Moses - A Legacy of Impacts on New York

MOSES A LEGACY OF IMPACTS ON NEW YORK OLIVER BALDOCK. MARCH 2015. 0536E.

Oliver Baldock Christ's College

Essay Title Jane Jacobs’ campaign to halt the destruction of her Greenwich Village neighbourhood placed her in direct opposition to the planning initiatives of Robert Moses through the 1950’s and ‘60’s. Using specific examples, discuss the effect of Moses’s projects on the physical development and social transformation of Manhattan and the surrounding New York Boroughs.

Essay Section C Word Count 2036

Jane Jacobs’ campaign to halt the destruction of her Greenwich Village neighbourhood placed her in direct opposition to the planning initiatives of Robert Moses through the 1950’s and ‘60’s. Using specific examples, discuss the effect of Moses’s projects on the physical development and social transformation of Manhattan and the surrounding New York Boroughs.

Robert Moses is the subject of much of American Urban Theory regarding his role in the history of New York and the constant battles his work brought. Robert Moses was responsible for both the destruction and construction of modern New York and this essay will discuss how his projects affected the city physically and socially, but also that Moses was not solely responsible for the projects that took place whether good or bad, despite the opinions of his toughest critic, Robert Caro.

Moses's projects brought about two public opinions. The first, advocated in Caro's aptly named book, 'The Power Broker and the Fall of New York', is the destruction that 'tore out the hearts of a score of neighbourhoods' [Caro, 1974] through constructions such as the Cross-Bronx Express-way.

The other, is the awe at Moses's work in pushing through plans which were held up in bureaucracy before Moses became Park Commissioner. Caro appears to ignore this argument and indeed, the context in which Moses brought his projects to New York. As the city's population fell by almost a million between 1950 and 1975, all over America, public officials were fearing suburbanisation following the increasing accessibility to automobiles from the 1920s. New York and it's infrastructure were in decline as it headed into the 1950s. [Jackson, 2008] It was not until the 1970's that city saw a turnaround with improvements in the legal system, infrastructure and the influx of foreign immigration. Jackson also notes that 'whatever the cause of the New York turnaround, it would not have been possible without Robert Moses'.

Both arguments provide insights into a 'gifted public servant who had mastered the Art of Getting Things Done' [Garvin, 2003]. However, Richard Wade argues, that whilst Moses was a pioneer, the 'physical shape of urban America would no doubt look very much the same whether Moses had lived or not.' [Wade, 1974]. This suggests that change for the city was inevitable and even Moses was subject to the 'prevailing tides of history'. Until the1940s Moses represented a public figure in the government, creating public beaches, swimming pools, parks, bridges and parkways. This was the era of the automobile, where the mornings could be spent in the city and afternoons on the beaches [Teaford, 2008]. The second half of the century, however, began to see a disillusionment in technology. Automobiles had made mass movement easy, but brought pollution, and in New York 1

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the excitement of 1933's 'New Deal', a program of relief, recovery and reform, had waned, and Americans were ready to find their villain. Wall Street and the Great Depression were in the past.

The 1972 Watergate Scandal, turned the eyes of the public to toppling high officials.

During the second half of the century, the controversy of Moses's projects started to combine with a new discomfort surrounding the power of high officials to begin the rejection of top-down planning.

Moses was behind the times in both his love of the car and his methods of construction. Teaford notes the coming of a new democracy in the 1960s, with 'the right of a fragment of the city, [specifically Jane Jacobs and fellow activists], to thwart the will of those who represented the majority of the electorate'. The change in public feeling was felt all over America, but so were projects such as Moses's. Los Angeles built nine hundred miles of highways, almost double that of New York, in the same period. In fact, Moses was not as quick to tear down slums as those in Detroit, New Haven or White Plains, nor did they begin to feel the 'renaissance' [Jackson, 2008] that New York experienced in 1975, just a year after Caro's harrowing report, turning New York into the social and economic hub of today.

Caro implies that Robert Moses was racist. So was most of America for well into the second half of the century. The question is whether his prejudices affected his work. Moses always had the approval of the city's liberal establishment [Jackson, 2008] and his prominent decision to place swimming pools in both the white and black areas of Harlem, rather than integrating them was supported by ongoing racial conflicts and the riot of 1935. Moses felt no duty to help the communities integrate, instead using the 1896 US Supreme Court Law of 'Separate but Equal' to create two similar pools with identical mechanical systems, subduing Caro's claims that cold water was used to dissuade black communities from using the facilities. As Eisenstadt stated, 'Moses didn't really care who went to any pool, but did not feel it was his responsibility to change local [attitudes]'. Similarly, the local mayor, La Guardia, promised on the opening day that both communities would receive equal treatment [New York Times, 1936]. This was an important statement in a community were ethnicities were in constant flux and reinforced Moses's unity with the government.

