Road to the Manifestos: The Final Mile

ROAD TO THE MANIFESTOS: THE FINAL MILE

ROAD TO THE MANIFESTOS: THE FINAL MILE

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CHAPTER ONE

CHAPTER TWO

Contents

CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER FOUR

CHAPTER FIVE

CHAPTER SIX

CHAPTER SEVEN

CHAPTER EIGHT

CHAPTER NINE

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

CHAPTER TEN

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Contents

Introduction

6

by Tim Allan

The most unpredictable government ever

10

by Tom Mludzinski and Sam Sharps

Lessons from last time (1)

18

by Hugo Sutherland

Lessons from last time (2)

26

by James O’Shaughnessy

What might be different

What’s on the table

36 42

Red lines and promises

48

Who is at the table?

54

The permanent government

64

by Sam Sharps

What it means for you

70

by Ben Thornton

Working with you

76

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Tim Allan Managing Director, Portland

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I

n the run up to the 2010 election, Portland published its guide to the next five years. We called it Cameron’s Britain. We did so knowing

that while events can always throw you, it was pretty clear who was going to be the next Prime

Minister. And aside from a few days where nobody quite seemed to know what would happen next, we never worried very much about the title of our document. Finally Portland’s Sam Sharps and Ben Thornton have sketched the scene in Whitehall during an election, and drawn some lessons for anyone who has a stake

Introduction

in the outcome.

Five years on, the future is very cloudy indeed. We could speculate what Cameron’s Britain might look like in 2020, or Miliband’s, or perhaps someone else. But predicting who will end 2015 as Prime Minister is not an easy call. The outcome in May is as uncertain as any election in living memory, save to say we may well have a second hung parliament in a row for the first time in more than a century.

So those outside the Westminster negotiation rooms need to understand what the result might mean, how the parties will then behave and where a deal might be done to form a government.

To help bring some clarity to the situation, we’ve worked with ComRes to flesh out seven post-election scenarios. Some are more likely than others, but each is possible. We have spent some time sketching out what they might mean for the parties and for policy.

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

Our own James O’Shaughnessy was right at the centre of the negotiations last time. His account of the negotiations, published here for the first time, gives a view from the Conservative camp. The Liberal Democrats and Labour already have their authoritative versions in the public domain, in the words of Andrew Adonis and David Laws. We have rounded up here the key lessons to be drawn from their respective books (both worth a read and available in all fine bookshops…).

Together these three give us about as comprehensive account of the coalition negotiations as you could want.

The question then is whether history will be repeated. To see what a fresh round of negotiations would look like, we have drawn some initial lessons about how the process might differ, before looking at some of the big issues up for discussion.

We’ve then rounded up early indications from the parties as to their priorities and pledges, to give a feel for where the points of connection might happen, and where there will be differences to overcome. We’ve also taken a look at the people who will be involved. Finally, Portland’s Sam Sharps has sketched the scene in Whitehall during an election.

All of this represents a handbook for anyone trying to make sense of the post-election period. For those looking to get the best outcomes after 2015, there is much more work to do. We would be delighted to talk to you about how Portland can help you achieve those goals.

CHAPTER TWO

The most unpredictable government ever

Tom Mludzinski Head of Political Polling, ComRes Sam Sharps Associate Director, Portland

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I

n 2013 Portland outlined seven possible outcomes of the election. All remain possible, though some of course are more likely than

others, and the shape of the next government remains more unpredictable than ever before.

What we do know is that no one will be sweeping into Downing Street on the crest of huge public popularity with a clear mandate for government.

The election won’t have a ‘winner’ but more of a ‘lucky runner-up’. The party sitting on the government benches could have as little as 33% of the vote.

The electoral arithmetic requires about 320 seats to form a bare majority (once Sinn Fein non-attendance and speaker and deputy speakers are taken into account) and 326 for an absolute majority (of one). The arithmetic of building a majority by coalition is made easier in the sense that each seat added to the governing side by the junior party reduces the size of the opposition by one as well.

The complicating factor this year is the status of Scottish, Welsh or Northern Ireland parties. In the past it may have been straightforward to do a deal which propped up a majority.

Now, in the wake of the Scottish referendum and with English votes for English laws on the horizon, the formation of a government with a substantial number of non-English MPs will be more problematic. Ultimately, electoral arithmetic might well trump ill-defined theories of legitimacy, but at the

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

very least ministers will find themselves with more questions to answer than in the past.

Outright Labour win This remains the most likely ‘clean result’, requiring no negotiation with other parties. To deliver a workable majority Labour government, Ed Miliband probably only needs around 33-35% of the vote. This implies a steady result in Scotland in the face of SNP pressure and gains from the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, to add at least 70 MPs to the total.

Questions of legitimacy will though remain in the air. It is plausible that the result could be achieved on a record-low postwar share of the popular vote for the majority governing party (Tony Blair in 2005 managed 35.2%, while at least polling higher than Michael Howard’s Conservatives). Although no doubt Labour ministers would put on a thick-skinned performance, their mandate to govern would be under constant scrutiny.

This is exacerbated even further by the political mood after the referendum in which the nationalist parties, particularly in Scotland, feel emboldened. And if votes on English laws are restricted to MPs from English constituencies, governing will become a much more complicated affair with the very real possibility that Labour holds a UK majority but only a minority in English constituencies.

Outright Conservative win To achieve this result, as Portland noted two years ago, David Cameron would need to pull off an unprecedented gain on the share of the vote that took him to power. It is worth remembering that in 2010, the Tories had a 7 point margin of victory over an unpopular Labour Party led by Gordon Brown, yet that was still not enough to win a majority.

Indeed, since January 2011 there have been over 1,500 polls and just five have shown a Conservative lead of more than two points. While exact calculations for how far ahead the Tories need to be are made ever more difficult by UKIP, the SNP and others, David Cameron’s party has not had anywhere near large enough a lead needed for a majority since the postelection honeymoon in 2010. He and his party would need a net gain of 23 seats coming from the Liberal Democrats, Labour and even UKIP, all the while having to hold off both the UKIP challenge in the dozen or so seats which they are likely to be competitive, and Labour’s advances in a number of marginal seats.

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All of which sounds extremely challenging but could just conceivably be achieved if the Labour vote collapses and the Tory offer seems particularly compelling. Another financial shock, for instance, might just work for the party better trusted to look after the economy.

Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition The most unpredictable government ever

If Labour wins thirty or so more seats, to reach 280-290 MPs, it would need a coalition partner with between 40-50 seats for a slim but working majority. Only the most optimistic Liberal Democrats expect such a good result, even with a strong ground campaign in incumbent seats.

The difficulty for Lib/Lab enthusiasts is that the aggregate number of seats between the two parties will remain fairly steady, and this might leave their combined MPs short of a majority. In other words, the closer Labour gets to a majority, the more it has to be assumed it enfeebles the Lib Dems.

The signs for the Liberal Democrats are quite poor in all respects. Looking overseas to countries with more experience of coalitions paints a depressing picture for the Liberal Democrats as junior coalition parties tend to be chewed up and spat out by their senior partners. The nearest parallel can be found in Germany. In 2009, the FDP (Germany’s Lib Dem equivalent) won a strong 14.6% of the national vote, and went into coalition with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s larger Christian Democratic Union (a centre-right party). At the following Road to the manifestos: the final mile

election, their share fell nearly ten points to just 4.8%, despite Merkel’s government being relatively popular.

Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition A renewed coalition between the two current governing parties is conceivable even if, in the face of a small Labour revival and UKIP threat (plus possibly a few Scottish Lib Dems gave way to the SNP), they lost an aggregate 32 seats.

