QIO
QUEENS INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER
A Letter from the Editor
Morgan Tomalty
Dear Reader,
ank you for joining QIO during a successful and rewarding tenth year as a publication. Together we have been challenged, and as a result grown as an academic journal at Queen’s University. My goals upon becoming Editor-in-Chief have all been met: we established a column that explores the relationship between art and global a airs, we pulled o ve successful debate columns, we engaged with local artists, became a sustainable publication, and strengthened QIO’s relationship with the broader Kingston community. rough the accumulation of these goals, I have come to realize new objectives that Volume XI’s editorial team will have the opportunity to tackle. With heavy hearts, the sta of QIO present you the fourth and nal issue of Volume X: ‘Identities and Myths.’
Colonel Christopher J. Barron, a U.S. Army War College Senior Service o cer and visiting Defence Fellow at Queen’s University, kindly contributed his expertise on the debate surrounding landmines. An additional outside submission comes from John Woodside, who comments on NATO’s Smart Defence program. Deborah Chu discusses the relationship between language and identity in the Ukraine, while Alexander McGurk delivers an interesting perspective on ‘Euroscepticism.’ Aaron Gi ord examines Canada’s global identity as ‘peacekeepers,’ and I discuss the interactions between religious minorities in Kingston, Ontario. QIO’s art columnist Claire Pierce reports on the Lebanese artist, Akram Zaatari, and his rst Canadian solo exhibition titled All is Well. Erica McLachlan examines the unjust treatment of Indigenous rights in Canada. Alexander McGurk and myself take on our Debate Column this issue, and discuss the pros and cons of national self-determination. Finally, our front cover is a mixed media design created by local artist, Colin Sinclair, as a satirical comment on the nuances of national identity in a global context.
‘Identities and Myths’ aims to explore identity politics in a local and global context, examine various nuances discussed in identity discourse, and break down preconceived notions surrounding identity across the international sphere.
Happy reading,
Morgan Tomalty, Editor-in-Chief Vol. 10
Deborah Chu and Alexander McGurk, Assistant Editors Vol. 10
contact@queensobserver.org to
871 and Counting: A Conservative Figure
by Erica McLachlan
On February 26, 2014, police discovered the body of Loretta Saunders in a highway median in New Brunswick. ree months pregnant at the time, the 26-year-old Inuk student at St. Mary’s University had been writing her thesis on missing and murdered Indigenous women at the time of her disappearance.Saunders’murder prompted the Indigenous Nationhood Movement to launch their #ItEndsHere social media campaign to ght “for Indigenous nationhood, resurgence, and decolonization.” Saunders’ case has attracted signi cant media attention and has galvanized communities across Canada to take further action against this gross injustice in the hopes of provoking meaningful and lasting political and social change for Aboriginals.
e issue should not come as a surprise to the Canadian government. Activists have been appealing to policymakers to address the growing problem of disappearing and murdered Aboriginal women for years. e Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) established Sisters in Spirit (SIS) in 2005. is policy and research initiative developed a sophisticated database that proved that at least 582 Aboriginal women in Canada had disappeared or been murdered between 1990 and 2010, when the Harper government chose to cut the project’s funding.
Maryanne
Pearce, who devoted
seven years to meticulously researching and documenting the cases of missing and murdered women in Canada, discovered that the number of Aboriginal women accounted for a shockingly high percentage of this cohort. Expanding on the work of the SIS, Pearce’s research has documented 871 cases of missing or murdered Aboriginal women, which accounts for approximately 23% of the total 3,842 cases she reviewed- a much greater number than previously imagined.
But for Pearce and other activists, it is not about the shock value of the numbers. Rather, they are moved by empathy and compassion for the su ering experienced by each and every family whose loved ones- mothers, sisters, aunts and grandmothers- have disappeared or been murdered. Only days before Saunders’ disappearance, Shawn Brant, a well-known Mohawk activist from Tyendinaga, issued an ultimatum to the Canadian government demanding an o cial inquiry. Brant is not alone: all of Canada’s provincial premiers and international organizations like the UN have also called for a comprehensive national inquiry.
Brant is taking action. At the end of February, he and a group of 80 supporters erected a blockade to peacefully protest near the reserve, and a week later moved to the CN and VIA rail lines nearby. In an open letter to Stephen Harper, he stated that “[i]t is our opinion that all diplomatic means to
convince you of the need for an inquiry have failed,” and he resolved to “take whatever and further actions that are deemed necessary…to compel you to call a National Inquiry.”
In March, a House of Commons’ Special Committee on Violence Against Indigenous Women produced a report entitled “Invisible Women: A Call to Action, A Report on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women in Canada.” NWAC supported the concept of establishing a committee from the outset, but was concerned that:
[W]ithout the expressed and complete inclusion of Aboriginal women and the expertise that could only be provided by National Aboriginal Organizations (NAOs) representatives, notably the NWAC, the committee would fall short of its’ mandate. e socioeconomic issues in conjunction with the racialized and sexualized violence experienced by Aboriginal women and girls is a complex and challenging issue that is best addressed and known by those who directly experience it.
By virtue of their rsthand experience of settler colonialism and patriarchy, these vulnerable and marginalized Aboriginal women are singularly quali ed to lead discussions regarding the development of an action plan. Yet despite seeking “ex-o cio, non-voting membership” status to participate fully in the parliamentary committee, NWAC was granted only
“expert advisor” and “expert witness” status in what they viewed as an e ort to “pacify NWAC and reduce negative public and media criticism.” According to the organization, this “failed to provide NWAC with the necessary materials to action the motion.”
Unfortunately, that’s not good enough. e government’s ongoing failure to address the increasing numbers of missing and murdered Aboriginal women has attracted international criticism. Amnesty International has called the high rates of violence a “national human rights tragedy,” claiming that “[t]here can be no piecemeal solution to a tragedy of this scale.” Similarly, the United Nations Human Rights Council, which conducted its Universal Periodic Review of Canada’s rights record in 2013, has condemned the violence and called for a national inquiry into the cases of missing and murdered Aboriginal women. Cuba, Iran and Russia criticized Canada’s record within this forum, prompting the Harper government to respond with skepticism at the inclusion of these states in the evaluation process rather than acting on their recommendations.
