HIST:RE Publication Journal Issue 1

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Dear Readers The History Sub-Club is proud to present our very first student-led academic journal publication, HIST:RE. The objective of HIST:RE is to provide a platform for NTU History undergraduates to showcase their past academic works while at the same time, introducing future NTU History freshmen undergraduates and curious readers into the realm of historical academic writing.

We have chosen the topic of ‘Singapura’ as the theme for our very first issue as we felt that that this topic would resonate intrinsically with many of our readers.

Through the papers presented in this journal, we hope to introduce a different perspective and perhaps even challenge one’s previous understanding of Singapore’s rich and diverse history.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank and acknowledge the contributions of our authors, editorial team and peer reviewers who dedicated their time and effort in order to make this publication possible. We would also like to extend our sincerest gratitude to our steadfast faculty head and advisor, Associate Professor Hallam Stevens for his guidance and support to make our journal possible.

If you are interested in submitting any articles, feedback or enquires, we would be glad to hear from you. Without further ado, we hope you enjoy HIST:RE and we look forward to your continued support!

Contact Details History Sub-Club Committee School of Humanities Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Email: soh-history@e.ntu.edu.sg

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Table of Contents An Era of Revival? A Study of Hakka Associations’ Responses to the Singapore Government’s Anti-Dialect Policies ........................................................................................ 4 Chong Jing Yee....................................................................................................................... 4 Rituals, Riots, and Woeful Women? The Gendered Establishment of Christianity in Singapore................................................................................................................................. 22 Soh Chuah Meng Esmond .................................................................................................... 22 Colonialism’s Contradictions – Japanese Healthcare Policies in Singapore, 1942- 1945................................................................................................................................ 30 Tejala Niketan Rao ............................................................................................................... 30 “The Road to Individualism Was Paved with Good Intentions:” The Singapore Dream: From 1965 to 2016 .................................................................................................................. 40 Soh Chuah Meng Esmond .................................................................................................... 40 Singapore - Efficient, Clean, Pragmatic? A Second Look at the Characteristics Of Singapore................................................................................................................................. 57 Chang En En ........................................................................................................................ 57 British, Dutch, Japanese or Chinese? The Sugar King Inheritance Dispute in Pre-war Singapore................................................................................................................................. 65 Jeremy Goh .......................................................................................................................... 65 British European Association of Singapore 1956 - 59: The Colonial Order’s Dying Breath ...................................................................................................................................... 70 Li Hezan Martin Edgar ........................................................................................................ 70 The Other Singapore Story .................................................................................................... 82 Christopher Lee Si Jie .......................................................................................................... 82 Broad Benefits with the Legalization of Social Egg Freezing in Singapore ...................... 87 Tan Jan Xiong ...................................................................................................................... 87

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An Era of Revival? A Study of Hakka Associations’ Responses to the Singapore Government’s Anti-Dialect Policies Chong Jing Yee School of Humanities History Undergraduate Abstract - Following the PAP-government’s inauguration in 1959, state-regulation in Singapore became increasingly tailored towards nationbuilding. To this end, dialect identities were perceived by the PAP-government as a challenge to its definitions of a Singaporean national identity.

This led to the implementation of numerous antidialect policies which sought to undercut the influence of dialect identities in Singapore. The 1980s, however, marked a period of change, with the PAP-government’s increased emphasis on retaining Singaporeans’ cultural heritage under its “return-toroots” policy. This thesis argues that Hakka Associations pursued a multi-tiered approach of simultaneous resistance and non-acquiescence in a bid for cultural survival. Their proclamations of successes should not be taken at face value, however, with evidences suggesting that existing attempts by Hakka Associations to revitalize themselves in the post-1980s era were largely unsuccessful in creating an environment conducive for the propagation of Hakka identity.

utilizing political socialization to adapt and create new national values. 2 When explained as such, PAP’s language policies targeting the elimination of dialects serve as a central tenet of Singapore’s nation-building project. The bilingual policy is one such example. Beginning in 1959, the bilingual policy under the PAP rendered mandatory the teaching of both English and a Mother Tongue (Mandarin for ethnic Chinese Singaporeans) in schools. 3 In turn, the bilingual policy aimed to eliminate dialects from use within school premises. 4

Introduction

The submission of the Goh Report in 1978 by thenDeputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee, however, proved to be a watershed in Singapore’s dialect history. Identifying dialect use at home and outside class as the main reason behind the limited success of the bilingual education reform, the Goh report led to the expansion of the government’s anti-dialect language policies beyond the borders of education. 5 What followed, was the government’s systematic pursuit of Mandarin as a replacement for dialects in all aspects of public life. Under the banner of the Speak Mandarin Campaign (SMC) in 1979, for instance, policies such as the banning of dialect programs over radio and television airwaves were implemented, thereby spearheading the eradication of dialects from public discourse.6

In 1979, Singapore’s nation-building project under the dominant People’s Action Party (PAP)government had been under way for two decades.

1 Described by Chan Heng Chee as “the process by which people transfer commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes and villages to the larger central political system”, nation-building thus requires a government to be effective, efficient and adept at

Similar anti-dialect nation-building policies were implemented in the 1970s-80s, when the PAPgovernment centralized all schools into a national stream under the Ministry of Education (MOE). 7 Justified on the premise of improving the standards of education among vernacular schools, this government-led centralisation policies masked a darker agenda—to strip dialect associations of their

1 Since the PAP-government’s inauguration in 1959.

http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/956--1979-02-10.pdf.;

2 Heng Chee Chan, Nation-building in Southeast Asia: The Singapore

Andreas Ackerman, Ethnic Identity by Design or by Default?: A Comparative

Case (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1972), 1-4.

Study of Multiculturalism in Singapore and Frankfurt Am Main (Frankfurt: IKO,

3 Cheryl Sim, "Bilingual Policy," Infopedia, September 01, 2016, accessed

2003).

March 17, 2018, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_2016-09-

6 Kenneth Paul Tan, Cinema and Television in Singapore: Resistance in One

01_093402.html.

Dimension (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 152; Lilian Chee and Edna Lim, Asian Cinema

4 Christina Bratt Paulston, International Handbook of Bilingualism and

and the Use of Space: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: Routledge,

Bilingual Education (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 401-402.

2015), 194.

5 Singapore, Report on the Ministry of Education, by Keng Swee Goh (1978), 1-

7 Lysa Hong and Jianli Huang, The Scripting of a National History: Singapore

112, accessed March 17, 2018,

and Its Pasts (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 186.

Keywords – Post-war Singapore, Hakka, Dialect, Revival, Post policy, Agency

5 influence over affiliated vernacular schools. 8 Since roughly fifty percent of Singapore's ethnic Chinese population studied in Chinese vernacular schools by 1959, this larger scale project would undoubtedly impact a large portion of the Singapore's ethnic Chinese.9 Despite popular opposition against the government’s anti-dialect stance, the intensification of anti-dialect policies went largely unhindered. This resulted in the plummeting use of dialects at home from 64.4% in 1980 to 7.2% in 1989.10 Similarly, the proportion of ethnic Chinese Singaporeans whose predominantlyused language was Chinese dialects have plunged from 76.2% to 30.7% between the period 1980– 2000. 11 Faced with such results, dialect scholars have reached the consensus that the elimination of dialects in post-war Singapore appeared both effective and irreversible.

Yet, despite the Singapore government’s ant-dialect regulations, dialect identities had not been eradicated by the 1980s. Rather, the 1980s saw the manifestation of numerous instances which illustrate the continued presence of dialect-based affiliations.

The revitalization of dialect clans, for example, saw the ushering in of a new phase of modernization, as they sought to engage with and promote dialect cultures to younger generations. Char Yong (Dabu) Association (CYDA), for instance, has since the 1980s collaborated with its youth wing to run Hakka language classes targeted at youths and young adults. 12 Closely following, Yoong Shoon Association has supported the formation of a Hakka choir, with the aim of passing on Hakka cultural values through contemporary songs. 13 In doing so, these Associations implicitly oppose the interests of the PAP-government’s anti-dialect regulations, while not explicitly attempting to roll-back governmental policies.

deception”. 14 In addition to the afore-mentioned examples of everyday resistance, dialect communities have also responded to the government’s anti-dialect nation-building policies with non-acquiescence. For example, while CYDA has not directly challenged their sidelined position in their affiliated school’s advisory system, it has nevertheless continued working with affiliated schools in the active dissemination of Hakka cultural values and identities, albeit repackaged to remain within the constraints of governmental educational policies. 15 These incidences suggest that government-imposed anti-dialect regulations have limits, and larger obstacles exist in limiting the propagation of dialect identities. What must be considered is the degree to which dialect communities have been successful in ensuring the rejuvenation and continuation of dialect identities, and the means they have adopted to achieve their aim.

Nevertheless, while these acts of everyday resistance and non-acquiescence might appear effective in retaining dialect-based cultural identities, their successes should not be taken at face value. This essay thus deals with illusions of success in what a declension narrative is.

Ultimately, this thesis aims to answer the following questions. Firstly, what implications does the existence of dialect identities have on the agency of dialect communities and the nation-building project?

Secondly, how has the PAP-government justified its implementation of assimilationist anti-dialect regulations despite its alienation of great segments of the Chinese population? Thirdly, in the face of such governmental policies, how effective have dialect associations been in their dissemination of cultural identities?

In this vein, Hakka Associations have demonstrated what political scientist James Scott defines as everyday resistance—resistance disguised amidst overt compliance through the adoption of “passive noncompliance, subtle sabotage, evasion, and

Before delving further into this examination, however, an examination of the term “identity” prove necessary. Identity, as defined by historian Benedict Anderson, involves a sense of comradeship an individual feels towards an imagined community, despite not having interacted with every belonging individual. 16 Furthermore, anthropologist Fredrik Barth posits that identity is dependent on social

8 Saravanan Gopinathan, Towards a National System of Education in Singapore,

Singapore," World Englishes 33, no. 3 (2014): 307-18, accessed March 17, 2018,

1945-1973 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1974).

doi:10.1111/weng.12092.

9 John Soon Kwong Yip and Wong Kooi Sim, Evolution of Educational

12 Phang Phow Ho, "Interview with Char Yong (Dabu) Association," interview

Excellence: 25 Years of Education in the Republic of Singapore (Singapore:

by author, November 30, 2017.

Longman, 1990), 11.

13 客 总 会 讯 Kezong Huixun [Annual Publication by the Hakka Community

10 Mui Hoong Chua and Rachel Chang, "Did Mr Lee Kuan Yew Create a

Guild], vol. 61 (Singapore: Nanyang Khek Community Guild, 2015), 39.

Singapore in His Own Image?" The Straits Times, March 24, 2015, accessed

14 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant

March 17, 2018, http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/did-mr-lee-kuan-yew-

Resistance. (Yale: Yale University Press, 2008), 1-135.

create-a-singapore-in-his-own-image.

15 Ho, “Interview with Char Yong (Dabu) Association”.

11 Phyllis Ghim-Lian Chew, "An Ethnographic Survey of Language Use,

16 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and

Attitudes and Beliefs of Singaporean Daoist Youths," ARI Working Paper 118

Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2016).

(July 2009): 1-21, accessed March 17, 2018, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1645120; Kingsley Bolton and Bee Chin Ng, "The Dynamics of Multilingualism in Contemporary

6 organizations which involve both self-ascription and ascription by others.17 Essentially, these definitions share a commonality: a sense of camaraderie brought about by belonging to the same side of the “self” visà-vis “others” polarity.18 While a number of works have attempted to study the PAP’s systematic eradication of dialect identity, there has been far less attention paid to dialect communities’ response and involvement with Singapore politics. In particular, there has been a dearth of literature exploring Hakka communities in post-war Singapore despite the rapid growth of Hakka scholarship since the 1980s.19 This omission is not surprising: Hakka associations are opaque, primary sources are few, and inquiries probing beneath the surface raises sensitivities. Bound by their allegiances to the nation (and by extension, her government), dialect associations in Singapore are wont to present themselves as agents acting in support of national interests. Casting light on their resistance and non-acquiescence towards governmental policies thus threatens to dispel the mirage of their unwavering support, which in turn has repercussions on the dialect community.

Singapore Hopo Association, for instance, refused inquiries by the author into the activities held by their dialect association. Arguing that they were simply “old men gathering to play mahjong”, the representative essentially discounts their involvement in preserving Hakka heritage and culture.20 Nevertheless, this topic warrants great intellectual examination for several reasons. First, as a means of social control, the PAP-government’s anti-dialect policies remain politically loaded, interweaved with the diffusion of power and influence. That the topdown implementation of policies is sufficient, and indeed, primary, to the removal of dialect allegiances, demands that it be critiqued and challenged. Second, the study of this topic reveals the existence of contradictions within state policy, vis-à-vis the championing of one “national” past. As noted by historian Wang Gungwu, the period of 1965–79 was characterized by the PAP-government’s reluctance to reclaim and utilize Singapore’s history. 21 The study of Singapore’s past, it was feared, would lead

to the strengthening of ethnic and cultural bonds at the expense of a unified Singaporean identity.

Referring to speeches by governmental officials, he argued that the post-1980 era marked a time of “apparent volte-face” which saw increased governmental acceptance of cultural roots and identity.22 In contrast, Yeh Yun-Tsui tied post-1980 nation-building the continued estrangement from one’s cultural roots. Shedding light on the urban planning policies under the HDB, she asserted that the Singapore government exercised the politics of spatial scale in public housing to eradicate dialect enclaves and divisions. 23 This engenders a fundamental contradiction: while the PAPgovernment actively championed the acceptance of one’s past and cultures as a central tenet of Singaporean identity, its nation-wide polices encoded powerfully coercive elements that threatened that acceptance in practice. Ultimately, this contradiction deserves greater historical scrutiny, especially regarding the consequences it entails for Hakka Associations in Singapore.

Thirdly, the 1959–2000s serve as an important timeframe for the study of Singapore’s dialect history. Contextualizing itself within the shifting socio-political climate of this era, this thesis seeks to examine the PAP-government’s 1959–80s antidialect nation-building policies, and its subsequent implications on the Hakka dialect community.

Admittedly, the timeframe is vast. However, it proves both vital and necessary for several reasons.

First, a large timeframe is necessary to critically analyse key moments representative of the sociopolitical context of that era, rather than a blow-byblow examination of all individual events. Secondly, having too narrow a scope would create a piecemeal version of Singapore’s dialect history, with overemphasis on either the successes or failures of Hakka Associations in their efforts at retaining dialect identity. Focusing on the 1959–1980s, for instance, would give an impression of no significant resistance, while examining solely the post-1980s era would reveal a lack of a decline in intensity.

Lastly, as a community that prides itself on adaptability and their ability to acculturate into local societies, the Hakkas should have been the prized

17 Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of

20 Phone call by author in October 2016 to Singapore Hopo Association.

Culture Difference (Bergen: Universitets Forlaget, 1969).

21 Gungwu Wang, Nation Building: Five Southeast Asian Histories (Singapore:

18 Mary S. Erbaugh, "The Secret History of the Hakkas: The Chinese Revolution

ISEAS, 2005), 200-260.

as a Hakka Enterprise," The China Quarterly 132 (1992): 941, accessed

22 Ibid. Wang refers to speeches including George Yeo’s “Importance of

November 30, 2016, doi:10.1017/s0305741000045495; Shuang Liu, Identity,

heritage and identity”, “Transmitting Historical Memories”, S. Rajaratnam’s

Hybridity and Cultural Home Chinese Migrants and Diaspora in Multicultural

“The Uses and Abuses of the Past”, and S. Jayakumar’s “Awareness of Our

Societies(London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015).

History Must be Promoted” to illustrate Singapore’s growing acceptance towards

19 Xing Gen Xu, 解码客家 Jiema Kejia [Deciphering Hakkas](Xiamen: Haifeng

the embracing of her cultural roots and identity.

