creation of successful ‘self policing’ public space as a means to designing out crime, therefore research by William H Whyte, Bill Hillier and Demos, guidance from the Commission for Architecture and The Built Environment (CABE) and from the Government’s ‘Urban Task Force’, into what makes public spaces successful have been incorporated into the toolkit. These complement more focussed crime reduction strategies like those of Oscar Newman, and UK guidance derived from them, described in recent planning legislation, guidance from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) or in the ‘Secured by Design’ principles of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) .

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APPROACH 1. Self Policing Space Bibliography references: 3, 5 ,6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14

Self policing spaces act to limit the opportunity/desire to commit crime. The aim is to create spaces where many strangers mix, and informal supervision by many eyes and ears deny the opportunity to commit crime even where potential perpetrators are present. Only 15% of criminal acts are pre-planned, with the remaining 85% being opportunistic. Removing the opportunity could therefore potentially prevent 85% of crime4. Self policing spaces can and do safely include features such as wildlife areas, ornamental shrub beds, shelters, seating etc which can add to popularity if located appropriately, features that could attract antisocial activity in less overlooked/busy locations.

Rationale • Opportunity to commit crime exists when perpetrators believe they will not be caught or challenged – either where they are alone/unseen, where they can dominate/intimidate others, or where criminal activity is tolerated.

• Activity and the presence of other people creates informal supervision of space & inhibits criminal activity • Fear of crime is greatly reduced in busy, well used areas.

Design Elements • People are most attracted to spaces on movement networks that allow ‘strategic’ views and easy movement in and out. People enjoy surveying the scene, and watching activity/movement.

• The busiest routes are direct, ‘legible’ ie easy to understand, with good visibility • Activity generates more activity. Seating, ‘active frontages’ eg shops, cafes, cultural facilities, or ‘attractions’ such as play/sport facilities, attractive planting, water etc can all generate activity. Mixed use developments can generate activity at different times of day.

• Spaces with limited visibility, or restricted movement in and out create fear of crime, as they may be dominated by groups who tolerate crime, or may provide hiding places.

• Fear of crime deters use of space, and so creates more opportunity for crime.

Neglect generates fear of crime, as it can indicate lack of care, and potential tolerance of crime. Tolerance of minor criminal activities eg vandalism can encourage other crimes through perceived tolerance, and will generate fear of crime.

Actions • Increase visibility of existing routes from surrounding movement networks, and surrounding buildings • Make direct connections to/from wider movement networks with wide routes.

The fewer changes in direction required between origin and destination, the busier the route. Avoid creating sunken or raised spaces where possible, as these have been found to be harder to animate • Assist people in understanding connections to wider movement networks and destinations by providing maps • Encourage more activity, by facilitating use of existing features, introducing attractions/events and facilities in connected locations. Put seating/ seatwalls along busy routes, rather than creating secluded seating areas. Popular seats are located in ‘strategic’ places where activity can be observed, preferably in more than one direction.

• Address fear of crime, by ensuring spaces seem cared for, so potential users are not deterred, and criminals believe no tolerance exists

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Strengthen social controls and social cohesion by engaging surrounding communities in activities including design and management Ensure planned developments will generate activity in & oversight of public realm, and aim for dense mixed use neighbourhoods

Critique • Not all areas are capable of being well connected to the movement network, or overlooked • Existing neighbourhoods may not be dense or mixed use • Budgets may not allow high standards of maintenance • Busy spaces may conflict with other goals such as nature conservation

APPROACH 2: Target Hardening (Bibliography references: 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10) Actions which accept that crime will be attempted because there are insufficient informal controls, and therefore aim to protect the ‘target’, most often by changing the physical environment.

Rationale Inhibit criminal activity by defending the potential target.

