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direction of the Bayas, and paid no attention to Graham’s flanking movement, though afterwards they wrote dispatches to prove that they had not ignored it. For they drew up the Army of the South on a short front, from the exit of the defile of Puebla on the south to the bridge of Villodas on the north, a front of three miles, with D’Erlon’s two divisions in second line on each side of the village of Gomecha, two miles farther back, and the Army of Portugal and the King’s Guards as a third line in reserve about Zuazo, not far in front of Vittoria, along with the bulk of the cavalry. This order of battle, as a glance at the map shows, presupposed a frontal attack from the line of the Bayas, where Wellington was known to be. It was illsuited to face an attack from the north-west on the line of the Zadorra above Villodas, and still more so an attack from the due north by the roads from Orduña and Murguia. On the morning of the 20th cavalry reconnaissances went out to look for the Allied Army they reported that the camps along the Bayas above Subijana Morillos did not seem very large, and that on the Murguia road they had fallen in with and pushed back Longa’s irregulars, obviously a Spanish demonstration[541] . ‘No indication being available of the details of a projected attack, and further information being unprocurable, only conjectures could be made[542] . ’
It is interesting to know from the narrative of Jourdan himself what these conjectures were. ‘Wellington,’ he writes, ‘had shown himself since the start of the campaign more disposed to manœuvre his opponents out of their positions, by constantly turning their right wing, than to attack them frontally and force on a battle. It was thought probable that, pursuing this system, he would march on Bilbao by Orduña, and from thence on Durango, so as to force them to fall back promptly on Mondragon[543] , in order to retain their communications with France. He might even hope to force them to evacuate Spain by this move, because it would be impossible to feed a great army on that section of the Pyrenees. The King, knowing that Clausel was on the move, had little fear of the results of a march on Bilbao, for on receiving Clausel’s corps he would be strong enough to take the offensive himself, and would strike at Wellington’s communications. It did not escape him that if the
enemy, instead of wasting more time on flank movements, should attack him before the arrival of Clausel, he was in a perilous position. For there was little chance of getting the better of an adversary who had about double numbers, and a lost battle would cut off the army from the road to France, and force it to retire on Pampeluna by a road difficult, if not impracticable, for the train and artillery of a great host. To avoid the risk of an instant attack from Wellington, ought we to fall back and take up the position above the pass of Salinas?[544] But to do this was to sacrifice the junction with Clausel, who was expected on the 21st at latest. And how could the army have been fed in the passes? The greater part of the cavalry and the artillery horses would have had to be sent back to France at once—famine would have forced the infantry to follow. Then the King would have been accused of cowardice, for evacuating Spain without trying the fortune of battle. To justify such a retreat we should have had to be certain that we were to be attacked before the 22nd, and we considered that, if Wellington did decide to fight, it would be unlikely that he could do so before the 22nd, because of the difficulty of the roads which he had taken. After mature consideration of the circumstance the King resolved to stand fast at Vittoria.’
Putting aside the gross over-estimate of Wellington’s strength— he fought with a superiority of 75,000[545] to 57,000, not with two to one—the main point to note in this curious and interesting argument is its defective psychology. Because Wellington had hitherto avoided frontal attacks, when flank movements suited him better, was it safe to conclude that he would do so adinfinitum? That he was capable of a sudden onslaught was obvious to every one who remembered the battle of Salamanca. Why, if he were about to repeat his previous encircling policy, should he go by Orduña, Bilbao, and Durango, rather than by the shorter turn Osma-Murguia-Vittoria? Apparently the French staff underrated the possibilities of that road, and took the presence of Longa upon it as a sign that it was only to be used for a Spanish demonstration[546] . Should not the speed with which Wellington had traversed the detestable country paths between the Arlanzon and the Ebro have served as a warning that, if
he chose to push hard, he could cover at a very rapid rate the rather less formidable tracks north of the Zadorra? In short, the old marshal committed the not uncommon fault of making false deductions from an imperfect set of premises. It is much more difficult to say what should have been his actual course under the existing circumstances of June 20. Napier holds that he might still have adopted Reille’s old plan of June 12 and June 18, i.e. that he should have thrown up the line of communication with France by the high road, have made ready to retreat on Pampeluna instead of on Bayonne, and have looked forward to making Saragossa his base. After having picked up first Clausel and then so much of the Army of Aragon as could be collected, he might have got 100,000 men together and have started an offensive campaign[547] . This overlooks the impossibility of getting the convoys and train safely along the bad road from Vittoria to Pampeluna, and the difficulty of making Saragossa, where there were no great accumulations of stores and munitions, the base of an army of the size projected. All communication with France would have been thrown on the hopelessly long and circuitous route from Saragossa to Perpignan, for the pass by Jaca was impracticable for wheeled traffic. Certainly Joseph would have had to destroy, as a preliminary measure to a retreat via Salvatierra or Pampeluna, the greater part of his train. And what would have become of his wretched horde of refugees?
Another school of critics—among them Belmas—urge that while it was perfectly correct to cling as a primary necessity to the great road to France, Vittoria was not the right point at which to defend it, but the pass of Salinas. Jourdan’s objection that the cavalry would be useless in the mountains is declared to have little weight, and his dread of famine to be groundless. For Wellington could not have remained for many days in front of the passes—he must have attacked at once a very formidable position, or Foy and the other troops in Biscay would have had time to join the King; and with 15,000 extra bayonets the French would have been hard to dislodge. The danger to Clausel would have been not very great, since Wellington would not have dared to detach a force sufficient to crush him, while the main French army was in his front, intact and ready
to resume the offensive. And on the other flank Biscay, no doubt, would have been exposed to an invasion by Giron’s Galicians, when Foy had withdrawn its garrisons to join the main army. But it is improbable that this movement would have been backed by any large section of the Anglo-Portuguese force; for Wellington, as his previous action showed, was intending to keep all his own old divisions in one body. He would not have risked any of his own troops between the Pyrenees and the sea, by trying to thrust them in on the back of the French position, to Durango or Mondragon. And if Giron alone went to Bilbao and Durango, his presence in that direction, and any threats which he might make on the King’s rear, would be tiresome rather than dangerous.
