State-Formation: Revisionist Historical Accuracy or Traditionalist Grand Narrative?

The defining characteristics of modern states today, namely bureaucratic organizations and the monopolization of violence, is ever-present in our daily lives. Without any historical context, it would be easy to assume that nation-states have always been this way; however, it is clear that the process of European nation-state formation took many years. While the traditional explanation of European state formation is conventionally accepted, this paper argues that the revisionist explanation, oft-overlooked, is more accurate Unlike the traditional approach, the revisionist approach does not overgeneralize, thus better accounting for the cases of state formation in France, Denmark and Sweden. This paper will first provide context about the main differences between the traditional and revisionist approaches to statebuilding. Then, this paper will analyze the definition of absolutism and how it is operationalized by the two approaches, demonstrating that the revisionist approach is better suited to historical evidence. Similarly, this paper will then compare and contrast the two approaches' understanding of ruler-estate relations, demonstrating that the revisionist approach best accounts for nuances Finally, this paper will conclude by attempting to address a major shortcoming of the revisionist approach: its implied timeline for nation-state formation

The revisionist approach has three main fundamental differences compared to the traditional perspective. First, while traditionalists such as Weber state that the formation of state bureaucracy in Europe has been ongoing for "over half a millennium" (Weber 2004, 44), revisionists contend that no such bureaucratization existed until the 18th century Secondly, revisionists emphasize that the centralization of power and the rise of absolutism did not necessitate the domination of the elite (Friedeburg and Morrill 2017, 7) Lastly, revisionism employs a very different definition of absolutism and subsequently underscores the role of absolutism in state formation more convincingly than traditionalists. These three major differences can be identified as originating from a fundamental difference in historical interpretation While the traditional approach promotes a historical grand narrative, revisionists place greater emphasis on historical outliers and misinterpretation (Wickham 2016, 1-2)

The concept of absolutism is central to both theories of state-building, yet the definition employed by Henshall is the most convincing. For traditionalists, absolutism in Europe was "the first mature embodiment of the modern state" (Poggi 1978, 62). This is because the transition to absolutism is identified as the point at which the monarch eliminated all local rivals for power thus monopolizing the use of violence (Tilly 1985, 174). For example, Poggi highlights the inactivity of the French Estate General between 1614-1789 and Louis XIV's establishment of territory-wide regulations as indicators of the French state's absolute authority and the weakness of local nobles (1978, 68-72). Moreover, traditionalists claim that a key proponent of absolutist rule, and subsequently nation-state formation, was the utilization of Roman law (Weber 2004, 51) Traditionalists argue that as Roman law acquired validity, European leaders subsequently had a tool for "articulating and sanctioning their will" (Poggi 1978, 74)

However, the entire traditionalist argument relies on a flawed definition of absolutism and a misguided analysis of history. Henshall reveals that the definition used by traditionalists is grossly inaccurate as it is a misappropriated definition used by later English authors to promote English exceptionalism (1996, 26-33) This is because, in reality, the type of absolutism that traditionalists refer to was perceived by 17th-century European polities as a despotic brand of absolutism employed by the Ottoman and Russian empires (Henshall 1996, 31). In reality, most European states were only absolutists in the sense that they only had authority within their jurisdiction while still requiring cooperation with local powers on issues outside of their prerogative (Henshall 1996, 52)

Traditionalists may argue that the original definition of the word is not important, as it is uncontested that European states began to increasingly centralize their powers over time, thus increasing their absolute authority. However, this argument also rests on an inaccurate understanding of power Absolutism was not a linear development, but rather cyclical in nature (Henshall 1996, 35). For example, Louis XIV's establishment of territory-wide regulations can be perceived not as newfound centralized power but rather as recovering authority which was lost by preceding French monarchs (Henshall 1996, 35-36)

Moreover, while traditionalists emphasize the inactivity of the French Estate General after 1614, they ignore that this body rarely met before 1614, thus weakening their French absolutism narrative (Henshall 1996, 51) Similarly, Downing emphasizes that the emergence of Roman law did not enhance what traditionalists identify as absolutism (1989, 227). In fact, legal experts during this period were very concerned about the distortion of Roman law and thus obstructed monarchs from manipulating the laws to their advantage (Downing 1989, 227) Therefore, it is clear that the traditionalist understanding and narrative regarding absolutism rests on a faulty definitional and historical basis.