In theory, the Liberal Democrats could make an offer to either party – if all else remained broadly the same, 50 Lib Dems could side with, say, 280 Labour or 280 Conservatives to form a majority. But such a fine balance relies on the Lib Dem holding on to almost all of their current seats, or the majority of Lib Dem losses to be to the Conservatives.

Traditionally in these circumstances it would fall to the Ulster Unionists (and now the DUP) to provide enough support in Parliament. The Conservatives have a better chance of such a deal passing off without huge controversy in that they will almost certainly have an English majority.

The grand coalition Indeed, the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland parties could well take on greater significance in the next parliament. Should Labour fall just short of an overall majority (say around the 310 mark) it could find enough common cause with the SNP, Plaid and maybe a couple of likeminded others to cobble together a coalition, if nothing else as a means of pressure on the Lib Dems in negotiations. The price the nationalists would extract for such a deal would be hefty (another referendum?), and the stability of the ensuing government would be undermined by questions of legitimacy in England.

An outcome we largely discounted in 2013 was that of one UKIP MP (the existence of which at that time seemed unlikely) joining the Conservatives in a broad right coalition. Should UKIP surge to half a dozen or more MPs in 2015 and win traditional Labour seats, they could just about take the Tories over the line, at least on a confidence and supply basis. But again, their demands for such a deal may well be high.

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Minority Labour or Minority Conservative Lasting minority governments have very little precedent in the UK, although the SNP managed a term of minority government in Scotland from 2007–2011 (with only 36% of seats). It is feasible that in the event of a decent Labour or Conservative showing at the election, say 310 seats, they could rely on a degree of consensus or a rolling programme of issue-based ad

The most unpredictable government ever

hoc coalitions to maintain a functioning executive.

The difficulty of course would be getting anything done except the bare minimum. Governing a minority would require the Prime Minister to exert total control over his or her Parliamentary party (almost inconceivable in the case of the Conservatives, and unlikely in the case of Labour), while knowing that every vote was still on a knife edge and the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary might be required in the lobby on any given day. A return to the 1970s where sick MPs had to be wheeled into the House to vote would bring significant and unwelcome uncertainty.

With the Prime Minister in 2015 facing several more years of difficult decisions over spending and public services, while having been elected on an ambitious policy programme, a Parliamentary minority is an incredibly weak platform for government. This therefore seems a sub-optimal solution, but could be one that the larger party declares as an option in pursuit of a better deal with a coalition partner.

The one circumstance in which this might change is a Road to the manifestos: the final mile

minority overall but a majority in England, coupled with a new convention barring MPs from constituencies outside England from voting on English affairs. Such a circumstance is not impossible for the Conservatives to pull off.

Conclusion While we do not know which scenario we will see as a result of the General Election, it is clear that the next government will not have an easy ride. Whether it is in coalition and keeping partners happy while managing their own party or juggling the difference between their leads in the UK and England, the Prime Minister will not only have to oversee the implementation of further significant cuts but also try and keep their government together. No easy task, made more difficult by an uninspiring victory which most likely faces the ‘winner’.

“There’s no point asking experts… no one knows what’s going to happen… to predict the next general election, you may as well play pin the tail on the donkey” Nigel Farage

CHAPTER THREE

Lessons from last time (1)

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Andrew Adonis

Hugo Sutherland Account Executive, Portland

Lessons from last time (1)

“Labour should have fought with every sinew in 2010 to retain power. To give up power voluntarily because you are tired of government and it is all too difficult is a betrayal of the people you serve. In politics, exhaustion and attrition need to be overcome, not indulged.”

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ritain has a proud history of strong, stable, majority governments. As politics tutors up and down the country

teach their students, our electoral system is designed to produce a clear winner. More often

than not, the party that wins the most seats takes the prize.

Many of our European neighbours accept coalition government and the often protracted negotiations that lead to their formation as a matter of course, but we tend to resort to coalition only at times of national emergency.

So the 2010 general election presented something new. It was a new experience for our politicians, for the monarchy and for the civil service. Covering the process was a new challenge Road to the manifestos: the final mile

for the media. And understanding what was going on was new to all of us as onlookers.

David Laws and Andrew Adonis – two of the lead actors in this drama – reflect in their books on how a climate of intense uncertainty gripped the nation. The unelected prime minister, Gordon Brown, clung on to office, desperate to negotiate a deal with the Lib Dems to keep his party in power. All the while, his main challenger, David Cameron, whose Conservative Party had somehow failed to win a majority, sought to gain power by whatever means through negotiations with the same party.

Despite his party performing well below the levels expected in the run-up to the election, this thrust the Lib Dem leader, Nick Clegg, squarely into the position of kingmaker over a frenzied five days of negotiations.

At the heart of this process were Mr Laws and Lord Adonis. Although neither was a household name, each was known within his party for thoughtful policy work. Architects of their own party’s manifestos and among the most trusted acolytes of their respective leaders, both played crucial roles in the negotiations and have gone on to write highly informative books reflecting on this curious state of affairs and the foundations of the Conservative-Lib Dem Coalition.

There is an element of catharsis about the Laws account.

Written only months after the election, it is a reflection on the ‘22 days in May’ that saw his own political career move so swiftly from triumph to disaster. He leads with a heavy amount of context, focusing from the outset on the run-up to the election, on how the Lib Dems had prepared for the possibility of coalition negotiations, and on his role in this. His is a considered analysis of the different personalities involved in the negotiations and the policies they debated over from all three sides – Labour, Conservative and Lib Dem. In contrast, although also written shortly after the events, Adonis waited for three years to publish his account. His ‘5 Days in May’ is more fast-paced, energetic and immediate in its reflections than Laws. What’s more, he is able to provide a fascinating and unique insight into the characters at large in Gordon Brown’s Downing Street during his final days in power and the machinations of the defeated prime minister himself. A consistently engaging feature of the book is Adonis’s willingness to pass comment on characters he was surely aware he would have to work with again in future. His openness and sincerity lends credence to his conclusions on why negotiations turned out as they did. Less engaging are the concluding chapters in the updated copy of his book, which read first as an attack on the Lib Dems’ ‘shift to the right’, second as a report card on the

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coalition government after three years, and third as a clear message to Ed Miliband, setting out a blueprint for Labour to follow to win the election outright in 2015.

Interestingly, given their public comments at the time, one of the fundamental disagreements between Laws and Adonis lies in their assessment of the parliamentary arithmetic in May 2010 – the building blocks for a coalition.

A running theme of Laws’s book is his lingering doubt that the seats were there to produce the progressive alliance of the

Lessons from last time (1)

Left that so many of his party’s supporters would instinctively have favoured, which Nick Clegg was evidently open to, and which Adonis and the Labour side clearly felt was possible.

Laws’s reflections on his conversations during the early days of the negotiations with his predecessor as the MP for Yeovil and Lib Dem grandee, Paddy Ashdown, are particularly instructive. Unsurprisingly, given his political leanings, Ashdown pushed heavily at the time for negotiations with Labour and the smaller parties on the Left. But Laws was clearly of the view that a coalition of this kind would prove too challenging to deliver and would not succeed.

