The Counter Terrorist Magazines - August/September 2013

B o sto n Ma r at hon • Hunt ing HAMAS • AQIM • Electromagnetic Pulse Attack

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

Counter The

august/september 2013

Volume 6 • Number 4

Secrets of

the IRGC

INTERNATIONAL

EDITION An SSI Publication ®

august/september 2013 USA/CANADA $5.99

www.thecounterterroristmag.com The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 1

Vertx® kryptek Typhon gunfighter shirt tm

tm

Vertx® men’s kryptek Typhon pant tm

tm

field ready.

Just add

adrenaline.

low profile.

relentless performance.

Circle 170 on Reader Service Card

Circle 170 on Reader Service Card

2 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 3

Circle 13 on Reader Service Card

Circle Reader Terrorist Service Card 4 121 The on Counter ~ August/September

2013

Counter

The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals august/september 2013 Volume 6 • Number 4

COVER story:

30

contents

30

16

48

Secrets of the IRGC

By Walter Purdy

FEATURES:

8

Firsthand: Hunting HAMAS in Qalqilya

By Garret Machine

16

Case Study: The 2013 Boston Bombings

By Elena Mastors

48

56

High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Attacks

By Mike Cheston

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

By Michael S. Toney

departments: 6 From the Editor

The “American” Model 46 Book Review

Inspire 69 Innovative Products

Jetboots, MRAD, Thorshield

72 Training Review

Multiple Assault, Counter-Terrorism, Action Capabilities

56 Cover Photo: 34th Anniversary of Iraniran Revolution.

Photo: marjan shiva

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 5

Counter The

From The Editor:

The "American" Model

O

By Chris Graham

Volume 6 • Number 4

n May 22, 2013 an off duty British soldier was run down in London, butchered, and beheaded. ITV News video depicts one of the attackers saying, “We swear by almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you.” Bewildered witnesses reported hearing the attackers shout “Allahu Akhbar.” One woman confronted the terrorists verbally, displaying both personal courage and tactical foolishness. Eventually armed police arrived and shot the terrorists.

Despite suggestions to the contrary, this attack is not unprecedented. Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh, one high profile victim of an Islamist knife attack, and self-described “terrorist” Omeed Aziz Popal’s San Francisco rampage in a Honda (deliberately running down 18 people) are but two of the many actions that share the tactics of the London attack and, for some reason, receive very little attention.

While already epidemic elsewhere, jihadi attacks are not foreign to the USA. Nidal Hasan’s 2009 killing spree (for some reason, misleadingly referred to as “workplace violence” by the US Army) targeted disarmed soldiers at Ft. Hood. Abdulhakim Muhammad shot disarmed US Army recruiters in Little Rock and many more attempts have been made.

There are essentially two models of defense against low-tech terrorist and criminal attack to consider. One is the “expert” model. It proposes providing omnipresent domestic surveillance, and law enforcement agencies empowered to act without inhibition.

The second is free. It already exists in the form of the 2nd Amendment and states that encourage responsible adults to carry concealed firearms for the public defense. We can call this the “American” model.

Former NSA executive, William Binney’s observation that we are at the threshold of becoming a “turnkey totalitarian state”1 (referring to internally targeted surveillance technologies and practices that have not yet been revealed) must be considered. In fact, London’s “Ring of Steel” may be the most famous example of money-is-no-object, near unlimited surveillance where citizens have surrendered freedoms (not having been given a choice) in hopes that a mythical “expert” would protect each of them.

The next time there is a violent attack against Americans, do you want your citizens watching like child-eunuchs or would you prefer that a responsible, adult member of the crowd produce her firearm, loaded with a high-capacity magazine full of the most lethal ammunition manufactured, and deliver accurate fire into the would-be killer(s) until his attack has been defeated, as has happened time-after-unpublicized-time?2 Whether you are a soldier, citizen or law enforcement agent facing criminal or terrorist attack, very rarely are you positioned to be “protected” by any force. Unless granted Stalinistic authority and supernatural omniscience, police will react and investigate. Criminal investigations and international intelligence operations perform a valuable mission detecting and interdicting some of the conspiracies, but you are the only one that can defend and prevent. The intended victim at the site of an attack is the actual “first responder”.

Do you really want to heed advice to the contrary from politicians standing behind armed personal security details or reporters who consistently misrepresent the definition of the term “assault rifle”? No wonder the list of sheriffs opposing political infringement of the 2nd Amendment continues to grow3 and the small number of law enforcement officers that support incremental gun and ammunition control measures and the United Nations’ Small Arms Treaty are so often political appointees.

Semper Fidelis, Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist

Endnotes:

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/ accessed 10 July 2013. http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/02/21/disarming-the-myths-promoted-by-the-guncontrol-lobby/ accessed 10 July 2013.

3 http://cspoa.org/sheriffs-gun-rights/ accessed 10 July 2013.

1 2

6 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

august/september 2013 Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Production Assistants Giselle Manassa Melissa Berne Contributing Editors Eeben Barlow Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Steve Young Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Chris Bell Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 204 Miami, Florida 33186

ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher.

The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher.

Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 204, Miami, Florida.

33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99.

(1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090.

For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: PARS International Corp.

Web: www.magreprints.com/quickquote.asp Email: reprints@parsintl.com Phone: 212-221-9595 • Fax: 212-221-9195 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:

www.thecounterterrroristmag.com © 2012 Security Solutions International

WWW.TACPROGEAR.COM

TRUST Your Instinct TRUST Your Equipment

DECADES OF TRADITION YEARS OF TRAINING ONE MOMENT OF TRUTH

PERFORMANCE ABOVE ALL ELSE

ARMOR – PLATES – VESTS – PACKS – BAGS – TOTAL SOLUTIONS Circle 101 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 7

Firsthand:

hunting hamas in qalqilya

Duvdevan pre-mission photo. Photos courtesy of the author.

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

By Garret Machine

During a pleasant April in Israel I was looking forward to my 25th birthday. I was fresh out of training, and new to my job. It was the most meaningful, satisfying, and underpaying job I had ever had. Over the previous year I had more than thirty special operations under my belt: being the first one through the door, breaching, being a field medic, and a sniper.

I

had operated in every major terror nest in the country, so I was feeling wellversed and experienced in our unit’s operational procedures. Usually I can’t mention specific locations, and I can never give the names of teammates and wanted men because of the classified nature of the work. But when a story hits the news, I can comment on some of the details.

On this night, I was going on a mission in Qalqilya. Qalqilya is known as a “soft” city compared to say, Jenin, or Bait Lechem. The mission was: capture, dead or alive (preferably alive) the second in command of the terror group HAMAS. If his brother, a man we also believed to be an operative, was there, we would take him also. Our target was said to be hiding in his parents’ attic, which we believed to

Author Garret Machine.

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 9

Packed for insertion. be accessible only through a trap door.

This would be a serious threat to our safety when we searched the house. Think about how an aggressor could easily shoot through a sheetrock and paint wall as he sees someone on the other side through a peephole. For this reason we brought a dog team to search ahead of us and sniff him out. This was not unlike big game hunting; the only difference being that this animal can shoot back. It is common knowledge in combat that the defender has a home court advantage over the attacker, so we required the element of surprise, which must seriously be taken into account.

At 22:00 I was on my way out of our base. By 23:00 we were readying our gear to embark. I was working with three others on this mission: one man was an urban sniper, one man was our squad leader, and one man was a combat medic. Our squad leader was a unique individual. He was about 5’10” and his flesh looked carved like a Greek statue,

but even more impressive was the fact that he could work like a machine. He had broken four Israeli Defense Force (IDF) physical fitness records, had the fastest obstacle course time for course Makim, the IDF sergeants’ course, the obstacle course record for Samabim and the field combat squad leaders course.

He had the record for fastest time up the “natural disaster,” which is a large dune, 30 meters high and made of soft sand, on the beach at a training base called Wingate. Wingate was the center for army combat fitness and hand-to-hand combat training located on the beach just north of Tel Aviv. He also had the IDF pull-up record at 75. That is not a typo.

The man was capable of 75 good, clean consecutive pull-ups.

Anyway, we needed to carry a stretcher with us on each outing. All the men in my squad were already geared up and had no room for it on their backs. It wasn’t something we could question though.

We were required to have one. So I

10 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

volunteered to take it. The stretcher was collapsed into a small backpack weighing about 12 pounds. I had other gear on my back, so I slung the pack over my shoulder.

By 1:00 am we were on our way to the objective. We moved in using armored vehicles similar to Chevy Suburbans. The city was quiet upon our approach. Few people were on the streets. It felt like a ghost town. The roads were wide, the air in the night was cool, and a nice breeze moved through the night. We quietly emerged from the comfort and safety of our vehicles. We ran silently through darkness, and while I had the stretcher slung over my left arm, my left hand gripped the foregrip of my 10” Colt M4.

The butt of the gun stayed in its place on my chest while my right hand grasped the pistol grip, with my trigger finger straight.

We all moved in our own directions to our predetermined positions. We ran straight down a street, then made a turn to the left as we entered a smaller alley

Circle 211 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 11

IDF troops capture a weapons cache in Qalqilya including: 100 kg of gun power, 100 kg of fertilizer, shrapnel for bombs and other bomb making equipment. Photo: Israel Defense Forces

that dead ended in about 30 meters.

Our team’s scheme of maneuver was to enter the apartment building that was now positioned at our right in the alley, to move to the top floor and gain control of the apartment there. We would then be able to overwatch our subject’s apartment building. Each building was about four stories. Once we had this vantage point we would have line of fire across to his place, to ensure that he could not escape out the back door of his apartment building, and

we could observe all movement on the roof of his building.

When we hit the building’s front door, it was locked. The medic and the sergeant worked the door with a hammer and a crow bar. These tools are crude, loud, heavy and don’t work on all doors, but with brute force anyone can use them.

The men started hitting and pulling hard and fast. We needed to rip that door open as quickly as possible. Two minutes in and it was already too long. We could

12 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

blow the whole operation if we were not in position and our subject made a run for it, or got to the roof without us seeing him. I covered the direction we came from. The sniper and I aimed down the alley pulling security for our squad members working the door.

The noise was loud, and two men came running around the corner. Both were dressed similarly: jeans, belts, and short sleeve button-down shirts. One of the men was holding a knife. It looked like a

$ */2%$/ 1(7:25. 2) 0$18)$&785(56 6833/,(56 $1' 6<67(06 ,17(*5$7256 2))(5,1* 727$/ 62/87,216

Â&#x2021; 2Q WKH JURXQG LQ $IULFD $VLD 0LGGOH (DVW 6RXWK $PHULFD DQG JOREDO KRW VSRWV ZKHUH H[SHULHQFH LV PDQGDWRU\ Â&#x2021; 2IILFHV ZDUHKRXVHV IXOILOOPHQW FHQWHUV LQ 86$ 0LGGOH (DVW 6RXWK $PHULFD $IULFD

241&7%65 5ERVICES

241%74'/'06 5174%+0) '(',&$7(' 352&85(0(17 7($06 :,7+ */2%$/ 6285&,1* (;3(5,(1&(

7$5*(7 '5,9(1 62/87,216 '(6,*1(' Â&#x2021; )HGHUDO 3URJUDPV 'LYLVLRQ ZLWK 3DVW SHUIRUPDQFH RQ /2*&$3 :336 $&27$ $)5,&$3 81,620 PRUH )25 &200(5&,$/ 0,/,7$5< /( Â&#x2021; 0LOLWDU\ DQG ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW GLYLVLRQ 35,9$7( 6(&85,7< 352)(66,21$/6 ZLWK FXUUHQW NQRZOHGJH RI ODWHVW VROXWLRQV WHFKQLTXHV

Â&#x2021; 6WUHDPOLQHG SXUFKDVLQJ RUGHULQJ

GHOLYHU\ DQG ELOOLQJ DSSOLFDWLRQV Â&#x2021; 3HUVRQDO 3URWHFWLRQ (TXLSPHQW

>33(@ 7UDLQLQJ 3ODQQLQJ 2SHUDWLRQV .OGISTICS #4'# -019.'&)' 0DLQWHQDQFH 3URJUDP 0DQDJHPHQW

$ */2%$/ 1(7:25. 2) 0$18)$&785(56 6833/,(56 $1' 6<67(06 ,17(*5$7256 2))(5,1* 727$/ 62/87,216

Â&#x2021; 2Q WKH JURXQG LQ $IULFD $VLD 0LGGOH (DVW 6RXWK $PHULFD DQG JOREDO KRW VSRWV ZKHUH H[SHULHQFH LV PDQGDWRU\

Â&#x2021; ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'HYHORSPHQW 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ 3URJUDPV 5LVN $QDO\VLV

241%74'/'06 5174%+0) Â&#x2021; 6SHFLDOL]HG VHUYLFHV DYDLODEOH XSRQ Â&#x2021; 2IILFHV ZDUHKRXVHV IXOILOOPHQW UHTXHVW FHQWHUV LQ 86$ 0LGGOH (DVW 6RXWK '(',&$7(' 352&85(0(17 7($06 :,7+

$PHULFD $IULFD */2%$/ 6285&,1* (;3(5,(1&(

VISIT US AT D.S.E.I. at Booth# N7-498

241&7%65 5ERVICES

7$5*(7 '5,9(1 62/87,216 '(6,*1(' Â&#x2021; )HGHUDO 3URJUDPV 'LYLVLRQ ZLWK )25 &200(5&,$/ 0,/,7$5< /( 35,9$7( 6(&85,7< 352)(66,21$/6 3DVW SHUIRUPDQFH RQ /2*&$3 :336 Â&#x2021; 3HUVRQDO 3URWHFWLRQ (TXLSPHQW $&27$ $)5,&$3 81,620 PRUH

>33(@ 7UDLQLQJ 3ODQQLQJ 2SHUDWLRQV 0DLQWHQDQFH 3URJUDP 0DQDJHPHQW

Â&#x2021; ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'HYHORSPHQW 1DWLRQDO Â&#x2021; 0LOLWDU\ DQG ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW GLYLVLRQ

6HFXULW\ 3URJUDPV 5LVN $QDO\VLV ZLWK FXUUHQW NQRZOHGJH RI ODWHVW Â&#x2021; 6SHFLDOL]HG VHUYLFHV DYDLODEOH XSRQ UHTXHVW VROXWLRQV WHFKQLTXHV

VISIT US AT D.S.E.I. at Booth# N7-498

Â&#x2021; 6WUHDPOLQHG SXUFKDVLQJ RUGHULQJ GHOLYHU\ DQG ELOOLQJ DSSOLFDWLRQV

.OGISTICS #4'# -019.'&)' $ */2%$/ 1(7:25. 2) 0$18)$&785(56 6833/,(56 $1' 6<67(06 ,17(*5$7256 2))(5,1* 727$/ 62/87,216

Circle 145 on Reader Service Card The

Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 13

kitchen knife with duct tape around the handle. They froze as they ran directly into our line of sight, only about ten meters in front of us. I yelled in Arabic, “Stop! Hands up… put your hands on your head… turn around.” The team sniper said to me, “get him,” and it was understood that he would cover me as I went in. I immediately disarmed the first man and threw his knife to the right side. I moved them both quickly to the left against the wall of the building. I pulled my flex cuffs from my vest without taking my eyes off the center of his back, allowing my peripheral vision to see his extremities. I pulled his hands down to his back and cuffed him quickly. The sniper moved in to cuff man two, who was on my left. By the time both men were cuffed the door was open. The whole ordeal took about four minutes.

