[re]imaging urban expressways

[re] imagining URBAN EXPRESSWAYS

PENNPLANNING 2012 STUDIO | CPLN 706 NANDO MICALE + HARRIS STEINBERG

2012

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[re] imagining URBAN EXPRESSWAYS CITY PLANNING STUDIO | CPLN 706 DEPARTMENT OF CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA SPRING 2012

1 ARGUMENT

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2 HISTORY

INSTRUCTORS: NANDO MICALE + HARRIS STEINBERG JORDAN BLOCK LAMONT COBB KAITLIN DASTUGUE ELIZABETH FRANTZ SUSANNAH HENSCHEL REINA KAPADIA ALEXANDRA KAPLIN JOSHUA KARLIN-RESNICK CHRISSY LEE EMILY LEHMAN ANNE MISAK MARY MILTIMORE MARY MORTON HOSUNG PARK RAPHEAL RANDALL DAN REED MICHAEL RUANE DANIELLA SCHWARTZ MATTHEW WICKLUND

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ii. TORONTO

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iii. NEW YORK CITY

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iv. NEW ORLEANS

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v. NEW HAVEN:

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vi. MONTRÉAL

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GARDINER EXPRESSWAY

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SHERIDAN EXPRESSWAY

CLAIBORNE EXPRESSWAY

OAK STREET CONNECTOR

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CUT + COVER:

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CAP:

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TUNNEL:

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BYPASS:

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COMPLETE REMOVAL:

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REPURPOSE:

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THE CENTRAL ARTERY, BOSTON, MA

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i. WASHINGTON D.C.

SOUTHWEST / SOUTHEAST EXPRESSWAY

3 CASE STUDIES

SIX CITIES

WOODALL RODGERS FREEWAY, DALLAS, TX

ALASKAN WAY VIADUCT, SEATTLE, WA

INTERSTATE 40, OKLAHOMA CITY, OK

AUTOROUTE BONAVENTURE

6 POLICY + RECOMMENDATIONS

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EMBARCADERO FREEWAY, SAN FRANCISCO, CA

THE BIG WORM, SAO PAULO, BRAZIL

CONCLUSION

4 FRAMEWORK + PROCESS

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ARGUMENT

REIMAGINING THE FUTURE OF URBAN EXPRESSWAYS We have reached a critical moment in the life of our urban expressways: The entire interstate system will have to be rebuilt sometime in the next five decades, at a cost of $2.5 trillion, and now is the time to consider whether there are better uses for these dollars. Conventional wisdom suggests that expressways will be reconstructed in place, and transportation policy as it stands reflects this belief. This report proposes that we take this opportunity to critically rethink what expressways do and do not do for our cities, and moreover for our lives. In many places, there are better alternatives for transportation, the economy, and society.

Freeways are a fact of life for everyone. For many, they are necessary parts of transportation routines. For others, they are an acute source of air pollution, a detriment to property values, and a nuisance for pedestrians. In the past half-century we have accepted both the good and the bad of expressways as permanent fixtures of the built environment. Standing in the way of alternatives are significant policy and funding hurdles as well as a mass of private citizens, commuters, residents, and businesses who see highways as an indispensable condition of cities. Getting the public and policy makers to reconsider our decades-old habits is an urgent problem. They will need to make tough choices regardless, with sources of funding like the gas tax dwindling rapidly. As policy-makers solve this problem, they should also clear the way for more financially sustainable transportation solutions.

The future of expressways in urban areas is about more than a limited discussion of transportation alternatives – it is about the future of cities. In an era of sharply limited public budgets, it is critical that cities make choices that promote environmental health and the needs of people from all income levels and backgrounds.

This report provides recommendations for addressing resistance at all levels of this debate, tying the fate of highways to considerations about the health of cities and neighborhoods; shifting the focus to the cost of maintaining the status quo; and illustrating the potential of highway removal in six North American cities.

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A R G UME NT

2012 The U.S. interstate highway system took nearly a half-century to complete and was, in its day, perhaps the most widelysupported public infrastructure project in this nation’s history. The rise of the interstate system had a tremendous impact on the development of U.S. cities and towns, allowing some residents to escape the confines of the industrial city and embrace the privacy and privileges of suburban living.

Fig.1.01: Freeway construction in Seattle during the 1960s as seen from Beacon Hill looking towards the Space Needle.

Fig.1.02: Traffic on the 110 in Los Angeles, CA snarles through the city.

Fig.1.03: The Dallas Deck Park is currently under construction, decking over the Woodall Rodgers Freeway between Dallas’ downtown and uptown areas.

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Fueled by a desire to offer city dwellers the same conveniences of private automotive travel enjoyed in the suburbs, cities would join in the highway construction game.

But rather than enticing people back to the urban core, urban freeways have in some instances had the opposite effect, exporting business activity, residents, and land value to the suburbs, rupturing the fabric of urban neighborhoods, and forcing city dwellers to bear a disproportionate share of the negative health and social impacts of highways without a commensurate benefit.

The 21st century has brought a renewed interest in cities and in urban policy and development. Facing imminent concerns over climate change, rising oil prices, and economic instability, policy makers, planners, and developers are beginning to assert the potential in cities to realize goals of equity and sustainability for all residents.

Urban highways have emerged as one thread in this discussion, suggesting the need for better alignment between transportation investment priorities and broader urban revitalization goals.

Although our aging interstates need some maintenance to ensure their safety and quality, the ongoing maintenance and improvement of all existing highways should not be a foregone conclusion. There is a choice to be made between rebuilding our existing highways and replacing them with more context-appropriate transportation solutions. While it is unrealistic and wrong-headed to tear down every city highway, the positive results of past highway removal projects suggest that removal should be seriously considered wherever possible. These projects promise new construction and engineering jobs in the short term, but they open up whole neighborhoods to new levels of economic development, creating jobs and economic activity far into the future.

A spate of recent studies and reports on highway removal underscores the growing interest in this debate. Most recently, the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy released a report entitled “The Life and Death of Urban Highways,” which details the positive effects of freeway removals in five case study cities. A number of academic studies have also attempted to quantify the impacts of removal on outcomes such as property values, environmental health, road capacity, and transit usage. This report takes a more prospective view, examining six cities that are considering or in the process of removing a freeway. These cases draw on lessons from past removals and analysis of current policy and funding constraints to offer both site-specific and high-level recommendations for design, policy, and practice.

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This studio has explored the feasibility of reimagining freeways in six North American cities - New Orleans, LA; Washington, DC; the Bronx, NY; New Haven, CT; Toronto, ON; and Montreal, QC. Conversations about highway removal are in different stages in these cities. For instance, in Washington, DC, planners are developing a vision for removal, while New Haven officials have made the decision to pursue removal. The range of conditions and stages of the projects has allowed the studio work to address a variety of solutions and potential outcomes.

Fig.1.04: Possible future for a new plaza and park entrance in the Bronx over the existing expressway right-of-way.

Fig.1.05: Proposed green connections and development in New Haven could replace the Oak Street Connector.

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HISTORY

THE 1800S: EARLY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS In contrast to the major role the federal government plays today in infrastructure funding, states and localities championed the earliest infrastructure investments in the US. In the late 1790s, states charted the private construction of toll roads to connect main cities and rural agriculture land. At the same time, America was expanding rapidly to the west, along her natural corridors – rivers, streams and coastlines. Merchants and traders needed new ways to get to the interior of the continent to harvest the wealth of natural resources and serve the expanding markets of the Midwest.

To serve these goals, the country’s first major infrastructure investments were in canals that connected the East Coast to the broad waterways and lakes in the Midwest. The Erie Canal, built by the state of New York, was the most important of these new waterways. Opened in 1825, the canal stretched across New York State connecting the Hudson River to Lake Erie, greatly expanding trade throughout the country. The canal became the main trunk line connecting either side of the Appalachian divide, and spurred the development of dozens of new canals across the Northeast and the Midwest.

Completed in 1818, the Cumberland Road was the first major “highway” to be built by the federal government. Also known as the National Road, the Cumberland Road is a straight-line route that extended west through the Appalachians to the fertile farmlands of the Ohio River Valley.

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2012 THE TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD

Fig. 2.01: Construction of the Transcontinental Railroad.

By the late 1800s, technology had overtaken waterways. Rails were now the quickest, most efficient way to move goods and people long distances. The federal government played a small but important role in the development of a vast network of transportation corridors by handing off thousands of miles to railroad companies, who tied the country’s two coasts together via the Transcontinental Railroad. By the 1880s, three trans-continental lines connected the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. The rail system continued into the twentieth century as the main means of long-range transport of passengers between urban centers and goods to market. Further improvements such as electrification allowed for faster service in an age of rapid urbanization and continued industrialization.

The nation’s overland country roads and highways, however, were a distant second in quality, requiring significant improvements and expansion before they could rival the railroads.

Celebrations after the construction of portion of the Transcontinental Railroad

Fig. 2.03: Completion of the Transcontinental Railroad.

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EARLY 1900S: SETTING THE FRAMEWORK FOR HIGHWAY SYSTEM The industrial revolution led to the expansion of many cities, mostly along streetcar and rail corridors developed by private companies. This era also saw the beginning of advocacy for roads. Bicyclists were actually the strong proponents of road investments in the early years, as part of the “Good Roads” movement. Ultimately, automobile drivers would the forward the agenda to build a better road network.

Fig. 2.04: Bicyclists in the early 1900s.

By the 1910s, cities were the center of the United States’ powerful industrial machine.

They were also the focal point of a new problem – how to ameliorate the byproducts of overcrowding, pollution, public health concerns. Thus, the modern city planning profession was born as planners stepped in with their first attempts to solve these new urban problems.

Cars quickly burst on the scene and made already crowded urban streets even more crowded and chaotic. During this same era, the federal government saw it had a role to play in addressing some of these problems, and it made its first investments in roads and highways with the crosscountry Lincoln Highway and the Federal Road Act of 1916. Over the next several decades, the American industrial engine became the most productive in the world, and a portion of that industrial might went toward producing cars.

Fig. 2.05: 1910 Ford Model T.

Fig. 2.06: Historic Lowell, MA.

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2012 1940S: MOVING TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM

Fig. 2.07 : Federal Highway Act of 1944.

Fig. 2.08: Levittown, NY: suburban community planned and built

by Levitt & Sons from 1952 - 1958.

Mass-produced and marketed, cars quickly became a must-have for the masses, and people began to take advantage of their new mobility. Post-WWII, a substantial increase in household formations coupled with increased access to mortgage credit resulted in a demand for housing the far exceeded supply. Home builders, trained the in wartime culture of mass production, built single-family, detached houses on large-scale tracts, creating cheap housing at a fast pace. In increasingly larger numbers, Americans moved out of cities and into the country’s new suburbs.

However, discriminatory practices, such as redlining, prevented many minority families from moving to the suburbs.

The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944 furthered the trend of suburbanization as it mapped out what would eventually become the interstate system. The bill did not have the funding mechanism needed to actually build the system, but it laid the groundwork for the next critical era in highway building. Mass production of cars and homes coupled with major federal investments facilitated massive suburban growth in the 1950’s and 60’s.

1950S - 60S: THE INTERSTATE ERA By the 1950s, city officials and business interests began to see redevelopment and highway construction as the key to the restoration of declining urban centers.

With the passage of the 1949 Housing Act (which included provisions for the Urban Renewal Program), city leaders now had Fig. 2.09: Highway interchanges, or “spaghetti junctions,” began to appear in cities across the United States.

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the funding and legal authority to tear down whole sections of their cities they deemed “blighted” to make way for new housing and commercial development, but also highways. So-called blighted land was often home to the city’s most vulnerable, poor residents who were usually ethnic or racial minorities.

Highway construction was funded by the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, which committed the government to funding 90 percent of the cost of building the interstate system, which had been almost entirely mapped in the earlier highway bill. The bill’s funding mechanism was the Highway Trust Fund, supported by a national fuel tax. The growing concern about traffic congestion and highway safety spurred widespread and bipartisan support from Congress, city officials, and the public.

Mayors and business leaders were eager for the urban renewal and highway funding as they grappled with how to reverse the flight of residents and businesses. The theory of people like Robert Moses – New York City’s master highway builder – was that cities needed to accommodate the car in the same fashion that suburbs did. City officials were particularly eager for new highways, believing they might simultaneously relieve congestion and restore economic vitality to central business districts. They would learn the downsides of this approach in the next decades, as people used the country’s broad new highway system to live farther and farther from central cities.

Fig. 2.10: St. Louis Riverfront after demolition to make space for the Gateway Arch, 1945.

Fig. 2.11: Robert Moses, avid supporter of highway infrastructure in New York City.

Fig. 2.12: Stuyvesant Town.

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HISTORY

Fig. 2.13: Jimmy Carter and other surveying the Bronx after urban rewewal demolition.

Fig. 2.14: Jane Jacobs, an American writer and activist who played a significant role in the eventual demise of NYC’s Lower Manhattan Expressway and Toronto’s Spadina Expressway.

Fig. 2.15: Citizens in Seattle band together in public protests against Interstate 5, 1961.

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2012 1970S - 80S : URBAN DECAY AND BACKLASH AGAINST HIGHWAYS

1990S - PRESENT: REGAINING BALANCE: CONTEMPORARY HIGHWAY ACTS

By the 1970s and 80s, it was clear that rather than reversing negative trends, urban renewal and highway building actually sped them up. By this time, vast stretches of urban territory suffered from deep disinvestment. Deindustrialization, depopulation, and federal disinvestment created urban centers characterized by high poverty, high unemployment, and racial segregation.

In today’s urban environment, the legacy of those federal policies, a new generation of urban leaders, and a new appreciation for cities’ role in our lives began to reverse the decades-long decline of cities. Urban leaders created new attractions and amenities in central cities. They also began to make new investments in public transportation, bike, and pedestrian infrastructure.

The 1970s saw a new consciousness of the plight of cities and their residents, and activism to try to address them. People like Jane Jacobs and other activists led freeway revolts in cities across the country to halt further urban freeway projects that threatened to bisect neighborhoods.

Federal policy began to shift around this time, reflecting the broader shifts in priorities. Federal highway acts mandated a more inclusive planning process and created a new vehicle – Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) – for determining which highway investments to make and how to make them. At the same time, Congress passed a series of environmental laws, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act, which would have major implications for highway building down the line. And it is in this era that we see the first experiments with reversing major highway investments. For instance, in 1974, Portland tore down Harbor Drive, making way for a waterfront park and sparking the imaginations of progressive leaders and planners across the country.