Chubanshe, 2007), 20-24; Qinghuang Yan, Ethnicities, Personalities and

23 Yun-Tsui Yeh, "The Change of Social Spaces within Chinese Settlements in

Politics in the Ethnic Chinese Worlds (Singapore: World Scientific, 2016).

Singapore under National Policies," Journal of Chinese Overseas 8, no. 1 (2012): 11-37, accessed March 17, 2018, doi:10.1163/179325412x634292.

7 pupil of the government’s homogenizing policies. 24 A deeper analysis, however, reveals that this was not the case. In the face of the PAP-government’s antidialect nation-building policies, Hakka communities instead took on varying forms of resistance and nonacquiescence.25 Focusing on themes of social control and social movement, this essay brings attention to the agency of the Hakka associations; rescuing them from the brink of obscurity and positing them as agents grappling with the anti-dialect nationbuilding process. This paper argues that Hakka Associations, far from simply accepting the PAPgovernment’s assimilationist anti-dialect policies, pursued a multi-tiered approach of simultaneous resistance and non-acquiescence in a bid for cultural survival. This creates an undeniable incoherence within the government’s homogenizing nationbuilding efforts.

Against this backdrop, this essay will survey the 1959–2000s dialect history of Singapore, examining how the Hakka community has strategized to preserve their integrity despite the government’s anti-dialect policies. Historians examining the PAPgovernment’s dialect policies have largely neglected this perspective, instead viewing government policies as effective in eroding dialect loyalties in Singapore. 26 To substantiate this argument, this essay will survey the following anti-dialect laws.

The first deals with the language policies of 1959 and 1979, which saw increased government intolerance towards the use of dialect in public discourse. The second considers the PAP’s centralization of education curriculums from 1960s– 1980s, which greatly limited the influence of Hakka Associations in dictating the syllabi and everyday administration of Hakka-affiliated schools.

Permeating the everyday life of individuals and Singapore society, these policies serve as apt illustrations of the PAP-government’s highly interventionist top-down nature of nation-building.

Here, the focus is not so much on how effective antidialect regulations were, but how they were rationalized by the government and tolerated (not amounting to acceptance) or resisted by Hakka Associations. Far from being a one-dimensional resistance-non-acquiescence dichotomy, the decisions of Hakka Associations typically exist as a multi-tiered response—splintering into simultaneous pursuits of both non-acquiescence and resistance. Recognising that conceptualizations of Hakka identity are dynamic, this thesis seeks not to pin down shifting notions of Hakka identity over time, but rather how Hakka Associations have sought to propagate what they believe to be cultural markers of Hakka identity. Furthermore, this essay is cautious against weighing the successes of Hakka Associations based on cultural markers they now deem to be emblematic of Hakka identity. Instead, by delving into general definitions of identity, this thesis identifies successes in retaining cultural identity through indicators such as the perpetuation of a “Hakka self” and “non-Hakka others” polarity– –commonalities encapsulated by all existing definitions of “identity”.

Literature Review Existing works on Hakkas usually attempt to either look into the shifting nature of Hakka consciousness and identity,27 or to study the effectiveness of Hakka associations in retaining their cultural traditions in the face of modernization and the government’s homogenizing policies. 28 While accounts in the latter category are valuable to this study, most simply describe the indifference of Hakka associations, bemoaning the subsequent loss of Hakka heritage without critically addressing the link between the government’s nation-building policies and Hakkas’ responses in their bid for cultural survival. Khun Eng Kuah and Evelyn Hu-Dehart are rare scholars who explore the oft-overlooked efforts

by Hakka associations to revitalize themselves to

24 Clyde Kiang, The Hakka Search for a Homeland (Elgin: Allegheny Press,

27 Leo Suryadinata, Migration, Indigenization, and Interaction: Chinese

1991), 4; Ben Yi Nan Song, 客家人的力量 Kejiaren De Liliang [The Strength

Overseas and Globalization (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011);, Ping Xiao, 客

of the Hakkas] (Zhidian Gongzuoshi, 1996); Phyllis Ghim Lian Chew, A

家 人 Kejiaren [Hakkas] (Chengdu: Chengdu Ditu Chubanshe, 2002); Zhong

Sociolinguistic History of Early Identities in Singapore: From Colonialism to

Guang Xie, 客家源流新探 Kejia Yuanliu Xingtan [New Research into Hakka

Nationalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 46.

Origins] (Fujian: Fujian Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1995).

25 Ho, “Interview with Char Yong (Dabu) Association”.

26 Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Khay Thiong Lim, "The Formation and

28 Cang Tai Qiu and Xing Huang Xiu, 客家族群兴在地社会：台湾与全球的

Limitation of Hakka Identity in Southeast Asia," Taiwan Journal of Southeast

经验 Kejia Zuqunxing Zaidi Shehui: Taiwan Yu Quanqiu De Jingyan [Hakka

Asian Studies 4, no. 1 (2007): 3-28, 2007, accessed March 17, 2018,

Ethnic and Local Society: The Experiences of Taiwan and Worldwide] (Guoli

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.625.9549&rep=rep1

Zhongyang Daxye Renwen Yanjiu Zhongxin, 2007); Zhong Xi Zhong, 客家人：

&type=pdf; Wei An Zhang et al., " 東 南 亞 的 客 家 會 館 ： 歷 史 與 功 能 的 探 Dongnanya De Kejia Huiguan: Lishixing Gongneng De Shentao [Hakka

东方的犹太人 Kejiaren: Dongfang De Youtairen [Hakkas: The Jews of the

Associations in Southeast Asia: A Historical Analysis]," Asia-Pacific Forum 28

East] (Sunny Books Publishing).; Lim Keak Cheng, "Patterns of Social

(2005): 185-219, accessed March 18, 2018,

Alignment : A Case Study of Hakka Association in Singapore," Southeast Asian

http://www.rchss.sinica.edu.tw/files/publish/1123_e4cafc58.pdf

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no.

4

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477-494,

accessed

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https://repository.kulib.kyotou.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/56531/1/KJ00000131833.pdf.

17,

2018,

8 appeal to younger generations. 29 Compiling a national study on dialect associations, they put forth their historical perspective that dialect associations activity worked within the constraints of their limited liberties to minimize the sidelining of dialect loyalties. 30 Nevertheless, their arguments lack specificity, because it traces the actions of all major dialect groups in Singapore, rather than Hakkas perse. 31 Therefore, they tend to make general observations about inter-dialect trends, while neglecting historical events and societal peculiarities unique to Hakkas. This essay seeks to address this gap by providing an in-depth study of Hakka communities in the context of Singapore, analyzing the symbiotic relationship between Singapore’s socio-political environment and the actions of the Hakka community.

That said, it is Michael Hsiao who dominates the arena of contemporary Hakka literature. Offering a novel perspective of Hakka communities in Southeast Asia, Hsiao observes that the Hakka identity has been constrained, both by the nationalism of indigenous populations, and the perception of a homogenous Chinese-ness of the ethnic Chinese groups. 32 Consequently, Hakka identity in Southeast Asia remains an undeveloped construct, limited by their inability to perceive “a sense of inequality” and “a need to act collectively”. 33 Discursively, his understanding of Hakka communities has certainly spread, with its principles re-written into more recent scholarships.

Zhang Wei-An, for example, reaffirms Hsui’s emphasis on the incomplete nature of Hakka identity.

The presence of a partial Hakka identity, he asserted, explains the subsequent disinterest of Singapore’s Hakkas clans in achieving cultural identity and construction; thereby crippling attempts by Hakka communities in preserving their culture and heritage.34 Nonetheless, this thesis disagrees with Hu and Zhang regarding their selection of sources. Their predisposition towards official government records places asymmetrical emphasis on governmental perceptions and actions, thereby silencing the voices of Hakka communities by viewing their actions

through tinted lenses of governmental prejudices.

This essay will overcome this limitation by conducting oral interviews of prominent Hakka representatives, and studying past publications by Hakka Associations. In doing so, it paves a path divergent from Hu and Zhang’s, uncovering new perspectives which can complement and revise the findings of their research.

Aside from works focusing on the theme of Hakka culture and identity, there is also a large corpus of literature that delves into the nature of nationbuilding in Singapore. As noted by scholars such as Michael Barr and P.J. Thum, Singapore’s PAPgovernment has modelled Singapore into an authoritarian entity, enmeshed by systems of topdown regulation.35 What arises, is the formation of a state-manufactured state identity, bound by the annihilation of dialect loyalties as key mobilisers of the ethnic Chinese communities. As interventionist as these policies are, the removal of purportedly dangerous loyalties serves only to strengthen the foundation on which the PAP-government’s legitimacy stands. 36 In this vein, the correlation between ideology and nation-building policies remain an unquestionable reality, with the high degree of naturalization of anti-dialect laws in official discourses cementing the PAP’s political legitimacy as the rightful government of Singapore. 37 Howbeit, while much of existing scholarship views top-down prescriptive policies as inevitable, and indeed, vital to Singapore’s nationbuilding process, this essay instead argues that the study of bottom-up reactions to governmental policies are just as paramount. As Christopher Tremewan concludes, social control has not simply been about imposing government-sanctioned social requirements onto a docile citizenry. 38 Rather, the invariable struggle that arises from public resistance would lead to the exacerbation of contradictions within state policy, thereby necessitating the continual refinement and re-adaptation of social control.39

29 Khun Eng Kuah and Evelyn Hu-DeHart, Voluntary Organizations in the

https://newnaratif.com/research/justifying-colonial-rule-in-post-colonial-

Chinese Diaspora (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 62-75.

singapore/; Michael D. Barr, Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs behind the Man (Kuala

30 Ibid.

Lumpur: New Asian Library, 2009); Michael D. Barr and Zlatko

31 Ibid.

Skrbiš, Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation-building

32 Hsiao, Lim, The Formation and Limitation of Hakka Identity in Southeast

Project (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2011).

Asia, 3-28.

36

33 Ibid.

Singapore (London: Routledge, 2006), 1-23.

34 Wei An Zhang et al., "東南亞的客家會館：歷史與功能的探 Dongnanya De

37 Su Hwi Tan, The Manufacturing of Social Consent: The Dynamics of

Kejia Huiguan: Lishixing Gongneng De Shentao [Hakka Associations in

Language Planning in Singapore (Singapore: National University of Singapore,

Southeast Asia: A Historical Analysis]," Asia-Pacific Forum 28 (2005): 185-

1995), 38-40.

219, accessed March 18, 2018,

38 Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in

http://www.rchss.sinica.edu.tw/files/publish/1123_e4cafc58.pdf.

Singapore (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

35 Ping Tjin Thum, "Justifying Colonial Rule in Post-Colonial Singapore," New

39 Ibid.

Naratif, 2017, accessed March 17, 2018,

Beng

Huat

Chua, Communitarian

Ideology

and

Democracy

in

9 As such, it appears apparent that the extant literature on all fronts of this essay’s consideration has not been satisfactory. To bridge this gap in understanding, this dissertation relies primarily on primary sources. Specifically, it draws on a body of official documents, such as parliamentary and public speeches, and memoirs of government policy makers.

Additionally, in shedding light on Hakka agency, this dissertation assigns primacy to oral interviews with prominent Hakka representatives and publications of Hakka Associations.

Chapter 1: The PAP-Government’s Rationalization Little can be said about the retention of Hakka identity without considering the continued use of Hakka dialect in public discourse. Viewed as a dynamic and multifaceted development, the concept of identity has been perceived by numerous historians and linguistic scholars as being negotiated through language. Scholars Michael Morris and Jacques Maurais, for instance, depict languages (and by extension, dialects) as differing between communities based on the how symbols and sounds are assigned meaning. 40 However, there remains more to language than simply communication; as scholars John Edwards, 41 George Steiner 42 and Stella Ting-Tooney observe. 43 Stressing the symbolic function of dialects “as an emblem of groupness…[and] a psychosocial rallying point”, they posit that the symbolic value of dialects lies in its amassing of cultural values and social memories which underpin the very spirit of the community. 44 Hence, encapsulated within these assertions is the belief that while Hakka linguistic skills are essential as an instrument of communication, even more salient is the perceived cultural one-ness it evokes among members of the Hakka community.

Additionally, the presence of written dialects is also indispensable to the preservation of Hakka identity as a medium of transferring Hakka cultures, customs and values through literature and folklore. 45 Such sentiments are echoed by philosopher Jacques Derrida, who derided what he defines as “voicecentralism”—that verbal communication is superior to written words and therefore warrants greater emphasis by academics. 46 Rather, he championed the study of written scripts, and maintains that writing is unparalleled in its ability to embody the historical experiences and beliefs held dear by the community.47 These sentiments also permeate governmental understanding, with then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew placing predominant focus on language as a medium through which culture is encoded. The retention of one’s Mother Tongue, he argued, was indispensable for the provision of “cultural ballast” needed to inoculate Singaporeans against Western influences. 48 Therefore, Mother Tongue was perceived by the PAP-government as imperative in preserving one’s cultural identity, while English was merely a necessary tool to stimulate international commerce and foreign direct investments. 49 Such governmental perspectives were exemplified, and made manifest, with the introduction of the Special Assistance Plan (SAP) in 1979. By selecting nine Chinese-stream secondary school to serve as SAP schools, the PAP-government sought to “preserve the best Chinese-stream schools so as to develop effectively bilingual students who were inculcated with traditional Chinese values”. 50 SAP schools possess an intensive Chinese curriculum tailored with an in-depth study of Chinese history and culture as manifested in its language and literature, thereby keeping alive Chinese cultural roots and traditions. 51 Evidently, at the heart of Lee’s language policies lay

40 Jacques Maurais and Michael A. Morris, Languages in a Globalising

http://www.todayonline.com/rememberinglky/language-survival;

World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53.

Kuan Yew, 154-157.

41 John Edwards, Language and Identity: An Introduction (Cambridge:

49 "In His Own Words: English for Trade; Mother Tongue to Preserve

Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Identity," The Straits Times, March 27, 2015, accessed March 17, 2018,

42 George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation (Oxford:

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/in-his-own-words-english-for-trade-

Oxford University Press, 1992), 494.

mother-tongue-to-preserve-identity;

43 Stella Ting-Toomey, Communicating across Cultures (New York: Guiford

Leo, Language, Nation and Development in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute

Press, 1999), viii.

of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 92-136; Singapore, Media Relations Division,

44 Ibid.

Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, SPEECH BY MINISTER

45 Anne E. Duggan, Donald Haase, and Helen Callow, Folktales and Fairy

MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW AT THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON THE

Tales: Traditions and Texts from around the World (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO,

REPORT OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE CURRICULUM AND PEDAGOGY

2016).

REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THURSDAY, 25 NOVEMBER 2004, by Kuan Yew

46 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago

Lee (2004), accessed March 17, 2018,

Press, 2017).

http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-

47 Ceren Yegen and Memet Abukan, "Derrida and Language:

html?filename=2004112501.htm.

Deconstruction," International Journal of Linguistics 6, no. 2 (2014): 48-61,

50 Cheryl Sim, "Special Assistance Plan Schools," Infopedia, July 21, 2016,

accessed March 17, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ijl.v6i2.5210.

accessed March 17, 2018,

48 Xuanwei Teo, "The Language of Survival," TODAY, March 23, 2015,

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_2016-07-21_154021.html.

accessed March 17, 2018,

51 Barr, Constructing Singapore, 93; Kenneth Paul Tan, Renaissance

Hock

Guan

Lee

and

Barr,

Lee

Suryadinata

Singapore? Economy, Culture, and Politics (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), 124.