Canada may come out ahead of Cuba, Iran and Russia on many human rights issues, but the fact remains: it is failing its indigenous people. QIO
#ItEndsHere
ALMOST A MIRACLE
by Alexander McGurk
Europe is sick. e euro area has seen little growth since the global nancial crisis began. It slipped back into recession in 2013, and growth for 2014 is expected to be an anemic 1.2 per cent. Unemployment has remained high, but with huge regional disparities: Germany boasts a healthy rate of 5.1 per cent, but in Spain the unemployment rate is a disastrous 25.6 per cent. e economies of the periphery are saddled with unmanageable debt burdens and the unaccommodating monetary policy of the European Central Bank.
Yet, the European Union keeps growing. Croatia was admitted in July 2013, and the states of the western Balkans are either candidates, applicants, or in negotiation for accession: Turkey, Serbia, and Montenegro are in accession negotiations, and Albania’s application is pending review. In March, Ukraine’s post-revolutionary government signed the EU association agreement that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych had refused, and resulted in the Euromaidan protests and the toppling of his government.
Even the much-maligned euro area continues to expand. In January 2011, during the depths of the debt crisis, Estonia adopted the euro. Despite concerns that its economy would contract under the de ationary euro regime, Estonia posted the highest growth rates in the euro area, and its only primary budget surplus. Europe, it seems, is stronger than it looks.
Photo: Spaceshoe, via Flickr. CC License.
To that, we should give as much credit to public opinion as to political leadership. Although public attitudes towards the European Union worsened during the crisis, a majority of EU members polled in November 2013 still held optimistic views about the future of Europe.
is shining halo extends even to the euro itself. An October 2013 Eurobarometer poll recorded strong support for the euro across almost all member states. Only Cyprus and Portugal showed less than majority support for the currency. Even Ireland, blighted by a short-sighted political class and a systemic banking crisis, showed robust public support for European institutions: 72 per cent of Irish respondents said that having the euro was a ‘good thing’ for the country.
To some extent, the failure of anti-EU nationalism re ects a failure of the political class. Few member-state political parties advocate withdrawal, and those that do tend to be politically marginal. Only the Communist Party of Greece, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) support immediate withdrawal. Of those three, only the PVV won more than 5 per cent of the vote in the most recent general election, and its appeal depends far more on its Islamophobia than its European policy.
e trials and tribulations of mainstream Euroscepticism – opposition to European integration – are perhaps best illustrated in Britain. ere, the Conservative Party has what is perhaps the largest constituency of Eurosceptic voters of any
major European party. But because the Conservative Party leadership has been moderately pro-Europe since the 1950s, public debates over European policy have always been an occasion for intra-party division.
Prime Minister David Cameron’s party has been able to weather the storm thanks to the continued support of the strongly pro-European Liberal Democrats. But the government’s position is not as secure as it might seem. Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg debated UKIP leader Nigel Farage on European policy in a set of two television debates on March 26 and April 2. Farage insisted that the British should have an immediate referendum on EU membership, whereas Clegg argued that there should only have a referendum on European membership in the event of a major new EU treaty. Instant polling after the second debate suggested that the public agreed with Farage, and by a margin of 69 to 31.
Nevertheless, it does not seem as though Farage’s television victory will translate into a referendum. UKIP polls at between 10 and 15 per cent, far below what he will need for substantial parliamentary representation at Westminster. e leadership of the two major parties, meanwhile, have together ruled out a referendum in the next parliament.
Prime Minister Cameron has promised a referendum on EU membership in 2017, after the next general election. But this is not a promise that holds much weight; Cameron is not expected to be the prime
minister in the next parliament. e man who is, Labour Party leader Ed Miliband, ruled out an EU referendum in March. In Britain, at least, mainstream Euroscepticism has not yet found its party.
But it is Germany, a nation at the heart of Europe, which better illustrates the majority attitude towards Euroscepticism. Alternative for Germany (AfD) contested the September 2013 elections to the Bundestag on a stridently anti-euro platform. It argued that no EU member should receive bailouts, and that all member states should be free to leave the euro area and negotiate their own currency unions. e party won only 4.7 per cent of the vote, less than the 5 per cent required for seats in the Bundestag.
Chancellor Angela Merkel won that election, with a 7.8 percentage point swing. She won not on promises of renegotiation, but on the promise of European unity. In the last days of the election, she pledged to defend Europe and her coalition against Eurosceptics. Since the election, she has rea rmed that commitment. Chancellor Merkel went to London in February, where Prime Minister
Cameron hoped that she would grant concessions to shore up his backbench support among Eurosceptics. e Chancellor did not oblige.
"Some expect my speech to pave the way for a fundamental reform of the European architecture which will satisfy all kinds of alleged or actual British wishes. I am afraid they are in for a disappointment," Merkel said in English. She insisted instead on an uncompromising vision of a united Europe, bound by history to a common cause. Merkel’s speech was haunted by war, but lit by the promises for peace and prosperity that European integration had delivered. “[It] almost seems like a miracle,” she said. “Yes, it is a miracle.”
It would be a mistake to call much of this a ‘European identity’. National identities are still deeper and stronger than any overarching European identity. But it shows, at least, that the promise of European integration is stronger than the Eurosceptics allow. It is still Merkel’s vision of Europe, not Farage’s, which is winning European hearts and minds. QIO
Photo: thierry ehrmann, via Flickr. CC License.
A DEBATE ON NATIONAL
pro. by alex mcgurk
‘Nations’ are a social ction, but they are also a social fact. at is, nations may be an ‘imagined community’, but they re ect real ties. We are united by shared languages and cultures, by histories, religions and institutions. We are bound together into communities under a common name. Culture and community would be the stu of mere anthropology, were it not for another social ction that has become social fact: the right to self-government.
In the West, political discourse is shaped by a liberal and individualist interpretation of citizen and state. It is important to recognize how thin and abstract this idea must seem to ordinary citizens, and how inadequate it is as a description of their political life. ey live their political lives not as rootless individuals, but as members of communities. eir political choices re ect not their private interest, but their community’s interests. And the community’s interest is not always liberal, but it is almost always republican: to rule one’s home in one’s own name.
e force of community is stronger where liberal and democratic norms are weak. In the European periphery, the life of democracy has been short and uneven. e last six years of recession have meant mass unemployment, collapsing asset values and contracting demand. e political class has failed to preserve national self-determination: Irish budgets are discussed in the German Bundestag, while Greek and Italian governments have been deposed at the request of European elites. ese are not auspicious signs for liberalism and democracy. Under these circumstances, the nation might be the only source of political legitimacy around.
e principle of national self-determination acknowledges that fact. It acknowledges, too, that selfgovernment is the best route to peace among nations. It is easier to feel that community interests are respected when one’s community shares in the government of the nation. It is easier to make peace when a community can deal with other communities as partners, rather than masters. And it is easier to keep the peace when the international community recognizes the right to self-government. Kosovo and South Sudan have made their peace by secession. Perhaps it would have been better to permit their self-determination before the civil war, rather than after.