“WE HAVE BEEN THROUGH A CAMPAIGN: NOW WE HAVE A COALITION. UNTIL TODAY, WE HAVE BEEN RIVALS: NOW WE ARE COLLEAGUES. THAT SAYS A LOT ABOUT THE SCALE OF THE NEW POLITICS WHICH IS NOW BEGINNING TO UNFOLD. THIS IS A NEW GOVERNMENT Road to the manifestos: the final mile

AND A NEW KIND OF GOVERNMENT.” David Cameron

Adonis’s reflections on what he calls ‘Lab-Libbery’ come to a rather different conclusion. He, Gordon Brown and Peter Mandelson quickly came to the view after the election that a rainbow alliance of virtually all the parties besides the Tories could produce a working government. He claims that Nick Clegg agreed that this was possible. But Clegg’s pre-election commitment to negotiate first with the party with the largest

number of seats and votes had opened the door to a possible Tory-Lib coalition. David Cameron’s ‘big, open, comprehensive’ offer to the Lib Dems followed and negotiations became all about personality and which party – Labour or the Conservatives – was prepared to do more to find common ground with the Lib Dems.

As both accounts convey well in different ways, this was the Conservatives. Laws is particularly scathing in his criticisms of the Labour negotiating team. His obvious respect for Adonis and Mandelson and for their intentions to look seriously at negotiating a Lab-Lib coalition does not go far enough to mask his contempt for the other members of the team in this context. At no stage during his account is the reader left with the impression that Harriet Harman or either of the Eds, Messrs Balls and Miliband, were prepared to cede the ground necessary to form a coalition government. Financial matters – absolutely key to discussions given the country’s parlous economic situation – were almost entirely off limits. Neither Balls nor Miliband were prepared to negotiate in the absence of Alistair Darling – a serious problem. All the while, the Conservatives and Lib Dems were engaging directly and effectively on policy issues and making genuine progress. The Conservatives had put together a strong and serious team that included heavyweights George Osborne and William Hague, and Laws goes so far as to state that “the sense of urgency and seriousness that was present during our talks with the Conservatives was never quite present during our discussions with the Labour team.”

Adonis does not shirk from accepting this in his updated account. He devotes a few pages of analysis to “Labour fatalism” and reports that in May 2010 “the party was exhausted, demoralised, almost leaderless, with many ministers and MPs anxious to escape into opposition and stay there for a good while recuperating.” Implicit in this is his view that Labour had been unprepared for the serious task of negotiating a new government. Without the prior groundwork

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and consideration of the likely issues and discussion points, negotiations were never likely to succeed. Negotiating a coalition government requires patience, a positive approach and the mutual understanding that both sides are prepared to make concessions, if necessary. Coming off the back of thirteen years in power, the incumbent Labour Government had significant baggage that the Conservatives did not.

And the major element of that baggage was Gordon Brown himself. Ultimately, Adonis concludes that had Brown

Lessons from last time (1)

resigned the Labour leadership the Friday morning after the election he would have given the Lab-Lib Dem negotiations more of a chance. His would have been the major power play and the defining moment, rather than Cameron’s ‘big, open and comprehensive’ offer to the Lib Dems that came later that day. As it was, Brown’s insistence in the first few days of negotiations on staying on and playing a role in the formation of a new government before stepping down as Labour leader later in the year pushed Clegg further towards the Conservatives. Laws charts Clegg’s frustrations with Brown’s erratic behaviour, including increasingly desperate phone calls during negotiations, and makes frequent reference to the ‘Gordon Brown problem’. The Lib Dems were acutely aware that Labour had been rejected by the electorate and with the Conservatives offering them more in any case – including, most importantly, on electoral reform – Laws presents the Conservative-Lib Dem coalition that emerged as the only Road to the manifestos: the final mile

logical choice. What was clear to him and the other Lib Dem negotiators towards the end of those five days in May was anything but clear to those on the outside.

With May 2015 fast approaching, Britain has come to understand a bit more about coalitions – how they come about and how they work in practice. If anything, with UKIP’s rise, the unpopularity of the Lib Dems, the predicted gains for the SNP in Westminster and the implications of all this for our two traditional parties of government, our politics is perhaps on

the verge of being more pluralistic than ever before. What seemed so unusual back in 2010 could soon become the norm and different teams could well be required to negotiate a new government come the 8th May. Both Laws and Adonis shed invaluable light in their accounts on how the process worked last time and the main issues different parties have to grapple with. They will again become required reading in the months leading up to next May.

CHAPTER FOUR

Lessons from last time (2)

James O’Shaughnessy Chief Policy Advisor, Portland

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A

s the General Election approaches, what might the next Government look like? After dabbling in coalition, is

Britain heading for another one? And if so, who will be doing the negotiating?

David Cameron didn’t go into the 2010 general election looking for a coalition, though he certainly prepared for that possibility. Despite a deeply unpopular Prime Minister, the task facing the Conservatives was very hard. As it was, the Tories Lessons from last time (2)

added over a hundred seats – their biggest gains for 80 years – but couldn’t form a majority. By planning for this eventuality, Cameron was able to realise his deep ambition to enter No 10 as Prime Minister.

The run-up to the election had been dominated by leaders’ debates, skewing the campaign. No one theme or policy issue came to the fore or dictated the agenda. Political campaigners rued the lack of rough and tumble and the tendency of seemingly minor events to dominate the news cycle, but the effect was a relatively stable period (Clegg-mania notwithstanding) that produced a result much as was predicted before the campaign proper began.

It is in exactly circumstances like this that David Cameron, sometimes nicknamed the ‘essay crisis PM’, thrives. Having joined the election team in CCHQ at around 7am, he took counsel from George Osborne, Steve Hilton and Andy Coulson and then retired for a quick sleep. Later that day he would make the “big, Road to the manifestos: the final mile

open, comprehensive offer” to the Lib Dems that changed the post-election dynamic and gave the Tories a real shot at power.

The experience of coalition negotiations have been extensively written about and are reviewed by Hugo Sutherland elsewhere. My first contribution to the negotiations was when I was I had to pass on an policy paper I had drafted in a swift, hushed meeting with a civil service official outside the Treasury.

In a John Le Carré-style document swap, I passed over the paper that had been stuffed in my jacket’s breast pocket, avoiding the press gang piled up outside the Cabinet Office.

Later on, I would join the main negotiating teams in order to thrash out some of the specific policy details, focusing on domestic issues while my colleagues Rupert Harrison and Denzil Davidson focused on economic and European issues respectively. My primary reaction to the negotiations was how friendly they were – even the most calculating members of each team, George Osborne and Chris Huhne, were getting along famously.

There were two reasons for this spirit of positivity. First, both parties had been out of power a long time – a very long time in the Lib Dems’ case – and were desperate to make something work. The other reason is that both were wellprepared, knowledgeable about each other’s positions, and willing to compromise. From the Tories’ side this was because of the assiduous and highly secretive work done by Oliver Letwin during the campaign. Squirrelled away in total isolation in a backroom of CCHQ, he had done the policy comparison work on his own, drawing up red lines and potential negotiating points.

He essentially merged the two parties’ manifestos, thinking about areas of common cause or difference and working out the maths needed to create a working coalition. This set the tone for the first years of the Coalition, which will be viewed by history as a period of extensive and radical reform.

Things are likely to be different if coalition negotiations are needed in the event of a hung parliament again in May. With five years of coalition experience under their belts, negotiations between the Conservatives and Lib Dems will be more hard-nosed. The atmosphere will be much less optimistic.

Agreeing a fresh deal is likely to take longer as the parties grapple with the electoral maths and wrangle over government posts. Dealing with the deficit would remain the priority and this would dominate everything.

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And this will have to be the case from the Labour side, too.

Where in 2010 the pressure was on Cameron, if Ed Miliband’s woes continue and Labour look like failing to win enough seats to win a majority, they will have to think more seriously about coalition. Will they negotiate with the Lib Dems? It seems certain that Nick Clegg’s head will be the price of any agreement between the two. Will they look to a broad-based coalition bringing in a number of the smaller parties? Will they consider a confidence and supply agreement with the SNP,

Lessons from last time (2)

who have already indicated they could be open to a deal with Labour on these lines?