Design Elements • Remove/control routes which cannot be made safe • Allow potential targets to identify and avoid risk • Increase visibility to and from routes/spaces • Protect property - reinforce security measures • Provide supervision rangers/wardens/ police/ volunteers Actions • Identify routes/ areas which cannot be easily ‘self policing’ – where routes cannot be made direct, or spaces well connected, or overlooked. Consider value of route and problems generated along it. Remove routes which are not considered valuable, or close routes at times when problems occur (gating).

• Increase visibility to and from valuable routes by removing barriers eg replacing walls/parapets with railings/grilles; thinning/ cutting back/ removing targeted vegetation; increasing lighting. Focus particularly at ‘bottlenecks’ / changes in direction where perpetrators can expect a reasonable supply of targets, and where they may be able to hide • Make targetted areas difficult or unpleasant to hide in or stay in – remove recesses in walls and ‘blind spots’ along routes, use thorny shrubs/railings to deter use of hidden areas, provide uncomfortable seating/ no seating where loitering may be an issue, remove/protect shelter • Create oversight by providing uses, by patrolling of wardens/ police, or through voluntary schemes like neighbourhood watch. Target activity so providing oversight at times where problems have been shown to occur.

• Create alternative routes/exits to allow potential targets means of escape/avoidance – where spaces have only one entry/ exit consider adding another. Make existing exits more visible

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Property crime: make fences/gates ‘unclimbable’, introduce security cameras, alarms, lighting, defensive planting, security guards

Critique • Visible signs of target hardening can encourage fear of crime by indicating the likelihood of criminal activity, and the absence of social controls • Action to prevent crime eg removing seating/ toilets/shelter may prevent legitimate use and enjoyment of open spaces

APPROACH 3: Limited Access (Bibliography references: 1, 6, 8, 9 ) Action to prevent criminals from entering a space undetected. Criminals are strangers, and if strangers are denied access or made highly identifiable, and closely monitored as a result, then criminals will be excluded. Such spaces can still be accessible to the public, but in controlled ways, for example allotment gardens, staffed nature reserves.

Rationale • Communities know each other and look out for each other.

• Spaces of undefined ownership allow strangers including criminals to be present.

• By limiting the legitimate user group, unauthorized entrants can be identified, deterred/ excluded.

Design Elements • Create boundaries that identify space as ‘private’ • use in defined ways by a defined group Action • Identify areas which are unlikely to be ‘self policing’, and may currently be under used or under valued • Identify the group who will take ‘ownership’ • Remove features that attract or give legitimate access to strangers • Define boundaries, and control access by physical prevention (gating, limiting through routes) design implication (threshold definition and apparent oversight) and/ or management (security guards, wardens) Critique • Could create disconnected urban areas reducing attractiveness of surrounding areas • Has implications for excluded communities without criminal intent

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Tool Kit Methodology Stage 1. Crime Map/Fear of Crime survey 1. Engage local community, local government officers and crime management professionals in relating qualitative and quantitative information 2. Create a ‘crime/ fear of crime and anti social behaviour’ map, identifying location of recorded and anecdotal incidents, and areas generating fear of crime

Stage 2: Identify areas suitable for ‘Self Policing’, ‘Target Hardening’, or ‘Limited Access’ 1. Map movement networks, and movement generators /destinations within/surrounding the study area 2. Assess connections to and through the study area 3. Map overlooking buildings and barriers to visibility 4. Superimpose crime map to identify specific problem areas 5. Review composite information and make a preliminary identification of areas/routes most suited to ‘self policing’, ‘target hardening’ or ‘limited access’. In some circumstances it will be difficult to differentiate, however tools are not directly contradictory, and existing behaviours, together with community priorities and budgets will largely determine appropriate actions.

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‘Self policing’ areas have the capacity to be connected directly to main movement networks, will be near generators of movement eg train stations/retail areas, can be linked directly with them, and are likely to be, or are capable of, being overlooked by surrounding buildings.

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‘Target Hardening’ areas generate sufficient through/ passing movement to be a useful part of the movement network, or have valued public use that cannot easily be relocated, but through reasons of existing urban structure, do not have direct connections or are somewhat isolated from main movement networks/ overlooking buildings.