Be this as it may, whatever the general policy of Jourdan and Joseph should have been, their particular dispositions for occupying the Vittoria position were very faulty. It was as well known to every practical soldier then as it is now, that a normal river-position cannot be held by a continuous line of troops placed at the water’s edge. For there will be loops and bends at which the ground on one’s own side is commanded and enfiladed by higher ground on the enemy’s side. If troops are pushed forward into such bends, they will be crushed by artillery fire, or run danger of being cut off by attacks on the neck of the loop in their rear[548] . Unless the general who has to defend a river front is favoured with a stream in front of him absolutely straight, and with all the commanding ground on his own side (an unusual chance), he must rather look to arranging his army in such a fashion as to hold as strong points all the favourable sections of the front, while the unfavourable ones must be watched from suitable positions drawn back from the water’s edge. By judicious disposition of artillery, the occupation and preparation of villages, woods, or other cover, and (if necessary) the throwing up of trenches, the enemy, though he cannot be prevented from crossing the river at certain points, can be kept from debouching out of the sections of the hither bank which he has mastered. And if he loads up the captured ground with heavy masses of troops which cannot get forward, he will suffer terribly from artillery fire, while if he does not hold them strongly, he will be liable to counter-attacks, which
will throw the troops who have crossed back into the river. The most elementary precaution for the general on the defensive to take is, of course, to blow up all bridges, and to place artillery to command all fords, also to have local reserves ready at a proper distance behind every section where a passage is likely to be tried[549] .
We may excuse Joseph and Jourdan for not entrenching all the weak sections of their front hasty field works were little used in the Peninsular War; indeed the trenches which Wellington threw up on the second day of Fuentes de Oñoro were an almost unique instance of such an expedient. But the other precautions to be taken were commonplaces of contemporary tactics. And they were entirely neglected. The front liable to attack was very long for the size of the defending army: whole sections of it were neglected. Bridges and fords were numerous on the Zadorra: incredible as it may seem, not one of eleven bridges between Durana to the north and Nanclares to the south was blown up. The numerous fords seem not to have been known accurately to either the attacking or the defending generals, but some of the most obvious of them were ignored in Joseph’s original disposition of his troops. Several alike of bridges and fords were lightly watched by cavalry only, with no further precaution taken. What is most astonishing is to find that bridges which were actually used by French exploring parties on June 20th, so that their existence was thoroughly realized, were found intact and in some cases unguarded on the 21st[550] . The fact would seem to be that the King’s head-quarters staff was dominated by a false idea: that Wellington’s attack would be delivered on the south part of the river front, from the defile of Puebla to the bridge of Villodas; and that the troops discovered on the Murguia road were Longa’s irregulars only, bound on a demonstration. An acute British observer remarked that the French position had two main defects—the more important one was that it faced the wrong way[551]: this was quite true.
The final arrangement, as taken up on the morning of June 20 was that the Army of the South arrayed itself so as to block the debouches from the defile of La Puebla and the bridges immediately up-stream from it—those of Nanclares and Villodas. Gazan did not occupy the entrance of the defile of La Puebla—to do so he must
have stretched his line farther south and east than his numbers permitted. But he held its exits, with some voltigeur companies from Maransin’s brigade, perched high up on the culminating ground immediately above the river.
From this lofty point on the heights of Puebla his first line stretched north-eastward along a line of low hills, past the villages of Subijana (low down and not far from the Puebla heights) and Ariñez (on the high road, at the spot where it crosses the position), a dominating point on the sky-line. The right wing nearly reached to the Zadorra at the spot where it makes the ‘hairpin bend’ alluded to above. But the solid occupation by formed troops did not extend so far: there were only a cavalry regiment and three guns watching the bridge of Mendoza[552] , and a single company of voltigeurs watching that of Villodas. The disposition of the units was, counting from the French left, first Maransin’s brigade occupying Subijana, next Conroux’s division in a single line on the slopes to the north of the village of Zumelzu, with a battalion holding a wood in front on lower ground. Then came Daricau’s division, one brigade in front line across the high road, the other brigade (St. Pol’s) in reserve north of the road, and in rear of Leval’s division, which was deployed on the prominent height in front of the village of Ariñez, which formed the end of the main position. Between Leval and the Zadorra there was only Avy’s few squadrons of light horse, watching the bridge of Mendoza. Nearly a mile to the rear of the main line Villatte’s division stood in reserve, on the heights on the other side of Ariñez, and with it Pierre Soult’s cavalry. The position was heavily gunned, as artillery support went in those days. Each of the three front-line divisions had its battery with it—a fourth belonging to Pierre Soult’s cavalry was placed on a knoll in front of the position, from which it could sweep the approaches from the bridge of Nanclares. In reserve behind Ariñez was not only Villatte’s battery, but two others drawn from the general artillery park, and during the early stage of the battle another pair of batteries, belonging to the Army of Portugal, were sent to join Leval’s divisional guns on the north end of the position. Gazan had therefore some 54 pieces in hand, without counting the half-battery of horse artillery belonging to Digeon’s dragoons, which
was absent far to his extreme right, by the banks of the upper Zadorra.
