PD20190905_발간물_2019 GPPAC책자

Perspectives on Peace and Security in a Changing Northeast Asia - Voices from Civil Society and the Ulaanbaatar Process -

Ulaanbaatar 2019

CONTENTS Introduction ...……………………………………………….. 1 Acknowledgements ...……………………………………….. 5 CHAPTER 1: Changing Dynamics in Northeast Asia – The New US-DPRK Relationship and its Impact •

Park Jung Eun (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) - Dramatic Changes on the Korean Peninsula and Challenges Since 2018 ...…………………………… 7

•

Bayarkhuu Dashdorj (Research Professor and Former Ambassador) - Ulaanbaatar’s Standpoint on the TrumpKim Summits ...……………...………………...………..16

•

Zhang Ling (The Charhar Institute) - The DPRK and a New Regional Order in Northeast Asia ...……………... 26

•

Daniel Jasper (American Friends Service Committee) Reuniting Families is a Critical Step in Diplomacy with North Korea …………………..……………………..… 31

CHAPTER 2: The Path Towards Denuclearization of Northeast Asia •

Kawasaki Akira (Peace Boat / International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) - The Nuclear Ban Treaty – The Path Forward for North Korea, South Korea, Japan and the Region ………………………………………… 35

•

Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan (Blue Banner) - Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast-Asia ...… 45

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Anastasia O. Barannikova (Maritime State University Vladivostok) - The Nuclear Status of the DPRK and The New Regional Order …………………………………... 52

CHAPTER 3: Making a Habit of Dialogue – the Role of Civil Society •

Kathy R. Matsui (Seisen University) - The Role of Civil Society in the Northeast Asian Security and Peace Dialogue: Processes and Mechanisms for Reconciliation…………………………………………...61

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Okumoto Kyoko and Lee Jae Young (Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute) - Training Peacebuilders for the Region: Experiments of Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute ………………………….…….. 73

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Akibayashi Kozue (Doshisha University / Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom) - A Feminist Perspective on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia…………………………………………………….. 80

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Kim Jeongsoo (Women Making Peace) - South Korean Women's Efforts and Activities Towards Peace on the Korean Peninsula: Trust-building with North Korean Women …………………………………………………87

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Darynell Rodriguez Torres (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict) - Making the most out of dialogue ……………………………………………….. 97

Contributor Biographies …………………………………...103

INTRODUCTION This volume is being published in August 2019, at a moment when the Northeast Asian region stands at a critical crossroads, with a decision to be made not only by the leaders, but by all people living in the region. In one direction, lies the choice to make the most of the momentum towards peace and reconciliation which has been so dramatically instigated by the first ever summit between the leaders of the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea) and highlighted by an unprecedented interest from the broader international community in peace on the Korean Peninsula. Down another path is the option of allowing the next era to be identified by heightening nationalism, military tensions and drastically worsening relations between countries, as seen between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) at present.

This publication contains a variety of perspectives from academics, peace activists, educators and practitioners, featuring sections on the changing dynamics in Northeast Asia and the impact of the new US-DPRK relationship, the path towards denuclearization of Northeast Asia, and the efforts of civil society to support a peaceful future for the region. It is a follow-up volume to the inaugural publication in 2017, which was the first such initiative to bring together voices of civil society experts from all countries represented in the stalled Six Party Talks. The year and some months since then have proven to be of dramatic historical significance for the Northeast Asian region, and particularly, for the Korean Peninsula: The former human rights lawyer Moon Jae-in was elected President of the ROK in May 2017 following the civil society driven so-called “Candlelight Revolution�, and in April 2018, he and the leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong Un, held the first inter-Korean Summit in eleven years, where they adopted the historic Panmunjom Declaration.

The Declaration commits the two countries to work together to end the conflict on the Korean Peninsula and improve inter- Korean relations, and has been followed by various cooperative activities and talks in the months since, amidst numerous obstacles. In June of the same year was the first-ever DPRK and US Summit, where Kim Jong Un met with President Donald Trump and together signed a joint statement agreeing 1

on new peaceful relations and reaffirming the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

These and other events have put inter-Korean peace on the global agenda, and provide a unique window of opportunity, as well a set of challenges, to civil society in the region. The contributors to this volume are all involved in various initiatives for peace and denuclearization in Northeast Asia, and united by their involvement with the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). GPPAC is a global network led by civil society organizations actively working to prevent violent conflict and build more peaceful societies. The network consists of 15 regional networks, with priorities and agendas specific to their environment, Northeast Asia one of these. The GPPAC process in Northeast Asia is a pioneering initiative aimed at forging and strengthening cross-border ties between civil society organizations through regular annual meetings, improving communication channels with other stakeholders including governments, and conducting peace education activities, amongst more.

The current main focus of the region is the Ulaanbaatar Process, officially launched in June 2015 and in which the majority of contributors to this volume take part. This is a civil society-led process convened by GPPAC Northeast Asia and its focal point in Ulaanbaatar, the Mongolian NGO Blue Banner. The Ulaanbaatar Process aims to promote regional dialogue (track II) and consolidate the role of civil society in the peacebuilding process on the Korean Peninsula and in the development of a regional peace and security mechanism for Northeast Asia. Crucially, the Ulaanbaatar Process creates a safe and regular space for civil society perspectives from across the region, including the DPRK, the ROK, and the United States, to be heard in the same forum. Each civil society participant in the Ulaanbaatar Process brings a unique perspective on the struggle for peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region, reflecting the fact that each of their nations has its own stake in a prospective peace.

Four Ulaanbaatar Process meetings have been held to date, each year since 2015, and this volume is being published to coincide with the fifth meeting, taking place in Mongolia in August 2019.

The diversity of the voices included in this publication – encompassing academic analysis, diplomatic considerations, and even personal voices and experiences – highlights the diversity of actors in the region working towards the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. All articles represent 2

the opinions of the individual authors rather than their institutions, and while they may vary in background and in style, this diversity itself demonstrates the broad range of actors engaged in trying to understand the changing dynamics in the region, and to identify ways in which to contribute to a transformation of the decades long ongoing conflict into a sustainable peace for the Korean Peninsula and for Northeast Asia.

In Chapter 1, several authors with diverse experiences in civil society activism, diplomacy, research and advocacy explore the dramatic changes that have been seen on the Korean Peninsula since 2018, and the challenges and opportunities presented by these changes. This chapter reflects upon the positions and circumstances of various other regional actors, presenting several hints for steps to be taken to move towards the creation of peace by peaceful means amidst this new regional order in Northeast Asia, including the importance of communication, and concrete confidence building measures such as family reunions.

Chapter 2 subsequently brings the focus more specifically on the issue of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The authors respectively present several suggestions for how this goal can be truly realized.

Namely, the chapter includes an examination of the role of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the contribution of Mongolia’s experience towards the potential establishment of a Northeast Asian nuclear-weapon-free-zone. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the DPRK’s nuclear status, a vital issue for any steps forward.

Finally, Chapter 3 highlights the various dynamic and evolving civil society movements for peace and denuclearization of the region. This includes processes and mechanisms for reconciliation, and an introduction to region-wide collaborative initiatives for peacebuilding training and capacity development for a transformation from the militaristic to a peace culture in Northeast Asia. Experts on women, peace and security also elaborate on the need for a feminist perspective in the region. They present the long tradition of feminist peace movements in Northeast Asia, including efforts for peace, dialogue and trust-building on the Korean Peninsula led by Korean women themselves. This highlights the need for the meaningful participation of women in the Korean peace process.

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As highlighted by its Executive Director Darynell Rodriguez Torres in the closing contribution to this publication, GPPAC’s work aims to make the most of dialogue. Maintaining the status quo in such a volatile region would only lead to unacceptable risks of conflict. Instead, it is vital to enhance citizen’s diplomacy efforts towards mutual understanding and peace. The editors of this volume and conveners of the Ulaanbaatar Process sincerely hope that both the continued efforts of the Process and the perspectives communicated through this volume will contribute to further building of the mutual understanding, respect and collaboration so crucial in the path towards a truly peaceful future for the Northeast Asian region.

Meri Joyce On behalf of the conveners of the Ulaanbaatar Process

August 2019

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This publication was created by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict Northeast Asia (GPPAC-NEA) and the Mongolian NGO Blue Banner – together the conveners of the Ulaanbaatar Process, a civil society led dialogue for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and in the broader Northeast Asian region.

Communication and coordination with contributors and the co-conveners was carried out by GPPAC Northeast Asia Regional Liaison Officer Meri Joyce of Peace Boat, under the guidance of Ambassador Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan, Chairman of GPPAC’s Focal Point in Ulaanbaatar, the Mongolian NGO Blue Banner.

Dozens of people were involved in the preparation and realization of this project. We would like to sincerely thank all the members of organizations represented in this publication who contributed, including not only the authors but also the many other colleagues and friends behind the scenes who supported with translation, research, communication and more.

This publication would not have been possible without the dedicated commitment of editor Anjeli Narandran, who went beyond requests and beyond time zones to collaborate in the process of bringing all of these important contributions together into this volume.

And finally, the organizers would like to dedicate this publication to the late Mr Galsanjamts Sereeter. As a Member of the Governing Council of Blue Banner, Galsanjamts played a crucial role in the development of GPPAC’s work in Northeast Asia and particularly in the Ulaanbaatar Process over the past years. His helpful nature and cheerful demeanor were a great support and delight to all, and he will be dearly missed.

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CHAPTER 1

Changing Dynamics in Northeast Asia – The New US-DPRK Relationship and its Impact

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DRAMATIC CHANGES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND CHALLENGES SINCE 2018 Park Jung Eun Secretary General, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy A surprise summit meeting between the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States was held in Panmunjeom, the symbol of a divided Korean Peninsula, on June 30, 2019. It was 4 months since the DPRK – U.S. Summit in Hanoi in February 2019, which failed to reach any agreement. As people had held such high expectations of the Hanoi summit, its breakdown shocked the world. Since then, the talks between the DPRK and the U.S. had been in deadlock. Despite the comprehensive Singapore Agreement which announced the new relationship between the DPRK and the U.S., peace in the Korean Peninsula and complete denuclearization, it seemed that the two countries were focused not on negotiating based on give-and-take, but only on ‘denuclearization first.’ The U.S. was full of distrust - it did not expect the DPRK to really denuclearize, and therefore, the discussions on the establishment of a new relationship between the DPRK and the U.S. and a peace agreement disappeared.

What was promising, though, was that the heads of the two countries continued to show their intention to continue with negotiation, and that the Moon Administration effectively played its role of intermediary by suggesting and achieving the summit meeting in Panmunjeom. The trialogue at Panmunjeom was a scene that would go down in history, and the heads of the DPRK and the U.S. agreed to continue working-level negotiations. Some critics asserted that the trialogue was nothing but one of President Trump’s presidential election campaign events. However, politics and diplomacy are all about navigating through the narrow gates of negotiation and bringing people to the table. It is still uncertain whether the two countries will be able to overcome their differences at future working-level negotiations. However, it is still better to resume 7

negotiations while holding onto their positions than to do nothing at all.

The DPRK and the U.S. must break down the wall of distrust between them, honor the agreement made in Singapore and start negotiating to materialize the steps and promises described in that Singapore Agreement.

The role of civil society is to persuade the international community, including the DPRK and the U.S., to support and make progress in the peace process.

No-deal in Hanoi: One Meeting Cannot Solve All Problems The Hanoi summit clearly showed how difficult it is to solve the conflict in which the Korean Peninsula is engulfed: it is the last place in the world where the Cold War continues to exist. It is not easy for two countries that have remained enemies for more than 70 years to suddenly engage in negotiations with complete trust in each other. Even DPRK Chairman Kim’s repeated expression of his will to denuclearize would not reduce the distrust of the international community, including the U.S. - that is the reality. The nuclear conflict in the Korean Peninsula grew out of hostile relations; the DPRK vs. the U.S. and the ROK vs. the DPRK. Thus, it is neither practical nor appropriate to demand that the DPRK accept fullblown denuclearization at once. The history of the nuclear issue that has persisted for more than 20 years proves that the ‘denuclearize North Korea first’ policy has failed to bring an end to the conflict in the Korean Peninsula. Rather, it has given the DRPK time to multiply its nuclear capacity. The two countries must engage in phased and simultaneous implementation of the Singapore Agreement at the minimum level, after aligning their demands and expectations. If the two countries can build mutual trust over the course of this process, they may make a greater leap forward.

The Parties Must Engage in Phased Implementation of the Singapore Agreement At the first summit meeting between the DPRK and the U.S. that took place in Singapore on June 12th 2018, President Trump and Chairman Kim agreed to: establish a new relationship between the two countries; build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula; and work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Also, 8

President Trump committed to providing security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

However, after the summit, no promise was honored and the agreement remained just that; an agreement. After the no-deal outcome in Hanoi, only the discussion on ‘denuclearization first’ prevailed. This is why the trialogue at the Panmunjeom was especially meaningful, because it gave a reason for the negotiations to resume.

It is a good thing that the atmosphere in the U.S. has changed after the trialogue at the Panmunjeom: from ‘denuclearization first’ to acknowledgement of a phased approach. According to the U.S website Axios, Stephen Biegun, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, said off-the-record immediately after the trialogue at Panmunjeom that although the U.S. would not lift the sanctions, it might be willing to make concessions such as providing humanitarian support and restoring diplomatic relations, if the DPRK were to freeze its nuclear program.1 Such ‘give-and-take’ would also be possible if the talks were headed toward denuclearization.

We need to identify a way to carry out all other elements, aside from denuclearization, of the comprehensive agreement made in Singapore, while maintaining the denuclearization process. It became obvious that the two countries held different views on the denuclearization process during the Hanoi summit. The DPRK should put its nuclear facilities other than Youngbyeon, where the state's plutonium is processed and which emcompasses 50~80% of the DPRK's nuclear program, on the agenda and the U.S. should also put on the agenda corresponding actions, such as sanction relief, establishment of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the U.S., and a declaration of the end of war. By doing so, the DPRK can eliminate skepticism about its will to denuclearize, and the U.S. can demonstrate its credibility with regard to actually implementing the agreement. At the same time, the two countries will be able to maintain momentum in the denuclearization process.

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Jonathan Swan, Erica Pandey, ‘Trump's negotiator signals flexibility in North Korea talks’, Axios, July 3, 2019. https://www.axios.com/trump-negotiator-steve-biegunsignals-flexibility-in-north-korea-talks-0b1f9a53-2599-49ac-b236-0fa819d175f8.html 9

Sanctions Against the DPRK that Prohibit Humanitarian Aid Must Be Lifted Many U.N. resolutions concerning sanctions against the DPRK state that they are just a means to an end, rather than an end in themselves. The resolutions emphasize peaceful, diplomatic and political arrangements in addition to sanctions, because of this reason. The resolutions emphasize that the sanctions against the DPRK shall not aggravate the life of North Koreans or negatively affect humanitarian aid activities, because humanitarian aid holds universal value for humanity that must not be stopped under any circumstances.

Reports2 by the U.N. and other international organizations show that humanitarian aid to the DPRK is urgently necessary. However, the sanctions by the U.N. and the independent sanctions imposed by the U.S. which were reinforced after the first DPRK - U.S. summit ought neither to harm the lives of the DPRK people nor to hamper humanitarian activities for them. Nevertheless, it is fortunate that the UN 1718 committee granted 14 exemptions 3 including medical aid, food, and facility and welfare support for the first six months of 2019. However, the U.S.-led sanctions against the DPRK are preventing North Korea from receiving humanitarian aid. Inter-Korean exchange and cooperation are indispensable catalysts for peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula.

This is despite the fact that the heads of the ROK and the DPRK had met and declared that the two countries would stop all hostile acts and create a permanent peace regime. This year, no Korean civil organization dedicated to providing support to North Koreans was allowed to visit the DPRK or carry out its activities. Also, all inter-Korean cooperation projects promoted by local governments of the ROK, including the Seoul Metropolitan Government, were suspended. Even the Mount Kumgang tourism region and the Kaesong Industrial Complex project that had been suspended irrespective of the U.N. sanctions against the DPRK remain suspended.

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UN Security Council resolution 2397(2017), Implementation Assistance Notice No.7 : Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 3 United Nations Security Council, United Nations, accessed August 8, 2019. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarianexemption-requests 10

Inter-Korean cooperation for humanitarian purposes not only provides help to the vulnerable in the DPRK, but also eases military confrontations and tensions between the two Koreas and helps them recover their sense of community. Inter-Korean humanitarian cooperation can also promote a virtuous cycle of peace, supporting the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. If the international community provides humanitarian aid to the DPRK, it will be regarded as a sophisticated diplomatic act that demonstrates respect for the DPRK and binds it as a member of international society. Sanctions against the DPRK that aggravate humanitarian suffering in North Korea and prevent the two Koreas from solving humanitarian issues and strengthening cooperation and exchange must be relaxed as soon as possible.

Denuclearization as a ‘Process of Peace’ Korean civil society has been emphasizing that the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula is a part of an unstable ceasefire system.

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an issue that cannot be separated from the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and the restoration of the DPRK - U.S. relationship.

This is evidenced by the fact that the DPRK began to develop nuclear weapons during the period of military confrontation and the arms race that persisted in the Korean Peninsula for many decades. Thus, demanding ‘denuclearization first’ as a non-negotiable condition for negotiations is unilateral and unrealistic. It is also clear that peace on the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved only by denuclearization. This is why Korean civil society emphasizes that denuclearization has to be part of a process of building peace and be implemented together with efforts to build a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. This includes the execution of a peace treaty or the establishment of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the U.S. Also, in order to completely denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, the denuclearization of North Korea alone is not enough. Complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved by ‘complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization’ of the DPRK only.

All nuclear threats that may exist within and outside of the Korean 11

Peninsula must be removed to completely denuclearize it. The possibility of the DPRK, as well as the ROK, using nuclear weapons must be ruled out. ROK, the U.S. and Japan rely on an extended deterrence strategy, which includes the transportation and placement, as well as research & development of nuclear weapons. Denunciation of the extended deterrence strategy must be one of the approaches towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula without any nuclear threats could transform Northeast Asia into a nuclearweapon-free-zone. This in turn, can make a significant contribution towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free-world.

The Precarious ROK-Japan Relationship and the Abe Administration’s Dangerous Bet A few days after the surprise trialogue at Panmunjeom, the Abe administration of Japan announced restrictions on exports to ROK. This is Japan’s economic retaliation against the ROK, due to a political and diplomatic issue. The Abe administration is dissatisfied with the Moon administration's refusal of the 2015 agreement on wartime sexual enslavement of Korean women and the Korean Supreme Court ruling on compensation for Korean forced labor victims. The ROK and Japan have gone through strained relations often in the past, due to historical issues, and lately, Korea-bashing voices have become louder in Japan.4 However, there had never been any problem bad enough to break the long economic and civil relationships between the two countries. This seems to have changed. The Abe administration has even accused the ROK without any evidence - of exporting strategic goods to the DPRK. It is hard to believe that Japan is retaliating against the ROK simply because of disagreements concerning historical affairs. Both the ROK and Japan believe in free trade and democracy and had been cooperating in many areas, including politics, the economy and the military. By making such accusations and retaliatory threats, Japan is testing the decades-long relationship between the two countries.

The Abe administration is threatening economic retaliation because of 4

The Korea Times, “Hate speech against Korean still active in Japan”, March 24, 2019. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2019/03/120_265876.html 12

historical affairs. This behavior can be interpreted in many ways. Ultraright-wing conservative forces in the ROK and the current ruling power in Japan have long shared a common interest. These forces were in power in the ROK for a long time in both the aspect of political power as well as in the dictatorship and development history of the ROK. Tensions rose temporarily when the South Korean public criticized the lack of resolution of historical tensions. However, the basic cooperative relationship between the two countries remained intact. The Abe administration uses hostility towards the DPRK as the basis of maintaining its power and wishes to maintain the status quo of a divided Korea over the alternative of a rapid transformation to a peaceful interKorean relationship.

The Abe administration is also trying to convert Japan into a country that can engage in the war, by amending Japan’s pacifist constitution. It continues to deny the fact that Japan invaded other countries and continues to seek ways to convert Japan into a strong militaristic nation.

Meanwhile, the democratic and dynamic civil society of ROK, that has resisted dictatorships and replaced people in power, is driving change in politics and diplomacy. Currently, the Moon Administration in the ROK is supported by its civil society.

Both the Abe and Park Geunhye administrations announced that the one billion Yen (USD 8.8m) received from Japan in 2015 as compensation for wartime sexual enslavement of Korean women marked ‘the final and irreversible’ agreement between both countries on this matter. This was despite the fact that civil society of the ROK strongly opposed such an agreement. However, in November 2016, the Park administration entered into a further agreement, the Korea-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Japanese corporations had forced Korean people into labor during its colonial period. The Supreme Court of Korea ruled that those Japanese corporations must offer compensation for their exploitation of Korean labor. The Abe administration is making an issue out of this Korean Supreme Court ruling and its execution.

Meanwhile, it has become clear that the Supreme Court of Korea had made the political decision to intentionally delay its ruling on forced labor during the Park administration. This behavior of the Supreme Court of Korea has been pointed out as evidence of the lack of its independence.

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Aside from the matter of historical affairs, there is a large difference in the way the two countries perceive the issues surrounding North Korea, the path of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the integration of the two Koreas. The gap between interests pursued by Korean and Japanese governments has never been wider.

The Abe administration implemented retaliatory actions so senseless that any advanced nation would never think of attempting them. This behavior demonstrates that the extreme right-wing conservative forces of Japan are able to threaten the ROK’s economy and security. The dominant opinion in South Korea is that the recent behavior of Japan shows how deeply the Korean economy has relied on Japan, and that the ROK must take this opportunity to quickly change its industrial structure.

However, South Koreans must realize that this is not just an economic problem. The Abe administration is pushing for amendments of the peace constitution of Japan and a revival of militarism. This does not just concern only Japan. This is a threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. We must note that we had underestimated the negative role the Abe administration has been playing with regard to the peace process in the Korean Peninsula.

There is No Choice but to Achieve Peace through Peaceful Means Under no circumstances should we replicate the past: military tensions and threats of nuclear war must not be repeated. South Korea’s government and civil society have made achieving peace through peaceful methods and solving problems through dialogue and negotiation possible and have confirmed that such possibilities can be turned into reality. In 2018, the two Koreas stopped all hostile acts, and the Korean Peninsula welcomed the most peaceful period since the ceasefire.