For traditionalists, the rise in absolutism and state monopoly of the use of force entailed the domination of the noble elite by the state (Weber 2004, 38). For example, Tilly states that it was in the best interest of the monarch to eliminate local rivals as it could financially benefit greatly by acting as a 'racketeer' in the realm of security (1985, 171) Furthermore, Poggi goes as far as suggesting that the weakening of the estates was inevitable due to external and internal factors (1978, 61-62) Externally, as the monarch became increasingly absolutist, it took power away from nobles. Internally, Poggi underscores that trends such as commercialization resulted in the nobility becoming relatively poorer as merchants got richer (1978, 66). Thus, the state would gain power at the expense of the estates

However, the revisionist approach, which delves into much greater historical specificity, paints a very different picture of state-noble relations Henshall, Friedeburg and Morrill underline a primarily cooperative relationship between the rulers and estates This is because recent historical analysis has demonstrated that the much-coveted taxation bureaucracy stressed by traditionalists was not sufficient for the rulers to build armies (Friedeburg and Morrill 2017, 3). Thus, as war-making expanded, so did the ruler's dependence on nobilities for loans

Moreover, the cases of France and Spain highlight the inaccuracy of the Weberian narrative, which claims that bureaucratization undermined the power of the local nobility (Friedeburg and Morrill 2017, 6-7) In both Spain and France, increased bureaucratization was achieved through a system of "coentrepreneurship" whereby the monarch would grant the local nobility offices, privileges and favours in return for their financial support (Friedeburg and Morril 2017, 7) Therefore, as monarchs across Europe started to create new institutions and bureaucracies, "local lords were rarely the victims of absolute monarchy: they were its beneficiaries" (Henshall 1996, 38). It is important to note that while the traditionalist narratives fail to account for any mutual cooperative relations, the revisionist approach does concede that ultimately the estates served to legitimize the ruler's authority over them (Henshall 1996, 51) Therefore, rulers became more powerful through cooperation and concessions, not coercion (Friedeburg and Morrill 2017, 9)

A traditionalist might point to the examples of Denmark and Sweden, states that relinquished elective monarchy and adopted absolutism, as examples of states which do not fit the revisionist approach However, analysis by Frost demonstrates that a resurgence of power into the hands of the monarch did not entail the monopolization of power as described by traditionalists (2015, 391) In Denmark, while a council-dependent elective monarchy was abandoned in 1665, the King was dependent on the nobility, not state bureaucracy (Frost 2015, 403) Moreover, despite the implementation of a tax state, the system was "based on opportunities for service provided to reconfigured elite" (Frost 2015, 403), thus not diminishing the power of the local elite, as the traditional narrative would predict. Likewise, in Sweden despite King Gustav Adolph's royal prerogative being much more significant than Danish Kings, he still had to secure the support of the clergy, nobles and burghers (Frost 2015, 403404; 404) These cases demonstrate that the revisionist understanding of absolutism and rulerestate relations is a more suitable approach than traditionalism (Henshall 1996, 31)

Traditionalists such as Tilly argue that one can see the process of state monopolization of violence as early as the 16th century in England and the 1620s in France (1985, 174) However, revisionists indicate that such historical evidence of state formation is not present even in the 1700s (Henshall 1996, 37) This raises the following questions: what ultimately triggered the massive bureaucratization had become ever so apparent by the late 1800s? How and why did state formation and professionalization suddenly become prevalent in less than a decade? These are questions that the revisionists largely fail to answer, as their focus has been on establishing that traditionalist nation-state formation was not present in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Perhaps the answer lies within Weber's "Politics as a Vocation " When examining the political organization of Britain and German states, Weber identifies the "caucus" system of Britain as the chief difference (2004, 65) In essence, Weber argues that the democratization of the franchise post-1868 resulted in the diminishment of the 'notables' political power as the masses were given new political rights (2004, 6566) Moreover, given the need to appease and garner the vote of thousands of new people, the state now operating in a "caucus" system is forced to create new electoral organizations in every district of the state, which, in turn, requires thousands of paid officials to operate this political “machine ” These new hires were necessary as the notables of each district were no longer sufficient for garnering the votes of the masses (Weber 2004, 65) Thus, relatively recent democratization and the expansion of the right to vote may account for the rapid transformation of states.

Similarly, Tilly underscores the creation of a statesubordinate police force as the final consolidation of power by the state (1985, 174). While Tilly does not state this as a pivotal and necessary step in nationstate formation, perhaps the creation of police bureaucracy in the 19th and 20th centuries were more crucial in centralizing state power than originally deemed by both approaches Despite Weber and Tilly representing the traditionalist understanding of state formation, their analysis of police and political bureaucracy in the 1800s may support the timeline of nation-state formation promoted by revisionist thinkers

In conclusion, this paper has highlighted three main differences between the traditional and revisionist understanding of state-building By analyzing these differences, it becomes clear that the revisionist approach is less tied down by the need to emphasize a grand narrative and is a more focused and historically nuanced approach. However, despite its strengths, this approach does not identify how the rapid development of state bureaucracy and the monopolization of power, which are hallmarks of all modern states, occurred in such a short period While revisionism successfully challenges the notion that nation-state formation has been a "half a millennium" long process (Weber 2004, 44), future research should focus on explaining the rapid development of nation-states during the 19th and 20th centuries

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