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‘Limited access’ areas will have little need for through movement, do not have connections to, or are extremely isolated from main movement networks. They are most likely to be under used spaces at present.

6. Community participation: engage community in reviewing findings of mapping exercise, recommended approach, and decision making about priorities for action /appropriate actions

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Stage 3: Identify appropriate actions Dependent on available budgets, these actions may be undertaken across entire study areas, or focus only on problem areas • • •

Identify valuable routes and facilities with local community, and those which are less used/valued/ non essential Where facilities are valued but located in ‘problem areas’ establish if relocation/ limited access is desirable Work with local stakeholders to identify priorities for action from all available options

Recommended Actions- ‘Self policing’ locations • • • • • • • • • •

• • •

Open up views and connect to surrounding movement networks In ‘problem’ areas, open up views from surrounding buildings Where night time use is essential, ensure good visibility, lighting and oversight, or identify viable alternate routes Where possible make strong, direct, wide connecting routes.

Where routes cannot be modified, allow for good visibility of route ahead, especially of means of exit Provide maps and other signage at entrances/ decision points Assess appearance/condition/ use of existing facilities/ features.

If budgets for maintenance are insufficient, consider targeting maintenance activities at defined locations, and creating lower maintenance areas elsewhere.

Consider removal of high maintenance features which are not required, eg redundant fencing, buildings Identify with community members additional facilities that may be required/ attract greater use to accessible locations near main movement network.

Public facilities located in less attractive areas may remain unused, as a critical mass of people may not be generated to overcome fear of crime. If isolated areas are to be animated, consider ’limited access’ approach Consider opportunities to create ‘strategic’ locations for seating in busy areas, and areas closest to surrounding movement network Consider opportunities to animate space through development.

Ensure planned developments generate activity / oversight, and strengthen connectivity.

Recommended Actions- ‘Target Hardening’ locations • • • • • • •

Allow users to assess risk before committing themselves to isolated routes, or parts of a route which are hidden, and provide a safe alternative Inform users of alternate routes by maps/direction signage at entrances/decision making points In ‘problem’ areas, open up views from/ to surrounding buildings/ movement networks Where night time use is essential, ensure good visibility, lighting and oversight or consider viable alternate routes Where possible make strong, direct, wide connecting routes.

Where routes cannot be modified, allow for good visibility of route ahead, especially of means of exit Consider removal of routes where safer alternatives exist

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• • • • • •

Remove barriers to visibility. Remove or replace walls/ parapets with attractive railings or grilles, to deter graffiti and promote visibility. Ensure designs robust and allow for litter removal.

Identify and take action to remove hiding places.

Identify structures targeted for criminal damage / anti social behaviour.

Where structures are not required, remove.

Protect required structures from abuse. Place thorny shrubs at the foot of walls susceptible to graffiti, or install attractive fencing where space allows.

Consider how maintenance of walls will be facilitated.

If night time access is non essential, and problems have been identified associated with night time use, consider gating, wardens / voluntary schemes such as neighbourhood watch or ‘limited access’ Plan for increased activity/oversight- develop planning guidance for new developments to increase oversight & activity of isolated areas where problems exist, and alternate routes are not desirable/ available.

Recommended Actions ‘Limited Access’ spaces • • •

Identify areas where through movement is not required/problematic and activity therefore unlikely to be sufficient to generate a self policing area.

Identify appropriate uses with the community, and identify user groups able or willing to use /manage the space. Agree time and conditions of access to the space Use appropriate high quality boundary treatments to define the area, the type dependent on proposed use. In river corridors, water may be considered as a boundary, for instance creating islands with gating or controls required only at bridging points

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Case Study: Ravensbourne River Corridor, Lewisham

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Case Study: Ravensbourne River Corridor, Lewisham Stage 1. Crime Map/Fear of Crime survey Consultation Findings Consultees included two community groups –the ‘Friends of Ladywell Fields’ group, and the Lewisham chapter of the London Cycling Campaign, the Park Keeper for Ladywell Fields, the Lewisham Wardens Service coordinator, Lewishams Drugs Action team, and officers from Lewisham Police ‘Safer Neighbourhoods’ team for each ward covered by the study area. Earlier consultations regarding Lewisham Parks has been incorporated, however substantial changes in management including the employment of a Park Keeper and increased neighbourhood policing as well as more recent physical changes to the space mean more historic data is no longer representative.