But recognizing national self-determination does not mean that we must ignore competing rights and norms. Although President Vladimir Putin has rightly a rmed that the Crimean people have the right to self-determination, he has ignored equally important norms of non-intervention and inter-state diplomacy. We may acknowledge that the Crimean referendum was compromised by Russia’s military presence without denying the Crimean people the right to selfdetermination.
It would be better if we were all citizens of the world, united by our common humanity. But so long as humans are bound together into ‘nations’, we would do well to accept their right to rule their own people in their own land, under their own name. To do otherwise would be to compromise their identity, and risk the peace. QIO
SELF DETERMINATION
con. by morgan tomalty
Numerous academics have defended the right of a national community to self-determination by appealing to the importance of national identity. Claire Palley, a legal scholar, suggests that the very existence of such a community requires a collection of interdependent institutions. Human beings need this structure in order to determine a stable sense of ‘who they are.’ If the preservation of identity requires institutional protection, then it reasonably follows that a national community is justi ed in pursuing the status of a state, as it is one of the institutions that can help protect and foster shared interests.
Historically, national self-determination has embraced elements of `democracy,' such as individual freedom, popular sovereignty, and a representative government. ese elements are mainly understood through a vision produced by the upheavals of the French Revolution: national and state boundaries should align and the state should consist of a homogeneous ethno-cultural community. e ideal of the homogenous nation-state has and continues to con ict with the reality of ethnocultural heterogeneity in an increasingly multicultural world. Take Canada, for example: nearly a quarter of the Canadian population considers themselves apart of a ‘minority’ culture and 15% of the population identi es with two or more ethno-cultural backgrounds. e Canadian Federal Government Agency projects that, by 2031, approximately 28% of the population will be foreign-born. e number of people belonging to visible minority groups will double, and make up the majority of the population in Toronto and Vancouver. In countries like Canada, the homogenous nation-state is a model of the past.
e fact is that in most parts of the world, people of di erent national memberships live intermingled with one another. As a result, no matter how we esteem the right to national self-determination, implementing this right a ects non-members unless there are none in the given territory. In addition, even if there are no non-members in the territory, there still is the
issue of divvying up resources and properties with the remaining part of the original state, which in turn, concerns non-members. is issue was pertinent in the recent con ict in the Ukraine, where the reuni cation with Russia ignored the rights of both Crimea's internal minorities and those of their accompanying Ukrainian citizens. Yael Tamier, a scholar of liberal nationalism, notes that the principle of national self-determination has led to an increase in the number of con icts within states, as sub-groups pursue greater self-determination, and as their con icts for control within groups and with the dominant state become violent. Tamier’s argument was apparent when the new government in Kiev had demonstrated its willingness to address Crimean concerns by satisfying self-determination claims internally before Russia intervened militarily to foreclose on any peaceful prospects.
Recent history has produced a set of methods for resolving national concerns that once might have outlined secession as the only practical option. ese methods include: resource-sharing, decentralization, and autonomy arrangements, among others. One such example occurred in 2004 when Indonesia negotiated an end to the quarter-century-old secessionist struggle in the North Sumatran province of Aceh. is was achieved by permitting the province greater control over rents from gas and oil manufacturing, extensive autonomy, and new provisions so that Acehnese interests could be better represented in Indonesian politics. ere have been hundreds of peacefully resolved self-determination claims over the past few decades, and in an increasingly plural world, resolving self-determination claims internally leads to more bene cial outcomes for minorities within a given state. Internal self-determination allows for a community to engage within interdependent institutions and establish a strong sense of national identity without the violence and discrimination that has occurred from full secession. National self-determination in a secessionist sense is outdated in a multicultural and plural world.
QIO
A Return to the Canadian Identity
by Aaron Gi ord
Peacekeeping with the UN is a concept that has become deeply ingrained in Canada’s national identity. In fact, it was rst suggested by former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson to create a United Nations force to help prevent escalation during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Prior to 1994, Canada was a strong supporter of peacekeeping operations that deployed thousands of blue-helmeted soldiers around the world, and boasted of its high level of participation in nearly all UN peacekeeping operations. is involvement in the eld consequently constructed and sustained our national identity as a peacekeeping nation. A strong commitment to international peace allowed Canada to gain recognition as a middle power, and often enabled Canadian governments to punch above their weight in terms of foreign policy.
at was twenty years ago, when more than a third of Canadian soldiers were out tted in UN blue. Today that number is down to only 88 police and 21 soldiers, the majority of whom are o cers on individual employments lling positions in UN headquarters. Currently there is not a single Canadian unit deployed in any of the UN’s sixteen current peacekeeping operations. is decline can be attributed to the quandary of the post-Cold War era and the end of the
conventional peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations have traditionally involved unarmed static observers maintaining positions along cease re lines to prevent aggressive territorial expansion. Since the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, intra-state con ict has become a much more complicated problem than conventional wars between states. Canada, along with other peacekeeping allies, has had a di cult time trying to adapt to con ict situations involving no bu er zones or established cease re areas, or those fought between religious, ethnic, and tribal groups. e failed peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s are prime examples of the di culties of rede ning the conventions of peacekeeping in these anarchic con icts.
After the turbulent events of the early ‘90s, both Conservative and Liberal governments have lost faith in peacekeeping missions and instead turned military spending towards war- ghting operations. Billions of dollars of military spending was put into Afghanistan with the goal of removing the Taliban from power and creating stability. is mission required the Canadian Forces to become a single-mission military with Afghanistan as the sole focus. e government has also withdrawn a large portion of funding for the Pearson Centre, a peace support operations
training facility. is facility trains soldiers to prepare for multidimensional peace operations alongside civilians and foreign o cers, and encompasses much more than standard combative training. While war and counterinsurgency missions are enemy‐centric, non‐consensual and primarily involve o ensive strategy, peacekeeping is based on a trinity of principles: impartiality, consent of con icting parties, and a defensive approach to the use of force. As we have seen from the war in Afghanistan, Canadian soldiers are illequipped to handle long term insurgency operations. In the decade spent trying to stabilize Afghanistan, more Canadian soldiers died than in six generations of peacekeeping missions.
