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TRACK SAFETY
RAILSTAFF JULY 2016
Interview with Simon French As a follow up to studying the 2015 RAIB Report I interviewed Simon French at the Department for Transport Offices on Horseferry Road in central London on May 27th. I continue to admire how since its formation to meet one of the recommendations of the Cullen Report it has fulfilled its role in investigating accidents and incidents. Its expertise and consequently the respect with which it is regarded has grown year on year. I questioned Simon French about the recommendations made in reports which are still outstanding; some going back as far as 2011! These include what RAIB describes as “repeated causality” events. Understandably his response was to suggest that my question should be put to the Office of Rail and Road (ORR). That is now my intention.
Class Investigation “red zone” report this year We discussed his Class investigation of “red zone” working incidents and accidents. Simon confirmed that he expects to publish the findings later this year.
He hopes the report will trigger track level discussions with front line staff, management and the trades unions. On the subject of track worker safety, I referred to the current impasse over the Planning and Delivery of Safe Work (PDSW) initiative. He told me that he agreed with my view that assigning track safety responsibility to a COSS (Controller of Site Safety) who is often not the most senior or influential voice on the site, is not the best way to do things in future. We then went on to discuss both the inadequacy of timely information provided to track staff and the excessive amount of irrelevant and unnecessary information paperwork provided in many safe system of work packages. Simon added that he is continually disappointed by investigation findings that include the identification of a lack of awareness of the requirements mandated by the Rule Book. I suggested that the time may have come when the industry’s aim should be for all track work to be done under signalled protection as is planned for High Speed 2. He responded by saying that speed is the relevant factor
in deciding on methods of protection. He added that the use and scope for the use of lookout protection in the future is one of the focus points for the current RAIB red zone working class investigation.
Reports take average of 11 months to complete In the early days of the RAIB I was critical of the time taken between an incident or accident and the publication of their report. The average time has reduced to 11 months which Simon is confident will be maintained if not reduced further. He stressed that his first priority in carrying out investigations is the quality and content of the report. He has no intention of setting a target time and reminded me that finalising a report includes time spent liaising with the organisations involved. One of his priority tasks is communicating information to the industry and sharing the technical evidence which may include the issuing of urgent safety advices. For the future his focus is on providing more web page updates of factual information to ensure their findings, and more particularly recommendations are available and in the public domain. He cited the recent Ivybridge information digest as an example setting a precedent for the future.
RAIB’s remit I pressed him on the sufficiency or otherwise of actions on their report recommendations. For a second time he referred me to the Office of Rail and Road. The RAIB was set up in response to one of the recommendations of the Cullen Report Part 2 Ladbroke Grove Inquiry. Its recommendations on accident investigation are numbers 57 to 74 in that report and relate to the purpose and practices to be used by RAIB. Chapter 11 is devoted to its formation; it is worth re-reading. Simon explained how, when progressing an investigation RAIB collects and share factual evidence with both the Police and Office of Rail and Road. Evidence is taken in accordance with police standards but written statements are not shared. He reminded me that the only RAILSTAFF.UK | @RAILSTAFFUK | FACEBOOK.COM/RAILSTAFF
way in which they could ever be shared would be as a result of a Court Order following a determination of “Public Interest” as defined in the Cullen Report. He added that in the 11 years since their formation there has not been a single case where this has occurred.
RAIB’s focus, responsibilities and concerns The role of the ORR Simon sees as complementary to that of RAIB. Ian Prosser as Chief Inspector of Railways and Director of Railway Safety at ORR clearly has the responsibility for driving the responses to RAIB recommendations as part of his responsibilities as well as deciding how and when to take enforcement actions. In the current financial climate I was pleased to learn that the RAIB last month began the process of recruiting inspectors to fill the vacancies they have. I also asked about the growing number of reports I have read about accidents and incidents at the train/platform interface. Speaking of a recent RAIB investigation Simon confirmed that having examined timetables and actual stopping times generally he was satisfied that they were both adequate from a safety perspective. However he shares my concerns over the reports of “trap and drag” incidents. His main concern based on their investigations is of a belief that the electronic door closed warning system alone may be relied upon when in fact safety checks before setting off are all important. Over reliance on train warning systems he commented had contributed to recent incidents. Next we discussed his concerns about track quality, which have grown due to the findings of a number of RAIB reports that have already been published. In particular he said he has been dismayed by the limited technical knowledge exhibited by some track maintenance engineers. I responded by raising my own reservations after reading a number of RAIB reports that a similar comment was maybe applicable to those carrying out both annual superficial as well as detailed structural examinations of structures.