THE
CHANGING WAYS THE U.S. MAKES
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS on research by
J E A N GA L B R A I T H Assistant Professor of Law
JEAN GALBRAITH
“From the vantage point of constitutional law, the rise of myriad paths for making international commitments amounts to an unvarnished win for presidential power.”
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The only way the Constitution specifies for the United States to enter into international commitments is through the Treaty Clause, yet, today, international commitments are commonly reached in other ways. In a forthcoming article, Penn Law’s Jean Galbraith explores the multiple avenues for the United States to make international commitments. She shows that checks and balances on these multiple pathways come not just from constitutional law, but also from international law and administrative law. Galbraith is a scholar of U.S. foreign relations law and public international law. Her article “From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations Law” is forthcoming in the University of Chicago Law Review. Her work focuses on the allocation of legal authority among U.S. governmental actors and, at the international level, between domestic actors and international regimes. The Constitution’s Treaty Clause requires approval from two-thirds of the Senate, which is a difficult hurdle to clear and gives a small group of Senators a large amount of influence. As a result, presidents have sought to make international commitments through other means. Of the New Start treaty on arms control, the Basel III accords on international financial regulation, the Iran deal on nuclear non-proliferation, and the Paris Agreement on climate change — which were all joined during the Obama Administration — only the New Start treaty went through the process outlined by the Treaty Clause. Scholars of foreign relations law typically focus on questions of constitutional law in studying the making of international commitments. Because of this, they overlook ways in which other bodies of law — especially international and administrative law — affect the processes by which international commitments are made. As an example, Galbraith describes how the international legal order both supports the use of “soft law commitments” — formal political undertakings like the Iran deal that are not binding under international law — and cabins their reach. In addition to international law, administrative law affects how the United States engages in international commitments through the crucial role played by executive branch agencies and independent agencies in the negotiation and implementation of international commitments.