We moved inside and cleared the stairwell one flight and platform at a time. The medic was on point taking the steps as the squad leader covered him. The sniper and I were escorting our suspects up the stairs after them. When we got to the top floor we found the apartment to be abandoned and the door open.

The medic and squad leader searched the flat. After it was deemed safe, we all entered. I guarded the two prisoners, whom I instructed to sit down in Arabic. The sniper took position inset from the window behind his 16” Colt M4, covering the targeted house. The medic and I proceeded to search the captured subjects a second time, while the squad leader radioed our position and confirmed that our location was secure.

He said that we had two prisoners. I gave the Palestinians’ identification cards to the sergeant so that he could radio in their numbers and names, provided the IDs were legitimate. This is standard procedure when detaining subjects in the field. After a few minutes we were

told over our earpieces: “This is the man we are looking for, he is our target, hold tight and we will send two men from our position with instructions” by the mission commander. Two more operators now came up the steps and through the door.

They told us to bring the two prisoners over to one of the extraction vehicles that had arrived in front of the building.

The medic and I brought them over at a light jog, about 50 meters from our original entry point. We secured them in the vehicle with our backup force.

We then entered the first floor of the wanted man’s apartment building, where the rest of our force had convened. We were about ten men in all. The door was opened when I arrived and everyone had taken a position in the living room, on the first floor of the apartment building.

We spoke in the doorway of the first secured apartment, through a megaphone into the stairwell, announcing ourselves as the army in Arabic, saying that everyone in the building needed to come out of their apartments and to the bottom floor at once. This was for the sake of safety, because if we needed to search the top floor apartment for terrorists and weapons, no one could be in the apartments in between. This ensured two critical things: one, that no innocent Palestinian civilian would be mistaken as a threat or caught in crossfire.

Secondly, when every man, woman and child in the building was down with us, we could be sure that noise or movement detected during our search was in fact enemy movement and could be treated as such.

We made sure that we had everyone and everyone agreed that no one was left hiding in his or her apartment. Then, we started to conduct our secure search, angle by angle. Everything in urban warfare is done by the angles of fire and cover. We moved from apartment to

14 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

apartment, floor to floor from the bottom to the top, slowly and methodically.

Eventually we approached the final apartment and rooftop where our man was believed to be. The brother was still at large and needed to be apprehended.

After breaching the door of the final apartment, we sent our dog to search for any sign of life within. He returned after finding no one and leading us to no signs of life. We moved in, stacked on one another at the doorframe, so that we could carefully scan each room with live fire before entering. If there is a closet or a couch, we don’t take the chance of opening it or looking behind it. We shot a few holes in it and then looked. It was too dangerous, and my life was too precious to risk to the unknown dangers of who might be hiding under a sink, or in a kitchen cupboard. The place came up clean, no brother to be found. We found the trap door that led to the attic hideaway that we learned about during our briefing. It was free from life as well, but not free from weapons. We found 7.62 x 39 mm ammo, knives, shanks, and one AK-47 assault rifle (semi and full auto).

The brother remained free, but the mission was a success. We went home with the knowledge that we had taken a top terrorist leader and his personal weapons out of the game—at least until he was replaced. The mission was relatively uneventful but productive; it took about six hours start to finish. We all considered what might have happened had he not been outside when we arrived, instead poised in the attic, ready with his gear.

•

about the author Mr. Machine is a veteran of the Israeli counterterrorism unit Duvdevan. He is author of Israeli Security Concepts (CreateSpace, 2010) and provides security consultation and training (www. counterterrorwarfare.com).

Circle 301 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 15

Case Study:

2013 Boston bombings At approximately 2:49 pm on April 15th, two explosions occurred near the Boston Marathon finish line. Some runners had already crossed the finish line.1 The first explosion took place in front of 671 Boylston Street and the second in front of 755 Boylston Street, about a block away and approximately ten seconds later.

16 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

By Elena Mastors

T

he devices were placed in front of the metal barriers used to separate runners and spectators. Three people were killed, and reportedly between 140 and over 200 were injured. Investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Boston Police Department, and other members of the Joint Terrorism Task

Force (JTTF), moved quickly to examine video footage from cameras in the areas of the attacks and follow investigative leads.

Suspects Identified According to the FBI criminal complaint filed in the US District Court of Massachusetts, footage captured from

video surveillance identified two suspect young men carrying backpacks turning onto Boylston Street from Gloucester Street and then walking toward the marathon finish. Further video footage and photographs revealed their presence in the area heading toward the scene of the bombings. They wore baseball caps and backpacks.2 The two men were finally

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 17

Scenes and approximate times of events of April 18-19. Photo: OpenStreetMap

identified as brothers Tamerlan Tsarnaev, age 26, and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, age 19.

The Pursuit On the evening of April 18th, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) police officer Sean Collier was

shot multiple times while sitting in his police cruiser on the university campus.

Collier died of his injuries. Police suspected and confirmed involvement of the two brothers in the shooting.3 Police surmise that the brothers were trying to steal Collierâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s gun, but could not figure

18 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

out how to get the gun out of the holster (which had a retention system) before departing the scene.4 The following day, in the early morning, the brothers kidnapped a driver at gunpoint in Boston, commandeering his SUV. The driver heard them say

Circle 265 on Reader Service Card

they were responsible for the bombings.

They drove to an ATM and withdrew cash using the hostage’s bank card. They then stopped for gas in Cambridge. At the station, the hostage escaped while Tamerlan was distracted operating a GPS.5 According to Watertown Police Chief Edward Deveau, police tracked the hostage’s cell phone and initiated pursuit. The brothers were then driving separate cars, one of which was the stolen SUV. On Laurel Street in Watertown, one officer arrived behind them and the two reportedly emerged from their cars and opened fire on him. The officer maneuvered his vehicle to expand the gap between himself and the bombers and waited for back-up.6 Other officers arrived at the scene. Reportedly over 200 rounds of ammo were expended

Circle 285 on Reader Service Card

during a 5-10 minute gun battle in which the brothers also threw explosive devices described by police as a pressure cooker bomb and four homemade grenade-like devices.7 The pressure cooker bomb exploded, but the others did not.8 Tamerlan advanced toward the police, firing his weapon, and ran dry. He was tackled by a police officer.

Dzhokhar then got back into the SUV and lunged forward, reportedly, running over his brother and dragging him a short distance.9 Police recovered a 9x19 mm Ruger used by Tamerlan at the scene.10 According to Tamerlan’s death certificate, he “died of gunshot wounds of torso and extremities,” from his shootout with police, and from blunt trauma to his head and torso. The latter he apparently sustained when his brother allegedly ran

Djokhar Tsarnaïev. Photo:VOA

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 19

him over while fleeing in the SUV.11 During this time, police requested citizens “shelter in place.” A manhunt was undertaken for Dzhokhtar, who abandoned the SUV a few streets away from the scene, and was presumed to be on foot.

A Watertown citizen reported that he noticed the cover of his boat was not on correctly and that he saw blood on

the floor. Police arrived and could see the form of a person they believed to be Dzokhtar sticking out from under the tarp. They used flash-bang grenades to stun the suspect and engaged in 20-30 minutes of negotiations.12 A state police helicopter with thermal imaging was utilized, as was an armored vehicle with an arm, which peeled back the tarp, revealing the suspect.13 The subject stood

up and lifted his shirt for the officers, demonstrating he was not armed.14 Police approached the boat and took the suspect into custody. They confirmed it was Dzokhtar by several forms of identification they found in his pockets.15 Gunfire in the Dzokhtar apprehension has not yet been fully explained, and media reports regarding apprehended weapons at the scene conflict. A note was found scrawled on the wall, presumably from Dzhokhtar, stating that US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq were the reason for the bombing.16 Dzhokhtar was wounded, having “apparent gunshot wounds to the head, neck, legs and hand.”17 He was first taken to Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center for his injuries and then transferred to the Federal Medical Center Devens.

Background The two brothers are Muslim ethnic Chechens, who were born in Kyrgyzstan and also lived in Dagestan. Dagestan is one of the Caucuses Republics in Russia, situated on the Caspian Sea and adjacent to Chechnya. Dzhokhtar emigrated to Cambridge, Massachusetts with his parents, Zubidat and Anzor Tsarnaev, in 2002, and Tamerlan arrived in 2004.18 Their two sisters also came to live in the United States. Anzor Tsarnaev opened an auto shop. The family received welfare benefits in the form of food stamps and section 8 housing from 2002-2012, totaling more than $100,000.19 Tamerlan, his wife, and daughter received public assistance until last year.20 Tamerlan, an amateur boxer, attended the Bunker Hill Community College, but left to pursue boxing. He stopped boxing in 2011 and was married to Katherine Russell in 2010. Tamerlan was not employed and stayed at home with the couple’s young child. He once told

20 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Circle 74 on Reader Service Card

Circle 275 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 21

Fragment believed to be part of bomb used in 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Photo: FBI

The remains of a black backpack that contained one of the bombs that exploded. Photo: FBI

a photographer, “I don’t have a single American friend” and “I don’t understand them.”21 His YouTube channel paid homage to videos supporting Islamic extremism and jihad.22 These include a rant by Feiz Muhammad, an Australian cleric and ex-boxer based in Malaysia.

In one video the cleric talks about evil ‘paganism’ in the Harry Potter movies.

Another video provides a dramatization of the Armageddon prophecy of the Black Banners of Khurasan, an all-powerful Islamic military force that will rise up from Central Asia and defeat the infidels; it is a martial-religious prophecy favored by al Qaeda.23 It was speculated that he was radicalized while in Dagestan in 2012. Reports from friends and family indicate he demonstrated radicalized beliefs before this trip, however.

Dzhokhtar went to Cambridge Ridge and Latin school. He was a student at the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth and took the US citizen oath on September 11, 2012.24 He did not appear radicalized to those around him. In fact, he was depicted by those who knew him as a normal 19-year old who spent time with his friends.25 After the attacks, he is reported to have gone to the gym and “hung out” with his friends. It appears, however, that he was influenced by his

22 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

older brother. He posted links to sites for Chechen independence in Russian on a social networking site.26 The brothers’ parents divorced in 2011 and then subsequently reunited, and currently reside in Dagestan, Russia. His mother left the United States while facing charges for shoplifting at a Lord & Taylor store.27

The IEDs The devices used in the bombings were hidden in backpacks and placed near the finish line. The bombs were made from pressure cookers. Both devices contained nails, one contained BBs also. The explosives were nitrate and perchlorate-based oxidizers, such as are found in commercial fireworks.28 It was determined that Tamerlan bought fireworks in New Hampshire in February.29 Empty fireworks were also found in Dzhokhtar’s dorm room.30 The fuses were hobby fuses and the detonators were radio control units from remote control cars.31 Investigators found explosive residue in Tamerlan’s apartment, suggesting that the bombs may have been built there.32 The pressure cooker bombs were similar to what al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula suggested in its Inspire magazine article, “How to Build

Circle 97 on Reader Service Card

a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.” Inspire was originated by two American members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Anwar al-Alwlaki and Samir Khan. Further, according to a report by the Terrorist Explosive Analytical Center, one of the bombs thrown at police in Watertown used an elbow pipe wrapped in black tape, as discussed in Inspire.33 Investigators also found female DNA on one of the bombs. The DNA from Tamerlan’s wife was tested, but reportedly did not match. It is not known whether this DNA is tied to an accomplice, a person that handled the materials, or from one of the victims of the bombings.34

More Evidence Obtained On April 21, the FBI searched Dzhokhar’s dorm room. There they found BBs, a large pyrotechnic, a black

Circle 83 on Reader Service Card

jacket and white hat, which appeared similar to those worn by one of the suspects identified in the video footage the day of the race.35 FBI Investigators questioned Dzhokhar in the hospital and he reportedly confirmed that he and Tamerlan followed the bomb making instructions in Inspire magazine. He stated they were upset about Afghanistan and Iraq.36 He also said they planned to travel to New York City and bomb Times Square.37 Furthermore, he disclosed that the Boston Marathon was a target of opportunity. He and his brother were due to set off the bombs on July 4th, but they completed construction of the bombs in his brother’s apartment early.38 After approximately sixteen hours of questioning, in an unusual turn of events, a magistrate judge and member of the US attorney’s office came to his hospital room and read Dzhokhtar his rights.39

Subsequently, he purportedly stopped cooperating with investigators and no further information was obtained.