The media, however, did not reflect such ideas. Local news and issues of Architectural Record [1941 – See Gutman], whilst talking highly of a 'city centre for all year use', chose only a selection of Gottscho's photographs from the opening day, filling the article with images of a white majority used pool rather than Gottscho's images of a mixed used pool from children of the Italian, Porto Rican and black communities. Despite a successful start of communal use by the children, the 2

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Italians, who lived closest to the pool, would not tolerate the Porto Ricans, and the black community were resentful of white intrusion. Moses's response to it questioned, 'what could be done about it? Policing could not solve the problem … since the most flagrant acts were committed outside of the park area' [Moses, 1938]. One man and his use of architecture could do little to change a community by itself. Forces far greater than Moses were needed if this community was to integrate.

The abolition of child labour and a move towards universal education meant that childhood became more focused on being a child. These baths provided a level of social interaction and engagement in the community that ultimately, thirty years later, would topple Moses from his power as the voice of these communities were heard. However, at this point, Moses was a fan of community engagement, promoting John Wagner's 'Learn to Swim Campaign' [Wagner, 1940], which, unlike other American cities where whites were preying on 'racist fears of body contact, dirt, disease and adolescent sexuality' [Gutman,2008], promoted the use of the pools by every ethnicity and every gender. This was the government's and Moses's imagery of a segregated but equal community. Tensions still existed but, in Moses's work at least, the infrastructure was standardised and provided equally and quickly across New York.

The same sensitivity cannot be seen in projects such as the Cross-Bronx Express-way. Built between 1948 and 1972, public opinion was turning against Moses, and there is truth in Caro's claim that it tore apart not only the neighbourhood of East Tremont, but the construction process and resulting traffic also severely affected the surrounding streets . Undoubtedly, the process of 'slum' clearances, which joined the construction of the express-way, encouraged the white flight movement that could be seen in most American cities with a significant black population. Moses's provision of infrastructure allowed easy access to the suburbs for those who could afford cars, at a time when property investment was becoming more popular. The East Tremont neighbourhood was left in the hands of the poorer citizens and immigrants who could barely afford to make use of Moses's express-way. This section of the express-way, a trench, became what Wendy Pullan defines as a 'thin boundary,' meaning it provides no 'capacity for movement, diversity and spontaneity', instead only there to divide a city. East Tremont, as well as other areas that Moses's projects destroyed, could be seen as a sacrifice for the future success of New York. However, are Moses's contributions so clear cut? As Rick Bell suggests, 'his legacy is more complicated' [Powell, 2007].

Moses's attitude is uncompromising. When James Lyons; President of the Bronx Borough at the start of the express-way's construction, and a 'reasonable community opposition [advocated] a 3

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superior route' through Crotona Park which would affect only 19 families, Bromley states that the decision was 'callously defeated' by Moses, because it seems, that route would have affected some powerful acquaintances, including, according to Arthur Nersesian, his brother [Nersesian, 2008]. A similar attitude is seen when Moses moved the Northern State Parkway three miles and curved it to protect the estates of well-connected landowners, including Otto Kahn, whilst he had no qualms about splitting the working farm of James Roth [Gratz, 2011]. A further half a mile would have protected Roth's farm from failing, but the decision had been made.

Kaufman suggests that 'Caro ascribes to Moses much that doubtless would have happened anyway' [Kaufmann, 1975] and Bromley continues to argue that if the Express-way was the only cause of the crisis in East Tremont then why didn't East Tremont North, an area outside the effects of the Express-way, continue as a 'smaller, but still vibrant' neighbourhood', instead of declining.

[Bromley, 1998] There are other historical and cultural factors which caused major shifts in East Tremont's population. The express-way caused a sharp decline in the 1950s but the 1960's gentrification caused a sharp rise as housing projects were undertaken in line with Moses's dislike of slums.