10 the recognition of language as a medium of transmitting beliefs and value patterns through literature, proverbs and folklore. 52 In this vein, dialects were seen as a stumbling block to the learning of Mandarin, since dialects were perceived

by Lee as adding unnecessary burden to the children’s’ learning load.53 The socio-economic circumstances in the 1950–70s, however, posed a great challenge to the government’s handling of the dialect “threat”. In particular, the high level of assimilation and intermingling between Hakkas and the non-Hakkas had accustomed the Singapore population to the issue of Hakka-non-Hakka inter-dialect engagement in both the private and public domain. While scholars such as B.W. Hodder and Chee-Kiong Tong have argued for the presence of a highly-segregated Singaporean plural society segmented based on the principles of ancestral origin, dialect and kinship ties,54 Hakkas are a notable exception to this rule. As revealed by the firsthand recounts of Mr. Ho Phang Phow, head of the Heritage and Publication Committee of CYDA, Hakkas in the 1960s did not congregate in Hakka enclaves. Rather, they dispersed amongst the periphery of Singapore’s geographical territories, involving themselves with, and acculturating into, local communities. 55 This resulted in their active mastery of other languages and dialects as lingua francas to be used when conversing with non-Hakka individuals—a prerequisite to effective naturalization into the local community Hakkas lived with. 56 Similarly, Hakkas dominance of the pawnshop and Traditional Chinese Medicine industry exposed them to clients from diverse dialect and ethnic groups, thereby further promoting cross-cultural contact and engagement.57

means of inter-cultural interaction. A survey conducted by the government in 1979 on the languages or dialects used by Chinese passengers speaking to bus conductors revealed that 75% spoke to Chinese conductors in Hokkien, while individuals speaking to Malay and Indian bus conductors in dialects averaged 33.8% and 28.4% respectively.58 Considering that Hokkiens accounted for a mere 43.1% of the ethnic Chinese Singaporean population, 59 it can be inferred that a significant number of non-Hokkien ethnic Chinese Singaporeans were verbally proficient in conversational Hokkien. Such evidence illustrates the prominence of inter-dialect and inter-ethnic communication in 1959–1970s Singapore, thereby socializing Singapore society to accept the influence of dialects in everyday discourse.

While not to the same extent as Hakkas, non-Hakkas too adopted the utilization of other dialects as a

The Singapore government was aware of these societal attitudes, especially after its attempts at introducing the bilingualism reform in 1959 were met with opposition from dialect associations, dialect-affiliated corporations and ordinary citizens alike. In January 1959, for instance, representatives from three Chinese associations wrote a joint memorandum to the Chief Secretary urging him to resume news broadcast in their dialects over Radio Singapore. 60 Less than a month later, the Khek (Hakka) Community Guild National Dramatic Corporation presented a direct challenge to the government’s anti-dialect policies by publicly refusing to partake in Radio Singapore’s special program for the Chinese New Year celebration. 61 The reason for this rejection, they declared, was their objection to the condition that the conductor had to make his announcements in Mandarin instead of Hakka. 62 In the face of such harsh criticism, the PAP-government was made conscious of the deeply entrenched socio-cultural attachments the local population possessed towards their respective

52 Teo, “The Language of Survival”.

HALL" (address, Singapore, September 7, 1979), accessed March 17, 2018,

53 Kuan Yew Lee, "SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW AT

http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/lky19790907.pdf.

THE OPENING OF THE SPEAK MANDARIN CAMPAIGN ON FRIDAY, 21

59 Emrys Myles Khean Aun Chew and Chong Guan Kwa, Goh Keng Swee: A

SEP 84" (address, Singapore, September 21, 1984), accessed August 6, 2018,

Legacy Of Public Service (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2012), 224.

https://www.mandarin.org.sg/ch/-/media/smc/documents/goh-pm-lee-kwan-

60 "Radio News Appeal," The Straits Times (Singapore), January 9, 1959,

yew_smc-launch-speech_210984.pdf.

accessed March 18, 2018,

54 Brenda S. A. Yeoh, Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19590109-

and the Urban Built Environment (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003),

1.2.48?ST=1&AT=filter&K=dialects

69;

of

singapore&DF=01/01/1955&DT=31/12/1970&Display=0&AO=false&NPT=&

Singapore (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1974); Chee-Kiong Tong, Identity and

L=&CTA=&NID=&CT=ARTICLE&WC=&YR=&QT=dialects,in,singapore&

Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia: Racializing Chineseness (Springer, 2014).

oref=article.

55 Ho, “Interview with Char Yong (Dabu) Association”.

61 "Impractical," The Straits Times (Singapore), February 1, 1959, accessed

56 Chew, A Sociolinguistic History of Early Identities in Singapore.

March 18, 2018,

57 Zhi Xun He, 客家传统行业系列丛书 Kejia Chuantong Hangye Xilie Chongshu

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19590201-

[Book Series on Traditional Hakka-dominated Industries], vol. 1 (Singapore:

1.2.42.2?ST=1&AT=filter&K=dialects

Char Yong (Dabu) Association, 2005).

singapore&DF=01/01/1955&DT=31/12/1970&Display=0&AO=false&NPT=&

58 Kuan Yew Lee, "ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER MR LEE KUAN

L=&CTA=&NID=&CT=ARTICLE&WC=&YR=&QT=dialects,in,singapore&

YEW AT THE OPENING CEREMONY OF THE “PROMOTE THE USE OF

oref=article.

MANDARIN” CAMPAIGN ON 7 SEP 79 AT SINGAPORE CONFERENCE

62 Ibid.

Peter

A.

Busch, Legitimacy

and

Ethnicity:

A

Case

Study

in

in

singapore&KA=dialects

singapore&KA=dialects

in

in

11 dialects. In turn, the government’s understanding of local sentiments towards dialects affected how it presented their anti-dialect nation-building proposals in the post-1959 era.

Realising the sensitive nature of anti-dialect state regulation in Singapore, the PAP-government framed its policies in ways which would address the predominant socio-economic concerns of the population—issues of national unity, racial harmony, economic pragmatism and the wellbeing of future generations. This chapter sheds light on the methods employed by the PAP-government in justifying the need for dialect-eradication in public discourse and argues that the Hakka Associations’ ongoing dissemination of written and spoken Hakka dialect demonstrates their non-acquiescence and resistance towards the PAP-government’s anti-dialect policies.

The PAP-government’s justification for the implementation of anti-dialect policies can be traced back to its interests of national unity, identity and development. The use of dialects, the PAPgovernment understood, espouses a collective consciousness towards an individual’s sub-ethnic roots, thereby rendering ethnic Chinese Singaporeans loyal to their ancestral Chinese homeland rather than Singapore. 63 Nevertheless, considering the delicacy of the dialect issue and the political volatility of the 1959–1970s, the PAPgovernment thus adopted, at least explicitly, a discourse of national development as a rallying call to action. In proposing Mandarin as a viable alternative to dialects and propounding Mandarin as a merit good beneficial to the Singaporean society, the PAP-government thus aimed to pre-empt, or at least minimize, public opposition to the imposition of anti-dialect policies.64 Publicly, the propounding of bilingualism as a pursuit of national development possessed two main tenets of rationalization. First, the nationalism argument, which maintains that

eradication of dialects was necessary to foster national unity beyond the borders of ethnic and dialect divisions. 65 Secondly, the education argument, which professed that learning dialects would hinder their ability to excel in both English and Mandarin, thereby undermining their future socio-economic development opportunities. 66 That said, while these assertions made up the government’s official stance towards the replacement of dialects with Mandarin, it should be recognised that indirectly, depictions of dialects in governmental and societal discourse since the 1960s have been transformed into morbidity. Linked to a range of socially unfavourable qualities such as academic and linguistic inferiority and a lack of social responsibility, dialect-users had become increasingly entrenched in perceptions of moral depravity.67 The 1984 slogan for the SMC, “Speak Mandarin, Your Children’s Future is in Your Hands”, is an apt indication of such moralistic undertones. 68 Recognising the intellectual supremacy of Mandarin over dialects, this choice of words places Mandarin on a government-invented high-ground; shutting down critics through implicitly placed judgements which equate a refusal to comply with the SMC with a conscious decision to undermine the welfare of future generations. 69 Such sentiments were further exemplified in Lee’s address in 1978 to Nanyang University’s Historical Society, where he argued “[if] Singapore Hokkien will become the lingua franca of the Singapore Chinese…[,] [t]his would be sad…because it is a dialect. It is not congruent with the written Chinese script…if Hokkien prevails, then the standard of written Chinese will go down.” 70 Read against the grain, the meaning embedded within Lee’s diction was that Hokkien was inferior to Mandarin due to its existence as a dialect. In turn, the placement of Chinese writing as possessing an unquestionable correctness in terms of linguistic

63 Hong Liu and Sin-Kiong Wong, Singapore Chinese Society in Transition:

March 2009, 5:00 Pm at the NTUC Auditorium" (speech, NTUC Auditorium,

Business, Politics, & Socio-economic Change, 1945-1965 (New York: Peter

Singapore, March 17, 2009), accessed March 18, 2018,

Lang, 2004), 113.

http://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/speech-mr-lee-kuan-yew-minister-mentor-

64 A merit good is a good which, when consumed, provides positive

speak-mandarin-campaign’s-30th-anniversary-launch

externalities. These third party spillover benefits, in turn, have great impact on

67 Siew Yeen Lim, "Speak Mandarin Campaign," Infopedia, July 04, 2013,

social welfare. Liew Kai Khiun, "Limited Pidgin-type Patois? Policy, Language,

accessed March 18, 2018,

Technology, Identity and the Experience of Canto-pop in Singapore," Popular

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_2013-07-04_122007.html.

Music 22, no. 2 (May 2003): 217-233, accessed March 18, 2018,

68 Peter Teo, "Mandarinising Singapore: A Critical Analysis of Slogans in

doi:10.1017/s0261143003003131.

Singapore’s ‘Speak Mandarin’ Campaign," Critical Discourse Studies 2, no. 2

65 10 Years That Shaped a Nation: An Exhibition Catalogue (Singapore:

(2005): 121-142, accessed March 18, 2018, doi:10.1080/17405900500283565.

National Archives of Singapore, 2008), 132.

69 Ibid.

66 Kuan Yew Lee, "SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW AT

70 Kuan Yew Lee, "POSTSCRIPT TO PRIME MINISTER’S ADDRESS TO

THE OPENING OF THE SPEAK MANDARIN CAMPAIGN ON FRIDAY, 21

THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, NANYANG UNIVERSITY, ON FRIDAY, 10

SEP 84, AT THE SINGAPORE CONFERENCE HALL" (speech, Speak

FEBRUARY 1978" (address, Nanyang University, Singapore, February 10,

Mandarin Campaign, Singapore, September 21, 1984), accessed March 18, 2018,

1978), accessed March 18, 2018,

http://mandarin.org.sg/en/~/media/smc/documents/goh pm lee kwan yew_smc

http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/lky19780210b.pdf; Barr, Lee

launch speech_210984.pdf; Kuan Yew Lee, "Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew,

Kuan Yew.

Minister Mentor, at Speak Mandarin Campaign’s 30th Anniversary Launch, 17

12 accuracy denotes its superiority vis-à-vis dialects.

Ultimately, this characterization of Mandarin and dialects as dialectic reinforces the purported difference in position and rank, since the deficiency of dialects is deemed as directly contrasting with the strength and rigour of Mandarin. Diffused across society, these ideas propounded within the state narrative culminates into an cultural subtext unwelcoming to the speaking of dialects, with dialects perceived as having no future, and “inferior” vis-à-vis Mandarin. 71 To this end, the banning of dialect programs on radio and television waves by 1981 was emblematic of the government’s commitment towards the eradication of dialects, and by extension, the cultural values embodied within these dialects, in public discourse.72

Chapter 2: Facing Leviathan: Responses of Hakka Associations In the face of anti-dialect governmental regulations, Hakka associations displayed a multifaceted response in demonstrating their resistance and nonacquiescence towards governmental attempts at curtailing the use of Hakka dialect in public discourse. This takes the form of two main strategies: the creation of an environment conducive to the usage of Hakka dialect amongst existing Hakkaspeakers, and the teaching of Hakka dialect to nonspeakers. For the former, interviews with representatives from both Ying He Hakka Association and CYDA have revealed their conscious effort to retain the use of Hakka dialect in association activities.73 Despite the implementation of the government’s language policies, these

associations nevertheless continue using Hakka dialect in broadcasts to their members; albeit complemented with a Mandarin translation. 74 In like manner, both associations have also sought to retain the cultural values embodied in spoken language through the singing of folk songs. Holding weekly singing sessions and annual concerts, these associations create opportunities for the reinforcement of traditional beliefs, values and customs through lighthearted entertainment. 75 The song “Passing on the Hakka Spirit across Generations” is one such example. 76 Performed during CYDA’s 150 years anniversary, it highlights the socio-economic challenges faced by early Hakka migrants and champions the preservation of the Hakka Spirit—cultural values that Hakkas, since early scholarship publications centuries ago, have maintained to be at the center of Hakka identity and culture.77 Beyond the singing of folk songs, leaders of Hakka Associations have also spared no effort in increasing awareness of Hakka cultural values through the publication of Hakka histories and folklores. Such efforts were revitalized in the post-1980s era, with a growing range of publications being produced by CYDA. These stories introduce a Hakka identity distinct from the purportedly homogeneity of the ethnic “Chinese” group in the Chinese-MalayIndian-Others (CMIO) racialization framework put forth by the PAP-government. Specifically, “Yenan Lake” and “Killing the Wife to Host an Esteemed Guest” are well-known Hakka folktales which portray the difficult living conditions faced by impoverished Hakka individuals and migrants. 78

71 Ian Johnson, "In Singapore, Chinese Dialects Revive After Decades of

Gannan) Kejiage [Passing on the Hakka Spirit across Generations (led by Lu

Restrictions," The New York Times, August 26, 2017, accessed March 18, 2018,

Zhi Yuan and Yang Ming Sheng], YouTube, June 27, 2013, accessed March 18,

https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/world/asia/singapore-language-

2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d_GInKuesFM. 77 Qiu and Xiu, 客家族群兴在地社会 Kejia Zuqunxing Zaidi Shehui [Hakka

hokkien-mandarin.html.

72 "Let

the

Old

Folk

Watch

Dialect

Video

Tapes," The

Straits

Times (Singapore), June 7, 1983, accessed March 18, 2018,

Ethnic and Local Society]; Zhong, 客家人 [Hakkas].

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19830607-

78 Xu, 解码客家 Jiema Kejia [Deciphering Hakkas]. 《叶南湖》(Yenan Lake)

1.2.60.3?ST=1&AT=filter&K=singapore

dialect&KA=singapore

narrates the tale of a financially-poor Hakka father and son, whose hard work of

dialect&DF=&DT=&Display=0&AO=false&NPT=&L=&CTA=&NID=&CT=

tilling their farmland during winter gained the interest of a god. The god, amazed

ARTICLE|LETTER&WC=&YR=&QT=singapore,dialect&oref=article.

by their persistence and dedication in spite of such unfavourable weather

73 Ho, “Interview with Char Yong (Dabu) Association”; Xue Hua Liu,

circumstances, granted them mercy by rewarding with a hotspring in which they

"Interview with Ying He Association (Ying Fo Fui Kun)," interview by author,

could rest their weary body from the winter chill. Overcome with joy, the father

December 14, 2017.

and son shared this newfound source of refuge with others in their community.

74 Ibid.

The second folklore, 《杀老婆款待先生》(Killing the Wife to Host an Esteemed

75 Ibid.

Guest), tells the story of a financially-poor Hakka mother and son, who willingly

76 Char Yong Dabu Choir, perf., "客家精神代代传 Kejia Jingshen Daidai Chuan

offered their only chicken as food to a weary scholar who happened to pass by

[Passing down the Hakka Spirit across Generations]," recorded June 21, 2008,

their house after losing his way. Due to their unfortunate monetary situation, the

in 客音客韵客家情：文娱之夜 Keying Keyun Kejiaqing: Wenwu Zhi Ye [Hakka

chicken was viewed by the family as a vital source of income. As the sale of eggs

Songs and Feelings: A Night of Lyrical Entertainment], Singapore Char Yong (Dabu) Association, 2008, CD; 客家精神代代传（卢致苑 杨明生领唱 /赣南） 客家歌 Kejia Jingshen Daidai Chuan (lu Zhi Yuan Yang Ming Sheng Lingchang

and the chicken was initially meant to afford the son’s marriage dowry, the killing of the chicken was thus akin to eliminating any chances of the son marrying in the future, hence the title Killing the Wife. Moved by their selflessness and hospitality, the scholar, upon passing the Imperial Examination, repaid them greatly.