Investigators were also looking into Tamerlan’s connection to a Canadian Islamic convert and jihadist William Plontikov, who was killed

by Russian forces in Dagestan in July 2012. Immediately after Plontikov’s death, Tamerlan left the region and travelled back to the United States.40 According to Russian press reporting, Tamerlan was first flagged by Russian law enforcement agencies due to his connection to Plontikov. Reports also revealed that Tamerlan met several times with Mahmud Mansur Nidal, another jihadist.41 Dzhokhar’s college friends, Azmat Tazhayakov and Dias Kadyrbayev, both Kazakh nationals in the United States on student visas, were interviewed. They

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 23

were initially arrested on immigration violations on April 20.42 The friends indicated that it wasn’t until they saw the photos in the news that they determined Dzhokhar was involved. This prompted them to go to his dorm room on April 15th with Robel Phillipos, another friend, and get Dzhokhar’s laptop and backpack containing empty fireworks, and then dump the articles in the garbage.43 According to the criminal complaint filed in the US District Court of Massachusetts, Kadyrbayev and Tazhayakov “intentionally obstructed justice in connection with the Marathon bombing investigation.”44 As of this writing, they are being held without bail and are expected to be indicted. Phillipos was charged with knowingly and willingly making false statements. The first three times he was interviewed, he claimed he did not go to the dorm room.45 He was released on bail.

Investigators are now looking into the brothers’ ties to the 2011 unsolved murder of Brandon Mess, a contact of Tamerlan, and two other men in Waltham, Massachusetts. The three victims’ throats were slashed and their bodies were covered in marijuana. 46 In late May, Ibragim Todashev, a Chechen, lunged at an FBI agent with a knife during an interview regarding the Mess murder, and was shot and killed by the agent. Todashev, a mixed martial arts fighter, knew Tamerlan, and according to FBI sources, Todashev was expected to confess to the murder of Mess.47

Intelligence Reviewed Tamerlan first came to the attention of the FBI when the Russian government provided information in March 2011.

According to reports, the Russians were concerned by a series of text messages sent from Tamerlan’s mother to her

24 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

relative regarding Tamerlan’s desire to join a separatist group.48 These specifics regarding the text messages, however, were allegedly not relayed to the FBI until after the bombings.

The FBI investigated Tamerlan between March and June 2011, but concluded he was not a threat. The FBI also stated that they asked for more information from the Russians, but did not receive any.49 The Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center and the CIA were not told of that investigation. Six months later, Russian officials requested the CIA place Tamerlan on a terrorism watch list and the National Counterterrorism Center list. His name was in the FBI terrorist screening database and a Homeland Security database.

Tamerlan traveled to Dagestan, Russia, in 2012, but US Customs and Border Protection did not do a follow up interview upon his return.50 His mother was also on the watch list.

Circle 297 on Reader Service Card

The Boston Regional Intelligence Center issued a report dated April 10th, identifying the Boston Marathon as an “area of increased vulnerability” and noted the potential to use “small scale bombings.”51 Of course, this report is one among scores of similar assessments of public events.

Charges and Aftermath Dzhokhar was charged “with using a weapon of mass destruction against persons and property at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013, resulting in death.”52 He is being represented by Judy Clarke, famous for the defense of Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski. Dzhokhar has developed a teenage fan base on twitter: #FreeJahar. As one fan put it, “Yes i like Justin Bieber and i like Jahar but that has nothing to do with why i

Circle 312 on Reader Service Card

support him. I know hes innocent, he is far too beautiful.”53

•

about the author Ms. Mastors (PhD) is currently Vice President and Dean of the School of Security and Global Studies at the American Public University System. She previously held senior positions in the Office of Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Endnotes http://c.o0bg.com/rw/ Boston/2011-2020/2013/05/01/ BostonGlobe.com/Metro/Graphics/ kt_complaint.pdf 2 http://c.o0bg.com/rw/ Boston/2011-2020/2013/05/01/ BostonGlobe.com/Metro/Graphics/ kt_complaint.pdf 3 http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/19/ 1

Runners pick up their clothing bags at the finish line hours after the explosions at the Boston Marathon. Hundreds, if not thousands, of unretrieved bags lie on the ground, belonging to runners who were diverted from the finish line.

Photo: Mark Zastrow from Boston, USA

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 25

Boston Marathon explosions. Photo: Aaron â&#x20AC;&#x153;tangoâ&#x20AC;?

Circle 113 on Reader Service Card

Circle 119 on Reader Service Card

justice/boston-marathon-timeline 4 http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ fbi-shoots-florida-man-linked-bostonmarathon-bombing/story?id=19231642#.

UaT5zRvn9dg; http://www.news. com.au/world-news/north-america/ boston-bomb-suspects-killed-policeofficer-sean-collier-for-his-gun/storyfnh81jut-1226628497292 5 http://transcripts.cnn.com/ TRANSCRIPTS/1304/26/acd.02.html 6 http://cnn.com/interactive/2013/04/ us/boston-marathon-terror-attack/ 7 http://www.wcvb.com/news/local/ metro/Watertown-police-chief-describesfirefight-with-Boston-Marathon-bombsuspects/-/11971628/19830666/-/ fmc5hh/-/index.html 8 http://cnn.com/interactive/2013/04/ us/boston-marathon-terror-attack/ 9 http://cnn.com/interactive/2013/04/ us/boston-marathon-terror-attack 10 http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/singlegun-recovered-accused-boston-bombers/ story?id=19028841 11 http://www.boston.com/ metrodesk/2013/05/03/bostonmarathon-bombing-suspect-tamerlantsarnaev-died-from-gunshot-woundsblunt-trauma-according-death-certificate/ HqbOisq2mQerevXscHn06J/story.html 12 http://article.wn.com/ view/2013/04/21/Dramatic_Helicopter_ Video_Reveals_Wounded_Bombing_ Suspect/#/related_news 13 http://www.nydailynews.com/news/

26 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

national/thermal-imaging-aided-bombsuspect-arrest-article-1.1322811 14 http://cnn.com/interactive/2013/04/ us/boston-marathon-terror-attack/ 15 http://c.o0bg.com/rw/ Boston/2011020/2013/05/01/ BostonGlobe.com/Metro/Graphics/ phil_complaint.pdf 16 http://www.foxnews.com/ us/2013/05/16/boston-bombing-suspectdzhokhar-tsarnaev-reportedly-left-noteinside-boat/ 17 http://c.o0bg.com/rw/ Boston/2011020/2013/05/01/ BostonGlobe.com/Metro/Graphics/ phil_complaint.pdf 18 http://swampland.time. com/2013/04/30/five-questions-incongress-about-the-boston-bombings/ 19 http://bostonherald.com/news_ opinion/local_coverage/2013/04/ tsarnaev_family_received_100g_in_ benefits 20 http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/ Latest-News-Wires/2013/0501/Tsarnaev100K-benefits-Family-s-public-assistanceunder-investigation 21 http://www.newyorker.com/ talk/2013/04/29/130429ta_talk_remnick 22 http://www.newyorker.com/ talk/2013/04/29/130429ta_talk_remnick 23 http://www.newyorker.com/ talk/2013/04/29/130429ta_talk_remnick 24 http://transcripts.cnn.com/ TRANSCRIPTS/1304/26/acd.02.html 25 http://www.nytimes.

com/2013/05/05/us/dzhokhartsarnaevs-dark-side-carefully-masked. html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 26 http://news.msn.com/us/bostonsuspects-web-page-venerates-islandchechen-independence 27 http://businessweek.com/printer/ articles/489956?type=bloomberg; http:// online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127 887324743704578447263803031592. html 28 http://www.foxnews.com/ us/2013/04/24/toy-car-parts-likelyused-to-detonate-marathon-bombsinvestigators-conclude/ 29 http://www.foxnews.com/ us/2013/04/24/toy-car-parts-likelyused-to-detonate-marathon-bombsinvestigators-conclude/ 30 http://www.fbi.gov/news/updates-oninvestigation-into-multiple-explosions-inboston 31 http://www.foxnews.com/ us/2013/04/24/toy-car-parts-likelyused-to-detonate-marathon-bombsinvestigators-conclude/ 32 http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/ explosives-residue-found-in-slain-bostonsuspect-s-apartment_846662.html 33 http://openchannel.nbcnews. com/_news/2013/04/26/17932143exclusive-government-doc-shows-howclosely-boston-marathon-bombersfollowed-al-qaeda-plans?lite 34 http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ feds-probe-boston-bomb-suspects-linkrussian-militants/story?id=19072494 35 http://c.o0bg.com/rw/ Boston/2011020/2013/05/01/ BostonGlobe.com/Metro/Graphics/ phil_complaint.pdf 36 www.huffingtonpost. com/2013/04/26/fbi-boston-marathonbomb-_n_3166750.html 37 Boston bombing suspects laptop may explain what radicalized them 38 http://www.foxnews.com/

us/2013/05/02/new-informationrevealed-about-boston-marathonbombing-devices/ 39 http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ lawmakers-ask-who-knew-what-aboutbomb-suspect 40 http://world.time.com/2013/04/29/ picking-up-the-boston-bomber-trail-inutamysh-russia/ 41 http://world.time.com/2013/04/29/ picking-up-the-boston-bomber-trail-inutamysh-russia/ 42 http://c.o0bg.com/rw/ Boston/2011020/2013/05/01/ BostonGlobe.com/Metro/Graphics/ phil_complaint.pdf 43 http://www.foxnews.com/ us/2013/05/02/new-informationrevealed-about-boston-marathonbombing-devices/ 44 http://c.o0bg.com/rw/ Boston/2011020/2013/05/01/ BostonGlobe.com/Metro/Graphics/ phil_complaint.pdf 45 http://c.o0bg.com/rw/ Boston/2011020/2013/05/01/ BostonGlobe.com/Metro/Graphics/ phil_complaint.pdf 46 http://www.theatlanticwire.com/ national/2013/05/investigators-aretrying-pin-another-triple-homicideboston-bombers/65108/ 47 http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ fbi-shoots-florida-man-linked-bostonmarathon-bombing/story?id=19231642#.

UaT5zRvn9dg 48 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000 14241278873242443045784753008560 08018.html 49 http://www.boston.com/news/ local/blogs/war-and-peace/2013/04/26/ former-chief-terror-information-sharingtsarnaev-handling-looks-like-mistake/ rkVhCeC5sUsWT2TxaVII8J/blog.html 50 http://www.boston.com/news/ local/blogs/war-and-peace/2013/04/26/ former-chief-terror-information-sharing-

tsarnaev-handling-looks-like-mistake/ rkVhCeC5sUsWT2TxaVII8J/blog.html 51 http://www.latimes.com/ news/politics/la-pn-intelligencereport-vulnerability-bostonbombing-20130509,0,7305052.story 52 www.fbi.gov/boston/pressreleases/2013 53 http://www.huffingtonpost. co.uk/2013/05/12/freejaharboston-bombings-suspectdzhokhar-tsarnaevsteenage-fanstoo-beautiful-terrorist_n_3262795. html?utm_hp_ref=uk

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 27

28 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Circle 291 on Reader Service Card

Victory!

O ne of the most famous weapons in the world isn’t a weapon at all. Going back to the Han

Dynasty eight centuries ago and on through the Roman Empire, World War II and right up to present day, one of the decisive factors in victory on the battlefield or in special operations has been none other than the lowly boot. Without good boots, military disasters have frequently occurred.

Take for example, Hitler’s campaign “Barbarossa” or Red Beard, where the biggest invasion in history (four million German soldiers along a front that was 2,900 miles wide) invaded Russia. The Germans didn’t count on the invasion lasting until winter.

There on the outskirts of Moscow, exhausted German soldiers that had been marching up to 12 hours a day, found themselves facing winter with light summer boots. Their feet were soon devastated by the freezing Russian cold, or what they called "General Winter." They were ultimately defeated by ice.

So, when SSI Tactical Gear set about designing the best boot for combat for law enforcement and military personnel, they used the experience they have as the leading trainers for SWAT and Special Operations teams around the world. This real-world experience led to a boot design that would protect warriors in any conditions. A boot warriors could fight in over glass shards, sharp metal shrapnel from

IED’s, and any other obstacles that got in their way.

They crafted the Victory to withstand the rigors of kicking through doors and windows to get the bad guys; accomplish the mission; come home safe and never be defeated by anything.

The Victory can now be yours through SSI Tactical Gear.

Using top quality components that are made in the United States of America including Velcro® safety fasteners, 3M Thinsulate® and YKK Zippers®, SSI’s Victory Boot is rugged as it is flexible. With a composite toe and anti-puncture sole it is customized to give you the traction you need on any surface. 1,000 Denier Nylon Cordura® with its breathable, antibacterial lining gives you full weather resistance. Genuine leather and water repellence completes the boot’s durability and performance.

In tough times for budgets in departments across the country, you can get the Victory for 30% less than any other competitive product that is made in America—quality and durability that exceeds footwear our well-known competitors make in China or in Asia— and still beats their price.

The Chinese may have known how to make good boots eight centuries ago, but today, only SSI Tactical Gear leads to Victory.

Call now to get agency or distributor pricing.

1-786-573-3999 ext 113, 305-401-6906, 305-302-2790. www.ssitacticalgear.com The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 29

Secrets of

the IRGC

By Walter Purdy

Hussein-Ali Montazeri And Ali Khamenei, 1979. Photo: Wikimedia Commons 30 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Iran 1979, the start of The Revolution. Photo: Iran Persian Gulf Forever

When the Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran on February 1, 1979, the Islamic Revolution faced a shattered economy, chaos on the streets, and fear of a coup d’état by the military.1

M

ohsen Sazegara, one of the founders of the Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi, or Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC), stated that the “CIA coup against Mossaadegh was fresh in our minds.” Sazegara thus proposed to Sayatollah Khomeini that the Iranian government establish a force to protect the Revolution and the country as a whole. Thirty-four years later, the IRGC, or Revolutionary Guard, has grown beyond those who founded it and

become a political, military, intelligence, and economic force unparalleled in Iran. As Ayatollah Khomeini stated, “If there was no IRGC, there would be no Revolution.”2 Since the founding of the Islamic Revolution, the IRGC has been a pillar of support for the political elite, and it is today the backbone of Iran. The IRGC was originally formed to protect the Revolution, but it is more than a large paramilitary organization. It can be viewed as both an elite alma mater and a

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 31

professional association or network. These days, alumni of the group hold the reins of power throughout the country, serving as mayors, governors, cabinet ministers, and ambassadors, among other positions.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is himself a former member. Currently, the IRGC has about 125,000 uniformed members who report directly to Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ali Khamenei.

