Aug. 21, Nixon and pak conversation

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Talks B€tveen Presidenr Nixon and Ptesident Ri.hard Nixon Plesident Pak ol ihe Republic ot Koiea Mr. SarE Ho cho lKorean Inteipreter) Mr. victo! Lee (u,s. Inrerprete!)

President Nixor: Befo.e ve go into a deiailed discussior today, I vourd like to ei?laiD a fcv iiems on my nev po]icy tos,ard Kor.a. xim 11-Songrs .egime is one ol the most ageressive and urcasonable Co,lhuist coutries in the vorld. As you recall, the pueblo incidenl o..urred before I took ower rhe Presid€ncy. Dlring my ele.tion .ampaign, 1 .ored that to give a warning to Notth Korca l{ N.rth Korea prowokcs anorhe} prowocatiwe incide ar€ prepa.ed to react and v l hke meastrres hareher thar the enemy prowo.alion. This ftessage vas siven ro rhe soviet Ambassador in ihe u. s. and r teriewe ft vas corveyed ro Norrh Kotea.

Nov I w.uld like to elaboraie on my nev policy tovald Aeia. The press ovellooked my siatemenr 10 the effect that rhe U. S. vi11 turlin its heaty obligations vith the Asian .ounhies conce honor the U. S. -ROK Dcfe st think ower is vhai voutd be the best vay to keep these commitmerts. 1.re hawe relaxed olr travel .esiricrions and purchases Fith resard io communisi China, but w€ regard Communist China as an asgressiye nation. U.S. policy tovard co@unist china has not chanS€d, and ve will ,ot adhir the country into rhe u,N, It is also necessary in ihi pay attentior to the sino-so$iet co.Itict. As yooknow, the soviet union has not helpcd us in solwinS the is3ues con.erning coneunist china, Norlh Korea, rhe vieinam w:r a,.t the Middre Easr. It is also onc of ihe .outries vhich prowid€ m itary aid ro Noith Korea.

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1tc canhot cooperate vi$ the sowiet uaion without ibe Iatterrs reciprocal acts. Under these cilcumstances, a .olleciive secu.ty vith the Soviets againsl Co]munisr China is mcaninsiess. It is liist necessary for ihe soviets to act viur sin.eriiy. beliewe that the non-Communis! coutrics tocaied o. the p€riphery ol Comunist china must be shengihencd since they aie ihreatened

by Colr]muist China, Nolth xorea and North vietnam. The Sowiet Uni.n will also become a gr€ater threat than nos il it is reft alone.

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Nov vith iegard to vietnah, we are avare ol warious e{Ioris made by tle ROK in South vietnam. w€ arc vithdralving ou trooPs lrom SVN when vc ihi r that the South viehamese have }uilt the abiliiy to repla.e them. As ve inf.rmed you in adwance, I agreed q'iih Ptesiilent Thien at Midvay to vithdrav 25,000 irooPs. Duringoy recent talks vith him, ve decided to rcllace mole tloops in Augusi, bui ve hawe been sithholdine taling the measure due to the enemv offensiwe ol t{o veeks ago. Probably Fithin aboat r0 days, PresideEr Tlieu, Ceneral Abrams and olher leader3 c.!cerned vi1l ta]k oler the subject again, we vin inlorm you in adwance the nr:mber and tioe of these t..op vithilravals, shicL vilr be catied out as long as they do noi alfect our combai .apabilities.

I! reeard to the Paris tarlis, I just had a tark {ith Ambdssador Loilse today, ,ho inlormed me uut there has been no Progress. ^s you Llov, November t is the lirst amiwersary ol out bomling nat.

Il I had been the Plesident rdst NoYember, r vould nol have Lart€d o lurther progres3 the bomlins. Tlis is jus situation about October 1s vill re-ewaluate the in the Fbris talks, ve I telieve that your gowerment s eflorts toward milita.y ard economic setf-relidnce a!e the .orrect road to take. I hope that orher .ounirica in Asia vill lotlov strit, ]l is nece.sary for tl]e U. S, io continue to play a great rolc in Asia. I think iLat economic and m ilary aid to rfosp .ounrries like the RoK vhich rake selI-reliarce ellorts snould be .oniinued. The sell-reliance reearlis yot made this morning (at ihe Piesidio ol San Francisco), I think, lvere good ones for amcrican public opinion t cowe.ment oflici21, I trawelled a gleat deal in the Pacili. r€gion.