However, this opportunity to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula is threatened by the interests of other countries. The support from and cooperation of the international community is urgently required. This is why South Korean civil society has urged a ceaseless peace process for the Korean Peninsula and continues to strive for the delivery of its voice to the international community, including the U.N., and the executive branch of the U.S. 14

The Korea-Japan relationship must be rehabilitated into a relationship where the two countries respect and cooperate with each other. The two countries must not incite chauvinism aimed at each other. South Korean civil society must actively exchange opinions with more members of Japanese civil society. That will help us turn the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia into peaceful regions without nuclear threats.

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ULAANBAATAR’S STANDPOINT ON THE TRUMP-KIM SUMMITS Bayarkhuu Dashdorj Research Professor, former Ambassador to Egypt The Korean Peninsula is the site of the only persisting conflict since the end of the Cold War. The Korean War ended in 1953, but in the 66 years that have since passed, no peace agreement has been concluded in this region. Looking at the pitiful scene of this region, I often wonder about the reasons for the placement of so many soldiers and weapons in such a small geographical area.

The Scandal Surrounding the First Summit The whole world paid attention on 12 June 2018, the day that the first Trump-Kim meeting took place. Many countries including Russia, Japan, China and South Korea were disappointed that they had been left out of the meeting. Indeed, the nuclear status of North Korea meant that the summit was of interest to and could have involved more than 6 countries.

According to many Russian media sources at the time, the Russians never expected that such meeting between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump would actually take place. This is not because Russia was excluded from or unaware of existing geopolitical games. Rather, Russia was not well versed in North Korea’s history or its new leader's viewpoints or his style of governance. Russian publications focused on the dark side of North Korea only. Russia’s lack of such details came as a surprise to me, because as a researcher based in Russia in 1992-1993, I can attest to the fact that research on North Korea was very developed at the time.

The entire world, except for Russia, was joyful about the first summit, assuming that Kim Jong-un would actually ban his own nuclear weapons program. Russian websites were warning Kim to not repeat Muammar Al Gaddafi’s pitiful destiny in 2018. Also, there was the question of what this “surrender” would cost. Russia wondered why North Korea was willing to compromise, despite the fact that it was indeed expensive (in terms of power, money, and capital) to make rocket-fired nuclear weapons. In general, Russians logically concluded that being “helped” by 16

western countries could completely destroy the DPRK's social regime.

The Significance of the Second Summit The second summit of the North Korea-U.S. leaders did not bring the expected results, leaving the world more skeptical about the dialogue process. Trump's political show of faith in Kim had failed. North Korea shut its door on the U.S. because Trump had promised to cultivate capitalism in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. This would have meant that the DPRK’s 70-year institution of uncompromising labor, its communist ideology, and the great power of Kim would have been diminished. It may have been no coincidence that "communist capitalist" Vietnam, which had been at war for a long time, was chosen for the venue of the summit as a living example to demotivate North Koreans.

The world was left wondering if Vietnam would be able to convince North Korea that it is possible to develop a market economy and liberate its market while remaining under the strict control of a communist party.

It is unfortunate that Ulaanbaatar was not selected as the venue for the North Korea-U.S summit. Initially, when the officials of the two sides held a secret meeting, North Korea proposed to host the summit in Pyongyang, but the U.S did not accept it. It was reported that Mongolia and its capital Ulaanbaatar was selected as the best possible option for the meeting. It is easy to explain why Ulaanbaatar was not selected as the venue. The current air quality and environmental pollution, political instability, corruption of its authorities, weak financial discipline, poverty could be used as negative excuses. Mongolia has the ability to host any state party. However, we need to be diligent and patient.

Finally, in the context of the two summits, I would like to praise Kim Jong-un. His autobiography is not outstanding but rather very ordinary. If one were to try to write his CV, it would not even fill a page. He is not well known in the world except for his two meetings with Trump and a few visits to China. Nevertheless, this young leader is worthy of praise as he has now written his name in Korean history books by fulfilling his father’s and grandfather's dreams of negotiating directly with the United States.

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Disdain for North Korea is Unproductive Since the DPRK-U.S summit, the world has been paying close attention to North Korea. In particular, the South Koreans were left most surprised because they never thought that the Americans would directly negotiate with North Korea without their presence. The United States may also have simply been shocked by the outcome. There has been no explanation from Trump, who showed such power in performing the huge gesture of attending the summit, attracting the attention of the whole world. Nevertheless, he still shut the door on the summit without any result. Kim perhaps became agitated when Trump suggested that North Korea would be able to develop its own capitalism with the help of the United States in exchange for surrendering its nuclear weapons to the U.S. Perhaps Kim had not expected that strange bargain. Now it is clear that antagonizing North Koreans is not a good approach.

It is even clearer that North Korea was prepared for any outcome. The DPRK’s ability to withstand pressure and persecution from a great empire was proven as a result of the Hanoi meeting. The DPRK demonstrated its strength through its nuclear weapon tests, and by launching far and medium-range ballistic missiles; events that become the mainstay of global news media. North Korea has not demonstrated any fear of press coverage, whether positive or negative. The DPRK is used to it. A six-sided negotiation is an overwhelming and inefficient affair, which is difficult to recover from. Such negotiation mechanisms are often merely tactics with which to buy some time. The North Koreans will negotiate with United States only, for they have seen better ways than multilateral negotiations and it has been proven twice in Singapore and Hanoi. In the DPRK, there is a strong mindset that the nation needs to defend itself from the United States, and they consider this as appropriate on their side.

The Hanoi summit seemed to offer an answer to the question of whether the DPRK would choose to grow together with the rest of the world or continue to develop independently. North Korea's main stance had long been to consistently demonstrate their ability to withstand the pressure of powerful countries all over the world. Although the world had not permitted them to possess nuclear weapons and missiles, the DPRK unofficially acquired the de facto status of “nuclear power state". If the United States, Japan, and South Korea are unable to begin negotiations 18

with the DPRK again, they will have to reluctantly revert to the previous approach of employing “strategic patience”, the carrot-and-stick approach that goes back to the Obama administration.

Here I would like to remind the reader of former South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s vision for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Park Geun-hye believed that there was a lack for trust between the DPRK, and the ROK and its allies. The DPRK had long sought a meeting with the United States, which had been repeatedly declined by the latter. This reveals Pyongyang’s lack of understanding: there can be no relationship without mutual trust. Park Geun-hye believed that confidence would have to be built and supported through negotiations before mutual assistance could ever be provided or solicited. This is the thrust of the "Seoul Process" initiated by Mrs. Park.

She proposed that ROK could help end North Korea's deliberate recession and make concessions to provide help during crises instead of completely abandoning the North. Consideration would be given to what kind of influence ROK could have and what channels they might employ, in order for the region to move away from constant instability. There were many sectors on which to cooperate and many common problems to address that went far beyond military politics. Among these were energy, the environment, the bird flu crisis, culture, and sports. Mrs. Park made her position clear at a time when the world saw the DPRK as a country that was always in need of help. Since 1997, South Korea has implemented an assistance policy towards North Korea. What we have seen over the many years that have passed is that internal affairs cannot be changed simply through foreign help. It is necessary for North Korea itself to create an environment that is accepting of international aid, rather than attempting to get it through threats. Mrs. Park's Seoul Process stated that the DPRK’s demonstration of its efforts to meet UN requirements on human rights, fundamental freedoms, and respect for gender equality would increase the chances of them receiving international assistance.

Furthermore, the project was initiated by the South to help North Korea's vulnerable groups, namely its children, and women. If the North tried to threaten them with the use of weapons, these programs would not be implemented. If the North made such threats, the ROK government would limit its reach-out to the North, warned Park when she was in 19

office. What did North Korea look like? The governing propaganda of North Korean society seemed to be “never be mesmerized by the South’s shiny development!" The countries that North Korea is threatening with its weapons have already attained a high level of development and have provided their people with a plentiful life. The DPRK however, has suffered from hunger with tens of thousands of people dying of starvation.

Also, its economy has not been able to find stability. It possesses a highly inefficient economy and there is much evidence of this. According to the Russians, who played a key role in providing economic assistance to North Korea before the collapse of the Soviet Union, 70-80% of factories have shut down in North Korea in 1992-1995. These factories were put out of commission when Soviet economic aid was discontinued. 90% of the population was thrown into extreme poverty and 95% of GDP was spent on debt settlements.

Before Park Geun-hye resigned and went to jail, she warned of the fact that North Korea was a country that is totally different to the modern world. The current president Moon Jae-in sees his neighbors in a more favorable light and displays a friendly attitude. He has urged the DPRK to start a partnership; however, the process has been disrupted for now.

The sentiment coming out of most countries is for these disruptions to end. They want to see the start of a bilateral partnership in Korea regardless of the DPRK’s relationship with the United States.

The DPRK’s Impact on Countries in the Region The two Koreas have worked together with the United States and China in the hope of ending the Korean War, which began in the 1950s, and establishing sustained peace and stability. Steady and persistent peace is yet to be established, but the first steps have already been made. The staging of weapons tests and war games has been discontinued. The two countries have ceased hostile activities, reinforced their borders, established border crossings, and sought to commence multilateral negotiations. The world is waiting for the opening of the railroad and the road connecting the two Koreas. The South Korean President Moon Jaein has chosen the right course. According to the Russian press, the two Koreas have shown some good signs in building infrastructure links.

Some Russian publications on Korean studies wrote that a RussianChinese issue was likely to arise as a result of the Korean Peninsula 20

dispute. According to the Russians, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping is preventing the two countries from merging into one. If Kim and Trump became comrades, they would create a new “Communist capitalist Korea” in the north and confiscate their weapons; the very weapons that would be necessary instruments to hold the United States at bay.

Although Pyongyang's leader is difficult to read, he listens to what Beijing says. Once in the past, China had fought for North Korea's independence and had suffered a great deal. Therefore, Russian authorities and researchers predicted that China would not be happy with the integration of the two Koreas. However, to stop North Korea going nuclear, China would pay more money than the West ever could; enough for North Korea to effectively overcome any sanctions.

Moreover, Russians are worried about what will happen next. Due to sudden developments such as the deeper US involvement in the Korean Peninsula, the Russians do not want to see China lose control in the matter. The Russian press once reported that Trump changes his position and views three times a day, a quality which could directly affect the Korean issue. However, according to the Chinese, based on their experience, perestroika1 must be brought about differently from what the Soviet Union went through. If China takes the lead in initiating reform in the DPRK, Russia will be presented with a lot of opportunities. No Korean railway project can be implemented without Russia. If Russia and China take part in North Korea's perestroika, the West will not take the lead.

China’s Experience Might Suit North Korea China’s reforms are not aimed at changing the power and control of the political regime and the communist party, but instead, to deploy the poor, to open their eyes and to slowly adapt to the world. North Korea's population is half the size of South Korea’s and if the two countries were to be united, the North might be assimilated into the South. Perhaps Russia and China are worried that DPRK citizens would be shocked to witness the more advanced development of the South. In 2018, North Korea was the world's most interesting topic. The leaders of the two 1

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines perestroika as follows. per·e·stroi·ka | \ ˌper-ə-ˈstrȯi-kə: the policy of economic and governmental reform instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union during the mid-1980s 21

Koreas met twice. The leaders of North Korea and the United States also met and this changed everyone’s expectations. A meeting between the North Korean and Japanese authorities may be on the horizon. A country, in which the security of society was guaranteed by a single political party and its leader’s strict governance, suddenly opened its doors to the world.

In a sense, this constituted a threat to their existence. On the other hand, it is worth remembering that that placing high expectations and excessive pressure on North Korea to reform could drive the country deeper into isolation.

With this new situation in mind, we can make alterations to Mongolia’s initiatives towards the DPRK. Mongolia is a neutral country with no political dispute with its neighbors. It has had partnerships with North Korea for 70 years. In this spirit, Mongolia may need to look back at its policies and approaches towards North Korea, to discover new cooperation tactics and options and to decide on a course of action. This will inform Mongolia’s adjustment of its amicable approach to North Korea as well as its cooperation with other regional neighbors and new partners.

The Standpoint of the United States Until recently, the positions of the United States and South Korea towards the DPRK were very clear. Then US president Barack Obama and former ROK president Park Geun-hye had agreed to uphold longstanding policies aimed at pressuring the DPRK to discontinue what they considered to be deliberate attempts to create crises in order to compromise stability in the region. It is evident that the repetitive “Provocation-Ban-Talk-Compromise-Support” cycle was becoming ineffective in the Korean Peninsula. This is a political cycle that lasted until 2018. The previous Government of South Korea had devised a new approach, dubbed the “Seoul Process” with the hope of building trust, balance, and bilateral relations between the two Koreas. However, the sole ally and supplier of North Korea, China had been actively engaging in the UN sanctions against the DPRK. North Korea and China's relations had soured as a result. At the same time, there had been no fundamental change in China's strategy towards North Korea. Pyongyang remained in strong opposition to the U.S. and South Korea, but Kim Jong-Un was facing new challenges. Ultimately, he understood that the future held little choice but to consider reform and a more open policy.

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Putin’s New Game At the end of April 2019, the North Korean leader arrived in Russia for a summit with President Vladimir Putin, just two months after his meeting with US President Donald Trump in Vietnam had ended abruptly.

Analysts say the timing of the Russia-North Korea summit served as a reminder to Washington that the North Korean leader had other options in the region backing his leadership.

The failed summit in Vietnam meant that Kim was unable to get the sanctions relief he sought from the United States. It was unlikely that he would get that in his meetings with Putin as well.

But while Russia fully enforces on Pyongyang the UN sanctions it had voted for, it has joined China in calling for reducing the punishment in recognition of steps taken buy North Korea to limit weapons testing.

The Kremlin considered this visit a key development in the settlement of the Korean nuclear crisis. "At the center of attention will be the political and diplomatic solution to the Korean Peninsula's nuclear problem," Putin's aide Yuri Ushakov told a news conference in April 2019. Putin's spokesperson Dmitri Peskov said that the two leaders planned to discuss "bilateral ties", followed by "issues of denuclearization and regional partnership".

The President of Russia does not seem to be a believer in Washington's use of sanctions as a political tool. However, he is simultaneously cautious about making any big new commitments, analysts say, as he attended a major international meeting on China's "Belt and Road" initiative in April 2019 in Beijing.

Mongolia’s Views and Involvement Our aim should always be to focus on how Mongolia and South Korea can work together to bring the DPRK closer to the world and strengthen the path towards peace. First and foremost, Ulaanbaatar and Seoul will need to conduct a joint study, examining what they want to achieve, and what kind of cooperation they will attract. This must then be tabled and translated into state policy. Involving North Korea in regional artistic, 23

sporting, humanitarian, and diplomatic events and attracting as much multilateral cooperation as possible, is better than persecuting the DPRK. Young Kim has distinguished himself from his father and grandfather.

His recent adoption of policies empowering farming units for production, and his incentives for the distribution of financial income have been carried out in a similar fashion as during Mongolia's communist regime.

Therefore, experts from North Korea's economic planning and management sectors could potentially benefit from visiting Mongolia to attend short-term training programs. However, rushing the DPRK in this direction would be a wrong move.

The DPRK is becoming more attracted to economic models that have beneficial effects in the short term: the expansion of the market economy might weaken their social control and threaten their political system. One of these attractive models could be a joint venture abroad. Part of the North Korean labor force could be employed in agricultural in the eastern region of Mongolia with the assistance of the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA2). Mongolia-ROK-DPRK joint ventures in agriculture and the manufacturing of ecologically sustainable agricultural products could be possible. The cultural sector offers yet another opportunity for Mongolia, North Korea, and South Korea to cooperate as seen by the registration of Kaesong city as UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Mongolia needs to support the idea.

The city was a main node in the relationship between Mongolia and Korea during the Yuan Dynasty. The reason why it has been named a site of world cultural heritage is because it is the home to two great shrines; that of the Mongolian royalty Nunchig Bortomor and King Kongmin, of ancient Korea. It is also recognized as one of the world's longest-standing links between the two sides of Korea and gained worldwide recognition as a North-South joint venture. If the United States, North Korea, South Korea, and China agree to turn the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty, it will be a good move for our country to initiate a draft resolution at the United Nations on the non-alignment of states with 2

The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was established in 1991 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea as a governmental organization for Official Development Assistance (ODA) to enhance the effectiveness of South Korea's grant aid programs for developing countries by implementing the government's grant aid and technical cooperation programs. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korea_International_Cooperation_Agency).

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nuclear-weapon-free status. Mongolia will certainly support the proposal of the South Korean Government to make Kaesong city an international peace park. Kaesong has the opportunity to become an area for tourist travel, and to be a platform to support public diplomacy efforts.

The Outlook Kim Jong-Un and Donald Trump's meeting had no conclusion, as it had not met the expectations of the global community with respect to the Korean Peninsula. There will have to be a worldwide effort to soften North Korea’s stance on nuclear weapons, to draw them into the international community, to stimulate international integration, and to strengthen the Korean Peninsula's stability and inter-Korean bilateral cooperation. To summarize, in the modern age of globalization, interdependence and economic ties supersede national boundaries.

Regional actors, including the East Asian Economic Community, are developing at great speed, as can be seen from China's rapid economic growth, integration, and multilateralism. It is hoped that Kim Jong-Un will realize the true cost of maintaining the military, its weapons, and militarization in general. His father had held two Korean summit meetings and had invited then South Korean President Kim Dae Jung to Pyongyang, much like how Kim had invited South Korea's current President to Pyongyang himself. He was seen as a leader who could be relied upon. I am sure he will overcome his country's troubles.

The year 2018 was a highlight in the history of North Korea. At the beginning of 2018, the country officially announced its nuclear weapons capability and tested intercontinental ballistic missiles. Its armed forces, tankers, cannons, planes, and small fleets have shown that the Korean People's Army should now be considered a powerful and nuclear-armed force in Asia, in particular in East Asia. North Korea is the fourth most militarized country in the world. The DPRK comes in right after China, Russia, and the United States. The North Korea-US, summit in Singapore, the meeting of the leaders of the two Koreas, as well as Kim Jong-Un's visits to China are all highlights of the DPRK’s history in the year 2018.

This is the beginning of a great period in history. The story continued in 2019 with a subsequent DPRK-US summit. Progress has been temporarily delayed, but it will resume.

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THE DPRK AND A NEW REGIONAL ORDER IN NORTHEAST ASIA Zhang Ling1 Director of International Cooperation, The Charhar Institute In November 2018, Professor Bae Kwang-Hee and Professor Yang Wook-joo from the Kim Il Sung University of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were invited to the Charhar Institute Beijing office for an academic visit. During their stay, they lectured on the Korean language for Charhar’s research fellows and staff. Recently, Dr. Han Fangming, Chairman of the Charhar Institute, gave a farewell dinner at which the two professors who were wrapping up their visit to China were officially awarded certificates as senior fellows of the Charhar Institute2.

The six-month Korean program served as an unofficial communication channel with the DPRK, which we at the institute have come to call the “Charhar Channel”. This was initiated by the Charhar Institute, an independent think tank focusing on international relations and foreign policy with the pursuit of its ultimate goal of peace, development and harmony. Since its inception in 2009, Charhar has made unremitting efforts to promote the peaceful settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue as well as peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia through “track 2” and “track 1.5” dialogues. In this way, the “Charhar Channel” has made its own contribution to the restoration and development of bilateral and multilateral relations as well as the de-nuclearization efforts on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the channel aims to expand the non-governmental exchanges between China and the DPRK into the fields of culture and the arts, to strengthen the role of think tanks, and to provide favorable conditions for the next step in opening high-level 1

Zhang Ling, Director of International Cooperation at the Charhar Institute. The article reflects the author's views, and not necessarily those of the institute.

2 The Paper, “澎湃新闻：朝鲜学者加盟中国智库，察哈尔学会聘请朝鲜教授为高 级研究员”, accessed April 10, 2019, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_3283652.

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dialogues. At the same time, it also makes reports on the situation in and policies of the DPRK, offering suggestions for the development of relations from the perspective of people-to-people exchanges.

As a student of the program led by Professor Bae and Professor Yang, I had something akin to a phobia of Altaic languages prior to embarking on it; I felt almost dizzy whenever I saw Korean or Japanese. Still, with great curiosity and enthusiasm, I enjoyed the courses and was indeed impressed by the teachers’ empathy and experience as well as their cordial and humorous style. They taught us from the heart and their eyes always twinkled with joy and kindness. As the class neared its conclusion, we enjoyed singing the sorrowful Korean folk song “Arirang” and the radiant “Nice to meet you”, which really evoked mixed feelings about socialism and cosmopolitanism.

Sometimes I think of how, in today’s fast-developing world where we are bombarded by information, chaos and disinformation, the people of the DPRK live in another dimension. Of course some may interpret this as falling behind the times. However, there is also something to be said, at the individual, family and community levels, for self-sufficiency that is not affected by external shocks. There is also a kind of simple happiness in that lifestyle, reminiscent of Far From the Madding Crowd by Thomas Hardy.

Rather than judge, I simply want to call for mutual respect and emphasize the need to listen to each other in the context of the Korean Peninsula and the wider issue of reconciliation and cooperation among the countries of Northeast Asia. Above all, foreign policy decision-making and political risks should be based upon the expectations that the ordinary person has for security and a better life.

The pleasant get-together with my Korean teachers also keeps reminding me of the current situation and informs my point of view regarding the DPRK and Northeast Asia more broadly.

Consensus built upon differences First, both in the context of the DPRK nuclear issue and Northeast Asian cooperation, the stakeholders should recognize their differences. More importantly, they should aim to reach consensus by all means.

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One of the characteristics of today's world is the simultaneous deepening of globalization and regional integration. Cooperation and integration among regional countries can in turn promote globalization, as evidenced by the European Union in Europe, ASEAN in Southeast Asia, and the League of Arab States in the Arab countries. However, the process of integration in Northeast Asia, even merely economic integration, has been slow. Territorial issues remain very prominent in Northeast Asia.

The division of the Korean Peninsula is widely regarded as a remnant of the Cold War, and touches a nerve in all parties concerned. It is regrettable that the United States-DPRK summit in Hanoi, Vietnam on February 28, 2019 failed to reach an agreement. Despite the differences between the DPRK and the United States (US), we are encouraged to have witnessed that the DPRK’s nuclear activities were paused as the result of the conversations conducted. It sends a good signal that establishing a long-term security mechanism in Northeast Asia can be expected.

