DISTRIBUTION A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Airpower Journal - Spring 1997
Stalingrad
An Examination of Hitler's Decision to Airlift JOEL S. A. HAYWARD
AFTER FEBRUARY 1943, the
shadow of Stalingrad ever
lengthened ahead of Adolf
Hitler. The battle for that
city had ended in disas
trous defeat, shattering the
myth of his military “Midas touch,” ending
his chances of defeating the Red Army,
per ma nently damaging relations with Italy,
Rumania, Hungary, and other allied nations,1
and, of course, inflicting heavy losses on his
eastern armies. More than 150,000 Axis sol
diers, most of them German, had been killed
or wounded in the city's approaches or ru
ins; 108,000 others stumbled into Soviet
captivity, 91,000 in the battle's last three days alone. (Although Hitler never learned of their fate, only six thousand ever returned to Germany.) The battle has attracted considerable schol arly and journalistic attention. Literally scores of books and articles on Stalingrad have ap peared during the 50 years since Stalin's ar mies bulldozed into Berlin, bringing the war in Europe to a close. Most have been pub lished in Germany and, to a lesser degree, Russia, where the name “Stalingrad” still conjures up powerful and emotional imagery.2 Comparatively few have been pub lished in the English--speaking world, and 21