I can assnre you that se vil1 not retreat ltom the Pa.ific area and tre will noi reduce our commiiments, but I thinL ve nccd intelliSent poricy, by giwing aid to the .onnt.ies who attempt ro help them'elwes any questions on t hawe in3t made a Eenera su.h subjects as m itaty equipment and economic deveropmeni?

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President pak: r appreciaie hearing your tirm pori.y toward the Rox, Asia in general and thc c I vourd rike io make my vievs clear on these subje.ts. As you knov, Kim n-sonc during rhe

pastie.yeaISol3ohasa1mostcom!reiedvarprep ihe .ouniry by lorce. Ije is r.or.inc ror an opportunity to invade the south. r{e has n61 done so b€cause of the U.S, comhithents to the

Rox and the presence oI A proyo]le a !va. i, he berieves rhat this Ame.icaD policy towatd the RoK is going to change or has changed, Kih's objectiwe in making vaiious provocations is to have Am siationed i. th€ RoK vithdrav as rhey hawe done i! solth viet,am, alienate the RoK from the u.s. and have the U.S, not inte.wene Ehen anr4hins happe.s ir Korea. The stlengthening of ROK delense {ould check these prowocations of Kim and have hift give np the iaea oI irvading the South by force. A vay t. a.hiewe this objective is to strengihen the equipm capability oI the ROl< forces rather than to sirength in south Ko.ea, to ihe exte thai the RoK can singrehand€d1y resisi No.th Korean invasion. since the U. S. has warious commilmenls all President Nixon: rf the sowieis or the chincae invade the RoK, it a dilrerent baU game. Since you vere in th v.urd rike to elaborate a litt1e o! my decision on the esiablishmcft of ihe ABM nehlorh. A..ording io our intenige chi,a vilr have 25 io 50 rcBM,s rry 1976 vhich caE h rargers in the U.S. We nov hawc aboui 1,000 but vithout the ABM b€tvorL a nn.rear-armed China might b€ able to !se nuclear btackmail agairst non-nu.lear countiies in Asia a.d pose a dancer ro thc u.s. Thai is why ihis subject is so impo.tani lor the delerse and security ol

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operations {in lhe ROK) and Vietnamese war have been .arried veu

viih U.S. aid. Concerni,e Korca, I do nol thinh you hawe to vorry about the Korean problem il our equipment is further streqthened. I believe

that we can heet North Ko.ean threats eil]lour increasins the pr€sent 1€we] ol U.S. forces in South Ko.ea il (miliiary) €quipmert is strenCthercd.

president Nixor: ln this coDectior, we are nov studying sympathetically tle MAP a.d oiher proposals your side has made {ouowing Mr. Packa.drs re.eni visit to your .ountry. rhat some ol the RoK uhits are equipped wiih weapons of wortd wa! lI,

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Presidcnr Pak: t appreciate your explana docirine o! Asia. r agree in principle vith you new po1i.y, esPecizrly on the aspe.t of having those countries wnich have relied on the U s.

Bince the end of worr.l war ll i.y to herp themselves. Some Asians, howewe., are apprehensive be.aus. of theit oisconcePlion and his undei3tandins oI your policy, berieving that the U. s. intends to vash s hands of Asia, leawing Asian problems to the AsianB themselvee.