Other factors outside of Moses's control defined the positioning of the Express-way. Bromley mentions that if the George Washington Bridge, already under construction as Moses planned this project, had been 'six miles further north... or further south', the two existing Express-ways could have borne the traffic load., negating the need for the Cross-Bronx Express-way. Jill Jonnes also suggests that local disputes, such as that concerning Crotona Park, prevented the rethinking of the entire project [Jonnes, 2002]. Moses, despite Caro's words, was not unstoppable, he was, however, an effective 'speed demon' [Lyon, 1936] who was at the forefront of an American movement towards change. Moses had a 'disregard for the will of the fragment as opposed to the people as a whole'[Teaford, 2008]. At the time, with little faith in public officials, this brought him 'public damnation', but as the costs of Moses's work are forgotten, his grand vision and effectiveness are becoming enviable traits with many in New York calling for a new Robert Moses.

To conclude, it's argued that Robert Moses was responsible for both the death of neighbourhoods and the current success of New York; the two are not mutually exclusive. However, to argue either in isolation without understanding the history and culture of New York at the time of Moses's 'reign' is, in Kaufman's words, '[giving Moses] the proportions of a colossus' [Kaufman, 1975]. Without the infrastructure that Moses pushed through the bureaucracy, the city would not have been ready for it's rise into the twenty-first century. Teaford acknowledges that his actions were well within the 4

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legal and structural constraints of the American government, but without a man who can transgress the red tape that held many in government back, New York would be stuck with the 'selfish “Not in My Backyard” opposition of a neighbourhood spokesperson [who] paralyses public policy aimed at enhancing the city as a whole' [Teaford, 2008]. This view is pessimistic of the bottom-up planning method pushed by Jane Jacobs in her battles with Moses, but half a century on, and in a current climate where proposals stagnate and there are calls for a new Robert Moses to arrive, it's hard to disagree with him. Such methods are insensitive to the communities on a smaller scale, and Moses destroyed more than a few, but in his and the government's creation of countless parks and pools, there is a recognition of equality. Many of the articles and writings mentioned in this essay, ironically note that many of the parks and pools originally created to facilitate a more affluent community are now part of the poorer areas of the modern city. Population and the relationships between communities change. Moses recognised both this and the futility of attempting to change the result of hundreds of years of history. Moses, after all, despite government backing, was just one man.

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Bibliography Bromley, R. 1998. Not So Simple! Caro, Moses and the Impact of the Cross-Bronx Expressway.

Bronx County Historical Society Journal. Vol. 35. No. 1. 4-29 Caro, R. 1974. The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York. USA: Random House.

Various Pages.

Garvin, A. 2003. The Second Coming of Moses. Cambridge & New York. 3: Cities.

Gottscho, S. 1939. Entrance section, boys waiting ,Betsy Head Play Center. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/gsc1994013640/PP/. Accessed 16 March 15.

Gratz, R. 2011. The Battle for Gotham: New York in the Shadow of Robert Moses. Nation Books.

125.

Gutman, M. 2008. Race, Place and Play: Robert Moses and the WPA Swimming Pools in New York City. University California Press. Society of Architectural Historians. 67. No. 4.

Jackson, K. 2008. Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 67-71.

Jonnes, J. 2002. South Bronx Rising: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of an American City.

Fordham University Press. Originally Published in 1986 as We're Still Here.

Kaufmann, H. 1975. Robert Moses: Charismatic Bureacrat. Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 90.

521-538 Lyon, J. 1936. 5,000 in the Bronx at Pool Opening. Buildings for Crotona Park. New York Times.

July 25, 1936. 30.

MIT, 2003. Project Evaluation. Big Dig Seminar at Boston University, Metropolitan College.

Accessed here: http://www.mit.edu/~uic/igert-cdrom/cross-bronx/xbronx.x005.pdf. Accessed: 17 March 2015.

Moses, R. 1938. Theory and Practice in Politics. Harvard University Press. 17-18.

Nersesian, A. 2008. New York: The Five Books of Moses. Akashic Books. Bk 2. 180.

Powell, M. 2007. A Tale of Two Cities. The New York Times. Accessed 17 March 2015.

Pullan, W. 2013. Locating Urban Conflicts: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Everyday. Palgrave Macmillan. 27.

Rodgers, C. 1939. Robert Moses: An Atlantic Portrait. The Atlantic. Accessed online at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1939/02/robert-moses/306543/. Accessed on 20 March 2015.

Stewart, J. 1998. Harlem Renaissance. Online Newshour Forum. PBS. Accessed 24 Februrary 2015.

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Teaford, J. 2008. Caro versus Moses, Round Two. John Hopkins University Press. Technology and Culture. Vol. 49. April.

Wade, R. 1974. The Power Broker. New York Times. 15 September, 455.

Wagner, J. Learn to Swim Campaign. New York City. WPA Art Project. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/98516763/. Accessed 17 March 15.

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