Guardians of The Revolution Inc. For the past three decades, the IRGC has supplied weapons and training to its

32 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, South America, Africa, and other places of interest to the regime around the world. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that active duty IRGC forces— including combat commanders, combat elements, training forces, and Qods Forces—have all been deployed to Syria to support President Bashar al Assad’s regime.3 The Revolutionary Guard also controls Iran’s nuclear weapon program, and it operates a mix of legitimate and front companies that seek to assist in acquiring goods, services, and technology from around the world for this program.

In addition, the group has huge economic

Circle 335 on Reader Service Card Circle 335 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 33

interests and commitments in not only defense companies but also in construction, shipping, oil, banking, real estate, and other technology enterprises.

Today’s IRGC is a state-controlled global economic conglomerate with an intelligence branch, a navy, an air force, a special operations branch, a political branch, and even a strategic studies institute. It has no direct equivalent in the Western world.

The IRGC’s “go-to” force and covert arm is known as the Qods Force (IRGCQF). Also called the Jerusalem Force, this special unit is led by General Kassim Suleimani, and it combines covert intelligence collection with direct action against any and all designated enemies of Iran’s government.

Qods Force Exports Circle 307 on Reader Service Card

Circle 115 on Reader Service Card 20% OFF Standard fees with discount code CTM_CSOG when you register by Friday, August 16, 2013

FEATURED SPEAKERS: • Richard A. Clarke Chairman, Good Harbor Security Risk Management

Enhancing Mitigation Capabilities for Network Cyber Threats September 16-18, 2013 | Houston, TX Metro Area Don’t miss the ESPIONAGE AND ENERGY Focus Day www.OilandGasCyberSecurity.com

• Michael W. Locatis Former Assistant Secretary of Cyber Security and Communications, DHS • Dmitri Alperovitch Co-Founder & CTO Crowdstrike • Jonathan Pollet Founder, Principal Consultant, Red Tiger Security

34 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Circle 289 on Reader Service Card

Throughout its history, the IRGCQF has worked with numerous terrorist groups and proxies across the globe.

This organization was involved in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the 1988 hijacking of a Kuwait Airlines flight, the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, and the 1994 attack on the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA). More recently, on May 30, 2013, the U.S. State Department noted a “marked resurgence of Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism, through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force.” The department’s annual report to Congress stated that “terrorist activity [has] reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s, with attacks plotted in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa.”4 The IRGC-QF has been successful in evading international sanctions and exporting weapons through use of a number of front companies and cutouts

NEW LOCATION FOR 2013!

The Florida Hotel and Conference Center, Orlando

Counter The

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

presents: 8th Annual

Homeland Security Professionals Conference and Exposition November 5-7, 2013 • Orlando, Florida With a sellout in 2012 at the Gaylord Palms you spoke and we listened: • More centrally-located, deluxe hotel • No parking charges • Inexpensive and plentiful alternatives to hotel meals • Internet in the rooms and in the lobby

Program for the 2013 Conference:

Hot Topics in International Crime & Terrorism • Key Note Speaker: Steve Emerson. Hear from the world’s recognized expert, the state of the enemy in the USA in 2013 and where they are most well organized and ready.

• Mike Gordon: Conducting cyber social media investigations and reconnaissance.

• Dean Olsen: Tactical Counterterrorism: The Law Enforcement Manual of Terrorism Prevention • Steve Young: Terrorist’s reconnaissance. Case Study: Mumbai.

• Richard Landes: The effects of cognitive warfare.

• James McGee: Hostage Rescues • Detective Llewellyn Edwards: Violence in Bermuda: potential impact on US Homeland Security • Peter L. Domenico: From Bias to Atrocity: Understanding the Progression from Normalcy to Mass Murder • Jackie Bozeman: What can be learned from Israel in terms of Homeland Security This conference is approved for graduate and undergraduate credits through Saint Leo University

Register now for $249 – for subscribers to The Counter Terrorist Magazine only (Expires Sept. 30th, 2013)

www.thecounterterroristmag.com/conference

LEARN MORE at: Call now for more information.

Phone: 866-573-3999 Fax: 866-573-2090 Circle 180 on Reader Service Card info@homelandsecurityssi.com Circle 177 on Reader Service Card

SSI

SECURITY SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL

®

Protecting the Homeland Together The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 35 ®

Iranian Safir vehicle. Photo: M-ATF, in places like the Levant and Africa.

For example, in March 2011, Turkish inspectors discovered a shipment of AK-47s, machine guns, mortar rounds, and ammunition aboard a Yas Air flight bound for Syria. The shipment on this IRGC-QF front-company flight had been labeled as spare auto parts. Yas Air has made numerous flights into Syria under the cover of humanitarian assistance.

Recently, the U.S. Treasury singled out three IRGC-QF commanders for sanctionsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Sayyid Ali Akbar Tabatabaei,

Esmail Ghani and Hosein Aghajaniâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; all of whom have been involved in operations like the covert Syria flights.

Tabatabaei is the Commander of the IRGC-QF Africa Corps.5 He directs all IRGC-QF operations in Africa, including oversight of weapons shipments throughout the continent. Esmail Ghani is a Deputy Commander of the IRGCQF in charge of financial disbursements to IRGC-QF units, including those in Africa, as well as to various terrorist groups, including Hezbollah. Hosein

36 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Aghajani is a longtime IRGC-QF commander who has facilitated weapons shipments intended for Gambia.

On May 13, 2013, Azim Aghajani (aka Azim Adhajani) a member of the

Beyond Syria and Lebanon, the IRGC has exported weapons and training to proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

IRGC-QF, and his Nigerian partner were sentenced to five years in prison for smuggling weapons into Nigeria.

Aghajani was using an Iranian front business called Behineh Trading Company to move 13 shipping containers with 107mm rockets, mortars, grenades, weapons, and ammunition through Lagos, Nigeria, en route to Senegal. Aghajani has been added to the United Nations Security Council Iran Sanction List established pursuant to Resolution 1737 (2006).

Adventures in Syria

The president of the Syrian Arab Republic, Bashar Al-Assad. Pozzebom / ABr

Circle 81 on Reader Service Card

For decades, the IRGC-QF has been supplying weapons not only to President Assadâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s forces in Syria, but also to Iranâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s main proxy Hezbollah via container ships, aircraft and trucking companies.

IRGC-QF front companies handle the transportation of these armaments, enabling transportation funds to stay within the IRGC enterprise while maintaining IRGC control over the weapons. For instance, on May 2, 2013, the Israeli Air Force conducted an attack on a shipment of Iranian weapons that included mobile Fateh-110 missiles intended for delivery to Hezbollah.

Along with weapons like these, the IRGC often exports trainers and senior leaders to oversee, advise, and command like-minded forces. One such individual was IRGC General Hassan Shateri, the highest ranking Iranian known to have been killed in the Syria conflict. Shateri was buried in Tehran on February 14, 2013. Reports indicate that he died in an Israeli airstrike on a

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 37

shipment of advanced surface-toair missiles he was overseeing. In addition to being a senior commander of the IRGC, Shateri was also the director of the Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon (ICRL)—a group designated for sanctions by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2010. Under Shateri, the ICRL provided financial, material, and technical support to Hezbollah. For example, Shateri oversaw construction of various

The concave copper shape on top is an Explosively Formed Penetrator. (EFP) Photo: StuCPO at en.wikipedia

Circle 343 on Reader Service Card

38 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

command and control facilities, as well as a fiber optics communication network that allowed Hezbollah to have secured communications in Lebanon. Shateri had served in Lebanon since 2006 and oversaw an IRGC business empire that included hotels, banks, malls, shipping companies, travel agencies, and other holdings. The ICRL also provided engineering expertise to Hezbollah’s construction arm, Jihadal-Binaa, which was designated for sanctions in 2007.6

IRGC vs US Army Beyond Syria and Lebanon, the IRGC has exported weapons and training to proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Former hostage Mike Metrinko stated, “Having spent time as a guest of the Iranians it didn’t surprise me to see IRGC operatives were in Afghanistan.”7 In 2004, another IRGC export was the Iranian-built “explosively formed penetrator” (EFP).

This device, with machined parts and a concave lid, was the deadliest bomb used against American military personnel in Iraq. In fact, Iranian proxies have accounted for almost a quarter of U.S. casualties in Iraq.

As examples like these illustrate, Iran has been running a shadow war against the United States that can be traced back to 1983. General David Petraeus, in his testimony to Congress, acknowledged that “the Iranian regime has… attempted to thwart U.S. and international efforts to bring stability to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader region.”8 Numerous members of the IRGC and Qods Force were captured in raids in Baghdad and Erbil, where they were working with proxies who were attacking American forces. Over the years, IRGC operatives have additionally trained proxies such

Circle 309 on Reader Service Card The

Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 39

Outside Africa and the Middle East, the handiwork of the IRGC can be seen in recently foiled attacks in Cyprus, Georgia, and Thailand in 2012.

as Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM), Keta’ib Hezbollah, Promised Day Brigades, and various other Shiite groups. In the words of General Petraeus, “the Qods Force also maintains its lethal support to Shia Iraqi militia groups, providing them with weapons, funding, and training.”9 In 2008, in the middle of a battle with insurgent militia, General Petraeus received a message from the commander of IRGC-QF that said, “You should know that I, Kassim Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan. And indeed, the ambassador in Baghdad is a Qods Force member. The individual who is going to replace him is a Qods Force member. Now, that makes diplomacy difficult if you think that you’re going to do the traditional means of diplomacy by dealing with another country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs because in this case, it is not the ministry. It’s not Mottaki who controls the foreign policy, again, for these countries at least. It is, again, a security apparatus, the Qods Force, which is also carrying out other activities.”10

Bringing The Revolution to the World Outside Africa and the Middle East, the handiwork of the IRGC can be seen in recently foiled attacks in Cyprus, Georgia, and Thailand in 2012. Similarly, in New Delhi, India, a cell composed of six IRGC members laid the groundwork to attack Israeli diplomats and other targets. After detailed casing and surveillance, they were able to establish a pattern and began to prioritize one particular vehicle. Thus, on February 13,

40 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

2012, an operative named Houshang Afshar Irani attached a magnetic bomb to an Israeli Embassy vehicle assigned to the Israeli Defense Ministry. The device detonated and injured two individuals, including Tali Yehoshua-Koren, the wife of an Israeli diplomat. Elsewhere, on October 17, 2012, an IRGC operative named Mansour Arbabsiar pled guilty to attempting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States by seeking to hire a Mexican drug enforcer to bomb a restaurant in Washington, D.C., where the ambassador dined. The second individual wanted in this plot, Gholam Shakuri, a member of the Qods Force, remains at large in Iran.

The best way to understand the intentions and priorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s government is to see how today’s Iranian leaders apply Khomeini’s ideology to the complexities and challenges facing their country.

Khomeini weaved a cohesive, motivating ideology into the IRGC and gave the group the goal of exporting the ongoing revolution and protecting it at home.

However, not even Khomeini could have predicted what the IRGC has become: the world’s most dangerous terrorist conglomerate.

•

about the author Mr. Purdy is president of the Terrorism Research Center, Inc. and has conducted many interviews of personnel involved in the Iranian Revolution. TRC provides training, research, and analysis into terrorism, insurgency, and geopolitical issues.

TRC also conducts a unique immersion training program entitled Persian Mirror Image. For more information, visit www. trchomelandsecurity.com.

Circle 279 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 41

Eliminating the Nexus Between Terrorism and Narcotics

SEpTEmbEr, 16-18, 2013 | miami, Florida ChECk ouT our human TraFFiCking WorkShop!

SAVE 20% OFF Standard fees with discount code CTM_CNT13 when you register by Friday, August 16, 2013

Interact with those who are on the forefront of the war on terrorism: • CAPT Donna Cottrell Commanding Officer, hiTron, uSCg • CDR Harry Schmidt Chief, Drugs and Migrants Division, uSCg • Steve Caldwell Director, Maritime Security and Coast Guard Issues Homeland Security and Justice Team uS gao

Support to Syria revolution against Assad regime in Yemen. Photos: Syria Freedom

www.CounterTerrorismEvent.com Circle 148 on Reader Service Card

Military Antennas 11th Annual

Advancing Air, Ground and Maritime Communications

September 17-18, 2013 Washington, D.C. Metro Area

SAVE 20% OFF Standard fees with discount code CTM_ANT when you register by Friday, August 16, 2013

FEATURING PRESENTATIONS FROM LEADING EXPERTS INCLUDING: • Dr. Robert Bonneau, Program Manager, Air Force Office of Scientific Research • Patrick Fink, PhD, Deputy Chief, Antenna and Wireless Systems Branch, NASA Johnson Space Center • William McCarthy, Tactical Radio Products Lead, U.S Army Communications-Electronics Command • Dr. Joe Guerci, Fellow, IEEE

Endnotes Terrorism Research Center Inc., Report:The Islamic Revolution and Return of Ayatollah Khomeini, January 2013.

2 Ibid.

3 The Iran Political Analysis Project, Rafsanjani’s Message to a Young IRGC in 1988 May Still Have Relevance Today, January 24, 2013.

4 U.S. State Department “Country Reports on Terrorism,” May 30, 2013.

5 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “Treasury Targets Iranian Arms Shipments,” March 27, 2012.