Mapped Information Recorded incidents information was provided by the Lewisham Crime Reduction Team’s data analyst. The data shows incidents recorded in the highlighted study area from 2005/06. The crime map for the previous year showed incidents focused in the same locations. Most of the incidents occurred in the evening / night time.

The number of crimes is not shown in relation to the number of people using the space, which could produce a different impression of relative safety.

Additionally the location shown is the location where the crime was reported. This may lead to anomalies, for instance the cluster of incidents at Lewisham Hospital may have taken place remotely but been reported and therefore recorded at Accident & Emergency, or incidents reported at train stations, which also reflect where incidents during travel are recorded.

The recorded incidents information has been supplemented by qualitative/ anecdotal information gathered from consultees to mitigate for such anomolies.

The mapped pattern of incidents recorded within the Ravensbourne corridor and Ladywell Fields is consistent with anecdotal evidence.

Stations at Lewisham and Catford/ Catford Bridge, though generating a relatively large number of incidents, have not been reviewed extensively within this study, as they are peripheral to the focus of the Quercus project.

The area identified on the map and in the key as having ‘policing issues’ has been identified by local police as one where pursuit of suspects is problematic.

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Stage 2: Identify areas suitable for ‘Self Policing’, ‘Target Hardening’, or ‘Limited Access’ 1. Map movement networks, and movement generators /destinations within/surrounding the study area The study area is within 10 minutes walk of the major retail areas of Lewisham and Catford, lying between these retail centres and the large areas of housing to the west. The retail centres are linked by a major road, which lies just east of the study area.

The study area is also the location of four surface rail stations and the Lewisham Docklands Light Railway station. Local people make good use of public transport, therefore these stations will generate a lot of pedestrian movement, particularly at peak times.

These destinations can and do generate movement, as does the hospital, a major local employer and source of visitors, centrally located to the east of the study area, and Crofton Park School, to the west of the study area, and north of Catford Station.

The river and railway lines which pass through the study area create barriers to movement east west, channelling movement to bridging points/ openings.

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2. Assess connections to and through the study area

The majority of connections between the study area and surrounding urban fabric are weak, and indirect. These types of connecting routes have been found to limit use of public space, even in potentially very busy locations.

People tend to favour more direct routes with the smallest number of changes in direction, even over shorter routes if more changes in direction are required.

Potential users are also deterred from investigating a new route if they are uncertain of its final destination.

Most of the connections to the river corridor are determined by access across surface railway lines, however there is scope for strengthening links in some key locations.

Weak connection & low visibility to Ladywell Fields and Ladywell Station from major east west movement route (Ladywell Road).

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3. Map overlooking buildings and barriers to visibility Surface rail and tree cover limit visibility within the study area, however the majority of accessible areas are overlooked. The main surrounding land use is residential, which provides an amount of activity and oversight throughout the day and over weekends. Many overlooking buildings face away from the park, and the fences at the rear of the property prevent overlooking at ground level, and are themselves subject to vandalism.

The section of Ladywell Fields adjacent Lewisham Hospital has benefited from the introduction of a cafĂŠ and cycle hire facility, where the new park keeper is located. The majority of oversight in this location during the summer months is from this building, as tree cover limits views from the hospital and residences across the railway line, which runs at grade from central Lewisham to Catford Bridge.

In general the study area has good levels of visibility and oversight.