Northeast Asian security is also affected by political arrangements like the US-ROK Alliance and US-Japan Alliance. This introduces a degree of unpredictability. Nevertheless, what remains unchanged is our shared hope for security and prosperity; eschewing war and promoting collaboration. Hence the countries in the region would do well to abandon geopolitical games and zero-sum thinking in favour of common interests. They should promote peace and development in East Asia by promoting cooperation, harmony, mutual trust, solidarity and stability in Northeast Asia. This would be in the interest of all countries and is the hope of the international community. This goal of consensus-building should be the cornerstone of all endeavors.

NGO’s growing roles within the ever-changing situation Second, civil society exchanges can serve to resolve disputes peacefully in the political sphere and NGOs should play a more significant and pragmatic role. At present, a general trend of peaceful dialogue on the Korean Peninsula has been developed and formed. Some scholars have concluded that the two Trump-Kim summits were “diplomatic shows”, in which the two protagonists enjoyed the attention of the media and the world while failing to yield any concrete measures. However, the “shows” themselves serve as information and signals of the momentum for peace. Now the global community expects even more discussion and 28

more good results. All parties should therefore cherish this opportunity to bring lasting peace to the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region.

In recent years, many NGOs focusing on this topic have made tremendous efforts, acted quickly and yielded some valuable successful stories in terms of humanitarian aid, reports, forums, dialogues and open calls. For example, several American NGOs like American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) have become the icebreakers and sent humanitarian assistance to the DPRK with hard-won approvals from the U.S. Commerce of Department, the Treasury Department, and the UN Security Council sanctions committee. They have also obtained special passports to help with agriculture, children’s welfare and health in DPRK. Finally, they broke barriers and demonstrated belief, courage and action, just as Daniel Jasper, AFSC’s Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for Asia, wrote ahead of the second Trump-Kim summit, “Take action today: On the eve of the summit, tell the Trump administration make reuniting Korean and Korean-American families a priority!”3 . Their experiences and expertise can now be shared with others.

Meanwhile efforts should be made to map out more rigorous, moderate, and quantifiable new steps on three fronts simultaneously: denuclearization, the provision of humanitarian aid and the economic development of the DPRK. Every project is like an investment plan for peace. That is to say, that it cannot be considered a mere handout package, but rather, a step-by-step and detailed project based on feasibility and vulnerability studies. At every stage we will have to agree on an area on which to focus our actions, based on the strength of our various partners.

Communication: make rational and peaceful voices resonate Last but not least, communication and the building of public opinion are also critical. Samuel Huntington4 asserted "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind 3

Daniel Jasper, “How the U.S. can pursue peace with DPRK (North Korea)”, accessed February 8, 2019, https://www.afsc.org/story/how-us-can-pursue-peace-dprk-northkorea.

4 Samuel Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.

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and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” While Northeast Asian countries enjoy similar cultural attributes, our popular beliefs are sometimes biased and steeped in stereotypes, partly due to our unique experiences formed by the different stages of modernization in which we find ourselves.

This kind of “clash” mostly occurs on social media, especially when discussing the issue of the DPRK’s nuclear status, tense bilateral relations and other serious political topics. Some scholars read the irrational comments of these “keyboard warriors’” with disdain. However, the age of mass communication and social media has already arrived and since public opinion can sometimes shape or endorse political actions, we cannot ignore it. How do we address the public's lofty expectations before people come to grips with more realistic solutions? How do we make morally and emotionally responsible judgments about these issues?

It is therefore important that rational and objective observations and ideas from researchers and practitioners be communicated to the general public.

More challenges ahead Northeast Asia is a sprawling region, accounting for 40 percent of the total landmass of Asia. It consists of many countries. Together they boast a myriad of complicated political, economic and cultural traditions.

Hence, it may well be said that Northeast Asia occupies a critical place in the international arena, which is further complicated by a changeable regional situation. Therefore, promoting peace and development, and prioritizing the situation in Northeast Asia will exert a positive impact on the political and economic structural arrangements in Asia as a whole and even in the rest of the world. Aside from the abovementioned geopolitical and economic issues, Northeast Asia also faces challenges shared by all other human beings: environmental pollution, urbanization, burgeoning AI, structural unemployment, and the contraction of equity and efficiency (i.e. addressing unbalanced development and ensuring a fairer distribution), etc. By harnessing the present momentum favoring peace and development, and by understanding the present-day challenges, we can contribute our wisdom to make peace possible.

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REUNITING FAMILIES IS A CRITICAL STEP IN DIPLOMACY WITH NORTH KOREA Daniel Jasper Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for Asia, American Friends Service Committee Despite tense rhetoric and recent missile tests, the U.S. and North Korea are still tentatively planning for more talks this summer following Trump’s spontaneous meeting with Kim Jong Un. Time, however, is not on the side of negotiators regardless of Trump’s comments that he is in “no rush” to reach a deal. Several important factors add urgency to this round of talks, and many are mindful that the approaching campaign season may give Trump the impetus to show progress quickly.

North Korea watchers will also recall that this spring, Kim Jong Un gave the U.S. until the end of this year to find a new approach – adding another deadline for progress. Beyond the political clocks, humanitarian issues such as a looming tuberculosis crisis and increasing food insecurity will need to be addressed by all relevant stakeholders in the next few months or the risk of another global humanitarian crisis will increase significantly and unnecessarily.

With the sporadic nature of the diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea, as well as important time-sensitivities, serious consideration should be given to consistent means of engagement that can help extend the timeline for talks and buttress working level discussions or even bridge the gaps between high level summits.

In 70 years of conflict between the U.S. and North Korea a myriad of issues has accumulated and entangled so effectively that it can be difficult to separate any issue from the denuclearization question.

However, this conflict still has daily impacts on the lives of Koreans and Americans. At least two urgent and non-aid-related humanitarian issues present important opportunities at this juncture– the repatriation of remains from over 5,000 U.S. servicemembers left in North Korea after 31

the war and reunions between Korean Americans and their families in the North.

Last summer, North Korea returned 55 boxes containing the remains of U.S. servicemembers following the signing of the Singapore Agreement1, which contained a provision that stated, “the United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.” While operations to repatriate remains have since been suspended,2 I have heard from both U.S. and North Korean officials that these operations, aside from the summits themselves, have been one of the most successful material cooperations during this recent détente.

That’s a significant point that bears repeating – both U.S. and North Korean officials have (at least, informally) recognized that the relatively simple operation of handing over remains has been a high point of U.S.North Korea cooperation under Trump. These operations, therefore, need to be pursued independent of nuclear negotiations in order to establish regular, direct contact that can be maintained despite any political turbulence. Carrying out these operations not only provides closure for families of U.S. servicemembers that have waited nearly 70 years to find out what happened to their loved ones, but also allows Washington and Pyongyang critical military-to-military contact.

In a similar vein, many Korean American families have been hoping to reunite with their families in North Korea for just as long and, in some cases, longer. Following the Korean War, over 100,000 divided Korean families came to the U.S. Estimates suggest that several thousand of those families are still living, and Korean American organizations have consistently reported requests from the community to reunite with loved ones.

As in the case of repatriation operations, reunions between Korean Americans and their families in North Korea represent an important 1

Alex Ward, “North Korea returns remains of 55 US service members”, Vox, accessed July 27, 2018. https://www.vox.com/2018/7/27/17621448/north-korea-trump-remains55-war 2 Amy Gunia, “U.S. Halts Recovery of Remains of Missing Soldiers Amid Impasse with North Korea”, Time, accessed May 9, 2019. https://time.com/5586320/north-koreasoldier-remains/ 32

opportunity for consistent, ongoing engagement that addresses another often-forgotten humanitarian crisis. Further, as the issue of remains repatriation is exclusively discussed between the two militaries, reunions between divided families would allow diplomats a parallel exercise in cooperation; a win-win-win.

It’s also worth noting that both issues of remains repatriation and family reunions are bipartisan and have been fully embraced by Congress.

Remains repatriation even received congressional appropriated funds for recovery operations. Several bills in the House that focus exclusively on family reunions, though, are stalled and need action, such as Representative Grace Meng’s bill HR 1771 the Divided Families Reunification Act as well as Representative Karen Bass’ resolution H Res. 410 - Encouraging reunions of divided Korean-American families.

The issues are mentioned as necessary components to transforming this conflict in many pieces of legislation going back years. Other current examples include H Res 152 Calling for a formal end to the Korean War and HR 2949 the North Korea Policy Oversight Act. In order to truly transform the U.S.-North Korea relationship, we will need to untangle issues of individual security from issues of arms control and international norms. Reuniting families (living and deceased), then, offers a viable way to help heal the wounds of war while, at the same time, cultivating the environment necessary to effectively discuss high level concerns of the U.S. and North Korea.

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CHAPTER 2

The Path Towards Denuclearization of Northeast Asia

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THE NUCLEAR BAN TREATY – THE PATH FORWARD FOR NORTH KOREA, SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN AND THE REGION Kawasaki Akira* Peace Boat / International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Introduction The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a humanitarian disarmament treaty that comprehensively and completely prohibits nuclear weapons and provides pathways for their total elimination.1 The treaty also provides victim assistance for those affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons as well as environmental remediation. 122 countries, nearly two thirds of the member states of the United Nations, voted in support of the adoption of the treaty. Now the process of signing and ratifying the treaty is underway and it will enter into force after it has been ratified by 50 countries.

No Northeast Asian country has yet signed the treaty, betraying the ColdWar division rooted in the region. Both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan are dependent on their military alliances with the US in which nuclear weapons form the central pillar of security strategy. China has chosen to be a nuclear-armed state since the 1960s. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has publicly pursued nuclear armament since 2006. Despite the historic declarations in Panmunjom in April 2018 and Singapore in June 2018, progress of the diplomatic process to end the Korean War and to denuclearize the Peninsula has been very slow.

This paper examines how the TPNW can be applied to Northeast Asia, in *

Kawasaki Akira is Executive Committee member of Peace Boat and International Steering Group member of International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). The views expressed in this paper are of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the organizations to which he belongs.

1 A/CONF.229/2017/8 as adopted 7 July 2017.

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particular to the three countries of Japan, the ROK and the DPRK. Is it possible for these countries to join the treaty? If so, under what conditions? How would their accession to the treaty contribute to achieving a lasting peace and the denuclearization of the region? To help answer these questions, this paper first considers the relationship between the TPNW and extended nuclear deterrence. It then discusses the verified disarmament process under the treaty and its application to the DPRK. TPNW and extended nuclear deterrence At the core of the TPNW is the rejection of the concept of nuclear deterrence. In the preamble, the treaty considers that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the principles and rules of international humanitarian law and expresses concerns at “the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.” Article 1 prohibits all activities involving nuclear weapons: This includes their development, testing, production, possession, use, threat of use and deployment “under any circumstances.” It also prohibits assistance to anyone engaged in any activity prohibited under the treaty.

Nuclear deterrence is a military doctrine in which the display of the readiness to use nuclear weapons against adversaries is employed as a means to discourage them from attacking. In other words, nuclear deterrence is premised on the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the position of any country adopting a nuclear deterrence policy should be understood to be incompatible with them becoming a party to the TPNW. The Japanese government explains that joining the TPNW would “undermine the legitimacy” of the US nuclear deterrence that is essential to Japan's security.2 It should also be noted, however, that the TPNW does not prohibit a country in military alliance with a nuclear-armed state from joining it.

Article 18 provides that the treaty shall not prejudice obligations of other existing international agreements “where those obligations are consistent” with the TPNW. An examination of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the 1953 ROK-US Security Treaty and the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty reveals that none of them explicitly makes provisions for nuclear weapons in any way. Therefore, these non-nuclear-weapon US 2

Foreign Minister Taro Kono's answer at the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, 30 January 2018.

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allies shall be able to join the TPNW as long as they undertake not to engage in any nuclear-weapons-related activities within the alliance.

Many parliamentary debates and studies have been initiated among NATO states and other European countries with regard to the question of if and how these states can join the TPNW.3 One outcome of these ongoing debates is that the Dutch government has made it clear that there is no legal obstacle for the Netherlands to join the treaty.4 In the case of a country that does not have nuclear weapons of its own but is in alliance with a nuclear-armed state, what specific activities are prohibited under the TPNW? Below I examine the question along with the prohibited items under Article 1.

Development, manufacture and possession Non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are already prohibited from receiving, transferring, manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.

These activities are also covered by the TPNW. The TPNW also prohibits the development of nuclear weapons under Article 1 (a), a much broader concept than actual production. While its detailed definition needs to be established in the future, a range of activities that lead to the production of nuclear weapons are to be prohibited by this clause in the interim. This will likely have implications for non-nuclear-weapon states engaged in activities related to nuclear technology.

Deployment, stationing, and “transit” Five NATO non-nuclear-weapons states, Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey, have US nuclear weapons deployed in their territories. The NPT is generally understood as not prohibiting these acts.

But the TPNW explicitly prohibits states parties from the “stationing, installation or deployment” of another country's nuclear weapons in their territories (Article 1 (g)) and obliges states parties with others’ nuclear weapons deployed to declare them (Article 2.1 (c)) and remove them “as soon as possible.” (Article 4.4)

3

For example, see Bonnie Docherty, “New Clinic Reports Call on NATO Members, Sweden to Join Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty,” Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School, 7 June 2018.

4 Susi Snyder “Dutch Government: Only politics stands in the way of joining the TPNW,” PAX, 8 March 2019 37

In Japan's case, not only the 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law but also the NPT, which it ratified in 1976, legally prohibit the production or possession of nuclear weapons. Since their inception in 1967, Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles (not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons) have been regarded as basic national policy 5 , despite never having been adopted into law.

However, secret agreements have existed between the governments of Japan and the US to allow transit and port-calls of nuclear-weaponsequipped vessels despite the declared principle of “non-introduction.”6 The governments have secretly adopted the interpretation that temporary transit and port-calls shall not be regarded as “introduction”. In 2010, the Japanese government admitted to the existence of the secret agreements but has not yet annulled them. Therefore, while Japan remains committed to not stationing, installing or deploying nuclear weapons, it is also poised to allow transit and port-calls should the US decide to carry nuclear weapons on vessels to visit Japan.

In the TPNW negotiation, the question of “transit” was debated. Some countries raised concerns about the explicit prohibition of transit, and it was ultimately excluded from the list of prohibited items. However, “transit” can be understood to be a form of “assistance”, the prohibition of which is covered in Article 1 (e) (f).7 Threat of use As a recipient of extended nuclear deterrence, a country could potentially request that their nuclear-armed ally use nuclear weapons on its behalf. It raises questions in relation to the two clauses of the TPNW about whether this constitutes threatening to use nuclear weapons (Article 1 (d)) and assisting, encouraging or inducing any nuclear-weapons-related activities (Article 1 (e) (f)).

The definition of “threat of use” is not clearly established. On the one hand, deterrence is essentially a policy utilizing the “threatening” effect of nuclear weapons. If a country proclaims that it adopts a policy of nuclear deterrence, the country is signaling to potential adversaries that the use of nuclear weapons cannot be excluded. The International Court 5

“Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan “Secret agreements get along,” The Japan Times, 11 March 2010.

7 Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “The Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: Negotiations and Beyond“, Arms Control Today, Vol.47, No.7, September 2017.

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of Justice, in the 1996 Advisory Opinion, discussed the question of whether “a policy of deterrence” constitutes “threat of force” which is prohibited under Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter although it did not examine its legality.8 On the other hand, a mere policy to rely on nuclear deterrence may not in itself be construed as a threat as it does not communicate the intention of using nuclear weapons to either make demands on adversaries or punish them if those demands are not met.

Therefore, critics could argue that it would be too much of a leap to define a nuclear deterrence policy as threat of use of nuclear weapons in itself.9 The US has declared that it will “defend Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional”10 while Japan recognizes that “the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable” and works closely with the US “to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence.”11 In other words, Japan has adopted a policy premised on the use of nuclear weapons by the US and is actively working to enhance their readiness in this regard. While there is scope to debate whether this directly constitutes “threatening to use” nuclear weapons, Japan’s behavior could be interpreted, at the very least, as “assisting, encouraging or inducing” the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The same should apply to the ROK. Assisting, encouraging, inducing Article 1 (e) of the TPNW prohibits state party actions that “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty.” The definition of assisting, encouraging or inducing should be thoroughly discussed among states parties and consequently codified in the future. If countries like Japan and the ROK consider joining the treaty, a distinction needs to be 8

International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996, para 48 and 67.

9 For the debates of pros and cons having “threat of use” in the nuclear weapons prohibition, see: Hirofumi Tosaki, Nobuo Hayashi, Implication of a Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty for Japan, International Law and Policy Institute, and Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, November 2016, pp. 18-20.

10 Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 10 February 2017.

11

National Security Strategy of Japan, 17 December 2013, pp.16.

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established between what is prohibited as assisting nuclear-weaponsrelated activities and what is not prohibited as “conventional” military cooperation with the US.12 The provision on “assistance” in the TPNW is identical to that of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. So the definition of “assistance” in the Mine Ban Treaty could be applied when discussing nuclear weapons. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) observes that states parties of the Mine Ban Treaty are almost all in agreement that the following activities constitute prohibited assistance.

However, some states still claim that only “active” or “direct” participation is prohibited.13 • • • • •

The participation in the planning for the use of the weapon; The agreement to rules of engagement that permit use of the weapon; The acceptance of orders to use, request others to use, or train others to use the weapon; The knowing derivation of military benefit from the use of the weapon by others; or The provision of security, storage, or transportation for the weapon.

Prior to the TPNW negotiation, the US governments had warned NATO allies that prohibitions of participating in “nuclear war planning” or “targeting of nuclear weapons,” “training personnel to take control of and use” nuclear weapons, or permitting transit or port-calls of nuclearweapons-equipped vessels would be problematic, claiming that they may “destroy the basis for U.S. nuclear extended deterrence.”14 For Japan or the ROK, there is no formal body for nuclear-weapons planning with the US like the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO. But in practice, Japan has been increasingly proactive in consulting with the US on nuclear weapons operations through the Extended Deterrence 12

Stuart Casey-Maslen, “The Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: Interpreting the Ban on Assisting and Encouraging ” Arms Control Today, October 2018 13 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Fact Sheet: Mine Ban Treaty Special Issues of Concern (Article 1, 2, 3) 1999-2014,” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, June 2014, pp 1-2.

14 ICAN, “US pressured NATO states to vote no to a ban, “ 1 November 2016.

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Dialogue since 2010. In this dialogue, Japanese officials reportedly receive briefings by the US Strategic Command, visit ICBM command and strategic submarines, and plan responses to nuclear attacks.15 Both Japan and the ROK have been vocal in their opposition of US nuclear disarmament measures under the Obama administration, including a nofirst-use policy.16 These tell that Japan and the ROK are not just passively covered by nuclear “umbrella” but rather are actively supporting the US readiness to use nuclear weapons. Unless they do away with such “assistance”, they should not be able to join the TPNW. Japan: Constitutional provisions For Japan, its constitutional provisions also matter. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution provides that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” Should a nuclear deterrence policy be regarded as “threat of force,” Japan's security policy would be unconstitutional. The Japanese authorities’ interpretation is, however, that the right to self-defense cannot be denied and that the possession of a “the minimum level of armed force” is allowed under the constitution.

Since the 1970s, the government has maintained that nuclear weapons are theoretically not excluded from “the minimum level” of self-defense although Japan would never choose the option of their use given the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. However, since the TPNW provided that the use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful “under any circumstances,” the concept of “permissible” nuclear weapons for selfdefense has become more questionable than ever.

Despite the so-called “Peace Constitution,” Japan, in practice, maintains strong Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and has been among the world's top-10 military spenders. Since the 1990s, Japan's SDF has expanded its overseas roles in assisting the US military.17 Nonetheless, in order to keep consistency with Article 9, the government has claimed that SDF activities do not constitute “use of force” in themselves or form an 15

Naotaka Fujita, “Japan mum on support for U.S. nuclear umbrella under Obama,” The Asahi Shimbun, 18 May 2018 16 Nobuyasu Abe, “No First Use: How to Overcome Japan’s Great Divide,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 1, 2018, Issue 1. 3 April 2018, pp.137-151.

17 Akira Kawasaki and Celine Nahory, “Japan's Decision on Collective Self-Defense in Context,” The Diplomat, 3 October 2014, 41

“integral part” (ittaika) of the US use of force.18 The Japanese Diet thus has repeatedly debated over what forms an “integral part” of force and what level of logistics support by the SDF to the US military is constitutional. Similar studies are necessary to help define what activities of Japan constitute “assistance” to the US in the context of the use of nuclear weapons.

TPNW and verified nuclear disarmament The TPNW provides pathways for nuclear-armed states to either “destroy nuclear arsenals and join the treaty” (Article 4.1) or “join the treaty and destroy arsenals” (Article 4.2). For the DPRK, the “join and destroy” pathway provides a model for its complete denuclearization. If the DPRK joined the TPNW, it shall declare its possession of nuclear weapons (Article 2.1 (b)), immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them with “a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination” of its nuclear-weapon program, including all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. “A competent international authority or authorities” shall be designated by states parties to deal with nuclear disarmament verification. Practical measures will be discussed at the meeting of states parties and additional protocols to the treaty can be developed (Article 8).

In the context of negotiations with the DPRK, the US government has set the goal of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID).” The process provided by the TPNW (as described in the above paragraph) is none other than a recipe for CVID. It is ironic then, that neither the US nor the ROK, or Japan, has even considered the TPNW approach for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They simply remain hostile to the treaty.

Some critics point out that the safeguard provisions of the TPNW are not strong enough.19 Hypothetically, if a country such as the DPRK, were to destroy its nuclear weapons, it could potentially easily rearm itself at a later date if safeguards are weak. But the treaty's provision is “without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the 18

Akira Kawasaki, “The Cabinet Decision of July 2014: the Basis of the Security Legislation,” Peace Studies Association of Japan, 9 September 2016.

19 Jeffrey Lewis, “Safeguards Challenges in the Nuclear Weapons Ban”, Arms Control Wonk, 10 July 2017.

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future” (Article 3) so, stronger safeguards can be developed in the future.

Otherwise, the TPNW's provision for verified, irreversible nuclear disarmament is sound and comprehensive.