6 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “U.S. Treasury Dept. Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism: Treasury 1

Exclusive OEM Sessions from: RAYTHEON LOCKHEED MARTIN GENERAL DYNAMICS BAE SYSTEMS w w w. M i l i t a r y A n t e n n a s E ve n t . c o m Circle 168 on Reader Service Card

42 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Announces New Sanctions Against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps— Qods Force Leadership,” August 3, 2010.

7 Terrorism Research Center, Inc., “TRC Interview with Mike Metrinko: An American Hostage in Iran,” February 2013.

8 Statement of General David H. Petraeus before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 16, 2010.

9 Ibid.

10 Interview and moderated Q&A with General David Petraeus, Institute for the Study of War, January 22, 2010.

New and improved

( portable vehicle barrier ) When Law Enforcement in Dallas wanted a product to protect the greatest sporting event in the US they chose SSI’s PVB. The reason the PVB is used by agencies and militaries across the globe is that it transfers the momentum of the threatening vehicle upwards and stops it in its tracks. Two adults can deploy the barrier in minutes, and there is no need for electricity whatsoever.

The Portable Vehicle Barrier comes with several customized configurations: • You can put wheels on it so that it acts as a swing barrier and easily opens a road • You can toughen the line by adding anchoring cables or place the PVB’s in one single row or even three rows to stop anything • Additional safety features can be added PVBs can be folded down quickly –moved and stored with ease – the PVB is reusable and durable.

Best of all NO maintenance is required.

Made in the USA means jobs in the USA and supporting our national economy. Ordering is quick and easy allowing us to make the PVB available to your agencies immediately. Besides being the most cost effective barrier in the business today, the PVB is a VBIED killer. CALL NOW.

Call now for more information. Pricing dependent on quantity and delivery location. Call: (305) 401-6906 or email info@homelandsecurityssi.com

Or visit our website: www.SSIPVB.com

Circle 308 on Reader Service Card

SSI

Circle 226 on Reader Service TheCard Counter

SECURITY SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL

®

Protecting the Homeland Together ®

Terrorist ~ August/September 2013Service 43 Card Circle 136 on Reader

From protecting the homeland... to protecting you.

If you require personal security services for your family or business—shouldn’t you depend on the very best—the trainers of the nation’s military, SWAT, and Intelligence agencies?

Let the Homeland Security leaders, SSI, take care of your security needs. We are proud to announce we now provide the following services:

• Executive/VIP Services • Special event security • Armed and Unarmed Professionals – qualified and trained • Special Police Officers • Background investigations/ Live Scan Fingerprinting • Employee Background Checks • Background checks • Canine Services • Mobile Patrol • Asset Protection • Loss prevention: retail and commercial parking lot patrol • Concierge Services

Call Henry Morgenstern NOW for more information.

Phone: 305-401-6906 or 786-573-3999 Ext. 113 contact@securitysolutionsint.com

Circle 295 on Reader Service Card 44 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

SSI

®

SECURITY SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL

Protecting the Homeland Together ®

Circle 305 on Reader Service Card

Circle 303 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 45

Book Review

Inspire By al Qaeda

Reviewed by: Chris Graham

Y

ou have probably heard of Inspire, the al Qaeda English-language online periodical, but you may not have taken the time to access and study it yet. The purpose of Inspire is twofold. It encourages the Muslim subset of peaceful supremacists to take the next step and transform themselves into violent jihadists, and also calls remaining Muslims to participate in a support network that can be used to wield power anywhere and everywhere in the world.

Inspire 1434 (2013), Issue 10, is a valuable edition to review. The first topic covered is “Torching Parked Vehicles,” by a writer identifying himself as Ibnul Irhab. “Causing Road Accidents,” also attributed to Ibnul Irhab, advocates sabotaging roads with oil at bends or by placing boards with nails in them because “Kuffars” have “chosen the wrong path.” Next, “Starting Forest Fires” by AQ Chef promotes some cheap and simple, if unreliable, techniques for igniting a blaze. After that, “The Ultimate Mowing Machine” by Yahya Ibrahim suggests attaching blades to the front of a four-wheel-drive truck, then targeting crowds to run down. This tactic is specifically recommended for use in Israel, the United States, Canada, and

most European nations in retaliation for defaming Mohammed.

In “Destroying Buildings,” AQ Chef returns, teaching techniques to combine “oxygen, fuel, and ignition” to obtain the desired level of explosion or combustion.

The next article, “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” by Dr. Khateer, is subdivided into sections: “Making Acetone Peroxide” and “Remote Control Detonation.” Some of the methods

46 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

described in this piece are similar to those used in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings.

“Shoot Like a Pro” by Abu Saleh describes stripping and operating a Makarov pistol, while “Training with the AK” by Abu Salih (new spelling) describes maintenance procedures and body position for employing the rifle. In “Tips for Our Brothers in the United Snakes of America,” Yahya Ibrahim (again) provides advice for aspiring terrorists.

Next, “You Ask, We Answer” features reader questions, the first of which comes from a doctor asking what he can do to support the cause. He is advised to create chemical or biological weapons or to assist the “mujahideen” with medical advice. The second question comes from a journalist who wants to join the jihad. He is encouraged to conduct surveillance operations and submit his targeting information. The last piece in the issue is titled “How to Use Asrar Al Mujahideen” and describes communicating with encrypted e-mail.

The publication then concludes by providing two e-mail addresses for contact, along with a photo of a man with a customized AK-47 and an RPG

bearing the message “We Are Coming.”

Inspire has a professional, clean appearance with a casual tone.

Occasional use of incorrect words suggests possible translation challenges, English deficiencies, or spell-check oversights. Experienced operators will note deficiencies in much of the tactical and operational advice given, but such observations miss the point.

Herein lies the real purpose of the magazine. It is not an effort to educate the most skilled operators possible.

Rather, it is a campaign to create the messiest killers and saboteurs possible.

Inspire displays to young Muslims the same level of compassion Usama bin Laden and the Iranian mullahs demonstrated toward the men, women, and children they seduced, coerced, and deceived into carrying out suicide attacks.

Whereas professional terrorists and their leaders operate with as much skill as

Circle 277 on Reader Service Card

they can muster studying other sources, Inspire is intended to help the ignorant and the young grab the spotlight for the men they serve immediately before destroying themselves. Some of the publication’s bomb-making advice is likely as dangerous for the maker as it is for the intended victims. Similarly, skilled shooters will recognize some of the firearms training as imprecise.

Thus, while there is no doubt the techniques described in Inspire can kill or destroy, the magazine is clearly not a manual for skilled professionals.

Instead, Inspire’s primary contribution to our world is to raise the heat under the international campaign Islamists are waging against non-Muslims. The heat is raised whenever the world experiences a jihadist attack, but also whenever the world sees a terrorist killed or captured and prosecuted. A combatant skilled at tradecraft that disappears after his

operational act only contributes once.

Some will use Inspire as a justification to attempt to censor the Internet.

However, students of history will likely recognize greater long-term hazards from censorship than from allowing access.

Exposure to this type of propaganda is valuable for anyone who wants to understand our adversary’s tactics and counter their dogma, as well as for citizens and voters oblivious to the viciousness and widespread nature of the challenge that we face.

Inspire is intended to create the widest, most decentralized (if unsophisticated) harassing enemy force possible—a collection of low-value individuals that, combined with more sophisticated efforts, is intended to circumvent technological advantage and “destroy your [our] economy”. Read it and learn how your enemy’s pawns are encouraged to operate.

•

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 47

high-altitude electromagnetic pulse attacks

By Mike Cheston

Counter The

Patriot missiles being launched to intercept an Iraqi SCUD missile over the city of Tel Aviv. Photo: Alpert Nathan, GPO.

48 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

No intelligent combatant positions himself in front of his adversaryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strengths and remains static for his enemy to engage.

Strategic thinkers should be on the alert to the full range of asymmetric warfare disciplines that competitors practice.

A

ntagonistic regimes like Iran and the Democratic Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), for example, have espoused national strategies clearly aimed at eliminating the US as a world power.

Both are currently unable to spearhead that strategy through conventional means, so the most viable options to pursue this goal would include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high-yield explosives (CBRNE), cyber, and the wide range of unrestricted warfare disciplines. An aggressor with the goal of defeating the

United States or another modern nation might consider a means to create damage in an unprecedented manner; not just an attack intended to knock the target to its knees. An attack that might create such domestic upheaval, suffering and unrest that the target would be rendered internationally irrelevant and preoccupied with saving itself might be an attractive option. The National Institute for Public Policy observes: One of the challenges U.S. policy makers face is to resist the urge to focus simply on those threats that are unusual,

Washington Metro, built deep, in case of nuclear attack. Photo: Pedro Layant

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 49

DPRK pours its national treasury into development of ICBMs, orbital vehicles, and nuclear weapons while its population literally starves. different, or designed to evade American strengths. Instead, defensive energies should be directed to defeat those threats that would wreak great damage upon American interests.1 When considering the possible means of an Iranian and North Korean attack there are clues that might be considered. Both nations are continuing to aggressively pursue nuclear capabilities well beyond so-called “peaceful purposes,” even at the expense of their national economy and citizen’s wellbeing. Iran’s leadership continues to push development of nuclear and other weapons, even while its population suffers under the most stringent UN economic sanctions in history. DPRK pours its national treasury into development of ICBMs, orbital vehicles, and nuclear weapons while its population literally starves. This is, of course, where further analysis of “threat” information slips into both the classified and the unknown.

Intelligence of this nature is very difficult to procure via technological means, and the US is limited in many of the human intelligence source areas (HUMINT), choosing instead to assess intent and capability from orbital platforms. To be clear, communications intelligence

(COMINT), electromagnetic intelligence (ELINT) and mass spectrum intelligence (MASINT) all have very high value, but they cannot clearly identify intent and in many cases they cannot nail down locations and quantities of weapons.

Intelligence failures abound when it comes to knowing when and where nuclear weapons are located. Two nottoo-distant past examples include the unexpected underground nuclear test of Pakistan’s nuclear program in 1998, and the revelation that North Korea in fact had a robust nuclear program days after it expelled the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors in 2009. These inspectors had the very mission of detecting any such activity but did not confirm these efforts.

It might be the asymmetric use of nuclear weapons (such as a High-Altitude EMP) that could knock a technologically

50 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

advanced adversary back into the stone age. The most popular scenario being played out in US war colleges envisions a missile launch from several innocuous foreign-flagged freighters off the eastern seaboard (this is an Iranian scenario, but a DPRK scenario could certainly play out in similar fashion. Perhaps, on the west coast). The launch sequence might use nuclear-tipped SCUD missile tube technologies (so-called “SCUD-in-abucket”) to deliver a payload into a low orbital position over the US. Two or three freighters loitering off the east coast of the US, launching missiles to an altitude of between 75–120 miles above the earth to orbital detonation might shower the eastern seaboard (or more) with a series of EMP waves. These waves are generally harmless to humans but would be destructive to the eastern half of the US electrical grid, if not a much larger

Circle 131 on Reader Service Card

MACTAC Multiple-Assault Counter Terrorism Action Capability

TM

The Newest, Most Dynamic Training Program from SSI . ®

SSI SWAT CT OPS EXPLOSIVE THREAT MITIGATION COURSE ®

The Most Complete CT Training Available.

MACTAC is the new tactical philosophy

Learn from the Experts:

offering your department and agency training for an extremely flexible and scalable response to any Active Shooter situation while maintaining the ability to respond to additional attacks.

• Terrorist Risk Assessments • Middle East Operational Debriefs—Improve Entry Methods • Secure Search Techniques for Structures • Multiple Breach Points and Advanced CT Tactics • Terrorist Hostage Rescue • Suicide Terrorist Vehicle Interdiction • Containment and Call-Out for Counter Terrorism Ops • Explosive Lab Interdiction in Urban Areas • Explosive/IED Threat Mitigation in Structures • Command, Control and Planning Issues

Tiered for full-spectrum training of your department personnel to meet multiple challenges.

• MACTAC Officers Course • MACTAC Leaders Course • MACTAC Instructors Course Call to register for our next program:

Camp Blanding, Florida

Call to register for our next program:

Camp Blanding, Florida

www.homelandsecurityssi.com

LEARN MORE at: Call now for more information.

Phone: 866-573-3999 Circle 125 on Reader Service Card Fax: 866-573-2090 info@homelandsecurityssi.com Circle 125 on Reader Service Card Circle 228 on Reader Service Card

SSI

SECURITY SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL

®

Protecting the Homeland Together ®

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 51

Scud missile parts and equipment found in the cargo hold aboard the North Korean vessel, So San in the Gulf of Aden, 2002. The boarding team later found 15 disassembled Scud missiles concealed by bags of cement, bound for Yemen. Photo: US Navy. portion of US power infrastructure, and cripple it for an extended period of time, possibly 6-18 months.

Both adversaries are racing toward orbital vehicle capability, stating “manned orbit” as a goal. Of course, there is no reason to believe that this is their only or primary goal. Why throw a monkey into space while your population starves?

Many of today’s analysts of rogue state capabilities in nuclear weapons research and missile delivery systems agree that it’s a matter of when, not if, one or both of these nations will have the ability to launch nuclear attacks of some sort.

Estimates on EMP or other asymmetric nuclear weapons capability range in a measure of 2 to 10 years, depending on the analyst. There are few reasons to expect these attacks will come in the form of a direct ICBM attack, though recently North Korea stated that ICBM ranges capable of reaching the US are on the list of strategic options it intends to continue to pursue.

That said, there are two compelling

reasons why these adversaries might not want to use the ICBM (surface targeting to detonation) capability: First, the US would be in a much higher readiness level if they suspected such capability was in place, and second, launching such an attack would be readily and immediately detected, with a likely devastating counter-attack. Knowing that risk, why then would these governments put so much of their national treasure into development of nuclear weapons systems that likely offer little strategic advantage?

