Is Gender Identity Disorder an Appropriate Psychiatric Diagnosis? Taking Sides- Critical Analysis Olivia Thompson 10/18/2012
The topic described in issue seven entitled, “Is ‘Gender Identity Disorder’ an Appropriate Psychiatric Diagnosis?”, summarizes controversial issues concerning the classification of transgendered and transsexual identity in the ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (henceforth referred to as the DSM). ‘Gender Identity Disorder’, GID, describes the diagnosis of disconnect between mind and body in which a person’s physiologically gender does not pair correctly with their intrinsic perspective of themselves. Two scholars take differing stances on this topic but, are not completely opposing. Both Mercedes Allen and Kelley Winters agree on the negative connotation of labeling transgendered people with a classifiable medical disorder. Their disagreement comes from the question of how to most effectively benefit the medical needs of the transgendered community. Allen believes in keeping the current DSM classification because of current medical issues that transgendered people face. Allen argues the need for having a medical label for transitioning transgendered people to fall under, in order to justify medical coverage from insurance companies. Winters pushes a need for reclassification, and argues that the stigma associated with the medically accepted terms of Gender Identity Disorder dramatically inhibits the progression of medical rights and coverage for transgendered people. Mercedes Allen argues issue seven on the ‘yes’ side in her article, “Destigmatization Versus Coverage and Access: The Medical Model of Transsexuality”. The medial necessities of transgendered people are so significant that by actually removing GID from the DSM, Allen believes that it will effectively, “do far more harm than good”( Allen, 2008). Allen does not discuss any other sources for medical classifications of transgendered people, only the listing in the DSM. Allen thinks that despite the unfortunate social implication of categorizing ‘transgender’ as a medical disorder, the label is imperative for medical coverage. She further reemphasizes her argument through inductive reasoning that there is no currently updated model for reclassification for the medical coverage of
transgendered people. Allen’s overall argument is a valid deductive argument with unsound premises. Her argument is valid because if the first premise were true, that one, transgendered people have critical medical needs directly related to their transgender identity; along with the second premise, that the DSM’s classification of GID directly effects whether transgendered people will be able to receive coverage, then the conclusion must be true, that without the Gender Identity Disorder classification in the DSM transgendered people risk losing all medical coverage. Allen often uses non sequitur informal fallacies while failing to trace her arguments within her larger argument. She begins detailing her argument by bringing up a common false analogy that she often sees as a counter argument to her argument. In concern to the social stigmatization that the DSM brings to transgendered people, many often compare homosexuals to transgendered people. In Allen’s first premise she explains that homosexuals were once classified in the DSM, and have since been removed. Her second premise is that by removing homosexuality as a disorder, it has since been more accepted and in conclusion transgendered people will find the same acceptance once their identity is not associated with a disorder. This argument is a strong but uncogent inductive argument that calls to the appeal of logos with the informal fallacy of a ‘false analogy’ because homosexuals do not have the same medical needs at transgendered people. (University core a, 2010) Allen calls to the appeal of pathos while she implements a correlation between the necessities of Transgendered medical coverage and the suicidal thoughts that occur because of the disconnect between body and mind. This notion of suicide is appealing to ‘stirring symbols, an argument to the people’(University core a, 2010). She inserts personal bias throughout but because of her fallacious appeal to false authority using her status as a transgendered identifying person she calls to the appeal of ethos. The bias, often times decreases the validity of her deductive arguments and creates a subjectivity that should not be present in an argument concerning facts on medical issues. Her ideas are typically very broad with ‘hasty generalizations’ and jump from point to point with ‘non sequitur’