To achieve a complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, legal frameworks other than the TPNW can also be sought – be it a bilateral, trilateral or regional treaty. But in any case, the basic requirements for verified disarmament should be the same as already defined in the TPNW. It could therefore be useful to simulate the DPRK joining the TPNW, and examine practical steps for its denuclearization under international verification. Indeed, the TPNW states parties now have to develop concrete and detailed processes for the first nuclear-armed state joining the treaty. If the ROK and Japan join such discussions, it would be in their own interest to simulate multilateral nuclear disarmament verification to be applied to the DPRK. Even if they are not yet ready to accede to the TPNW, they will be “invited” to participate in the meeting of states parties together with NGOs as observers (Article 8.5).

Conclusion In the long-term, a joint accession by the DPRK, the ROK and Japan to the TPNW would help establish an accountable and sustainable nuclearweapon-free Korean Peninsula and wider Northeast Asia.20 The DPRK would be required, upon its accession, to dismantle all its nuclear weapons programs, subject to international monitoring, in a time-bound, verifiable and irreversible manner. This would no doubt bring about security benefits for the ROK and Japan, and will have a wider positive international impact. But this can only be done if there is a firm strategic decision by the DPRK's leadership to live without nuclear weapons.

International support, including developing capacity for nuclear disarmament verification, would also be essential. This is a field where current supporters and non-supporters of the TPNW can and are encouraged to cooperate. If the US and China join a disarmament verification framework on the Korean Peninsula, it can become an entry point for a regional nuclear disarmament dialogue engaging the nuclear powers.

On the part of the ROK and Japan, they would, upon accession to the TPNW, first be obligated to ensure that no nuclear weapons are stationed 20

Also see ICAN's Roadmap for the Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, June 2018.

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or deployed in their territories, including within US bases. The DPRK has repeatedly called for a verified confirmation of the non-existence of nuclear weapons on the South. The ROK’s accession to the TPNW would address this concern. The ROK and Japan would also need to unambiguously do away with any activities that assist the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons by the US. Given their present deep attachments to nuclear weapons, major shifts in their security policies will be required. Clear definition of “assistance” of nuclear weaponsrelated activities must also be established. Proponents of the traditional concept of the “nuclear umbrella” would criticize such a move as unrealistic. But keeping the readiness to use nuclear weapons would one day result in their actual use, either by design or by accident. Today, the TPNW has declared that the use of nuclear weapons is unlawful under any circumstances, and it is going to enter into force. The ROK and Japan should consider that denuclearizing their own security policies is a realistic, responsible choice that prevents a nuclear catastrophe.21

21

See Hiroshima Roundtable 2017 Chairman's Statement, 1-2 August 2017, hosted by Prefectural Government of Hiroshima, for arguments in support of conventional capability to deter the DPRK 44

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREEZONE IN NORTHEAST ASIA Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan Chairman, NGO Blue Banner Introduction Compared to the conferences and RTDs on promoting peace and security on the Korean peninsula issues just two years ago, the world has witnessed many positive and somehow promising moments since 2018, including the recent meeting of the US President and the Chairman of DPRK’s as well as the trilateral summit meeting of the leaders of the two Koreas and the US at Panmunjom’s Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The USDPRK summit meeting helped to overcome the post Hanoi stalemate in US-DPRK talks by agreeing to re-starting the working level negotiations.

In this article I have chosen to focus on an issue that so far has never been considered at any official level, i.e. the issue of the possibility of establishing a Northeast Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone (NEA-NWFZ).

Establishing a regional NWFZ is rightly considered as a practical contribution to limiting nuclear weapon proliferation and increasing confidence and cooperation within the region and well beyond it. At present the world knows well about five NWFZs that comprise 115 nations. These zones have three common characteristics: 1. Prohibition of development, testing, manufacturing, production, possession, acquisition, stockpiling and transportation of nuclearweapons anywhere within the zone; 2. Prohibition of the use or threat of use nuclear weapons against states and areas within the agreed zone and provision of security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon states (the P5), meaning the United States, the Russian Federation, China, United Kingdom and France.

3. Establishment of an agreed mechanism to ensure compliance with the NWFZ treaty.

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Established Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones The five NWFZs include Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco treaty), the South Pacific (Rarotonga treaty), Southeast Asia (Bangkok treaty), the entire African continent (Palindaba treaty) and Central Asia (Semipalatinsk treaty). Each one of the five NWFZs has its specifics, reflecting the specifics of the region and the relations among the states of the region. All have contributed to strengthening mutual trust and greater cooperation.

In 1998 United Nations General Assembly has welcomed Mongolia as a country with a unique nuclear-weapon-free status and in 2012 the P5 have welcomed “the passage” of Mongolia’s national legislation defining the status and declared that they would respect its unique status and would not contribute to any act that would violate it. In 2009 Mongolia was accepted as member of the international conference of NWFZs and the conference was renamed as the Conference of NWFZs and Mongolia (in short NWFZM conference). Last year United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 73/71 welcomed Mongolia’s offer to act as coordinator of NWFZM conference to be held in 2020 just prior to the 2020 NPT Review conference.

There have been a number of international studies undertaken on NWFZs, namely in 1975 a comprehensive study on the question of NWFZs in all its aspects that contained many concrete ideas and suggestions. The 1999 report of the Disarmament Commission on the issue of “Establishment of NWFZs on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned” provides a number of suggestions and in 2017 a VCDNP1 Task force reported on enhancing cooperation among the NWFZs. All these reports underline the positive role that such zones can play not only in the region but well beyond it.

A Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Establishing a NEA-NWFZ has been proposed by some states of the region since the 1970s but without any follow-up measures. Cold-war suspicion and mutual distrust have also hampered serious consideration of such proposals. Such proposals were either deliberately ignored or it was considered that there should be a radical improvement in the security 1

Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 46

environment to have a look at them seriously. Since 1990s a number of bold initiatives have been made unofficially to establish a NEA-NWFZ. Thus John Endicott of Georgia Tech has proposed to look into the possibility of establishing a limited NWFZ in NEA (LNWFZ-NEA), limited meaning both in respect to geography and weapons2. However the nuclear-weapon states were not supportive.

Then in mid-1990s a proposal was made by Dr. Hiromichi Umebayashi of Peace Depot (Japan) to establish a NWFZ covering the two Koreas and Japan, known as the 3+3 formula, with the US, Russia and China providing appropriate security assurances. Dr. Seongwhun Cheon and Tatsujiro Suzuki proposed a Tripartite NWFZ that would have involved the three nuclear-weapon states at some appropriate later stage of negotiations. In 1995 Andrew Mack of the Australian National University proposed a NWFZ involving not only the two Koreas and Japan, but also Taiwan. For obvious reason it was a non-starter. A year later Dr. Kumao Kaneko of Japan proposed the so-called circular NWFZ consisting of a circular area with a 2000 km radius from the Korean DMZ in which non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon states would have concrete commitments regarding nuclear weapons to be agreed upon.

Recent developments In 2011 Dr. Morton Halperin of the Nautilus institute, a well-known US foreign policy expert, proposed a comprehensive approach to the issue of concluding an agreement on Peace and security in Northeast Asia that would include termination of the state of war, mutual declaration of no hostile intent, creation of a permanent council on security, provision of assistance for nuclear and other energy, termination of sanctions/response to violation of the treaty and establishing a NEA-NWFZ. Based on Dr. Halperin’s broader comprehensive approach, the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), based in Nagasaki, organized 3 workshops during which a number of new ideas have been explored and examined. In 2016 the Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA) was established to provide a venue for frank exchange of views 2

It would remove the non-strategic weapons as a first step towards subsequent reduction of nuclear weapons. Thus the proposed circle zone would cover an area of almost 1200 nautical miles radius from the center of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), while the ellipse zone would cover areas as far as Alaska.

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and ideas among experts, academics and civil society so as to facilitate political processes and elaborate policy recommendations aimed at promoting the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ. Bearing in mind the above post-cold war developments, the UN Advisory board on Disarmament matters in July 2013 recommended to the United Nations Secretary-General to “take action towards establishing a NEANWFZ”. In September of that year at the UN High-Level meeting on disarmament President of Mongolia stated that the country was “prepared, on an informal basis, to work with the countries of NEA to see if and how a NWFZ could be established in the region. Though we know well that that would not be easy and would require courage, political will and perseverance, it is doable.” Since then Blue Banner, Mongolian NGO devoted to promoting full institutionalization of the country’s nuclearweapon-free status, has been working with RECNA and some other interested NGOs and think tanks of the region to promote the idea of establishing NEA-NWFZ. One of the permanent agenda items of the Ulaanbaatar Process (UBP), a track 2 regional dialogue mechanism launched in 2015 by GPPAC’s 3 Northeast Asian focal points in partnership with Blue Banner, is the issue of promoting establishment of NEA-NWFZ. UBP provides political space and venue for civil society organizations of the region, including representatives of the two Koreas, Japan, Russia, China and the US to openly exchange views, information and analysis of the situation on and around the Korean peninsula as well as share the views regarding innovative ideas and concepts regarding the issue. In 2017 Blue Banner voiced the idea of recognizing the DPRK as a de facto nuclear-weapon state and involving the latter’s experts in future consideration of NEA-NWFZ related issues.

A bold conceptual approach is needed The four inter-Korean and the three DPRK-US summit meetings since 2018 have shown that there is a political will to work for denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. However, the sides need first and foremost to agree to clearly define the notion of “denuclearizing the Korean peninsula” since both the post Singapore and post Hanoi discussions have demonstrated that there is a wide conceptual gap in this. As is known, in many cases including in this case, the devil is in details and these need to 3

Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict 48

be addresses carefully. Hence working level negotiations would provide the opportunity to work more seriously towards denuclearization of the Korean peninsula rather than demanding unilateral denuclearization of the DPRK first.

Many scholars, including of Blue Banner, believe that a novel, practically acceptable and doable conceptual approach to the issue of denuclearizing of not only of the Korean peninsula, but of the entire NEA needs to be developed. In other words the issue of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula needs at some stage to be linked to the issue of establishing a NEA-NWFZ, while the bilateral DPRK-U.S. talks need to be expanded to include other former parties to the Six Party Talks, first and foremost the Republic of Korea. As things stand today it would almost take a miracle to convince the DPRK to agree to fully denuclearize itself and thus part with its nuclear weapons and/or its nuclear weapons infrastructure. This could be accomplished as a result of long and tortuous negotiations and exceptional bargaining. The question is whether the sides can come to an agreement on it. In order to do that a bold conceptual approach is needed.

In the meantime the DPRK might opt to keep its weapons or at least some of them, if not increase or further modernize them. A logical question arises in that case as to whether Japan or the Republic of Korea, both technologically nuclear capable states, would allow it to happen.

Will they allow the US to accept the DPRK as a de facto nuclear-weapon state as long as the latter’s weapons would be incapable of reaching the US territory, meaning that the US might tolerate DPRK’s weapons that theoretically would threaten its two allies in NEA. Would its two allies agree to that? Even the question of the temporary freeze of nuclearrelated activities during possible US-DRPK negotiations would lead to heated discussions and would need a strict verification agreement and mechanism. And would the DPRK be satisfied with the sole US security assurances? Wouldn’t the de facto recognition of DPRK as a nuclear weapon state embolden it in regards to Japan and the Republic of Korea?

Mindful of nuclear weapon states’ past practice the DPRK would feel more assured and comfortable by acquiring additional assurances from its former allies – Russia and China - that the US would keep its part of the deal regarding the security assurances. There is also the issue of how to ensure that the talks of economic assistance to and investment in the DPRK’s economy would in practice benefit the latter and not serve only as a verbal incentive for moving the political process. There is also the broader question of how all these would affect the NPT regime.

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Then there is a broader issue of the US nuclear umbrella extended to Japan and the Republic of Korea, known as the “extended” nuclear deterrence that not only protects them but also prevents them from acquiring nuclear weapons themselves. Since Japan and the Republic of Korea are both non-nuclear states, the question would arise whether there is a need to provide them with extended ‘nuclear’ deterrence if the Korean peninsula is properly denuclearized. Frankly speaking the US and each one of its two allies have much stronger conventional arsenals to counter effectively any non-nuclear threats. Blue Banner believes that US extended nuclear deterrence and strategic ambiguity in ruling out the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons to respond to non-nuclear threats to itself and the allies does not contribute to greater confidence nor to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and policies, the policies that are supported by the overwhelming majority of the international community.

In that sense a sole purpose nuclear weapons use declaration by the nuclear weapon states, i.e. as long as nuclear weapons existed it would be used only in response to the use of nuclear weapons, would play a positive, reassuring role in NEA. Extended deterrence that excludes nuclear weapons would, until an appropriate security mechanism is agreed upon, retain the basic bilateral security commitments of the US to Japan and the Republic of Korea as well as constrain the latter two from pursuing and developing their own nuclear weapons. If nuclear deterrence is perceived widely today as part of the regional security problem, the ‘non-nuclear’ deterrence can become part of the solution since it would contribute to greater predictability and stability and hence would avert a possible uncontrollable chain reaction leading to the regional nuclear arms race. This would also lead to ‘denuclearizing’ regional war planning and military exercises.

Such tailored ‘non-nuclear’ extended deterrence would open the way to start discussing the issue of establishing a NEA-NWFZ. It is too early to discuss the possible content of a treaty establishing a NWFZ4, however the three nuclear weapon states, i.e. the US, Russia and China, would be expected to provide legally based security assurances to the DPRK, the 4

Though as mentioned earlier, there are already a number of concrete practical proposals that could form the basis of discussion of the issue.

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Republic of Korea and Japan, while Russia and China would make sure that the US assurance is also politically credible. Content wise, the NEANWFZ treaty could also have provisions on providing economic assistance to the DPRK, as alluded to on a number of occasions by the US President. Politically, establishment of NEA-NWFZ would show that DPRK’s stance cannot be used as a justification for keeping or pursuing regional missile defense or counter defense systems in the region.

Blue Banner supports the positive and promising movements registered since the 2018 winter Olympic games and is prepared to work with the like-minded NGOs and think tanks to support and promote the positive signs and gestures in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula as agreed in principle at the 2018 Singapore US-DPRK summit and reaffirmed at the Panmunjom summit. Hence it is prepared to continue to share views on creating conditions for discussing and establishing a NEA-NWFZ which would benefit all the countries of the region and the region as a whole.

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THE NUCLEAR STATUS OF THE DPRK AND THE NEW REGIONAL ORDER Anastasia O. Barannikova Ph.D, Research Fellow, ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University The officially declared goal of the United States and others in the continuing dialogue with the DPRK is its verifiable nuclear disarmament; the goal of the latter is to obtain the no less verifiable security guarantees from the US. However, no country concerned has a clear concept of both denuclearization and normalization or the ways in which these goals can be achieved. The lack of flexibility shows a divergence between the official and real goals of the countries in the dialogue. Indeed, signing an agreement with the US cannot be a major goal of the DPRK as agreements between any states have short lifespans and can be easily sacrificed for the national interests of the stronger country. As for the nuclear disarmament of the DPRK, the consequences of this for regional security would be much more serious than those of the development of the country's nuclear weapons.

DPRK's Motivating Factors and Strategic Goals There are many approaches to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Officially, the US promotes the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of the Korean Peninsula but limited to its Northern part 1 . DPRK insists on CVID of the whole Korean Peninsula, which would inevitably require the removal of the US nuclear umbrella for ROK2. There are also other approaches proposed by experts

1

Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Kang Kyungwha at a Press Availability”, U.S Department of State, accessed August 8, 2019. https://www.state.gov/remarks-with-republic-of-korea-foreign-minister-kang-kyungwha-at-a-press-availability/ 2 Korean News, “Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is DPRK's Invariable Stand”, accessed August 8, 2019. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201309/news29/2013092906ee.html.

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of different countries: “Managing deterrence” 3 , Hecker's roadmap 4 , CRID model5 etc. Each of the considered approaches has both strengths and weaknesses, but they have a common drawback: Only the DPRK is considered the subject of denuclearization. This contradicts the very concept of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It should be noted that none of the approaches takes into account the factors motivating the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons and its strategic goals.

First, the possession of nuclear weapons is considered by the DPRK as a security guarantee. It was the threat to its security, which once pushed the DPRK to develop nuclear weapons many years ago. In the course of the Korean War, the US leadership was seriously considering the option of a nuclear strike on North Korea6. The United States conducted a series of training atomic bombings of North Korea involving B-29s and created “Operation Plan 8-53” providing for the use of “large numbers of nuclear weapons” against China, Manchuria and the DPRK7. These plans have never been implemented but they pushed the DPRK to developing its national nuclear program for the purposes of national security. The threats to the DPRK have since changed but nuclear weapons have become an integral element of the DPRK’s security system. Military and nuclear doctrines of the DPRK (which are not publicized but can be inferred based on official statements) rely on nuclear weapons as the main deterrent of external threats. Nuclear disarmament would automatically deprive the DPRK of this deterrent and reduce its ability to respond to large-scale enemy aggression, even with the use of 3

Warden, John K., Panda, Ankit, “Goals for any arms control proposal with North Korea”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, accessed 13 February, 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/02/goals-for-any-arms-control-proposal-with-north-korea/ 4 Hecker, Siegfried S., Carlin, Robert L. and Serbin, Elliot A., “A technically-informed roadmap for North Korea’s denuclearization”, Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University, accessed 28 May, 2018, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/cisac-north-korea.

5 Toloraya, Georgy, “From CVID to CRID: A Russian Perspective”, 38North.org, accessed 26 December, 2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/12/gtoloraya122618/ 6 Wayne Thompson, Bernard C. Nalty, “Within limits: the US Air Force and the Korean War”, Air Force History and Museums Program 1996; Harry S. Truman, “The President’s News Conference”, The American Presidency Project, November 30, 1950. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/news_conferences.php?year=1950.

7 Korean War Project. Operation Plan 8-53: MAR RCT LEX III. 1ST Marine Division [REINF] FMF [NOTE: FOLDER 2 OF 2] http://www.recordsofwar.com/korea/USMC/Box%2020-12.pdf 53

conventional weapons. As a result, the country would become weak and vulnerable with its security endangered.

For many years the international community and Northeast Asian states did their best to deprive the DPRK of other forms of security. The DPRK could not rely on allies, military and technical cooperation or adequate security guarantees; no country shared military technologies and weapons which could form the defense system of the DPRK; economic sanctions led to budget shortages and a huge gap in military technology between the DPRK and its potential enemies.

Security is not the only factor that motivates the DPRK to develop its own nuclear potential. Political considerations are no less important. Its nuclear arsenal has become an integral part of the domestic policy of the country and a symbol of its prestige. The nuclear status of the DPRK was enshrined in its constitution in 2012 and plays an important role in internal propaganda. Moreover, the nation’s nuclear potential justifies the hardships and low standard of living its people have suffered for many years. At the same time the ability of the country to develop these weapons like “major powers” have done and its new status as the “nuclear power of the East” engenders national pride. The abandonment of nuclear weapons in such circumstances would undoubtedly have serious consequences both for security as well as the image of North Korea’s leadership. Furthermore, it would question the future of the regime as the nuclear weapon defends it both from external and internal threats. The only way to disarm the DPRK is through global denuclearization (of course, this would have to be initiated by the largest nuclear weapons) or the development of an even more powerful weapon.

Having now successfully completed the development of its nuclear weapons and having become a de facto nuclear state, the DPRK’S status is not just a matter of security and prestige. The DPRK'S nuclear status can help the country to achieve certain foreign policy goals as well.

Reunification is undoubtedly one of them. However, reunification through the absorption of one system by another is impossible and technically unfeasible and its shortcomings are well understood both in South and North Korea8. North Korea has its own vision of reunification 8

Lee, Jae-ho, “Even if North Korea collapses, it will not be possible to unification under international law” (이재호. 북한 붕괴해도 국제법상 흡수통일은 불가능), Pressian.com, accessed 12 September, 2013. http://m.pressian.com/m/m_article/?no=7272#08gq 54

- unchanged for decades: One nation – two systems9. It promises not unification in the full sense but rather the coexistence and cooperation of two independent countries. It has the potential to promote integration processes and to lead to establishing a political system on the Peninsula that Koreans find attractive.

One important consideration remains; that the Korean Peninsula be neutral in its foreign policy. This was first pointed out by Kim Il Sung when he proposed the idea of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo. It is also suggested that Kim Jong Un, while studying in Switzerland, became interested in the historical experience of that country as a neutral state. If Korea had had such a status in the previous century, the Korean War and subsequent division of the Peninsula could have been avoided. Even now, both Korean states are actively involved in the rivalry between the US and the People's Republic of China. As the status of the DPRK has changed, its chances of finding its place in the sun have increased. However, to achieve this goal, the DPRK needs its nuclear potential, which has already proven itself to be an efficient tool for foreign policy. Korea has historically been a “strategic plaything” in the confrontation of “great powers”. Thanks to its nuclear weapons, North Korea now has the opportunity to become a “strategic player”.

Even the most flexible approaches to denuclearization or US-DPRK normalization do not consider the abovementioned strategic goals. They provide compensation for the removal of North Korean nuclear weapons as a means of security only. But what about the other functions of this weapon? If it has become a symbol of North Korea’s prestige and an integral part of its ideology, disarmament could very well destabilize the regime. If a nuclear deterrent has been created in order to achieve geopolitical goals, it is clear that North Korea can give it up only after having achieved these goals.

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«Декларация о развитии отношений Севера и Юга, о мире и процветании», Uriminzokkiri.com, accessed 4 October, 2007. http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?lang=rus&ftype=tongil&no=2; The July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, United Nations Peacemaker, accessed 8 August, 2019. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_720704_The%20Ju ly%204%20South-North%20Joint%20Communiqu%C3%A9.pdf 55

Nuclear Status of the DPRK and Other States' Interests Recent events show that the countries involved in dialogues on the issue of security on the Korean Peninsula intentionally repeat the mistakes of the six-party talks. It is unlikely that the US leadership was not aware of the position of the DPRK on the issue of denuclearization. The refusal of the DPRK to make unilateral concessions without any reliable guarantees was also not surprising. This approach could perhaps have been justified in the 2000s when the DPRK did not have nuclear weapons, struggled under serious economic problems and could conceivably make concessions. Now, however, using these old approaches simply seems strange. There are two possible explanations for the continued use of these inefficient tactics. First, the major powers in question are ignoring the shifting balance of power in Northeast Asia and still consider the world to be uni- or bi-polar. Second, the large powers are fully aware of this shift but are trying to postpone the inevitable and maintain the status quo; with one very important oversight – The North Korean regime and its de facto nuclear status are integral parts of the status quo. If this is the case, it means that denuclearization cannot be the real goal of the big powers.

The North Korean nuclear program caused the destabilization of the security system in Northeast Asia in the initial stage of its development.

However, the initiation of a military nuclear program by the DPRK could not have been a surprise for the big powers as those states actively contributed to creating the current nuclear potential of the DPRK. Legally recognized nuclear powers shared their technologies in the early stages of North Korea’s nuclear program, allowed later leakages of those technologies, and failed to give security guarantees when the country was ready to agree on disarmament. The instability caused by the DPRK’s nuclear weapons has being maintained artificially by regional actors for many years. However, constant instability could be considered as a new kind of stability with the nuclear weapons of the DPRK as a stabilizer. In June 2018, a similar opinion was voiced by American experts in articles entitled “Why the United States Needs North Korea to Stay Nuclear? ”10 10

Hongyu Zhang, Kevin Wang, “Why the United States Needs North Korea to Stay Nuclear”, The National Interest, accessed 24 June, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-united-states-needs-north-korea-staynuclear26382?fbclid=IwAR15N7MLHryXGdQBO7cIweJjt65HPhZv2eYaEDdr5_dL0AJQ3Qk -MT3Xkb4.

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and “North Korea Is a Nuclear Power. Get Used to It”11 among others.

The leadership of the United States, most likely, has already “got used” to the nuclear status of the DPRK. However, it maintains instability around it in the interest of its own geopolitical gains. The fact that American experts have started talking about it openly may indicate a shift in US foreign policy strategy and the changing role of the DPRK. However, ongoing contradictions and disagreements within the government of US will continue to influence its official stance.

The DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons in fact serves the geopolitical interests of the United States and other countries, including Russia and China. Both countries view stable North Korea as more important than denuclearized one12. Indeed, nuclear weapons guarantee the security of the current North Korean regime. They prevent any attempts of violent regime change by external forces and grant North Korean leadership opportunities to develop the country independently. The security of the regime, in turn, guarantees stability near PRC-DPRK and RF-DPRK borders. A stable regime in the DPRK not only guarantees the absence of refugee flows, which are typical zones of armed conflicts and civil wars.

This also prevents US troops from being deployed on the territory of the DPRK. As for the United States, the nuclear status of the DPRK serves US interests simply because a nuclear North Korea will not fall under the total influence of neighboring countries. It will remain a relatively independent state, currently serving a role of buffer, and subsequently capable of deterring others. Despite the official rhetoric, United States has demonstrated their real attitude to denuclearization this year. First, the US withdrew from the deal with Iran thus negating any deals and agreements of such kind; and second, it made no concessions and took no steps towards the DPRK. This has made North Koreans believe that the US has pushed them to stop bilateral dialogue and continue their nuclear activities.

11

Vipin Narang, Ankit Panda, “North Korea is a nuclear power. Get used to it”, The New York Times, accessed 12 June, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/opinion/trump-kim-summit-denuclearizationnorthkorea.html?fbclid=IwAR2Eh33lXPUdrutitKwLSAhWDEoj54myuUCtH0TkLJolask_a GRv5KppAi8.

12 Philip, Sherwell, “China accepts nuclear North Korea and thinks US must do so too”, The Times, accessed 3 December, 2017. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chinaaccepts-nuclear-north-and-thinks-us-must-do-so-too-qw59p5v2t.

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In recent years, the nuclear program of the DPRK has been used as a reason for the militarization of all the countries of the Northeast Asian region including Russia and China. The progress of North Korea in the nuclear and missile development sphere in recent years has had a significant impact on the balance of powers in the region: Along with strengthening the position of the DPRK itself, it has served as a pretext for an arms race involving all the countries of the region. United States have used these tensions as justifications for deploying missile defence systems in ROK, useless against the DPRK but capable of deterring Chinese missiles13. Russia and China are advancing their own strategic forces and missile defense systems and strengthening troops in the Far East14. Japan, under the pretext of protection against a "North Korean threat", has modernized its fleet, which now exceeds the needs of selfdefense15. It is now considering the deployment of US missile defense systems on its own territory. ROK launched new KSS-III missile submarine last year. The specifics of the submarine (long endurance and capability of launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles) made observers suspect Seoul in laying the foundations for deploying sea-based nuclear deterrence16. The arms race has spread beyond Northeast Asia, involving Pakistan, India, Iran, and Israel. Since this arms race has not yet finished, the countries involved would clearly not be interested in the removal of the pretext for it, or in any change of the status quo.

The DPRK's nuclear weapons have become an integral part of the modern Northeast Asian security environment. Integration processes on 13

Williams, Jennifer, “THAAD, the missile defense system kicking off a new US-China fight, explained” // Vox Media, accessed 2 May, 2017. https://www.vox.com/world/2017/3/10/14882778/thaad-south-korea-missile-defensesystem-china-explained.

14 Gertz, Bill, “Hypersonic missiles from China, Russia pose growing danger to U.S.”, The Washington Free Beacon, accessed 30 November, 2016. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/air-force-hypersonic-missiles-china-russia-posegrowing-danger-u-s/; Sitdikov, Ramil, “Will Russia and China build an SCO-based joint missile defense system?”, Sputnik, accessed 20 July, 2016. https://sputniknews.com/military/201607201043363315-russia-china-joint-missiledefense/ 15 Bercuson, David J. “Why Japan is building its military fast”, National Post, accessed 6 November, 2018. https://nationalpost.com/opinion/david-j-bercuson-why-japan-isbuilding-its-military-fast.

16 Roblin, Sebastien, “Are South Korean Submarines About to Go Nuclear?”, The National Interest, accessed 9 March, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/aresouth-korean-submarines-about-go-nuclear-46582.

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the Korean Peninsula started independently of (or against) the will of the “great powers”. The growth of China has weakened the US' position in Northeast Asia and now one can't speak about American dominance in the region. Moreover, one can't speak about any country’s dominance.

Despite the fact that China is allegedly trying to take the place of the United States, the processes in the region are more complicated than those of a bipolar and even multipolar world. We can speak about emerging “centers of power”17 in the world and Korean Peninsula is one of them. Yes, there may still be cold war-type thinking in the region; but without military blocs. China, Russia and the DPRK are independent military powers. It has become possible because all of them are nuclear countries. If China and the DPRK had not started nuclear programs they could very well have become satellites of the USSR and would have suffered from its collapse even more severely. The cold war would never have ended in that case. Thanks to the nuclear status of these countries, there is no military alliance opposed to the U.S.-Japan-ROK triangle. We have politically and militarily independent countries instead.

Denuclearization would inevitably lead to drastic changes and, in fact, would cause another change of regional order. The countries of the region that have not yet recovered from the recent changes will obviously not be ready for new ones. Therefore, it is in the interest of all participants in the current dialogue process around the DPRK to slow down inevitable change. We can expect that denuclearization talks will be just talks, buying time for North Korea, the US, and China to adjust to new realities in Northeast Asia.

17

Lavrov, Sergey, “Russia in the 21st-Century World of Power”, Russia in Global Affairs, accessed 27 December, 2012. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russia-in-the21st-Century-World-of-Power-15809.

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CHAPTER 3

Making a Habit of Dialogue: the Role of Civil Society

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THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY AND PEACE DIALOGUE: PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS FOR RECONCILIATION Kathy R. Matsui Department of Global Citizenship Studies, Seisen University Peace and security in Northeast Asia may depend upon developing relationships among nations based on mutual respect and trust; this relationship building may be especially important as historical scars have not been fully healed since the end of World War II. Japan also faces territorial issues with neighboring nations. Tensions in Northeast Asia are also a result of an increase in military spending. There is a need to identify peaceful methods for establishing a foundation for reconciliation and diplomatic relations. Conflict transformation processes and negotiations may resolve the tensions, but it is difficult to heal the deep hurt and bitterness in the minds and hearts of those who were victims to extreme violence and violations of human dignity. Reconciliation may have a crucial role to play in the healing process of the Northeast Asian Region. The process of reconciliation involves uncovering the truth, offering sincere apologies, achieving forgiveness, developing empathy, making amends, respecting human rights, working for an inclusive society (Tutu, 1999) and hundreds and thousands of dialogues. This article will introduce the definition, process and mechanism of reconciliation. Later, the article seeks to discover ways to apply the reconciliation process in Northeast Asia.

The Process and Mechanism of Reconciliation When a relationship is disrupted, our well-being is threatened.

Reconciliation seeks to reestablish a harmonious relationship. It seeks to reestablish trust when trust is broken. However, reestablishment of that relationship and trust is only possible with the process of true reconciliation, described as follows by Tutu (1999): True reconciliation exposes the awfulness, the abuse, the pain, the 61

degradation, the truth. It could even sometimes make things worse.

It is a risky undertaking but in the end, it is worthwhile, because in the end dealing with the real situation helps to bring real healing. (p. 271) Reconciliation is not achieved overnight. It is a long-term process, and all people concerned, victims and perpetrators, need to strive for its achievement by making amends, respecting human rights, and working for an inclusive community of one family, bound together in a delicate network of interdependence. Enright (2001) clarified that reconciliation is an act of two parties that requires the parties to renew trust and resume a relationship after a period of estrangement (p. 31).

The current Japanese Prime Minister Abe mentioned early this year that he will not have dialogue simply in order to have further dialogue with North Korea. However, many pre-dialogues are needed in order to create the opportunity for dialogue. There were incidents involving the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea between 1970 and 1980.

North Korea acknowledged this and allowed five victims to return to Japan temporarily, but the Japanese government violated this agreement and refused to return them back to North Korea. Japan is determined to have all the abductees return home and states that diplomatic relations with North Korea are not possible until this issue is resolved. Further efforts to have dialogue are needed to resolve this issue and build a better relationship for peace in Northeast Asia.

Dialogue plays an important role in achieving emotional attunement of the parties involved. One act of dialogue may not be enough.

Reconciliation may require hundreds of dialogues or even thousands.

The founder of Sustained Dialogue, Harold Henry (Hal) Saunders has served past Presidents of the United States: D. Eisenhower, J.F Kennedy, L.B. Johnson, R. Nixon and J. Carter in international affairs. Saunders was a key participant in the Camp David Accords and helped negotiate during the Iran Hostage Crisis and developed the sustained dialogue model for resolving conflicts. At the GPPAC related Conflict Resolution Education Conference held in 2015 at the George Mason University in Washington D.C., Saunders mentioned that it took him 5 years of dialogue between Palestine and Israel until he finally was able to reach the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1978.

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Lederach (2003) describes the process of conflict transformation: “Conflict transformation suggests that a fundamental way to promote constructive change on all these levels (interpersonal, inter-group and social-structural) is dialogue. Dialogue is essential to justice and peace on both an interpersonal and a structural level. It is not the only mechanism, but it is an essential one.� (p.21) Furthermore, the order of discussion (Positive Future, negative future, positive past and negative past) during dialogue also plays a crucial role.

Norwegian Peace Studies expert J. Galtung described his negotiation experience with the leaders in Afghanistan. At the dialogue roundtable, the leaders of Afghanistan clashed with differences of perspectives and ideas. When Galtung asked the leaders how they would like Afghanistan to be 30 years from now, they all responded in unison that they wanted to see peace in their country. Galtung reminded them that if the present conflict continues, there would not be a peaceful future. Then he asked them how Afghanistan was 30 years ago, and all the leaders again answered in unison that it was a peaceful country and that the negative past began with conflict. Through this discussion the leaders realized what the root of the conflict was and were able to continue their talk with respect and a shared vision. Reconciliation requires a process of relational transformation.

From the experience given above, reconciliation in Northeast Asia would require hundreds and thousands of dialogues, instead of threats and economic sanctions; instead of dividing and labeling societies as good or bad. If opportunities for true dialogue are made possible, then the countries of Northeast Asia will probably share the same hope for a positive future.

Uncovering the Truth Those who have been the instruments and perpetrators of oppression must deal with their past in a way that sets them free from shame and guilt whether acknowledged or repressed, as well as from the attempt to cling to unjust privilege to the disadvantage of others. Those who have been victims of oppression have to remember the past correctly, so that they are set free from a soul-destroying bitterness and uncontrollable desires for vengeance.

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Japan is still being criticized for not fulfilling its moral obligation and social responsibility towards the victims of the military atrocities and violations against humanity it committed during its colonization of countries in Northeast Asia and during World War II. Unless these issues have been properly addressed by Japan, the perpetrator, it would be very difficult to establish a good relationship between Japan and its neighboring countries in Northeast Asia and the Pacific. Ogawa (2000), a staff writer of Harvard International Review, explains, “Japan’s World War II occupation of a substantial part of Asia left indelible scars. The Nanking Massacre and the plight of the Korean ‘comfort women,’ stand out among examples of Japanese cruelty during the war era” (p. 42).

If human injustice is committed, it is important to restore honor to those who have been treated in an undignified way. There is a need to uphold the basic human rights for the dignity of human life and pursuit of justice.

Processes of public forgiveness, apology, justice, and reconciliation are considered instruments for social healing (Montiel, 2002, p. 221). The victims of Japan’s military sexual slavery have carried the hurt and shame for more than 70 years. In addition to legal reparations and sincere public apology by the Japanese government, there is a strong need for the victims to find means to restore their dignity, to heal the past, and overcome historical trauma.

Truth must be uncovered, and guilt acknowledged for the region to move beyond the past, to be healed, and to feel renewed. For healing to take place, De Gruchy (2002) noted that the perpetrator needs to honestly admit the wrong done and to have sincere remorse: Whether necessary for amnesty or not, an honest recognition of guilt and genuine remorse is necessary for the healing of perpetrators and makes forgiveness, and therefore the healing of victims, more probable….

We need to recognize ourselves in our guilt, and therefore come to appreciate that accepting responsibility for the past will in fact set us free from its destructive potential. (p. 199) This acknowledgement of guilt can serve as the basis of a new commitment to restore justice.

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The Role of the Apology An act of apology humbles the offender and offers the offended the power to forgive. A collective apology would diminish the resentment that has been built up in a person over the years. To apologize is to lower oneself; it is an act of humility. Apologizing is necessary for a nation to be at peace with the countries they have done wrong to.

More than seventy years have passed since the end of World War II, yet to this day, the Japanese government has been the focus of criticism for not taking adequate responsibility for the military atrocities committed in the past. Er (2002) states that “grudging offers of deep reflection and remorse (but not amounting to a genuine apology) to its neighbors (from Japan), coupled with Chinese and Korean refusals to forgive and forget past atrocities, have led to profound distrust among the countries involved” (p. 34). Furthermore, Er argued that Japan’s refusal to officially apologize for its wrongdoings during occupation and its military aggression would be an obstacle to establishing a good relation between Japan and its neighboring countries (p. 33). Japan would have to acknowledge wrongdoing, articulate sincere sorrow, and apologize for the harm done, if peace was to be obtained. (Matsui, 2019 p.219) Forgiveness is a complex process. Tutu (1999) claimed that unless the perpetrator acknowledges the wrong done to the victim, the process of forgiveness and healing is not possible (p. 270). Past atrocities committed during conflicts remain as scars in the memories of the victims. Those who were harmed carry a long history of grievances and unless these memories are identified and understood, reconciliation will not be achievable. Montiel (2002) explained, “public forgiveness requires sensitivity to the historical, cultural, and political contexts of both conflicting groups. Because of its context sensitivity, there is no unitary formula for public forgiveness, except perhaps a respect for pluralism and local experimentation” (p. 271).

A sincere apology from the perpetrators is mandatory, if the victims are to overcome a traumatic past and embrace healing. Transgression involves both perpetrators and victims. The victims have the choice to forgive. Perpetrators, too, have the choice to (a) feel truly sorry for the wrong committed, (b) promise never to repeat the same wrongdoings, and (c) make an effort to make up for their horrendous acts. Some 65

perpetrators, however, may choose to deny their wrong deeds. The perpetrator’s attitude can have a large impact on the victim.

Further research of this reconciliation process is needed to search for an appropriate method to be applied in Northeast Asia, to heal the past and move forward.

The Role of Forgiveness in Reconciliation Forgiveness is an internal process, whereas reconciliation is an external, interpersonal process. Forgiveness is granted or received, whereas reconciliation is earned through trustworthy behavior. The process of reconciliation is a restoration of trust among the participants.

(Worthington et al., 2000, p. 229). Reconciliation is not possible without forgiveness, nor is it possible if the offender is not repentant. In other words, a person may forgive but not reconcile, but forgiveness is necessary for reconciliation.

Emerson (1964) described the concept of forgiveness from various perspectives. According to the original Hebrew word, forgive means “to have a weight lifted (p. 75). The Bible relates forgiveness to strength and the freedom to be newly creative. From the Christian perspective, people forgive others as they are already forgiven by God (Emerson, 1964, p.

147). The Christian faith revolves around this concept, and Christians are encouraged to give themselves openly to others, even if others hurt them; for humanity, there is no life where there is no forgiveness (Emerson, 1954, p. 188).

Buddhism mentions the importance of transforming the pain inflicted by others and embracing anger and suffering (Hanh, 1998, p. 193). When people are angry at someone, they have the tendency to punish those who have hurt them. However, the Buddha teaches that such an act of retribution will cause more suffering. Kornfield (2008) stated: In Buddhist philosophy, forgiveness is not presented as a moral commandment —“Thou shalt forgive.” It is understood as a way to end suffering, to bring dignity and harmony to our lives. Forgiveness is fundamentally for our own sake, for our own mental health. It is a way to let go of the pain we carry. Practicing forgiveness, we may go through stages of grief, rage, sorrow, hurt, and confusion. As we let ourselves feel 66

the pain we still hold, forgiveness comes as a relief, a release for our heart in the end. (p. 346) Buddhism also suggests that the people who make others suffer actually are the ones who need help and guidance to end their suffering (Hanh, 1998, p. 196).

Role of Empathy in Reconciliation Empathy can enhance the reciprocal nature of the reconciliation process.

Worthington et al. (2000) found that, in group interventions to promote forgiveness, people with empathic capacity were more likely to benefit from forgiveness treatment (p. 241).

The process of reconciliation can be described using a medical metaphor where empathy is the antiseptic and forgiveness is the bandage keeping away threats of infection. Love is the heart pump of healing, bringing the lifeblood to nourish the relationship and absorb germs (Worthington, 2003 p. 179). Empathy can also help people develop the capacity to see a mass of humanity as individual human beings with individual souls, as a throbbing human soul that loves and hates, toils and tries, laughs and weeps in bitter tears. (De Gruchy, 2002 p. 64).

Empathy can help the transgressors imagine others’ suffering and lead them to apologize. Empathy can help the victims know how the transgressor feels and allow them to replace negative feelings with positive emotions.

Empathy can transform unforgiveness into a willingness to forgive.

In addition to empathy, Worthington (2003) mentioned the characteristics of humility and the absence of pride as, “character traits that most predict being willing to risk seeking forgiveness� (p. 196). Pride discourages people from seeking reconciliation. True humility allows one to think about and care for others. Along with empathy, humility is an emotion that can help replace negative feelings with positive feelings, promoting healing.

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Making Amends, Respecting Human Rights, and Working for an Inclusive Society through Restorative Justice In general, justice pursued by criminal law requires that the level of punishment be proportionate to the severity of the wrongdoings committed. This type of justice is known as retributive justice. In contrast, restorative justice is a form of justice that is relational and social.

The emphasis of restorative justice is on rehabilitation, on compensation, on the recovery of dignity and the healing of social wounds. Similarly, restorative justice is part of the process of reconciliation as it seeks to restore a relationship that has been broken by human rights violations and to make healing possible.

Tutu (1999) mentioned that justice fails if people only seek retributive justice, since that concentrates on the punitive aspect and does not take into account the victims. In contrast, he claims that restorative justice is the means to recover certain characteristics of the traditional African practice of ubuntu: In the spirit of ubuntu, the central concern is the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he has injured by his offense. (pp. 54-55) Thus, restorative justice seeks healing, and reconciliation. In the case of South Africa, both the victims and the transgressors are still alive and are bound to live in the same area. In the case of Northeast Asia, both the victims and the perpetrators of the past war are living in the same region and they, too, are locked in cohabitation, with the perpetrators often living a privileged economically strong existence. Thus, a similar reconciliation process that rehabilitates both the victims and the transgressors may be the key to promoting positive relations in Northeast Asia.

Worthington (2003) noted that seeking justice is restoring “the balance that was upset‌. But achieving justice is no guarantee that reconciliation will occurâ€? (p. 182). Justice can act as an agent to process transition from conflict to reconciliation.

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Atonement may include building trust, revealing the truth, acknowledging the wrong, stating an apology, and paying compensation.

As Jeong (1999) explained: Building trust has to follow overcoming past wounds of victimization by such means as acknowledgement of past crimes and expression of contrition…. Exposure and full accounting of the past ought to lead to an apology on the part of aggressors.

Material compensations as well as apologies can be offered at both an individual and institutional level to make good for past damages. (p. 25) Compensation and reparation can be key elements in making reconciliation possible. Compensation does not necessarily mean just monetary payments, but could take other forms, such as a memorial.

Moreover, compensation is important in establishing a long-term vision of social transformation. Tutu (1999) also stated the importance of compensation as a matter of reparation, “without adequate reparation and rehabilitation measures, there can be no healing and reconciliation, either at an individual or a community level” (p. 58).

De Gruchy (2002) noted that restorative justice involves more than just compensation or restitution: Restorative justice is rather the attempt to recover certain neglected dimensions that make for a more complete understanding of justice. Its emphasis is on rehabilitation, on compensation, on the recovery of dignity and the healing of social wounds. (p. 202) Furthermore, Sullivan and Tifft (2005) mentioned a needs-based approach to restorative justice that weighs the importance of involving everyone concerned and listens to the voice of each, striving to ensure: Everyone feels that his or her present needs are being presented, acknowledged, respected, and met, and, therefore, feels justly treated….The aim of needs-based, restorative justice is to respond to the unique needs of each person, and thereby achieve a level of "equal well-being" that expands the collective well69

being of all. (p. 113) Thus, restorative justice is not complete unless the victims’ individual needs are understood and met. Needs-based restorative justice also strives to restore the well-being of the wrong-doers, in hopes of improving the collective well-being of all citizens. A process of restorative justice is encouraged in Northeast Asia to listen to the needs and pain of the victims of Japanese atrocities during the years of colonization and World War II. Northeast Asian Civil Society’s Efforts to Create a Lasting Peace Peacebuilding addresses structural issues and the long-term relationships between parties in conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p. 30). Efforts at peacebuilding are actively undertaken by civil society. To conduct healing, reconciliation, and peacebuilding, there is a need for civil actors to perform these processes. The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) was formed by worldwide civil society organizations to contribute to the process of reconciliation where governments and the United Nations fall short. The GPPAC collaborative network of civil society organizations includes citizens of various sectors and disciplines, all the way from the community to the international level.

