Court Highlights Continued from page 16 Lynch v. Dimaya No. 15-1498, Cert. Granted September 29, 2016 Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions governing an alien’s removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague. Dean v. United States No. 15-9260, Cert. Granted October 28, 2016 Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Pepper v. United States overruled United States v. Hatcher and related opinions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit to the extent that those opinions limit the district court’s discretion to consider the mandatory consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in determining the appropriate sentence for the felony serving as the basis for the Section 924(c) conviction.
Second Circuit Highlights A summary of some of the Second Circuit’s most significant published decisions in favor of the defense.
Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch No. 16-54, Cert. Granted October 28, 2016 Question Presented: Whether a conviction under one of the seven state statutes criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21-year-old and someone almost 18 constitutes an “aggravated felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act – and therefore constitutes grounds for mandatory removal. SEARCH AND SEIZURE United States v. Allen, 813 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, Sack, JJ.) (concurrence by Lohier, J.) Two days after an assault, officers went to the defend-ant’s apartment with a “pre-formed plan . . . to arrest [him] for the alleged assault and process him . . . at the Springfield police station.” The officers did not seek an arrest warrant. The defendant answered his door when the police knocked and spoke to them for five or six minutes, remaining inside his threshold. The officers ultimately informed the defendant that he was under arrest. The defendant asked if he could put on his shoes and tell his twelve-year-
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old daughter that he was leaving. The officers said he could, but only if they accompanied him. The officers followed the defendant into his apartment. Once there, they asked the defendant if he had anything in his pockets. He had seven bags of marijuana. The officers also saw drug paraphernalia in the apartment. Based on these observations, the officers obtained a search warrant for the apartment and discovered a hand gun and more drug paraphernalia. The defendant was ultimately charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the firearm. The district court denied the defendant’s suppression motion. The district court found that because the officers did not cross the threshold when they arrested the defendant, they were not required to have a war-rant or exigent circumstances. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression issue. On appeal, the Second Circuit examined a line of cases stemming from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton, the Supreme Court held that officers violate the Fourth Amendment when, in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, they physically enter protected premises to effect a warrantless search or arrest. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that there is no Payton violation unless the police physically cross the threshold and enter the home. The Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that, in some situations, officers may violate Payton without physically entering the home. The Second Circuit held that “when officers approach the door of a residence, announce their presence, and place the occupant under
Atticus | Volume 29 Number 1 | Winter 2017 | New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers