Rally Around the Flag: A Comparison Between the Chinese Communist Resolutions on Party History

The Chinese Communist Party’s relationship with history, while not necessarily unique relative to the national myths often imagined in other countries, is defined more by the Party’s insistent micromanagement of the historical narrative which, in turn, defines its rule over China The passage of “historical resolutions” over the years by the Party’s Central Committee symbolizes this pursuit of an orthodox historical narrative Apart from establishing a nationally recognized Party history that justifies Party rule, these historical resolutions are also a mechanism for enforcing unity within the Party, usually by affirming the Party’s present leadership or making appeals towards past authority with which the present leadership can be connected to Any possible differences or distinctions, meanwhile, are explained as rectifications or innovations in political practice. In doing so, the Party claims an unbroken and congruous line of continuity, maintaining the integrity of a Party centre around which Party members unite at all instances

On November 16, 2021, the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore published a commentary article: “China’s Third Historical Resolution: A Preview ” Authored by Director Bert Hofman, the article attempts to analyze the significance of China’s third historical resolution, passed days earlier at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the 19th Party Congress Hofman has very helpfully done much of the work in tracing the historical purpose and function of such resolutions, the first being issued in April of 1945 under Mao Zedong and the second in June of 1981 under Deng Xiaoping He noted they “settled important ideological conflicts within the Communist Party” (Hofman 2021, 1) Indeed, readings of the earlier resolutions show that the bulk of each resolution’s material is devoted to criticizing ideological ‘deviations’ and ‘mistakes’ from within the Party This criticism then acts as a segue towards the other purpose of such resolutions, which is the affirmation of the present leadership’s ideological position In the first resolution, there are frequent mentions of the “correct line represented by Comrade Mao Tse-Tung” as opposed to the errors of Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming among others. In the second resolution, much ink is spilled on criticism of the Cultural Revolution, cults of personalities, and the Gang of Four In turn, both Mao and Deng were validated by the passing of these historical resolutions

Hofman makes a few observations on the third historical resolution passed under Xi Jinping’s leadership He first notes that the length of time discussed is much longer now: an entire century as opposed to a few decades of Party history. He also believes that, unlike both earlier resolutions, there are “ no obvious ideological issues to be settled,” and even describes it as “ a rather tame affair” (Hofman 2021, 2-3). Instead, Hofman suggests that the significance of the third historical resolution goes beyond its supposed ideological importance, but rather in the mere fact that it was passed under Xi He writes, “This elevates Xi to the same level as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, and sets the stage for Xi himself and his version of socialism to be around for a long time to come ” (Hofman 2021, 4) However, Hofman at the time of writing did not have access to the full resolution as passed by the Central Committee, and could only rely on a published communique which he presumes “previews the main contents of the resolution” (Hofman 2021, 3) While this is certainly an acceptable presumption, Hofman was regardless unable to analyze the source directly. Now that the full text is available, a comparison of the third resolution with its predecessors is possible, though not all aspects will be covered here. By beginning with three distinctions, however, Hofman’s preliminary analysis can be complemented

Each historical resolution traditionally begins with an account of Party history The first two do so, however, at the expense of national history The first resolution begins directly from the Party’s founding in 1921 and only made general references to the Chinese struggle “against their enemies, imperialism and feudalism” (Mao 1965, 177) This is slightly expanded upon by the second resolution, which describes the Xinhai Revolution led by Sun Yat-Sen as “bringing to an end over 2,000 years of feudal monarchical rule,” although it failed to rectify the “semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature of Chinese society” (CCP 1981) Glossing over prerevolutionary China by defining it in terms of its monarchist system can be interpreted in the following manner, in which the Party in Mao’s time saw itself as a progressive force seeking to emancipate the Chinese people from a backwards political system, and in Deng’s time upholding the tradition of modernizing China Thus, it made sense to draw little attention to the past, except to criticize it, and hence readers will see the Party’s wording of their goal as, “national salvation ” (Mao 1965, 193)

Compare this with the third resolution, which speaks not of salvation but of “national rejuvenation ” It also declares that “with a history stretching back more than 5,000 years, the Chinese nation is a great and ancient nation that has fostered a splendid civilization and made indelible contributions to the progress of human civilization” (Nikkei Asia 2021) China’s semicolonialism and semi-feudalism is blamed on “the aggression of Western powers and the corruption of feudal rulers,” who presumably betrayed the Chinese people by selling out to the imperialists following the First Opium War, thus beginning a period of humiliation for China (Nikkei Asia 2021) Although it quickly echoes the second resolution by rephrasing the inadequacy of the Xinhai Revolution, there is a clear shift in emphasis All three resolutions acknowledged hardships in modern Chinese history, but the notions of ‘salvation’ and ‘rejuvenation’ hold differing meanings The former simply implies the imperative to bring China out of its predicament, to rescue it from its present situation into a better one The latter adds another layer of meaning in implying that China not only needs to be brought out of its circumstances, but that it used to be great and must therefore be made great again The Party is no stranger to Chinese nationalism, but this harkening back to a bygone, better times must be recognised as a significant development, as the Party seeks to legitimate itself not only in an ideological sense but in a historical sense as well.

There are also shifts in foreign policy orientation. The second resolution more or less retained a revolutionary tone, pledging to “ oppose imperialism, hegemonism, colonialism and racism, and safeguard world peace ” (CCP 1981) Even though it references Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as the basis for diplomatic, economic, and cultural exchange, the resolution nonetheless stresses the necessity to uphold proletarian internationalism and support the “liberation of oppressed nations, the national construction of newly independent countries and the just struggles of the peoples everywhere” (CCP 1981) In other words, the Party maintained a theoretical commitment to the internationalist struggle. Such language is absent or at least heavily toned down by 2021 Gone is the emphasis on national liberation and class struggle, replaced instead by a more conventional narrative of developing friendly relations and deepening friendly cooperation, as well as stressing China’s active participation in international relations.