With the election result so uncertain, each side will be very thoroughly prepared for a variety of potential outcomes.

Researchers and policy advisers in three main parties have been ‘coalition-testing’ all policies and future commitments as part of election planning for months. Every decision made will take the possibility of continued or a new coalition into account and the emphasis will be squarely on how another deal would work in practice.

Like it or not, the leaders of our political parties are having to accept the new reality of a more pluralistic approach from the electorate and an increasingly important role played by the smaller parties such as UKIP. The challenge this time would be the need for greater democratic discussions within their own parties than in 2010 for both the Conservatives and Labour. It remains doubtful whether the Parliamentary Road to the manifestos: the final mile

Conservative Party would back another coalition. Labour may be more willing, but only marginally.

For the Lib Dems, despite their woeful polling and Nick Clegg’s negative approval ratings, they will be focused on being the kingmakers again. Even if they wake up on 8 May having lost twenty seats, the arithmetic could mean that they still play a vital role. Led by Danny Alexander, the Treasury chief secretary, their policy experts will be preparing for all possibilities.

The roles needed in a negotiating team As negotiations last time demonstrated, there are certain functions that need to be fulfilled in a coalition negotiating team. We can expect that each team will again be made up of at least four people who all bring something slightly different to the team, some of whom might perform more than one function. What is certain is that the following four functions have to be accounted for:

1. The money person Someone with a thorough understanding of the finances, how the Treasury works and the financial impacts of policy decisions.

2. A representative of the leader’s office A trusted lieutenant to communicate each party leader’s views, highly likely to be the Chief of Staff.

3. A representative of the party Someone with excellent relationships within the party, respected and able to communicate with different wings of the party equally well.

4. The policy brain Someone who knows all the policies inside out and has prepared for all possibilities on crucial negotiating points.

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What will the line ups be?

Conservatives While far from certain, our best guess is that the Conservatives negotiating team would be: The money person George Osborne for definite, the only choice and a key part of the negotiating team in 2010. A firm friend of the Prime

Lessons from last time (2)

Minister and the party’s key strategist. As Chancellor, the man who understands the Treasury and what can and can’t be done better than anyone.

A representative of the leader’s office Could be the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, Edward Llewellyn, as in 2010. While Llewellyn is expected to step down from the role after May, he could stay on to oversee negotiations.

A representative of the party Michael Gove. With William Hague stepping down as an MP, this role is likely to be filled by Gove. As Chief Whip – popular with MPs, peers and party members alike – and a Cameron confidante, he is ideally placed to take on the role.

The policy brain Oliver Letwin will certainly be involved in some way. The party’s Road to the manifestos: the final mile

main ‘policy brain’ and importantly, ‘Lib Dem-friendly.’ Another person who could be involved here is Jo Johnson, head of the Downing Street Policy Unit and the man charged with coming up with ideas for the party’s election manifesto.

Labour The Labour team is more difficult to predict. Like the Conservatives in 2010, Labour will be going all out to win the election and gain a majority. Entertaining coalition will be a last resort to secure power. There’s a personal dynamic too. The party is under periodically troubled leadership and Ed Miliband will not want people involved who could be future rivals for his position. As things look at the moment, the team we could expect to see would be: The money person It’s hard to look beyond Ed Balls. Central to Labour policy making, with a lengthy Treasury background and now a term as Shadow Chancellor under his belt.

A representative of the leader’s office Lucy Powell has taken on a pivotal role for Ed Miliband and Labour’s 2015 campaign. Trusted by Miliband, and his first Chief of Staff, as an MP she is again a key figure in his team.

A representative of the party Much like with Balls, it’s hard to look beyond Harriet Harman. A Labour big-hitter and Deputy Leader of the party, we can expect her to demand to be part of any negotiations.

The policy brain Lord Stewart Wood could take on this role – Miliband’s closest aide and ally, and crucially, his ‘ideas’ man. He has been heavily involved in coordinating Labour’s election manifesto. Another candidate for this role might be Torsten Bell, a Labour strategist in ‘team Miliband’ who has long been focused on policy development. And we shouldn’t discount Andrew Adonis who played an influential role last time and could be called upon to do so again.

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Liberal Democrats The easiest team to predict in many ways, given that their chance of remaining in government rests on negotiating a new coalition. Nick Clegg went public early this year with the team of five he has picked to prepare for negotiations. With no Chris Huhne – a key member of the 2010 negotiating team – and Andrew Stunnell unlikely to play such a prominent role again, we can expect a negotiating team to reflect the names in Nick

Lessons from last time (2)

Clegg’s announcement: The money person Danny Alexander as Treasury chief secretary, a trusted ally of Clegg, a veteran of the 2010 negotiations and a man who has worked well with the Conservatives before.

A representative of the leader’s office Johnny Oates could play an important role here as chief of staff to Nick Clegg and one of the most influential party voices. Another option could be Lynne Featherstone who is a trusted Clegg ally and a part of the team picked to prepare for negotiations.

A representative of the party Highly likely to be Steve Webb. Particularly popular with the left wing of the party, he would bring balance to the team and has performed an important role already in this parliament, Road to the manifestos: the final mile

serving throughout as Minister of State at the Department for Work and Pensions.

The policy brain This will certainly be David Laws. Central to negotiations, and planning for negotiations last time, he will again perform this function. Ideologically to the right of his party, he is particularly popular with the Conservatives.

Conclusion What’s sure is that this will be a fascinating and unpredictable election. The closer we get, the less likely it looks that the Conservatives or Labour will get the majority they are after.

With UKIP and the SNP looking set to take seats from both the Conservatives and Labour, we could be headed towards hung parliament territory again. The number crunchers will be busier than ever as the votes come in, with a number of different scenarios possible.

If we do get another hung parliament, we can expect longer, more protracted negotiations than in 2010. But our media won’t stand for negotiations over a number of weeks as is often the case in other European countries. Discussions will be transactional rather than trust-based, personalities will be crucial, and securing key government posts will be paramount.

CHAPTER FIVE

What might be different?

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n typically British form, there was no reliable guide to what happened after the 2010 election.

Various precedents were wheeled out, and experts

opined on what might or might not be expected according to convention or political pressure. But the three things that most influenced the form of negotiations last time were: • the feeling that the Conservatives had earned the right to be in government, even if they had not won outright; • the perceived necessity to calm international markets

What might be different?

at a difficult economic time; and • the eventual petering out of ‘Cleggmania’ and the sudden adjustment to a smaller Liberal Democrat parliamentary force.

THE HUNG PARLIAMENT CONTINGENCY STILL RELIES UPON CALL “THE GOOD CHAP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT” - THAT GOOD CHAPS OF BOTH SEXES KNOW WHERE THE UNWRITTEN LINES ARE DRAWN AND DO NOT PUSH MATTERS TO THE POINT WHERE THEY CROSS THEM. Peter Hennessy

None of these may apply in 2015.

First, in 2010 the Liberal Democrats adopted a doctrine that it would negotiate first with the party which won the most seats.

In 2015 that may or may not be the party with the most votes: the ‘side closest to winning’ might be open to interpretation.

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

Second, the international bond markets are not seen to be so threatening now, and international examples suggest periods of negotiation are not hugely destabilising.

And third, the giddiness of 2010 has given way to a more sober Liberal Democrat party, which is braced for losses and will be planning accordingly.

So once again, the process is pretty much open to be made the way the participants would like it. We can though still predict a few ways in which things will be different this time around.

Preparation All three partners have had plenty of time to consider how they would like to play negotiations, and to anticipate their opposite numbers’ strategies.

