The Spread Offense

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an eighth grader, I was formally introduced to the single wing formation, although I had seen it used often by Princeton University’s squad countless times as a fan at Palmer Stadium. My father took me to Princeton games as often as possible, and I even attended the historic 100th anniversary game of college football pitting the Tigers against the Scarlet Knights of Rutgers in 1969, which was the last year Princeton used the single wing formation as its primary offensive set. As a budding center in the single wing, I learned how to spiral the snap to the tailback or the fullback with precision, snapping the ball to the back’s right knee or left knee depending upon the direction in which the play was designed to go. The varsity coach, Ken Keuffel, was the leading proponent of the single 24

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wing, having originally been taught its intricacies by Princeton head coach Charlie Caldwell when Keuffel played for the orange-and-black in the ‘40s. Keuffel not only wrote books about the offense, but also consulted scores of college and pro coaches during his long career. If the single wing had been chemistry, Keuffel would have clearly been a mad scientist because of his depth of knowledge and commitment to the offense, which he used to great effect during his 21-year career at Lawrenceville School and six-year tenure at Wabash College. The single wing was once commonplace in both the professional and collegiate ranks until after World War II. The Pittsburgh Steelers were the last in the NFL to use the formation and while other small school programs continued to use it after it died out at Princeton,

® Getty Images Sport/Photographer: Kevin C. Cox

® Getty Images Sport/Photographer: George Gojkovich

The Spread Formation’s Roots Sprouted

from the Antiquated Single Wing the T-, I-, Wishbone, Veer and other more intricate multiple-set formations took over in the ‘50s, ‘60s and ‘70s. Today, the spread formations that have become the rage, particularly due to the success of Urban Meyer’s offensive schemes and principles at the University of Florida. When he was at Bowling Green and Utah, his offenses were effective, too, but until he won national championships at Florida few people gave it its just due. Rich Rodriguez’s offense at West Virginia with Pat White at the controls was often unstoppable. Bill Snyder used his own version of it at Kansas State in the late ‘90s to take advantage of the talents of dual threat signal-caller Michael Bishop. Meyer’s offense is a marriage of the spread and single-wing formations. Often the term spread provides the connotation that the offense spreads its 11 players from sideline-to-sideline making it more difficult for defensive backs to cover receivers,

By Carl Danbury

which is often the case with Mike Leach’s offense at Texas Tech and countless others. But, in reality, Meyer’s offense is predicated upon the run, not the pass (see Gators’ Run-Pass Balance), and uses option principles notoriously successful in the wishbone and veer of the late ‘60s and ‘70s. “One of the biggest misconceptions that defensive coordinators have about our offense is that they look at our offense and believe that we want to throw the ball a lot,” said former Florida offensive coordinator and current head coach at Mississippi State, Dan Mullen. “The opposite is true though. We’d rather run than throw.” “All things being equal, anybody can stop the run and anybody can stop the pass,” Meyer said. “But can you stop both?” In a recent interview with Chris Harry of the Orlando Sentinel, Meyer explained his rationale. “So how do you take advantage of the guy that’s the extra AUGUSt 09 | SUmag.com |

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® Getty Images Sport/Photographer: Stephen Dunn

The Spread Formation

defender? There’s two ways to do it. One: you run a single-wing offense, which means you spread a guy out so that [extra defender] has to go cover him. Two: you spread out and throw the ball. We’re going to do both. “If you know me, you know I think any offense can work if you have the right personnel back. Offenses are overrated. People are not. The NFL will take a quarterback and put him on a very bad team and call him a bust. Never mind that the defense ranks last in the league and there’s no offensive line. Chris Leak [in 2005] had about as bad a three-game [stretch] as we’ve had at Florida that I’ve ever had as a coach and it just so happened that Bubba Caldwell broke his leg, Jermaine Cornelius sprained his ankle, Chad Jackson had a bad hamstring and Dallas Baker broke his ribs. And so Chris Leak struggled the next three games when we’re playing [Miss. State], LSU, Georgia. It doesn’t matter what you run. It’s personnel based.” Florida’s offense may work with any quarterback/ tailback, but it flourishes with a unique talent like Tim Tebow. The same is true with other talented multiple threats at the position, like White, Bishop or former Arkansas tailback Darren McFadden who also could throw, for example. Simply, that means if you have talented back, the offense is more effective. “It’s a flash-in-the-pan offense because you have 26