The answer may be an asymmetric scenario in which these nations employ nuclear weapons using attack profiles heretofore not experienced in the theater of war, but providing the greatest damage with the least risk of counter-attack. If the US loses its power grid—and with it its’ electromagnetic spectrum, its access to satellite constellations critical to communications, mass data transfer, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to an EMP—it may also lose most of its command,

52 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

control, communication and intelligence (C3I) capability and be subjected to a humanitarian crisis on a biblical scale (mass casualties from disease, starvation and the ensuing loss of civil law and order). One only need study the first 72-hours after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans to understand the potential for breakdown in social order when infrastructure no longer works. That was 72 hours, not multiple months.

The key target may be the US power grid, and more importantly, the principle control devices that support it. Once compromised by an EMP triple-wave assault (E1, E2 and E3), major transformer systems would have to be replaced/ rebuilt, requiring construction, delivery and installation of highly complex devices like the Very High Voltage Transformers in use today. These devices routinely require 12 month construction periods in benign circumstances—and that’s the problem.

Analysts cannot depend on Western or self-centric cultural determination of “rational reasoning” when considering a complex adversarial mindset. Indeed, the 2003 NIE stated that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons development program, an estimate based upon the US definition of a weapons development program, generally involving centralized laboratories and unified effort. Iran instead embarked on a decentralized strategy of nuclear program development, isolating elements of the program from other programs. Today it appears Iran has continued its development using these decentralized research centers, counter to the US government’s definition of nuclear weapons development. This further effects the “when” side of the capability equation of nuclear readiness.

In an article dated February 5, 2013, Israeli General Amos Yadlin predicted that Iran was likely within six months of

Circle 28 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 53

EMP attack is a potential risk. The fact that destruction of a modernized nation’s power grid would likely render that nation essentially sub-3rd world and irrelevant on the world stage for an extended period of time merits high priority for strategic interdiction and consideration in the National Planning Scenario.

developing a nuclear weapon.2 A 2010 New York Times article described Iranian President Ahmadinejad re-confirming his nuclear ambitions: “Iran’s president boasted Thursday that his nation had the capacity to make weapons-grade nuclear fuel if it chose to, in a speech intended to rally the nation as it marked the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.”3 Basing a national strategy on what our analysts would do—rather than on what our adversaries are doing, are likely to do, or may do—is referred to as “mirror imaging,” and continues to be an Achilles heel of Western governments and the intelligence services that support them.

Simply because “we” wouldn’t pursue a particular course of action because it doesn’t fit into our understanding of a rational action, does not mean that our adversary’s reality is identical to ours.

Furthermore, the will of today’s intelligence analysts to push back on senior leadership or lack thereof (aka political word-smithing) allows assessments like the NIE to become a policy fulfillment document, rather than an unvarnished assessment. One need only consider the simmering scandals swirling around the September 11th Benghazi attacks and subsequent cover up efforts to see how facts can be skewed to meet perspective for senior personnel who do not wish to bend perspective to match facts.* Professional intelligence only has value if analysts stay out of the business of proving a thesis (or cherry picking facts to support the hypothesis). The most common failure of both leaders and analysts is to factor calculations simply leaving out unknown or unknowable variables or assuming values for unknowns. A willingness to admit what is unknown or unknowable is a distinguishing advantage. Competent professionals must be honest admitting

54 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

what they don’t actually know (this was clearly a challenge in these WMD case studies). For obvious reasons, unclassified NIE may be divergent from the picture painted when including classified information.

The EMP capability challenges of our adversaries cause some analysts to argue that the three elements of a successful launch are not currently available to our enemies: (a) miniaturization of the nuclear payload, (b) fusing technology to ensure detonation takes place at the nominal altitude, and (c) missile technology capable of lifting the payload.

It is abundantly clear that both Iran and DPRK have missiles capable of carrying payloads into space.

Development of nuclear payloads in miniaturized payloads is simply a matter of time and research (or money to purchase miniaturized payloads from black market sources), and both Iran and DPRK are active in nuclear research and development, even more so than even the US or its allies now that we have sequestered all of our nuclear weapons development. On the surface, the issue of fusing may not appear to be particularly challenging, but specialists generally agree that it offers significant challenges.

Ofcourse, solving this and other issues is a matter of “when,” not “if.” Ultimately, discussion of development of this missile technology may be moot.

DPRK has in fact conducted nuclear research for over 20 years, it is believed to have conducted at least three underground nuclear tests, and has stated the latest test involved a “miniaturized” nuclear device.4 Indeed they continue to test both missile and nuclear weapons as of the time of this writing. As of February 2005, Defense Intelligence Agency analysts reported they believed that North Korea had produced as many as 12–15 nuclear weapons,5 which would

*Editor's note: See Vol. 6, No. 3, “The Benghazi Cover Up”.

further suggest that they had developed somewhere between six and eight plutonium bombs.

Couple this race to nuclear research and design, with the equally unconstrained development of missile technology (delivery vehicle), and we can anticipate the likely future. DPRK is developing a three to four stage missile technology called the Taep’o-dong-3, with an estimated range of 10,000 km (6,200 mi) and a launch date anticipated in the 2015 to 2018 timeframe. While payload is in question, the same technology is also being developed for orbital purposes, which will provide for a much larger payload.

EMP attack is a potential risk. The fact that destruction of a modernized nation’s power grid would likely render that nation essentially sub-3rd world and irrelevant on the world stage for an extended period of time merits high priority for strategic interdiction and consideration in the National Planning Scenario.

Today, EMP is not one of the 15 DHS Planning Scenarios. The US government deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to Guam because of North Korean threats.

However, the system is designed to bring down a missile in the terminal phase of the launch, on its way back to earth toward its target. It is not designed to take down the missile on its way up to orbit, and is reported to have limited capability against ICBMs. Many nations and their citizens are at risk from the strategic maneuverings of rogue nations, and the development of H-EMP (highaltitude EMP) capability in Iran or DPRK could be catastrophic. The Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack stated: “A single EMP attack may seriously

degrade or shut down a large part of the electric power grid in the geographic area of EMP exposure effectively instantaneously.

There is also a possibility of functional collapse of grids beyond the exposed area, as electrical effects propagate from one region to another.”6

•

About the author Mr. Cheston is a retired USMCR colonel. He served as an intelligence officer and ground combat officer and is the principal of Seraph, Inc. (www. seraphinc.us). He currently works as a consultant on a number of security and intelligence efforts domestically and internationally.

Endnotes Understanding “Asymmetric” Threats to the United States, Lamakis, Kiras and Kolet, September 2002, National Institute for Public Policy 1

Circle 29 on Reader Service Card

“Israeli security expert: Iran’s 6 months from a nuclear bomb,” Washington Times, 5 February 2013, Online Edition http:// www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/ feb/4/israeli-security-expert-irans-6months-nuclear-bom/ 3 Michael Slackman, Iran Boasts of Capacity to Make Bomb, The New York Times, February 11, 2010.

4 North Korea’s nuclear tests, BBC News Asia, February 12, 2013, http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/world-asia-17823706 5 Debating N. Korea nukes, Knut Royce, Newsday (New York), February 16, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/ news/2005/050216-dprk-nukes.htm 6 Dr. John S. Foster, Jr, et. al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, April 2008, http://www. empcommission.org/ 2

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 55

al qaeda in the islamic maghreb

56 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

By Michael S. Toney

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has become the wealthiest and most active of all al Qaeda affiliates, using its funds in a hearts-and-minds campaign aimed at the most impoverished residents of the Sahara-Sahel region.

A

QIM operates on a budget comparable to that of a small pharmaceutical company or steel manufacturer, positioning it as one of the top 1,000 employers in Northern Africa.

Led by Abdelmalek Droukdel, a.k.a.

Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, AQIM is headquartered in Algeria. In addition to conducting terrorist, guerrilla, and unrestricted warfare, AQIM members

smuggle commodities such as guns, drugs, and other goods and traffic in humans in support of efforts to establish an Islamist state.

Global Concerns Algeria—the home of AQIM—is the largest member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with petroleum and gas export

potential valued at more than $2.5 trillion dollars.1 The nation’s population is 99% Sunni (the globally predominant Islamic sect).2 After more than 60 years of turmoil, Algeria has become “a transit and, to a lesser extent, a destination and source country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking,” much of it conducted by “criminal networks which sometimes

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2013 57 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 57

[Jemal Oumar] Traders traversing the Sahel-Saharan region are feeling the impact of recent AQIM activity. Photo: Magharebia

extend to sub-Saharan Africa and to Europe.”3 These include a number of Islamic terror groups—with AQIM chief among them.4 In fact, unless interdicted, AQIM will likely become a dominant regional political entity, as the Taliban has in Afghanistan.

The establishment of AFRICOM by the U.S. Armed Forces offers a means of assistance to African countries under siege by the numerous violent organizations operating on the continent.

However, AFRICOM’s efforts focus primarily on “strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations.”5 Consequently, AFRICOM’s actions generally do not displace AQIM’s “hearts and minds” manipulations. Its presence also offers propaganda opportunities to AQIM, whose leaders claim that AFRICOM is yet another example of foreign interests’ forceful attempts to control African nations, reminiscent of the colonial and annexation activities of European countries in the 19th and 20th centuries.6

Evolution of Algerian Terrorism AQIM was conceived from the ideological differences between Hassan Hattab, a former Armed Islamic Group (GIA) regional commander, and his GIA colleagues over the slaughter of innocent civilians.7 Hattab resigned from GIA and founded the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which rebranded as AQIM in 2007. This pattern of creation, evolution, and, in many instances, dissolution is typical of violent organizations formed in Algeria.

Hattab’s original intent may have been to scale back the violence, but AQIM has since surpassed many of its peers in its number and scope of violent acts, rarely differentiating civilians from military targets. To date, it is estimated that AQIM is responsible for more than 5,000 fatalities, injuries, and kidnappings.8-48

58 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Recruitment Within the Sahara-Sahel, regional warlords and criminal networks combined with discontent youth, extreme poverty, and poor education create an environment conducive to AQIM’s efforts to recruit, indoctrinate, and cultivate logistical and political support. Although Tuaregs (Saharan nomads) are generally hostile toward foreign Islamists, they are progressively more receptive to AQIM, largely because of ties created through marriage—a technique practiced in numerous regions.49 AQIM recruits often display the following traits:

Young recruits: • Are impoverished • Are distrustful of government • Identify with jihadism • Blame Western influences (extreme anti-colonial sentiments)

Circle 308 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 59

Middle-aged recruits: • Are among the working poor and may be owed unpaid wages • Are distrustful of leadership (wage looting) • Sympathize with jihadists • Desire a more literal form of Islam

Older recruits: • Are impoverished (often farmers and villagers) • Are distrustful of government • Sympathize with jihadists • Desire protection from competing violent organizations AQIM propaganda, such as videos entitled “Join the Caravan” and “Series of the Swords,” are designed to inspire prospective recruits to join the jihadist movement.50 In particular, Wadud urges jihad against Northern African governments (fomenting rebellion), proclaiming these military juntas received approval from the U.S., France, and Israel (execrating these nations). Wadud explains his objective as follows: “O people of Islam, you have the warning. Wake up from your slumber.

Prepare for war. The Cross is marching towards you. So, raise the flag of jihad… let blood spill from us… and let our bodies be torn to pieces until we restore the Caliphate of the Righteously Guided according to the doctrine of the prophet hood.”51 This speech pattern recurs in Wadud’s statements as well as those of other ranking AQIM members.

Financial Resources In Algeria, low-wage earners typically earn around $2,400 (U.S. equivalent) per year. In comparison, the lowestpaid ministry secretary in the nation’s government earns $34,272—nearly

$32,000 more than his low-wage counterparts,52 who live well below the poverty line.53 In fact, an estimated 23% of Algerians are among the impoverished and malnourished working poor,54 presenting a vacuum of strategic importance that AQIM can afford to fill.

AQIM interacts with other organizations, such as the MarxistLeninist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), in pursuits including drug smuggling and security services.

With access to equipment, weapons, uniforms, passports, and vehicles captured in attacks, AQIM continues to gather momentum and has been known to employ improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings.

AQIM has three principal means of fund-raising: (1) provision of logistical and security services; (2) sales (e.g., human trafficking and sales of drugs and other commodity items); and (3) kidnapping for ransom operations.

For example, FARC has employed AQIM for “logistical assistance and secure transportation for a shipment of cocaine across Africa, false identification documents, and other material support and resources.”55 AQIM likely has an annual operating budget in excess of $10 million, as extrapolated from ransom funds.56 It is important to note that this figure does not account for funds generated by logistics and security services, nor by sales of illegal commodities.

Evidence of AQIM’s logistics and security services, as well as its connection with FARC, surfaced in 2013, when members of both organizations were captured by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) while preparing to exchange weapons for drugs. Specifically, AQIM agreed to provide FARC with ground-to-air missiles, AK-47 assault rifles, and grenade launchers in

60 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

exchange for four tons of cocaine (with a street value of $250 million).57 In this scenario, Algeria was to serve as the logistics hub between Colombia and Europe, with AQIM as the central actor supplying weapons stolen from Syria and transporting cocaine to Spain and France, from where it could subsequently be distributed throughout Western Europe.

As this situation illustrates, AQIM is like any purposeful organization in that it seeks out relationships with groups of financial and logistical value—whether located at home or abroad.

Tactics Most AQIM operations involve small numbers of actors who employ roadblocks or other techniques to kidnap, injure, or kill. After an operation, these individuals quickly disperse to remote desert or mountainous areas.58 Seldom does AQIM conduct more than one operation simultaneously. A typical operation concludes in minutes as opposed to hours or days, with the exception of kidnap operations, which can extend into months. These brief “right place at the right time” operations require good intelligence.