13 Relating in vivid detail the characters’ tenacity and clannishness which existed despite challenging environmental circumstances, these stories imbue in readers a recognition of cultural values Hakkas perceive as emblematic of the Hakka Spirit: hard work and human kindness. 79 By promoting behaviours deemed favourable by the community, these folktales effectively serve as “a valuable source of insight into [Hakka] character, embodying and preserving the values, beliefs and customs of the people”. 80 Beyond simply the act of publishing Hakka folklore into written text, the way Hakka Associations seek to present their stories is also worth considering. The Hakka dialect, since the 19th century, has ceased to exist as a centralized ideographic script. 81 Consequently, attempts by Singapore Hakka Associations to approximate it into the Chinese language reveals their desire to transcend the boundaries of spoken dialects; by presenting Hakka oral culture in written Chinese ideographs and prose.

This reflects their inclination to increase the folklores’ accessibility to Singaporeans, most of whom possess no fluency in reading written Hakka. 82 By placing Hakka dialect alongside Mandarin during public addresses, as well as presenting of Hakka folklore through written Chinese ideography, these programs indicate the community’s refusal to accept any treatment less than equality between Hakka dialect and Mandarin.

Hence, these beliefs exemplify the Hakka communities’ determination to retain their cultural roots through the preserving of Hakka songs, dialect and folklores that embody their values and heritage.

That said, it would be inaccurate to posit these dialect programs as an explicit resistance against the PAP-government’s homogenizing nation-building regulations. While the PAP-government has made evident its aim of replacing the use of dialects with Mandarin, these Hakka-dialect programs have not expressed any attempt to challenge this trend. Rather than replacing Mandarin with Hakka as the lingua franca in Hakka Associations, these programs instead seek the peaceful coexistence of Hakka dialect with Mandarin, whereby Hakka dialect is

79 Qiu and Xiu, 客家族群兴在地社会 Kejia Zuqunxing Zaidi Shehui [Hakka Ethnic and Local Society]; Zhong, 客家人 [Hakkas].

80 Duggan, Haase and Callow, Folktales and Fairy Tales, 473.

81 Christine Lamarre, "Early Hakka Corpora Held by the Basel Mission Library: An Introduction," Cahiers De Linguistique - Asie Orientale 31, no. 1 (2002): 71104, accessed March 18, 2018, doi:10.3406/clao.2002.1604.

82 Khoon Choy Lee, Golden Dragon and Purple Phoenix: The Chinese and Their Multi-ethnic Descendants in Southeast Asia (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013).

83 Barbara Crossette, "Western Influence Worries Singapore Chief," The New York Times, 1987, accessed March 18, 2018,

perceived as deserving equal treatment vis-à-vis Mandarin. Ultimately, the Hakka community has demonstrated their non-acquiescence towards the government’s language policy.

Chapter 3: To What End? (In)Effectiveness of Hakka Associations’ Resistance and Non-Acquiescence That said, the extent to which Hakka Associations should be credited for their recent propagation of Hakka culture and loyalties through Hakka dialect is an area worth scrutinizing. The post-1980s era, in particular, appears to be a period of flourishing for Hakka identity and culture. This was attributed to a series of conveniently placed coincidences which enabled the limited revitalization of Hakka Associations under a loosening (but not cessation of) the PAP-government’s anti-dialect nation-building policy. As noted by historian Wang Gungwu, the 1980s saw an increase in PAP-government’s acceptance towards Singapore’s national heritage, based on government perceptions of increased Westernization and its implications on Singaporeans’ loyalty towards their cultural roots. 83 Specifically, Westernization, with its replacement of Singapore’s “traditional Asian values of morality, duty and society” with “individualistic, and self-centred outlook of life”, was considered by the PAPgovernment as a threat to the formation of a favourable Singaporean national identity.84 In turn, Singapore’s preservation of its “traditional Asian” cultural heritage was posited as a remedy against the ills brought about by Westernization. Against this backdrop, the notion of “Shared Values” was raised

by First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong during a speech in 1988, before being formalized by the PAP-government in 1991. Its aim, according to the PAP, was to “evolve and anchor a Singaporean identity” shared by Singaporeans of “varied cultural heritages”, based on local values which have enabled Singapore’s socio-economic success. 85 That said, despite the PAP-government’s profession that these notions of “Shared Values” were conceptualized with all Singapore’s communities in mind, works by scholars Michael Barr and Chua Beng-Huat reveal the Confucian ideals embedded within. 86 In effect, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/04/world/western-influence-worriessingapore-chief.html 84 Joseph Foley, Language, Education and Discourse: Functional Approaches (London: Continuum, 2005), 78.

85 Charlene Tan, "“Our Shared Values” In Singapore: A Confucian Perspective," Educational Theory 62, no. 4 (2012): 449-463, accessed March 18, 2018, doi:10.1111/j.1741-5446.2012.00456.x.;

David Chan and Mui Teng

Yap, 50 Years of Social Issues in Singapore (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), 138.

86 Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne, Singapore Politics Under the People's Action Party (London: Taylor and Francis, 2002), 63; Chua, Communitarian

14 while PAP-government rhetoric championed the preservation of all communal roots and heritage, it was insomuch as they fell within concepts of Confucian ideals.87 Nevertheless, as scholar Yeh Yun-Tsui observes, the PAP-government’s anti-dialect policies were never removed, despite the championing of local cultural roots preservation in governmental rhetoric. With the PAP-government bound by its clashing interests vis-à-vis dialect-use and cultural roots, what followed was an apparent paradox. While the PAPgovernment implicitly softened its anti-dialect regulations under the notion of retaining one’s cultural roots, it explicitly reinforced the need to continue its rejection of dialect-use in public discourse. 88 While dialect music and television programs remain off airwaves, for instance, the government has, since the 1980s, stopped short of imposing an official ban on dialects in public discourse. In addition to running nightly classes for Cantonese songs in government-run community centers, the government has also allowed for Chinese dialect opera institutions to perform with little obstruction.89 The PAP-government also extended such latitude to Hakka Associations, by utilising ambiguous diction in its “Shared Values” rhetoric which granted Hakkas opportunities for cultural revitalization. A closer examination of official statements published

by Hakka Associations reveal their awareness of this latitude, and their desire to capitalize on the opportunity provided. The sentences “The Singapore government has, since the 1970s and 80s, encouraged the retention and dissemination of cultural roots and traditions held by one’s social groups”,90 “in this era of change, the Nanyang Khek Community Guild will cooperate with national and governmental interests, and make corresponding measures. [This will] enable the Hakka community to develop a close relationship with the society and nation, while pursuing mutual development” 91 and “[t]he Hakka Community Guild has encouraged its subsidiary Associations to implement Hakka cultural activities…including the holding of Hakka dialect classes”92 reflected in official publications by Hakka Associations, when read in connection, demonstrate that Hakka Associations interpreted the Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, 31; Barr and Skrbiš, Constructing Singapore, 4.

87 Ibid.

88 Lee, "SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW AT THE OPENING OF THE SPEAK MANDARIN CAMPAIGN ON FRIDAY, 21 SEP 84, AT THE SINGAPORE CONFERENCE HALL.".

89 Khium, "Limited Pidgin-type Patois?”, 217-233.

90 Xian Qiang Huang, 新 加 坡 客 家 文 化 与 社 群 Xinjiapo Kejia Wenhua Yu Shequn [Singapore Hakkas Cultures and Social Organizations] (Singapore: Humanities Press, 2008), 107-112.

government’s return-to-roots policy as indeed, latitude. The ambiguous contextualization of “cultural roots” in state policy, Hakka Associations understood, was indicative of the PAP-government’s softening stance vis-à-vis dialects; since it warranted the championing of Hakka culture as a subset of ethnic Chinese identity. Hakka Associations were therefore emboldened to pursue the simultaneous advancing of both Hakka and Chinese culture without worry of government reprisal. This resulted in the implementation of various events, such as the Hakka language classes held by CYDA in the 1980s, the public reading of Hakka and Chinese literature in the 1990s, and the formation of a Hakka choir which participated in the national event “The Night of Public and Hakka Songs” in 2007.93 Admittedly, Hakka Associations deserve credit for their capitalization on ambiguities in governmental policies. Nevertheless, preeminence should be placed upon shifting attitudes and stances of the PAP-government, since it was these changes which provided the necessary impetus for the revitalization of Hakka Associations. As recognised by historian Khun Eng-Kuah, from the late-1960s to early 1970s, Hakka Associations faced a steady drop in influence, with a decline in membership numbers and value in the eyes of the Singaporean-Hakka community.94 It was only in the 1980s that Hakka Associations, encouraged by what they saw as increased government support for dialect affiliations, were motivated to seek revitalization. By inventing new roles for themselves, Hakka Associations sought to retain their relevance to contemporary Singaporean society. Likewise, by attracting young individuals into their ranks, Hakka Associations aimed to override existing perceptions of Hakka Associations as “old-fashioned” “old men’s clubs”.95 Accordingly, while attempts by Hakka Associations to revitalize themselves appeared vigorous, it was only made possible by the PAP-government’s loosening antidialect regulations.

That said, despite the latitude granted to Hakka Associations by the PAP-government’s policies, the subsequent surge in scope and frequency of Hakka Association activities was not followed by a similar leap in Hakka Associations’ effectiveness in 91 Li Jian Wang, 新加坡客家会 馆与文化研究 Xinjiapo Kejia Huiguan Yu Wenhua

Yanjiu

[Singapore

Hakka

Associations

and

Cultural

Research] (Singapore: Global Publishing, 2012), 20.

92 Huang, 新加坡客家文化与社群 Xinjiapo Kejia Wenhua Yu Shequn [Singapore Hakkas Cultures and Social Organizations], 107-112.

93 Huang, 新加坡客家文化与社群 Xinjiapo Kejia Wenhua Yu Shequn [Singapore Hakkas’ Cultures and Social Organizations], 108-111 94 Kuah and Hu-DeHart, Voluntary Organizations in the Chinese Diaspora, 62.

95 Ibid.

15 promoting Hakka identity. As noted by Ho, whilst 1980s governmental policies have granted increased opportunities for collaborations between CYDA and external organizations in the publication of sociohistorical research and literary works, the societal demand for such scholarship has dwindled substantively. 96 Where once Association members competed for access to Hakka-related publications, participants of annual Hakka Association meetings have, in recent years, left behind books given out as part of their welcome package. 97 Such apparent public disinterest has discouraged the mass publication of Hakka scholarships, which further hampers the ability of Hakka Associations to present Hakka culture, identity and loyalties through their publications.

Hakka Associations lack both the motivation and resources to effectively promulgate Hakka culture and identities. 99 Of the Hakka Associations in Singapore, for example, only CYDA possesses both the ability and desire to implement annual Hakka dialect classes. Even so, CYDA lacks adequate structures, as the interview with Ho reveals. Caught between issues of deficient manpower and differing pronunciations across various ancestral Chinese provinces, CYDA has been unable to ensure the maintaining of a comprehensive class timetable and syllabi. 100 Correspondingly, such problems have greatly limited the duration and content of dialect classes, resulting in the teaching of only basic vocabulary insufficient for daily conversations. 101

Conclusion Of the limited Hakka literary publications published

by Hakka Associations, contemporary works have proven inadequate in communicating and cultivating Hakka culture and identities among their readers.

Rather than incorporating values and experiences representative of what Hakkas perceive as central tenets to their identity and culture, recent publications have instead presented a shift in emphasis from illustrating cultural values to mere descriptions of everyday experiences. Although relevant to the general Hakka population, the lack of depth in contemporary Hakka literature appears more as a personal anecdote than an exemplification of cultural values purportedly encapsulated by the wider Hakka community. In “Views on my Ancestral Hometown” published in 2015, for instance, the author draws focus onto her experience as a foreign-born Hakka visiting her ancestral hometown for the first time.98 Depicting her feelings of alienation vis-à-vis her socio-environmental surroundings, the work ends abruptly with a celebratory statement professing the beauty of the author’s ancestral hometown. Existing in stark contrast to Hakka folklores “Yenan Lake” and “Killing the Wife to Host an Esteemed Guest”, the absence of cultural value markers, such as clannishness and perseverance, deemed by Hakkas as central to their identity and culture in contemporary literature impede their effectiveness as a vehicle of identity formation and retention.

Beyond simply written text, attempts by Hakka Associations to teach Hakka dialects to non-speakers have also faced significant difficulties. Although The Straits Times reporter Lea Wee paints an optimistic picture of great societal demand for Hakka dialect classes, closer scrutiny reveals that

This thesis has analysed the arguments forwarded by the PAP-government and Hakka Associations surrounding dialect identity and loyalties since the PAP’s inauguration in 1959. While Hakka Associations have stressed that their actions have been in line with the government’s assimilationist anti-dialect nation-building policies, this thesis contends that Hakka Associations have instead pursued everyday-resistance and non-acquiescence.

Chapter one considers how the PAP-government’s language policies were premised on notions of dialect socio-economic inferiority vis-à-vis Mandarin, and its challenge against the PAP-defined Singapore national identity. Capitalizing on increased government latitude in the 1980s, Hakka Associations have demonstrated their resistance and non-acquiescence against governmental anti-dialect policies. Nevertheless, despite their opportunism and adaptability, Hakka Associations have largely been unsuccessful in perpetuating Hakka identity and loyalties.

Nevertheless, the diminishing influence of Hakka Associations did not happen overnight. Despite the purported successes of Hakka Association activities depicted in their publications and speeches, a deeper probe reveals that their high-water mark of sociocultural authority had passed decades ago. As my thesis suggests, the responses by Hakka Associations to government policies proved inadequate in the formation and preservation of a well-rounded Hakka identity.

The professed success of Hakka Associations, therefore, should not be taken at face-value.

Bypassing the celebratory tone encapsulated in

96 Ho. "Interview with Char Yong (Dabu) Association."

100 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

101 Abigail W.Y. Ng, "Hakkas Are in Tune with a Singing Revival," The Straits

98 小荷尖尖 Xiaohe Jianjian [Small Sharp Lotus], vol. 3 (Singapore: Singapore

Times,

Char Yong (Dabu) Association, 2015), 22.

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/hakkas-are-in-tune-with-a-singing-

99 Ho. "Interview with Char Yong (Dabu) Association."

revival.

March

2,

2017,

accessed

March

18,

2018,

16 much of publications by, or in collaboration with, Hakka Associations, a closer examination reveals that Hakka Associations are simply congratulating themselves on having attempted revitalization; even as sources reveal their awareness of dwindling Hakka societal identification and allegiance.

Essentially, Hakka attempts at revitalization are, in effect, a story of declension, whereby attempts at cultural revival have largely (if not completely) culminated in failure.

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客家精神代代传（卢致苑 杨明生领唱 /赣南）客

Yeh, Yun-Tsui. "The Change of Social Spaces within Chinese Settlements in Singapore under National Policies." Journal of Chinese Overseas 8, no. 1 (2012): 11-37. Accessed March 17, 2018. doi:10.1163/179325412x634292.

家歌 Kejia Jingshen Daidai Chuan (lu Zhi Yuan Yang Ming Sheng Lingchang Gannan Kejiage[Passing on the Hakka Spirit across Generations (led by Lu Zhi Yuan and Yang Ming Sheng)]. YouTube. June 27, 2013. Accessed March 18, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d_GInKuesFM

Yeoh, Brenda S. A. Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003.