These are citizens who joined together to make conflict prevention a sustainable and achievable objective.

Another process would be a learning process through peacebuilding training. NARPI is designed to educate peace leaders to build a culture of peace and to transform Northeast Asia, with all its potential for conflict, into a resourceful region of collaboration and peace. The Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute (NARPI) began in 2009 with the aim of strengthening and empowering people in Northeast Asia through providing peacebuilding training and building cross-cultural networks.

Another process would be led by religious leaders of the Northeast Asian region. The International Peace Corps of Religions (IPCR) plays that leadership role. IPCR consists of participants of various religious traditions and meets every year either in Korea or in Japan to share research findings and to discuss issues in the region.

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Each of these processes highlights actions to restore and maintain peace in Northeast Asia that should be taken immediately. There are issues in the region that have not been resolved for more than 60 years, since the end of WW II. There are domestic and regional conflicts that the Northeast Asian region still faces today. These include the crisis of the Korean Peninsula, territorial disputes (Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai, Kuril Islands/Northern Territories, Dokdo/Takeshima), the revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, threat of remilitarization, increasing nationalism, lack of historical understanding and reconciliation, challenges of human security, and the recent diplomatic friction between Korea and Japan on export controls over vital manufacturing materials.

Grassroots social and religious organizations have mobilized to help Japan regain broken trust, begin the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding, and build positive domestic and international relations. By achieving these objectives of justice, and effective reconciliation, the countries in Northeast Asia may be able to build a collaborative future.

It is crucial that GPPAC, NARPI and IPCR continue with their activities to bring stability and peace in Northeast Asia. Such organizations are instrumental to developing harmonious and collaborative relation in the region.

References De Gruchy, J. W. (2002). Reconciliation: Restoring justice. Minneapolis (MN); Fortress Press.

Emerson, J. G., Jr. (1954). The dynamics of forgiveness. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Enright, R. D. (2001). Forgiveness is a choice: A step-by-step process for resolving anger and restoring hope. Washington DC: APA Lifetools.

Er, L. P. (2002). The apology issue: Japan’s differing approaches toward China and South Korea. American Asian Review, 20(3), p. 31-54.

Galtung, J. (2005) Pax Pacifica: Terrorism, The Pacific hemisphere, globalization, & peace studies. London: Pluto Press.

Gerzon, M. (2003). Becoming global citizens: Finding common ground in a world of differences. Retrieved July 1, 2006, from http://www.mediatorsfoundation.org/ related1reading/becomingglobalcitizens.pdf Hanh, T. N. (1998). The heart of the Buddha’s teaching: Transforming 71

suffering into peace, joy and liberation. London: Rider.

Jeong, H. (Ed.) (1999). Conflict resolution: Dynamic and process and structure. Hants, England: Ashgate. Kornfield, J. (2008). The Wise Heart.

New York: Bantam Books.

Lederach, J. P. (1999). The journey toward reconciliation. Scottdale, PA: Herald Press.

Lederach, J.P. (2003). The little book of conflict transformation. New York, NY: Good Books Matsui, K. R. (2019). Shared Reflections and earnings from Betty Reardon—Action Planning Models: National and International Partnerships in Asia—. In D. T. Snauwaert (Ed.) Exploring Betty A. Reardon’s perspective on peace education: Looking back, looking forward. (pp.217-228). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Montiel, C. J. (2002). Sociopolitical Forgiveness. Peace Review, 14(3), 271-277.

Ogawa, S. (2000). The difficulty of apology: Japan’s struggle with memory and guilt. Harvard International Review, Fall 2000, 42 – 46 Sullivan, D. & Tift, L. (2005). Restorative justice: Healing the foundations of our everyday lives. Monsey, NY: Willow Tree Press.

Tutu, D. (1999). No future without forgiveness. New York: Doubleday.

Worthington, E. L. Jr. (2003). Forgiving and reconciling. Downers Grove, IL: Inter Varsity Press.

Worthington, E. L. Jr., Sandage, S. J., & Berry, J. W. (2000). Group interventions to promote forgiveness. In M. F. McCullough, K. L. Pargament, & C. E. Thoresen (Eds.), Forgiveness: Theory, Research, and Practice (pp. 228-253). New York: Guilford.

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TRAINING PEACEBUILDERS FOR THE REGION: EXPERIMENTS OF THE NORTHEAST ASIA REGIONAL PEACEBUILDING INSTITUTE (NARPI) Okumoto Kyoko and Lee Jae Young Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute Background: Northeast Asia In Northeast Asia, peace training or conflict resolution/transformation is a new concept as a preventive methodology for violence – whether direct, structural and/or cultural, despite the fact that military tensions among countries in the region are much higher than in other regions. Throughout history, Northeast Asians have observed that wars and military conflicts began with misunderstandings, misguided hatred, or political propaganda.

It is now time to educate and train coming generations about the fact that weapons have failed to bring harmony and peaceful coexistence in Northeast Asia. War and military confrontation have only created longlasting animosity and mistrust among nations and peoples. Thus, transforming the culture of militarism into the culture of peace and coexistence should become a key focus for the future security and prosperity of the region.

Compared to the military preparation it has undergone, however, the history of peace training or education in Northeast Asia is rather short and weak. If Northeast Asia wants peaceful coexistence and sustainable development, it needs to teach and learn how to live together peacefully.

It is a very simple idea that peace needs to be taught, trained and shared if people want to have it. In other words, ultimate peace cannot be achieved through military measures or economic sanctions, but is possible only through training or educating people to live for peace, live in peace, and live by peace.

Like other regions, therefore, Northeast Asia needs an institute, such as the Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute (NARPI), in which the concepts of peace are discussed; the ideas of implanting peace are brainstormed; and the experiences of peacebuilding are shared. The idea 73

of NARPI was born from the discovery of the need for and demand from activists and students working in the field of peacebuilding. NARPI is a place for the further training of students, NGO activists, professionals, scholars, religious leaders and government officials who are interested in deepening their knowledge of peace and sharpening their peacebuilding skills. Peacebuilding can be achieved by people who undergo peace training and respond to needs in their communities. This is real peacebuilding, something which governments in Northeast Asia have limited power to achieve.

Again, it becomes clear that a peaceful future in Northeast Asia is not possible without raising and nurturing people of peace. One day Northeast Asians will offer an alternative to “In order to make peace, prepare for war,” a phrase commonly used in international diplomacy.

Instead, without fear or doubt, they will say “Prepare for peace, in order to achieve peace”. The time of change is imminent as Northeast Asia is set to be a center for the transformation towards peace.

Background: The Stories of NARPI’s Creation and Development Lee Jae Young: Ironically, it was during my military service in the early 1990s when I became interested in peace. I had been a Marine for 26 months of mandatory military service, required of all young Korean men.

My daily mission was to watch the North Korean side through a telescope at the western border of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). When the first leader of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, died, the fate of the entire Korean Peninsula was suddenly thrust into uncertainty including the prospect of potential war. I had to spend an entire week in a trench with heavy weapons along with thousands of soldiers at the border to carry out the mission of shooting anybody attempting to cross it. During that week, I began to realize that true peace could only be possible through nonmilitary approaches. No one can achieve peace by pointing a gun at another’s head.

Soon after my military service, I attended the Canadian Mennonite Bible College (CMBC) known as a “pacifist school”. After struggling for a while to understand the concept of Christian Pacifism, I finally came to agree with the Mennonites’ belief. I chose to study more about peace at 74

another Mennonite school in the US, the Eastern Mennonite University (EMU), where there was a Master’s degree program offered by the Conflict Transformation Program (now the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding).

After experiencing both military training and peacebuilding training, I came to firmly believe that peacebuilding training is the more practical way to make peace. As I studied at EMU, I became one of three founding members of Korea Anabaptist Center, as its peace program coordinator.

After witnessing the fragile peace maintained by North and South Korea at reciprocal gunpoint, and realizing that many of the peacebuilding organizations in Northeast Asia were ill-equipped in conflict resolution and peacemaking skills, I wrote a working paper in 2006 outlining my vision for NARPI. A version of this would be formally accepted and funded by the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) Peace Desk in 2009.

With MCC’s first grant in 2009, I traveled to Japan, mainland China, and Taiwan to meet people who shared a similar vision; to start a regional peacebuilding institute in Northeast Asia. Okumoto Kyoko was one of them.

Okumoto Kyoko: I was then (and still am) working for some peace NGOs voluntarily, as well as teaching at a women’s university in Osaka, Japan, full-time. For me, Japanese imperialism was and remains a main cause of so many conflicts in the region. Even after the Asia-Pacific War, Japan has not been brave enough to face up to and overcome its own history of patriarchal colonialism. Transforming Japan’s mentality from the inside was a challenge worth pursuing, and yet it felt like an impossible dream. I gradually came to understand that approaching Japanese civil society from the outside could be a way of fostering hope.

Representatives of several civil society peace groups from all over the Northeast Asian Region met for the first time in 2009 to brainstorm together about what the NARPI project could look like. All these likeminded people formed the steering committee later. At the first three NARPI Steering Committee Meetings in Seoul (April 2010), on Peace Boat (October 2010), and in Taipei (April 2011), the NARPI steering committee (then 12 members from five countries in the region) planned its first Summer Peacebuilding Training. The steering committee has continued to meet each summer during the NARPI Training and 75

continues to plot the direction of NARPI collaboratively.

In addition to this, I also experimented with a pilot project consisting of peacebuilding workshops held over five days and four nights in Hiroshima, Japan in August 2010. I asked all NARPI colleagues based in Japan to get together to make this small project happen. I also asked numerous facilitators from the region working in the realm of peacebuilding and conflict transformation to conduct peace training of different forms. I then called on to my peace networks in Japan to come together in Hiroshima, to jointly try out this experimental project and to provide feedback on it. This way, I could see how at least Japanese participants could actually put this idea into practice, rather than just discuss the big dream.

Mission and Vision of NARPI Northeast Asia is a region of historical, territorial, military and nuclear tensions. Today many human and financial resources are dedicated to the militarization of Northeast Asian nations. Transforming the existing culture of animosity and militarism into a culture of peace and reconciliation can be possible through education and a fundamental paradigm shift. However, a void exists in the area of education and training opportunities to empower people with the skills, knowledge and resources needed to bring about this change. NARPI is working to strengthen and empower people in Northeast Asia by providing peacebuilding training and building cross-cultural networks. During the summer, participants from Northeast Asia receive training in the areas of peacebuilding, conflict transformation, restorative justice, mediation and more. Within these training programs we also seek to build relationships between people from different parts of Asia and to practice transformative approaches to conflict and cultural differences. The idea of NARPI was inspired by the needs and demands of activists and students working in the field of peacebuilding. NARPI is led by a Steering Committee of partners from Northeast Asia and trains people primarily from this region.

The vision of the Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute is for Northeast Asia to be a region of active non-violence, mutual cooperation, and lasting peace.

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The mission of NARPI is to transform the culture and structure of militarism and communities of fear and violence into just and peaceful ones by providing peacebuilding training, connecting and empowering people in Northeast Asia.

Annual Summer Peacebuilding Trainings NARPI, as its name implies, was created specifically to address regional concerns in Northeast Asia, particularly militaristic and nationalist tensions remaining from the Cold War era. In addition, the Cold War structure and mindset still remains, even though there have not been any direct military conflicts since the Korean War ended in 1953. As a result, historical, territorial, military, and nuclear tensions and disputes continue throughout the region. Also, the region maintains a very subtle balance among “powerful� countries and marginalized countries and peoples.

The first Summer Peacebuilding Training of NARPI was held in Seoul and Inje, South Korea, in August 2011. After a successful first summer training, NARPI has continued its summer peacebuilding training programs in Hiroshima (2012), Inje again (2013), Nanjing (2014), Ulaanbaatar (2015), Jinshan and Taipei (2016), Okinawa (2017), Jeju (2018) and Nanjing again (2019). The participants of NARPI come mainly from South Korea, Japan, mainland China, Taiwan, and Mongolia.

We also had some participants from East Russia, and beyond Northeast Asia.

The NARPI annual summer peacebuilding training is a 15-day program.

After a restful first day during which the participants arrive at the training venue, they are divided into three (or four) courses for five full days, from morning to late afternoon. In the evenings, sometimes participants conduct mutual learning sessions. For the next three days, all participants spend time together on field trips. They have traveled together to a DMZ observatory, to peace memorials and museums, a ger (a traditional Mongolia dwelling in the form of a tent covered in skin and felt), sites of historical massacres and also sites of hope. Finally, during the second week of training, participants continue to learn, divided into three (or four) courses, before departing for their homes.

NARPI advocates the creation of a new type of community. Rather than 77

forming individual communities of objectors who stand apart from mainstream culture, NARPI seeks a regional solution to militarization.

The primary focus of the training is building a regional network and community throughout Northeast Asia. NGO workers, university students, professors, teachers, religious workers and community leaders with a commitment to peacebuilding, build trust during the trainings and field trips. They also nurture deep friendship that last long.

Participants need to have the ability to participate in workshops conducted in English. NARPI tries to provide some language support, but they unfortunately need to have a certain level of English. Courses cover the topics of peacebuilding, conflict transformation, restorative justice, trauma healing, arts-based approach, mediation and communication skills, and peacebuilding through art and media, among others. They are cofacilitated by expert facilitators from the region and beyond.

Over the past nine years, NARPI Summer Peacebuilding Trainings have had an impact on the lives of the nearly 350 people who have joined trainings as participants, facilitators and volunteers. NARPI participants often express gratitude for the unique opportunity NARPI provides to meet friends from around Northeast Asia, as well as the safe space available for discussing sensitive subjects like history, identity and nationalism. The experience of learning history first-hand through NARPI field trips in different parts of region that have been affected by violence is powerful, creating a common regional understanding of history, with the voices of victims at the center. Many NARPI participants also share that their coursework has equipped them as peacebuilders in their families, communities and work. Each year a growing percent of people are returning to NARPI for continued training, demonstrating the deepening impact of NARPI on their lives.

Even though NARPI has not yet reached its 10th anniversary, we are starting to see the impact of NARPI beyond the individual level, as well.

Early this year, a NARPI repeat participant and 2017 local host, Fukuda Nobuya, opened the Okinawa Bridge Builders Institute, with a vision of providing peacebuilding training for the people of Okinawa. It is our dream to see the development of more peacebuilding institutes in Northeast Asia. We believe that one day there will be more peacebuilding institutes than military academies in this region 78

For the future: Celebrating its Tenth Anniversary in 2020 NARPI will be celebrating its tenth anniversary in the summer of 2020.

We will hold a Strategic Planning Meeting, involving around 30 NARPI stakeholders, to create a vision for the next ten years of NARPI. This gathering will replace the annual Summer Peacebuilding Training next year, and then the annual trainings will resume in 2021. We hope that many important discussions and dialogues will take place at the Strategic Planning Meeting so that NARPI can make progress in regional peace and peacebuilding processes.

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A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA Akibayashi Kozue Doshisha University / Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Introduction: Women, Peace and Security The pledge of the international community to ensure participation of women in peace and security policies at all levels appeared for the first time in United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), adopted in October 2000. This is the first UN Security Council Resolution that addresses “gender” as an essential element of peace and security. It is a part of “gender mainstreaming,” the overarching UN policy to integrate a gender perspective in all aspects of its policies. This is one of the achievements of the mid-1990s when women’s human rights movements were gaining global power, demanding that women’s rights be recognized as universal human rights and that a gender perspective be regularly included in policy making processes.

Another significance of UNSCR 1325, something that civil society organizations strived to achieve, is the recognition of systematic sexual violence as a peace and security issue, not an unfortunate but inevitable outcome of armed conflicts. The UN, its member states, and all parties to armed conflicts are responsible for the prevention of sexual violence during war time, the resolution says.

UNSCR 1325 is known to have been lobbied for by the very strong, wellcoordinated and focused efforts of civil society organizations, from its inception to its adoption. Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the first international women’s peace organization which began in 1915, was among those civil society organizations that created the NGO coalition for women, peace and security in the New York UN community. The coalition constitutes peace and human rights organizations active at the UN Headquarters in New York. The NGO 80

coalition activists even drafted the resolution to make it visible that the achievement of gender equality is indivisible with the achievement of peace.

Since then, the UN Security Council has adopted 7 more resolutions that are referred to as Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS) by the New York UN Community.1 The WPS Agenda has become a standard policy within the United Nations and all member states. In addition, the United Nations itself has made it its own responsibility to implement what WPS resolutions call for. To fast forward to the present day, we are now looking at a commitment from almost 80 UN member states with a National Action Plan (NAP) that is a series of national policies for implementation of UNSCR 1325 and in some cases of UNSCR 1820 that articulates sexual violence during armed conflicts is a tactic of war.

What, then, is the status of gender mainstreaming in peace and security in the Northeast Asian region? Has the UN-led gender mainstreaming been helpful to bring peace in the region? This short piece tries to shed light on feminist peace movements in the region, which have been tackling the issues of peace and security in an attempt to answer these questions.

Feminist Peace Movements in Northeast Asia In looking for quick answers to the above questions, one may point out that there has been increased public discussion lately on the participation of women in peace and security. If we look at NAPs in the region, however, only ROK and Japan have completed their NAPs. This does not necessarily mean that other countries are not interested in the WPS agenda or that the governments of ROK and Japan are more interested in the WPS agenda. Some countries assert that they already have sufficient participation of women in peace and security policies thus, there is no need to introduce new policies. That may capture some realities. Even those with NAPs should not be immune to criticism with regard to the focus of their NAP or even the level of inclusion of civil society participation in the process of creating, implementing and monitoring the NAP. Indeed, as the region has suffered for almost seven decades of 1

UNSCRs 1820 (2009), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2010), 1960 (2011), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), and 2467 (2019) are considered the Women Peace and Security Agenda.

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conflict in the form of the Korean War, and as denuclearization of the region remains a pertinent issue, even more substantial discussions on the WPS in the region should be in place.

In fact, a further question should be asked. Would an increase in women’s participation bring sustainable peace and security to the region?

Some civil society activists have been critical of the UN approaches to the WPS agenda and NAPs, arguing that explicitly designed policies to change the discourse and policies for peace and security to incorporate a feminist perspective are more urgently needed than a mere headcount of the number of women in peace and security related policies. Simply put, “more women” does not assure inclusion of a feminist perspective.

Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV), a feminist peace movement in Okinawa, Japan, is one of the long-time advocates of a feminist perspective in peace and security with whom I have worked to develop transnational solidarity networks. Since its official establishment in 1995, OWAAMV women have called for a fundamental transformation of the concept of militarized security to more humancentered security with a clearer aim of achieving gender equality.

Okinawa, the southernmost archipelago of Japan, is host to a disproportionately large percentage of United States military personnel and land-occupation in Japan. OWAAMV women have called attention to the problem of sexual violence perpetrated by U.S. soldiers against women and girls, (and at times, men and boys), that has continued since the U.S. military landed on their islands in 1945 at the end of the AsiaPacific War. It was indeed after the war had ended, throughout so-called peace-time that they have been most exposed to sexual violence by soldiers. When it comes to sexual crimes, it is known that there is a large gap between the number of reported crimes and actual occurrences due to the strong stigma attached to the victims who are more reluctant to report these crimes to the authorities than victims of other crimes. In this aspect, OWAAMV members who have worked to support victims of sexual crimes in Okinawa are in general deeply critical of the community’s patriarchal culture that inflicts shame on the victims.

OWAAMV’s activities show that not a single year has passed without sexual violence by the U.S. military in Okinawa since 1945.2 They have 2

Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence. “Sexual Crimes by US soldiers against Women in Okinawa: 1945 – 2017”.

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argued that sexual violence by U.S. soldiers in Okinawa takes not only the form of direct violence against local individuals in the host community, but is also a form of structural violence intrinsic in the institution of the military and militarized security. This highlights the fundamental contradiction of military security: the presence of the U.S. military on Okinawa, supposedly for the provision of “security,” is in fact the source of threat and insecurity of the well-being and even survival of its people. This is particularly true in the case of, women and children who are considered more vulnerable and therefore the object of security policies. Having lived under this contradiction for decades, OWAAMV has posed such vital questions as “Whose security is the U.S. military in our community supposed to provide?” and “What is security when the very presence of the U.S. military has caused insecurity in our lives?”

Their questions have led them to deepen their critical analysis of military security itself, including the very assumption on which military security has been conceptualized: the exercise of coercive force is the primary method to assure “security” therefore strengthening the coercive force and its institution of the military is given the highest priority of policies including resource allocation. The sanction of coercive force or direct violence, they further argue, is the source of sexual violence by soldiers because violent and destructive masculine traits are taught to soldiers in military to enhance their capability to exercise force to kill the enemy.

This analysis has resonated with researchers and activists who have shown that sexual violence is about displaying power and control over the weaker, the feminine.3 There are also various kinds of discrimination and discriminatory attitudes, such as racism, that soldiers are expected to learn or internalize in the process of becoming a soldier. OWAAMV views that sexual violence by soldiers in a host community under longterm military stationing is a manifestation of the larger problem of military security and the military.4

3

For example, Reardon, Betty. (1985). Sexism and the War System. New York: Teachers College Press.; Enloe, Cynthia. (2000). Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

4 Akibayashi, Kozue and Takazato, Suzuyo. “Gendered Insecurity Under Long-term Military Presence: The Case of Okinawa” (pp.38-60) in Reardon, Betty, and Hans, Asha. eds. (2010). The Gender Imperative: Human Security vs State Security. London and New Delhi: Routledge.

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A Feminist Perspective on Peace and Security OWAAMV also challenges the dichotomy of “peace and war” and has put forward an argument for a perspective of “long-time military stationing” for more profound understanding of the problem of military security. As a part of Japan, Okinawa is not under armed conflict.