The middle class began to respond, and many cities saw their first upticks in population in decades. Federal policy began to support this shift. The interstate system reached full build-out in the early 1990s, and federal highway policy began to be more intermodal, starting with the Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity Act (ISTEA) in 1991 and followed by two similarly-orientated federal highway bills in the 2000s. Mayors and other leaders in a few cities, including San Francisco and Milwaukee, approached rethinking their urban highways in the 1990s and some highways got town down and were replaced by boulevards and new commercial and residential development.

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Fig. 2.16: Millennium Park, example of active public space.

Chicago, IL.

Fig. 2.17: Multi-modal street with bike lanes, light rail and auto traffic; Portland OR.

Fig. 2.18: Parklets: parking spaces reimagined for pedestrian use; San Francisco, CA.

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CANADIAN HIGHWAYS

Fig. 2.19: Construction of the Transcanadian Highway.

Canada’s history of highway building in a large part mirrors that of the United States, albeit on a smaller scale. While the 1867 Constitution Act provided the provinces with complete responsibility for road building, the Department of Transport was created in 1935 in recognition of what was a changing transportation environment in Canada at the time. By 1949, the TransCanada Highway Act was passed which called for the construction of an East-West route across Canada. Construction of the Transcanadian Highway began in the 1950s, the same decade that highway building hit its stride in the US, and was completed by 1971.

In contrast to the US, provincial and local governments are responsible for highway building and maintenance in Canada.

In the 1950s, the federal government provided half of the $1.4 billion that was needed to construct the Transcanadian Highway. Today, provincial governments are responsible for the planning, design, construction, operation, and maintenance

Fig. 2.20: Transcanadian Highway, near Savona, BC.

Fig. 2.22: Scenic views of Canada’s natural landscape surround the Transcanadian Highway.

of highways within their jurisdictions.

Due to this decentralization, Canada’s highway system is much smaller than the US system. At 4,900 miles, Canada’s system is just 10% of the US system. While there have been proposals to expand the system, such as a Canadian Autobahn, these ideas remain controversial.

Trans-Canada Highway 0

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400

Kilometers

Fig. 2.21: Trans-Canada Highway , Present.

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Fig. 2.23: Highway 401, one of Canada’s busiest highways today.

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CASE STUDIES + ALTERNATIVES KNOWING THE HISTORY OF HIGHWAY REMOVAL INFORMS THE FUTURE There is no correct solution to transforming an urban freeway. Every highway has its own unique set of conditions, contexts, and uses and requires an equally unique approach to its removal or reuse. Some cities have already dealt with the problem of highways in their urban core. Looking at examples of how they approached the problem can be an invaluable tool for cities considering a highway teardown. In this section, these examples illustrate six methods of highway removal: cut and cover, cap, tunnel, bypass, complete removal, and repurpose. Though these projects varied in their outcomes, they provide an excellent road map for future projects.

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CUT + COVER:

THE CENTRAL ARTERY, BOSTON, MA

2012 MORE THAN JUST A HIGHWAY TEARDOWN Conceived in the 1970s and completed in 2005, Boston’s “Big Dig” project may be one of modern America’s most ambitious urban infrastructure projects. The scope of the project included the demolition of a viaduct carrying the Central Artery (a portion of Interstate 93) through downtown Boston and replacing it underground, carving a third tunnel to Logan Airport, and constructing the 15-acre Rose Kennedy Greenway as a major addition to the city’s open space.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CENTRAL ARTERY

Fig. 3.01: The Big Dig Project necessitated a large amount of construction over more than a decade.

In the 1930s, the city’s planning board recommended that Boston’s street system be modernized and proposed building an elevated expressway to alleviate congestion. Construction of the Artery began in 1949, several years prior to the Federal Aid Highway Act. Construction displaced hundreds of families and businesses. Realizing the effect of the Artery, the city buried the final stretch in 1954. Almost immediately, the Artery was over capacity. Accident rates reached four times the national average due to poor design and high traffic volume. As a result of its failures, the state scrapped plans for and expanded inner city highway network.

THE BIG IDEA The State’s then-transportation secretary Fred Salvucci is credited with conceiving project and convincing then-Governor Michael Dukakis with promises of a better city. The State won the public favor with

Fig. 3.02: An aerial view of the Artery prior to construction.

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promises including labor agreements with unions, keeping all six lanes open during construction, preserving three-quarters of land as open space, and improving mass transit. Due to these mitigation efforts and others, more than 80 percent of Boston residents and two-thirds of Massachusetts residents supported the project in its early years.

BUILDING THE BIG DIG In the 1970s, Governor Dukakis convinced the federal government to pay 90 cents for every dollar arguing the Central Artery was built with State money prior to the Highway Act. Massachusetts Democrat and House Speaker Tip O’Neill was able to set aside funds for project. A decade later, newlyelected President Ronald Reagan vetoed the bill that contained the Big Dig’s first real federal funding. Through rallying, enough support was raised to secure initial funding.

With federal funds secured, construction began in 1991. Over 14 years, building the Artery required moving 14 cubic tons of earth, relocating infrastructure, and constructing 7.5 miles of highways, six interchanges, and 200 bridges.

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HIGHWAY M30, MADRID SPAIN Beginning in the early 2000s, Madrid began transforming nearly 200 acres of its city by burying huge swaths of its inner ring highway. The project, like the Big Dig, was heavily criticized for going far over budget. The work, however, has yielded a massive addition to the city’s public space and allowed access to the Manzanares river for the first time in decades.

Fig. 3.03: A linear park over the M30 highway in Madrid.

BUDGET WOES A major budget shortfall might be the Big Dig’s infamous legacy. Originally estimated at $5.6 billion, the project’s total cost was $14.8 billion. Despite escalating costs, construction proceeded. Washington imposed spending limit the on Big Dig project in 2000, leaving the State’s taxpayers to pay the rest, which equals about half of the project’s cost.

Fig. 3.04: A similar aerial showing the Rose Kennedy Greenway after completion of the project.

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CAP:

WOODALL RODGERS FREEWAY, DALLAS, TX

2012 THE LONG WAIT FOR THE EXPRESSWAY

BRIDGING THE DIVIDE

Beginning in the early 1950s, Dallas planners and members of the City’s business community began making a case for completing the beltway system that circled the downtown area. In 1958, the 366 Spur, renamed the Woodall Rodgers freeway was approved by TxDOT under the condition that local agencies raise 100 percent of the funds for land acquisition.

After several bond issues, it became clear that original estimates were too low to acquire the full amount of land. After a protracted stalemate, Dallas County eventually agreed to help finance the project. As a result of these delays, they highway was not completed until 1983.

Upon completion, the highway became a dividing line between the Uptown, Downtown, and Arts districts of the city.

In 2002, Project Pegasus, a plan to rebuild several central Dallas highways, put forth the idea to build park decks over certain highway spans. While the Spur was not involved in the plan, the idea was forged to make progress on the deck over the Woodall Rodgers Freeway. In 2005, a coalition of business leaders, planners, and politicians advanced the project. A public private partnership was established to lead the development of the project with The Woodall Rodgers Park Foundation tasked with raising private funds. The project was funded with a combination of local bonds ($20 million), state and federal highway funds ($20 million), and private donations ($50 million). As a condition of the private donations, the largest donor was granted naming rights, renaming the park Klyde Warren Park after their son. The deck is currently under construction. The park will span three blocks of the spur and includes a restaurant, running paths, a children’s park, a stage, and flexible recreation space.

EXTENSION AND GENESIS OF THE DECK

Fig. 3.05: A rendering of the proposed Klyde Warren Park from the Office of James Burnett.

While discussion of extending the spur stretches back to the 1960s, it was not until the late 1990s that TxDOT expressed the need for an extension of the highway west across the Trinity River. After several years, agreement was reached that the span over the river should be an architectural asset to the city. Architect Santiago Calatrava was contracted to design the bridge. Again, the cost estimates proved to be far below the bids and the project went through several stages of redesign. Currently the bridge and extension are under construction. Where the bridge project was conceived to bring attention to the city, the project sparked interest in diminishing the perception of the highway through the center of Dallas.

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INTERSTATE 670, COLUMBUS, OH Opened in 2005, the Cap at Union Station opened over Interstate 670 in Columbus, Ohio. Small deck cover an area of highway ranging between 50 and 70 feet. The primary function of the small decks was to continue the street wall of High Street between Downtown and the Short North neighborhood, thereby reducing the appearance and presence of this large, depressed freeway. Built for only $10 million, this small intervention is being used as a precedent for similar projects around the country. Unlike many highway cap projects, this development is not based around green space, but rather houses several retail and restaurant businesses. In addition to serving as an example of innovative urban design, the project was one of the first speculative commercial developments to bridge a highway.

Fig. 3.08: The small caps over Interstate 670.

Fig. 3.06: Construction of the deck supports near completion.

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Fig. 3.07: An aerial of the highway prior to construction of the deck.

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TUNNEL:

ALASKAN WAY VIADUCT, SEATTLE, WA

2012 NATURE HELPS AUTHORITIES MAKE THE DECISION FOR REMOVAL

FUNDING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE TUNNELS

In October 2011, a large wrecking ball smashed into the southern section of Seattle’s Alaskan Way Viaduct, a double decked, elevated section of State Route 99, marking the beginning of the end of the road’s 50+ years of service as a heavily used connection across the city’s downtown. Following the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake, the viaduct sustained significant damage, and the Washington Department of Transportation estimated that it had a 1-in-20 chance of collapsing following another seismic event.

The two-mile tunnel will consist of four lanes of traffic, with southbound lanes stacked on top of northbound lanes.

The current viaduct will be completely demolished. Boring of the tunnel is slated to begin in 2013 and the projected completion date is 2015. The projected cost of the project is between $3.1 – 4.2 billion dollars, but total funding for the project had not been secured as of fall 2011. About $1.7 billion of the funds would come from the state gas tax, $200 million from other state transportation funding, $480 million from the FHWA, $60 million from local sources. The project is also considering making the tunnel a toll road, which is estimated to provide an addition $400 million in funding to pay for the project.

The initial effort for construction of the viaduct began in 1945 after the Bureau of Public Roads recommended the construction of two expressways to accommodate commuters travel to and through downtown Seattle. Built in 1953, the viaduct formed a critical connection across the city, accommodating 110,000 commuters a day.

Fig. 3.09: The Alaskan Way divides the city from its waterfront.

CHOOSING AN ALTERNATIVE

Though the project may take years for its impact to be apparent, it has the potential to transform downtown Seattle through increased public space and access to one of the city’s greatest assets, its waterfront.

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BJORVIKA, OSLO, NORWAY The City of Oslo, in an effort to reclaim its former industrial waterfront and historic region of Bjørvika, has removed the physical and visual barrier created by European E18 and is in the process of executing a new waterfront development vision and plan. The demolition of E18 was catalyzed by the desire to reduce the environmental impact of the road, create urban development opportunities and provide sustainable transportation. The cost of the project is estimated at $6.48 billion which has been financed through grants, sale of freed road space, as well as grants from the city of Oslo and tolls from other highways through the city.

This project is being implemented as a result of strong and committed local government, long range-planning, and financing.

Organizing the cooperation of various government agencies and political groups made the process of choosing an alternative lengthy and complicated.

Through a new partnership between the State, City, and Kings County, three alternatives were selected: a twin bored hybrid tunnel, a surface road hybrid, and an elevated road hybrid. In January 2009, the twin bored tunnel hybrid was approved as a result of many community meetings and political action.

Fig. 3.12: Site plan of new available land along harbor in Bjorvika.

Fig. 3.10: A simulation of proposed surface conditions.

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Fig. 3.11: Section of stacked tunnel configuration.

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BYPASS:

INTERSTATE 40, OKLAHOMA CITY, OK

2012 I-40 REALLIGNMENT IN OKLAHOMA CITY Oklahoma City just opened a new alignment for Interstate 40, which divided downtown from the city’s riverfront through the elevated Crosstown Bridge. The city plans to tear down the single-decked structure and turn it into a “gateway boulevard” at the center of a new “Core to Shore” neighborhood development.

I-40’s new alignment, just five blocks to the south of the old structure, opened to traffic in January 2012. The new freeway runs at surface level or in open-cut channels along a former Union Pacific Railway rightof-way. The new route was built to carry 173,000 vehicles every day, and the new design incorporates modern highway safety features, including wider shoulders and longer on- and off-ramps. It will permit traffic to flow at 70 miles per hour, rather than the old structure’s 50 mph limit. The replacement project cost $650 million and was financed through a combination of state and federal highway money.

Fig. 3.13: Aerial view of I-40 running through downtown Oklahoma City.

OBSOLESCENCE HELPS MAKE THE DECISION FOR BYPASS Construction on the old Crosstown Bridge finished in 1965. The original structure was built to carry 76,000 vehicles per day, but by the end of its life, more than 120,000 cars and trucks traversed it daily. Annual maintenance of the expressway ran to $1 million per year. The bridge was first rehabilitated in 1977, but officials had to shut it down for emergency repairs just 12 years later, after finding a major crack in a pier beam. Because of the bridge’s “fracture critical” design, a single structural failure could have brought it down.

Fig. 3.14: Map illustrating the old and new alignment of I-40.

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Though locals viewed the elevated highway as a divisive eyesore, plans for the new alignment were not without controversy. The Oklahoma DOT’s plans initially divided the City Council, and a local Latino economic development group threatened to sue to stop the project.

However, after a city-sponsored process, politicians and community leaders united around the DOT’s preferred alignment. The consultants’ positive vision for the area and DOT assurances that project funding would finance other area infrastructure improvements convinced community leaders to support the plan.

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Fig. 3.15: I-40 Expressway suffered from major structural deficiencies.

AN ARMATURE FOR FUTURE GROWTH Today, the area is scattered with industrial uses and is marked by large tracts of vacant land. City officials predict that demolishing the old I-40 structure will “in effect, remove the south boundary” to the city’s core, “making major changes in the area to the south inevitable.” The city’s plan for the area would bring 3,000 new residences, 550,000 square feet of new retail, “built-to-suit” offices, a convention center, adaptive reuse of the historic Union Station, a multi-modal transportation hub, and several major new parks, phased in over a 30-year period. A wide boulevard running the length of the old Crosstown Bridge right-of-way would be the center of the new district, acting as “both a ceremonial gateway to downtown and a ‘bridge’ that links downtown to the Core to the Shore district.”

