2nd blog post

Patrick Kim 2nd Blog post: Beyond traditional nuclear arms control, ABM, and SALT I. *Photo for blog: Nixon signing things at the Moscow summit (I’m sure this photo exists, but haven’t searched for it yet 7/22/2015) *Primary source: Memo/draft on speech to announce ban on bacteriological weapons. *the first three paragraphs serve as background and is quite long, compared to the main point of the piece. Editing could/should be focused on first three paragraphs.

The era of the Cold War was largely dominated by fierce political, cultural, and philosophical interstate rivalry between two great powers—the U.S.S.R and the U.S. (Perhaps a quip about the latter? i.e. the U.S.) For the former, communist ideology, and thus ideological competition, was engrained into the fundamental philosophy of the state. In his memoir, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin recalls, “Soviet foreign policy was always closely connected to the philosophy and ideology of the Communist Party.

Consequently and invariably, its international outlook was an important component of the whole political platform of the party” (In Confidence, 196). Both philosophical and practical commitments were inseparable to the two states.

In addition to this political, cultural, and philosophical medley, security considerations were particularly prominent. While the de facto nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and U.S. further threatened an already volatile world-order, the destructive potential of these weapons was increasing at an alarming rate.

(Perhaps one more sentence on: imagery related to how insecure nuclear weapons made people feel, i.e. schoolchildren in the U.S. participating in mandatory nuclear outbreak drills). The political calculus of both states was under extreme duress.

During this era of instability, President Nixon initiated a process of arms control with the Soviet Union to check the alarming proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The pinnacle of Nixon’s success in arms control is the dual-pronged SALT I and ABM limitation treaty, which were both signed in 1972. However, President Nixon contributed more to arms control than his two greatest foreign policy accomplishments suggest.

Image of MEMORANDUM/DRAFT regarding Nixon’s speech here: By late 1969, an unprecedented and largely covert movement in American history was slowly coming to a close. On November 25 th, 1969, President Nixon delivered a monumental speech to the nation, in which he expounds that “First, in the field of chemical warfare, I hereby reaffirm that the United States will never be the first country to use chemical weapons to kill.” President Nixon continues, “…Therefore, I have decided that the United States of America will renounce the use of any form of deadly biological weapons that either kill or incapacitate.” The United States had voluntarily, and unconditionally, renounced an entire arsenal of her weaponry.

The decision was denounced by critics for being a political ploy under the guise of an appeal to peace and humanity.

Since the inception of the Nixon administration, the war in Vietnam had been deteriorating on both domestic and military fronts. Anti-war pressure was mounting, and as part of his presidential platform, Nixon had pledged to end the war. Largely, the American public was outraged at the secrecy of military and its appalling use of chemical weapons (i.e. Agent Orange) during war. President Nixon’s announcement would mollify this burgeoning anti-war conscience, thus loosening unfavorable domestic tension.

However, the possibility of implicit political motivation fails to delegitimize the concrete progress made in arms control, thanks to this decision.

As the most powerful nation in the world, President Nixon was privy to the idea that this seemingly limited, domestic announcement would have globally reverberating consequence. Indeed, President Nixon urged other states and the global community to follow in U.S. steps.

“The United States positively shall associate itself with the principles of the Draft Convention prohibiting the use of biological weapons of warfare presented by the United Kingdom and the UN 18 National Disarmament Conference, on August 26, 1969.” Later, this draft is realized by the success of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Perhaps more importantly, the process of banning biological warfare can be analyzed as the beginnings of a U.S. strategy regarding arms control in conjunction the Soviet Union. It signaled U.S. willingness to control arms, and U.S. conviction to act. To this end, U.S. strategy paid off; the Soviet Union ratified the clauses proposed by the Biological Weapons Convention. Albeit less destructive than nuclear weapons, but nonetheless disturbing to the conscience of mankind, biological warfare was now unacceptable to the international community.

Regardless of Nixon’s ambitions and U.S. political strategy, the ban on biological weapons undeniably progressed the goal of attaining a safer world.

“Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction. By the examples that we set today, we hope to contribute to an atmosphere of peace and understanding between all nations.” Of course, the United States was most concerned about the Soviet Union—its permanent and most capable foe.