Based on reported information, there is a 12% chance that an incident will occur at a checkpoint or an illegal roadblock. For instance, in 2002, 20 fighters disguised as Algerian soldiers set up a roadblock 1 kilometer from a municipal guard headquarters. This operation concluded within 15 minutes and resulted in the death of two members of the Algerian National Security Agency.59 This type of operation requires precision and comes with great risk to insurgents because of the possibility of direct engagement. This is atypical to organizations in which many of their members are well-known by the military and police.

In another fake roadblock conducted on November 8, 2008, AQIM operatives wearing stolen Algerian military uniforms assassinated the Chibane Fateh, the mayor of Timezrit, at the entrance to the Adekar municipality.60 The typical procedure during fake roadblock operations like this one is to stop and identify targets of value; release other captives, if convenient; kill the targets; burn the vehicles and then take down the roadblock and disband. This assassination was orchestrated by Boualem Bekay, a.k.a. Khaled El Mig, who was later killed

by Algerian military forces in the forest of Yakourene.61 About 87% of all AQIM operations are armed assaults using firearms and explosives against military, militia, and civilian targets. Kidnap operations and suicide bombings account for another 11% of operations, with assassinations

Circle 155 on Reader Service Card

making up the remaining 2%. Defected AQIM members are often targets for assassination because of the likelihood that they will cooperate with authorities.

High-ranking military, police, and government personnel are also common targets, as in the case of Fateh. More than 37% of all AQIM operations use some form of firearm, usually small arms, while over 40% employ explosives.62 AQIM has an inventory of weapons, such as AK-47s, DSHK 12.7-mm heavy machine guns, SPG-9 mortars, hand grenades, RPGs, MANPADS (man portable SAMs), and a variety of remotely detonated improvised explosive devices (roadside, VBIED, belts) and landmines.

As a point of reference, an AK-47 sells for between $269 and $768 USD.63 Although some of AQIMâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s weapons were purchased, others may have been imported from hotspots like Syria in

exchange for other wartime commodities, or perhaps simply captured from one of the weapons caches of embattled Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

Military and police movements such as convoys, search operations, and patrols are targeted 26% of the time, followed by military and police facilities at 10%.

These facilities include barracks, guard stations, police stations, and headquarters buildings, which are often attacked by projectile explosives (e.g., mortars, RPGs, improvised projectiles explosives).

AQIMâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s typical procedure when attacking military and police movements involves an initial explosive detonation intended to stop the movement, followed by gunfire and projectile explosives.64 Targets such as embassies, utilities (i.e., gas and oil facilities and pipelines), and transportation services account for less than 10% of all AQIM engagements;65

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 61

however, workers are frequently targeted as they move to and from utilities sites.

Such workers are often transported by buses traveling well-known routes to and from gas and oil processing plants.

This predictability, along with the knowledge that some of the workers are likely foreign, presents AQIM with an opportunity to achieve several objectives, such as shutting down production,

gaining the attention of foreign press, and instilling a great deal of fear in current and prospective members of the workforce.

â&#x20AC;˘

about the author Mr. Toney holds a doctorate in business administration with specialization in organizational behavior from the University of Phoenix. He has worked with the U.S. Department of Defense for more than 25 years, and has published two books: Terrorist Organizational Behavior (Toney, 2012) and Organizational Behavior Profile: AQIM (CreateSpace, 2013).

endnotes Trefis. Why Algeria Remains Important For BP. 2013 January 25 [cited 2013 May 20]; Available from: www. trefis.com/stock/bp/articles/164651/ why-algeria-remains-important-forbp/2013-01-25.

2 Columbia University Press, The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism.

2007, New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 430.

3 CIA. CIA World Factbook. 2012 October 31 December 17, 2012]; Available from: https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/ag.html.

4 Black, I., WikiLeaks cables: Algeria goes from security joke to US ally in Maghreb, in The Guardian. 2010.

5 U.S. AFRICOM. What we do: AFRICOM mission statement. 2013 [cited 2013 May 21]; Available from: http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do.

6 Pakenham, T., The Scramble for Africa: White Manâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912.

Harper Perennial. 1992: Harper Collins Publishers.

7 Ibrahim, Y.M., Algeria Militants Vow to Kill Women Linked to Government, in The New York Times. 1995.

8 Toney, M.S., Organizational Behavior 1

Circle 111 on Reader Service Card

62 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Circle 191 on Reader Service Card

www.homelandsecurityssi.com Find out more at:

Take your training to a higher level...

SSI Elevated Tactics training Enhance the tactical flexibility of your SWAT or SOP team with elevated training using specialized equipment and tools such as those manufactured by Patriot3. Improve your tactical surprise and force protection with additional operational options provided through elevated, special-use vehicles. In this two-day introduction and awareness training, you’ll learn: • Vehicle driving and operating techniques in a variety of situations • Global case studies of real-world operations using the specific equipment • Using vehicle platforms for observation, structure multiple entry techniques, and linear assaults • Elevated obstacle negotiation and firing platforms • Emergency evacuations, climbing and descending options • Distraction and deception techniques ® SECURITY SOLUTIONS • and much more...

SSI

INTERNATIONAL

Protecting the Homeland Together ®

Call now for more information.

Elevated Tactics Training provided in partnership with Patriot3.

Phone: 866-573-3999 Fax: 866-573-2090 contact@securitysolutionsint.com Circle 313 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 63

Profile: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

2013, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

9 Janusian. Terrorism Tracker. 2013 January 17, 2013]; Available from: https://www.terrorismtracker.com/search/ results.

10 Mickolus, E.F., Terrorism 20052007: A Chronology. 2008, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

11 Mickolus, E.F., Simmons, S. L., Terrorism 2002-2004: A Chronology.

Vol. 1. 2006, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

12 Mickolus, E.F., Simmons, S. L., Terrorism 2002-2004: A Chronology.

Vol. 2. 2006, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

13 Mickolus, E.F., Simmons, S. L., Terrorism 2002-2004: A Chronology.

Vol. 3. 2006, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

14 Mickolus, E.F., Simmons, S. L., Terrorism 1996-2001: A Chronology.

Vol. 1. 2002, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

15 Mickolus, E.F., Simmons, S. L., Terrorism 1996-2001: A Chronology.

Vol. 2. 2002, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

16 RAND. Database of worldwide terrorism incidents. 2010 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://www.rand.org.

17 START. Global Terrorism Database.

2010 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://www.start.umd.edu.

18 START. Global Terrorism Database.

2011 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://www.start.umd.edu.

19 START. Global Terrorism Database.

2012 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://www.start.umd.edu.

20 START. Global Terrorism Database.

2009 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://www.start.umd.edu.

21 SITE. AQIM Claims 22 Attacks Killing and Injuring 164. 2010 August

10 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://news.siteintelgroup.com/ component/content/article/127-aug10.

22 SITE. AQIM Claims Suicide Bombing in Nema, Mauritania.

2010 September 2 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://news. siteintelgroup.com/component/content/ article/166-09-02-10.

23 SITE. AQIM Claims Suicide Bombing in Zemmouri, Algeria.

2010 September 3 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://news. siteintelgroup.com/component/content/ article/168-09-03-10.

24 SITE. AQIM Claims Ambush in Wagadou Forest of Mali. 2011 July 5 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://news.siteintelgroup.com/ component/content/article/860-aqimclaims-ambush-in-wagadou-forest-ofmali.

25 SITE. AQIM Claims Raid on Algerian Barracks in Kabylie Region.

2011 April 20 December 6, 2012]; Available from: http://news.siteintelgroup. com/component/content/article/6jihadist-news/625-aqim-claims-raid-onalgerian-barracks-in-kabylie-region.

26 SITE. AQIM Claims Raid on Mauritanian Forces in Bassiknou. 2011 July 18 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://news.siteintelgroup.com/ component/content/article/902-aqimclaims-raid-on-mauritanian-forces-inbassiknou.

27 SITE. AQIM Claims Suicide Bombing at Tizi Ouzou Police Station.

2011 August 18 December 6, 2012]; Available from: http://news.siteintelgroup. com/component/content/article/6jihadist-news/1009-aqim-claims-suicidebombing-at-tizi-ouzou-police-station.

28 SITE. AQIM Claims Suicide Bombings at Cherchell Military Academy.

2011 August 28 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://news.siteintelgroup.

64 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

com/component/content/article/1039aqim-claims-suicide-bombings-atcherchell-military-academy.

29 SITE. AQIM Claims Two Suicide Bombings in Boumerdes, Algeria. 2011 July 19 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://news.siteintelgroup.com/ component/content/article/908-aqimclaims-two-suicide-bombings-inboumerdes-algeria.

30 SITE. AQIM Highlights Enemiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Cooperation, Shows Attacks in Video -Part 2. 2011 August 5 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://news. siteintelgroup.com/component/content/ article/969-aqim-highlights-enemiescooperation-shows-attacks-in-videopart-2.

31 SITE. AQIM Releases Tape of French Prisoners Addressing Sarkozy. 2011 April 26 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://news.siteintelgroup.com/ component/content/article/643-aqimreleases-tape-of-french-prisonersaddressing-sarkozy.

32 SITE. AQIM Criticizes Franceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Alleged Negligence of Hostage Issue (Update). 2012 September 26 December 6, 2012]; Available from: http://news. siteintelgroup.com/component/content/ article/6-jihadist-news/2322-aqimcriticizes-frances-alleged-negligence-ofhostage-issue-update.

33 SITE. AQIM Video Shows Raid in Jijel, Calls Algerian Soldiers to Repent. 2012 November 6 December 6, 2012]; Available from: http://news. siteintelgroup.com/component/content/ article/6-jihadist-news/2443-aqim-videoshows-raid-in-jijel-calls-algerian-soldiersto-repent.

34 STRATFOR. Algeria: Militants Reportedly Attack Military Barracks.

2013 February 7 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http://www/stratfor.com.

35 STRATFOR. Cameroon: French Citizens Reportedly Kidnapped. 2013

Circle 141 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 65

February 19 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http://www/stratfor.com.

36 STRATFOR. The Emergence of Guerrilla Warfare in Mali. 2013 February 13 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http://www/stratfor.com.

37 STRATFOR. In Mali, a Possible Tuareg Suicide Bomber. 2013 February 8 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http://

66 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 Circle 221 on Reader Service Card

www/stratfor.com.

38 STRATFOR. Mali: 2 Injured In Suicide Attack Near French Camp. 2013 February 21 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http://www/stratfor.com.

39 STRATFOR. Mali: 2 Men With Explosives Arrested Near Gao. 2013 February 9 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http://www/stratfor.com.

40 STRATFOR. Mali: 3 Soldiers From Chad Killed In Suicide Attack. 2013 April 12 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http://www/stratfor.com.

41 STRATFOR. Mali: Chadian Army Kills 65 Militants. 2013 February 23 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http:// www/stratfor.com.

42 STRATFOR. Mali: Islamists Kill Four Civilians In Tonka. 2013 March 8 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http:// www/stratfor.com.

43 STRATFOR. Mali: Militants Reportedly Execute Hostage. 2013 March 20 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http://www/stratfor.com.

44 STRATFOR. Mali: Suicide Bomber Attacks Military Checkpoint. 2013 February 8 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http://www/stratfor.com.

45 STRATFOR. Mali: Third French Soldier Reportedly Killed. 2013 March 4 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http:// www/stratfor.com.

46 STRATFOR. Nigeria: 6 Foreign Workers Reportedly Abducted. 2013 February 20 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http://www/stratfor.com.

47 STRATFOR. Nigeria: Ukrainian Oil Workers Released. 2013 February 20 April 13, 2013]; Available from: http:// www/stratfor.com.

48 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1985-2005. 2011, Great Barrington: MA: Berkshire Publishing Group, LLC. 49 Africa Confidential, Storms in the sand. Africa Confidential, 2010. 51(19):

p. 8-9.

50 Australian Government, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), A.N. Security, Editor. 2010.

51 SITE. AQIM Expansion Throughout North Africa. 2009 June 1 December 6, 2012]; Available from: http://news. siteintelgroup.com/component/content/ article/109-0609.

52 Wozniak, Y., Salaries in the Maghreb: The Land of Equality? The North Africa Journal, 2012.

53 United Nations, Millennium Development Goals Indicator. 2012.

54 CIA. CIA World Factbook. 2012 October 31 December 17, 2012]; Available from: https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/ag.html.

55 U.S. States Attorney’s Office Milian man sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 57 months in prison for

Circle 294 on Reader Service Card

conspiring to provide material support to terrorists. 2012.

56 Toney, M.S., Organizational Behavior Profile: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

2013, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

57 Bond, B., Hill, P., al Qaeda’s £168 million cocaine smugglers: terror group flooding Britain with drugs, in The Daily Mirror. 2013: Great Britain.

58 Gilmour, J.G., The Terrorist Threat in North-West Africa: Part One. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 2012.

14(2).

59 START. Global Terrorism Database.

2012 December 19, 2012]; Available from: http://www.start.umd.edu.

60 Janusian. Terrorism Tracker. 2013 January 17, 2013]; Available from: https://www.terrorismtracker.com/search/ results.

Algeria News, Khaled “El Mig” shot, in Algeria News. 2012.

62 Toney, M.S., Organizational Behavior Profile: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 2013, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

63 Small Arms Survey. Guided light weapons reportedly held by nonstate armed groups 1998-2012. 2012 September October 31, 2012].