Fig. 3.16: New refigured I-40 boulevard under construction.

Fig. 3.17: The plan outlines the City’s vision for the highway.

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C A S E S T UDI E S + A LT E RNAT I V ES

COMPLETE REMOVAL:

EMBARCADERO FREEWAY, SAN FRANCISCO, CA

2012 A LESSON IN THE BENEFITS OF HIGHWAY REMOVAL The Embarcadero Freeway ran along the San Francisco bay and was originally designed as a direct connection from the Golden Gate Bridge to the Bay Bridge.

Almost immediately after work began on the Embarcadero in 1953, talks of tearing it down began. Due to community outrage, the city halted work on the Embarcadero in 1959, which left it unfinished. Extending just under 1.5 miles and running along the San Francisco waterfront, the double decked concrete structure was nicknamed “The Stub” because of its abrupt ending.

Fig. 3.18: The Ferry Building and waterfront severed from the city.

AN EARTHQUAKE DECIDES THE FUTURE OF THE EMBARACADERO As soon as construction stopped critics began pressuring the government to remove the massive concrete structure.

The Loma Prieta Earthquake struck San Francisco on October 17, 1989 and the Embarcadero closed due to structural damage. After the closure, traffic moved onto the street grid – illustrating the point critics had made all along – that there was sufficient latent capacity to handle the traffic demands in the absence of the highway. During this time the city also saw BART ridership increase by 15 percent, showing the potential for some commuters to move from car to transit options.

Freeway removal supporters saw these developments as definitive evidence that the Embarcadero should be removed and not repaired.

The project was financed with federal earthquake dollars, originally earmarked for highway repair, proceeds from the sale of land previously occupied by off-ramps and

the repurposing of the material from the takedown. The removal included recycling a significant amount of steel and concrete from the structure, which offset the total cost and placed the actual removal cost at $3.25 million with an additional $50 million spent to create the boulevard and public spaces.

A BOULEVARD THAT SETS THE STANDARD FOR HIGHWAY REMOVAL The ROMA Design Group designed the new boulevard along the waterfront. The road included three travel lanes in each direction, significant streetscaping and the introduction of a streetcar line. The project has sparked wide scale revitalization along the waterfront and soon after the Embarcadero came down buildings like the Ferry Building and Pier 1 saw significant investment.

The successes of the Embarcadero project can provide lessons for other takedown projects. Transit in the area has increased, and ridership has increased across transit platforms- bus, trolley and ferry. Tourism has increased due to the waterfront revitalization. The freeway takedown opened up more than 100 acres of prime land for redevelopment. In addition to the increase in public space, commercial and residential development has increased significantly. The immediate area saw a 51% increase in housing as well as a 23% increase in jobs. Property values in the neighboring communities increased by 300% and sales for the area are well above the citywide average.

P EN N D ES IG N

CHENONGGYECHON, name of case study, location is et quamus aut quam,KOREA sitempe rferis aut aut am no is SEOUL, SOUTH et quamus aut quam, sitempe rferis aut aut am no is et quamus aut quam, sitempe rferis aut aut am no quamus aut quam, sitempe aut aut am no Inis et the 1970s, the city of rferis Seoul covered is et quamus aut quam, sitempe rferis aut aut am no up the Chenonggyechon stream which is et quamus aut quam, sitempe rferis aut aut am no had run through thesitempe heartrferis of the nation’s is et quamus aut quam, aut aut am no is et quamus aut quam, sitempe rferis in aut the aut am no capital for centuries.

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highway and heralded as a sucessful moderization project for the city.

In 2003, Mayor Lee Myung-bak lead an initiative to remove the highway and restore the long neglected stream back to its original role as the centerprice of citylife. The impact on traffic patterns due to the removal of the highway was negated through the establishment of a BRT line adjacent to the Chenonggtechon. The new public greenway has served as a catalyst for the revitalization of downtown Seoul.

Fig. 3.20: Stream in place of the old highway in Seoul.

Fig. 3.19: The new tree lined boulevard with transit running down the center.

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3

C A S E S T UDI E S + A LT E RNAT I V ES

REPURPOSE:

THE BIG WORM, SAO PAULO, BRAZIL

2012 BRAZIL CHOOSES TO KEEP A HIGHWAY

A UNIQUE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

Removal of the structure is not the only choice in evaluating ways of mitigating the harmful impacts of highways on urban environments.

Communities adjacent to the Big Worm demanded that the government do something to impact the negative externalities borne by these neighbors.

Since 1976, the Minhocão has closed to traffic on Sundays and holidays, when pedestrians take over the street. A walk from the city center to the end of the highway takes about two hours, and the length is lined with “pixações” (graffiti tags unique to São Paulo), mobile grills, buskers and street vendors selling aqua de coco.

These are days that Paulistanos can simply enjoy the freedom of a car-free highway.

The Via Elevada Presidente Artur da Costa E Silva in Sao Paulo, Brazil is more commonly known as the Minhocão or “Big Worm.” The nickname refers to a giant mythical worm said to inhabit the jungles of South America—an appropriate moniker many claim for the twisting, elevated highway that twists through the heart of the city.

A HISTORY OF POOR DESIGN

Fig. 3.21: On Sundays and Holidays, the Big Worm is closed to cars.

Fig. 3.22: Aerial view of the Minhocão or “giant worm.”

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The Minhocão was conceived in the late 1960s, but was temporarily blocked by city officials and residents who worried that the 3.4 km (2.2 mi) ribbon of concrete, plied by 80,000 vehicles per day, would bring unwanted consequences to neighboring communities in the form of health impacts and noise pollution. As São Paulo’s population began to swell, however, Brazil’s military dictatorship finally allowed architect Paulo Maluf to begin designing the elevated highway. The Big Worm was completed in 1971. Like so much in São Paulo—which has grown from a population of 2 million in the 1950s to around 20 million today—the Minhocão is considered a poorly planned necessity. It has been called “an architectural aberration” and “cruel scenario architecture,” lamented for destroying such gems as Roosevelt Plaza and the once upscale Belle Epoque enclave of Avenida São João, now degraded by the Big Worm.

P EN N D ES IG N

Fig. 3.24: The size of the road allows for multiple uses.

Planners are currently considering removing the Big Worm all together, but they will have to overcome certain challenges such as resistance from residents who view the freeway as a beloved community asset for its Sunday use. Other challenges include finding another route for car traffic and increasing the capacity of the subway system.

Fig. 3.25: The road in full use on a busy day.

Fig. 3.23: Bicyclists and pedestrians flock to the closed highway.

Fig. 3.25: Cars on the Big Worm on weekdays.

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4

FRAMEWORK + PROCESS LEARNING FROM PRECEDENTS Looking across the case studies discussed in the previous chapter, it is evident that there is not a “typical� highway removal scenario. Each removal decision emerged from a unique set of circumstances, and in each case, the removal strategy was shaped by the constraints and opportunities specific to that site and city context. In cases such as the Cheonggyecheon Freeway in Seoul, the support of a prominent political champion played a significant role in realizing the highway removal. With the Embarcadero in San Francisco, damage caused by the Loma Prieta earthquake brought the removal issue to the fore and created an opportunity to use disaster relief funding to offset the removal costs. In other cases, like the removal of the Park East Freeway in Milwaukee and Harbor Drive in Portland, popular support and advocacy help to raise the profile of the removal. Despite the idiosyncrasies of politics, funding and circumstance in these precedent cases, there are some broad similarities in the processes that surfaced the ultimate decision to remove or modify a highway. The process model on the following page outlines in broad strokes the process by which highway removal decisions are made and identifies key factors that shape the decision-making process.

32

DESIGN + IMPLEMENTATION

DECISIONMAKING

PUBLIC PROCESS + DELIBERATION

BUILDING SUPPORT

4

F RA M E WORK + PROCE S S

2012

At least one of these conditions must be satisfied to surface a study of alternatives:

POPULAR SUPPORT

POLITICAL CHAMPION

HIGHWAY STUDY

WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

• ALTERNATIVES • CIVIC ENGAGEMENT • EVALUATION

FUNDING

PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE

Decision-making mechanism varies based on state/municipal policy: PUBLIC REFERENDUM

HIGHWAY DESIGN STUDY PROCESS

REMOVAL DECISION

• ALTERNATIVES • CIVIC ENGAGEMENT • EVALUATION

DOT DECISION

MEASURING IMPACTS / EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES Historic precedents for highway removal reveal not only the complex and nuanced forces that drive removal decisions, but also the range of potential benefits and impacts of removal and redevelopment.

As a way to evaluate design alternatives within our six case study cities, the studio developed the evaluation matrix below that captures both the monetary and nonmonetary impacts of various scenarios (rebuild, remove, modify, etc). The matrix was used to inform our final recommendations for the six case study cities and reflects our principles of optimizing social, environmental, and economic conditions in cities.

ACTIONABLE PLAN

Fig. 4.01: Process Diagram.

In the initial phase of the process, a highway may or may not be under active consideration for removal or modification.

Often times, it takes some critical push to surface a deeper investigation of highway removal or modification alternatives. As mentioned above, a political champion, grassroots advocacy, key window of opportunity (such as a natural disaster, or scheduled roadway maintenance/ evaluation), or funding source (such as a TIGER grant), might help to surface a more extensive study of alternatives to the status

part of a DOT-led study, public referendum, or political vote, the process may lead to a commitment by state or city officials to remove or modify the highway. Once an official decision has been reached, the city enters the design process to develop a more detailed implementation plans.

The six cities examined in the following chapters are each at different points in the process of reevaluating an urban highway.

Montreal and New Haven have already reached an official decision to remove and redevelop the highway. In Washington, DC, the Bronx, New Orleans, and Toronto, the deliberation is either still in progress or in the nascent stages. The process model provides us with a descriptive tool for understanding and contrasting where each city lies in the decision-making process.

P EN N D ES IG N

quo. A study may be sponsored by state or city DOTs, community groups, elected officials, or other private organizations.

Although the nature of such studies may vary greatly, it is often an iterative process by which various alternatives are evaluated against the goals and objectives of stakeholders (e.g. residents, businesses, city officials, advocates, and planners).

Ideally, this process produces a preferred alternative that can either cycle back into the deliberative process to generate greater popular or political support. Or, if

SOCIAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

ECONOMIC

Enhance pedestrian environment

Improve access to transit

Increase developable land

Capitalize on existing assets

Improve open space network

Create employment opportunities

Remove blighting influences

Manage stormwater

Minimize road maintenance costs

Create opportunities for placemaking

Improve air quality

Expand local tax base

Improve social + physical connections

Mitigate noise pollution

Retain or improve competitive advantage of local industries

Fig. 4.02: Matrix.

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35

IMPLEMENTATION AREAS

Average Daily Traffic:

WASHINGTON D.C. | SOUTHWEST/ SOUTHEAST EXPRESSWAY 1957

5

SIX CITIES

Study Area

5.6 miles

175,000

TORONTO | GARDINER EXPRESSWAY

SITE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIX NORTH AMERICAN CITIES

1966

Study Area

4.6 miles

100,000

NEW YORK CITY | SHERIDAN EXPRESSWAY 1964

Study Area

1.25 miles

There truly is no “one size fits all” approach to mitigating the harmful effects of highways on urban neighborhoods. However, all of the following cases must consider removal strategies under the same political and economic conditions of federal dollars in short supply and a national growing consciousness of making our urban places more livable and sustainable. The following cities represent both a wide spectrum of cities in different stages of a removal decision as well as a vast spectrum of market conditions. But most importantly, the following cases represent an array of what is possible.

35,000

NEW ORLEANS | CLAIBORNE EXPRESSWAY 1968

Study Area

4 miles

91,000

NEW HAVEN | OAK STREET CONNECTOR 1959

Study Area

1.9 miles

75,000

MONTREAL | AUTOROUTE BONAVENTURE 1966

Study Area

.62 miles 1” = 1 mile

36

55,000

i

WASHINGTON D.C.

ii

TORONTO

iii

NEW YORK CITY

iv

v

NEW ORLEANS

vi

MONTRÉAL

SOUTHWEST / SOUTHEAST EXPRESSWAY GARDINER EXPRESSWAY SHERIDAN EXPRESSWAY CLAIBORNE EXPRESSWAY

NEW HAVEN

OAK STREET CONNECTOR AUTOROUTE BONAVENTURE

i

WASHINGTON D.C.

SOUTHEAST / SOUTHWEST EXPRESSWAY

PREPARING FOR FUTURE GROWTH BY RESTORING AN 18TH-CENTURY AVENUE. The Southeast/Southwest Freeway was built to revitalize Washington’s historic core but instead became a social, visual and physical barrier, separating Southeast and Southwest Washington from the rest of the city. As the city debates how and where to grow, they should look to the Southeast/Southwest Freeway corridor. Starting the conversation about the future of the freeway spans should present the concept within existing conversations about growth, development pressures, transportation and the future of the city and region.

susannah henschel dan reed matthew wicklund

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S I X C I TI E S | WA S HI NGT ON D. C .

2012

P EN N D ES IG N

National Mall L’Enfant Plaza Tidal Basin

Pe nn s Ave ylvan nu ia e

Southwest

ing sh Wa

Navy Yard

ton ne

an Ch

int Po

l

r ive

cR ma

to Po

ins Ha

14 th Br Stre id g et e

C Br ase idg e

Capitol Hill

Anacostia River

11th Street Bridge

Fig. 5.i.01: Study area.

CONTEXT The Southeast/Southwest Freeway, signed as I-395 and I-695, connects Northern Virginia with downtown Washington, passing through the innercity neighborhoods of L’Enfant Plaza, Southwest, Capitol Hill and the Navy Yard.

Our study area runs from the 14th Street Bridge to the Center Leg Freeway and further east to the 11th Street Bridge and Pennsylvania Avenue.

Fig. 5.i.02: Construction of the Southeast/Southwest Freeway in the 1960s.

Washington D.C.’s famed layout of avenues and squares was proposed

by Pierre L’Enfant in 1791. Since the L’Enfant vision, Washington DC has developed both within the original bounds of the plan as well as far beyond.