Three-quarters of a mile behind Gazan’s reserves, the whole Army of the Centre was deployed on each side of the high road, Darmagnac’s division north of it in front of Zuazo, Cassagne’s division south of it, level with Gomecha. Treillard’s dragoons were behind Cassagne; Avy’s chasseurs (as has been mentioned above) were watching the Zadorra on the right.
In the original order of battle of the 20th the Army of Portugal had been in third line, a mile behind the Army of the Centre, on a level with the villages of Ali and Armentia. But when Digeon’s dragoons reported in the afternoon that they had discovered Longa’s column on the Murguia road, it was decided that a flank guard must be thrown out in that direction, to cover Vittoria and the high road to France from possible raids. Wherefore Reille was told that it would be his duty to provide against this danger. He took out Menne’s brigade of Sarrut’s division from the line, pushed it over the Zadorra, and established it in a position level with Aranguiz on the Murguia road, a mile and more beyond the river. Late at night, apparently on a report from a deserter that there were British troops behind Longa[553]—(indeed the man said that Wellington himself was on the Bilbao road)—Reille took off the other brigade of Sarrut’s division in the same direction, and sent it with Curto’s regiments of light horse to join Menne. There remained in front of Vittoria of infantry only Lamartinière’s division, and the King’s Guards; but there was a very large body of cavalry in reserve—Tilly’s and Digeon’s dragoon divisions of the Army of the South, the King’s two Guard regiments of lancers, and the bulk of the horse of the Army of Portugal, Boyer’s dragoons and Mermet’s chasseurs: there must have been 5,000 sabres or more in hand.
One further precaution was taken—lest the enemy might be moving against the high road to France from points even more to the north than Murguia, a trifling force was sent to cover the exit of the chausséefrom the pass of Salinas; this was the Spanish ‘division’ of Casapalacios belonging to the Army of the Centre, strengthened by some scraps of the French troops of the Army of the North, which
had come in from minor garrisons during the recent retreat. Casapalacios’ Afrancesados, nominally three regiments strong, were under 2,000 bayonets—they had with them five weak squadrons of their own nation, a half-battery, also Spanish, and an uncertain (but small) French auxiliary force, which included a battalion of the 3rd Line, part of the 15th Chasseurs, and a section of guns equipped from the artillery dépôt of the Army of the North, which had long been established at Vittoria and had not been sent to the rear[554] .
Casapalacios took post at Durana, covering the bridge of that village, the most northerly one on the Zadorra: the French battalion was at Gamarra Menor on the other side of the water.
Wellington spent the 20th in arranging for the general attack, which he had determined to deliver if Joseph stood his ground. The plan was ambitious, for the battlefield was far larger than any on which the Anglo-Portuguese Army had ever fought before, and the numbers available were 30,000 more than they had been at Salamanca or Bussaco, and more than double those of Fuentes de Oñoro. Moreover, he intended to operate with a great detached turning force against the enemy’s flank and rear, a thing that he had only once done before—at Salamanca—and then only with a single division. The battle plan was essentially a time-problem: he had to arrange for the simultaneous appearance of four separate masses in front of the French position. All started from parallel points in the valley of the Bayas, but the obstacles in front of them were of very varying difficulty, and the distances to be covered were very different.
(1) Hill, with the large 2nd Division (four brigades), Silveira’s Portuguese division, Morillo’s Spaniards, and V. Alten’s and Fane’s light dragoons, 20,000 sabres and bayonets in all, was to cross the Zadorra completely outside the extreme French left wing, to storm the heights of Puebla, which formed the end of Gazan’s line, and then, advancing from the defile, to strike at Subijana de Alava with his main body, while continuing to thrust his flank along the heights above, which dominated the whole region, and extended far behind the enemy’s left wing.
(2) Two parallel columns were to march from the camps on the Bayas; one consisting of the 4th and Light Divisions, R. Hill’s, Grant’s, and Ponsonby’s cavalry brigades, and D’Urban’s Portuguese horse, was to advance by the country road from Subijana-Morillas to the two bridges of Nanclares. Opposite those passages and the neighbouring ones it was to deploy, and to attack the French centre, when Hill should have got a footing on the Puebla heights and in the plain by Subijana. The second column, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Divisions, was to move from Zuazo and Anda on the Bayas across the high mountain called Monte Arrato by a country track, and to descend into the valley of the Zadorra at Las Guetas, opposite the bridge of Mendoza, up-stream from the ‘hairpin bend’. In this position it would be almost in the rear of Gazan’s right wing above Villodas: it was to attack at once on reaching its ground, if the progress of Hill on the south was seen to be satisfactory. ‘The movement to be regulated from the right: although these columns are to make such movements in advance as may be evidently necessary to favour the progress of the two columns on their right, they are not to descend into the low ground toward Vittoria or the great road.’ The total strength of the four divisions and cavalry of this section of the army was about 30,000 sabres and bayonets.
(3) Graham’s column-head was at Olano, three miles in front of Murguia, and six from the Zadorra. He had in front Longa’s Spanish infantry, with whom Anson’s light dragoons were to join up when operations should begin. Behind were the 1st and 5th Divisions, Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese brigades, and Bock’s heavy dragoons. The total force was about 20,000 men of all nations. As an afterthought on the 20th Wellington directed Giron, who was to reach Orduña that day, to come down to the upper Bayas in Graham’s rear, where he would act as a support if necessary. The object of this order is not quite obvious. Giron came down too late for the battle, arriving at Murguia only in the afternoon. It is known from his own dispatches that Wellington over-estimated Reille’s force, which Graham had to fight, not knowing of Maucune’s departure[555] , and Giron may have been intended to add weight to the attack in this quarter. His troops would, apparently, have been
more usefully placed if they had been sent from Murguia to attack the unguarded upper fords of the Zadorra.