Thev vi11 naturalty diepel this apprehersion vhen they furry unde.stand your new policy. lt w l be necessary lor ue to giwe guiderines and study methods of sraduatly decreasing ihe U.S, burdens so as to hawe these Asian countries able t. .telend ihemsetves. In this comection, I vould like to h.we the U. s. guide various countries of Asia 30 they .an share the tespo.sib ity and burdens in accordance vith their respectiwe ability. At plesen!, some conntries ate 3naring e*cessiwe budens beyond their ab[iiy and vi.e wcrsa. The Republic of Korea a.d Japan ale Sood examples. Korea is not only diwided bu1 also is a dev€loping counky. Japan, despiie iis stro.s economy, is hardly .a.ryins f5 share oI the burdens in Asia. The Japa.ese are even tryi.g to .eIuse to provide mirihry bases to Okinawa when it is returned to Japan, thtrs hindering ihe unity ol Asia. Seweial Asian .onntries as weu as ihe p€ople ol South Korca a.e diesatislied,it6 strch a Japa.ese posttrre, I do not hawe lhe details on the bilaterar regotiatiors for ihc return .l okinawa to Japan, bur r beriewe that if the isrand is to be .everted to Japan, the Japanese shar€ ol tne burden3 i, Asia hust be inc.eased lirsi, bel.re okinawa is actualty returred.

tj99j3e4!=9!, rhis is a iteli.ate issue becalge ofthe constitution .l Japan vhi.h ve helped dralt. For a IonE time I have thought that

Japan 3houla ])hy a ftuch more Eignifi.anr rore than the pre.e.t in ils delen.e and couective economi. a.tivity. Some procress haB been made in the econohic aspe.t. As you are avare, Prime Minister Sato is c.ming her€ in November, and we should make every efio.t to hawe tant to lr€e Japan, hjft survire politicany, Japah spends onry zbout one percent ol its GNP ir its defense, vhich

The Japa,€se say that the delense and security ol South Kore. and Japan are interrelared, bui in practi.e they hawenrl

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Presirlent Pat: They think ttat they do nor have to do anrthing since ihey h2ve south Korea in tuont orrhem and the u. s. i. back of rhem.

They need U.s, ailwice in rhis regard. For example, moetofthe hat€d 'equipment,, .arried by Noiih Korean gtrerr as vho hawe i i.io south Korea such as their radios and shoes a.e made in Japan.

Although ve made a proiesi againsi this, rhey cortinue to serl ihese ilems to make a profit. Thus ihe people of Sonth Eorea have no sood {eerings t.vard the Japanese. Incidentarly, ilere hawe been }epoits 1o the etfect that since American troops have been withdrawing, other :llied troops oight {orrow suit. It is my urinl<iDg that unless qe are requesred by sourh vietnam or rhe u, s.,

Pre.ident Nixon: The.e has b€en no progre3s ir ihe Paris ta1k3, and Nowember r i, rhe firat a.nlwersary oI our bombins ha1t. what do you think our tactica should be? Do you think we should reopenthe bombirgs?

Presideni Pak, lt is up to your dc.ision, but I think ii is dilliculi lio reopen rhe bombings) because of your domestic public opinio.. whe. t las i ormed by Ambassador Portcr resardins ihe bombiag halt, last November, I told hii how -e wourd be taking this !:!ion R holt

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Prcsident Nix.n: ln ihe ev€nt ihai we resume our bohbi.gs, whai do you thinh th€ rea.rions .f Asia

Prcsiaert Nixon: whai is your view oh the sino-sowiet conflict? Ho' it is and hov lons do you b President Pak: we havc aralyzed lh€ sihation a greal dear. There is a 50-50 chance a var might break oot b€teeer ihe tvo counties. Some heliewe that a var wilt .or be etaged since both ol ihem kno' ihey both *ould suffe. a g.eat deal of damage and a var mighi be a proto.g.d one.