During the early 20th century, Southwest Washington experienced a period of decline and disinvestment. In 1952, much of the neighborhood was designated a redevelopment zone and subsequently rebuilt as separate office and housing districts in the Modernist style. An inner loop freeway system was proposed for Washington during the 1960s, but due

Fig. 5.i.04: Over 4,000 new homes were built in Washington, D.C. in 2011, reflecting increased development demand.

Fig. 5.i.05: NCPC’s Monumental Core Framework Plan envisions removing portions of the freeway and restoring the street grid.

to community opposition, the Southeast/ Southwest Freeway was the only portion that was built. Instead, Congress redirected the funding into construction of the regional Metro system.

Commission, the federal planning agency for Greater Washington, released a plan that proposes capping over portions of the Southwest Freeway while replacing the elevated Southeast Freeway with a new, atgrade avenue. However, the plan does not explore how this could be carried out.

PROBLEM STATEMENT Presently, Washington is experiencing sustained population and job growth, resulting in substantial development pressure. In recent years, developers and public officials have proposed raising the city’s current 130-foot height limit as a way to gain more buildable area. At the same time, worsening traffic congestion has led to a push for alternate modes of transportation. The city has laid out 48 miles of bike lanes in the past several years and has started work on a 37-mile streetcar network. Meanwhile their newly-released vision for sustainability proposes that 75% of all trips be made without a car by 2032.

The Southeast/Southwest Freeway has not yet been a part of this conversation.

In 2009, the National Capital Planning

Repositioning the Southeast/Southwest Freeway through strategic interventions would open up land for development and reconnect neighborhoods while reducing car trips. Instead of getting caught up in the decision to reposition the freeway, this study hopes to bring plans to the table about highway removal as a solution by illustrating the possibilities that lie in the latent land and air rights surrounding the freeway. Through a series of context specific interventions of caps, tunnels, and the introduction of an at-grade avenue, the District of Columbia could recapture land for additional development, physically and visually reconnect the city, and expand Washington’s non-car infrastructure system.

Fig. 5.i.03: The Southwest Freeway is often congested and serves as a barrier to neighborhoods on both sides.

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S I X C I TI E S | WA S HI NGT ON D. C .

2012

P EN N D ES IG N

VISIONS New

0

1/4

are A Dela w

1/2

1mi

South Capitol Street

venu e SW

C Br ase idg e

Phase 2

E nue S y Ave Jerse

Fig. 5.i.06: Section, cap over the freeway at 7th Street SW.

Phase 1

W eS nu ve EL eA NN HA ain M NC TO ING SH WA

Our proposal reconnects the urban fabric, restores historic view corridors, and creates new opportunities to create housing, offices, retail, cultural uses, and public open space. It also restores Virginia Avenue, which was severed by the construction of the Southeast Freeway.

The plan is divided into three phases, each of which is tailored to existing freeway conditions and the needs of the surrounding neighborhood.

Pen n

sylv

Virg

inia

Aven

ani

aA

ven

ue

SE

ue S

E

Phase 3

M Street SE

et

e Str

r

te Wa

A STI

ER

RIV

O

AC

AN

SE

Fig. 5.i.09: Complete site plan.

ue S

W

Independence Avenue SW

Aven ware

Aven

ue S

Dela

E

Fig. 5.i.08: Section, newly restored Virginia Avenue at 5th Street SE.

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0

1/8

1/4

ue S

South Capitol Street

sylv

ani

aA

ven

ue

E

Little Square 11th Street SE

E

nue S

y Ave

80’

Aven

Pen n

8th Street SE

inia

5th Street SE

Virg

Jerse

40’

Garfield Park

Fig. 5.i.10: Site plan, Phases 1 + 2.

New

20’

E

I Street SW

M Street SE

0

nue S

Big Square

on gt l hin e as nn W Cha

Fig. 5.i.07: Section, new square at Delaware Avenue SW.

y Ave

7th Street SW

inia

Jerse

Virg

New

10th Street SW

Hancock Park

SE

eet

tr rS

te Wa

tia cos

SE

er

Riv

Ana

1/2mi

Fig. 5.i.11: Site plan, Phase 3.

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S I X C I TI E S | WA S HI NGT ON D. C .

2012 Phase 1 largely retains the existing Southwest Freeway while replacing the Case Bridge with a tunnel. We use the air rights over the depressed freeway to provide sites for housing, retail space, and museum sites, creating a new cultural center a few blocks south of the National Mall.

Fig. 5.i.12: Selling air rights over the Southwest Freeway allows new development to mend the urban fabric.

Fig. 5.i.13: Replacing the Southeast Freeway with an at-grade avenue connects Garfield Park to the surrounding neighborhood.

Fig. 5.i.14: Removing the elevated freeway structure allows the extension of Barracks Row, a popular retail district.

44

In Phase 2, we restructure the interchange between the Southwest Freeway and Center Leg Freeway as a large public square. The new square is lined by high-rise office and residential buildings with ground-floor retail, creating a lively regional destination akin to Dupont Circle in Northwest D.C. In Phase 3, we demolish the elevated Southeast Freeway and replace it with Virginia Avenue, a grand diagonal street with a landscaped median containing bike and jogging lanes. The avenue would end at a small, neighborhood square. Finally, a new neighborhood along the Anacostia River takes the place of the existing freeway stub ramps.

Despite this proposal’s size, the development pressure in the District makes it feasible over a 15 to 20 year buildout period. Value capture techniques, such as a TIF district around the freeway and land sales, can help offset the cost of modifying the freeway. The potential for private investment is tremendous. Conservative projections indicate that the return could be forty-five dollars in private investment for every dollar of public funds spent. This estimate does not include the projected tax revenue stream from the potential development, projected at over $110 million per year after full build out. With

P EN N D ES IG N

all development receiving a ten-year tax abatement, the net present value of the tax revenue over the next thirty-years is double the public investment necessary to achieve full-buildout.

RECOMMENDATIONS Our goal is to make highway removal a legitimate option for the city and region, both through the vision we presented but also through a larger cultural shift. We want to make highway removal a regional discussion, involving the District and the states of Maryland and Virginia. We want to involve all potential stakeholders, including federal agencies, state and local government agencies, landowners and community groups, ensuring that everyone has buy-in and the selected solution meets their needs.

7910 dwelling units

1.3m sq.ft. retail

14.4m sq.ft. office 1.4m sq.ft. hotel + museums Fig. 5.i.15: Potential development at total buildout.

Public investment $139.9m Tax revenue: years 1-30 $825.9m

Additionally, we would like to bring everyday citizens on board through an educational campaign that shows the practical use and benefits of a car-free lifestyle to those who may be skeptical of its feasibility. We also want to make drivers pay for the road capacity they use, through a congestion charge and performance pricing scheme that can meter traffic while raising revenue for public amenities.

Finally, we would like to create a programming scheme for the public spaces we propose, creating spaces that celebrate the culture of Washington, D.C. and draw people from the city and region.

In doing so, we can turn the Southeast/ Southwest Freeway corridor from a barrier to a celebrated gathering space and regional asset.

Tax revenue: years 1-30 with 10-year abatement $277.6m Fig. 5.i.16: Public investment vs. tax revenue for the entire buildout scheme.

Public investment Land sales revenue

Private investment

Fig. 5.i.17: Public investment vs. land sales revenue vs. private investment.

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ii

TORONTO

GARDINER EXPRESSWAY

RECONNECTING TORONTO TO THE WATERFRONT The elevated portion of the Gardiner Expressway acts as a major barrier to pedestrians and cyclists trying to access the public spaces and entertainment venues along the Lake Ontario waterfront. The highway is also a fiscal drain on the city due to high maintenance costs. By removing the elevated Gardiner, Toronto can reconnect the dense urban fabric and street grid of the central business district with the new development and amenities along the waterfront and provide needed improvements to the transit system.

alexandra kaplan mary miltimore anne misak

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S I X C I TI E S | T ORONT O

2012

Fig. 5.ii.01: The Gardiner Expressway runs along Lake Ontario between the western suburban areas and the central business district.

CONTEXT The Frederick G. Gardiner Expressway is an 18 km (11 mile) stretch of highway that runs along the Lake Ontario shoreline in Toronto, Ontario. The Gardiner extends from Highway 427 in the west to just past the Don Valley Parkway (DVP) in the east. This project focuses on the 7.2 km (4.5 miles) elevated portion from Dufferin Street to the DVP. The Gardiner was built along the industrial waterfront.

Today, condominium development, parks,

Barrie Richmond Hill Georgetown

Stouffville

Oshawa Milton

Lakeshore West

P EN N D ES IG N

Fig. 5.ii.04: The Gardiner is a major pedestrian barrier to the waterfront and fiscal drain on the city.

stadiums, and entertainment complexes have replaced the industrial land. Condos, the Gardiner, and the adjacent rail lines have contributed to poor pedestrian connectivity, a fragmented urban fabric, and limited access to public spaces. The Gardiner Expressway is a major fiscal drain to the City of Toronto. Maintenance costs for the elevated portion of the Gardiner are estimated to cost the city over $150 million over the next ten years. As the expressway approaches its useful life, it is necessary to consider alternative futures.

REMOVAL CREATES OPPORTUNITIES Removing the elevated portion of the Gardiner is a necessary step toward reconnecting the city and the waterfront and reknitting Toronto’s urban fabric. Our proposal includes removing the elevated portion and dispersing traffic onto an improved local street network as well as encouraging mode-shift by expanding the city’s mass transit system.

>150k

100k-125k

75k-100k

100k-125k

y Parkway Don Valle

Parliament St

Yonge St

Spadina St

Fig. 5.ii.02: The Gardiner and TTC’s transit system are shown in relation to Go Transit’s rail routes and their corresponding ridership levels, illustrated by wedge size.

< 75k

1 km

Fig. 5.ii.03: Traffic counts along the Gardiner show that it is mainly used by commuters traveling to the CBD.

48

Fig. 5.ii.05 Maple Way will be a new east-west arterial, helping to reknit the urban fabric.

49

2012

Spadina St

ay

Spadina St

arkw ey P Vall Don

Parliament St

a ey P Vall Don

rkw

Parliament St

Yonge St Yonge St

Spadina St

P EN N D ES IG N

ay

S I X C I TI E S | T ORONT O

Spadina St

5

Proposed Development

1 km

Fig. 5.ii.06: Removing the Gardiner allows for a denser street grid along the waterfront.

ENHANCE LOCAL STREET NETWORK

By removing the Gardiner and developing a more efficient multi-modal system we address the existing problems and accomplish the following planning goals:

The Gardiner is heavily used by commuters travelling into the CBD from the west and east part of the city. There are also considerable local trips.

• Reconnect the urban fabric • Create a pedestrian and cyclist friendly environment • Balance public and private spaces • Make public spaces responsive • Ensure a diversity of uses and residents • Encourage multi-modal transportation

Condo 35’

Sidewalk 20’

Traffic Lanes 30’

Sidewalk 18’

Traffic Lanes 30’

Sidewalk 46’

Parking Lot 91.5’

Fig. 5.ii.08: The area around the Rogers Center illustrates the application of the principles outlined above.

Our proposal is to remove the elevated Gardiner and create a more localized street grid that reconnects many of the northsouth streets. An east-west arterial called Maple Way will replace the Gardiner and Lake Shore Boulevard. Maple Way is five

Condo 35’

Sidewalk 20’

FLEX BUS 11’

Traffic FLEX/ Traffic Lanes commuter Lanes 10.5’ 11’ 10.5’

FLEX BUS 11’

Sidewalk 20’

Fig. 5.ii.07: Maple Way will be a more flexible street, better meeting the needs of commuters, residents, and businesses.

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New Development 129’

lanes with 6m sidewalks creating a more pedestrian friendly environment. Three of the five lanes are used for auto traffic: one in each direction and a flexible middle lane that responds to traffic flow. The two outside lanes are dedicated bus lanes during peak travel times and parking lanes during off-peak and nighttime hours to facilitate commercial activity. Queens Quay, the other main east-west arterial, caters to other modes of transportation with dedicated streetcar lanes and a separated bike path along the waterfront.

Commercial

New Development

Mixed Use

Existing Parks

High Density Res. Low Density Res.

Proposed Parks Existing Parking

Civic Flex Spaces

Proposed Parking

MODE-SHIFT TMode shift will help absorb traffic from taking down the elevated portion of the Gardiner. This proposal expands the current TTC transit system by adding two new subways: one north-south following Parliament Street from the waterfront to Bloor Street; one east-west from Brown’s Line in the west, following Queens Way and King Street, through Union Station, and eventually connecting to the BloorDanforth subway at Victoria Park Station.

1-4 Floors

14 - 16 Floors

4-8 Floors setback above 4

setback above 16

8-12 Floors 12 - 14 Floors

16 - 18 Floors 18 - 20 Floors Special Height Zone

Fig. 5.ii.09: The area around the Rogers Center illustrates the application of the principles outlined above.

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S I X C I TI E S | T ORONT O

2012

a rkw a ey P Vall Don

Parliament St

Yonge St

Gardiner Removal $474 million

P EN N D ES IG N

S SALE TAX $8 b

Spadina St

y

5

Private Investment $1.7 billion

Proposed Subways Proposed Underground Streetcar Go Rail

TTC Streetcar

TTC Subway

Proposed Streetcar

Station

TRANSFER 1% $560M

GAP 10% $850M 1 km

In addition, the Bathurst streetcar would be tunneled up to Front Street and the Queens Quay streetcar will be extended along the waterfront between Dufferin and the DVP. Also, a streetcar will be added to Cherry Street from the waterfront to Gerrard Street.

The improved transit system is estimated to cost about $8.9 billion. This proposal calls for an increase of 5% in the city’s sales tax over 30 years and a 1% transfer tax for 20 years to cover most of the cost. The sales tax increase would generate $8 billion and the transfer tax $560 million. The remaining $851.5 million would come from Ontario’s and TTC’s transportation capital budgets.

developing the 769,792.5 sq m (2,565,975 sq ft) of land where the Gardiner used to be, removal of the Gardiner will have a 4 to 1 return on public investment. Removing the Gardiner will also help to reknit the urban fabric of Toronto’s CDB with the new development along the waterfront, create a more pedestrian and bike friendly environment and provide improved access for all Torontonians to one of the city’s most valuable assets: its waterfront.