The orders issued to Graham gave him a rather perplexing choice of action. He was (like the 3rd and 7th Divisions) to guide himself by what was going on upon his right: he must get in touch at once with the centre columns; he might attack if it was obviously profitable to the main advance, but he was to avoid letting his whole corps be drawn into close action in front of Vittoria, for his main object must be to turn the enemy’s position, by getting round its right wing and cutting the great road to France. The lack of precise direction in this order is, no doubt, a testimony to Wellington’s confidence in Graham’s judgement. But it cast a grave responsibility on him: if he had been told simply that he was to turn the French right and seize the great chaussée, matters would have been simple. But he is given leave to attack frontally if circumstances farther down the line seem to make such a policy desirable: yet he must not attack so heavily as to make his great turning movement impossible. It must be confessed that the difficult problem was not well solved that day by the gallant old general.
The whole day of the 20th was spent in getting the columns into order, and the arrangements for the attacks synchronized. Wellington took a survey of all the routes in person, as his wont was. It was not till late in the afternoon that he became certain from the dispositions of the enemy that an eleventh hour retreat was not contemplated by the King[556] . The timing was that Hill, who had a few miles to march, should attack at eight in the morning, that both Graham and the column consisting of the 3rd and 7th Divisions should get into position by the same hour, and make ready to attack, when it was clear that the flank movement of Hill had already begun and was making good progress. Meanwhile the other central column, the Light and 4th Divisions, should cross when Hill had won the defile of Puebla and room to debouch beyond it, but not before. The rather late hour fixed, in a month when dawn comes at 4 a.m., was dictated by the fact that Hill had a river to cross, and the 3rd and 7th Divisions mountain tracks to follow, which neither could have negotiated in the dark. Some hours of daylight were needed to get
them into position. Even so the brigades of the left-centre column were several hours late at their rendezvous.
The French commanders, as we have seen, made no move on the 20th, save to hurry off convoys and to throw back Reille on the north-west flank of Vittoria, to protect the royal chaussée and the two Bilbao roads. Jourdan wrote to Clarke that evening a perfectly sensible dispatch as to the difficulties of the situation, but one which showed that he was wholly unaware that he might be forced to a general action within the next twelve hours. All depended, he said, on Clausel’s prompt arrival: if he should come up on the 21st there was no danger: if he delayed, the army might have to choose between two tiresome alternatives—a retreat on the pass of Salinas and one on Pampeluna. If Wellington, as he suspected, was making a great turning movement by Orduña and Durango, the army would be forced to take the wretched road Salvatierra-Pampeluna. ‘The King does not yet know what decision he will have to make: if General Clausel delays his junction much longer, he will be forced to choose the retreat into Navarre.’ Of any idea that Wellington was about to attack next morning the dispatch shows no sign.
Jourdan had been indisposed all that day—he was laid up in bed with a feverish attack. This caused the postponement of a general reconnaissance of the position, which he and his King had intended to carry out together. They rode forth, however, at 6 a.m. on the 21st. ‘No intelligence had come to hand,’ writes Jourdan in his memoirs, ‘which could cause us to foresee an instant attack. We arrived at the position by Zuazo, from which Count Reille had been recently moved, and stopped to examine it. Its left rested on the mountain-chain in the direction of Berostigueta, its right came down to the Zadorra behind La Hermandad and Crispijana. It is dominating, yet not over steep, and has all along it good artillery emplacement for many batteries. It connected itself much better than does the Ariñez position with the ground about Aranguiz now occupied by Reille, which might be heavily attacked. Struck with the advantages of this position, the King appeared inclined to bring back the Army of the South to occupy it, and to place the Army of the Centre between it and the Army of Portugal. The three armies would
have been closer together, and more able to give each other rapid assistance; and the eye of the Commander-in-Chief could have swept around the whole of this more concentrated field in one glance. This change of dispositions would probably have been carried out on the 20th if Marshal Jourdan had not been indisposed, and might perhaps have prevented the catastrophe that was to come. But the officer sent to call General Gazan to confer with the King came back to say that the general could not leave his troops, as an attack on him was developing. It was judged too late to change position. Riding to the front of Ariñez, to a long hill occupied by Leval’s division, on the right of the Army of the South, the King saw that in fact the enemy was on the move. About eight o’clock the posts on the mountain reported that the Allies had passed the Zadorra above La Puebla: a strong column was coming up the high road and the defile, a smaller one had diverged to its right and was climbing the mountain itself. General Avy, sent on reconnaissance beyond the Zadorra on the side of Mendoza, reported at the same time that a large corps was coming in on Tres Puentes behind the rear of General Leval. And he could see signs in the woods opposite, which seemed to indicate the march of other troops in the direction of the bridge of Nanclares. No news had yet come in from Reille, but we prepared ourselves to hear ere long that he, too, was attacked[557]’ .
It is unnecessary to comment on the character of a Headquarters where a passing indisposition of the Chief of the Staff causes all movements to be postponed for eighteen hours, at a moment when a general action is obviously possible. But it is necessary to point out that the existing dislocation of the troops left three miles of the Zadorra front between Reille’s left and Gazan’s right unguarded when the battle began, and that this had been the case throughout the preceding day. And during that day who was responsible for the fact that not a single one of the eleven bridges between the defile of La Puebla and Durana had been ruined and only three obstructed[558]? Gazan must take a good deal of responsibility, no less than Jourdan.