CafĂŠ and Cycle Hire at Ladywell Fields

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4. Superimpose crime map to identify specific problem areas

The composite map indicates that ‘hotspots’ are located where routes are restricted by the need to cross rail and river corridors, and there is a combination of poor visibility and weak/ indirect connections.

At the stations, poor visibility is combined with a reliable supply of ‘targets’ for potential crime.

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5. Review composite information and make a preliminary identification of areas/routes most suited to ‘self policing’, ‘target hardening’ or ‘limited access’. In some circumstances it will be difficult to differentiate, however tools are not directly contradictory, and existing behaviours, together with community priorities and budgets will largely determine appropriate actions.

Summary of Preliminary Recommendations Short Term Area 6, Area 9- ‘Target Hardening’ • Targeted improvement of sightlines • Work with School adjacent area 9 as majority of incidents relate to pupils Area 4 ‘Self Policing Space’ • Review park entry and station connection, • Review access to river, location, type & condition of facilities Area 6- Self Policing Space • Review connections & layout • explore location/protection of facilities.

• Potential alternate night time/ cycle route vs crossing foot bridge.

Medium Term Area 1, Area 2- Target Hardening • Brighten & light • Allied with Town Centre redevelopment recommend overlooking active frontages, plan direct connection to new retail centre Area 5, Area 10, Self Policing Space • Work with neighbouring/overlooking property owners to improve boundaries and entry areas.

Area 8, Target Hardening • Review boundary treatments to allow overlooking, • gated alleyways, • limit through routes Long Term Area 7- Self Policing Space • Allied with and dependent on development of adjacent site. Plan connecting routes through development and strong connection of park frontage with building frontage .

Area 11- Limited Access • Area of Bowling Green /tennis courts currently little use, very isolated, generates fear of crime and ASB, consider use as allotments, nature reserve.

Target Hardening • Station entry exit highly isolated in urban fabric, consider development opportunities of disused buildings, alternate routes.

Area 3 – Limited Access • Lowest priority. Isolated, some evidence of ASB, under used.

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Community participation: engage community in reviewing findings of mapping exercise, recommended approach, and decision making about priorities for action /appropriate actions

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Stage 3: Recommendations Subject to Consultation

Area 1

Northern Section Area 2 Areas 1 and 2 are major connections to the stations and retail centre for residents west of the railway line. Connections are indirect, and cannot readily be reconfigured.

The current condition of these strucutures is poor, particularly of area 1.

Redevelopment plans for the town centre/ rail connection should consider how planned frontages opposite these restricted access routes can provide some level of animation and oversight, particularly at night time.

Strong attractive lighting schemes are recommended.

Area 3 Area 3 Area 3 is isolated within the current urban structure. It is in use for dog walking, and has some degree of oversight, but viaducts to the southern end are currently in use by the street population. Action here is not considered a priority.

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Area 4

Central Section

Area 4

Area 4.

Addressing the indirect connection between station and road, and poor connection/ visibility of Ladywell fields park entrance to northern access point are a priority.

Entrance to park should be widened to as great an extent as topography allows.

Bridge parapets particularly over the river could be replaced with railings/grille to allow visual access. Consideration should be given to creating a larger area at grade by the park entrance to strengthen connections. Vegetation blocking views to and from the entrance could be relocated.

Station access is problematic in its current location. A direct route across the fields to the hospital is under construction, and would benefit from connection to the station, with the main route from the station to the northern access road then into the more open area of the park.

Alternatively at night, access to the station would be via the footbridge, not via the park.

The park between areas 4 & 5 has potential to be very busy. Assets include proximity to town centre, station, hospital, & main east west route, and presence of the river.

Currently condition of many features is poor, river inaccessible, with railings creating maintenance burden. Layout of features across centre reduces connectivity, creating isolated areas.

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Area 5 Hidden cameras and prosecution of fly tippers recommended short term. This section of the park would benefit from stronger connections across the river, particularly visually, and potentially physically, as facilities to East may be underused.