We need to shift away from investing heavily in sophisticated military technology for the Canadian forces and leave the war ghting operations to our US neighbour. Adding a few thousand Canadian soldiers on top of the hundreds of thousands of US soldiers focused on counter insurgency is not the best way to use our military resources. e United States has had a di cult time trying to pursue peacekeeping operations in the past and has created a niche for Canada to rise as a leader in this eld. We should dedicate our military spending not to ghting alongside our US allies but rather invest in the operations that the Americans are unwilling or unable to ful ll. Lumping our military resources in with the American forces does not contribute to a positive image of the Canadian
Forces, and only serves to make us appear dependant on their military capabilities. Canada also risks its international reputation by tying its actions too closely to the US, which in the past decade has pursued many unilateral security goals.
Currently, the UN has just over 83,000 troops dedicated to peacekeeping operations, the highest number of troops in history. Countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Brazil and Ghana all contribute from one to eight thousand troops even though they are less economically secure than Canada. Many of the current security concerns in the international system are centered on environmental disasters that displace large numbers of civilians and expose fractures in society. Canada has the unique experience and ability to train soldiers to interact and negotiate with foreign o cers and citizens in a non-threatening, helpful manner in an environment where combat skills are less necessary. Continued e orts should go towards increasing funding for peacekeeping training facilities such as the Pearson Centre, and away from expensive military endeavours Pollsters at Nanos Research found 52% of respondents considered peacekeeping the most important role for the Canadian military. If we want to continue touting this image in cultural symbols such as the female peacekeeper on our tendollar bill, we better be certain that we earn the reputation we feel so strongly towards. QIO
Canadian Multicultural Policy and Religious Minorities in Kingston, Ontario
by Morgan Tomalty
Canada is internationally celebrated for our embrace of multiculturalism. It is an ideal that is not only engraved in our policies but also enshrined in the Constitution itself. Yet upon ending my nal year at Queen’s University, I found myself questioning the state of multiculturalism in Kingston, Ontario, and its e ect on minority Jewish and Muslim communities. I began to wonder if Canadian ideals of multiculturalism are weaker in a city with a low percentage of cultural and religious minorities. In the
course of my investigation, I found that Kingston religious communities appear to adhere to Canadian multicultural policy by bridging gaps between sects in their own religious communities; however, they do not seem to do the same for external religious communities. Although this creates greater unity among the di erent sects of each individual minority religion, there is less unity between Jewish, Muslim, and Christian adherents. As a result, Judaism and Islam are treated as homogenous entities by other members of the Kingston community.
In order to adequately understand Canadian multiculturalism, it is important to de ne what multiculturalism means in Canadian policy. Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau, known as the “Father of Multiculturalism” in Canada, emphatically stated, "Cultural pluralism is the very essence of Canadian identity.”
William James, a scholar of multiculturalism, claims that there is a limited pluralism here in Kingston where Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, and Sikh adherents amount to approximately 2% of Kingston’s population.
James compares this number to Toronto, wherein Jewish and Muslim communities comprise 15% of the total.
Greg O’Toole, a scholar of Canadian multicultural policy and its relationship to religion, goes further to describe Canada as a “protected religious oligarchy”. In other words, Canada contains a diversity of religious minorities, but the ‘Big ree’ (Roman Catholic, United Church, and Anglican) tower over the religious marketplace. e prevalence of the Big ree is ampli ed in Kingston, Ontario where adherents to various forms
Photo: kezee, via Flickr. CC License.
of Christianity amount to 77 percent of its population.
Prime Minister Trudeau’s concept of ‘cultural pluralism’ is equated with religious tolerance in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. e Charter places an emphasis on the national value of multiculturalism in Canada, especially in Section 27, which reads:
is Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.
Section 27 emphasizes the ‘preservation’ and ‘enhancement’ of Canadian heritage. As the Jewish community grew in Kingston, the majority Christian community became less charitable towards the Jews. When the Beth Israel congregation was considering
various properties in November 1953, the Roman Catholic diocese of Kingston reportedly “declined to sell any portion of the land for synagogue or non-Church a liated building purposes.” is does not appear to be assisting the ‘preservation’ or ‘enhancement’ of Jewish heritage in Kingston. Nevertheless, due to the small Jewish population, diverse sects of Judaism, from Agnostic to Orthodox Jews, all gather at the same synagogues in Kingston and are accepting of one another. Kingston emerged as a place where Jews were forced into what O’Toole terms a “sometimes unnatural cohesion.”
A similar phenomenon has occurred in the Muslim community in Kingston. e Islamic Centre of Kingston services all Muslims in the Kingston area, from Sunnis, Shi’ites and some Ismailis. is unity is an interesting contrast
to the tensions erupting between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims the world over, which last month the Toronto Star called “the Middle East’s new greatest divide.” e Muslim community here numbers less than a thousand and as a result, Kingston’s Muslims have been able to move past their internal diversity and have created a shared Islamic unity. In general, it appears that internal divisions do not a ect small religious groups in Kingston because they must unite to ensure the continuity of their religion in the community.
e unity found within Judaism and Islam is positive in some respects, but not in the way the Kingston community regards each group. According to the Ontario Jewish Archives, anti-Semitism was prevalent in Kingston until the end of the Second World War; in fact, Jews were banned from the Cataraqui Golf Club
and the Kingston Yacht Club until the mid-1960s. AntiSemitic attitudes have changed during the post-war period, but remain somewhat mixed even today. is point was exempli ed in 2005, when controversy erupted over the renaming of Market Square to Springer Market Square, after Kingston philanthropist Norman Springer o ered to donate $1 million towards the renewal of a space which for years had a strong Christian in uence. Islamophobia remains prevalent at Queen’s University and in the Kingston community. Just last October, three men were arrested after assaulting six Muslim undergraduate students in what police called a "hatebased attack."