At eight o’clock on the morning of the 21st the action commenced, on a most beautiful clear day, contrasting wonderfully with the heavy rain of the 19th and intermittent showers on the 20th. Every hill-crest road and village for twenty miles was visible with surprising sharpness, so much so that incidents occurring at a great distance were easily to be followed by the naked eye, still more easily by the staff officer’s telescope.
The clash began, as Wellington had intended, on the extreme right. Here Hill’s columns crossed the Zadorra, where it broadened out below the defile of La Puebla, far outside the French line. The 2nd Division led up the high road, with Cadogan’s brigade heading the column; but before they entered the narrows, Morillo’s Spaniards were pushed forward on their right, through a wood which covered the lower slopes, to seize the spur of the Puebla heights immediately above the road. Till this was cleared, it would be impossible to move the 2nd Division forward. Eye-witnesses describe the deploying of the Spanish column as clearly visible from the high ground on the Monte Arrato heights: the first brigade appeared emerging from the woods below, then came stiffer ground, ‘so steep that while moving up it they looked as if they were lying on their faces or crawling[559]’ Then the smoke of the French skirmishing fire began to be visible on the crest, while Morillo’s second brigade, deployed behind the first, went up the heights in support. The enemy, who was not in great strength at first, gave way, and the Estremadurans won the sky-line, formed there, and began to drive up from the first summit to the next above it. This also they won, but then came to stand—Gazan had pushed up first one and then the other of the two regiments of Maransin’s brigade from his left, on the main position, to support the voltigeur companies which had been the only troops originally placed on this lofty ground. Hill, seeing the advance on the mountain stop, sent up, to help Morillo, Colonel Cadogan, with his own regiment the 71st, and all the light companies of Cadogan’s and Byng’s brigades. This turned the fight, and after a stiff struggle for the second summit, in which Morillo was severely wounded, Maransin’s brigade was turned back and flung down hill: it halted and re-formed low down on the slope, losing the crest completely.
Having his flank now reasonably safe, Hill turned off the other two battalions of Cadogan’s brigade to follow the 71st, and then pushed his second British brigade (O’Callaghan’s) up the defile of La Puebla, and deployed it on the open ground opposite the village of Subijana de Alava, which lay near the high road, and was the first obstacle to be carried if the whole corps was to issue forth and attack the French left. One battery moved up with the brigade, and got into action on a slope to its right. The rest of the 2nd Division and Silveira’s Portuguese issued from the defile, ready to act as reserve either to Morillo on the heights or O’Callaghan in the open ground. Meanwhile the enemy could be seen dispatching troops from his reserves, to attack the spurs of the mountain which had been won by Morillo and Cadogan. For the heights of Puebla commanded all the left flank of the main French position, and, if Allied troops pushed along them any further, Gazan’s line would be completely turned. Jourdan says that his orders were that Maransin’s brigade should have attacked, with a whole division in support, but that Gazan took upon him the responsibility of sending in Maransin alone, and only later, when the latter had been beaten down from the crest, first Rey’s brigade of Conroux’s division and then St. Pol’s reserve brigade of Daricau’s division, from the hill on the right behind Leval. It would seem that Daricau’s two regiments took post on the slopes behind Subijana, where there was a gap in the line, owing to Maransin’s departure, while Rey and his brigade went up the Puebla heights, to try to head off Morillo’s and Cadogan’s attack.
In this it was wholly unsuccessful: after a severe struggle on the crest, in which Cadogan was mortally wounded[560] , the French reinforcements were checked and routed: the Allied troops began to push forward again on the heights, and were getting right round the flank of Gazan’s left wing, while Maransin’s troops on the lower slopes were being contained by the 92nd and 50th, the rear regiments of Cadogan’s brigade, and Daricau’s were hotly engaged with O’Callaghan’s three battalions, which occupied Subijana and then attacked the hillside above it, but failed for some time to secure a lodgement there.
Jourdan was by this time growing anxious, and not without reason, at the rapid progress of the Allies on the Puebla heights. He ordered Gazan to send up at once his only remaining reserve, Villatte’s division from the height behind Ariñez, to gain the crest at a point farther east than any that the enemy could reach, and to attack in mass along it. In order that he might not be forestalled on the summit, Villatte was told to march by a long détour, through the village of Esquivel far to the east, where there was a country road debouching from the chaussée. Indeed so perturbed was the Marshal by the threat to his left, that he suspected further turning movements in this quarter, and sent orders for Tilly’s dragoons, from the cavalry reserve, to ride out by Berostigueta to the Trevino road, to see if there were no British columns pressing in from that quarter. He also directed D’Erlon to move one of his two infantry divisions, Cassagne’s, in the same direction, to support Tilly if necessary. Gazan, if we may credit his long and contentious report on the battle, suggested to Jourdan that it was dangerous to disgarnish his centre, and to push so many troops to his left, while it was still uncertain whether Wellington’s column-heads, visible on the other side of the Zadorra, were not about to move. Might not Hill’s attack be a feint, intended to draw off the French reserves in an eccentric direction? The Marshal, says Gazan, then declared in a loud voice, so that all around could hear ‘that the enemy’s movements opposite our right are mere demonstrations, to which no attention should be paid, and that if the battle were lost it would be because the heights oi the left of Subijana remained in the enemy’s power[561].’ Then lay the real danger.