D

Given the estimated $1.7 billion of private investment that would be generated by

Spadina St

The estimated cost for removing the elevated Gardiner is $402 million, plus another approximately $72 million to

y alle on V

FINANCING THE PROJECT

construct Maple Way. In order to pay for this, Toronto could establish a Tax Increment Finance (TIF) district in order to capture the value of the new and proposed development taking place along the waterfront. If the TIF district was implemented, the city could collect about $60 million a year. Most TIF districts are in place for 20-30 years, so assuming a 20 year life span, the TIF district could generate about $1 billion, which is more than enough to cover the $474 million price tag to remove the Gardiner.

y kwa Par

Fig. 5.ii.12: Transit Improvements can be funded mainly through an increase in the sales tax and a 1% transfer tax.

Parliament St

Fig. 5.ii.11: Public investment will induce an estimated 400% return in private investment.

Yonge St

Fig. 5.ii.09: Improved transit options such as subways along King Street and Parliament will help induce mode-shifts after removal and make Toronto a more sustainble city.

1 km

Fig. 5.ii.10: Open spaces along Maple Way and throughout the waterfront area can be improved to be more responsive to community needs.

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Fig. 5.ii.13: A TIF district would capture the increasing value of new development along the waterfront to pay for the removal of the Gardiner.

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iii

NEW YORK CITY SHERIDAN EXPRESSWAY

BUILDING ON COMMUNITY-LED REVITALIZATION AND OPEN SPACE ASSETS TO MAKE QUALITY OF LIFE IMPROVEMENTS The Sheridan Expressway is an underutilized highway in the Bronx, NY. While community advocates have campaigned for the removal of the Sheridan since the late 1990s, there are still those who see the Sheridan as a vital link for truck access to the nearby Hunts Point industrial business zone. We believe that by making changes to the broader freeway network, it is possible to serve the interests of the many stakeholders at the table and to realize quality of life improvements for residents in the area.

elizabeth frantz chrissy lee daniella schwartz

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2012 CONTEXT

Fig. 5.iii.01: Average daily trips. Red: More than 100,000 adt, Orange: 50,000 - 100,000 adt, and blue: less than 50,000 adt

The Sheridan Expressway is a 1.25-mile connector route between the Cross-Bronx and Bruckner Expressways. With an average daily volume of 35,000 vehicles, the Sheridan is underutilized and functions more like a high-capacity local road particularly in comparison to the other highways in the South Bronx (see Fig. 5.iii.01). New York City received a TIGER II Grant in 2010 to evaluate the future of the Sheridan, including removal and modification scenarios for possible futures.

P EN N D ES IG N

At-Grade Below Grade Elevated

Fig. 5.iii.05: Pedestrian realm under the elevated Sheridan Expressway.

Built in 1962, the Sheridan was part of Robert Moses’ larger vision to connect New York City to suburbs farther afield. The ring of highways constructed around the South Bronx between 1930 and 1970 tore through residential neighborhoods and fueled disinvestment and rapid population loss.

Hunts Point

Food Distribution Center

Fig. 5.iii.02: Highway (solid) and Local (dashed) routes. Existing routes are shown in orange and proposed routes are in red.

sidewalk 15’

west farms road 44’

median 47’

sheridan expressway 101’

starlight park

elevated subway

sidewalk whitlock avenue 48’ 16’

sheridan expressway 100’

amtrak/csx 109’

park

Today, the Sheridan continues to be a physical barrier and blighting influence in the community and is adjacent to underutilized industrial lands. The surrounding neighbor hood is two-thirds Hispanic and one-third Black and largely low-income. The majority of residents in this area are renters, and they experience higher housing costs burdens than renters in the Bronx and in New York City at large. The preponderance of highways in the South Bronx has also had a number of significant public health impacts by degrading air quality and limiting access to open space. Several studies have connected high asthma rates in the South Bronx to the presence of the highway network, and local advocates refer to damaging effects of the highways as a public health emergency. Despite historic

Fig. 5.iii.04. Existing Conditions.

Fig. 5.iii.06: Below grade section of the Sheridan with the elevated MTA 6 train above Westchester Avenue.

setbacks, community organizations in the South Bronx have played an active role in recent years to lead community improvement efforts around a variety of issues, including workforce development, affordable housing, education, and environmental justice - perhaps most notably resulting in major restoration efforts around the Bronx River.

network, it serves as a major access route for trucks entering the Hunt’s Point Food Distribution Center to the south, a $3 billion regional economic center that attracts 70,000 vehicles on a daily basis. However, trucks only drive on the Sheridan for a half-mile before exiting onto local streets (see Fig. 5.iii.02). Modifications to the broader highway network would eliminate the need for trucks to use the Sheridan and allow for its removal and redevelopment.

Such improvement include elevating the Bruckner Expressway, building new ramps

Although the Sheridan is not well-utilized in comparison to the broader highway

Fig. 5.iii.03: Existing conditions sections of the Sheridan Expressway at 174th Street and at Westchester Avenue.

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2012 from the Bruckner directly into Hunts Point, and improving the interchange between the Major Deegan and Cross-Bronx. These improvement are being considered as part of the current land use and transportation study.

SITE DESIGN Our vision for the redevelopment of the Sheridan aims to satisfy a number of key interests in the community: (1) to make safer street level connections for all modes; (2) to maintain truck access to Hunts Point; (3) to facilitate the transition of underutilized industrial parcels along the Sheridan to residential and commercial uses; and (4) to build on new park investments along the Bronx River as part of the Bronx River Greenway Plan.

LM CA

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Fig. 5.iii.08: Site Plan.

We propose replacing the Sheridan with a multi-way boulevard, combining part of the Sheridan right of way with the local road that runs adjacent to it, West Farms Road. In the central portion the newly formed “Sheridan Drive,” the north and south lanes of the boulevard split to create new development parcels. This design will allow for continued truck access to Hunts Point in the short term, but also reconnect local east-west streets to the riverfront.

Figure 5.iii.10 shows the full Sheridan Drive right-of-way with two lanes of travel in either direction and a side lane for parking access.

phased road diet along Sheridan Drive. As shown in Figure 5.iii.09, in the initial phase of removal, the Sheridan Expressway can be uncoupled from the Bruckner and converted into a single boulevard to accommodate truck traffic. As industrial parcels east of the Sheridan are rezoned, the boulevard can be split into two one-way streets to create new development parcels (see Fig.5.iii.08). As a final phase after trucks are re-routed, the one-way streets can be converted into two-way streets and side lanes closed to further calm traffic.

existing building

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Land freed up by the removal of the Sheridan can be reprogrammed to create new park space and development parcels. We envision the majority of new development devoted to mixed-use, midrise residential development, including a total of 1,300 affordable units. New parcels in the northern and southern portions of the site will be devoted to new park and community spaces such as ball fields, community gardens and a recreational center. We recommend ground-floor commercial uses interspersed throughout the development to create more active frontages. Commercial development should be clustered along Westchester Avenue, strengthening the

bike/ ped path

shared bike lane existing building

sidewalk 18’

side parklane ing 11’ 11’

car travel 22’

sidewalk 15’

new building 60’

private courtyard 60’

new building 60’

car travel 22’

parking 11’

greenway 70’

bronx river

Fig. 5.iii.11: Jennings Street.

pedestrian bridge 95’

below grade parking 140’ existing sidebuilding walk 15’

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This approach will maintain truck access in the short-term, but allow for a more pedestrian-oriented street design in the long-term.

Fig. 5.iii.10: 174th Street.

Assuming that long-term improvements to the broader highway network will eventually allow for trucks to access Hunts Points without taking the Sheridan, we propose a Fig. 5.iii.09: Phased Road Diet.

starlight park

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park- side meding lane ian 11’ 11’ 8’

car travel 22’

median 10’

car travel 22’

sidewalk 30’

new development 30’

amtrak/csx 95’

concrete plant park

Fig. 5.iii.12: Westchester Avenue.

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New Parks Bike/Ped Path Park Entry Existing Parks

2012 existing commercial corridor on this street. Similarly, buildings are oriented to face the street and the river to weave the new development into the fabric of the surrounding neighborhood and create a better orientation to the waterâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s edge.

And finally, we propose a number of midblock pedestrian cut-through to shorten the length of the blocks and create more pedestrian paths to the river.

RECOMMENDATIONS

increase opportunities for local economic development, and create a healthier built environment. As such this is not a project that capitalizes on market forces, but rather furthers community-led revitalization efforts.

Given the extent of existing community mobilization around the Sheridan study, it is important, but also advantageous, that community advocates play an active role in the planning and implementation. This can be achieved through the creation of a land trust which ensures long-term housing affordability and through the creation of a

P EN N D ES IG N

park conservancy to raise private funds for park maintenance.

Considering the Sheridan as part of the larger network creates an opportunity to capitalize on recent public investment in the South Bronx and build on communityled efforts to secure quality of life improvements.

We estimate the cost of removal to be $260 million, including the cost of remediating industrial lands, removing the existing infrastructure and building replacement roads. Public investment in removal and site preparation could spur upwards of $460 million in private development.

Although the city will not see an equal return in tax revenues due to the amount of affordable housing in the project, we believe that there are substantial social benefits that will accompany removal of the Sheridan that justify such a major public investment. Removal will meet the communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s need for affordable housing,

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Fig. 5.iii.13: Capitalize on park investments by creating new access points to the parks adjacent to the Sheridan.

Fig. 5.iii.15: Above: New park entrance and plaza at Westchester Avenue.

Fig. 5.iii.14: Looking along Sheridan Drive West at new commercial and residential development.

Fig. 5.iii.16: Below: New park space along the Bronx River to the east side of Sheridan Drive.

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iv

NEW ORLEANS

CLAIBORNE EXPRESSWAY

RECLAIMING INFRASTRUCTURE AS A TOOL FOR NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT The Claiborne corridor includes a 3.5 mile elevated section of Interstate 10 that runs through central New Orleans, Louisiana. After Hurricane Katrina, the city and region experienced dramatic changes in population and investment, and an influx of federal and non-profit funding combined with new residents provide momentum for urban change. Discussions around removing the expressway date back to the early 1970s, with the city most recently receiving a federal grant to study alternatives including removal in late 2011.

Our vision for the Claiborne corridor incorporates three guiding principles of culture, context and investment that reflect current and new land uses. The new corridor will include removed, reduced and reused sections of the expressway to create an enhanced sense of place across the various neighborhoods of the area. Further recommendations include policy changes, public engagement, and funding strategies to support removal.

lamont cobb kaitlin dastugue reina kapadia emily lehman

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1 mile

Fig. 5.iv.01: Context map of Claiborne Expressway in relation to the local highway network

Fig. 5.iv.02: The Claiborne corridor cuts through various areas of the city, including busy commercial districts and historic residential neighborhoods

2012 CONTEXT

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The Claiborne corridor runs through central New Orleans east-west from the Pontchartrain interchange to the 610 interchange. The corridor includes several neighborhoods across the city, including the Central Business District and historic Treme. The corridor is blocks from the French Quarter and includes landmarks such as the Louisiana Superdome, Louis Armstrong State Park, and the historic Circle Food Store. New Orleans has seen a bevy of planning and investment efforts discussing removal of the elevated expressway from the corridor.

The Congress for the New Urbanism commissioned a study that examined the feasibility of removal and offered the prevailing vision for a highway free corridor.

In 2011, the city received a $2 million dollar TIGER II planning grant from the U.S. DOT to further study alternatives for the corridor.

Before the expressway was built, the Claiborne corridor was a thriving commercial corridor with a wide neutral ground that served as an important public space for the community. The corridor began to see some decline in the early 1960s. With the completion of the expressway later that decade, that disinvestment was accelerated. Today, there are many undesirable conditions along the corridor including many vacant or underutilized properties and blight.

Additionally, the elevated expressway serves as a significant physical and psychological barrier between neighborhoods.

Although extensive planning efforts have studied removal, there are still significant challenges. Local officials are ambivalent to supporting full removal, and the Port of New Orleans cites the expressway as critical link for freight traffic through the city. Additionally, there has not yet been complete buy-in from local residents supporting removal.

Fig. 5.iv.03 Existing section of the Claiborne corridor. The corridor currently includes both elevated and surface traffic lanes

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Despite itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s negative influence, the expressway has also been folded into the cultural life of the community, with residents often reclaiming the highway to incorporate in their own cultural traditions. Today, the infrastructure also serves as a vehicle for public art and a community gathering and performance space. The Claiborne is also a place of high ground in the community.

Some residents have voiced skepticism over its removal because of its potential to be used in case of another flood.

P EN N D ES IG N

Fig. 5.iv.04: Claiborne Avenue in the 1950s held the widest neutral ground median in the city at 100 feet wide

Fig. 5.iv.05: Today the corridor is dominated by the elevated expressway overhead

In the next several years, $50 million will need to be spent to repair high priority ramps along the expressway. This money can be spent repairing what is already there, or we can use this opportunity to think of new strategies for how to reuse this infrastructure in a way that is more responsive to community needs and uses.

Fig. 5.iv.06: Local residents have adapted the space under the Claiborne for visual and performing arts

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VISIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

Guiding principles for urban design: Culture. Capitalize on the rich cultural heritage of the area as well as the local tradition of reusing the space underneath it. Context. Propose contextappropriate interventions that respond to the existing and planned assets in the adjacent neighborhoods. Investment.

Reutilize the Claiborne infrastructure as a commodity that creates value, rather than a depreciating asset.

For decades, tourists have benefited from a direct route into downtown at the expense of those who live in the neighborhoods adjacent to Claiborne. To fund the $533 million needed to see this project is completed, tourism revenue capture strategies could include: dedicating revenues from the newly created Hospitality district, using land sales, and instituting a new tax on rental cars.

Fig. 4.iv.07 The Transect Approach

Figure 4.iv.08 Design Concept. Since the Claiborne Expressway and Claiborne Avenue are redundant, parallel routes, traffic capacity can be removed from the expressway altogether and absorbed by Claiborne Avenue and the grid network of city streets. Then, the physical structure of the expressway - which will no longer be used as a roadway - can be either kept in tact, reduced in form and re-purposed, or demolished entirely.

KEEP IT Retain full structure including decking Fig. 4.iv.09 Infrastructure Treatment Typologies

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The guiding principles have been incorporated into the “transect approach,” (Fig. 4.iv.08) which slices along the corridor through perpendicular transect zones characterized by the activity taking place within them. The transect approach informs the treatment of the infrastructure into keep / remove /or reduce typologies based on what is appropriate in each section. This approach also allows for cross-connections to be made across Claiborne Avenue into the adjoining neighborhoods.