Kingston religious communities appear to adhere to Canadian multicultural policy by “preserving,” “enhancing,” and bridging gaps between sects in their own religion, but do not seem to do the same for religions outside their own. Furthermore, non-Islamic and non-Jewish members of the Kingston communities fail to recognize the many di erent groups within Islam and Judaism due to the minority population of these religions, and as a result essentializes both religions as a uniform whole. is in turn uni es the sects in each group yet ultimately ‘others’ each religion. Being a Kingstonian myself, I care for the wellbeing of every citizen of this community and believe that Kingston would greatly bene t from implementing practical programs to create interfaith dialogue between members of all faith-based communities.
QIO
e Catholic Apostolic Church, circa 1945, located between Barrie and Division on Queen St. Presently, it is the Renaissance Event Venue.
Photo: Bill Stevenson, via Flickr. CC License
mother tongues border tongues
e politicization of language and identity in Ukraine by Deborah Chu
We are accustomed to speaking of identity in terms of one’s appearance. e colour of our skin, the class signi ers embedded in our clothing, the gender we present as –the normalization of these discourses have conditioned us into believing that we can organize the people around us simply by looking at them. But what happens when we open our mouths and speak?
It is easy to take language for granted, especially if one speaks in the native tongue of where they live. Yet language is fundamental to the nebulous
concept of identity and “belonging,” arguably more so than any feature of our appearance. As essentially social beings, much of our self-construction emerges from our relations to others. We are sons and daughters, friends and lovers; we are Canadians and/or Chinese and/or American, we are fans of the Toronto Maple Leafs. “Our” people are those we know and understand. What is “foreign” is therefore whatever we cannot make sense of. And how do we comprehend each other if not through language?
e recent events in Ukraine seem to paint the portrait of a nation that has yet to arrive at a coherent sense of itself. ough
the modern conception of an autonomous ‘Ukraine’ arose in 1918 with the fall of the Russian Empire, rival political factions soon tore the nation into civil war. e country was divided once more when the Red Army invaded two-thirds of Ukraine in 1921, and merged the western third into Poland. It was only in 1991, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, that Ukraine separated from Russia once more with a referendum that recorded a 90% vote in favour of independence. Since then, however, Ukraine has remained caught between Russian and European spheres of in uence - as exempli ed by the “Euromaidan” protests against President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to
strengthen economic ties with Russia instead of signing a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union.
is tug-of-war highlights Ukraine’s internal linguistic ruptures. ough Ukrainian is the only o cial state language, those living in the south and the east of the country are primarily Russian-speaking, as opposed to the west and north which predominantly speak Ukrainian. ese language lines mirror the country’s political divisions: the proRussia Yanukovych swept into power in 2010 when he won the majority of votes in the eastern half of the country. His elevation of Russian to the status of regional language
Photo: acidka, via Flickr. CC License.
in certain Eastern areas in 2012 led to a physical brawl in Parliament, and to opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko denouncing the move as “a crime against the state.”
It is clear why a single o cial language is of such paramount importance to Ukrainian nationalists, who believe a uni ed, distinctively ‘Ukrainian’ identity is necessary to resist incursions from abroad. Yet political machinations both domestic and abroad have created a siege mentality that is exacerbating regional di erences. When politicians opposed the promotion of the Russian language to regional status, President Vladimir Putin’s government in Moscow alleged that Russian speakers and other minorities were being relegated to a second-class citizenship.
Indeed, after the Euromaidan protests resulted in Yanukovych being ousted from power, Putin moved Russian armed forces into Crimea under the purported rationale of protecting Russians and Russian-speakers in the peninsula. In his speech before the Russian parliament on March 18th, Putin stressed the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties that inexorably bound Crimea to Russia, whatever the lines on the map might say. In his speech before the Russian parliament on March 18th, he stated that when the borders of Ukraine were decided upon in 1991, “this was done with no consideration for the ethnic make-up of the population”:
Incidentally, the total population of the Crimean peninsula today is 2.2 million people, of whom almost
1.5 million are Russians, 350,000 are Ukrainians who predominantly consider Russian their native language. Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in di erent ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.
Putin insisted that Crimea was, and always has been part of Russia due to its ethnic and linguistic makeup, and therefore the Crimean peninsula was merely being returned to its rightful place in the Russian Federation. Tensions continue to run high, with many wondering whether Putin’s next move may be to reclaim the southeast
of Ukraine under this logic. e Obama administration and politicians across the EU immediately denounced Putin’s actions and have imposed economic sanctions on Russia.
It seems strangely tting that a country whose very name means “borderland” should embody so many levels of division. Yet many Ukrainians insist that these di erences are not nearly as stark as politicians may make them seem. In reality, many of its citizens under the age of 35 – those who would have come of age after the collapse of the Soviet Union –are bilingual, and easily switch between languages at work and at home. Several political commentators have suggested that stoking fears about ‘language problems’ is merely a strategy to avoid discussing real
problems, such as Ukraine’s high unemployment rate.
Here in Canada, we too experience a degree of linguistic tension. Yet con ict between Anglo- and Francophone populations have eased considerably since the heyday of the Front de libération du Quebec in the 1960s and 70s. In comparison, Ukraine as we understand it today has only enjoyed true independence for twenty-two years. Such a young country needs more time in order to inculcate a public consciousness of itself as a distinct nation – one that is able to de ne its relationship to European and Russian ideologies, yet remain sensitive to a plurality of tongues, cultures, and people. QIO
Photo: mischvalente, via Flickr. CC License.
AKRAM ZAATARI
by Claire Pierce
Fresh from representing Lebanon at the Venice Biennale, All is Well is Akram Zataari’s rst Canadian solo exhibition. Perhaps too brief to be considered a retrospective, it still encompasses the major themes of Zataari’s artistic production and includes several of his more famous works. e themes of documentation, concealment, and excavation weave a narrative framework for the exhibition, while the idea of self-censorship as both a freedom and as a response to an intolerant society provides an animating tension. e majority of the work deals with the Lebanese response to the invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon by Israeli forces in the 1980s and 90snamely the e orts of imprisoned Lebanese resistance ghters to
gain the right to communicate with friends, family, and prisoners held elsewhere, and to be photographed every six months. is awareness that documentation is essential to human existence, even amidst the most adverse of living conditions, seems even more germane in todays smartphonecentric world. is becomes a major theme of the exhibition: if an individual’s existence is not documented for someone, somewhere, at some point in time, do they exist at all?