Orders were given that when Villatte should have got on the crest of the mountain, and should be delivering his attack, a simultaneous move forward was to be made by Conroux, and the brigades of Maransin and St. Pol, to cast the enemy out of Subijana, as well as off the heights of Puebla. It is interesting to note that Hill had as yet only engaged two British brigades, and one small Spanish division, and had succeeded in attracting against himself a much larger force—the whole of Conroux’s and Villatte’s divisions, and the two brigades of Maransin and St. Pol. In the French centre and right
there remained now only Leval’s division and the remaining brigade of Daricau’s, and in reserve there was only one of D’Erlon’s divisions, since the other had gone off on a wild goose chase toward the Trevino road. Wellington could have wished for nothing better.
But by the time that the French counter-attack on Hill’s corps was developing, matters were beginning to look lively all along the line of the Zadorra, and the combat on the heights was growing into a general action. It was now about eleven o’clock, and Wellington had been for some time established on a high bank above the river, facing the centre of the French position, to the left of the village and bridges of Nanclares, from which he could sweep with his glass the whole landscape from the heights of La Puebla to the bridge of Mendoza. To his left and right the Light and 4th Divisions lay in two masses, a mile or more back from the river, and hidden very carefully in folds of the Monte Arrato, the battalions in contiguous close column lying down in hollow roads or behind outcrops of rock, and showing as little as possible. The great mass of cavalry in reserve, four brigades, had not been brought over the sky-line yet, and lay some distance to the rear. Only Grant’s hussars were near the Light Division, dismounted and standing to their horses in covered ground. The French lines were perfectly visible, ‘unmasked, without a bush to prevent the sweeping of their artillery, the charging of their cavalry, or the fire of their musketry acting with full effect on those who should attempt to cross the bridges in their front, which it was necessary to carry before we could begin the attack on their centre[562],’ King Joseph and his staff were conspicuous on the round hill before Ariñez.
Hill’s advance having begun, and made good progress, Wellington was watching for the two other movements which ought to have coincided with the attempt to cross the river at Nanclares for the frontal attack. They had neither of them developed as yet: at least nothing was to be seen of the 3rd and 7th Divisions on the down-slope of the lofty Monte Arrato, and there had not yet been any heavy burst of cannonading from the upper Zadorra (which was not visible from the spot where the Commander-in-Chief had placed himself), to tell that Graham was engaged.
The reason for the comparative silence in this quarter was undoubtedly the wording of Wellington’s orders to Graham, which left so much to the judgement of the commander of the great turning column. He had been placed, almost from the start of his march, in the presence of a secondary problem. Reille, as we have seen, had been given on the 20th the charge of the upper Zadorra and the great road to France. Hoping that he had only Longa’s Spaniards in front of him, and judging that it would be well to keep them as far from the road and the river as possible, the commander of the Army of Portugal had placed Sarrut’s division and a brigade of Mermet’s light horse in an advanced position a mile and more in front of the river, on a ridge flanking the main Bilbao road, above the village of Aranguiz. Lamartinière’s division and Boyer’s and Digeon’s dragoons had been left on the nearer bank. When therefore Graham, marching down from Olano, neared Aranguiz, he found a considerable French force blocking the way. Remembering his orders to look to the right, to adapt his movements to those of the troops in that direction, and not to be drawn into unnecessary fighting, he halted for some time, to see how matters were going on the critical wing, and meanwhile deployed alongside of Longa’s men in his front, Pack’s Portuguese brigade and Anson’s light dragoons, with the 5th Division in support, before Sarrut’s position. He also detached Bradford’s Portuguese to his right, with the idea of getting in touch with the troops in that direction. Reille, who was present in person with his advanced guard, saw with dismay the depth of the column descending upon him, and recognized that he must fall back and hold the line of the Zadorra, the only possible front on which he could oppose such an enemy. About midday or a little later Graham ‘thought himself justified in advancing, in order to draw the enemy’s attention to his right, and so assist the progress of the army from the side of Miranda (i. e. Hill’s column), where the enemy seemed to be making an obstinate resistance in the successive strong positions which the country afforded[563].’ The very moment that Graham sent forth Longa and Pack to advance, the French retired by order, not without some skirmishing, in which the 4th Caçadores stormed the hill just above Aranguiz. But neither side had any appreciable losses.
Graham could now advance to within a mile of the Zadorra, and was in command of the plain-ground as far as the villages of Abechuco, and Gamarra Mayor and Menor. All three are on the northern or right bank of the river, and Reille had determined to hold them as têtes depont covering the bridges. They had been hastily barricaded, and the artillery of the Army of Portugal had been placed on the opposite bank in a line of batteries, ready to sweep the open ground over which an assault on the villages must be launched. Graham had therefore to deploy for a formal attack on the new position. He sent Longa up-stream and over the hills, to attack Gamarra Menor and Durana, placed Oswald and the 5th Division, with a section of Lawson’s battery, over against Gamarra Mayor, and drew out the 1st Division and the two Portuguese brigades opposite Abechuco, which would have to be taken before the bridge of Arriaga could be attacked. Keeping in mind Wellington’s main purpose, indicated in his orders, of cutting the great road to France, he told Longa and Oswald on the flank that they might push hard, while he seems to have acted in a much more leisurely way in front of Abechuco, where no attack was launched till actual orders had been received from head-quarters bidding him press harder. But meanwhile Longa took Gamarra Menor from the French battalion of the 3rd Line, and then, pushing on, came into collision at Durana bridge with his renegade compatriots the Franco-Spanish division of Casapalacios. As the great road to Bayonne actually passes through Durana, and was now under fire from Longa’s skirmishers, it may be said to have been blocked for all practical purposes at this early stage of the battle. It was not till the afternoon, however, that Longa succeeded in storming the bridge and occupying the village, thus formally breaking the enemy’s main line of communication with France—to save which King Joseph had risked his all. Apparently he was hampered by having no artillery, while the Franco-Spaniards had some four or five guns with them, bearing on the bridge.