However, the presence of the U.S. military since 1945 has always placed Okinawa much closer to the wars that the U.S. military has constantly waged in East Asia and beyond. After Japan gained independence in 1952 from the Allied Forces occupation after the Asia-Pacific War and the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War was signed in 1953, the majority of the U.S. Marine Corps in Japan was moved to Okinawa and since then, the U.S. military bases in Okinawa have hosted the largest number of Marines, trained to engage in direct combat, outside the United States. During the Vietnam War, it was the unique semi-tropical climate of Okinawa that catered to the need for the U.S. military to train their soldiers for the jungle warfare in Vietnam. Under this pretext, U.S. military have been stationed there for over seven decades. The people of Okinawa have suffered adverse impacts from the activities of the U.S. military including various forms of environmental destruction or violation of basic rights. Their experiences and conceptualization of their historical experiences to live only a fence away from the active military, demonstrates that it is a false notion to conclude that the mere absence of war is peace: violence exists in a continuum.

The conceptualization of long-term military stationing as a problematic of peace and security has driven OWAAMV to form a network of feminist peace activists in other host communities of the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific region. This includes the ROK and the Philippines, with whom some of the OWAAMV members had already forged solidarity on the issue of sexual violence and prostitution around the U.S. military bases since the mid-1980s.5 The network later developed to include other groups on the continental United States, in Hawai’i, as well as the unincorporated U.S. territories of Guam and Puerto Rico. It is no coincidence that there are former U.S. colonies, like Okinawa, among them. The connection with Hawai’i, Guam/Guahan and Puerto Rico, 5

Suzuyo Takazato, co-representative of OWAAMV cooperated with members of Durebang in ROK, an organization to support women in U.S. military camp town prostitution, and Buklod Center, a similar organization in Olongapo, Philippines. Both organizations were established in 1986.

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which were colonized, has contributed to fostering the analysis around military security and colonialism and the post-colonial conditions of the host communities.

With feminist activists in other parts of the world, OWAAMV started to advocate an alternative framework for human-centered security expressed in the following four conditions: Assuring an environment that is sustainable for all lives; meeting basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, basic medical care and education; respecting individual and cultural rights and dignity; protection from avoidable harm. These should be the priorities of security policies, they argue.

To offer some background to each of the four conditions, the environment that we live in should be sustainable for all lives as human beings are an integral part of the environment. The second condition on basic needs is about resource allocation, especially the proportion of military/defense related budget that could be reallocated to meeting basic needs. The third condition about rights and dignity derived from several aspects of the problem of military security, which operates via various forms of discrimination, such as sexism and racism. It is also about the disrespect and even destruction of indigenous cultures of the host communities that have been colonized. It is a common experience of those in the former colonized communities that military exercises and operations are often conducted on their sacred sites. The fourth condition calls on us to be clearer about what can be avoided and what cannot. For example, armed conflicts or war can be avoided because they are the result of political decisions. On the other hand, natural disasters themselves are not avoidable, but their impacts can be reduced or avoided if adequate policies are taken. This is about policy priorities and also about people’s behavior and choices.6 These conditions are the embodiment of the values that are often characterized as “feminine”, closely associated with the daily lives of the community, the management of which is the primary responsibility given to women. The solidarity networks of feminist peace movements have advocated that these feminine values should be central in the notion of 6

For more detailed discussions on the conditions, please see Reardon, Betty. “Women and Human Security: A Feminist Framework and Critique of the Prevailing Patriarchal Security System” (pp.7-37.) in Reardon, Betty and Hans Asha. (2010).

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peace and security.

Looking Forward A feminist perspective on peace and security is a challenge to the notion of coercive force and the military as the primary source of security, as well as to military security, that in reality has caused harm. It highlights the continuum of violence in our daily lives. As discussed above, the solidarity networks of feminist peace movements, particularly under long-term military stationing, reveal the central problem of military security, something that is vitally missing in the UN-led WPS agenda discourse, which places a strong focus on the situation under more visible armed conflicts. We have seen that the UN-led WPS policies often confine the problem to directly impacted areas in developing nations, thereby neglecting to capture the entirety of the issue of peace and security. In the Northeast Asian region, where the issues of peace and security are more nuanced and have played out over the long-term, a feminist perspective would offer a new direction for civil society actions.

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SOUTH KOREAN WOMEN’S EFFORTS AND ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: TRUST-BUILDING WITH NORTH KOREAN WOMEN Kim Jeongsoo Representative, Women Making Peace My name is Jeongsoo Kim and I am the standing representative of Women Making Peace, a specialized movement formed to realize reunification and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

It is my hope that this paper will be read by North Korean women for two reasons. First, there is no other way for me to send my message to the women of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This publication is currently the only official one in which South and North Korean civilians can share their opinions concerning peace building on the Korean peninsula. So, I am hopeful that North Korean sisters can read my paper in this publication. Second, I hope that North Korean Women will participate in the 64th Non-Governmental Organization Committee on the Status of Women Forum (NGO CSW Forum), which will be held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City in March 2020. It is my hope that we will be able to work together with the United Nations (UN), using an NGO side event during the CSW as a platform for sharing and delivering North and South Korean women’s voices, hopes, demands and appeals for peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Why do Women Need to Participate in the Korean Peace Process?

There have been many questions and doubts raised regarding the need for women’s participation in peace processes. We women have spent so much energy persuading and proving to others how much women have been victimized and how severe their suffering has been in conflict situations. This is the very reason why women need to participate and be engaged in the peace processes.

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Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) is the term now used to explain how women have been affected differently or disproportionately in the context of armed conflict. In 2008, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1820 for Women, Peace, and Security recognized the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence to dominate, disperse and humiliate a population as a weapon of war.

Sexual violence and rape is often used as ‘a tactic of war’.

So far, most armed conflicts have been dealt with from political and military perspectives. These approaches do not necessarily take into account people’s pain and suffering caused by these conflicts; including women’s experiences in armed conflicts. In other words, there is a need for armed conflicts to be analyzed from a gender and human security perspective. A gender-based analysis of armed conflicts will likely demonstrate the reason why women have to participate in peace processes and will inform the meaningful participation of women in peace processes.

In South Korea, the 7-decade long division of the Korean Peninsula has also affected women very differently from men. The following chart shows South Korean military spending compared with that of other countries. If we compare the military budget of South Korea with that of Canada, whose GDP is very similar to that of South Korea, we will see the difference in their military spending and the number of soldiers. This is a heavy burden that the South Korean government has to bear in this situation of division.

1,619,423

Military Budget (MB) US $m2 43070.0

20,494,099

648798.3

GDP US $m1 S. Korea U.S. 1

MB/GDP (%)

No. of Soldiers3

2.6

599,000

MB per capita /USD 841.8

3.2

1,358,193

1985.5

Source: World Bank 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd.

Source: Military budget, MB/GDP and MB per capita: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2018 figures (released 2019). https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

3 Number of soldiers: International Institute for Strategic Studies (14 February 2018).

The Military Balance 2018. London: Routledge. ISBN 9781857439557.

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Japan China Canada

4,970,915 13,608,151 1,709,327

46618.0 249996.9 21620.6

0.9 1.9 1.3

247,150 2,035,000 63,000

366.5 176.7 585.1

How does this affect women’s welfare? To answer this question, we can compare in two ways: First, South Korea’s military budget in comparison to the budget of the Ministry of Gender Equality. In 2019 the total military budget is 46.7 trillion USD but the budget for gender ministry for 2019 is just 1.6 trillion USD. These two budgets show how much money South Korean people pay to maintain national security under the situation of division. Second, is South Korea’s military cost burden of the 2019 Special Measure Agreement for US forces deployed in the territory (1,225,840,614.24 USD) in comparison to the 2019 total budget of South Korea’s Ministry of Gender Equality (1,577,971,935.40 USD). The simple truth is that the South Korean government spends significantly more money on UN forces in Korea than on the Ministry of Gender Equality. This is yet another side effect of the division of the Korean Peninsula. We could therefore name this phenomenon the “cost of division to women”.

In addition to this low budget set aside for women’s needs, South Korean women have long suffered because of militarism, dictatorship, sexism, discrimination, violence and misogyny in daily life (as illustrated by the #MeToo movement). So it could be said that South Korean women are in an ongoing state of gender-based violence in the current situation of a divided Korean Peninsula. This violence against women must end right now. This is a key reason why South Korean women are trying to meet North Korean women and appeal to the UN and international society for the end of the Korean War and for a sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Two South-North Korea Summits & Three North Korea –U.S. Summits It was a thrilling moment when the South and North Korean leaders appeared together on television after signing the Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula on 27th April 2018.4 In the document, the two leaders solemnly declared before 4

Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula, accessed April 27, 2018.

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80 million Koreans and the whole world that there would be no more war and that a new era of peace had begun on the Korean Peninsula. Like any other Korean, I was really excited and happy since this seemed to be a de facto declaration of the end of the Korean War. In the Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit the following June, the leaders recognized that “mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”. Having read this, I came to the conclusion that trust-building between South and North Korean women would be a prerequisite for the development of further relations.

In essence, the work of Women Making Peace has been about building a bridge of trust and confidence between South and North Korean women; women who will live together on the Korean Peninsula during the Korean peace process and after finally having built a peace regime and achieved reunification.

After the two summits between South and North Korean leaders in 2018, there has been much change on the Korean Peninsula, and military tensions have decreased significantly. However, overall inter-Korean relations have not made progress because of the stalemate in the denuclearization talks between North Korea and the United States. In particular, due to the UN and international sanctions against North Korea, even the provision of urgent humanitarian aid to the North Korean people in crisis has not been possible. We all know the most vulnerable people in North Korea are the sick and elderly, the children and women: these are also the vulnerable ones who need humanitarian aid most urgently.

Women’s Activities for Peace on the Korean Peninsula (2018~2019) Korea Peace Now! is a global women’s campaign to end the Korean War and bring peace on the Korean Peninsula. Launched officially in 2019, this campaign is led by Women Cross DMZ, the Nobel Women’s Initiative, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and the Korea Women’s Network for Peace. (Korea Women’s Network for Peace itself is a network of four South Korean women’s groups consisting of Women Making Peace, Korean Women’s http://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/32.

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Association United, Korea YWCA and the National Women’s Alliance.)

The goal of the Korea Peace Now! campaign is to achieve the official end of the Korean War and a Peace Treaty between North Korea and the US. This campaign is based on the concept of human security5, as opposed to military security, national security or security based on military alliances.

The campaign is expected to be a model for the meaningful participation of women in the Korean peace process.

1) Efforts to Resume South-North Korean Women’s Dialogue and Exchanges After the Panmunjom Declaration, South Korean women’s groups had several opportunities to think about, discuss and share ideas on future dialogue and exchanges between South and North Korean women. In seminars, symposia and workshops, we have shared ideas on how to prepare dialogues and exchanges between women from the North and South. Most importantly, women in South Korea had to ask the following questions: -

When will we have a chance again to meet North Korean women?

What issues do we have to deal with and what project could we work on together?

When the Korean peace process is concluded successfully, would it be possible for women of both South and North Korea to achieve sustainable peace and gender equality both politically and economically?

Through this process of reflection, South Korean women’s groups consolidated their position on the future of women in South and North 5

Human security vs. National Security. The concept of human security emerged as a challenge to traditional ideas of security. Traditional approaches to security prioritize the nation state’s right to defend itself from external threats. Human security is a peoplecentered approach focused on the protection and empowerment of individuals. Human security also expands the scope of what constitutes a security threat to address economic, food, health and environmental insecurity. While traditional approaches focus on defending the state’s physical and political integrity from external threats as a way to ensure global stability, human security conceives of individual security as essential for national, regional and global stability. From WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY MANUAL, www.unwomen,org.au. P. 8.

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Korea.

First, gender equality has to be guaranteed in the Korean Peace Process. When peace comes to the Korean Peninsula, women’s peace and the quality of their lives should also be improved.

Women should not be left behind in the context of peace and prosperity in the Korean Peninsula.

Second, when South-North economic cooperation projects are realized, North Korean women in particular also have to actively participate in them so as to improve their economic standing and power just as other groups in North Korea will advance theirs.

Specifically, when the Kaeseong Industrial Complex, a joint project between North and South, resumes operations, it will be necessary for the number of women managers to be increased and the labor conditions for women workers to be improved as well.

In order to realize these goals, two conditions must be fulfilled.

First, there needs to be a Department for Women’s Affairs with co-directors from both sides in the South-North Kaeseong liaison office, so that South and North Korean women can work together in the peace process.

Second, there should be a fixed budget for gender issues in the South Korean Ministry of Unification’s Fund for South-North Exchange and Cooperation, because without a gender budget, women’s activities and programs for dialogue, exchange, and cooperation could not work effectively.

2) South-North Korean Women’s Meeting on Mt Kumgang on February 12, 2019 On 12 February 2019, a delegation of 16 women (8 from the South, 5 from the North, and 3 from abroad) met and had chance to share and exchange their concerns and suggestions to each other. I myself was able to represent South Korea, and although it was my 4th visit to Mt. Kumgang, I was full of emotion when the South Korean delegation crossed into the northern side of the DMZ and finally came to see 92

Kumgang Mountain.

Before the South-North women’s meeting, more than 100 South Korean women’s organizations and over 1,000 individual South Korean women released a Women’s Statement for Sustainable Peace and Prosperity of the Korean Peninsula to the Hankyoreh Newspaper on January 28, 2019.

In this statement, the women stated that sustainable peace and the reunification of Korea should be achieved through democratic processes guaranteeing the meaningful participation of women and featuring their voices and concerns. They also stated that the quality of life of South and North Korean women should be improved through regular meetings and cooperation between them. Finally, they also expressed their belief that sanctions against North Korea, which hinder the productive development of South-North relations, should be lifted immediately.

The delegation of South Korean women delivered the statement to their North Korean sisters and proposed holding a large exchange event in Pyongyang in 2019 so that South and North Korean women from diverse regions, separated for so long that they know nothing of each other, could meet and talk together, share ideas and learn to understand each other.

3) South Korean Women’s Peace Campaign to End the Korean War, March 2019 In March 2019, three lawmakers and several women activists from South Korea visited Washington D.C to appeal for the end of the Korean War and the signing of a Peace Agreement. There, they met some members of Congress and Senator Bernie Sanders (Vermont), a presidential candidate for the Democratic Party. This tour was made possible by the “Korea Peace Now” campaign group, the abovementioned coalition in which four South Korean women’s groups, including Women Making Peace, Korea Women’s Associations United, YWCA Korea and the Korea Women’s Alliance, have worked together since the 2015 Women Cross DMZ event.

South Korean women also appealed for peace on the Korean Peninsula at in an NGO side event to the 63rd CSW “Northeast Asian Women Lead: Peace on the Korean Peninsula”. I was one of the panelists for this event, 93

also coordinated by the Korea Peace Now campaign, in which more than 200 female participants from around the world, including prominent peace activists, participated. They registered numerous concerns about the 2nd North Korea-US Summit in Hanoi, which had just taken place, and asked how women could participate meaningfully in the Korean peace process.

Through these two events, we South Korean women realized that it is very important or even essential for us to make the reality of the division of the Korean Peninsula and the negative impact of sanctions against the vulnerable people of North Korea be known to citizens of the United States and especially, to so-called opinion leaders and the policy community in Washington D.C. so that they can see the necessity of a Peace Agreement between Korea and its surrounding countries.

4) South Korean Women’s Groups Demand that the Korean Government Provide Food Aid to North Korea On May 16, 2019, 20 South Korean women’s organizations issued a public statement on food aid to North Korea, in which they demanded that a) food be sent to North Korea without any hesitation; b) that regular food aid programs for North Korea be governed in cooperation with civil society groups; and c) that issues surrounding food aid be separated from other issues being dealt with in the Korea-U.S. working group, allowing the South Korean government to make decisions about food aid on its own.

5) Women Making Peace’s Projects for 2019 Women Making Peace plans two major projects this year: First, the Women, Peace, Security (WPS) workshops, a series of six networking workshops for young women who want to learn about and understand the relationship between the WPS (UN Security Council Resolution 1325) agenda, the Korean peace process, and the meaningful participation of women in the process. 30 participants from government agencies (including the South Korean Ministry of Gender Equality and the Ministry of National Defense, as well as the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)), academic institutes, media and civil society groups will be working together after the workshops to plan a 94

Peace Talk Show for ordinary people and will publish a workbook for citizens.

The second project is a “Train the Trainers” program. This is a participatory peace and reunification program for 30 participants who want to learn conflict resolution skills and methodologies for use in the context of peace and reunification. This project consists of a series of seven workshops and a two-day day residential program. Participants who complete this program will become Women Making Peace-certified facilitators for peace and reunification education.

Two Calls-to-action for North Korean Women (1) I hope that South and North Korean women will launch a joint program during the 64th NGO CSW Forum in March 2020. That year will be a very important one for the global women’s/feminist movement as it will be the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform and Action Plan (BDPA, 1995)6, and 20th anniversary of the adoption of UNSCR 1325 for Women, Peace, and Security. Therefore, UN Women has chosen “Women, Peace, and Development” as the theme for the 64th NGO CSW Forum which will feature numerous governmental and NGO events. Women Making Peace, Korea Women’s Associations United, and the Korea Peace Now Campaign group will also organize several events to raise public awareness of peace issues on the Korean Peninsula.

Members of the South Korean women’s peace movement hope that North Korean women will participate and undertake joint programs to make the 6

The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was drafted at the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) and exposed the persistence of gender discrimination globally and the lack of focus on gender inequality by member states. The Platform of Action noted 12 ‘critical areas of concern’, labeled A to L, which much be addressed to ensure equality and women’s empowerment. Critical Area E is particularly relevant to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. It draws attention to the human rights abuses that arise in conflict and militarized settings. Critical Area E calls for: (1) Increased participation of women in all areas of conflict related decision-making, (2) Protection of women living in conflict zones, (3) Reduction in military spending, (4) Promotion of non-violent conflict resolution, (5) Recognition of women’s peace building contributions, and (6) Specific support for displaced women and women living under colonial occupation. From WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY MANUAL, www.unwomen,org.au. P. 16.

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collective voice of Korean women heard and the face of Korean women visible to the UN, to global civil society, and to the United. It would be especially effective, if North Korean women could use this opportunity to express how much they want peace and the end of the Korean War, how severely the sanctions have affected them, and how inhumane their impact has been so far.

(2) The adoption of a National Action Plan (NAP) for UNSCR 1325 for Women, Peace, and Security by the DPRK would be momentous. The South Korean government adopted its first NAP for UNSCR 1325 in May 2014. The second NAP (2018-2020) is currently in effect. As of December 2018, 78 member states of the UN (around 40% of its members) adopted NAPs. Before the adoption of the ROK NAP, South Korean women’s civil society groups organized the “1325 Network” with 45 organizations and demanded that the National Assembly and the government adopt the NAP. This finally happened in 2014 and now 10 civil society groups, including Women Making Peace, participate in its governance, in the form of an NGO advisory group. South Korean women want North Korean women to work towards adopting a DPRK NAP for UNSCR 1325, so that both South and North Korean women will have more common ground in their work on the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, especially in the UN and global context.

What South Korean women want from the Korean peace process is simply sustainable peace and prosperity, and well-being which both South and North Korean women can enjoy together with no more fear of war. My hope will finally be realized when South and North Korean women work together, with full commitment and great confidence, for peace.

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MAKING THE MOST OUT OF DIALOGUE Darynell Rodríguez Torres Executive Director, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) In 1972, the Nixon administration initiated a process of engagement with China amid a context of rising hostilities. President Nixon's visit to China and his meeting with Mao Zedong became a landmark in Sino-American relations, as it started a process of de-escalation of hostilities between two countries that saw each other as main foes. The expression ‘Only Nixon could go to China’ has been used since then as a metaphor of the hard line politician who could take bold actions to drastically undertake a policy change that would encounter a strong opposition if done by someone else.

Forty-seven years later, it seems we have a similar scenario, which brings an opportunity to end one of the last conflicts of the Cold War. The Trump administration has the opportunity to undertake a historical policy change towards the DPRK, starting a process of normalization, which could lead to supporting a transformation process in the Korean peninsula.

In the long run, this engagement strategy could prompt a gradual process of denuclearization by providing mutual security assurances and eliminating the perception of mutual threat.

When looking at the current situation in the Korean peninsula, most analysts agree on a fundamental premise: there is no military solution to the conflict. The stakes are too high and the human costs would be unimaginable. If this premise is accepted, there are basically two other options to consider: maintain the status quo or move forward towards normalizing relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), on one hand, and the United States and the DPRK on the other (Kearney, 2017).

Maintaining the status quo would imply a high risk, in a very volatile region characterized by mistrust, limited communication channels and the feeling of being constantly under threat. This would build on the already 97

fertile ground for miscalculations, mutual provocations and military escalation.

This leaves de-escalation of hostilities and the eventual normalization of relations as the most desirable, if not really the only option. As mentioned by the American academic John Delury, ‘the unpalatable truth is that there is really only one serious path out of the quagmire: normalization of relations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.’ (Delury, 2018). Of course this normalization process would also have to include relations between the DPRK and ROK as well as Japan.

Begin by ending the war Any serious effort to walk towards normalization of relations should consider one fundamental step: the need to reach a peace treaty that finally puts an end to the Korean War. This will be a significant step in acknowledging the concerns of the DPRK on one hand, and provide mutual reassurance about the security of all the parties involved in the conflict.

While for the population of the US, being technically in a state of war with the DPRK may not have many implications in their day to day life, the situation for the people in the Korean peninsula is very different.

Those who have been able to visit the DPRK can immediately experience how the feeling of being under threat marks the day to day of North Koreans. The war there is not dormant; it is not an abstraction or a technicality; it feels very real and present in people’s lives.

As any state who feels under threat, the DPRK’s priority is to ensure its own security and guarantee its survival. The classic realist paradigm of international relations defines the national interest in terms of power, and power is defined in terms of a country’s military capacity to protect itself.

North Korea’s defence policy follows this logic. As stated by the foreign affairs analyst Fareed Zakaria, ‘the North Korean regime has tried to buy insurance. And in the realm of international affairs, the best insurance is having a nuclear capacity’ (Zakaria, 2017). From the perspective of North Korea, rather than offsetting the military balance in the region, what its nuclear weapons programme does is to level the playing field.

Acknowledging the security concerns of the DPRK and discussing different options to provide reassurance about its security would be a 98

more effective policy than 20 more years of sanctions. Putting a formal end to the Korean War could be that factor that prompts a virtuous cycle to build confidence and bring lasting change in the region.

As stated in 2017 by members of the Korean National Peace Committee: ‘Once a legal guarantee for peaceful co-existence between the DPRK and the U.S. is provided by the conclusion of a peace agreement, not only can DPRK-U.S. relations, but also issues of DPRK-Japan and the north and the south Korea relations be resolved’ (Korean National Peace Committee, 2017). Having talks about how to put a formal end to the Korean War should be one of the first steps to walk towards normalization of relations, reduce tensions and pave the way for future talks about a nuclear free zone in the Korean peninsula.