The resolution was careful enough to leave the fundamentals of Chinese foreign policy untouched, persistently opposing “hegemonism and power politics” and seeking to “safeguard the interests of developing countries” (Nikkei Asia 2021) However, the meaning has clearly shifted. The roots of Chinese opposition to hegemony stem from hostility towards the United States and the USSR when both states exercised disproportionate influence over the international system. This suspicion was summarized in Mao’s Three Worlds Theory, differing from the Western model by placing both superpowers in the same category and criticizing them for engaging in imperialist behaviour In Xi’s time though, China is undisputedly America’s counterpart in Asia and the USSR had long ceased to exist American unilateralism may remain alive and well for the foreseeable future, but the resolution ignores issues with Chinese unilateralism, such as the South China Sea disputes Now that few socialist regimes remain, China has shifted its rhetoric away from revolutionary support for the global proletariat in favour of traditional diplomacy In other words, China no longer seeks to promote revolution, but regime stability. To “safeguard the interests of developing countries,” really means maintaining stability in those countries as opposed to pushing for proletarian emancipation, a policy working to China’s benefit by cementing support within the international system

Finally, the third resolution is unique in its affirmation of Xi’s guiding ideology, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era ” (Nikkei Asia 2021) An entire section is dedicated to its discussion, a feature not seen since the first resolution. Deng Xiaoping Theory, which would only be added to the Party constitution

1997, did not appear anywhere in the second resolution, and that resolution maintained Mao Zedong Thought as the Party’s “valuable spiritual asset” even as it criticized his excesses during the Cultural Revolution (CCP 1981) Deng himself receives relatively little attention in the resolution, a reflection of his emphasis on collective leadership and fear of another Mao-like figure dominating the Party The third resolution brushes away these concerns. It does state that the Party must “uphold Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development,” thereby linking up all previous Chinese leaders who have their ideologies entrenched in the Party constitution, but the spotlight remains on Xi (Nikkei Asia 2021) A consistent phrasing throughout the resolution describes, “the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, ” making it clear that Xi’s position within the Party is greatly elevated (Nikkei Asia 2021)

This is further evidenced by a review of each resolution’s conclusion, all of which include a call for Party unity The first resolution reads, “Today, with unprecedented unanimity the whole Party recognizes the correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-Tung’s line and with unprecedented political consciousness rallies under his banner” (Mao 1965, 220). This sentiment is more or less carried through to 1981, where that resolution implores, “This session calls upon the whole Party… to act under the great banner of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, closely rally around the Central Committee of the Party ” (CCP 1981) The third resolution, however, seems to sidestep this in its own conclusion, “The Central Committee calls upon the entire Party to rally more closely around the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, to fully implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era… ” (Nikkei Asia 2021) This omission of Mao, whose significance in Party history has consistently been upheld, is far from an attempt to diminish his standing What it does accomplish, however, is entrench Xi’s already solid position at the Party leadership In some sense, then, Hofman’s assessment that Xi is essentially equated to the stature of Mao and Deng is well-founded.

The title of the third resolution hints at these distinctions with Hofman noting that it reflects a concern with “achievements” and “experience” rather than “questions” (Hofman 2021, 3) To add to his commentary, both Mao and Deng’s resolutions emphasized the need to resolve certain questions of Party history, which is unsurprising given their respective historical contexts Mao had just about concluded the Yan’an Rectification Campaign while Deng oversaw the end of the Cultural Revolution, both turbulent periods that necessitated the consolidation of authority over the Party Evidently, Xi did not see the need to do the same While all three resolutions are in some way reflections of the paramount leader’s authority, Xi’s case remains unique in that unlike Mao and Deng, his period of leadership was not characterized by political uncertainty, giving his resolution significance in its affirmation of the de facto reality that does not exist in the previous two, even to the point of sounding celebratory This moment of stability enabled the third resolution to present an affirming and positive message of unity between the Party and the people in striving for national rejuvenation, as opposed to the previous two whose calls for unity were more partisan and fractured Nevertheless, he has not neglected to connect the third resolution to its predecessors. In stating that “their basic points and conclusions remain valid to this day”, a line of continuity and hence ideological legitimacy is established between Xi, Mao, and Deng (Nikkei Asia 2021)

However, through comparing the texts themselves, various differences reveal themselves, such as in the fields of historical narrative, foreign policy orientation, or even personal affirmation Respectively, China is embracing a nationalist bent by co-opting imperial history into its own, more likely to behave like a traditional great power as opposed to a revolutionary one, and is witnessing once again the concentration of power in the personalistic rule. The successful passage of this third resolution is the culmination of shifting political trends in China over the past few decades, with the resolution itself symbolizing the shift’s completion.

Bibliography

Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 1981. “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China.” Translation from the Beijing Review 24 (27): 10-39. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121344.

Nikkei Asia. n.d. “Full Text of the Chinese Communist Party’s New Resolution on History.” Accessed June 18, 2022. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Full-text-of-theChinese-Communist-Party-s-new-resolution-on-history

Hofman, Bert. 2021. “China’s Third Historical Resolution: A Preview.” EAI Commentary 41.(November). https://research.nus.edu.sg/eai/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/2021/11/EAIC41-20211116-1.pdf

Mao, Zedong. 1965. “Appendix: Resolutions on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party.” In Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: Volume III, First Edition, 177–225. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/MaoSW3.pdf