and varied arguments within a certain topic. (University core a, 2010). Others may gain a sense of her perspective because of her constant appeal to pathos while trying to gain pity by showcasing issues, such as the problems that transgendered people face with public restrooms, or how difficult getting coverage medically, “even with the DSM-iv”(Allen, 2008.), classifying their need for treatment. In stating that it is difficult even despite the DSM calling for treatment, in which the treatment is surgery, Allen does not realize that she is essentially contradicting her argument by recognizing that the DSM does not provide any significant aid in the medical benefits for transgendered people anyway. This argument is weak and inductive because Allen has no premises for her conclusion of the overall importance of GID classification in the DSM, creating a non sequitur fallacy. Allen has displayed a definitive stance on her position but has failed to see that the obvious necessity for a reclassification of the GID in the DSM. Allen offers up Canada’s medical model, and while still emotionally driven, the disorganization of premises in relation to conclusions makes it less of an argument and more of an opinionated explanation. Her very first premise of this particular argument is that even though many complain people about paying extra taxes for transgendered medical coverage, why would anyone choose to have a, “sex change” if it was not important or necessary. This premise is non sequitur; it does not follow her previous comment about taxes at all and was simply inserted to divert the attention of the reader. The preceding premise explains that psychologically it is necessary to align body with mind because of the hasty generalization that transgendered people are constantly, “borderline suicidal” (Allen 2008). Every mention of risk of suicide is the deliberate call to the appeal of pathos. The conclusion of this argument is that the medical community recognizes these psychological factors, which is why GRS (genital reassignment surgery or SRS , sex reassignment surgery) is the, “recognized treatment” (Allen 2008). Previously and subsequently however, Allen states that it is difficult to get coverage anyway. The contradiction creates a counteracting deductive argument, especially because the premises are not only flawed but
illogical and unsound in relation to the conclusion. Opposing, Kelley Winters argues in her article, “GID Reform Advocates: Issues of GID Diagnosis for Transsexual Women and Men”. Winters uses a strong and cogent inductive overall argument, using the first premise that, “the DSM is regarded as the medical and social definition of mental disorder throughout North America”(Winters 2007.), and second true premise that GID is a disorder in the DSM. With these two premises, the reader can conclude inductively that transgendered people are stigmatized, associated socially and medically with a, “psychosexual disorder”(Winters 2007). While looking to further understand the validity in diagnosing this identity as a disorder, Winters emphasizes that if the diagnosis lied in the, “distress for those born in incongruent bodies or forced to live in wrong gender roles” (Winters 2007), then perhaps the diagnosis would be valid. But according to Winters, that since the DSM remains offensive and ambiguous, the diagnosis as a disorder is detrimental to transgendered people. Throughout Winter’s article, specific sources and examples used directly from the APA (American Psychological Association) build a stronger overall inductive argument by showing more evidence to strengthen the cogent premises that she sticks with throughout. By displaying the offensive terms in which North America categorizes a whole group of people in a negative light and inconsistent gendered terminology, it strengthens the argument that this directly socializes and conditions people into having certain ideals of transsexuals that are negative. By this point she can make the strong inductive argument that in conclusion to the, “misaligning terminology” (Winters 2007), the classification is not actually aiding them in medical coverage, but deterring them as insurance companies continue to drop sex reassignment surgery (SRS) coverage. Winter’s called to the appeal of logos in this argument however, with the informal fallacy of ‘post hoc, ergo propter hoc’, (University core a, 2010), by making a casual relationship between the negative classification of GID and insurance companies dropping SRS coverage.
Overall Winter’s had a stronger argument especially with the use of examples and sources directly from the APA, notably, Winter’s article was also taken from GIDreform.org which appears to be an organization website run by Kelley Winter’s herself. Allen did not draw from any sources and her article was taken from a ‘Wordpress’ blog account. Allen’s article was packed with informal fallacy and used less inductive reasoning to prove her thesis and overall goal of argument. Altogether Allen had the weaker argument of the two.
References Allen, M. (2008). Destigmatization versus coverage and access: The medical model of transsexuality. Retrieved from http://dentedbluemercedes.wordpress.com/2008/04/05/destigmatization-versuscoverage-and-access-the-medical-model-of-transsexuality/ Allen, M. (2012). Taking Sides: Clashing Views in Human Sexuality. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Winters, K. (2007). Gid reform advocates. Retrieved from http://gidreform.org/GID30285a.pdf Winters, K. (2012). Taking Sides: Clashing Views in Human Sexuality. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. (2010). University core a handbook. Boston, MA: Pearson Learning Solutions.