The park entrance here has potential to appear more welcoming. Structures currently block views near the entry and are subject to graffiti. Tree cover creates low light levels in this location. Adjacent properties an asset. Work with local neighbourhood to encourage more positive relationship of adjacent boundaries, more overlooking.

Area 6 Area 6 has been highlighted as a crime ‘hotspot’, and as such should be a priority for action.

Reducing tree cover locally around the access bridge, and replacing solid parapets with grille would address issues of visibility.

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Area 6

Area 6

Longer term, a comprehensive approach is recommended to reviewing the configuration of access and river crossing points in this location, as well as developing an action plan for the changing rooms which are currently subject to vandalism, and anecdotally drug use.

Area 7

Southern Section

Central Section

Area 8

Area 7 Long term, area 7 has the potential to be overlooked, and to be well connected with the new planned development. Recommendations to the planning department regarding location of active frontages on the park, per housing south of Ladywell Arena, and direct connecting routes will increase activity and safety here. (in purple above)

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Area 8 Area 8 has limited overlooking of public areas from residences, and indirect routes through via alleys. Review with local residents to address issues of safety/security to reduce burglaries/ criminal damage and policing issues. Traditional approach per ‘Secured by Design’ recommendations.

Area 9 A bottleneck with visibility restrictions, and issues of anti social behaviour associated with pupils of adjacent school including trespass on railway. Recommend short term action to increase overlooking form school building of this space. Consider work with school/ wardens/Safer Neighbourhood team for supervision of space at end of school day. Consider controlling entrance to overgrown access road into area 11.

Area 9

Area 9 (Entry to Area 11)

Area 10 Area 10 has strong physical connections to active frontages, and potentially overlooking property to three sides. Low tree canopies restrict visual access at the entrance and connection with wider movement network, and may reduce potential number of users. Surrounding properties tend to have solid boundaries to first floor level of mixed materials, restricting overlooking, and providing sites for graffiti.

Work with surrounding residents to review boundary treatments, increase visibility, and protect vulnerable walls potentially with thorny shrubs.

Area 10

Area 10

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Area 11

Area 11

Area 11 The most physically isolated part of the site, with limited opportunity for animation or oversight.

The section from Catford Bridge Station to the former stadium development site is highly problematic but is a valuable route. Providing some oversight through encouraging development long term, plus provision of safer alternate routes in the interim is recommended.

West of the railway line, Area 11 currently has some facilities in reasonable condition, including bowling green and tennis courts, however physical disconnection and visual barriers mean these facilities arel likely to be under used. It may be possible to link this area across the river by removing vegetation and providing additional bridging points, however consideration should be given to relocating existing bowling green, and providing a limited access facility in this area, such as managed nature reserve and/ or allotment gardens or other managed use of benefit to the community.

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Case Study: Dee River Corridor, Chester The case study of Chester is based on a two day site visit. It is therefore not as thorough as the study of Lewisham, nor is it based on stakeholder discussion. This case study is included to demonstrate how the toolkit can be applied to a different scale, and to different contexts to provide valuable information, highlighting potential problems before they arise.

Stage 1. Crime Map/Fear of Crime survey The data indicating incidents of crime along the river corridor were not available for inclusion in this study. Much of the riverside route, which is the focus of Chester’s element of the Quercus project is only recently completed, or under construction.

Crime information regarding the route in its entirety will therefore not be available as yet. It is recommended, however, that any information regarding existing sections be mapped, both to target sections which will remain unchanged, and as baseline data to assess the impact of the route and associated projects.

Other elements of the toolkit can be used to indicate places most likely to require

action, and the most appropriate approach, by assessing the current patterns of movement, connectivity and visibility along the planned route

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Stage 2: Identify areas suitable for ‘Self Policing’, ‘Target Hardening’, or ‘Limited Access’ 1. Map movement networks, and movement generators /destinations within/surrounding the study area Approximately two thirds of the study area lies more than 10 minutes walk from Chester’s town centre. Between the town centre and the riverside walk lie the city walls, and the main vehicular movement route around town.