Importantly, all three will have written their manifestos with an eye to how they will play out in coalition talks. In some cases this will have emerged as a clearly-signalled red line which they will be able to make clear is non-negotiable. In others, the parties might have left things out of the manifesto to give them maximum room to manoeuvre.

Time With some of the pressure off, the talks could go on for much longer this time. While both the major parties will want to pressure those with whom they are negotiating to seal the deal, the Liberal Democrats will know that they are by far the most realistic chance of either the Conservatives or Labour to form a majority.

So as much as the Tories and Labour might threaten to govern as a minority or put together a grand coalition elsewhere, the Lib Dems will be hoping to set their own pace – and extract as much as they can along the way.

Detail Although the manifestos might be shorter on detail, the form of the final agreement might be lengthier. Assuming the next coalition partners are aiming to deliver another five-year government, the Lib Dems in particular will be conscious of the danger of running out of policy halfway through. While there was a mid-coalition review of sorts in 2013, it did not really result in any new policy, and the negotiating dynamic was by that stage pretty much extinguished.

Of course, no government can predict five-year priorities with total confidence and ministers will have to spend their time dealing with the unexpected. But we can probably expect a fuller agreement with longer-term ambitions.

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The power brokers The role of the civil service in the process is, in true British style, subtle, ill-defined and influenced by the personality of those involved. While trying hard to avoid accusations of political interference, Whitehall will do its best to nudge parties together and facilitate a harmonious discussion.

But whereas Gus O’Donnell was very focussed on process in 2010, down to arranging meeting rooms and discreet routes by which they could be run, his successor Jeremy Heywood is

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

What might be different?

more inclined to ‘fix’. Mr Heywood might be tempted to play a more constructive role, still respecting impartiality but finding ways to bring the parties together to form a workable platform for government. Given what is at stake, this could be the most important role he ever plays.

“I think it contradicted what a lot of people thought would be coalition, which would be, ‘oh, it’s mushy, they’re not going to do very much, you know, they won’t be able to do anything’. We’ve seen with this government that you could criticise them for many things, but actually you couldn’t criticise them for lack of action.”

Gus O’Donnell

CHAPTER SIX

What’s on the table

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T

he 2015 manifestos will represent both a set of offers to the electorate and the opening gambit in coalition negotiations. Although, as we have already

seen, all sorts of outcomes are possible, the main strategising has naturally been done by the three big Westminster parties, expecting the big decision to be whether the Liberal Democrats go with the Conservatives or Labour.

During 2014, the parties showed their hand to varying degrees. The Liberal Democrats published a full premanifesto. Labour concluded its policy forum with a formal

What’s on the table

statement of policy. The Conservatives remain the last to set out a programme, held back in part by the pressures of being in government but also the freedom afforded by a more relaxed party constitution. However, there are sufficient public statements, party conference promises and long term policy goals to give a strong hint of what the Tory platform will look like.

Collectively, this gives us a decent impression of how the parties line up. Any policy agreement will include a number of detailed pledges, but any negotiation will have to open with a

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

set of headline issues.

“By fighting you never get enough, but by yielding you get more than you expected.�

Dale Carnegie, How to Win Friends and Influence People

Responsibility and control Demands around departmental posts will probably be driven by the Liberal Democrats. One big question for them is what their leader does in a future coalition government. If the Lib Dems are this time negotiating three rather than four or five cabinet posts, they might first insist that all of these have a departmental purview. Nick Clegg has maintained that he made the right decision in 2010, taking up the Deputy Prime Minister role that gives him with wide-ranging interests but little formal power. But he might insist this time that he should receive a proper job as a means of securing a greater legacy – Secretary of State for, say, Education.

Additionally, the Liberal Democrats have already briefed that they might ask for full control of one or more departments.

Even where a Lib Dem secretary of state has been in place for the past four years (in DECC and BIS), the Conservatives have ensured that the department is balanced with a senior minister, meaning that a fully-fledged liberal departmental agenda is difficult to establish. Of course, all departments have to cope with the oversight of the Treasury, and the checks on their activity through cabinet committees, but establishing a little liberal bastion in Whitehall might still be quite appealing.

Leadership A feature of the 2015 election is that all three major party leaders have been in place for nearly the entire Parliament, but all three have low personal ratings and seem to lead discontented parties. In 2010, the Lib Dems made a feature of their negotiation with Labour that Gordon Brown would have to make way. Such an ultimatum from them is not likely this time, but such will be the atmosphere within the parties that succession plans for Clegg, Cameron or even Miliband might yet be an implicit or explicit part of the discussions.

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Europe It is nearly inconceivable that a government containing Conservative ministers could get away with not holding a referendum on EU membership in 2017. So this is likely to be a non-negotiable plank of the Tory offer. However the protocols for campaigning in the referendum would then have to be worked out.

Depending on the outcome of reform discussions, the official government position in the referendum could be to stay

What’s on the table

in the EU, in which case whipping would presumably be suspended to allow Tories to fight for an exit, presumably with no Lib Dems of any consequence joining them. Or the official position could be to leave, at which point the Liberal Democrats would have to break from the Government and campaign with the opposition, taking a relatively small number of Conservatives with them.

This implies a need for clear visibility of three things: the circumstances in which the Government will reach an official position on ‘stay’ or ‘leave’; the protocol for how the government can function during a hugely divisive campaign; and the consequences for the coalition if the public rejects the government’s official view.

For Labour, the calculation is rather different. With no commitment to a referendum, any discussion about Europe may touch on reform and an anti-UKIP strategy, but the issue can be

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

safely relegated down the agenda – unless the party is forced into promising a referendum in the later stages of the election.

Devolution Immediately after the cross-party effort to win the Scottish independence referendum, devolution emerged as a dividing line between the parties. Quite apart from the issues of legitimacy in forming the coalition, the uncertain settlement means that there could be a lot to play for. Tory insistence on English votes for English laws could leave Danny Alexander’s post as Chief Secretary looking anomalous, for example, while the Liberal Democrats could Labour push for greater English devolution. Big constitutional issues of this sort would normally only be sorted through cross-party consensus, but with so much at stake and electoral arithmetic so finely balanced, the parties will be tempted to fight for any advantage they can.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Red lines and promises

Raise tax-free allowance from £10,500 to £12,500. Start the 40% tax rate at £50,000 instead of £41,900.

No mansion tax.

Mansion Tax

Tackle tax avoidance while keeping headline rates low.

Increase spending on infrastructure at least in line with growth in national income.

Eradicate the deficit by 2018 through further substantial cuts in departmental budgets.

Conservative

Income Tax

Tax Corporation Tax

Infrastructure

Economy Austerity

Issue

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

Tax properties worth more than £2 million.

Cut income tax for lower and middle earners, with a lower starting rate of 10p. Restore 50p top rate for those earning over £150,000.

Reverse the 1% reduction planned by George Osborne.

Create an independent National Infrastructure Commission to identify Britain’s long-term needs.

Close the deficit through tax increases and spending cuts. No additional borrowing for new spending.

Labour

Red lines and promises

Tax properties worth more than £2 million.

Raise tax free allowance from £10,500 to £12,500. Raise capital gains tax substantially.

Crack down on tax avoidance.

Following a spending review, the party will ensure investment in infrastructure will rise both in absolute terms and as a share of the economy.

“Strict new fiscal rules” to ensure the deficit has gone by April 2018, with the wealthy contributing the most.

Liberal Democrat

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Immigration

Controlling immigration to be “at the heart” of renegotiation with the EU. Migrant access to benefits to be further restricted.

Make migrants wait two years to claim out of work benefits.