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to have certain players to run it,” said former Auburn coach Tommy Tuberville. “The teams that are going to be more consistent are the teams that line up and just run it right at you, old hard-nosed football. Florida has done great with it, West Virginia has done great with it, but both are still running teams. Tim Tebow is Florida’s tailback and he is very versatile. If you can find guys like that to run it, you’re fine, but if you don’t have that type of quarterback then you’re rolling the dice. It doesn’t take but one turned ankle to go from here to another level,” Tuberville said while motioning downward. “The quarterback is the most critical position in this offense,” Mullen said. Former Furman and N.C. State head coach Dick Sheridan agreed with Tuberville saying he personally wouldn’t run the spread offense. “I personally wouldn’t run it and I wouldn’t want to be critical of people that do, but it’s not my cup of tea,” Sheridan said. “That doesn’t mean it’s not a good concept. “It’s the shotgun married to the single wing and everybody is looking for a Tim Tebow [to run it]. It’s the rage and it’s what everyone is trying to do, and some teams are more effective with it than others. Florida obviously has been very effective with a talent like Tim


The Spread Formation

Tebow, who can run and pass, and take advantage of one less defender. The concept is good.” When offenses line up in certain alignments and add motion to create chaos among the defenders, then spread the field from sideline-to-sideline creating space, defensive responsibilities and keys become confusing. Passing offenses are difficult enough to defend in that illustration unless you have at least four quality pass defenders who can play man-to-man. Once you add a bonafide threat of a good running attack like Florida possesses, defensive coordinators are forced to try to take away one aspect of their game, but are rarely able to take away both. Against Florida’s offense, defenses are forced to honor the dive or power run, the draw, the option, and then the pass. After the Dolphins used a version of the formation against the Patriots last year, New England head coach Bill Belichick, who was once a regular visitor of Ken Keuffel’s before the latter’s death in 2006, said the offensive alignment the Dolphins used gave them a manpower advantage. “When you put a quarterback under center, you lose a blocker, you lose a gap. You basically play with 10 men on offense. When the quarterback is one of the runners, whether it’s single wing or veer or wishbone, the defense runs out of people to defend you,” Belichick told Tim Layden of Sports Illustrated last November. “There aren’t many players who can run and throw,” Belichick added. “Tebow, obviously, is a special one. But you’ve got major questions because if you’re going to run him 15 times a game, how long will he last before they break him in half?” Tuberville wondered the same thing.

“You have to be a tough son-of-a-gun to be a college or pro quarterback. You’re going to get your cage rattled if you run against defenses in college, and especially in the pros,” he offered. “The average life of an NFL running back is three years. If you really want to shorten a quarterback’s career, you put him back there and start running the ball 15 times a game, and see how long he lasts. “Teams will try variations of it if they have guys like Tebow and White, but when it comes to the bottom line, teams are going to win with defense, and two to three tailbacks running the football,” Tuberville said. That may very well be true long term, but after spending time reviewing a ton of Florida replays from 2008, there was one element to their offense that stood out above all others: the number of potential tacklers the defense had in position to tackle a ball carrier were few. That is particularly the case when the Gators run anything other than a dive or power run. In games against Florida State and Alabama last season, the vast majority of the time the Seminoles and Crimson Tide had only one tackler in range of a ball carrier and at the most they had two. With dynamically speedy runners like Jeff Demps or Percy Harvin running the ball that puts tremendous pressure on defenders to make an open field tackle. Call the formation what you want, but Meyer’s version of the spread combines facets of many different formations and offenses. Since arriving at Florida, the Gators have scored 1,922 points in 53 games for an average of 36.26 points per game. And as they and others have proven, you can win a lot of games when you can allow 35 points a game and still win! SU

Gators’ Run-Pass Balance

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2008 545 rushing attempts 5.9 average per rush 329 passing attempts 14.2 average per catch Rushing percentage: 62.4 Passing percentage: 37.6

2005 455 rushing attempts 3.9 average per rush 385 passing attempts 11.3 average per catch Rushing percentage: 54.2 Passing percentage: 45.8

2007 487 rushing attempts 5.3 average per rush 361 passing attempts 13.9 average per catch Rushing percentage: 57.4 Passing percentage: 42.6

Totals 3,437 offensive plays 1,963 rushes 57.1 1,474 passes 42.9

2006 476 rushing attempts 4.7 average per rush 399 passing attempts 13.0 average per catch Rushing percentage: 62.4 Passing percentage: 37.6

Tebow’s 3-year career totals 475 carries 41% 681 pass attempts 59%

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