It is likely that for these reasons sections of the route will not generate sufficient pedestrian or cycle traffic to make them entirely self policing, and other approaches to designing out crime will take precedence.

As with Lewisham, the river, road and railway lines that pass through the study area create barriers to movement, and focus activity to bridging points/ openings. Good visibility and direct connections will be important in designing out crime from these ‘bottlenecks’, where potential targets are ‘channelled’.

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2.

Assess connections to and through the study area

The majority of connections between the study area and surrounding urban fabric are weak, limited by heavily trafficked roads in the west, and by the structure of existing bridge structures elsewhere.

Connections across and to Grosvenor Park from the town centre north east of the river offer scope for improvement, although property ownership, changes in level and the need to protect historic urban fabric may limit what is possible.

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3.

Map overlooking buildings and barriers to visibility

There are several sections of the study area where there are few overlooking buildings, and limited visibility from activity on the river itself, notably to the west of the study area and around the racecourse at the Roodee (open area centre west).

The Earls Eye – the open area to the east of the study area - is well overlooked, with good levels of visibility and oversight, though the connecting route along the river’s southern bank has limited visibility. Activity on the river provides overlooking for this route during the day. The path is optional rather than utilitarian here, so use in quiet times, for instance at night, will be optional. Target hardening to improve visibility is therefore unlikely to be required in this location, apart from in the immediate area of the footbridge, connecting the major housing area to the south with the town centre in the north.

The section of riverside route connecting the major car park to the south of the city centre with the ‘Groves’ to the east may well be used at night by tourists returning from the bars and cafes along the groves or using the river route from the town centre, so here, low visibility may be problematic.

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4. Superimpose maps to identify specific problem areas

The composite map indicates where poor visibility and weak connections closest to the to the main movement network may prevent spaces that could be busy from being well used, where main pedestrian routes coincide with poor visibility, and where sections of the route are more remote and may be most vulnerable to criminal damage, envirocrime or anti social behaviour.

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5. Review composite information and make a preliminary identification of areas/routes most suited to ‘self policing’, ‘target hardening’ or ‘limited access’.

Preliminary Recommendations by area (crime map of existing sections required to set priorities)

a. Strengthen connection to the town centre to maximize use. Target HardeningBarriers to prevent car access to target envirocrime. Site presence of rangers and targetted police action to deter motorbikes and give legitimate users confidence. b. Self policing space- Improve connection across busy road, consider targeted improvement of overlooking from houses c. Direct connection of housing frontage to riverside best practice. Avoid gating sections that create discontinuous routes. d. Target hardening - Connections through bridges problematic. May require rangers presence to avoid criminal damage and antisocial behaviour where poor visibility coincides with indirect connection to west. Generally, foster good visibility splays and wide path for users, plus alternate exit/ entry.

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e. Target hardening-Poor visibility combined with main pedestrian route to car park, consider regular patrol of wardens/ community police, and good visibility splays and wide path for users f. Self-policing space-consider how visual and physical access can be improved to draw people from town centre to riverfront. g. Focused target hardening at bridge southern entry to improve visibility. Work with adjacent property owners to improve overlooking.

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Case Study: Dommel River Corridor, s-Hertogenbosch, Netherlands The case study for s-Hertogenbosch is based on a two-day site visit. This case study is included to demonstrate how the toolkit can be applied to different scales, and to different contexts to provide valuable information during the design stage, highlighting potential problems before they arise. The plans as shown no longer represent the design to be implemented. Following the site visit the decision was taken to amend designs, taking on board tool kit recommendations, while retaining the original design objectives.

Stage 1. Crime Map/Fear of Crime survey The data indicating incidents of crime along the river corridor were not available for inclusion in this study. It is recommended, however that any information be mapped, as baseline data to assess the impact of project.

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Stage 2: Identify areas suitable for ‘Self Policing’, ‘Target Hardening’, or ‘Limited Access’ 1.