No commitment to a referendum, but will push for reform of the EU.

NHS to be given ‘first chance’ to provide services under Labour’s preferred provider policy. Services would be opened up to competition only if commissioners judge the NHS is unable to meet their requirements .

Continue with the Health and Social Care Bill.

Outsourcing

Hold an in/out referendum in 2017 after renegotiating the terms of Britain’s EU membership.

Hospital trusts and other NHS bodies to evolve into NHS integrated care organisations, working from home to hospital to coordinate physical, mental and social care.

All patients to have access to a GP from 8am to 8pm, seven days a week by 2020. 5,000 more GPs to be trained.

Services

Europe Referendum

£2.5bn a year Time to Care Fund to pay for 20,000 more nurses, 8,000 more GPs, 5,000 more care workers and 3,000 more midwives by 2020.

Continue to ringfence NHS funding and keep pace with inflation.

Health Investment

Focus on exit checks as a way to stop migrants from over-staying and abusing freedom of movement.

Will hold a referendum if there is a new EU treaty transferring powers to Brussels.

NHS mergers no longer to come under the jurisdiction of the Competition and Markets Authority and commissioners will not have to put all services out to tender.

Health and well-being boards to be increased in size and given power to hold budgets.

A real terms increase in NHS funding of £1 billion in 2016/17 and 2017/18, along with an extra £500m for mental health services.

Continue with the free school and academy programme.

Secondary Education

Build at least 200,000 houses a year by 2020.

Will legislate to provide longer-term lets with predictable rents.

100,000 new homes for first-time buyers at a 20% discount.

Encourage more tenants onto the market with Right to Buy and the allocation of homes for first-time buyers.

No increase in working age benefits for two years, affecting those receiving JSA, tax credits, and child benefits.

Housing House Building

Landlords

Benefits

Cap raises in child benefit at 1% until 2017. Repeal the ‘bedroom tax’.

Back ‘community owned’ renewable energy and invest in research into energy storage and transmission.

Require all teachers to be qualified.

Parents of primary school children to be guaranteed childcare from 8am to 6pm. Compulsory sex and relationship education in all schools. Reform of tax treatment for private schools.

A range of new vocational initiatives to ensure as many young people go on an apprenticeship as go to university.

No firm policy as of yet, but have opposed the further expansion of onshore windfarms.

Environment Renewable Energy

Three million apprenticeships to be created, funded by benefit cuts.

Education Vocational training

Freeze benefits only as part of a package with tax increases. Implement a yellow card system rather than immediate DWP sanctions.

Tackle overcrowding by incentivising social landlords to reduce the number of tenants under-occupying their homes, freeing up larger properties for larger families.

Build 300,000 houses a year.

Legally-binding decarbonisation target, largely to be achieved by a focus on renewable energy.

Protect the education budget from cuts. Guarantee qualified teachers and a core curriculum set by independent experts in all state schools, academies and free schools.

200,000 grants to employers and expand the number of degree equivalent Higher Apprenticeships.

Develop National Colleges to deliver the high level vocational skills.

Red lines and promises‌

CHAPTER EIGHT

Who is at the table

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Liberal Democrats The Liberal Democrats are the only party to have formally announced their negotiation team. Seemingly the new kids in 2010, supporting Nick Clegg this time will be a team which after five years looks like seasoned government warriors.

Danny Alexander MP The Chief Secretary will once again play a key role, and has already begun the process of drawing up a list of Who is at the table

non-negotiable issue, something the party will be asked about in the election campaign. Closely tied in to the Osborne austerity plan during his time in the Treasury, his majority in Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey is a healthy 8,700 but he may yet face a fight to keep out the SNP. David Laws MP At the heart of the talks in 2010 before a very short stint as minister, resignation and eventual recall to government, Mr Laws is Chair of the Manifesto Working Group and will play a pivotal role again in 2015. As a free market and social liberal, Laws was always seen as more closely aligned with the Conservatives than much of the party.

Avoiding accusations that he is already lining up a deal with the Tories, he has stated the party will not ‘pre-negotiate’ a future

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

coalition by watering down the Lib Dem manifesto.

Sal Brinton Baroness Brinton steps into Tim Farron’s shoes as party President in 2015. She has already underlined the importance of a structured decision making process in a future negotiation, where the negotiating team frequently communicate and consult with the parliamentary party, Federal Executive and Federal Policy Committee. She has also backed the idea of forming a special

Federal Conference to debate and vote on the way forward.

These suggestions should give additional influence to the party’s grassroots.

Steve Webb MP Without ever gaining a great public profile, Steve Webb has built a reputation as a strong and capable minister within DWP, gaining respect across the political spectrum. This credibility, coupled with a strong intellect and grasp of the issues, will make him a key part of negotiations. Traditionally linked to the left of the party, he is on record recognising the alienation of many supporters during the coalition years and is likely to push for a distinctive and radical liberal policy contribution to the next programme for government rather than a broad compromise.

Lynne Featherstone MP The Hornsey and Wood Green MP has been a minister throughout the coalition years without ever making the Cabinet table, providing a campaigning force through her work in equalities and international development. She has not been without controversy, with her attack on journalist Julie Burchill and more recently her opposition to allowing a visa for ‘dating guru’ Julien Blanc. But overall this experience may give her a good insight into how to build a platform with broad populist appeal.

“I remain of the view that the worst outcome next year would be either a Conservative or Labour only government – because only the Lib Dems can anchor the country in the centre ground.”

Nick Clegg

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Conservatives The Tory negotiation team will, like the party’s policy platform, emerge nearer the time of the election, and the party leadership may well deny the need for negotiations right up to election day. But we can see some early stages of how the blue side will line up.

George Osborne MP Considered support to the main Conservative lead of William Hague in 2010, Mr Osborne was undoubtedly the Who is at the table

architect of the programme for government, aided by a broad agreement with Nick Clegg and David Laws on the need for a smaller state. This time around, he may have half an eye on future leadership of his party as well as the legacy of his time as Chancellor. His Budgets have demonstrated a real radicalism and in the few instances where he has been drawn into social issues he has shown a liberal streak. So his personal preferences might draw the Tories in interesting new directions if he is given scope to lead negotiations.

Jo Johnson MP Mr Johnson has achieved the feat of playing a hugely influential role without ever raising his personal profile.

In 2013 he was appointed by David Cameron as Parliamentary Secretary at the Cabinet Office to help develop the 2015 Tory manifesto with Minister for Road to the manifestos: the final mile

Policy Oliver Letwin. He also heads the Policy Unit for Number 10. He will have a view on Britain’s place in the world: as a Financial Times journalist he regularly extolled the benefits of EU membership and as a former New Delhi correspondent, he understands the challenge posed to Britain by the emerging economies.

Ed Llewellyn David Cameron’s Chief of Staff was part of the negotiating team in 2010. His connections to the Liberal Democrats proved useful and may do so again, having worked for Paddy Ashdown when the former party leader was High Commissioner to Bosnia. These connections have occasionally proved too much for some Conservatives – and friends of Michael Gove have loudly questioned his loyalties – but he remains trusted by David Cameron.

Oliver Letwin MP Although Letwin will not be the principal overseer of the manifesto this time around, he will likely play an influential role in coalition negotiation. The Minister of State in the Cabinet Office works across departments to ensure the smooth running of the coalition and is reportedly behind some of the key messages that unite the two parties. Reputed to enjoy high degree of trust with Danny Alexander, he is edging into elder statesman territory and while he will not be a front line election campaigner he will be a steady head in putting a policy platform together.

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Labour As James O’Shaughnessy says earlier in this book, the Labour line-up is difficult to predict, although we can anticipate a few candidates.