Or the othe. hand, somc int€rpret ihat the ronger ihe presenl lonnict coniinues, the harder for ihe sovieis ro dear vilh c.mmunisr china. we also hawe i,lormation ihat.he sovier m ilary takes a hawkish ariitude. o,e thing i3 .ertain, thonch -- the present .onllict win not be sorred in

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I oppose th€ wi€v ihai the u. s. and the U. s. S. R. should co.perate to re6.rain communist china. Both the Soviet Union and China are otrr p.teniial enemy, and thi8 viev does not mahe sense, lf the Sowi€t Union sweeps over china, the lo.mer vill Aet stronge!, po.ins a ereater thr€at to Asia,

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PrcsLd.nt Pak:

This exblains the reason vhv ve hav€ eated the rrawel resf.ictions anrl pDrchases. we are tryins to dispet the Sowiet idea .f opposing China by.ooperating vith the U.S. But ve vill contilue to support rree China, and our pori.y tovard communi3t Clira remains

n vould be betrer for ue to lemowe both povers ihan powers eet st.orger than the o1!er.

President Ni*on: The economic s.o{+h .at€ in s{ch countrics as South Korea, Japan, singapore, Iree chira and Thailaad has grovn higher

qhereas the economi. rew€l of China ihan other couniries ol the 'orldand North Korea has been lovered. Nov the danger is in an area ol of subw.rsion. This is a.nr. Ln the ROK, lor example, becalse .l f.r.es lying beyord the paralrel, Arihougn, as you Lrov, public opinion here demands !educti.n of to.ps we have au over ihe vorld, I rejected the idea ol dec.ea3ilg the nuober of our men stayine in the ROK. I vill make this wiev .lear to ihe publi. to parn Kim 11 Song. I had talks vith General Bo.est.el, and during ihe lasi cabinet meeting Fe rcceiwcd a report that the supply ol smarr ships to the RoK Navy ha3 progressed ai a fast tempo. Altho!3h our defense budgct thi, year is iisht, I think ve silt be able t. meet some of the reqnesis the ROK na3 made. I do not vant to giw€ a wrong noiion io rim Il-Song ihat theU.S. i3 Iessering its resp.nsibility for the ileferse olrhe ROK. Nov, I knov you have yariors €c.nomi. program3 undcr vay. This will be knoM in tvo to three weelis, but t vould like to inlorm you that i.day ihe Export l]nport Bank has decided to gire $73 millLon to ihe RoK for ihe .onstructron of one pove. plant and an atomic po$'er p1ant.

Since I heard that your cou.t.y wants more privaie invesrmcnt utike some oI the Asiar countiies, I pra. to cn.ourase this aspect.

Presideni Pak: As I told you in the car (vhile proceedin8 to the st.

Fran.is Hotel from ihe Presidio ol Sa. Francisco), the ROK is ind€IiedtotteU,S. lor its e.onomic Erovth. Our 'linancial ildependence raterruiil a lee years ago Fas about 50 percent, livillbe 9.1,3 Percent

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inthenextliscaryearanila1mostl00percentinthey we vin, h.*ever, need surprus agri.uriural producrs ror the tihe being. l{e hawe en.onraged eaports to obiain more foreign .urr€n.y and priwate inwestrent. Th€ Sotrth Korean peopte have been making erforts to achiewe a eetJ independent economy, and I hop€ you rolld consider giving us assista.ce ro achiewe this rarget during the .ext

Presidcni Nixon: I hawe held the same vlcv rince my fir.t wisil to your country in 1953. lt is difiicult vith this yea.'s budset, but the ROK

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import of r.xtiles, but I hopc ihat yon makc the RoK an cxception in ihe mea3ure so aB 1o help Ure coutry a.hieve iis economi.

Thc Rox has entercd the iexiile markei only durins ihe rec.ni years, I hope that . rcasonable soluhon .ar be found to satisly both the RoK ana Japa. we can djscuss ih€ matt€. in detail tomorro{, bui this iB not an easy problem ro solye. I vill try to deal vith ihc ROK l]roblcm

On the toop matt€., I vill info.m you tomorrov our Covelnment and President Thieu hawe decided on it. we are

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truggle. I krov ihai for the RoK populaii.n,

has nagc ihan thc U.S. has done. I will inform you ol all the a€a5ures ve ptan to iake or South Korea

I apprcciaic lLslcning to your vie*s on vari.us suble.E. to hear your remarks on th. |orean prolrlem,

It is a little noiEy outside, but pl.a3e rem€mber ihat American peopl€ are Korea's friehds.

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