Zataari focuses on the gure of Nabih Awada, a Lebanese communist resistance ghter captured at sixteen and imprisoned in Israel for more than a decade. ree cases evocative of vitrines in a natural history museum line the walls of the cavernous main space. One holds letters exchanged
between Awada and his friends and family and two display 48 photographs with inscriptions sent from other prisoners to Awada while he was still jailed. As prisoners were forbidden from discussing political or military matters in their letters their correspondence takes on an eerie optimism, echoing the title of the exhibition, which comes from a letter from Awada to his mother. It is also a play on previous works by Zataari, examining Hezbollah censorship in television broadcasts of the resistance.
e 48 photographs, arranged in two cases on parallel walls, present a di erent take on correspondence. is communication is one sided, and in many cases, the men writing to Awada had never met him. Yet there is an alarming intimacy about many of these
pieces, heightened by the fact that prisoners could only write about personal matters. Many speak of memories and hopes for the future and in one case a writer discusses his favorite songs. ere is a palpable loneliness – along with a sel sh desire to be known by one of the heroes of the resistance –that is consistent amongst these images, along with a sense of the bonds forged by war. ough the inscriptions are deliberately constructed so as to avoid censoring – and in some cases lead the reader to believe they are in fact encoded – the accompanying images o er a di erent take on censorship. e majority of images show the men smiling, with e ort put into their appearance and the composition of the photo. e backgrounds often show colored hangings and the men adopt a variety of poses and
gestures, these are decidedly not the static “mug” shots that are inevitably associated with the documentation of prisoners. In several cases the photograph is referenced in the inscriptionM some to say that the best photo has been chosen to send to Awada, others to lament the poor quality of the photo or the sitters unsatisfactory appearance. is vanity seems at odds with the harsh physical and emotional conditions of imprisonment, but suggests larger truthsabout the human psyche. ese prisoners, some of whom had participated in hunger strikes to gain the right to be photographed, wanted control over the way they would be documented and thus perceived, and utilized a speci c aesthetic language that echoed the required positivity of the inscriptions to foster this perception. ey wanted to be documented and remembered, but in a speci c way, as individuals rather than prisoners. e fact that prisoners with almost no basic liberties would chose to depict themselves in such a way suggests that documentation is of greater importance to the documented than to those for which it is intended . e concern over
appearance inevitably invites a queer reading, which Zataari encourages through his lm Tomorrow Everything Will Be Alright, shown on the wall between the two cases. e lm shows a text message conversation between two former lovers played out on a single typewriter. ough the sex of only one of the lovers is revealed throughout the conversation and the accompanying didactics do little to clarify it, the lack of female subjects elsewhere in the exhibition leads to the conclusion that the conversation is between two men. Compelling and emotional, it highlights the universality of love and heartbreak, even in a country where homosexuality is criminalized. e placement of the lm encourages a critical reading of the photographs and letters, and indeed of a society that encourages homosocial interaction while condemning homosexuality. e lm ends somewhat ambiguously showing a sunset on the 31st of December 1999. It is unclear whether this is meant to be a symbol of hope or despair, which aptly serves as a metaphor for the exhibition as a whole.
ough Zataari never reveals if Awada reciprocated correspondence to the 48 prisoners, he does show a video of the now-freed Awada writing a letter of his own to Samir alQintar, Israel’s longestMheld political prisoner. Awada writes in the style of the secret messages passed through prisons; miniscule writing that is hidden from the viewer, with the paper folded and encased in plastic so that it may be swallowed and moved without detection. Behind this video –projected on a freeMstanding wall in the middle of one end of the gallery – are two large photographs, one of the letter Awada wrote to Samir encapsulated and ready for ingestion, and the other of the missile case that held the letter of resistance ghter Ali Hashisho to the family whose home he had occupied while ghting. e letter, which remained buried in the home’s backyard for 11 years, speaks to Hashisho’s desire for peace, and his respect for the home of the Christian family that he had occupied. An adjoining room plays In is House, Zataari’s lm about the excavation of the letter. e lm captures the multiplicity of perspectives in times of war
beyond the occupier/occupied binary, and the importance of documentation from times of war in preserving these diverse perspectives. e juxtaposition of this lm with another showing the making and interring of a time capsule in Kassel, Germany emphasizes the importance of documentation for both the present and for posterity.
Zataari assumes an intentionally ambiguous role in the execution of this exhibition. With the exception of the lms, his primary role as is really one of a curator of documentation – whose work is curated in turn – rather than as a creator. It is meta-curated, meta-documentation with an almost ethnographic lean. e accompanying didactic panels in the exhibition are brief, and perhaps do notprovide the background that is more than likely necessary for a Canadian audience. However, the lack of political information allows the viewer to connect rst with the humanity of the documented subjects, beyond the barriers of ethnicity, political, or religious a liation. e compassionate connection is aided brilliantly by the use of the gallery space. e dark walls and arrangement of the works along the outer edges while the interior remains empty leaves the viewer feeling both claustrophobic and exposed. e low, dimly lit display cases force visitors to come close to the objects, and confront the subjects at a range usually forbidden in a gallery. e space fosters empathy with the subjects of the work, the prisoners and lovers who feel at once con ned and vulnerably exposed by their circumstance.
QIO
Coalition of the (Financially) Willing
e Myth of NATO’s Smart Defence and Strategic Partners
by John Woodside
At the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen unveiled “Smart Defence,” a purportedly new approach to ensuring NATO capabilities would not be further limited by the drastic budget cuts made by member states in the years following the nancial collapse of 2008. Smart Defence strives to encourage the e cient pooling of resources, better priority setting, and specialization of member states capabilities. While this appears to o er a logical solution to the nancial strains NATO is facing, the echoes of this initiative will be heard decades into the future.
Smart Defence signals an internal con ict playing out within NATO, because the policy is propelled by the fact that the United States is increasingly reluctant to pay Europe’s security bill. e only Europeans to commit the two percent minimum of their GDP to military spending are the United Kingdom, France, Albania, and Greece, which leaves a considerable discrepancy between NATO’s theoretical operational budget and the reality of its defence spending. e United States has historically made up the di erence by spending upwards of four percent of GDP on its military As a result, the US has been able to direct NATO’s priorities in accordance with
American interests. In the post-Bush years, however, American and European interests are diverging, and security concerns for Europe, such as the on-going crisis in Ukraine, are not re ected in actionable commitments from the United States.
e United States, by contrast, is in the process of pulling out of the Middle East, and moving its resources into the Paci c in an attempt to counterbalance Chinese and Russian in uence in the region. By and large, European states will be hesitant to follow the United States into another theatre of operations, given the recent shortcomings and mismanagement exempli ed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In November 2009, Barack Obama signaled his Paci c shift in a speech delivered in Tokyo He announced:
" e growth of multilateral organizations can advance the security and prosperity of this region. I know the US has been disengaged from many of these organizations in recent years. So let me be clear: those days have passed. As a AsiaPaci c nation, the United States expects to be involved in the discussions that shape the future of this region, and to participate fully in appropriate organizations as they are established and evolve."