Map movement networks, and movement generators /destinations within/surrounding the study area The site lies close to the main commercial and leisure area of ‘s-Hertogenbosch less than 10 minutes walk from the main train station. It is adjacent to a secondary pedestrian route between residential areas, the commercial area and the station. It has the potential to be very well used and to be self-policing.

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2.

Assess connections to and through the study area The main access into the new park has been located for historic reasons. It is not directly at the end of either of the two main connections to the commercial centre, and is obscured to the north by the restored former bastion tower. The park is also set almost two metres below the main ground level, (see elevation from the riverside below the plan), to allow a close inspection of the restored bastion wall, and to preserve ground levels as far as possible to retain trees.

The resultant connection to the main movement network is therefore indirect, meaning the space is likely to be less well used than its location would indicate.

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3. Map overlooking buildings and barriers to visibility ,Tree cover and the sunken position of the garden mean it is not entirely overlooked, even from the immediately adjacent street, and particularly at the entry area. Again this is likely to reduce the use of the space through fear of crime.

4. Superimpose maps to identify specific problem areas As the study area is small, the composite issues are readily understood without composite mapping.

5. Review information and make a preliminary identification of areas/routes most suited to ‘self policing’, ‘target hardening’ or ‘limited access’.

The restrictions set on the site’s design by historic considerations and tree preservation mean the park may not be sufficiently well used to be entirely selfpolicing, and target hardening measures may be required.

Poor visibility from the street above means anti social activities could take place unobserved. If the space is quiet, it may attract anti social groups, who could dominate the single entry point. Even one person seated at the foot of the entry stairs could deter a user who may feel unsafe to pass close by.

Actions that can increase visibility and encourage overlooking should be taken.

By encouraging users to sit along the wall’s top, for instance at street level sitting areas, greater overlooking and activity can be introduced without compromising historic features. The best location for these areas would be at the ends of streets connecting to the commercial area, as people are drawn to ‘strategic’ locations 5, 7.

Creating a more direct or wider street entry point, or second entry/ exit may also encourage more use, as it will address fear of crime.

Strategic thinning of vegetation would increase overlooking from the adjacent footbridge.

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Bibliography

1

ACPO CPI June 2004 Secured by Design Principles..... www.securedbydesign.com/pdfs/SBD-principles.pdf

2

Armitage, Rachel (2000) An Evaluation of Secured By Design Housing Within West Yorkshire, Home Office Briefing Note 7/000 www.crimereduction.gov.uk/secureddesign13.htm (visited 12/04)

3

CABE Space (2004) Policy Note: Preventing Anti-Social Behaviour in Public Spaces CABE www.cabespace.org.uk/data/pdfs/preventing_asb.pdf (visited 12/04)

4

Clarke, Heather et al (2004) Under Lock & Quay , http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/vehiclecrime34.htm

5

Hillier, Bill 1996 Space is the Machine, (Cambridge University Press)

6

Jacobs, Jane (1993) The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Random House, New York.

7

LaFarge, Albert (2000) The Essential William H Whyte, Fordham University Press, New York

8

McManus, Jim (2004) Security Without the Spikes? A Practical Resource Pack for Crime Prevention in the Public Realm Groundwork UK www.crimereduction.gov.uk/secureddesign31.htm (visited 12/04)

9

Newman, Oscar (1972) Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design, Architectural Press, London.

10

Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2004) Safer Places. The Planning System and Crime Prevention – A Summary, ODPM Publications, West Yorkshire

11

Quercus Project (2006) Designing Out Crime- Review of Literature & Current Planning Policy (unpublished)

12

Urban Task Force (1999) Towards an Urban Rennaissance, E & FN Spon, London

13

Valentine, Gill (1992)‘London’s Streets of Fear’ The Crisis of London, Routledge, London pp90 –102

14

Worpole, Ken & Greenhalgh, Liz (1995) Park Life: Urban Parks and Social Renewal. Comedia & Demos,

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