REDUCE IT Expose beams and minimal columns

REMOVE IT Remove structure entirely

P EN N D ES IG N

traffic lights between the port and the Pontchartrain Expressway and establishing a dedicated lane for truck traffic on I-610.

Mode Shift. The reduction in car traffic capacity can be mitigated through building a more robust bicycle and pedestrian network as well as building upon recent streetcar system investments by adding a line to nearby Broad Street.

Interim Strategy. An interim strategy can move the process from the deliberation phase to execution. One strategy to create dialogue and explore alternatives would be to have a scheduled, monthly event where the expressway would be shut down to car traffic and open to local events- such as a bike ride, tailgate, festival-- which would showcase a different use for the infrastructure. Meanwhile, traffic patterns in light of the closure would be studied. Other policy recommendations respond to social, economic, and environmental facets of the project.

Repurpose Materials Concrete from Claiborne’s removal should be reused as “riff raff” to anchor newly constructed levees for both flood protection and coastal restoration purposes.

Build a Broad Coalition. The conversation must be expanded from one of transportation considerations to considerations of social and environmental justice. Securing key champions from different sectors and all levels of government will ensure that the conversation is expanded.

Fig. 4.iv.10 Temporary closure of the Autobahn in Germany, allowing for pedestrian use.

Balance Interests. Trucks traveling from the port would take an estimated eight extra minutes to leave the city if Claiborne were removed. This delay could be mitigated by introducing signal prioritization for Fig. 4.iv.11 Traffic from the Port of New Orleans can use existing highways to travel through the city

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Fig. 4.iv.12 REDUCE IT: Adjacent to downtown and two historic cemeteries, the mixed-use transect is an example of where the former highway structure gets modified and reused. Reduced to its bones, the I-beams act as a frame for vegetative growth, creating a shady, cool, sheltered public plaza underneath, as well as a transit hub at the intersection with Canal Street and the streetcar line.

P EN N D ES IG N

Fig4.iv.15 KEEP IT: The Cultural Core runs through the heart of Treme, a neighborhood with strong cultural, artistic, and musical traditions.

This transect celebrates that heritage by providing spaces for performance as well as honoring the neutral groundâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s traditional role as a public gathering space. The southern bay of the expressway is retained and reclaimed as an elevated public park.

Fig. 4.iv.13 (above) Claiborne today (right) Proposed infrastructure adaptation

Fig.4.iv.16 REMOVE IT: The land freed up by removing the elevated structure in the Enterprise Zone transect allows for this area to be a place for concentrated economic development activity, honoring historic Claiborne Avenueâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s importance as commercial corridor in the city. Pop-up commercial and incubator spaces in the neutral ground, paired with city-wide small business programs, can facilitate local entrepreneurship.

The reestablished St. Bernard Circle and the reopened Circle Food Store will serve as the heart of this district.

keep

remove

reduce

remove

keep

reduce

remove

keep

Fig. 4.iv.14 Site Plan of Full Corridor

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NEW HAVEN

OAK STREET CONNECTOR

MOVING BEYOND THE RIGHT-OF-WAY TO REPAIR A CITY At the time of its construction, the Oak Street Connector wrested a large swath of the urban area from pedestrian control and ceded it to the automobile. As the city works to extract this highway from the downtown core, the transformative potential of the effort should expand beyond the immediate right-of-way to include the large surrounding areas that have been negatively influenced by the highway and the cityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s car culture. This project provides New Haven with a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to create a strategic framework that will reknit the fractured urban fabric and guide the development of the city for decades to come.

jordan block hosung park michael ruane

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HISTORY

Fig 5.v.01: Location of Route 34 looking east in 1950 (left) and after its construction in 1970 (right).

The Oak Street Connector, or Route 34,in New Haven, Connecticut is a limited access highway that links the downtown at its west end to the interchange of I-91/I-95.

It stands as a reminder of the urban renewal era in which it was conceived. The incomplete project which relocated 881 households and 350 businesses remains as a scar on the city of New Haven. After plans for the highwayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s expansion were met with opposition and a lack of political will, the project was formally abandoned in the 1970s. Having only reached as far as College Street, the highway successfully separated the downtown core from major amenities including the Yale Medical Campus and Union Station and sealed the area off from most development interests. In its current state, the highway and its surroundings produce a hostile environment to pedestrians and cedes a large swath of the city to the automobile.

Having recognized the need to remediate the damage and barrier effect of the depressed highway, in 2006 the state

Fig. 5.v.02: Route 34 from the Air Rights Garage looking east, taken in 2012.

ext

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N 1/4 Mile Fig. 5.v.04: Existing conditions along Route 34 showing the physical barrier it creates, lack of urban fabric to the south and the limited extent of the current Downtown Crossing project.

and city began an effort to explore redevelopment opportunities that would eliminate the dominating presence of the highway. With the successful acquisition of a federal TIGER II Grant, the city has made its commitment to the highway removal a reality. The grant is providing funding for both design and construction elements of the first phase of the Downtown Crossing Project. This project aims to remove the depressed portion of the highway and relocate traffic onto the surface streets or frontage boulevards to allow for the development of approximately 11 acres that exist in the right-of-way.

PROBLEM STATEMENT Despite this gesture to significantly remediate the city fabric, the project deserves to be re-evaluated in respect to economic, social and environmental impacts beyond the transportation considerations in the limited extent of the existing right-of-way. In order to maximize potential return in economic, social, environmental and transportation terms

CURRENT ISSUES The city of New Haven faces several social, economic and environmental issues as a result of the current highway right-of-way. The issues that are the there are the focus of the proposal include: -Car-centric focus of corridor -Physical barrier of highway -Degradation of urban fabric -Limited focus of existing proposal

the project should address the urban area to the south of Route 34. This would help to remediate the entire extent of damage caused by the highway and in doing so, it would be important to explore opportunities to relink and revive these areas to the south. This, in turn, will help to reknit Yale University Medical, Union Station and residential communities back into the city.

Fig. 5.v.03: Existing profiles of the Route 34 right-of-way showing the physical barrier and development opportunity that exists.

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DESIGN PROPOSALS Reconnect South Church Street to the City: Building off of the existing proposal for the downtown crossing, there are opportunities to reconnect the street grid across the Route 34 right-of-way. By providing walkable and plentiful crossings, the once obtrusive barrier is now a fluid district of the city that can create more marketable development opportunities south of Route 34.

Disperse Traffic: In order to maximize the existing transportation network, there are opportunities to create several changes that will reduce the volume of traffic along the existing right-of-way. The first key proposal is the rerouting of Route 1 and creation of a new exit from Route 34 to the east of the Amtrak ROW allowing for improved access and dispersion of traffic into the city. In addition, the move allows for the reconstruction of Route 34 at-grade with State Street creating a transition from the expressway into the city grid.

The second major dispersion element is

2012 the creation of a series of underground parking structures which will be built in the former depression of the highway. This will reduce street level traffic and leveraged to encourage development without excessive surface parking.

Leverage Public Investment & Existing Assets: The extent of development in this proposal is focused on the leveraging of strategic public investment that works with market pressures and assets to build the momentum of the project. In this proposal, the strength of the burgeoning life science district and major institutional presence of Yale are major drivers along the existing right-of-way. The land use map shows the focus of these potential development areas. In addition the connection to Union Station becomes a major driver for transit oriented development. Strategic public investment in road re-alignments, active public space, pedestrian and bicycle improvements, and improved access to transit that will stimulate private investment.

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Fig. 5.v.05: Vision for New Haven with potential build-out of the medical services district, west end park and Church Street.

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Fig. 5.v.06: Land use (top) and Urban Design Guidelines (bottom) plans demonstrate the larger vision for New Haven along the Route 34 corridor.

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1

Re-establish the Urban Fabric: The success of an urban environment hinges on the density of its street network that allows for walkability, diversity of experiences, and livable communities.

The proposal reknits the urban fabric and calls attention to specific design elements including accents at major focal points and street wall facades that add character and life to the area. These urban design guidelines provide a diversity of experience with focus on quality of life improvements that make for unique, livable places.

A

30â&#x20AC;&#x2122;

30â&#x20AC;&#x2122; B Fig. 5.v.07: Sections showing proposed profiles of Church Street (top) and MLK Drive including underground parking (bottom).

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2012 investments will rely on a diverse set of financing techniques. The largest potential lies in tolling I-95. With over 150k of ADT, allowing tolling revenue to be raised from the Pearl Harbor Memorial Bridge would help to fund the development stimulating public investments that would increase tax revenues at the state and city level, and repair the damage that was inflicted on the city so long ago. With this strategic phasing, New Haven can leverage existing drivers to create a framework for decades of future development.

1 Fig. 5.v.08: View looking toward Union Station on Church Street illustrates renewed density focused around the station providing mixedincome and use development, active street space and a new street car system linking to the downtown.

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PHASE 1 Retail: 340,400 sq ft.

Office: 2.6 million sq ft.

Residential: 727,600 sq ft.

PHASE 2 Retail: 182,140 sq ft.

Office: 200,500 sq ft.

Residential: 988,000 sq ft.

PHASING AND RECOMMENDATIONS The ability of a small market like New Haven to succeed in such an ambitious proposal is through careful phasing and strategic public investments to improve the public environment and stimulate or grow current markets of development. The phasing for this project seeks to build first on the active institutional and life science markets creating a core at Church Street and the new MLK Drive. In addition to phasing the success of the larger public

P EN N D ES IG N

PHASE 4 Retail: 144,300 sq ft.

Residential: 361,500 sq ft.

PHASE 3 Retail: 82,500 sq ft.

Office: 348,000 sq ft.

Residential: 619,200 sq ft.

2 Fig. 5.v.09: View looking west on the Park Front Drive showing the integrated park space with new single family development.

$1.2 BILLION PRIVATE INVESTMENT

$330 MILLION PUBLIC INVESTMENT 3 Fig. 5.v.10: MLK Drive at York Street looking west shows the former location of the Air Rights Garage replaced with mix-use life sciences development and a mixed mode streetscape with protected bike lanes, landscaping, and active store fronts.

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Fig. 5.v.11: Phasing and development scheme.

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MONTRĂ&#x2030;AL

AUTOROUTE BONAVENTURE

BUILDING NEW CONNECTIONS TO A STRONG DEVELOPMENT MARKET Strong development pressure and a strong public transportation framework put the city of Montreal in a strong position to create a string of successful new developments and public spaces in a corridor just south of downtown, currently dominated by an elevated highway. The city has decided to remove the last kilometer of the Autoroute Bonaventure, between the Lachine Canal and downtown, but it is critical that it replaces it with a context-appropriate solution.

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2012 HISTORY AND TODAY The Autoroute Bonaventure was the result of infrastructure-building in preparation for Expo ’67, a world’s fair that brought millions of visitors to Montreal. The highway opened in 1966 and brought drivers from its growing south-shore suburbs. Today, the last kilometer of the freeway and an elevated rail viaduct that runs parallel cut an approximate 120-meter divide between two neighborhoods just south of the city’s booming downtown. The two structures allow for cross-traffic, but dark, narrow corridors under the structures discourage street life seen in other parts of the city and create a psychological barrier between the two areas, Faubourg to the east and Griffintown to the west. As a result, despite strong residential growth in the two neighborhoods, the area as a whole has not been as successful.

LAVAL

DOWNTOWN + OLD CITY

LONGUEUIL

Fig. 5.vi.01: Montreal is an island city in southern Quebec.

Autoroute Bonaventure runs just south of downtown and just west of Old City.

E PLAC TURE AVEN BON

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Fig. 5.vi.02: The autoroute is surrounded by two emerging neighborhoods, Faubourg and Griffintown.

The two neighborhoods were first workingclass neighborhoods, settled in the early 20th century by workers at the nearby port.

The Canadian National Railroad viaduct was the first structure to cut through the dense street network, during the 1930s, and this began a decades-long transition in the area, first into a predominately industrial area and later into what the area is today – scattered with surface parking, underutilized industrial parcels, and vacant lots. Over the last decade the area has begun to transition again. Numerous midrise condominiums have been constructed, particularly in Griffintown, and the city is processing building permits that would open the door to many more.

2012

[GRID]

NEW

[GRID]

Fig. 5.vi.04: The autoroute ripped through the historic street network. Left, the street network in the 1930s. Center, the current network.

Right, the proposed network.

system. The freeway brings 4,000 vehicles into and out of the downtown every day, including more than 1,000 daily bus trips in each direction bringing thousands of commuters from the south shore to the city’s main bus terminal.

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REMOVAL DECISION AND PRIOR PLAN The city decided to remove the final kilometer of the freeway in the mid-2000s, when Quebec’s provincial government

transferred ownership of this segment to the city. Quebec still manages the portion of the route between the Champlain Bridge and the Lachine Canal and is investing $50 million in refurbishing the structure.

City officials decided that development potential in its portion of the corridor was worth more than the millions of dollars required to refurbish the freeway. Tearing the structure down aligns well with the city’s development goals, as outlined in its 2004 Master Plan – making the city steadily more bike- and pedestrian-friendly,

The two pieces of infrastructure play an important role in the city’s transportation Fig. 5.vi.03: The expressway is currently a major barrier between Griffintown and Faubourg.

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Fig. 5.vi.05: Griffintown was first settled by workers at the nearby port. Above, the neighborhood in the early 20th century.

Fig. 5.vi.06: The autoroute was built as part of an infrastructurebuilding boom in preparation for Expo ‘67, a world’s fair.

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2012 reconnecting the city with its waterfront, and shifting travelers from singleoccupancy vehicles to its higher-capacity and more environmentally friendly public transportation system.

AVENUE VIGER O

MANSFIELD ST

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PLACE BONAVENTURE

RUE SAINT ANTOINE

The city’s first plan for the area was not well received by the communities immediately surrounding the freeway. Released in 2009, the plan proposed replacing the structure with a pair of four-lane one-way streets on either side of high-rise buildings and public spaces. Bus traffic would run in dedicated lanes along the west side of the rail viaduct, terminating at a ground-level pedestrian space next to a refurbished portion of the viaduct. Community members objected to the scale of proposed development and the noise impacts of the heavy transit traffic on Griffintown. The city went back to the drawing board, and an early version of the new plan, to be released in 2012, scales down the development but expands one of the roadways to five lanes and maintains the bus traffic on the west side of the viaduct.