客总会讯 Kezong Huixun [Annual Publication by the Hakka Community Guild]. Vol. 61. Singapore: Nanyang Khek Community Guild, 2015.

Yip, John Soon Kwong, and Wong Kooi Sim. Evolution of Educational Excellence: 25 Years of Education in the Republic of Singapore. Singapore: Longman, 1990.

Zhang, Wei An, Zheng Qian Fan, Kai Zhong Lin, Wei Xian Li, Han Bi Zhang, and Xing Huang Xiao. "東南亞的客家會館：歷史與功能的探 Dongnanya De Kejia Huiguan: Lishixing Gongneng De Shentao [Hakka Associations in Southeast Asia: A Historical Analysis]." Asia-Pacific Forum 28 (2005): 185-219. Accessed March 18, 2018. http://www.rchss.sinica.edu.tw/files/publish/1123_e 4cafc58.pdf.

Zhang, Wei An. "张维安：保存客家文化，发展 多 元 文 化 社 会 Zhang Weian: Baochi Kejia Wenhua, Fazhan Duoyuan Wenhua Shehui [Zhang Wei-An: Preserving Hakka Cultural Heritage While Pursuing Multiculturalism]." Xinhua News, April 1, 2014.

Accessed March 18, 2018. http://sg.xinhuanet.com/201404/01/c_126337521.htm.

小荷尖尖 Xiaohe Jianjian [Small Sharp Lotus]. Vol. 3. Singapore: Singapore Char Yong (Dabu) Association, 2015. 新加坡河婆集团成立三十周年纪念特刊 Xinjiapo Hopo Jituan Chengli Sanshi Zhounian Jinian Tekan [Hopo Corporation 30th Anniversary Special Publication]. Singapore: Hopo Corporation, 2011. 永远说不完的课题：客家文化论集 Yongyuan Shuobuwan De Keti: Kejia Wenhua Lunji [the Never-ending Debate: Hakka Cultural Studies].

Singapore: Singapore Char Yong (Dabu) Association, 2008. 腾 越 明 天 ， 共 创 辉 煌 Fengyue Mingtian, Gongchuang Huihuang [Soar into Tomorrow, Create the Future Together]. Singapore Char Yong (Dabu) Association, 2002. 茶 阳 之 声 Char Yang Zhi Sheng [Char Yong's Voice]. Vol. 45. Singapore: Char Yong (Dabu) Association, 2009.

22

Rituals, Riots, and Woeful Women? The Gendered Establishment of Christianity in Singapore Soh Chuah Meng Esmond School of Humanities History Undergraduate

Abstract - This short paper examines the lack of interest in Christianity among Chinese migrants who lived in Singapore throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two arguments are defended in this essay. Using the Chinese-led antiCatholic riots of the 1850s as a microhistorical case study, the first section challenges the assertion that the violence was rooted in economic grievances.

Instead, this paper, based on limited material evidence and testimonies, posits that differences over religious practices and rituals lay at the heart of the anti-Catholic violence. The ease by which Catholic practices were localised in nineteenth century Singapore made them potential challengers to the order dominated by male-dominated Chinese secret societies, the latter whom drew heavily upon Chinese diasporic religion to maintain their sociopolitical preponderance in early colonial Singapore.

The second part of this essay examines relaxed immigration rules that once limited female migrants from making the voyage from mainland China to Singapore since the early twentieth century. Relying upon the diaries of the Chinese preacher John Sung (Song Shangjie), who stopped in Singapore throughout his tour of Southeast Asia, this section suggests that women were especially drawn to the monogamous and salvationist tenets of Christianity.

This sentiment as expressed by women contrasted with their male secret society counterparts, who were wary of the erosion of their own power bases in Singapore during the nineteenth century.

Keywords – Women, Secret Societies, Chinese women, Christianity, Catholics, John Sung, Male– Female Ration, Song Shangjie, Missionary

Introduction “Christianity102 did not make great headway among the Singapore Chinese.”103 Although this notion has long been taken for granted, few answers have been offered as to why this had been the case given that Singapore’s geographical centrality in Southeast Asia had attracted the London Missionary Society’s (LMS) attention from as early as 1815-19. 104 By examining material evidence from the nineteenth century along with an analysis of the diaries of the evangelist John Sung in the twentieth century,105 this paper seeks to trace the Singapore Chinese’s interest in Christianity.

By virtue of periodisation, I will argue that the Chinese in Singapore lacked an interest in Christianity in the nineteenth century, given that the secret societies possessed hegemonic control over the spiritual landscape of the Singapore Chinese, a notion best demonstrated by the anti-Catholic riots of 1851. By extension, I will contend that the easing of the gender imbalance among the Singapore Chinese in the twentieth century opened a window of opportunity for Christianity to claw back some spiritual ground.

Riots and Blood: Secret Societies in pretwentieth century Singapore The 1851 anti-Catholic riots easily demonstrated the hostility that Singapore Chinese had for “converts to Christianity amongst the Chinese pepper and

102 The Oxford English Dictionary defines Christianity as the “religion of

‘Christianity’ in Asia, see Peter C. Phan, introduction to Christianities in Asia,

Christ; the Christian faith; the system of doctrines and precepts taught by Christ

ed. Peter C. Phan (Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 1-6.

and his apostles.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “Christianity,” accessed

103 Maurice Freedman, "Immigrants and Associations: Chinese in Nineteenth-

November 10, 2016,

Century Singapore," Comparative Studies in Society and History 3, no. 1 (1960):

http://www.oed.com.ezlibproxy1.ntu.edu.sg/view/Entry/32458?redirectedFrom

31.

=#eid. For the purpose of this essay, the terms ‘Christian’ and ‘Catholic’ will be

104 Bobby E.K. Sng, In His Good Time: the Story of the Church in Singapore,

used interchangeably with one another since the stratification of the various

1819-2002 (Singapore: Bible Society of Singapore, 2003), 25-38.

groups in Singapore that adhered to the teachings and philosophies of Christ prior

105 John Sung [Song Shangjie] (1901-1944) was a renowned evangelist from

to the Second World War is not at the bone of contention in this paper. For an

China who travelled around Southeast Asia (including Singapore) from 1928-

introduction into the complexities that revolve around the use of the term

1939 as a Christian missionary. For a complete biography of his life, see Lim KaTong, The Life and Ministry of John Sung (Singapore: Genesis Books, 2012).

23 gambier plantations” 106 in an orgy of violence that “covered the island in fire and flame.” 107 Conventional accounts suggest that the riots were an expression of the secret societies’ resentment that Chinese converts were breaking away from the secret societies’ control.108 On the other hand, Carl A. Trocki offered an economic rationale for the riots, arguing that the Christian communities’ circumvention of the opium distribution monopoly owned by the secret societies was at the heart of the dispute. 109 Here, I will argue in the favour of the previous’ line of thought, where the highly-localised spiritual alternative provided by Christianity constituted an existential threat to the sworn brotherhoods characteristic of the Chinese secret societies and mostly-male community in nineteenth century Singapore.

included The Perfect Man’s Model 112 (Annex A1) which married Confucian precepts with Christian tenets. 113 What was interesting about Gutzlaff’s work the text’s layout: it is printed in a style reminiscent of Chinese scriptures where characters were to be read from the top-down, right to left manner (Annex A2).

To be sure, the practices of Chinese Christians in nineteenth century Singapore remain poorly documented, but what clues available prove that Christian proselytisers and Chinese converts alike were competent to adopt ritualistic elements and decorative features commonly associated with Chinese religions to fit their own ends. Assisted by the British’s nonchalance towards the lifestyles of the Chinese before 1877, 110 coupled with the fact that Singapore existed outside of the strict surveillance systems that only allowed religious symbols to be used in religious ceremonies approved by the Qing,111 Christians in Singapore were given a freehand in manipulating and appropriating key symbols and features in Chinese religion.

Likewise, a streamer embroidered with the words ‘Jesus is coming’ 114 was seized from the Catholic communities in the aftermath of the 1851 riots 115 (Annex B1). It underscored the malleable use of icons from Chinese religions on the part of the Chinese Catholics in Singapore. Juxtaposed alongside the use of similar banners carried in front of saintly figures in the Qing dynasty (Annex B2), the Chinese Catholics could be said to have shaped once-foreign rituals into the mould of Chinese religions, knowing full well that there was a wealth of features present within Chinese religious culture that could be tapped upon to broaden the associability and appeal of a religion “which is perceived as foreign not only in the Malay world [of Singapore] but in the rest of Asia [viz. China] as well.” 116 Evidently, the Chinese-Christians’ successful appropriation of Chinese religious culture might have had been more successful than previously understood, a notion that not only drew away recruits from the secret societies, but threatened the secret societies’ raison-d’etre since this served to erode the very spiritual cum ritualistic ballast that the secret societies in Singapore were buttressed upon.117

Since 1836, in an attempt to reach out to the Chinese masses in Singapore, Carl Gutzlaff had already began publishing a series of books in Singapore that

The role of the secret societies in Singapore in eliminating any seeds of Chinese Christian influence in Singapore cannot be underestimated, given that

106 “The Overland Free Press,” The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile

111 Topley, “The Emergence and Social Function of Chinese Religious

Advertiser, March 5, 1851.

Associations in Singapore,” 290.

107 “Local,” The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, February 21,

112 全人矩获

1851.

108 Among all else, see Sng, In His Good Time, 59-61; C. M. Turnbull, A History

113 Carvalho et. al., Christianity in Asia: Sacred Art and Visual Splendour, 259.

of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 71-72; Pedro

114 耶稣再来

de Moura Carvalho et. al., Christianity in Asia: Sacred Art and Visual Splendour,

115 Carvalho et. al., Christianity in Asia: Sacred Art and Visual Splendour, 260-

ed. Alan Chong (Singapore: Asian Civilisations Museum, 2016), 255 261; Irene

61; Lim, Secret Societies in Singapore, 102. There appears be a common

Lim, Secret Societies in Singapore: Featuring the William Stirling Collection

typographical error in these sources, where the riots supposedly occurred in 1857,

(Singapore: National Heritage Board, Singapore History Museum, 1999), 22.

despite the quoted sources noting that the riots occurred in 1851. For verification,

109 Carl A. Trocki, Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore,

see Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 71-72.

1800-1910 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 107-110.

116 Edmond Kee-Fook Chia, “Malaysia and Singapore,” in Christianities in

Trocki’s response arose as a response to an earlier work by Lee Poh-Ping, where

Asia, ed. Peter C. Phan (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 82.

Trocki claimed that the latter’s economic explanation of the riots failed to hold

117 Topley, “The Emergence and Social Function of Chinese Religious

water. Lee’s argument can be viewed in: Lee Poh-Ping, Chinese Society in

Associations in Singapore,” 291, 295-96. For the mythical origins of the Heaven

Nineteenth Century Singapore (Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University

and Earth Society (tiandihui) that preceded the Ghee Hin secret society in

Press, 1978), 66-71.

Singapore, see Lim, Secret Societies in Singapore, 10-13. For an analysis of the

110 Freedman, “Immigrants and Associations,” 34; Marjorie Topley, “The

mythical and religious dimensions of the many Chinese triads, see Barend Ter

Emergence and Social Function of Chinese Religious Associations in

Haar “Myth in the Shape of History: Elusive Triad Leaders,” in Chinese Triads:

Singapore,” in Cantonese Society in Hong Kong and Singapore: Gender,

Perspectives on Histories, Identities, and Spheres of Impact (Singapore:

Religion, Medicine and Money, ed. by Jean DeBernardi (Hong Kong University

Singapore History Museum, 2002), 19-29.

Press, 2011), 290.

24 these secret societies also acted as a well of spiritual satisfaction for Chinese migrants, a facet best demonstrated by the invocation of the Chinese Deity Guan Di118 during the esoteric ceremonies (Annex C) that gave their name to these organisations. The popularity of Guan Di among secret societies can be traced to two reasons. Firstly, as Guan Di possessed hagiography coloured by fictive kinships of a homosocial nature, the concept of sworn brotherhood as invoked through esoteric rituals by Chinese secret societies in nineteenth century Singapore would have dovetailed with his worship.

Secondly, the popularity of Guan Di among early Chinese migrant communities hinged upon the martial deity’s ability to carve out, and subsequently defend, a territorial niche on his devotees’ behalf in foreign lands – the latter which included Singapore.

Guan Di worship thus pandered to two needs common to Chinese secret societies in nineteenthcentury Singapore, namely the affirmation of their homosocial makeup, and their identities as organisations who fought to maintain their foothold in a foreign land. The fact that Christianity was able to conceal its foreignness and masquerade elements of Chinese religion and the practices of the secret societies indubitably unnerved the latter. For example, the initiation rituals that called for the swearing of blood oaths were a common thread in many secret societies.119 Thus, the accusations that were heaped upon Christians in Singapore by the Chinese since 1837 became significant, not because of their grotesque nature, but by the hauntingly similar rituals that also called for the use of blood. Song Ong Siang noted that the construction of St. Andrew Cathedral was plagued by rumours on the Chinese community’s part, who believed that the building needed “the blood of thirty-six men…for the sanctification of the new church.” 120 These rumours would have intimidated the Chinese secret societies, who might have seen Christian converts as rivalling secret societies since the rituals of these Chinese Christians, be they real or imagined, were so similar to the practices employed by the secret societies in the nineteenth century.

Twentieth Century Singapore: Women and Christianity While most had credited the 1889 Society Ordinance for having driven the secret societies out of the public eye, 121 little attention has been paid to a concurrent demographic change in Singapore, namely the fact that more women began to step on her shores after the ban on emigration from mainland China was removed at the end of the nineteenth century (Annex D). 122 This critical development needs to be seen as the last nail in the secret societies’ coffin; since the Chinese in Singapore were no longer a predominantly male and homosocial community, the links of sworn brotherhood and the sacred rituals associated with the latter began to fade into obscurity. With more Chinese women, Christianity possessed the anchor that it needed to establish itself in Singapore.

An analysis of the diaries of John Sung reveals many interesting facets about the popularity of Christianity among the Chinese in Singapore. Inter alia, Sung’s entries included a number of women who turned to Christianity under his encouragement, mirroring the prominent number of women who bid him farewell at the end of his first visit to Singapore in 1935 (Annex E). 123 Although Daryl Ireland examined many forces – such as irresponsible immigrant husbands, alongside the creation of an identity purposeful for women and the latter’s subsequent empowerment and mobilisation – that nudged women towards John Sung’s cause, interaction between Sung’s proselytisation and the established patriarchal order in Singapore was largely side-lined. This section, rather than challenging Ireland’s work outright, serves to supplement his findings by examining the aforementioned relationship.

The context of late-Qing China and the status of women in Chinese migrant communities offered an explanation as to why women were so drawn to the evangelical brand of Christianity espoused by Sung.

The ubiquity of polygamy 124 and the generally subservient position of women to emigrant Chinese men 125 in the Straits Settlements of the twentieth century left an emotional landscape that was ripe for

118 关帝; Lim, Secret Societies in Singapore, 42-43.

Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), 43 and 57-60; Lee, Chinese

119 Ibid, 16.

Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore, 38-39.

120 Song Ong Siang, One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore

123 “700 Chinese Weep On Wharf: DYNAMIC EVANGELIST GOES HOME,”

(Singapore: University Malaya Press, 1967), 85.

The Straits Times, October 27, 1935.

121 Lim, Secret Societies in Singapore, 27; Freedman, “Immigrants and

124 Song, One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore, 120; Natalie

Associations,” 38; Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 103.

Oswin, “Sexual Tensions in Modernizing Singapore: The Postcolonial and the

122 William Skinner, “Creolised Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia,” in

Intimate,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28 (2010): 134-136.

Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, ed.

125 Ta Chen, “The Family,” in Emigrant Communities in South China: A Study

Anthony Reid (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 86; Wang Gungwu, The Chinese

of Overseas Migration and Its Influence (New York: Institute of Pacific

Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy (Cambridge,

Relations, 1940), 129. Reprinted in Liu Hong, ed. The Chinese Overseas, 118– 148.

25 Sung’s brand of preaching, where egalitarianism was expounded in the name of Christianity. During Sung’s visit to Telok Ayer Methodist Church in 1935, 126 his diary spoke of two events that demonstrated how powerful the Christian doctrine was in influencing the lives of Chinese women for the better. Gan Bim Yeck, described by Sung as a “well-known import and export businessman,” chose to end his practice of polygamy, divorcing two of his three wives at the end of one of Sung’s sermons.127 This would have left an indelible mark upon Gan’s concubines, the latter who might have seen Sung’s compelling sermon as the cause of their liberation from a polygamous union. Likewise, the singing of Sung’s congregation attracted the attention of two women who were wives of a polygamous “commercial advertisement artist,” who not only left their “unrepentant husband” but “sought training at (the) Chien Lien Bible School” as well.128 The focus on women as individualistic entities who were entitled to seeking salvation from God, as noted

by Ireland, contrasted with the lower status occupied by married women vis-à-vis their husbands in polygamous unions. The egalitarian and individualistic premises of John Sung’s sermons were thus difficult to resist, as demonstrated by the two afore-mentioned examples.

Women, in search of alternatives to the usually oppressive relationships shared with their husbands and the patriarchal Chinese societies of the late-Qing were thus attracted to Sung’s preaching, which not only promised them spiritual salvation and grace, but a means of building the moral basis of their resistance against the oppressive and polygamous marriage systems that proliferated among the Chinese in twentieth century Singapore. Sung’s orders to Singapore’s evangelistic bands in 1936 repeated his demand for church leaders to “show fairness to all and favour no one,” 129 accentuating the spirit of equality of all, be they man or woman, before God, an egalitarian proposition that women would have found refreshing, if not liberating, in the still ubiquitous hierarchal (and often repressive) social structures adopted by Chinese communities in twentieth century Singapore.

Like the role of homosocial relationships between male members of Chinese secret societies in the preceding century, the agency of Chinese women in swinging the religious pendulum in the favour of the Christianity in twentieth century Singapore should not be underestimated. Christianity in twentieth century Singapore, as Sung’s diary had demonstrated, had the emotional and gendered beachhead that it had lacked previously.

Conclusion All in all, this paper does not seek to claim the last word on the establishment of Christianity among the Singapore Chinese. In nineteenth century Singapore, based on the material evidence available, the Chinese Christians in Singapore had successfully ridden upon various elements of Chinese religious culture. This development would have unnerved the secret societies, prompting them to eliminate any trace of Christian influence among the Chinese.

Subsequently, with more women being allowed to leave China by the end of the nineteenth century, the twentieth century created a demographic that was conducive to the establishment of Christianity among the Chinese in Singapore. Thus, the gendered appeal of Christianity among the Singapore Chinese, inter alia, deserves a fair amount of future inquiry and study.

Annex A1

Source: Museum exhibit, Quanren Juhuo [The Perfect Man’s Model], cat. 119, Asian Civilisations Museum, Singapore. Photograph taken by the author on August 27, 2016.

126 Song Shangjie, The Diary of John Sung: Extracts from his Journals and

127 Ibid, 240.

Notes, trans. Thng Pheng Soon, comp. Levi (Singapore: Genesis Books, 2012),

128 Ibid, 240-241.

239.

129 Ibid, 274.

26 Annex A2

Annex B1

The inside of the Quanren Juhao. Note how the text is aligned in a fashion that would have been familiar to a curious Chinese reader in the nineteenth century.

Source from: Pedro de Moura Carvalho et. al., Christianity in Asia: Sacred Art and Visual Splendour, ed. Alan Chong (Singapore: Asian Civilisations Museum, 2016), 257.

Source: Museum exhibit, Christian Streamer [embroidered with耶稣再来 – Jesus is Coming], cat.

120, Asian Civilisations Museum, Singapore.

Photograph taken by the author on August 27, 2016.

27 Annex B2

Annex C

Source: Museum exhibit, The William Stirling Collection: Altar Paraphernalia (Illustration of Guan Di, God of War), National Museum, Singapore.

Photograph taken by the author on September 12, 2016. 阴 曹 地 府 行 刑 的 夜 叉 。 清 代 [Qing dynasty painting of yakshas torturing sinners in the Netherworld]. Note the similarities between the banners carried in front of the incorrupt officials in the foreground of the painting with the streamer in Annex B1. Source from: Ma, Shutian, Zhongguo Gui Shen [Ghostly Deities of China] (Beijing: United Publishing, 2007), 213.

Annex D

Estimated sex ratios of Chinese men to Chinese women in Singapore during then nineteenth century.

Note how the disproportionate presentation of men only tapered off by the end of the nineteenth century.

Source: Lee Poh-Ping, Chinese Society in Nineteenth

28 Century Singapore (Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 39.

Annex E

Freedman, Maurice. "Immigrants and Associations: Chinese in Nineteenth-Century Singapore." Comparative Studies in Society and History 3, no. 1 (1960): 25-48.

Haar, Barend Ter. “Myth in the Shape of History: Elusive Triad Leaders.” In Chinese Triads: Perspectives on Histories, Identities, and Spheres of Impact, 19-32. Singapore: Singapore History Museum, 2002.

Lee, Poh-Ping. Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore. Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Lim, Irene. Secret Societies in Singapore: Featuring the William Stirling Collection. Singapore: National Heritage Board, Singapore History Museum, 1999.

The turnout at John Sung’s farewell when he departed from Singapore in 1935. Note the relatively large representation of women in the foreground of the photograph. Source: Song Shangjie, The Diary of John Sung: Extracts from his Journals and Notes, trans. Thng Pheng Soon, comp. Levi (Singapore: Genesis Books, 2012), 245.

Bibliography “700 Chinese Weep On Wharf: DYNAMIC EVANGELIST GOES HOME.” The Straits Times, October 27, 1935.

“Local.” The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser. February 21, 1851.

“The Overland Free Press.” The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser. March 5, 1851.

Chen, Ta. “The Family.” In Emigrant Communities in South China: A Study of Overseas Migration and Its Influence. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. Reprinted in Liu Hong, ed. The Chinese Overseas, 118–148.

Chia, Edmond Kee-Fook. “Malaysia and Singapore.”

In Christianities in Asia, edited by Peter C. Phan, 7796. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Carvalho, Pedro de Moura, Clement Onn, Istvan Perczel, Kenneth Parry, Lauren Arnold, Maria da Conceição Borges de Sousa and William Robert Sargent. Christianity in Asia: Sacred Art and Visual Splendour. Edited by Alan Chong. Singapore: Asian Civilisations Museum, 2016.

Lim, Ka-Tong. The Life and Ministry of John Sung.

Singapore: Genesis Books, 2012.

Ma, Shutian. Zhongguo Gui Shen [Ghostly Deities of China]. Beijing, United Publishing, 2007.

Oswin, Natalie. “Sexual Tensions in Modernizing Singapore: The Postcolonial and the Intimate.”

Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28 (2010): 128-141.

Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v.

“Christianity.” Accessed November 10, 2016. http://www.oed.com.ezlibproxy1.ntu.edu.sg/view/E ntry/32458?redirectedFrom=christianity#eid.

Phan, Peter C. Introduction to Christianities in Asia, ed. Peter C. Phan, 1-8 Malden, MA : WileyBlackwell, 2011.

Skinner,William. “Creolised Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia,” in Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese, edited Anthony Reid, 51-93. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996.

Sng, Bobby E.K. In His Good Time: the Story of the Church in Singa pore, 1819-2002. Singapore: Bible Society of Singapore, 2003.

Song, Ong Siang. One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore. Singapore: University Malaya Press, 1967.

Song, Shangjie. The Diary of John Sung: Extracts from his Journals and Notes. Translated by Thng Pheng Soon and compiled by Levi. Singapore: Genesis Books, 2012.

29 Topley, Marjorie. “The Emergence and Social Function of Chinese Religious Associations in Singapore.� In Cantonese Society in Hong Kong and Singapore: Gender, Religion, Medicine and Money, edited by Jean DeBernardi, 175-202. Hong Kong University Press, 2011.

Trocki, Carl A. Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800-1910.

Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Turnbull, C. M. A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Wang, Gungwu. The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy.

Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000.

30

Colonialism’s Contradictions – Japanese Healthcare Policies in Singapore, 1942- 1945 Tejala Niketan Rao School of Humanities History Undergraduate

Abstract - This essay will examine healthcare in Singapore during the Japanese Occupation, focusing not only on the daily operations of the healthcare system, but also how the Japanese administration managed medical emergencies such as epidemics.

The Japanese authorities’ attempts to create a medical system in Singapore distinct from the British medical system were linked to the broader project of the Japanese colonization of Singapore and the rejection of the West that constituted a significant pillar of Japanese colonialism in Asia.

This essay will primarily focus on the Japanese colonization of Singapore from 1942 to 1945.

Although the period of Japanese colonization in Singapore was shorter than in other countries and shortened due to the defeat of the Japanese, there were still significant impacts within that time-frame.

I would argue that the case of Singapore, when compared with the medical systems implemented by the Japanese in other regions they governed, highlights the contradictions inherent in colonization. This was evident in the Japanese administration co-opting local medical authorities in Singapore during the Occupation – while this serves as an example of their colonization process, it also highlights the contradictions and ironies present in the Japanese colonization process. While these contradictions were inherent in Japanese colonization, they were arguably worsened by the circumstances of wartime Singapore – namely, the war-induced shortages of medicine, labour, and so on. This in turn resulted in the Japanese co-opting more local labour and making more compromises, in turn making the contradictions in their colonization more evident. This is evident in how the Japanese handled malaria in Taiwan and Singapore, and later on, in how they treated alternative systems of medicine, such as traditional Chinese medicine, that operated outside the medical institutions run by the Japanese. These case studies demonstrated not only the contradictions and ironies inherent in Japanese colonization, but also how wartime conditions exacerbated these contradictions, and the fluidity of Japanese colonization as it attempted to respond to the circumstances of wartime Singapore.

Keywords – Wartime Singapore, medical history, medicine, Singapore history, Southeast Asian history, colonialism

Introduction This essay will first examine the Japanese framing of health and medicine in relation to Japanese ideologies, before proceeding to demonstrate how these beliefs about health and medicine were manifested in Singapore, and the contradictions that arose as a result. Apart from examining Singapore, this essay will adopt a comparative approach and examine how disease was treated in other Japanese colonies in Asia, focusing specifically on the case study of malaria and Taiwan. Examining how the Japanese framed and treated disease within their colonies allows us to better understand the policies implemented in Singapore as part of Japanese colonization.

Furthermore, examining the differences between policies implemented in Taiwan and Singapore highlights the fluidity of Japanese colonization and how it cannot be considered as a monolithic entity. To examine Japanese healthcare policies in Singapore, I will examine newspaper articles from the Syonan Shimbun, the main newspaper in Singapore at the time and a means of propaganda for the Japanese, along with interviews with the locals in Singapore who lived through the Japanese Occupation. This approach provides a better understanding of the propaganda spread by the Japanese administration and contrasts it with the lived experience of the people, thereby revealing the ironies present in Japanese colonization.

Japanese Ideology In order to understand Japanese healthcare policies in Singapore, it is first necessary to understand Japanese ideology about healthcare. Japanese ideology about Japan’s position in the world and its role as the “liberator and leader of a newly united Asia,” as well as Japanese beliefs about medicine

31 and healthcare.130 Healthcare, namely the concept of public health, was a central pillar of Japanese ideology. The Japanese view of healthcare based upon the premise that the state was akin to a human body, and that the individuals within it were part of this larger body – hence, the health of the individual was closely tied to the overall health of the state. 131 Thus, this led to the establishment of the public health system as a central part of the state – measures implemented by the state to monitor and gauge the health of the individuals within the state, and therefore ensure the health of the state itself. 132 This resulted in healthcare being viewed as a “national responsibility,” with diseases being perceived as “national enemies.”133 When these ideas about healthcare and medicine were translated into policy in countries colonized by the Japanese, they were often merged with Japanese rhetoric justifying its colonialism. By “embracing” Japanese rule and emulating Japan, the countries of Asia could “overcome the damage” that had been caused by Western colonialism and involvement in Asia and achieve progress and prosperity. 134 In this paradigm, the West, namely Britain and America, were perceived as having exploited the people of Asia and deliberately fostering “communal ill will” amongst them, who otherwise possessed a “common heritage.” 135 This Japanese ideology emphasized that other countries in Asia were “ignorant and of low intelligence” and hence needed Japanese guidance to advance and to unite as one people unhindered by the divisions that the Western colonial powers had created. 136 Hence, with the combination of these ideas about healthcare, and the Japanese position in Asia, the Japanese viewed themselves, and by extension their healthcare system, as modernizers of Asia who would improve the health of the colonized peoples of Asia, and therefore benefit them as a whole.137

With Clean Bill of Health,” published on 2 January 1943 commemorating the start of the new year, which discusses how Singapore maintained a “clean bill of health” in 1942 due to the “effective and prompt measures” the Japanese authorities implemented, specifically the work done by the Syonan Medical Department. 138 The article proceeds to discuss the infectious diseases affecting Singapore, such as dysentery and typhoid, and the vaccinations and inoculations the Japanese implemented to halt the spread of such diseases and prevent their recurrence.139 The article proceeds to highlight how the healthcare system implemented by the Japanese was allegedly better than that implemented by the British, through comparing the decrease in the number of cases of typhoid during the Japanese Occupation with data from the pre-war years.140 These types of articles tended to focus on the improvements and advances of the Japanese system in comparison to the previous system of healthcare under the British – one such article published in September 1942 claimed that more vaccinations against diseases such as dysentery, typhoid, and smallpox had been performed during the Occupation up until that time than during the British era.141

This was evident in the articles published in the Syonan Shimbun championing the medical system that the Japanese implemented in Singapore. One such case would be an article, “Syonan Starts Year

However, closer examination into the foundations of the Japanese medical system highlighted the contradictions that arose when it was paired with Japanese anti-Western ideology. Firstly, the nature of the modern Japanese healthcare ideology, with its focus on a public health system as a central tenet, was inspired by Western theories about public health administration – in fact, the close relationship between the state’s integrity and public health was inspired by the work of German writers such as Rudolf Virchow’s “social medicine” and Otto von Bismarck’s “social policy,” as well as models of public health administration in European countries such as Prussia. 142 Hence, here arises one of the fundamental ironies that arose with Japanese colonial medicine – although it was steadfastly antiWest, the medical system that it was championing had in fact been inspired by Western theories and

130 Paul Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/article/syonantimes19430102

History (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1998), 132.

-1.2.24.

131 Sabine Frühstück, “Managing the Truth of Sex in Imperial Japan,” The

139 Ibid.

Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 2 (May 2000): 334.

140 Ibid.

132 Ibid, 334-335.

141 “Fight Against Dysentery, Typhoid And Smallpox,” Shonan Times (Syonan

133 Ku Ya Wen, “Anti-malaria Policy and Its Consequences in Colonial Taiwan,”

Shimbun),

in Disease, Colonialism, and the State: Malaria in Modern East Asian History,

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/syonantimes1942090

ed. Ka-che Yip (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 33.