64 Toney, M.S., Organizational Behavior Profile: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 2013, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

65 Ibid.

61

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 67

international Resources ITW Nexus Advanced Products and Accessories A Division of Illinois Tool Works Inc. Throughout the years, ITW Nexus APAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s breadth of engineered products has expanded exponentially. Our mission is to outperform conventional solutions while conforming to strict performance and quality standards. We provide unique access to the newest advances in research and development across a wide spectrum of applications. Divisions such as Nexus, Fastex, and our new Advanced Products and Accessories division are known throughout the world for their history of Quality and Innovation. Now these products and associated technologies are being made available to all end users through our expanding group of strategic distribution partners, targeted at valueadded opportunities in the Commercial/Industrial, Military/Defense, Law Enforcement, Hunting/ Outdoor, Maritime and Personal security markets. In addition to our world class high performance plastic and metal hardware, find end user accessory products like the FASTmag, Grimloc, TacLink, Web Dominator, Quick Cap Connector, MASH Hook and CLASH Hook at www.itwmilitaryproducts.com. Please contact us for more information or to find a an authorized source for ITW Products. www.itwmilitaryproducts.com

Lenco BearCat Riot Control vehicle The Lenco BearCat Riot Control vehicle is designed for International Police Forces operating in hostile urban environments. The BearCat Riot Control is equipped with a heavy-duty hydraulic RAM capable of moving cars, barriers and other debris. An optional Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) is available for effective, non-lethal crowd dispersion. The armored windows and exterior lights are also protected against objects thrown at the vehicle. The BearCatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s increased length provides room for 12-man Tactical & Special Forces teams. The BearCat Riot Control vehicle can also be used as a SWAT, Communications, and Convoy vehicle. www.LencoArmor.com

Asian Edition

Counter The

The next issue of the Counter Terrorist Magazine will see the Asian Edition become a reality. The publisher, SSI president Henry Morgenstern, was just out in Singapore and struck a deal with local firm that will publish the magazine there. Articles from the local area will be published in an E-Zine for the South East Asia market. This will enable the Counter Terrorist Magazine to provide US advertisers with distribution into one of the liveliest security marketplaces in the world encompassing Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore itself and more. Likewise, advertisers in South East Asia that are interested in the US market will be able to increase their reach. No changes will be made to the US and European publication. The Asian edition will be a subset of the US edition with several articles dedicated to the problems of that area. Interest parties should contact Henry Morgenstern on 305-401-6906 about advertising in the ASIAN Edition.

68 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Innovative Products Thorshield Thorshieldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s generation III fabrics and technologies are designed to provide protection from electroshock weapons such as TASER and Stun Guns. Thousands of law enforcement officers are protected with these energy weapon protection technologies since 2006. Thorshield protection is now available to all authorized body armor carrier manufacturers. www.thorshield.com

Jetboots Diver Propulsion System JDPS is a hands-free system designed for the military and commercial diver. It uses brushless motors and lithium polymer batteries. JDPS is designed to extend the range of fully geared combat swimmers for reconnaissance, search and rescue, patrols, hull inspections and other uses. Batteries can even be swapped underwater and JDPS can be worn onboard a wide range of insertion platforms. www.patriot3.com

MRAD This innovative, precision rifle features a userchangeable barrel system. The barrel is removed by loosening two bolts with a Torx wrench. Besides reducing maintenance and logistical burdens, this design allows for user level caliber interchangeability and serviceability using MRAD rifle barrel kits. Every detail was designed to create a highperformance personalized rifle. www.barrett.net

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 69

Counter

advertiser index

The

June/Jule 2013

Volume 6 • Number 3

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals To request detailed product information, circle the appropriate reader service number (RSN) on the attached Reader Service Card. The card is self-addressed and includes postage. For more information on all of our advertisers and advertising opportunities, please visit our website at: www.thecounterterroristmag.com/advertising.asp Individual advertisers’ websites are also provided below for your convenience.

Page

Ad/Company • website and/or email........................................................................................................ RSN Number

42 35 59 71 50 11 25 4 18 45 21 20 47 66 23 19 37 34 40 26 34 26 61 41 67 3 34 24 53 73 15 33 62 43 75 45 39 62 38 63 44 51 28–29 76 7 13 55 22 65 2 74

11th Annual Military Antennas Conference • www.militaryantennasevent.com......................................... 168 8th Annual Homeland Security Professionals Conference • www.terrorconference.com....................... 177 Adams Industries • www.adamsindustries.com................................................................................................ 308 Advanced Homeland Security Training in Israel by SSI • www.homelandsecurityssi.com...................... 215 ALLRed - Armadillo Tactical Gear • www.armadillotacticalgear.com...................................................... 131 American Public University • www.amuonline.com/counter-terrorist...................................................... 211 American Technologies Network • www.atncorp.com.......................................................................... 312 Barrett Firearms Manufacturing • www.barrett.net.............................................................................. 121 Center for Rural Development • www.preventivestrategies.net............................................................... 265 Cyalume • www.cyalume.com............................................................................................................... 305 Defense Solutions Group - DSG Arms • www.dsgarms.com.................................................................. 275 Diamond Back Tactical • www.diamondbacktactical.com....................................................................... 74 Elite K9 • www.elitek9.com.................................................................................................................... 277 Frazer, Ltd • www.frazerbilt.com........................................................................................................... 221 Golden Engineering • www.goldenengineering.com.............................................................................. 83 Golight Inc • www.golight.com.............................................................................................................. 285 Icor Technology • www.icortechnology.com........................................................................................... 81 IDGA’s Actionable Intelligence for Defense & Homeland Security • www.actionableintelsummit.com.... 115 IDGA’s Counter Narco-Terrorism and Drug Interdiction • www.counterterrorismevent.com.................... 148 IDGA’s Cyber Security for government • www.cybersecurityevent.com.................................................. 113 IDGA’s Cyber Security for Oil and Gas • www.oilandgascybersecurity.com............................................ 289 IDGA’s Homeland Security 2013 • www.homelandsecurityexpo.com/CTPA............................................ 119 J & N Tactical • www.jntactical.com....................................................................................................... 155 K9 Cop Magazine • www.k9copmagazine.com..................................................................................... 279 Kiesler Police Supply • www.kieslerpolicesupply.com............................................................................. 294 Lenco Industries Inc. • www.lencoarmor.com......................................................................................... 13 Lithos Robotics • www.lithosrobotics.com.............................................................................................. 307 Mattracks • www.mattracks.com........................................................................................................... 297 Midwest Security & Police Conference/Expo • www.mspce.com.......................................................... 28 NTOA Tactical Operations Conference & Trade Show • www.ntoa.org................................................ 329 Patriot3 • www.patriot3.com................................................................................................................. 301 PoliceOne Academy • www.policeoneacademy.com.............................................................................. 335 PoliceTraining.net • ww.policetraining.net............................................................................................. 191 Portable Vehicle Barrier - SSI PVB • www.ssipvb.com.......................................................................... 226 Precision Reflex • www.precisionreflex.com.......................................................................................... 235 Reconyx • www.reconyx.com................................................................................................................ 303 Soldier of Fortune • www.sofmag.com.................................................................................................. 309 Southern New Hampshire University • www.snhu.edu/ct.................................................................... 111 Southern Police Equipment • www.southernpoliceequipment.com.......................................................... 343 SSI Elevated tactics • www.homelandsecurityssi.com.............................................................................. 313 SSI Personal Security • contact@securitysolutionsint.com........................................................................ 295 SSI SWAT-MACTAC • www.homelandsecurityssi.com............................................................................... 228 SSI Tactical Gear • www.ssitacticalgear.com.......................................................................................... 291 Sturm, Ruger & Co • www.ruger.com/LE............................................................................................... 347 Tactical Products Gear • www.tacprogear.com...................................................................................... 101 Tactical Products Group Inc. • swww.tacprogroup.com.......................................................................... 145 Tex Shield Inc • info@tex-shield.com..................................................................................................... 29 Thorshield - G Squared Consulting• www.thorshield.com..................................................................... 97 1 • www.urbanshield.org....................................................................................................................... 141 Vertx • www.vertx.com......................................................................................................................... 170 Z-Medica • le@z-medica.com................................................................................................................ 71

70 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

SSI

®

SECURITY SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL

The Advanced Global Security Workshop in

Israel The experts on training in:

the Homeland Security professionals best resource

Since 2005, SSI has taken nearly 500 First Responders to Israel and shown them the basics of the Israel security concept.

Thanks in part to that program, we are better able to defend ourselves in the United States. In response to demand, we are now offering a once-in-a-lifetime experience covering the following advanced subjects:

November 8-16,

2013

Hezbollah - a threat as deadly as al-Qaeda - Learn about them in their own territory, along Israel’s northern border.

Hostage Rescue - Discover how they go wrong.

Hospital Response - Find out how Israel’s critical response hospitals handle surge and multi-casualty incidents.

Israel Counter Terrorism units - Learn how they operate.

Israel National Police - National Academy; See how they train?

Sensitive Installations - Participate in a day-long exercise and training program in how to set up a complete security system.

Secret Israel Homeland Security Simulator - See how this works at a base south of Tel Aviv.

Stay in Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and visit some of the most amazing sites! Register now if you are US Military, a Homeland Security Professional, a Security Professional, an EMS, or an EMT.

www.homelandsecurityssi.com

LEARN MORE at: Call now for more information.

Circle 215 on Reader Service Card

Phone: 866-573-3999 Fax: 866-573-2090 info@homelandsecurityssi.com Circle 50 on Reader Service Card Circle 215 on Reader Service Card

SSI

SECURITY SOLUTIONS INTERNATIONAL

®

Protecting the Homeland Together ®

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 71

Training Review

Multiple Assault, Counter-Terrorism, Action Capabilities

T

he Multiple Assault, CounterTerrorism, Action Capabilities (MACTAC) four-day course allows agencies to acquire instructors trained in MACTAC tactics. These instructors are able to immediately train their agencies’ personnel in both the MACTAC Basic Course and the MACTAC Squad Leader Course.

The MACTAC Basic Course builds on what we already know from existing rapid response tactics. For instance, active shooter training has taught officers how to form a team and move toward gunfire. MACTAC adds to this training by teaching first responders to assess, evaluate, and rapidly plan a response to effectively stop the deadly behavior.

It also adds tactical tools so that first responders can resolve the entire gamut of threats we face today—from individual active shooter incidents through skilled team attacks, such as those encountered in some terrorist incidents.

The objective of MACTAC tactics is to fix suspects in place. The goal for the first officers or deputies on scene is to move toward the gunfire. Then, as more personnel arrive and more contact teams deploy, supervisors can organize them into squads. This is what makes MACTAC a robust and effective response to a wide range of active shooter scenarios.

MACTAC training involves three separate segments: MACTAC Basic is intended to be mandatory for all personnel, regardless of

By Joe Witty rank, so that everyone can gain baseline knowledge of MACTAC concepts.

The MACTAC Squad Leader Course gives frontline supervisors and upper management personnel the tools needed to lead a response from the front. Key leaders learn squad-level maneuver tactics. The course also features classroom discussion and practical application exercises, such as role-playing the use of ICS/NIMS tools to coordinate and control an agency’s response to deadly behavior. The goal of these activities is creation of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for agency personnel.

The Strategic MACTAC Response Course is designed for command staff and upper management personnel.

Security Solutions International offers the Strategic MACTAC Response Course as a separate stand-alone course to assist agencies in training their leaders to manage these types of incidents.

On the first day of a recent four-day course session, students attended the MACTAC Basic Course classroom presentation. The first thing discussed was the fact that when presented with an active shooter incident, the initial law enforcement personnel on scene, regardless of position or rank, should form a contact team and move forward to stop the deadly behavior.

We next progressed to a discourse on squad-level tactics. Here, students learned to use military-type cover and maneuver tactics to fix the bad guys in position. Once suspects are fixed, they are

72 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

limited in their ability to access additional victims. We also talked about cover-fire protocols that several departments have adopted into their policy and guidelines.

In addition, we discussed the need to constantly analyze what you know, assess your options, and plan your response.

Boyd’s OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) Loop was incorporated throughout the training.

After concluding this discussion, we spent the remainder of the day conducting practical exercises to ingrain basic maneuver tactics. Students analyzed moving as a contact team down to its simplest elements, including roomclearing techniques. We also practiced cover-and-maneuver and squad-level movements incorporating three contact teams in which the instructor acted as the squad leader.

On day two, our classroom work progressed to the MACTAC Squad Leader presentation. Here, we discussed tactical leadership principles and concepts. We dissected case studies and led the students through a debate regarding the leadership skills required for successful outcomes. We then discussed how to lead a squad and how to deploy as a MACTAC leader to lead a platoon. All of these activities were based on the idea of building a response from the bottom up, resourcing the smallest unit and self-deploying. Later, as more resources become available, key leaders can begin using ICS/NIMS as tools for success. The remainder of the second day was spent on

Circle 329 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 73

scenarios in which single contact teams moved to stop an active shooter.

The third and fourth days of the MACTAC training program allowed students to practice what they’d learned by running contact team, squad, and multiple-squad-level scenarios. More than 90% of our scenario-based exercises were conducted with role players and simunitions.

After each training evolution, we conducted thorough debriefs. Here, instructors guided students in key leadership positions through what they did best, what they did worst, and how they could do it better the next time. We also discussed equipment limitations. The world moves forward, and we, as a law enforcement community, are forced to face reality—and the reality is that there are a multitude of areas in which we can do a better job. These include carrying equipment such as level-four plates and plate carriers, Individual First Aid Kits (IFAKs), more ammunition, compact rifles, and signaling devices, as well as personally raising our skill standards.

Later on the fourth day, during the instructor-level course, the students themselves conducted the training with mentoring by their instructors. This session demonstrated that the students had clearly grown into skilled MACTAC instructors by the end of the course.

On all four days, students were encouraged to explore and honestly discuss where their organizations stood capability-wise, should they need to respond to the next Newtown, Connecticut, or Mumbai, India, attack.

Traditionally, we’ve trained individuals at the first-responder level to gear up and run toward the gunfire. Now, with MACTAC, we have a model not only for training our first responders, but also for giving frontline supervisors and command staff the tools required to

appropriately lead and manage a response to a threat situation. www.homelandsecurityssi.com

•

years. He is a former Recon Marine and 19th Special Forces Group veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan.

About the author Mr. Witty is a 22-year veteran of the Los Angeles Police Department and has been a member of SWAT for over 14

74 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013

Circle 71 on Reader Service Card

Circle 235 on Reader Service Card

The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 75

76 The Counter Terrorist ~ August/September 2013 Circle 347 on Reader Service Card