RUE SAINT-JACQUES

E

RUE NOTRE DAM

RUE DALHOUSIE

RUE SAINT MAURICE

RUE SAINT PAUL

RUE QUEEN

RUE PRINCE

RUE DUKE

RUE NAZARETH

RUE ANN

RUE SHANNON

RUE WILLIAM

RUE OTTAWA

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Fig. 5.vi.07: A new proposal for the Bonaventure corridor, including more than 50 acres of appropriately-scaled development.

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A NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE AUTOROUTE BONAVENTURE Our proposal for the corridor re-knits the historic street network, increases the area’s development potential, protects the neighborhoods from the high-volume public transportation traffic, and scales the entire development to more pedestrianfriendly proportions. Like the city’s plan, the proposal includes a string of development between two one-way roads, but it scales the development to a level more in-line with that of the surrounding neighborhoods and decreases the visual impact of new buildings by stepping higher

17 M

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Fig. 5.vi.08: Section depicting new road configuration.

floors back from the street frontage. The one-way streets – Rue Nazareth running south and Rue Duke running north – are each two lanes wide, a scale appropriate to the urban context. They include dedicated bike lanes and parking lanes, which, coupled with street trees and furniture, shield pedestrians from the psychological impacts of the relatively high-volumes of traffic that would run on these roads.

A central component of the plan is a proposed pair of dedicated bus-rapidtransit lanes, running between Rue Nazareth and the rail viaduct. This alignment would protect Griffintown and Faubourg from the noise and pollution by-products of high volumes of buses while expanding the corridor’s publictransportation capacity. Buses would terminate in a new bus terminal under Place Bonaventure at Rue Saint Antoine, replacing what is currently a dark space under the building and the last segment of the CN rail viaduct. Passageways through or under Place Bonaventure would connect bus travelers to the city’s subway system and the central train station, just to the

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Fig. 5.vi.09: Proposed circulation patterns. Orange: Automobile circulation. Pink: Bus rapid transit circulation.

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north. Buses would also stop at a station part-way down the corridor, where the plan proposes opening up the rail viaduct to street-level development. Parks and development at the southern end of the corridor would create a new visual gateway to the downtown. This proposal would open the area to more than $1 billion in development investment that would yield more than 70,000 square meters of residential, mixed-use, and light industrial uses.

15 m

Fig. 5.vi.10: Height Comparison and Massing Model. Proposed development is scaled in line with the Griffintown and Faubourg neighborhoods on either side of the highway.

Fig. 5.vi.11: The Canadian National railway viaduct, opened to shops and restaurants. Lights, similar to those in other parts of the city, activate the space at night.

BOH + LOFT OFFICE

Fig. 5.vi.13: The viaduct’s footprint would make the full space quite flexible for a variety of uses.

Fig. 5.vi.14: A new BRT station would create a new gateway to Montreal’s downtown and entryway to metro system.

STORE FRONT

Fig. 5.vi.12: The viaduct is a two-story space that would be flexible for a variety of uses, including urban boutiques, restaurants, and food markets.

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CONCLUSIONS The Autoroute Bonaventure corridor presents a great opportunity for Montreal to extend its downtown to the south, create a grand new entrance to city, and channel the city’s strong development pressures into an area rife with potential. The city would be well advised to make sure its proposals are at a scale appropriate to a pedestrian-friendly city context and make adequate accommodations for more ecologically friendly forms of transportation in with an already high level of public transit use. This proposed plan does both, laying the groundwork for strong future growth.

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Fig. 5.vi.15: A proposed public space on the east side of the viaduct, which would reinforce new connections between Griffintown and Faubourg.

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POLICY + RECOMMENDATIONS

WE HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL MOMENT IN THE LIFE OF OUR URBAN HIGHWAYS. The entire interstate system will need to be rebuilt in the next five decades. We need to make sure that we have the policies in place to allow us to critically rethink highways in urban areas.

In order to do this, we need to change the way we think, change our process, and change what we implement.

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THINK

PROCESS

IMPLEMENT

Regionalize Transportation Planning & Implementation

Strengthen EIA Process

Make Funding More Transparent, Equitable, & Sustainable

Change Motor Vehicle Bias

Improve Stakeholder Participation Process

Most governing boards of MPOs currently have a one-jurisdiction/one-vote system. This system should be restructured into a weighted voting system based on population.

1.1 Expand authority of MPOs to make decisions on regional issues.

Transportation planning is done mostly at the municipal and provincial level. Having a regional body that is responsible for planning and funding transportation projects will help insure that the projects meet the needs of various stakeholders.

1.2 Increase authority of MPOs to implement regional transportation projects.

Most MPOs lack the power to implement recommended regional transportation projects.

MPOs should become the implementing agency for regional transportation projects.

1.3 Restructure MPO voting policies to be more representative of the regional population.

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TRANSPORTATION

LAND USE

ENVIRONMENT

ECONOMY

REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLAN Fig. 7.02: Proposed MPO responsibilities.

1. REGIONALIZE TRANSPORTATION PLANNING + IMPLEMENTATION Transportation systems extend beyond political boundaries. When planning for large, crossjurisdictional systems a regional entity can best ensure the equitable, efficient, and sustainable use of these systems.

Federal designation of MPO responsibilities should be expanded to include land use, environment, and the economy within their scope of activities. All MPOs should create a comprehensive regional plan that address expanded responsibilities.

METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION

Link Transportation & Land Use

Fig. 7.01: Proposed policy framework.

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1.4 In Canada, create regional transportation authorities to implement projects.

2. CHANGE MOTOR VEHICLE BIAS IN TRANSPORTATION CULTURE Everyone uses the transportation network but the current transportation culture favors auto usage.

This bias needs to be changed and broadened to include all modes of transportation.

2.1 Change behavior by altering language.

All transportation documents should explicitly state the mode referred to when discussing alterations, improvements, or changes to the transportation system.

2.2 Prioritize reduction of auto-oriented traffic.

Transportation Demand Management (TDM) policies have been successful in reducing the influence of auto-oriented mobility on the structure and development of cities and regions. Reduce unnecessary auto trips through strategies such as telecommuting and flexible work schedules.

2.3 Reinterpret level of service ratings to better reflect needs of urban areas.

Level of service ratings should be applied to all modes of transportation and should be adjusted to better reflect the usage in an urban area.

3. BROADEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT + GIVE IT TEETH The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) currently serves as an advisory document.

The scope of analysis should be expanded and binding.

3.1 Develop baseline requirements for project approval.

EIAs are currently used to inform decision makers of possible environmental impacts.

However, a project may move forward irregardless of the EIA findings. Evaluation

metrics that include specific baseline requirements should be developed. Any project which does not meet these baseline requirements should be rejected in its current state.

3.2 Evaluation should explicitly assess socioeconomic, environmental, health, and transportation impacts.

The Federal DOT, HUD and EPA should develop coordinated evaluation metrics and a threshold requirement to be used to evaluate alternatives.

3.3 Include removal as an alternative during assessment.

Three categories of investment options should always be evaluated against each other in transportation projects: Retain, Modify, Remove.

4. INCLUDE ALL STAKEHOLDERS IN DECISION MAKING All stakeholders should have the responsibility to act as decision makers rather than simply allowing them to participate in the process.

4.1 Provide a framework where stakeholders have direct input into the planning process.

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STAKEHOLDERS IDENTIFIED AND NOTIFIED

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Government/Public Agencies Residents/Users Businesses

PUBLIC MEETINGS

IMPLEMENTATION AGENCY

Fig. 7.04: Proposed public education campaign.

The regional implementing agency oversees the highway reassessment process but does not directly develop plans. It provides a framework for stakeholder groups who will create plans during public meetings. When a plan or series of alternatives is created, the implementation agency will evaluate them through the EIA for implementation.

4.2 Create an independent steering committee.

The independent steering committee acts similar to a board of directors for the project, participating in the planning and implementation process as an mediator between the public and the implementing agency.

4.3 Allow for an iterative process.

An iterative process is the key to a successful project and includes an implementing agency that: 1) manages the process, 2) identifies the stakeholders and 3) provides a framework for constraints/trade-offs to stakeholders.

5. REINFORCE LINKS BETWEEN TRANSPORTATION + LAND USE Transportation and land use are interdependent systems. Our current transportation system and

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land use patterns are unsustainable. Our policies should reconnect them.

INDEPENDENT STEERING COMMITTEE

Public/Implementation Agency Partnership

DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVES

5.1 Increase cross-agency initiatives at all levels of government.

EIA EVALUATION

HUD, DOT, EPA, and DOE should develop crossagency programs to encourage sustainable land use and transportation practices. Funding for them should be funneled through MPOs.

VOTING AND SELECTION

EVAL. FAILURE

Steering Committee can hold additional public meetings to negotiate changes to plan requested by the public or the implementation agency

PROCEED WITH IMPLEMENTATION

5.2 Incentivize the private sector to make sustainable transportation choices.

Encourage employers to consider the availability of transportation options when locating their companies. Individual employers should provide transit incentives that increase the use of all mobility linkages.

5.3 Encourage homeownership in urban areas.

Provide federal tax deduction on home mortgages applied towards urban property.

Encouraging homeowners to relocate into urban areas would reduce auto use in favor of more sustainable transportation options. This would reduce the long-term costs of highway investment.

Fig. 7.03: Proposed stakeholder process.

6. FUNDING SHOULD BE TRANSPARENT, EQUITABLE + SUSTAINABLE The funding and financing of transportation infrastructure should be transparent, reflect the importance of equity for all citizens, and reward sustainable approaches to highway reassessment.

6.1 Explore alternative user fees across all transportation systems.

The fuel tax can no longer cover the cost of maintaining our road network. Raising it and

finding new funding mechanisms are necessary to maintain and improve our infrastructure. All roads, including highways, should be allowed to be tolled. Pollution, congestion, and toll charges can be an effective way of reducing traffic while raising funds for all modes of transportation.

6.2 Publicize the true state and cost of transportation infrastructure.

Current pollution emissions, infrastructure obsolescence dates, and maintenance and rebuilding costs should be publicly highlighted

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FINANCE

FUNDING

PPP: Public-Private Partnerships

Credit Instruments: TIFIA, RRIF Tax Incentives: Tax-Oriented Leasing, Private Activity, Bonds, Tax Credit Bonds, TRIP and State Bonds

Social Impact Bonds

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Fees: Development/Impact Fees, Linkages Fees, Mitigation Fees, Parking Fees, Registration Fees

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A Social Impact Bond is a finance tool that can be used to pay for projects with social benefits.

The social benefits result in government savings that are then used to pay back private investors.

For example, there is research linking childhood asthma rates to proximity to highways. Assuming government savings from a reduction in childhood asthma can be quantified, they could be used to finance the removal of a highway.

Investors buy social impact bonds. This money is then used to pay for the highway removal, which leads to a reduction in childhood asthma rates, thus lowering healthcare costs for the

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government. A portion of that savings are used to pay back the investors.

Through these policy and funding examples, if we can change the way we think, change our process and change what we implement, we can achieve a more sustainable and equitable urban environment.

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Fig. 7.05: Finance + funding toolkit.

and marketed to educate politicians and users about the true costs of driving and to help them consider alternative approaches to transportation.

6.3 Reallocate and share transportation funding with all modes of transportation.

FUNDING/FINANCE TOOL KIT The policy changes outlined above are an important step in implementing a new paradigm for urban transportation. Another important consideration is how we pay for these types of projects. Fig. 7.05 outlines a Funding and Financing Tool Box to help decision-makers.

Urban areas rely on multiple forms of transportation, which is not supported by our current funding structure. Funding should address the diverse transportation needs of metropolitan regions.

SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS One finance mechanism that is new and innovative and has the potential to link the social benefits of highway removal to the physical implementation process is a social impact bond.

PAY BACK SOCIAL IMPACT BOND

SOCIAL BENEFIT ACHIEVED (REDUCTION OF CHILDHOOD ASTHMA)

GOVâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;T SAVINGS (REDUCTION IN HEALTH CARE COSTS) Fig. 7.06: Social impact bonds.

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CONCLUSION

MOVING TOWARDS A NEW VISION FOR CITIES As a massive tab comes due for rebuilding the American and Canadian expressway systems over the next several decades, both governments must avoid blindly investing in the systems as they exist today. Where limited-access highways currently run through the continentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s densest and most sensitive urban areas, the countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; approach to both transportation and urban place-making must change.

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Toronto

New Orleans

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The visions laid out in this book show what can happen when we shift from focusing exclusively on the efficient movement of automobiles to showing equal respect to users of all modes.

This report has reinforced the already voluminous evidence that expressways harm the city neighborhoods through which they run, slicing through neighborhoods, dumping pollutants on nearby residents, and creating urban dead spaces. Hopefully, it has also shown the possibilities inherent in an alternate future for the continent’s cities – one in which public investments align with a broader vision of urban equity, sustainability, and vibrancy.

In Washington, D.C., such a shift would re-knit the city’s historic urban fabric and restore the vision of the city’s visionary planner, where the Southeast/ Southwest Freeway currently separates people of different races and income levels and mars view-sheds toward the city’s grand architectural masterpieces and monuments. In Toronto, removing the Gardiner Expressway would reopen the city’s waterfront to activity, where residents are currently walled off from the natural amenity. In New Orleans, contextappropriate modifications to the Claiborne Expressway structure would support rich

cultural connections and allow for new kinds economic development. In the Bronx, removing the Sheridan Expressway would open space for much-needed affordable housing and new connections to a neglected river. In New Haven, removing the Oak Street Connector and proceeding with a structured and phased development process would catalyze development in what is currently a weak market. And in Montreal, removing the Autoroute Bonaventure and focusing development around a heretofore underutilized piece of linear infrastructure would connect two rapidly developing neighborhoods, reinforcing strong trends.

In all of these places, highway builders erected limited-access freeways during a time of single-minded focus on moving as many automobiles as possible as quickly as possible into urban areas. Today’s public leaders must not repeat their mistakes. Instead, they must chart a new course – one that benefits people of all backgrounds, conserves resources, and helps cities do what they have historically done best: Bring economic actors into close proximity, provide ladders of opportunity to immigrants and low-income communities, and foster cultural ferment that drives our society forward.

This vision is within reach, but it requires a shift in public consciousness, strong political leadership, and a realingnment of national priorities. These visionary proposals, in concert with the window of opportunity presented by aging and obsolete infrastructure and the growing interest in urban vibrancy, provide a catalyst for reimagining urban expressways.