Ed Balls MP Ed Balls ends the Parliament with an improved reputation following a mildly disastrous leadership bid and years of mockery over his command of Twitter. He remains the Tories’ main target in reminding voters of Labour’s economic track Who is at the table

record and his personification of the style and strategy of the Brown years was a negative in negotiations in 2010. But Mr Balls earns his place at the table first by his widely recognised weight in policy, and second by improving relations between him and Nick Clegg. His thorough understanding of reputational and financial impacts of policy decisions will be critical to negotiations.

Douglas Alexander MP Never a very high profile Labour figure, and with a Scottish accent which could become increasingly problematic in discussions of national government, Mr Alexander is nonetheless likely to land a key role in negotiations. Following the Scottish referendum, he was quick to warn parties that voters want change, and will be conscious of the threat to Labour north of the border. But he is also leading the Labour campaign for the UK to stay in Europe, which represents the party’s best and only hope Road to the manifestos: the final mile

to generate some business support for a Labour-led administration.

Lord Adonis Despite having spearheaded the Labour drive in 2010 to form a Lab-Lib Dem coalition, and being one of Ed’s closest policy advisers, Andrew Adonis may play a more backroom role this time round. Newsnight reported in April that Lord Adonis met with Clegg’s chief of staff Jonny Oates and Lib Dem donor Neil Sherlock, to discuss ‘mutual concern over Europe’.

Lucy Powell MP Lucy Powell played a key role in Ed Miliband’s leadership campaign in 2010 and is known to be a deeply trusted ally. Her promotion to the shadow cabinet was though the cue for some disquiet in the Labour ranks, made worse by a leaked strategy document. Only an MP for three years, she has displaced some old hands and owes her position to her closeness to Ed Miliband, a leader otherwise not surrounded by loyalist MPs. Harriet Harman MP Labour’s deputy leader for eight years and a thirty-year veteran of parliament, Harriet Harman has served through Labour’s ups and downs, remaining something of a target for right wing journalists throughout. But her experience and reach within the party should position her well to construct and sell a deal to any sceptical party members. She will also be the most senior and accomplished woman involved in the negotiations – line-ups on all sides will be very male-dominated.

Lord Stewart Wood and Torsten Bell The brains behind the Miliband operation, these two men are responsible for policy and strategy and will do much of the translation into a programme for government, but may leave the political deal-making and relationship-forging to others.

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The other players A whole cast of characters could become involved in the discussions after the next election. However, two in particular are most likely to be seen and heard as May progresses.

Nicola Sturgeon MSP In her first speech as party leader, with big electoral gains on the horizon, Ms Sturgeon ruled out any possibility of coalition with the Conservatives, promising that “the SNP will never put the Tories into Who is at the table

government”. When it comes to Labour, nothing has been ruled out. Having highlighted the tactical benefits of partnering with a Labour government who depended on SNP votes, Ms Sturgeon was clear about her top three areas of negotiation: more devolution; a “rethink” of austerity; and the future of Trident weapons on the river Clyde. Unspoken in all of this is the leverage the Scottish Government can apply on the issue of a future referendum.

A more modern and less dramatic performer than her predecessor Alex Salmond (who might yet reappear as a Westminster MP), Mrs Sturgeon still represents a formidable political figure, as proven by her unanimous selection as party leader. Her positioning so far is cooperative, but she has a strong tribal streak and feels empowered to drive a very hard

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

bargain if given the chance.

Nigel Farage Whether UKIP ends up with one seat or ten (and a lower number is still probably more likely), Nigel Farage is likely to be in high demand for media comment after the election. Whether he is in a position to influence the shape of the next government is a different question.

Farage recently said he would “do a deal with the Devil”, or even Ed Miliband’s Labour, if it got him what he wanted – an in-out EU referendum. Perhaps recognising the implausibility of a UKIP secretary of state, he has alluded to a confidence and supply arrangement instead of a full-blown coalition deal in the event of a hung parliament, where his party would back ad hoc measures such as the Budget, but not hold ministerial posts.

“There will be a barrowload of SNP MPs after the general election. Whether it’s a small wheelbarrow or a big wheelbarrow will depend on the Scottish people.

Right now it looks pretty big.”

Alex Salmond

CHAPTER NINE

The permanent government

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“What the Civil Service wants, and I always compare it to a rather stupid dog, it wants to do what its master wants and it wants to be loyal to its master and above all it wants to be loved for doing that.�

Sam Sharps Associate Director, Portland

The permanent government

Richard Mottram, 2002

D

uring an election campaign, the civil service can get a bit forgotten about.

But its relationship with the political

process is, for those of us on the outside, worth thinking about. Handled in the right way,

understanding and beginning to engage with civil servants during a campaign can have benefits later on.

The very top of the civil service will have prepared for what happens next. By convention, every official opposition gets the chance to meet senior civil servants and outline its programme for government. For two elections in the first decade of the century, this convention was politely respected with no expectation of William Hague or Michael Howard bothering the Number 10 decorators. But in 2010 the prospect of change was very real and it was much more important for

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

Whitehall to understand the policy platform that a Cameron government would implement.

Even then, much of this was confined to a small number of officials behind closed doors. For most of the civil service, the normal business of government goes on through election campaigns. Ministers continue to have functions which the department is there to discharge. And they remain ministers until the Queen invites someone to form a government, who then in turn makes the new appointments.

This means that the machinery of government must remain in place, and in theory it has plenty of work to do. The reality, though, is that the pace of life slows substantially. With political masters out on the campaign trail, the demand for policy analysis, speeches, briefing and correspondence dries up. The work done to support parliamentary activity also stops.

What’s more, pre-election purdah means that much of what the government wants to do is not possible. Big policy announcements can only be made by consensus with the opposition, meaning this is a rare occurrence. Even public appearances by officials at conferences or external meetings pretty much stop (although sensible officials interpret these rules with some common sense – nobody ever won or lost an election because a civil servant gave a presentation to fourteen people in a hotel suite).

So government departments do what any office would do in the circumstances: take things easy, catch up on admin, bond as a team and watch things unfold.

During the rest of the electoral cycle, many civil servants pay remarkably little attention to party politics. But during an election campaign, officials will read the papers pretty closely (online or buying their own; budgets no longer stretch to copies in the office). Typically, they exhibit three emotional responses to what they see.

First, weariness. Cynical officials with years of experience of how difficult the business of government can be tend to look at party political promises with an unforgiving eye. Often the work of special advisers (or ‘teenage scribblers’ as I often heard them called), these pat solutions for long-standing problems are met with some scepticism. This can usually be ironed out once these ideas become proper government policy, but there is always a period of tutting at the impracticality of what is in the manifestos.

Second, trepidation. Incoming ministers and special advisers like to complain about departments’ tendency to amass power, claim budget and extend missions. This can be

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massively irritating to political leaders who would much prefer their department did a few things really well and for less money, and left unchecked it represents Whitehall at its worst.

But at the same time, this is an entirely natural response which politicians would do well to understand. If you work in a department, you would like to know whether that department will still be there the week after the election. You want to feel that the work you do is recognised, and to know that you will be given the tools to do it to a really high standard. At heart, civil The permanent government

servants want to feel their work is important. And politicians should consider what the opposite might look like. A department which is eager to rush to its own demise, or at least meekly accepts any reduction in its importance, is unlikely to provide a strong backing to its secretary of state.