8-

134 Kratoska, Japanese Occupation, 132-133.

1.2.13?ST=1&AT=filter&K=research+laboratory&KA=research+laboratory&

135 Ibid, 132.

DF=&DT=&AO=true&NPT=&L=&CTA=&NID=syonantimes&CT=&WC=&

136 Wen, “Anti-malaria Policy,” 34

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137 Wen, “Anti-malaria Policy,” 34

142 Fruhstuck, “Managing the Truth of Sex,” 334.

138 “Syonan Starts Year With Clean Bill of Health,” Shonan Times (Syonan Shimbun),

15

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32 systems. This was evident even in the Japanese’s framing of tropical diseases such as malaria. The Japanese framing of malaria and treatment of it was closely connected to the broader sphere of global malariology; the Japanese monitored Western malariology programs to understand how to control and treat malaria, a significant obstacle to the Western colonization of Asia, so as to demonstrate Japan’s “status as a new colonial medical power.”143 This was reflected in the mosquito-targeting approach utilized by the Japanese in Taiwan and Singapore that focused on destroying the habitats mosquitoes were breeding in – this approach was based on British and American malariologists’ work and resulting theory that eliminating the species of mosquito that transmitted malaria would eliminate the disease as well. 144 This fundamental contradiction would only be exacerbated by the conditions of wartime Singapore that forced the Japanese to make compromises and changes to the policies they had implemented in Taiwan, which in turn exacerbated the existing contradictions.

Case Study: Malaria in Colonial Taiwan In order to understand Japanese colonial policies regarding healthcare, one important case study would be that of Taiwan, specifically how the Japanese contended with malaria in colonial Taiwan.

Taiwan’s position as the starting-point for the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia means that understanding Japanese colonial policies regarding healthcare implemented in Taiwan would provide insight into the Japanese approach towards healthcare in Southeast Asia and Singapore. 145 Furthermore, Taiwan was where the Japanese had to contend with tropical diseases, as well as the tropical climate that accompanied those diseases. Hence, examining the Japanese approach towards tackling a tropical disease like malaria in colonial Taiwan provides a better understanding of their approach towards tackling malaria and similar diseases in Singapore, as well as insight into how this approach changed or was modified over time to adapt to changing circumstances. Ku Ya Wen’s work on Japanese anti-malaria measures in Taiwan explains how these measures could be divided into two broad categories: the “human approach” and the “mosquito approach.”146 The first approach focused on treating the afflicted with quinine as well as blood

testing; the second focused on targeting mosquitoes and either killing them or reducing their population through all available methods.147 This two-pronged approach was rooted in Japanese conceptions of illness and disease; indeed, the mosquito-approach that focused on changing the environment to prevent mosquitoes breeding was derived from the “miasma” theory, brought by early Western missionaries to Taiwan and later adopted by the Japanese.148 In their governance of Taiwan, the Japanese used the miasma theory as a base on which to build their understanding of malaria, arguing that Taiwan’s tropical environment was the main cause for malaria, as the environment allowed for the flourishing of mosquitoes and therefore for the proliferation of malaria, since mosquitoes were perceived as the main “vector” of transmission of the disease. 149 This issue regarding the environment was, to the Japanese administration of Taiwan, further compounded by what they perceived as the “uncivilized” behaviour of the indigenous Taiwanese people. 150 This was because malaria was “almost an accepted way of life among the indigenous people” and they did not “respond actively” to government anti-malaria measures.151 All this was subsequently reflected in how the Japanese would later tackle malaria in Singapore, with the mosquito-approach being emphasized, in part due to the limited stocks of quinine as a result of wartime shortages. Interviews from the National Archives of Singapore with those who participated in the anti-malaria campaigns highlight how the mosquito-approach was implemented in wartime Singapore – these campaigns not only focused on keeping the environment clean, but also on destroying mosquitoes’ habitats.152 Shanmugasivanathan recalls that his work as a sanitary officer during the Japanese Occupation included the duties of a larvae searcher, such as “search[ing for] and kill[ing]” mosquito larvae that carried diseases. 153 This mosquito-focused approach is reflected in articles published in the Syonan Shimbun over the course of the Japanese Occupation. One such article was one that was published in May 1942, not long after the start of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore. This article, titled “Waging War On Malaria And Mosquitoes,” was published as part of

143 Shiyung Liu, “An overview of public health development in Japan-ruled

148 Shiyung Liu, “The Theory and Practice of Malariology in Colonial Taiwan,”

Taiwan,” in Death at the Opposite Ends of the Eurasian Continent: Mortality

in Disease, Colonialism, and the State: Malaria in Modern East Asian History,

Trends in Taiwan and the Netherlands 1850-1945, ed. Theo Engelen et al.

ed. Ka-che Yip (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 49-50.

(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 174.

149 Ibid, 52.

144 Wen, “Anti-malaria Policy,” 40.

150 Ibid, 50.

145 Hsien-Yu Chin, “Colonial Medical Police and Postcolonial Medical

151 Ibid, 52.

Surveillance Systems in Taiwan, 1895-1950s,” Osiris 13 (1998): 327.

152 Shanmugasivanathan, interview with Tan Beng Luan, April 7, 1983,

146 Wen, “Anti-malaria Policy,” 35.

accession number 000263, National Archives of Singapore.

147 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

33 a series of talks on the subject “Health is Wealth.” 154 This article is notable in that it describes the policy of the Health Department as “wag[ing] war on all mosquitoes” through destroying their breedinggrounds. 155 The use of the metaphor of war is significant as it suggests the intensity with which the Health Department regarded its mission to handle malaria. Furthermore, given the wartime context, it could be argued that this was an attempt to tie the fight against malaria to the broader context of the war, by implying that the mosquitoes were as much of an enemy as the rival countries. This perception of malaria as a national enemy that threatened the security of the state was one that was prevalent in Japanese perceptions of disease and was reflected in their perception of malaria in Taiwan as part of the ‘miasma’ that was inherent to Taiwan’s environment.156 However, while the approach adopted by the Japanese to tackle malaria in Singapore may have been a continuation of the approach used in Taiwan, it would be inaccurate to deem these two approaches as completely identical. It can be argued that the Japanese choosing to adopt the mosquito-approach instead of the human-focused approach in Singapore was due to wartime conditions. The shortage of medicine due to war meant focusing on treating malaria in those who had contracted it was not a feasible solution and it was far more resourceefficient to focus on preventing malaria; this meant that the Japanese had to adopt the mosquitoapproach instead of the human approach due to the lack of resources to support the human-focused approach.

Japanese approach to malaria in Singapore placed greater emphasis on cooperation with the locals – this is evident in a June 1942 Syonan Shimbun interview with Dr Kozo Ando, Chief of the Medical Department in Japanese-occupied Singapore at the time. Ando’s emphasis on the “co-operation of the public” being necessary in order for the anti-malaria drive to be effective suggests that the administration viewed cooperation with the locals as an integral part of its anti-malaria approach. 158 This need for cooperation from the locals was in fact an established feature of the Japanese anti-malaria approach – a 1944 article published in the Syonan Shimbun titled “Nippon Medical Science is Playing Big Part in Malai” and commemorating the second anniversary of the start of the Japanese Occupation highlighted the cooperation of locals as a key factor in preventing epidemics and reducing infectious diseases, bringing them closer to the aim of a “clean Syonan.”159

One significant aspect of the Japanese approach to malaria in Singapore was its emphasis on the need for the locals to cooperate with the Japanese administration. This marked a departure from the Japanese’s confrontational attitude towards indigenous medicine in Taiwan. 157 In contrast, the

This need for cooperation with the locals was not merely limited to propaganda efforts; it was reflected in the type of people working as part of this approach. Tan Wee Eng recalls how the staff of the anti-mosquito department was multi-racial; according to him, no race was discriminated against or favoured by the civilian authorities. 160 Furthermore, research into newspaper archival sources reveals that local doctors were often called upon to disseminate information about anti-malaria measures – this is evident in a 1944 article providing information on Dr CJ Paglar’s speech to the local population on how to prevent and cure malaria as well as precautions to prevent mosquitoes from breeding. 161 In the capacity of a leader of the Eurasian community in Singapore, Doctor Paglar offered recommendations that paralleled the Japanese’s own in Singapore. 162 The advice given

by Dr Paglar for people to keep their surroundings clean to prevent mosquitoes breeding aligns with the mosquito-focused approach adopted by the Japanese

154 “Waging War On Malaria And Mosquitoes,” Shonan Times (Syonan

159 “Nippon Medical Science Is Playing Big Part in Malai,” Shonan Times

Shimbun), May 2 1942, accessed April 11, 2018,

(Syonan

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155 Ibid.

160 Wee Eng Tan, interview with Tan Beng Luan, June 5, 1985, accession

156 Wen, “Anti-malaria Policy,” 33.

number 000566, National Archives of Singapore.

157 Wen, “Anti-malaria Policy,” 43-44.

161 “Malaria Can Exact Heavier Toll On Human Life Than War Itself,” Shonan

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&QT=mosquitoes&oref=article

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162 Ibid.

34 administration. 163 Hence, this suggests that in Singapore, local doctors whose perceptions of disease aligned with the Japanese perceptions of disease were co-opted into serving in the Japaneserun healthcare system and mediating between the Japanese administration and the locals. As the following section will show, this phenomenon was not limited to anti-malaria treatment alone but appears to have been a feature of the Japanese administration’s healthcare system in Singapore. I would argue that in the case of malaria at least, the increased emphasis the Japanese placed on cooperation when tackling malaria in Singapore highlights that they understood that their prior approach in Taiwan had not been effective and that modifications needed to be made in order to increase the effectiveness of their approach, in order for their state-building process to be more effective; their choice of approach too reflects an adaptation to wartime shortages of medicine in Singapore. This revealed a fluidity to Japanese colonization that will be discussed in the subsequent sections, as the Japanese attempted to adjust their approach to Singapore’s specific conditions and wartime circumstances.

in that instead of using the Japanese language or Nippon-go to disseminate this information, they were using local dialects, therefore highlighting that the Japanese administration understood that the reality of Japanese colonization on the ground was far more complicated, even with regard to the locals who worked for them. This was evident in other events, such as anti-epidemic talks conducted by local doctors speaking to members of their own communities in their own dialects as opposed to Japanese.166 This was because for many in Malaya, the Japanese language was difficult to learn and despite the presence of classes, the fact that many working adults had also to work normal jobs during the day and then later on, had to maintain home gardens as part of the campaign to grow more food, meant that it was “impossible to achieve proficiency.”167 Hence, as a result, the use of Malay and even English had to be permitted for administrative matters. 168 This need to employ the local dialects was subsequently reflected in the outreach efforts conducted by the Japanese administration and therefore highlighted an acknowledgement of and concession to the reality on the ground.

On Incorporating Local Authority

This reliance on local medical authority was also reflected in the hiring practices of the Japanese administration when staffing the medical service during the Occupation – although there were Japanese doctors working in Singapore, many of the doctors were also locals who had worked under the British and were incorporated into the Japanese civil medical administration. 169 According to T.J. Danaraj, a doctor during the Japanese Occupation, while the Japanese retained control over the highest positions and authority of the medical departments in the different states in Singapore and Malaya, many local non-Japanese doctors could still obtain high positions in the medical service, with hospital care becoming their “responsibility” and the Japanese refraining from interfering with their “management of hospitals or treatment of the patients.” 170 Ernest Monteiro concurs, stating that the local doctors “literally ran the medical service” and that the medical treatment that they provided

As mentioned earlier, this increased focus on local cooperation and use of local doctors to spread propaganda and therefore perform a type of mediation between the Japanese administration and ordinary people was not limited to the treatment of malaria; in fact, local doctors and their authority were called upon for other aspects of healthcare as well. Continuing the previous section’s analysis of local doctors’ role in disseminating information about healthcare, this was not merely limited to malaria, but rather to diseases in general as well.

Apart from his speech on preventing malaria, Dr Paglar delivered other talks about germs and diseases, such as one organized in 1944 that was presided over by Dr Sato, an official from the Health Department. 164 This was one of a series of talks conducted as part of a Health Week campaign – apart from Dr Paglar, other local doctors also spoke on various health topics in non-Japanese tongues.165 It can be argued that this was a type of compromise 163 Ibid.

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164 “'Be Germ-Conscious' Warns Dr Paglar In Health Talk,” Shonan Times

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(Syonan Shimbun), May 8, 1944, accessed April 10, 2018,

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&QT=mosquitoes&oref=article

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167 Kratoska, Japanese Occupation, 130.

true&NPT=&L=&CTA=&NID=syonantimes&CT=&WC=&YR=&P=2&Displ

168 Ibid.

ay=0&filterS=0&QT=mosquitoes&oref=article

169 Ibid, 192.

165 Ibid.

170 T.J. Danaraj, Japanese Invasion of Malaya and Singapore: Memoirs of a

166 “Anti-Epidemic Talks to Public,” Shonan Times (Syonan Shimbun), July 19,

Doctor (Kuala Lumpur: T.J. Danaraj, 1990), 119.

1944, accessed April 12, 2018,

35 was the “best available.” 171 This was a contrast to the system under the British, where local doctors not only earned less money than the British doctors, they also did not have the chance to achieve higher qualifications or perform major surgery even if their skill level was equal to that of British doctors; promotion was also much harder for local doctors as compared to British doctors. 172 This increased reliance on local doctors was reflected in other measures as well – the traveling dispensaries used by the Health Department were under the charge of Dr Doraisingham, a non-Japanese. 173 Given that these dispensaries were meant to provide medicine as well as healthcare advice to people in the rural areas of Singapore, this hence suggests that the Japanese recognized the value of local medical authorities in effectively propagating their version of healthcare.

Hence, the fact that the need for intermediaries was recognized by the Japanese administration and measures were implemented to fill this need suggests that the Japanese colonization process had to operate with a certain level of fluidity in its responses to the unique circumstances of wartime Singapore. However, this fluidity also underscored another contradiction in Japanese colonialism in Singapore. Apart from the contradiction between the anti-West ideology espoused by the Japanese and the Western-inspired healthcare models and treatments of diseases that they adopted, the case study of local doctors being co-opted into the Japanese healthcare system highlights an irony with the operation of Japanese colonialism at groundlevel. Although the Japanese wished to civilize the locals through implementing their own modes of healthcare, they were still reliant upon local doctors to disseminate information to the community. This hence highlighted the Japanese intimacy with the “native[s]” of Singapore, a phenomenon that I would argue was endemic to colonialism in general.174 Like the British in colonial India, the Japanese were placed in the contradictory position of establishing that their healthcare system was superior to the British system and the locals’ methods of managing disease, while at the same time relying on the local doctors, who had generally been trained under the British, to disseminate their information. Hence, this adoption by the Japanese of the ‘uncivilized’ locals as part of their healthcare system and their usage of

languages other than Japanese to communicate with the locals reveals one of the ironies of the process of Japanese colonialism in Singapore. These compromises, made in order to deal with Singapore’s wartime conditions, would only make these ironies and contradictions more evident and thereby negatively affect the process of colonization, as the subsequent section will demonstrate in its analysis of how the Japanese administration dealt with alternative systems of medicine.

Discrediting Alternatives – How Effective Was It? The contradictions and ironies present in Japanese colonialism, along with wartime constraints, ultimately weakened it, and this became apparent in how it failed to completely discredit and prevent alternative systems of medicine, such as traditional Chinese medicine, from operating. Apart from promoting the importance of their system of healthcare through stressing how it was allegedly superior to the previous British system, the Japanese administration in Singapore also discredited alternative systems of medicine, one notable case in point being traditional Chinese medicine. For many Chinese, especially those who were lower-income, uneducated or from vernacular-educated communities, traditional Chinese medicine was still preferable to Western medicine, according to Loh Kah Seng. 175 Loh attributes this preference for traditional Chinese medicine to the “social dynamics of Chinese migration,” where many Chinese who immigrated to Singapore continued to maintain links to their ancestral villages in China through various means, such as through temples, “huiguans” (clan associations), community schools, and medical halls set up by Chinese community leaders and businessmen.176 Hence, many Chinese immigrants, especially those from lower-income communities, preferred traditional Chinese medicine and physicians trained in that school of medicine over Western medicine and Western-trained physicians; in fact, many only visited Western clinics and hospitals during the terminal stage of their illness. 177 Loh argues that this resulted in a “vicious cycle” by causing many Chinese to view Western medical institutions as “death houses,” thereby further increasing their mistrust of this system of medicine,

171 Ernest Steven Monteiro, Interview with Pitt Kuan Wah, October 9, 1984,

ay=0&AO=true&NPT=&L=&CTA=&NID=syonantimes&CT=&WC=&YR=

accession number 000488, National Archives of Singapore.