Meanwhile Robinson’s brigade of the 5th Division had stormed Gamarra Mayor, defended by the French 118th and 119th— Gauthier’s brigade of Lamartinière’s division. This was a brilliant and costly affair—it being no light matter to attack in column of
battalions the barricaded streets of a compact village. The British, however, burst in—Colonel Brooke with the 1/4th being the first to force an entrance: the French abandoned three guns which had been placed in the barricades, and fell back in disorder across the bridge. General Robinson endeavoured to improve the success by instant pursuit, but the French had guns bearing on the bridge, which swept away the first platoons that tried to cross it. Very few men reached the other side, and they were shot down before they could establish a lodgement on the farther bank. It was necessary to halt, re-form, and bring up more artillery before the attack could be repeated.
It was now past two o’clock, and the noise of Graham’s attack was sufficiently audible all down the British line, and was carrying dismay to French head-quarters. But what of the other column, that of the 3rd and 7th Divisions, which was to appear on the middle Zadorra opposite Gazan’s almost unguarded flank, in the direction of the bridge of Mendoza? It was overdue, now that both the large flanking corps were seriously engaged, and the attention of the enemy attracted toward them. But before the missing column came into action, there had been an unexpected modification of the position in the right centre. At 11.30 Wellington appeared before the Light Division, and told Alten to move it more to the left, so as to be over and above the bridge of Villodas, which it would have to attack at the moment of general advance, leaving the two bridges by Nanclares to the 4th Division and the cavalry. So rough and wooded was the ground that the division, moving in a hollow way, was established less than 300 yards from the brink of the Zadorra and the French line, without attracting the notice of the enemy. An officer of the 43rd writes: ‘I felt anxious to obtain a view, and walking leisurely between the trees found myself at the edge of the wood, in clear sight of the enemy’s cannon, planted with lighted matches and ready to apply them[564] . Had our attack begun here, the French could never have stood to their guns, so near were they to the thicket—our Riflemen would have annihilated them.’ The British bank of the Zadorra here completely commanded the bridge and the French bank, which accounts for the fact that the enemy’s
artillery did not detect the approach of such a large body of troops as the Light Division. But after a time a bickering fire across the river between skirmishers on both sides broke out at several points, and some voltigeurs even pressed across Villodas bridge, and had to be cast back again by the skirmishers of the 2/95th.
There was to be, however, no attempt to pass this bridge as yet by the British. While Wellington was still with the Light Division, a peasant came up to him with the astounding intelligence that the bridge of Tres Puentes, the one at the extreme point of the ‘hairpinbend’ of the Zadorra, was not only unoccupied but unwatched by the enemy: he offered to guide any troops sent to it. The Commanderin-Chief made up his mind at once to seize this crossing, which would outflank the French position at Villodas, and told the peasant to lead Kempt’s brigade of the Light Division to the unwatched point, about a mile and a half to the left. ‘The brigade moved off by threes at a rapid pace, along a very uneven and circuitous path, concealed from the observation of the French by high rocks, and reached the narrow bridge, which crossed the river to the hamlet of Yruna (part of the scattered village of Tres Puentes). The 1st Rifles led the way, and the whole brigade following passed at a run, with firelocks and rifles ready cocked, and ascended a steep road of fifty yards, at the top of which was an old chapel. We had no sooner cleared it than we observed a heavy column of the French on the principal hill, and commanding a bird’s eye view of us. However, fortunately, a convex bank formed a sort of tête de pont, behind which the regiments formed at full speed, without any word of command. Two round shots now came among us: the second severed the head from the body of our bold guide, the Spanish peasant. The brigade was so well covered that the enemy soon ceased firing. Our post was extraordinary we were in the elbow of the French position, and isolated from the rest of the army, within 100 yards of the enemy[565] and absolutely occupying part of his position, without any attempt having been made to dislodge us.... Sir James Kempt expressed much wonder at our critical position, without being molested, and sent his aide-de-camp at speed across the river for the 15th Hussars, who came up singly and at a gallop along the steep path,
and dismounted in rear of our centre. Some French dragoons, coolly and at a slow pace, came up to within 50 yards of us, to examine, if possible, our strength, but a few shots from the Rifles caused them to decamp. We could see three bridges within a quarter of a mile of each other, in the elbow of the enemy’s position. We had crossed the centre one (Tres Puentes), while the other two, right and left (Villodas and Mendoza), were still covered by French artillery[566] . ’
Expecting to be instantly attacked, and to have to fight hard for the chapel-knoll on which they had aligned themselves, Kempt’s brigade spent ‘half an hour of awkward suspense.’ The immunity with which they had been allowed to hold their position was suddenly explained by a movement which they had not been able to observe. The missing column of Wellington’s army had at last come up, and was plunging with headlong speed into the rear of the troops which were facing Kempt, so that the French had no attention to spare for the side-issue in the hairpin-bend of the Zadorra. Instead of being attacked the brigade was about to become at once an attacking force.