In the following years, the United States will seek to further strengthen ties with
Australia, New Zealand, India, and most importantly Japan, the cornerstone of America’s Paci c pivot, as a way to entrench themselves in what appears to be the latest theatre of operations. Clearly NATO is experiencing a division between their primary nancier and the majority of their member states. In an age of austerity, NATO is simultaneously experiencing these budget cuts with debates about the future and direction of the alliance as a whole. Without an identi able enemy to unite all members, NATO has shifted from the ‘collective defence’ required to deter the very real existential threat posed by the Soviet Union, to a relatively ambiguous global force which seemingly determines the boundaries of its operations on a case-by-case basis.
However, because European NATO states are unlikely to follow the United States as willingly into the Paci c given their limited capabilities and still-fresh scars of war, the US will seek new avenues to confront its security challenges. While strengthening ties to some paci c states through alliances like ANZUS and Anpo, countries like Australia and Japan are also now described as ‘strategic partners’ because they will prove critical to legitimizing and providing support for American ambitions. Strategic partners may be best understood as a retread of George W. Bush’s ‘coalition of the willing,’ which was used to further legitimize war e orts in Iraq after Ko Annan claimed the invasion was illegal. e parallel here is not that war is imminent, but rather that when the United
States is faced with a security dilemma and does not have broad international support, it is not afraid to use whatever instruments are available to turn their ambitions into a reality, whether or not that reality is achieved is a separate story altogether. e role of America’s strategic partners in the Paci c will be to rea rm America’s in uence, and thereby limit China’s growth.
e Paci c is experiencing signi cant economic growth, and although America is the world’s top spender on military hardware, they do not enjoy the supremacy typically enjoyed by the top dog . Without the ability to direct policy e ectively in this region, America’s ability to play a decisive role in international crises is severely limited. By building ties in the Paci c, America is hoping that it can tap into the Paci c economic circuit and protect its interests.
Smart Defence is a solution to the shared budgetary problems NATO faces, but its implementation will further encourage the United States to seek out additional partners to achieve their foreign policy goals. is will likely prove to be advantageous for NATO as a whole, but it will also catalyze heated debates about member state obligations. For Smart Defence to qualify as ‘smart’ it will need to avoid the usual problems of mismanagement that come with megamultilateral coordination. An e ective dialogue with those in the defence industry is therefore required to minimize the friction between the domestic and super-national obligations NATO member states face. QIO
An American soldier on the lookout for IEDs and mines in Tahwilla, Iraq.
The Safest Path
Defying the International Pressure to Ban Landmines
"We'd
by Col. Christopher J Barron
Back to the Future
e improvised explosive device (IED) has been the most in uential weapon used against the United States in the last decade. Strategically, the weapon evoked a response that was tremendously expensive but not always e ective. It earned much attention at tactical levels where it strangled movement and maneuver while killing thousands, and at operational levels where it stymied campaign plans reliant upon close interaction with
civilian populations. e IED’s impact is remarkably outsized in comparison to its cost and is even more impressive considering that the typical device is nothing more than a crudely assembled landmine. It is ironic that for all of the post-Cold War promises of net-centric warfare, precision munitions and information dominance, the greatest weapon that emerged was one that had changed little in over 70 years.
Yet, the emergence of the landmine as a weapon of choice should not be surprising. Low
manufacturing costs, ease of employment and devastating power make it an ideal weapon. Landmine-equipped forces have successfully attacked foes across the capability spectrum, to include lavishly funded and equipped modern armies. What should be surprising, however, is that while the landmine has proved its worth on the battle eld, much of the world – including the US’ closest allies – has moved in the opposite direction by declaring the use of conventional antipersonnel landmines (APLs) to be ine ective and morally unacceptable. Pressure on
the US to comply with the 1999 Ottawa “Convention on e Prohibition of e Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and On eir Destruction” is constant, even though US actions satisfy many of the convention’s requirements.
Despite this pressure, the US should not accept the “Ottawa Convention.” e military justi cations for landmines are compelling, moral concern is overstated and the convention itself is likely just a waypoint on the path to
rather take on a thousand enemy in a re ght than have to walk through a known mine eld."
-United States Army Soldier in Vietnam, 1970
larger bans on other common munitions. Instead, the US should maintain a robust lethal counter-mobility capability. Today, that capability primarily comes through traditional “dumb” landmines, but eventually “smart” or networked munitions could provide the same tactical and operational e ects. Lethal counter-mobility works, and its devastating power – so frequently and e ectively used against the US and its allies –can and should be turned on the enemy.
Ottawa’s Flawed Assumptions
e 1999 establishment of the Ottawa Convention was the culmination of an international campaign to ban APLs, spearheaded by a
coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public gures and several key members of the Canadian government. Signatories agreed, among many other tasks, to destroy their APLs, foreswear any future use and refuse to assist any nation that employs APLs. For now, the convention still permits anti-vehicle landmines (AVLs), landmines that can self-destruct automatically, and munitions that require a man-in-the-loop to re them.
Much of the US objection to the Convention is based on the need for landmines in defensive operations on the Korean peninsula. is position was held by the Clinton and Bush administrations, but is currently under review; many in the anti-landmine community expect the Obama
administration to shift from the current position and move to ratify the treaty.