The third, more positive emotion is excitement. The arrival of new ministers, or an entire new government, can be a big moment of energy for civil servants. New faces, new ideas and a fresh start can provide a really positive atmosphere. This is even the case where the policy these ministers bring is a total reversal of what has gone before. On occasion, civil servants feel very attached to a particular policy, and feel defensive about its deconstruction. But on the whole, they are remarkably adaptive to changes in direction, and will be quite happy to spend a period undoing their own work.

All of which is worth knowing about and understanding. In each case, the civil service is waiting to follow where its Road to the manifestos: the final mile

political masters lead. But amidst all of this, there are some things the civil service can do that politicians cannot.

Where something major is in view that will require significant government effort, but is not yet an urgent priority, Whitehall is occasionally better equipped than Westminster to gear itself up. Some issues are very deliberately postponed until after the election, meaning political engagement is impossible. But in a quiet way, officials can anticipate the big issues and at least plan to face them, even if making decisions

is a way off. Talking to them will not produce big decisions but can lay the ground for how decisions are framed some way in the future.

So election year is an opportunity to take stock, prepare and adapt – whether defensively or proactively. Civil servants can seem over-formal, or mistrustful or even just shy. But the period before the election provides a genuine opportunity to help the civil service help you in the period afterwards.

CHAPTER TEN

What it means for you

Ben Thornton Partner, Portland

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I

n 2010 there was reasonable certainty about the outcome of the election. David Cameron was expected to become Prime

Minister, but it was going to be close.

As a result, campaigning, particularly in

marginal seats, dominated the first half of 2010. At the same time, all parties had written and locked their manifestos well in advance of the election being called. Many will remember that during this period, instead of developing policy the

What it means for you

Conservatives had a dedicated team, led by Francis Maude and Oliver Letwin, preparing their policies and shadow teams to execute their plans once in Government.

The impact was that from the January of 2010 onwards, it became increasingly difficult for businesses to gain time with stakeholders. And that if they did, the opportunity to influence had often passed.

Today, the situation looks similar but amplified. The opportunity to genuinely influence manifestos, unless you are at the centre of a major political issue, has passed. Already, MPs, advisers and political staff are out campaigning in their own constituencies and in the many marginal seats around the country.

But this doesn’t mean this will be a quiet period for Portland or our clients. Instead, we have a clear view of the areas our clients should be focusing on to make the most of the next four months and prepare for the next government –

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

whatever colour or shape it takes.

As a minimum, here are the five things those responsible for their organisation’s political relations should be thinking about:

1. Understand the red lines Much of the major parties’ policy has now been aired, and all three have started to signal the areas which may or may not be up for negotiation during any coalition talks. When thinking about your own pre and post-election plans it will be vital to have a clear understanding of likely policy and where each party’s red lines will fall. This means anticipating the parties’ deliverables and tradeables, and where they might give ground, and then the forces that will drive them once in power.

2. There may be final opportunities to influence Although the manifestos are now largely complete, there will be some final opportunities to engage where you are either at the heart of a critical debate or emerging issue, or have something truly compelling to offer. While most will be busy campaigning, we now know with some certainty who is likely to be in the room and advising around the edges during any coalition negotiations. If you have a strong case to make, and your issues touch on the parties’ priorities there are still opportunities to do business with this group.

3. Whitehall matters Don’t forget the importance of the civil service. Officials won’t commit to much, but should be prepared to listen to you so they are in the picture before their new ministers arrive. They are also now developing the briefing books which will be handed to new ministers on day one of the next government outlining their assessment of manifesto policy and how it can be implemented.

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4. This will be a campaign of ‘650 general elections’ Given the uncertainty about the result of this election, campaigning in seats across the country will be harder than ever. While your organisation may not be of national importance, this doesn’t mean you won’t get pulled into a local campaign by candidates looking for every opportunity to score points over their rivals. And while meeting your local PPCs will become increasingly difficult, don’t lose sight of how the

What it means for you

political landscape may be changing in the communities where you do business.

5. Plan beyond the 7th of May As soon as the next Government is in place, a new phase in UK public affairs will begin. You have an opportunity now to consider and prepare not just how you will use the first 100 days of the next Government, but what you want to defend against or achieve during the next Parliament.

This is the sort of thinking and planning we deliver for our clients every day. Our senior team is unparalleled in UK public affairs, and our consultants across the team are experienced practitioners delivering quality execution, analysis and advice.

We would be delighted to discuss this work and what it means

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

for your organisation in more detail.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Working with you

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I

f you want to be confident about what the next political year holds for you, you need to understand where you stand.

But you also need to understand where politics is going and

the people who will make a difference. Portland’s insight and understanding of the UK political scene is unparalleled. Our team, drawn from the highest levels of Westminster, Whitehall and Fleet Street, designs and implements communications programmes for businesses and organisations across all sectors of the economy.

Working with you

Our top team of advisers includes: Tim Allan Tim founded Portland in 2001 after a career spanning business and political communications. He spent six years working for Tony Blair in Opposition and then in 10 Downing Street. He was a key media adviser during the 1997 election campaign and then served as Deputy Press Secretary in Number 10 during the early period of the Blair government.

Following that he was appointed Director of Corporate Communications at BSkyB plc, responsible for corporate and financial communication during the launch of digital television in the UK.

Alastair Campbell Alastair, who was Tony Blair’s long-time Press Secretary and senior adviser, is one of the country’s foremost Road to the manifestos: the final mile

experts on leadership, communications and strategy. As the Prime Minister’s Press Secretary and later Director of Communications and Strategy, he was responsible for modernising the Government’s communications structures and approach.

He was involved in every area of policy, travelled extensively with Mr Blair and established close relations with many world leaders. Since leaving Government, he has forged a successful career as an author, broadcaster, public speaker and adviser to senior business figures on leadership and strategy.

Kitty Ussher Kitty Ussher provides economic and policy analysis to Portland and its clients. A former Treasury Minister, she is now a research fellow at the Smith Institute, an associate at the Centre for London, a member of The CityUK’s Independent Economists’ Panel and a co-founder of Labour in the City.

Kitty was an MP from 2005 to 2010, and her government experience also included three years as special adviser to the Department of Trade and Industry from 2001 to 2004.

George Pascoe-Watson George spent 22 years on The Sun and was Political Editor for five years, widely regarded as one of the most influential jobs in the UK media. He is a regular panelist on BBC Question Time, Sunday AM, Sky News, BBC News Channel, Any Questions, The Week in Westminster and Five Live.

He is a former chairman of Parliamentary Lobby Journalists. GPW advises clients on all aspects of media handling, crisis management and campaigning, providing formidable insight into the political world.

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James O’Shaughnessy James is Portland’s Chief Policy Adviser. He was Director of Policy for David Cameron for four years, 2007-2011. He was responsible for drafting the Conservative Party’s 2010 general election manifesto, co-authored the Coalition’s Programme for Government, and played a leading role in managing the Coalition Government’s policy programme.

Prior to working in Downing Street, James was Director of Policy and Research for the Conservative Party between 2007 and 2010, and before that Deputy Director at the think tank Policy Exchange.

Mark Flanagan Mark Flanagan is Portland’s Senior Partner for Road to the manifestos: the final mile

Content and Digital Strategy.

He joined Portland from Downing Street, where he was Head of Strategic Communications, working for both the Labour and Coalition Governments.

Since joining Portland he has advised clients on digital and social media communications. Prior to his political career Mark worked in radio, most recently as Managing Director of LBC (Europe’s biggest commercial newstalk radio station) from 2002–2005.

During 2015 we will be working with clients to deliver the right results for them.

If you would like to discuss how we see your situation, and how we might help, please get in touch. info@portland-communications.com www.portland-communications.com @PortlandComms

Road to the manifestos: the final mile

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info@portland-communications.com www.portland-communications.com @PortlandComms