A word is necessary as to the leading of this column. It had been placed by Wellington under Lord Dalhousie, now commanding the 7th Division. This was an extraordinary choice, as this officer had been only a few months in the Peninsula, and had no experience of the higher responsibilities—though he had commanded a brigade in the Walcheren expedition[567] . But being as Lieutenant-General slightly senior to Picton (though they had been gazetted majorgenerals on the same day in 1808), he was entitled to take the command over the head of the war-worn and experienced leader of the 3rd Division. The latter had been directing one of the great marching columns during the early stages of the advance, and was not unnaturally sulky at being displaced. Common report in the army held that he was in disfavour at Head-Quarters, for intemperate letters complaining of the starving of his division during the recent march beyond the Ebro[568] . Be this as it may, Picton was during the forenoon hours of June 21st in one of his not infrequent rages. For though his column had started early, and the 3rd Division had reached Las Guetas, the villages on the south side of the Monte
Arrato, which were to be its starting-point for the attack on the line of the Zadorra, Lord Dalhousie refused to advance farther than the edge of the hills, using apparently his discretion in interpreting the orders given him ‘to regulate his action from what was going on to his right and only to move when it should be ‘evidently necessary’ to favour the progress of the columns in that direction. He was obviously worried by the fact that the two rear brigades of his own division, Barnes’s and Le Cor’s, had been hindered by an artillery breakdown in the steep road behind, and were not yet up, though Cairnes’s battery, which had delayed them, ultimately overtook the leading brigade[569] . Hence he used his discretion to wait for formal orders from Head-Quarters, and to do nothing. Picton, who could note the advance of Hill’s column, and could see that the French were utterly unprepared for an attack on the middle Zadorra, chafed bitterly at the delay.
We have an interesting picture of him on that morning from eyewitnesses. He was a strange figure—suffering from inflammation of the eyes, he had put on not his cocked hat but a broad-brimmed and tall civilian top-hat—the same that may be seen to-day in the United Service Museum. ‘During the struggle on the right the centre was inactive. General Picton was impatient, he inquired of every aide-de-camp whether they had any orders for him. As the day wore on, and the fight waxed louder on the right, he became furious, and observed to the communicator of these particulars, ‘D—n it! Lord Wellington must have forgotten us.’ It was near noon, and the men were getting discontented. Picton’s blood was boiling, his stick was beating with rapid strokes upon the mane of his cob. He rode backward and forward looking in every direction for the arrival of an aide-de-camp, until at last one galloped up from Lord Wellington. He was looking for Lord Dalhousie—the 7th Division had not yet arrived, having to move over difficult ground. The aide-de-camp checked his horse and asked the general whether he had seen Lord Dalhousie. Picton was disappointed; he had expected that he might at least move now, and in a voice which did not gain softness from his feelings, answered in a sharp tone, ‘No, Sir: I have not seen his Lordship, but have you any orders for me.’ ‘None,’ replied the aide-
de-camp. ‘Then, pray Sir, what are the orders that you do bring?’ ‘Why,’ answered the officer, ‘that as soon as Lord D. shall commence an attack on that bridge,’ pointing to the one on the left (Mendoza), ‘the 4th and Light are to support him.’ Picton could not understand the idea of any other division fighting in his front, and drawing himself up to his full height said to the astonished aide-de-camp, ‘You may tell Lord Wellington from me, Sir, that the 3rd Division, under my command, shall in less than ten minutes attack that bridge and carry it, and the 4th and Light may support if they choose.’ Having thus expressed his intention, he turned from the aide-decamp and put himself at the head of his men, who were quickly in motion toward the bridge, encouraging them with the bland appellation of ‘Come on, ye rascals! Come on, ye fighting villains[570] . ’
Ten minutes as the time required to plunge down from the hillside to a bridge two miles away seems a short estimate. But there is no doubt that the advance of the 3rd Division was fast and furious —an eye-witness describes it as shooting like a meteor across the front of the still-halted column-head of the 7th Division. The military purist may opine that Picton should have waited till he got formal orders via Lord Dalhousie to advance. But the moments were precious—Kempt was across the Zadorra close by, in an obviously dangerous state of isolation: the French in a few minutes might be sending infantry to block the bridge of Mendoza, which they had so strangely neglected. The 7th Division was short of two brigades, and not ready to attack. Wellington’s orders were known, and the situation on the right was now such as to justify the permissible advance which they authorized. Neither Wellington nor Dalhousie in their dispatches give any hint that Picton’s action was disapproved— complete success justified it.
Picton had directed Brisbane’s brigade of the 3rd Division straight upon the bridge of Mendoza, Colville’s upon a ford 300 yards farther up-stream. Both crossed safely and almost unopposed. The only French troops watching the stream here were Avy’s weak brigade of cavalry—under 500 sabres—and their three horse-artillery guns commanding the bridge. But the latter hardly got into action, for on Picton’s rapid approach becoming visible, General Kempt threw out
some companies of the 1/95th under Andrew Barnard, from his point of vantage on the knoll of Yruna, who opened such a biting fire upon the half battery that the officer in command limbered up and galloped off. Avy’s chasseurs hovered about in an undecided way but were not capable either of defending a bridge or of attacking a brigade in position upon a steep hill. Wherefore Picton got across with small loss, and formed his two British brigades on the south side of the river. Power’s Portuguese rapidly followed Brisbane, as did a little later Grant’s brigade of the 7th Division—Lord Dalhousie’s other two brigades (as we have already noted) were not yet on the ground. On seeing Picton safely established on the left bank Kempt advanced from his knoll, and formed on the right-rear of the 3rd Division. The trifling French detachment at the bridge of Villodas— only a voltigeur company—wisely absconded at full speed on seeing Kempt on the move. The passage there was left completely free for Vandeleur’s brigade of the Light Division, who had long been waiting on the opposite steep bank.
The British were across the Zadorra in force, and the critical stage of the action was about to commence: the hour being between 2 and 3 in the afternoon.