Heavy-lifting to support the Ottawa Convention was done by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which broadly speaking is a coalition of NGOs that grew frustrated with the pace that the United Nations took in addressing landmines. e argument championed by the ICBL and its supporting partners has long centered on two key ideas: that dangers posed to civilians by longabandoned APLs have created humanitarian crises, and that landmines in general are not e ective – and therefore unnecessary – from military standpoints. is latter concept is counter-intuitive and
despite the ICBL’s claims, is fundamentally awed.
e ICBL cites an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study that purports to show the futility of using mines, despite their use in virtually every con ict since WWI. While the ICRC study does illustrate the challenges and dangers of using landmines, its conclusions are ultimately unsound as it misses the IED experience of the last ten years. From 1967-1968 alone, nearly 10,100 US casualties in Vietnam came from mines and other explosive booby traps. Yet the study brushes aside the damage done by Vietcong APL mine elds. is is odd, considering that in some US units, APLs accounted for nearly half of the casualties. e
e Cambodian Landmine Museum holds hundreds of mines set o throughout the Khmer Rouge region.
study then claims that APLs are ine ective because mass infantry assaults can eventually penetrate mine elds, but this reasoning is undercut by the fact that the required human wave attacks generate high casualty rates. e APL prohibition fails to take into account the true military utility of mine elds, which is that mine elds are rarely expected to fully block an attack; their true and invaluable military bene t is in delaying or disrupting an enemy attack long enough to target it with accurate res. e ICRC also minimizes US and South Korean reliance on mine elds as key to their defense against attack from North Korea by claiming that a well-trained force can breach a mine eld with only 1-3% casualties. is suggestion di ers greatly from experiences at US Combat Training Centers (CTCs), where breaching typically
resulted in the destruction of 25-35% of the attacker’s forces.
Interestingly, the anti-APL community seemingly suggests that landmines are more of a problem for the emplacer than they are for the enemy. ICBL claims that US mines caused 34% of the American casualties in the Persian Gulf War; although, this claim is simply false. Detailed analysis from the US Government Accounting O ce shows that only 6% of US casualties were from landmines, and none of the landmines were of US origin. Despite the modern insistence on mistake-free warfare, no weapon is perfect, and armed landmines can pose threats to friendly forces. However, accurate marking, recording and reporting, can mitigate this risk. Trends at US CTCs have shown this is a challenge, but in large measure due to infrequent and low-
Barbed wire and a forboding sign are all that separates viewers from a mine eld in the Falkland Islands.
quality training.
e second rationale behind the APL ban is a moral one. Few would disagree that abandoned landmines (and other unexploded ordnance) have been devastating to civilians. e Soviets scattered millions of small APLs across Afghanistan. All three factions during Yugoslavia’s civil war routinely emplaced landmines along what became the Zone of Separation, and the Khmer Rouge routinely mined Cambodia’s populated and traveled areas, and made no attempt to record locations. Many of these mines remain, waiting for unsuspecting victims. Estimates in the 1990s placed deaths and injuries due to APLs at over 20,000 per year, and were used as the central justi cation for the APL ban.
By not ratifying the convention,
the US is regarded in many eyes as not caring about this tragedy. However, addressing the crisis and maintaining the right to use APLs are not mutually exclusive. While it’s fair to concede that the US manufactured large quantities of landmines, some of which were used irresponsibly by allies or third parties, the sale or transfer of APLs from the US ended in 1992. Since that time, the US has played a leading role in humanitarian demining, devoting nearly two billion dollars over the last 20 years to training, equipping and funding demining personnel. is level of commitment is di cult to reconcile with the idea that the US does not care about landmine victims, and is powerful when measured against the fact that the US is addressing problems created largely by others. e argument that the US is somehow feeding the humanitarian crisis
by not ratifying the convention is untenable.
Moreover, the US should not deny itself a capability just because it was used irresponsibly in the past. ere is nothing evil in the landmine, and its immediate e ects are no di erent than that of the bullet, grenade or rocket: all have great capacity to wound and kill. Yet we freely condone them based on the user’s intent and the assumption of responsible targeting. e di erence is of course that the landmine is persistent, while the others typically are not. But it is not so inherently dangerous that safe usage is impossible, and the US must measure that possible, future risk against the certain, current risk when it commits to ground combat. War is fraught with ethical challenges, and there is a touch of hypocrisy in a national position that reserves the right to employ nuclear weapons yet nds the use of landmines morally unacceptable.
e Path Ahead
So what should US position be vis-à-vis the landmine and is there room for compromise with the Ottawa Convention? ese questions have answers, but they must acknowledge that the US should place its national interests and the lives of its service members above international pressure.
e US must embrace the concept of lethal countermobility, and the landmine is still the best provider of that capability. is will become increasingly critical as the US military contracts toward North American basing. Forces conducting
rapid deployments to conduct air eld or port seizures, secure key installations or establish intermediate-staging bases will immediately nd themselves in tenuous positions, and the ability to shape terrain with lethal counter-mobility is a tremendous force multiplier. To assume that an enemy will never again maneuver against a US force, or could somehow be interdicted by joint res alone, borders on magical thinking.
e same applies to small combat outposts in relatively mature theaters. In 2009, a small US outpost in eastern Afghanistan was attacked by hundreds of enemy ghters; eventually the attack was defeated, but the perimeter was breached in three places and eight US soldiers killed. Afterward, a US Central Command investigation found that there was an “inadequate use of Claymore mines for perimeter security.” If soldiers at that outpost had the ability and authority to employ large numbers of APLs or similar
munitions, that battle might have ended di erently. e responsible employment of landmines in these scenarios represents no more risk to non-combatants than they already face from unexploded ordnance, errors in targeting and the fog of war.
Can there be compromise with the Ottawa Convention? Probably not, and a rati cation by the US would likely result in little more than a weeks good press, and then a dangerous re-energizing of the movement to ban all landmines, whether dumb or smart. What the US should do is to continue to address Ottawa’s underlying themes, namely the concerns regarding landmines’ inherent persistence and indiscrimination. To prevent irresponsible use by others, the US should continue its ban on the sale of APLs. Funding for humanitarian demining at or near its traditional rate should continue as well; USfunded demining e orts are a true success story and o er
a way to de ect some of the criticism of its landmine policies. Simultaneously, the US should continue research and development on smart and networked munitions that automatically self-destruct (or self-deactivate), di erentiate between targets or put a manin-the-loop as part of the ring process. ese systems could satisfy Ottawa-type concerns and still deliver the same capabilities as traditional landmines. Abandonment of landmines, whether APL or AVL, however, should come only after the replacement solution has been proven and elded to the force. Until then, landmines must remain despite the pressures of Ottawa and its awed premises. e responsible use of lethal counter-mobility o ers a true capability that simply cannot be replaced. To knowingly sacri ce that advantage needlessly exposes US soldiers to risk, and if there is one thing the future assures, it’s that risk is never in short supply. QIO