Enhancing citizens´ diplomacy to safeguard steps towards peace After the suspension of the Six Party Talks in 2009 official spaces for dialogue were virtually inexistent. This lack of dialogue channels can be considered as one of the elements that explain the exacerbation of tensions, the cycle of provocations and the military escalation in the region.

While most official channels of communication were closed, civil society organizations stepped up to fill this gap by convening track II dialogues and developing activities to enhance people to people interaction across the two Koreas. Under the current context, civil society organizations need to continue with their efforts and support the official process that is underway.

As in any other process of this nature, the situation in the Korean peninsula often feels like a roller coaster. When it seems a decisive step is about to be taken, it is then followed by a setback. We need to be aware that the process of re-building trust and confidence to break the cycle of tensions and military escalations will be long and bumpy. Once again, civil society initiatives can be an important instrument to ensure sustained dialogue despite these difficulties.

Since 2015, the Northeast Asian network of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, GPPAC, has been leading a track II dialogue, the Ulaanbaatar Process. This initiative came out of the 99

realization that platforms for dialogue in the region were urgently needed.

The Ulaanbaatar Process emerged then as such a platform for dialogue, seeking to engage civil society participants from all the countries involved in the Six Party Talks. These dialogues are hosted in Mongolia and seek to strengthen the role of civil society as a complement to official diplomatic efforts.

The objectives declared by the participants in this process are: • To strengthen the role of civil society in the context of building peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

• To complement and contribute recommendations to official processes, including the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue for Northeast Asian Security initiated by the Mongolian government.

• To support the development of an institutionalized regional mechanism supporting dialogue and reconciliation in Northeast Asia.

• To contribute to overall confidence building measures within the Northeast Asia region.

The meetings of the Ulaanbaatar Process have been a useful space to exchange knowledge and have constructive discussions on issues of concern for the entire region. These include the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia, the need to advance towards a permanent peace treaty and the role of civil society actors across the region to contribute to achieve these goals.

The experience of the Ulaanbaatar Process highlights the need for developing platforms that facilitate dialogue and regional engagement.

Ensuring the sustainability of these initiatives, however, is always a challenge. While there is a recognition of the efforts of civil society, these activities require funding and donors often seem skeptical about their concrete results.

The Ulaanbaatar Process was conceived as long-term initiative to facilitate and sustain dialogue. It aims at complementing and stimulating official processes with the understanding that there is a need to make dialogue a habit in the region and that expecting ‘quick gains’ on very complex issues is not realistic. Since it was first launched, significant outcomes have emerged in terms of facilitating regular engagement, gaining a better understanding of the issues by looking at them from different perspectives and developing a joint problem solving approach 100

among the participants.

The time seems ripe for the Ulaanbaatar Process to move into a new stage.

Participants in the dialogue need to strategize together how they can contribute to support the diplomatic breakthroughs that have taken place in the last years and prevent that the setbacks in the process bring us back to positions of isolation and lack of engagement. Bringing the conclusion of six years of dialogue into key decision makers and being more public about the discussions and recommendations made by dialogue participants, could be some of the next steps in this dialogue process for the coming years.

As any mediator would say, despite the ups and downs, the progress and set backs of a particular process, the important thing is to always be there.

Civil society initiatives have always been there, especially when no other spaces for dialogue were open. A process of de-escalating tensions and transitioning into a peace regime in the region will need of civil society initiatives at various levels to make it successful. Enabling the current civil society led processes to continue their work and stimulating new initiatives is critical.

Conclusion Engagement and dialogue, not isolation, sanctions and military threats, should be the corner stones to normalize relations in the region, prevent an arms race and eventually advance towards the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in Northeast Asia. Putting a formal end to the Korean War would be a very significant step in de-escalating tensions and providing mutual security assurances that would enable a process of normalization in the region.

Opening channels for interaction and exchanges at different levels will be critical in building confidence and changing mutual perceptions. This includes the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, the effective engagement of the DPRK in different multilateral forums (both global and regional), the development of opportunities to foster people to people interaction and the integration of the DPRK in the global economy.

Measures of this type would not only contribute to de-escalating tensions and preventing a military clash which could turn into a nuclear catastrophe; they could also stimulate some changes inside the DPRK 101

which arguably are already underway.

Moving in this direction will require drastic changes in the foreign policy of the countries involved in the conflict. But there are precedents that show that those shifts are possible and can lead to dramatic breakthroughs. These diplomatic efforts should be accompanied by civil society initiatives, which already have proven useful in keeping some channels of communication open and creating useful people-to-people exchanges. Only through a combination of decisive political action, diplomatic efforts and citizen’s engagement, the current state of mutual mistrust and antagonistic narratives can change and the last standing conflict of the Cold War can finally be overcome.

References Delury, J. (2018) ‘Normalize the Hermit Kingdom’. In Foreign Policy, January 2018.

Kearney, C. (2017) Strengthening Understanding Through Dialogue. A Peacebuilding Approach to the Korean Peninsula Conflict, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Siem Reap, Cambodia.

Korean National Peace Committee, (2017) ‘The Northeast Asian Context and the Ongoing War on the Korean Peninsula’. In Reflections on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia. Uragsh-Orgil company, Ulaanbaatar 2017, pp. 104-117.

Zakaria, F. (2017) “We think North Korea is crazy. What if we’re wrong?”, The Washington Post, accessed on 23 April, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/we-thinknorth-korea-is-crazy-what-if-were-wrong/2017/07/06/d13044b0-628611e7-a4f7af34fc1d9d39_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.64d0216b16aa.

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CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES (In alphabetical order) AKIBAYASHI Kozue Dr Kozue Akibayashi is a feminist researcher/activist, living in Kyoto, Japan. She is a member of the Kyoto branch of the Japan section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the world’s oldest international women’s peace organization that began in 1915. Kozue has been active in the international activities of WILPF and a member of its International Board. She was elected International President of WILPF at their 100th anniversary Congress in the Hague in 2015 and served until August 2018.

She is a professor at the Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan where she teaches feminist peace education/research. She has a doctoral degree in education from Teachers College Columbia University. Her research and activism has focused on feminist analysis of peace and security, demilitarization and decolonization of security, and global feminist peace movements. She has worked with Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence in Japan on the issue of sexual violence by US soldiers who have been stationed in Okinawa since 1945. With OWAAMV, she has been a core member of International Women’s Network Against Militarism, the international solidarity network of feminists in host communities of the US military in such places as Okinawa, mainland Japan, ROK, the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. She has recently become more active in Korea Peace Now!, the global campaign for peace on the Korean Peninsula jointly organized by Women Cross DMZ, WILPF and the Nobel Women’s Initiative in cooperation with the Korean Women’s Movement for Peace. Korea Peace Now! was officially launched in 2018 as a result of the 2015 international feminist peace action to cross the DMZ from the DPRK to the ROK, calling for ending the Korean War and uniting separated families. Kozue was among the 30 feminist peace activists who joined this Women Cross DMZ. Anastasia BARANNIKOVA Dr Anastasia Barannikova is a research fellow at ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (Vladivostok) and Advisor for the Korea 103

National Heritage Protection Foundation (Pyongyang). Her research interests include (but are not limited to) regional (Northeast Asia) security and nuclear non-proliferation; the Korean Peninsula, DPRK foreign and domestic policies, DPRK nuclear and missile program, and nuclear posture. Barannikova is the author of more than 100 publications in scientific journals, newspapers and blogs, including articles in Russian, English, Chinese, Korean, Mongolian and Japanese languages. She is also a speaker/presenter/security expert at a number of international conferences held in China, DPRK, Japan, Mongolia, ROK, and Russia.

Barannikova has a background in Linguistics, Intercultural Communication and International Relations from the Far Eastern Federal University (1999-2004), National, Information and Military Security from the Russian Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (2004-2006), and History & Political Sciences from ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (2010-2013). She has joined numerous workshops and trainings (including “Elements of atomic and nuclear physics”, National Research Nuclear University MEPhI; International School on Global Security-2016, PIR Center and Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, fellowship at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.) in 2019, etc.). She holds a Ph.D in History from ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University.

Dashdorj BAYARKHUU Dr Dashdorj Bayarkhuu is a Mongolian research professor, columnist and writer and former Ambassador of Mongolia to Egypt. Prior to his nomination to the ambassadorial position, Bayarkhuu worked in the media, defense, diplomatic and educational sectors. After his tenure as Ambassador in Cairo, he returned to academic field as a Visiting Professor of International Politics and Contracted Researcher.

During his tenure in Egypt, Bayarkhuu also acted as Concurrent Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the State of Kuwait in 2009, First Concurrent Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2009–2014, Concurrent Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2012–2015 and was responsible for serving 14 countries in the Middle East. He summarized incidents of the Arab Spring that took place in the Middle East and published two books, including the first ever publication about Arabian history in Mongolian.

After returning from Cairo, he was invited as guest professor to many 104

institutes and schools where he delivered presentations about diplomatic studies and the Arab Spring. In 2013–2014, he worked as Chief Editor of Britannica's Edition on the Foreign Policy of Mongolia at NEPKO Publishing in Ulaanbaatar. He is the author and biographer of the book “Jambyn Batmunkh”, a NEPKO Publishing’s document on another diplomatic person's life.

He received a Professor in International politics from the Academy of Sciences in 2003, and his field of research specializations includes foreign policy analysis, foreign policy-making process, the history of diplomacy, contemporary international relations, contemporary international studies, geopolitics and security, comparative politics, communist studies and transition politics, sinology and oriental studies.

His current academic activities include as a contracted researcher at the Institute for Strategic Studies, National Security Counsel of Mongolia; contracted researcher at the Institute of International Relations, Academy of Sciences of Mongolia; visiting professor and editor at the National Academy of Governance, Government of Mongolia; Professor at Guren Graduate Institute; Columnist and member of the board, the Government Newspaper.

ENKHSAIKHAN Jargalsaikhan Dr Enkhsaikhan is an international lawyer and diplomat who represented his country in Austria, the USSR/Russian Federation and at the United Nations offices in New York and Vienna. In the early 1990s he served as the foreign policy and legal advisor to the first democratically elected President of Mongolia and later as the Executive Secretary of the first National Security Council. In 2008-2013 he served as the focal point for Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status and in 2013-2014 as Ambassador-at-Large in charge of disarmament issues. Between 19922015, as representative of Mongolia, he promoted the country’s nuclearweapon-free status and held over 80 meetings and talks with experts and Ambassadors of the five nuclear-weapon states (P5) that led to signing by the latter of a joint declaration whereby they have recognized Mongolia’s status and pledged not to contribute to any act that would violate that status. Dr. Enkhsaikhan has also worked in the civil society sector dealing with such issues as promotion of peace and non-proliferation, democratic governance, human rights and gender equality.

He has contributed nearly 100 articles on international relations, democracy promotion, non-proliferation and regional security, organized or participated in many regional meetings aimed at promoting peace, 105

international cooperation, environmental protection and good governance.

He has published a scholarly book entitled: “The nuclear future of Mongolia…” (in Mongolian).

The Government of Mongolia has bestowed upon him the title of Merited Lawyer of Mongolia and the Order of Labor Merit of Red Banner. In 2019 the Global Peace Foundation awarded him with Innovative Scholarship Peace Award.

At present Dr. Enkhsaikhan serves as Chairman of Blue Banner, a Mongolian NGO dedicated to promoting the goals of nuclear nonproliferation and institutionalizing Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status. Nowadays his work specifically focuses on working with the younger generation under the motto: “Informing, inspiring and empowering the youth”.

Daniel JASPER Daniel Jasper is the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)’s Public Education and Advocacy Coordinator for Asia. His role is to bring lessons learned from AFSC’s programs throughout Asia back to policymakers in Washington. His current work focuses heavily on the humanitarian, peacebuilding, and people-to-people aspects of U.S.-North Korea relations.

Daniel has ten years of experience working in public policy, advocacy, and international affairs. Prior to joining AFSC, he worked at World Learning, where he administrated the U.S. State Department's International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP). He has also worked for the Minnesota House of Representatives, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the United Nations, as well as serving as a Paul D. Coverdell Fellow for Democracy North Carolina and Peace Action – North Carolina. Daniel completed two assignments with the Peace Corps (Turkmenistan, 2008-10; St Lucia, 2013-14), where he collaborated with foreign ministries to improve local education standards. Daniel holds a master’s degree in Public Policy from Duke University and bachelor’s degree in Global Studies, Cultural Studies, and Linguistics from the University of Minnesota – Twin Cities.

He has appeared in several media outlets, including the New York Times and The Nation. He has also written for popular platforms such as LobeLog, Foreign Policy in Focus and Zoom In Korea, and has published numerous policy briefs with institutions including the Stimson Center and the United States Institute of Peace. He is also the author of AFSC’s Engaging North Korea series – volume I, volume II, and volume III. 106

Meri JOYCE Meri Joyce is the Northeast Asia Regional Liaison Officer for the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), and International Coordinator of Peace Boat.

Originally from Melbourne, Australia, Meri graduated from the University of Melbourne and Kyoto University with degrees in Politics and Asian Studies, and has been working with the Japan-based international NGO Peace Boat since 2005. Peace Boat is the Regional Secretariat for the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) in Northeast Asia, and Meri is Regional Liaison Officer for GPPAC in the region. In this capacity, she coordinates various peacebuilding, disarmament, sustainability and conflict prevention related programmes within Japan and Northeast Asia. Amongst these projects include the Global Article 9 Campaign, which mobilized over 30,000 people in Japan to attend a global conference on constitutional and peacebuilding related issues, the Ulaanbaatar Process, a civil society dialogue process for confidence and capacity building in Northeast Asia launched in 2015, and various education and advocacy programmes related to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Meri also sits on the Steering Committees of the Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute (NARPI) and Women Cross DMZ, and is involved in various coordination work as part of Peace Boat's role as an International Steering Group member of the 2017 Nobel Peace Laureate, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). In addition, she is also active as an interpreter and translator between Japanese and English.

KAWASAKI Akira Kawasaki Akira is a member of the Executive Committee of Peace Boat and a member of the International Steering Group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), 2017 Nobel Peace Laureate. A core member of ICAN’s leadership since 2010, he served as Co-Chair of ICAN from August 2012 to June 2014. Since 2008, Kawasaki coordinates the ”Global Voyage for a Nuclear-Free World: Peace Boat Hibakusha Project,” in which atomic bomb survivors travel the world to share their stories and call for a nuclear free world. In 2009 and 2010, he was an advisor to the co-chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. After the 11 March 2011 tsunami and nuclear disaster, he initiated Peace Boat’s 107

activities to help children of Fukushima and organized the Global Conference for a Nuclear Power Free World in January 2012 as the Conference Director. He lectures at Keisen University in Tokyo and writes frequently for Japanese newspapers and for peace and disarmament journals.

KIM Jeongsoo Kim Jeongsoo is currently the standing representative of Women Making Peace (ROK). She has been involved in the women’s peace movement for 30 years. As a peace activist and scholar, she has focused on Peace Education and its relationship with education for reunification and has published several books and manuals on this area. She was the chief secretary for the First Lady of ROK and participated in the 2nd SouthNorth Korean Summit in 2007. She is now working as a civilian advisor for the Ministry of Gender Equality (for UNSCR 1325), the Ministry of Unification (for South-North Exchange and Cooperation Fund), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for Action with Women and Peace) and the Kyunggi Province (for Peace and Cooperation Policy). She has also been serving as a senior advisor of the President of South Korea for the InterKorean Summit since 2018, and is a standing representative of the women’s committee of the Southern Committee for the June 15th Joint Declaration.

Her organization Women Making Peace was established in 1997, by founding members who were leaders of the women’s peace and unification movement in South Korea, and the first civilian leaders to go to North Korea across the DMZ to participate in the 3rd Seminar on Peace in Northeast Asia and Women’s Role held in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea in 1992. Since its establishment in 1997, Women Making Peace has been a leading group in the women’s peace movement in South Korea in Inter-Korean women’s exchange, disarmament, peace education and conflict resolution programs at schools and local communities, and international solidarity for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Women Making Peace is also one of four South Korean women’s organizations working with Women Cross DMZ, the Nobel Women’s Initiative, and WILPF (Women’ International League for Peace and Freedom) in the Korea Peace Now! Campaign, a global campaign to end the Korean War and realize a Peace Treaty by the year of 2020.

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LEE Jae Young Jae Young graduated from Eastern Mennonite University with an MA in Conflict Transformation, focusing on Restorative Justice. He began his career as a peacebuilder at the Korea Anabaptist Center where he was a peace program coordinator for 10 years (2001-2010). Then he founded the Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute (2010), where he currently serves an executive director. He also founded the Korea Peacebuilding Institute (2012), a leading organization for the Restorative Justice movement in South Korea. He has conducted various workshops and lectures on restorative justice, mediation and peacebuilding for schools, legal system, government, NGOs, and community organizations in Korea. In addition, he has facilitated at the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI) in the Philippines and the Christian Forum for Reconciliation in Northeast Asia. Currently he lives with family and staff together as a small community called the Peace Building Community near Seoul.

Kathy R. MATSUI Dr Kathy R. Matsui, Ph.D. is professor at the Department of Global Citizenship Studies, Seisen University (Tokyo, Japan) and teaches courses on conflict resolution and peace related subjects. She received her doctorate degree from Leadership Studies Program, Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington. Her research concerns are development of capacities for conflict resolution and reconciliation. She works with peace researchers and educators internationally in International Institute on Peace Education (IIPE) and the Global Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). As a peace educator, she recently focuses her activities on facilitating peace education course for Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute (NARPI), held annually for participants from Northeast Asia and Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI), held annually in Davao, Mindanao, Philippines for participants from Southeast Asia. She is also active in her participation in inter-religious dialogue and cooperation for world peace as a member of the Women's Executive Committee, Peace Research Institute and the Reconciliation Education Task Force of World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP). Some of her publications are: (1) “Restorative Justice and Transcendence,” (Transcend Research, Issue No. 11、pp.9~16, 2013)(2) “Communication Skills in Conflict Transformation,” (Seisen University, Institute of Language Education Bulletin, Issue No. 3 pp. 85 ～98 September, 2010)(3) “The Role of 109

Experiential Learning in Educating Future Global Citizens,” (Seisen University Human Science Research Institute Bulletin, No. 19, pp.1~12, 2009) (4) Lessons From WWII Comfort Women: The Role of Peace Education in Developing Capacities for Forgiveness and Reconciliation (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012).

OKUMOTO Kyoko Dr Okumoto Kyoko is Chairperson of the Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute; Professor in the Department of International & English Interdisciplinary Studies of Osaka Jogakuin University; board member of the Peace Studies Association of Japan, Transcend Japan and Nonviolence Peaceforce Japan; Regional Convener for North East Asia of Transcend International; and leader of ACTION-Asia.

She works in the fields of Peace Studies, Conflict Transformation, Nonviolent Intervention, and particularly focuses on the Arts-based Approaches to Peacework. She teaches and facilitates peace workshops held mainly by civil society groups, and universities/schools. She tries to expand and deepen the network among Northeast Asian CSO/NGO people, and between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, as well as with South Asia.

PARK Jungeun Park Jungeun is Secretary General of People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD). She joined PSPD, an advocacy NGO in the Republic of Korea, in 2000 and worked at the Peace and Disarmament Center of PSPD for 15 years dealing with denuclearization and military alliance issues. She is a member of the Policy Advisory Committee of the Ministry of National Defense and a chairperson of the steering committee of Civil Peace Forum, a network of peace organizations in the ROK. People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) is a nongovernmental organization based in Seoul, Republic of Korea. It was founded in 1994 by activists, scholars and lawyers who were engaged in various democratic movements for participatory democracy and human rights. PSPD has been working on promoting people’s participation in government decision making processes, socio-economic reforms and peace on the Korean peninsula, by closely monitoring the abuse of power of the state and corporations to enhance transparency and accountability.

PSPD does not receive any government funding, and is 100% funded by individual donations and membership fees. To be an independent and transparent watchdog organization, our mandate requires all works of 110

PSPD to be politically impartial. In 2004, PSPD obtained consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

Darynell RODRIGUEZ TORRES Darynell Rodriguez Torres is the Executive Director of the GPPAC Foundation. Darynell has over twenty years of experience in the areas of international affairs and peace and conflict studies; working at the interface of politics and international public policy. He has a deep knowledge of conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues and extensive contacts with external stakeholders including civil society organisations, government representatives and high-level officials at the United Nations system and regional multilateral organisations. Previous to his appointment in GPPAC he worked as adviser of the President of the Colombian Senate, in the Secretary General's office of the Secretariat for Ibero-American Cooperation (currently SEGIB) and as a political risk analyst and public policy consultant for European public affairs firms.

Darynell's academic background includes a BA in Political Science and International Studies from West Virginia University, a Masters in Applied Political Studies by FIIAPP, a specialist degree in Communications and Political Management from the Complutense University of Madrid and a Masters in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Sciences.

ZHANG Ling Zhang Ling is a think tank professional and researcher on international relations and foreign policy. She is responsible for international cooperation, communications and project management at the Charhar Institute, and her main task involves working in various capacities with think tanks, NGOs, business and media. Having carried out many projects at home and abroad in the ROK, Japan, Cambodia, Mauritius, Djibouti, Paris and La RĂŠunion in France, Ling has gained a range of experience in peace and social development, executive, administrative and non-profit management. She has designed a special website embodying the timeline and retrospect, analyses and interviews on the first Trump-Kim Summit (koreanpeninsula.charhar.org.cn) with her team and was copy editor for the Chinese version of Strengthening Understanding Through Dialogue: A Peacebuilding Approach to the Korean Peninsula Conflict by the Centre for Peace & Conflict Studies.

Her research interests include think tank and NGO’s role in global governance, public diplomacy, peace studies and conflict prevention, 111

corporate diplomacy and international cooperation on poverty alleviation and environmental protection, and most recently she is exploring the cyberspace geopolitics and cyberdiplomacy. Ling is the author of Public Relations for Transnational Corporations in International Public Relations (Peking University Press, 2016) and she is also a part-time International Affairs Commentator for Legal Weekly with article contributions including “It’s hard for Britain to say goodbye to EU Laws while breaking up with the EU”, “Will the EU collapse after Brexit?”

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