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New York

New Haven

Montreal

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CREDITS 1. INTRODUCTION

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Fig. 2.22- Wikipedia, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Trans_Canada_Highway_BC.jpg Fig. 2.23- Skyscraper City, http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=652035&page=5

3. CASE STUDIES + ALTERNATIVES Cover Photo: www.pauldorpat.com

Cover Photo: Flickr User: eblaser

Fig. 3.01 – Skanska USA, Big Dig Construction, Skanska.com

Fig. 1.01 – ”Seattle Now & Then: We Come in Peace.” June 4, 2011. http://pauldorpat.com/

Fig. 3.02 – Ryan, David L, “Big Dig Before and After,” The Boston Globe, January 3, 2010

Fig. 1.02 – “View Live Traffic Cams.” http://trafficlook.com/.

Fig. 3.03 – West 8, Madrid Rio, www.west8.nl/projects/madrid_rio/

Fig. 1.03 – Brenda. “Dallas’ Deck Park Receives Additional $9 Million in Donations.” February 25, 2011. http://www.homespricedtosell.com/

Fig. 3.04 – Ryan, David L, “Big Dig Before and After,” The Boston Globe, January 3, 2010 Fig. 3.05 – Office of James Burnett, Woodall Rodgers Park, http://www.ojb.com/projects/#/woodall-rodgers

2. HISTORY Williams, Jonathan, “Paying at the Pump: Gasoline Taxes in America,” Tax Foundation, Number 56, October 2007. Pg 1-20.

U.S Dept. of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, “Fact Sheets on Highway Provisions,” SAFETEA-LU Section Title XI; 4121. http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/safetealu/factsheets/ htft.htm (last accessed Jan 17, 2012).

Fig. 3.06 – Williams, Shawn , “Woodall Rodgers Park receives $9 Million in private donations”, The Dallas South News, May 2, 2012 Fig. 3.07 – Archer Western Contractors, Woodall Rogers Deck Park Bridge, http://texas.construction.com/texas_construction_projects/2010/0601_WoodallRogers.asp, June 3, 2011 Fig. 3.08 – Kamin, Blair, “Ohio highway cap at forefront of urban design trend” Chicago Tribune, October 27, 2011 Fig. 3.09 – LMN Architects, 5 Principles for Renewing Seattle’s Waterfront, lmnarchitects.com

Wachs, Martin, “A Quiet Crisis in Transportation Finance: Options for Texas,” RAND Corporation Testimony Series, April 2006. Pg 1- 19.

Fig. 3.10 – Washington Department of Transportation, www.alaskanwayviaduct.org, August 19, 2010

Sugrue, Thomas J., The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit, 6.

Fig. 3.11 – Washington Department of Transportation, www.alaskanwayviaduct.org, August 19, 2010

Bluestone, Barry,“Deindustrialization and Plant Closure,” Deindustrialization and PlantClosure. Eds. Holly E. Brown, and Paul D. Staudohar, Lexington: D.C. Health andCompany, 1987.

Print.

Fig. 3.12 – Staten Vergsvesen, Bygatene i Bjørvika, http://www.vegvesen.no/Vegprosjekter/Bjorvika/Bygatene

Strom, Elizabeth A., and John H, Mollenkopf, Eds. The Urban Politics Reader. New York: Routledge, 2007. Print. 158.

Fig. 3.14 – Oklahoma City Planning Department, Core to Shore Plan, http://www.okc.gov/planning/coretoshore/index.html

Mollenkopf, John, A Phoenix in the Ashes: The Rise and Fall of the Koch Administration in New York City Politics Princeton University Press, 1992, 61.

Fig. 3.15 – Oklahoma City Interstate 40, Oklahoma Department of Tranportation

Glaeser, Edward, “What a City Needs,” The New Republic online. Published 9/4/2009. Accessed 1/17/12. http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/what-city-needs?page=0,1.

Fig. 3.16 – 40 Forward, Oklahoma’s I-40 Crosstown Expressway, http://www.40forward.com/

Project for Public Spaces, “Jane Jacobs – Biography,” Accessed 1/17/12. http://www.pps.org/articles/jjacobs-2/.

Fig. 3.17 – Oklahoma City Planning Department, Core to Shore Plan, http://www.okc.gov/planning/coretoshore/index.html

Preservation Institute, http://www.preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysEmbarcadero.html

Fig. 3.18 – The Embarcadero Freeway, San Francisco History Center, San Francisco Public Library

Mohl, Raymond, “Stop the Road: Freeway Revolts in American Cities,” Journal of Urban History, vol. 30, no. 5, July 2004, 674-706.

Fig. 3.19 – Ryer, Richard, Trolley Tracks, Embarcadero, San Francisco, California, http://www.panoramio.com/photo/2532051

Baum-Snow, Nathan. Did Highways Cause Suburbanization? from the Quarterly Journal of Economics. May 2007. pp. 16.

Fig. 3.20 – Nishioka, Kyle, “Seoul tears down an urban highway and the city can breathe again”, Grist, http://grist.org/infrastructure/

Goodwin ,Ron. Race Issues @ suite101. Suburbanization and the American Dream. Apr 9, 2009. http://ron-goodwin.suite101.com/suburbanization-and-the-american-dreama108390.

Fig. 3.21 – Hobbs, Thomas Locke, http://www.thomaslockehobbs.com/2005_06_26_archive.html

Freeman, Tyson. National Real Estate Investor Online. The 1950s: Post-War America Hitches Up and Heads for the ‘Burbs. Sep 30, 1999. http://nreionline.com/mag/real_estate_postwar_america_hitches/ Dr. Rodriguez, Jean-Paul. The Geography of Transport Systems. The Interstate Highway System. http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/map_interstatesystem.html.

Hall, Peter. 1998. Cities in Civilization. Random House. The City as Freeway: LosAngeles 1900-1980.Neil Smith. Gentrification, the Frontier, and the Restructuring of Urban Space.

Title image- Cov blogs, http://covblogs.com/eatingbark/archives/2008/11/ Cover Photo: www.eriecanal.org Fig. 2.01- Walk Forest Walk Blog, http://walkforrestwalk.blogspot.com/2010_04_01_archive.html Fig. 2.02- Forest History, http://www.foresthistory.org/education/Curriculum/activity/activ3/act3es.html Fig. 2.03- Josh Brown, http://www.joshbrownnyc.com/hayes/seeingboom&bust.htm Fig. 2.04- Bike Delaware, http://www.bikede.org/2012/03/05/upcoming-commuter-classes/ Fig. 2.05- Bold Ride, http://www.boldride.com/ride/1912/ford-model-t-touring

Fig. 3.13 – Oklahoma City Interstate 40, Oklahoma Department of Tranportation

Fig. 3.22 – Fried, Ben, “Cartoon Tuesday: Paint the Pavement… on the Elevated Highway,” Streetsblog.org, http://www.streetsblog org/category/cities/brazil/

4. FRAMEWORK Cover Photo: www.vintageportland.files.wordpress.com

5. SIX CITIES I. WASHINGTON, DC. Fig. 5.i.05 – District Department of Transportation Fig. 5.i.05 – NCPC Monumental core framework plan

Fig. 2.06- Amazing Stories, http://www.awesomestories.com/assets/lowell-stacks

II. TORONTO

Fig. 2.07- US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/06mar/07.cfm

Environmental Assessment Terms of Reference, Sept. 2009, Waterfront Toronto, http://www.nanosresearch.com/WaterfrontTO/library/EA%20Terms%20of%2 Reference.pdf

Fig. 2.08- Dipity, http://www.dipity.com/ctownsley/Expansion-and-Industrialization/

Cover Photo: Waterfront Toronto, http://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/image_galleries/central_waterfront/?12582

Fig. 2.09- Skyscraper City, http://forum.skyscraperpage.com/showthread.php?t=167666&page=16 Fig. 2.10- Aaron Evodesign Blog, http://aaron-evodesign.blogspot.com/2011_07_01_archive.html

Fig. 4.ii.03 – CBS News Toronto, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/story/2011/11/09/big-fix-gardiner.html

Fig. 2.11- Constructing Urbanism, http://constructingurbanism.com/2011/12/ Fig. 2.12- Tropolism, http://www.tropolism.com/2006/10/stuy_town_and_peter_cooper_vil_1.php Fig. 2.13- Dynamic NYC Tours, http://www.dynamicnyctours.com/ Fig. 2.14- Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/bps/media-view/136546/1/0/0 Fig. 2.15- Seattle PI, http://blog.seattlepi.com/thebigblog/2010/01/04/what-was-seattles-most-disruptive-construction-project/ Fig. 2.16- Public Art Green Art, http://www.publicartgreenart.com/green-art-at-millenium-park.html Fig. 2.17- One More Cyclist, http://onemorecyclist.wordpress.com/ Fig. 2.18- Peopling Places, http://peoplingplaces.wordpress.com/2010/11/15/a-constructive-takeover-of-milwaukee-avenue/ Fig. 2.19- The Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan, http://esask.uregina.ca/entry/trans-canada_highway.html Fig. 2.20- Vancouver Sun, http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/features/hosedatthepumps/storyimage.html?id=36e2d45d-9628-4b23-a520-5fe17d4267fc&img=aaffddde-c71a49d1-852b-d442b5f4bdf8&path=%2Fvancouversun%2Ffeatures%2Fhosedatthepumps%2F Fig. 2.21- Transport Canada, http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/mediaroom/backgrounders-b04-r009e-1628.htm

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III. NEW YORK New York State Department of Transportation, Traffic Data Viewer, https://www.dot.ny.gov/tdv.

Goranson, Kum S, Jasek J, and Kerker B, “New York City Community Health Survey Atlas,” New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 2007.

Thurston, George D., Ariel Spira-Cohen, and Lung Chen, “South Bronx Environmental Health Policy Study,” NYU School of Medicine Research, February 2007.

Angotti, Tom, “Community Land Trusts and Low-Income Multifamily Rental Housing: The Case of Cooper Square, New York City,” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2007.

Hunts Point Vision Plan, City of New York, 2003.

New York State Department of Transportation, “Bruckner Sheridan Interchange and Commercial Access to Hunts Point Peninsula,” https://www.dot.ny.gov/regional-offices/region11/ projects/project-repository/bese/index.html Industco Holdings, LLC, “Cortona Park East/West Farms Rezoning Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),” 2011.

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IV. NEW ORLEANS “BioDistrict New Orleans” website and master plan http://biodistrictneworleans.org/ Brooks, Walter and Lynn Dupont. New Orleans Regional Planning Commission, Interview. 8 March 2012 Choice Neighborhoods New Orleans. http://www.ibervilletreme.org/ City of New Orleans. “Claiborne Corridor Plan: Leveraging Infrastructure to Build Inter-parish Access and Equity” DOT TIGER II planning grant request. 2010 http://media.nola.com/ politics/other/New%20Orleans%20HUD%20DOT%20proposal%20-%20Claiborne%20Corridor%20Plan%5B1%5D.pdf Davis, Jack. Trustee, National Trust for Historic Preservation. Interview 9 March, 2012 Fauria, Vaughn R. President, New Corp, Inc. Interview 9 March 2012.

Friends of Lafitte Corridor. “Vision Plan” 2007. http://folc-nola.org/greenway/master-plan/ Gilchrist, William. Director of Place-based Planning, City of New Orleans, Interview. 8 March 2012 Kelly, James. Boardmember, Providence Community Housing. 9 March 2012 Krupa, Michelle. “’Hospitality zone’ taxes on downtown meals, hotel rooms proposed” New Orleans Times-Picayune. 17 April 2012. http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/04/ hospitality_zone_taxes_on_down.html The National Urban League. http://www.nul.org/who-we-are/executive-leadership/executive-staff Renne, John L. and MURP 4062 Applied Techniques for Transportation Planning. “New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study: A University of New Orleans Analysis of Best Practices and Public Opinion” University of New Orleans. 2011. http://transportation.uno.edu/publications/ Smart Mobility, Inc. and Waggonner & Ball Architects. “Restoring Claiborne Avenue: Alternatives for the Future of Claiborne Avenue” 2010. http://www.cnu.org/ Tate, Jonathan. Adjunct Assistant Professor of Architecture, Tulane University. Interview. 10 March 2012 Tishman, Maggie. Coordinator, NEWCITY Neighborhood Partnership. Interview. 9 March 2012.

Fig. 5.iv.04 – www.nola.com Fig. 5.iv.06 – www.gonola.com Fig. 5.iv.10 – www.spegielonline.com

V. NEW HAVEN “Background and History.” Route 34 New Haven Downtown Crossing. 12 July 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2012. http://downtowncrossingnewhaven.com/ Downtown Crossing: Tiger II Grant Application. Rep. City of New Haven, 2010. Print.

Fig. 5.v.01 – Route 34 New Haven Downtown Crossing. 12 July 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2012

VI. MONTREAL “Evolution du secteur et principes de reconstruction urbaine.” Societie du Havre de Montreal. 2009.

Sainte-Marie, Pierre. Societie du Havre de Montreal. Interview Feb. 2012.

Societe du Havre de Montreal. 2009 Fig. 5.vi.05 “History” http://havremontreal.qc.ca/en/index.php/le-harve/histoire Societe du Havre de Montreal Fig. 5.vi.06 http://www.arch.mcgill.ca/prof/castro/arch673/winter2010/photos/1960s_expo/ McGill University

6. POLICY + RECOMMENDATIONS

Diana Lind Dan Muroff David Seltzer Ian Lockwood

Peter Park Peter Angelides Ashwin Balakrishnan Thomas Deller

Alex Krieger Wig Zamore John Landis Kate Daniel

BILL DOWD + KENNETH WALTON, National Capitol Planning Commission

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ADVISORS WASHINGTON D.C.

Cover Photo: www.sf-planning.org

CHRIS GLAISEK, WATERFRONToronto

7. CONCLUSION Cover Photo: Flickr User: Tom Williamson

TAWKIYAH JORDAN + ERICK GREGORY, New York City Department of City Planning WILLIAM GILCHRIST, City of New Orleans - Place-Based Planning WALTER BROOKS, Regional Planning Commission-New Orleans KARYN GILVARG, New Haven City Plan Department PIERRE SAINTE-MARIE, Société du Havre de Montréal

100

TORONTO NEW YORK NEW ORLEANS NEW HAVEN MONTRÉAL

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[re] imagining urban expressways