&QT=kozo,ando&oref=article

172 Ibid.

174 Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern

173 “Travelling Dispensaries Busy At Work In Syonan,” Shonan Times (Syonan

India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 46.

Shimbun), August 21, 1942, accessed April 11, 2018,

175 Kah Seng Loh, Making and Unmaking the Asylum: Leprosy and Modernity

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Development Centre (SIRD), 2009), 38.

1.2.47?ST=1&AT=filter&K=kozo+ando&KA=kozo+ando&DF=&DT=&Displ

176 Ibid.

177 Ibid, 39.

36 making them less likely to turn to it to treat their ailments. 178 I would further argue that these decisions made by the Chinese to rely more on traditional Chinese medicine, however intentional or unintentional, revealed that a significant proportion of Singapore’s population preferred a system of medicine that operated outside of the framework of hospitals and clinics that comprised the British colonial healthcare system and later on, the Japanese healthcare system instituted in Singapore.

I would argue that the existence of this other system of medicine was viewed as a threat by the Japanese administration as it limited the extent of their reach over the people of Singapore – when a significant portion of the population chose to go to medical institutions that were outside the Japanese colonial medical framework, this meant that the administration was less able to monitor the population and by extension, bring them under the control of the Japanese administration. Furthermore, beyond merely the issue of allowing people to evade colonial control, I would argue that the existence and popularity of Chinese medicine amongst a significant portion of the population posed an ideological threat as well, through countering the Japanese propaganda about their system of medicine and healthcare being superior to other systems, thereby contradicting Japanese propaganda that their system of healthcare was sufficiently advanced to Western and other Asian modes of medicine. That the Japanese viewed local traditions as uncivilized and responsible for causing illness is evident in the case study of malaria in colonial Taiwan mentioned earlier – the indigenous people of Taiwan were viewed as “pre-modern,” by the Japanese, who felt the need to “reform” their “uncivilized” ways to prevent them from contracting malaria, highlighting how medicine and healthcare were considered part of the broader Japanese colonizing mission to modernize the countries under Japan’s rule. 179

1944 newspaper report in the Shonan Shimbun highlights – this report describes how Chinese medical practitioners and shops that sold Chinese medicine and herbs had to apply for certificates of registration “in accordance with the poisons and deleterious drugs ordinance.” 180 This was because Chinese medicine shops, like other local medical practitioners, “in the course of their business, [had] poisons and deleterious drugs in their possession.”181 While this may be perceived as an attempt by the Japanese administration to extend their control over alternative systems of medicine by regulating them, I would further argue that this means of regulation also served as a means of discrediting traditional Chinese medicine – by deeming the herbs and other substances employed in Chinese medicine as poisons, this eroded the boundary between Western medicine, perceived as toxic by a significant proportion of the Chinese community, and Chinese traditional medicine, perceived as the more effective and healthier alternative. As a result, traditional Chinese medicine could not be perceived as a healthier alternative to Western medicine, as this ordinance grouped it and Western medicine together as both systems of medicine allegedly used substances classified by the administration as poisonous.

One method through which the Japanese attempted to discredit traditional Chinese medicine in Singapore was through regulation that linked it to poisons. This was evident in the case of the Poisonous and Deleterious Drugs Ordinance, as a

This discrediting of Chinese traditional medicine through regulating it in the same means as Western medicine was paired with the Japanese administration’s linking of Chinese medicine shops to profiteering. An article published in 1943 describes a case of the owner of a Chinese medicine shop being charged under the Food Control Ordinance and fined overcharging for medicines, specifically ‘Aspro’ tablets. 182 Slightly more than three weeks later, the newspaper published another report on another Chinese medicine shop being fined for overcharging on medicine. 183 One significant feature of these articles is the specific mention of the race of the accused in the article – in all cases, the fact that the accused was Chinese is mentioned in the headline itself. This hence suggests that a link was being made between the race of the accused and their criminal activity, with their race being spotlighted and placed at the forefront, even before

178 Ibid.

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179 Wen, “Anti-malaria Policy,” 32.

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180 “All Drug Licences Renewable During Month Of March,” Shonan Times

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(Syonan Shimbun), March 3, 1944, accessed April 13, 2018,

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183 “Chinese Fined $250 for Overcharging On Medicine,” Shonan Times

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(Syonan Shimbun), April 24, 1943, accessed April 11, 2018,

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181 Ibid.

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182 “Chinese Fined $1,800 For Profiteering In 'Aspro' Tablets,” Shonan Times

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(Syonan Shimbun), April 1, 1943, accessed April 11, 2018,

&WC=&YR=&QT=chinese,medicine&oref=article

37 the details of their offences were known. Hence, I would argue that this constituted a discrediting of traditional Chinese medicine – by linking the people and the institutions, in this case Chinese medicine shops, to illegal profiteering, the Japanese hence attempted to discredit the system of medicine that operated within these institutions.

However, while the Japanese may have attempted to discredit Chinese traditional medicine in favour of promoting their own healthcare system and medicine, whether this was successful was another matter entirely. The wartime shortages in Singapore resulted in drugs used by the Japanese, such as quinine, becoming scarce commodities. Stocks of quinine were limited and a significant portion of these stocks was generally reserved for the military – as a result, quinine available for civilian consumption reached high prices on the black market. 184 Ersatz medicines were not unheard of during the Occupation. 185 Hence, people turned to folk medicine and local herbs to replace imported drugs that were now unavailable to most Singaporeans. 186 It can be argued that even the Japanese administration recognized that there was a need for an alternative system of medicine due to the wartime-induced shortages, as evident in a 1942 Shonan Shimbun newspaper article – this article specifically mentions that certain types of herbs found in Malaya could be substitutes for imported medicines, and quotes a doctor’s statement of them being “a contribution to the Chinese medical world.”187 Clearly, Japanese attempts to establish their system of medicine as superior were not fully successful, as people continued to seek out alternative medicine due to wartime constraints. The contradictions and ironies present in the system of Japanese colonialism with regard to healthcare ultimately meant that it was ineffective in replacing existing, alternative systems of medicine, such as traditional Chinese medicine.

Conclusion The fundamental ironies between Western influences on Japanese healthcare ideology and the anti-West propaganda that constituted a significant part of their colonialism meant that their attempt to colonize through healthcare was likely to face major difficulties, even without wartime contingencies.

Furthermore, the compromises they made in their healthcare approach as a result of wartime shortages – co-opting local labour, using non-Japanese

languages, and so on – further exacerbated these ironies and ultimately made their colonialism ineffective in terms of completely replacing alternative systems of medicine, such as traditional Chinese medicine. Further research in this sphere could use an expanded scope to analyze testimonies from members of Singapore’s healthcare system under the Japanese who are still living.

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40

“The Road to Individualism Was Paved with Good Intentions:” The Singapore Dream: From 1965 to 2016 Soh Chuah Meng Esmond School of Humanities History Undergraduate

Abstract - This article historicises the merit of the ‘Singapore Dream’ in post-independence Singapore by positing three separate, albeit inter-related assertions. Firstly, this paper argues that the bifurcation of the ‘Singapore Dream’ into two distinct phases as stressed by the Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) and commentators in Singapore do not hold true.

Instead, these two so-called ‘distinctive forms of the ‘Singapore Dream’ have shown remarkable manoeuvrability in blending into one another.

Subsequently, the ‘individualistic’ and ‘selfish’ nature of the ‘Singapore Dream’s’ second form will be taken to task. Although the PAP had pinned the blame upon materialistic and selfish Singaporeans for the ‘Dream’s’ socially unacceptable metamorphosis, the second thesis suggests otherwise. It argues that the PAP had passed policies that reflected its transactionlike approach towards public and foreign policies, a sentiment that has been consequently internalised by Singaporeans. The final part of this essay examines the problems of how the ‘Singapore Dream,’ throughout its various manifestations, had ignored perspectives that do not fit into the bread-and-butter paradigm envisioned in all components of the ‘Dream.’ In other words, the ‘Singapore Dream’ has been a ‘Nightmare’ for those who were excluded from the concept’s imagination, even though, ironically, the belief in the ‘Singapore Dream’ was an aspiration for ‘Singaporeans.’

Keywords – Singapore Dream, “1-2-3-4”, 5Cs, Development, Modernisation, People’s Action Party (PAP), Singapore Nightmare

Introduction The Singapore Dream exists, albeit in multiple manifestations, and yet, because of the difficulty of properly defining a concept as abstract as that of a ‘Dream’ has led many to discredit its existence. The fundamental tenet of the Singapore Dream was an undeniable appropriation of the renowned American Dream, where the notion of a ‘Dream’ implied that it was possible to “achieve a fuller and richer life for all” according to The Epic of America, the magnum opus of James Truslow Adams published in 1931.188 A conventional and popular account of the Singapore Dream is largely limited to the current model of the “5C’s” where the aspirations of Singaporeans are confined to a Car, Credit Card, Condominium (private property), Cash and Country Club Membership. 189 However, the “5C’s” was preceded by the “1,2,3,4” model of the 1960s where Singaporeans desired ‘1 Spouse, 2 Children, 3-Roomed Flats and 4 Wheels (Car)’, which supposedly demonstrates a transition from a society which prided familial well-being into one that prioritises material wealth and individual gain ahead of everything else.190 Nonetheless, I feel that this particular observation does not deserve the golden halo that it wears, since it very simplistically pigeonholes the Singapore Dream into two distinctive blocs. In reality, the ‘family-centric’ and ‘materialistic’ values of these two different manifestations of the Singapore Dream have fed into one another. In this regard, I will attempt to demonstrate how the “1,2,3,4” mentality had actually evolved and fitted itself into the gaps of the newer “5C’s” model, 191 rather than being completely displaced by an individualistic one. In order to

188 James Truslow Adams, The Epic of America (New Brunswick, London:

191 To be sure, there are multiple combinations of the Singapore Dream,

Transaction Publishers, 2012), 404.

particularly in its second incarnation. Given that this essay revolves around how

189 Goh Chok Tong, Speech by Mr. Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister, at Marine

the machinations of the state had shaped the Singapore Dream in its own likeness,

Parade National Day Dinner, 07 August 2010, 8:00 PM at Roland Restaurant,

this paper will revolve around the state’s understanding of the said-dream (see

Marine Parade Central: Live Our Dreams, National Archives of Singapore,

footnote 2). For alternative renditions of the second Singapore dream viz. the

accessed April 27, 2016, http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-

‘5Cs’ please see: Adrian W J Kuah, “Recast the S’porean identity based on

html?filename=20100814001.htm.

inclusivity, fairness — not materialism,” TODAY, April 12, 2016, accessed April

190 Debbie Soon, “Choice: The Sixth ‘C’,” Lee Kuan Yew School of Public

27,

Policy: Institute of Policy Studies, 2010, accessed April 27, 2016,

based-inclusivity-fairness-not-materialism.

http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/2013/04/Debbie_Choice-The-Sixth-C_011210.pdf.

2016,

http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/recast-sporean-identity-

41 achieve a comprehensive understanding of the Singapore Dream, the concept of a Dream needs to be studied according to its methods as well as its goals, despite the latter receiving disproportionate attention in popular culture and memory as a set of tangible, material goods that could be potentially purchased by all Singaporeans.

The oft-repeated mantra of the family-centric “1,2,3,4” paradigm of the 1960s into the “5C’s” of the 1980s and beyond serves to cement an ideal of success that is defined along the lines of material success, which while not wrong in itself, conceals more than it reveals.

While the goals of the Dream might have had changed, it must be stressed that the manner by which Singaporeans have taken for granted in order to fulfil their Dream – that is, social mobility - has not yet changed very much – it was, and still is, fundamentally premised on the ideal of a meritocratic society, where social mobility and opportunities to succeed are open to those who are willing to work for them.

This essay is comprised of three different, but related contentions: firstly, I will provide a brief documentation and critique of the existing narratives that have been articulated in the popular press and media about the Singapore Dream. Secondly, and at the heart of the essay’s thesis, I will argue that the Singapore Dream was, and is, a by-product of the state’s machinations through public and foreign policies that articulate the state’s commitment to two ideologies prided by the state, namely ‘pragmatism’ and ‘meritocracy’, which, paradoxically, provided the opportunities for the Singapore Dream to be manifested from the perspective of ordinary Singaporeans, but not in the form by which it is desired by the political elite. A clear disjoint of ideals can be observed in the exchanges between the populace and the state; on the one hand, literature that was examined thus far subtly hinted at the state’s frustration at the supposed ‘self-centredness’ of her own people, yet on the part of ordinary Singaporeans, they did not see any fundamental errors in the manner by which they had shaped their aspirations, given that the state had done much in the name of ‘pragmatism’, the flip-side to the more individualistic interpretation of ‘opportunism’.

Finally, the logic of a “Singapore Nightmare,” which has partially crept into the consciousness of the public will be surfaced as a point worthy of further research and discussion in the last part of this essay, with

specific references being made to what is being perceived as an increasingly unattainable Singapore Dream, a politically-quiescent citizenry and spaces for the arts have been almost completely saturated by voices endorsed by the state.

1. The First Singapore Dream: “1, 2, 3, 4.”

At first glance, the “1,2,3,4” aspirations of Singaporeans in the first incarnation of the Singapore Dream appear to be a product of the grassroots. Most, if not many of the aspirations supposedly belie a hope for a better future and much more importantly, a focus upon the well-being of the family as a unit of society.

Singapore has often been described as a modern Confucian state underpinned by soft authoritarianism,192 where the family is understood as a building block of society, a rhetoric that gained a degree of momentum with the People Action Party’s (PAP) introduction of the ‘Shared Values’ discourse in Singapore.193 This description was, and still is built upon a powerful state whose near-ubiquitous presence has permeated almost every aspect of Singapore life.

Thus, this section works on the premise that the first Singapore Dream is by and large, a product of government intervention and statist control.

1.1 “1 - Spouse” The concept of only having one spouse appears to be a relatively personal choice. Thus far, not much attention has been given to the notion of having only ‘1-spouse’ in contemporary Singapore. The ideal of monogamy has been taken for granted, yet its very presence as one of the components of the first Singapore Dream signifies a gendered slant in the favour of females in the 1960s when the Dream first came into fruition. The call for a single spouse reveals an individual want to start a family, yet the very notion of a single spouse reveals how far policies endorsed by the state had permeated the popular consciousness of Singaporeans.

Everything else considered, the ‘one spouse’ ideal underscored how vital a marriage with a member of the opposite sex was to the formation of the Singapore Dream, since it occupied the first position in the “1,2,3,4” line-up. The PAP lived up to its 1959 election manifesto after the Party rode upon the slogan of “one man, one wife” to victory by calling for the equal treatment for women,194 a promise fulfilled by its subsequent passing of the 1961 Women’s Charter

192 Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir and Bryan S. Turner, The Future of Singapore:

193 Chua Beng Huat, “Communitarian Politics in Asia,” in Communitarian

Population Society and the Nature of the State (New York: Routledge, 2014), 39-

Politics in Asia, ed. Chua Beng Huat (New York: Routledge, 2009), 14.

42.

194 Diane K. Mauzy and R.S. Milne, Singapore Politics Under the People’s Action Party, (London, New York: Routledge, 2002), 160.

42 that legally criminalised polygamy, 195 with the exception of Muslim marriages, which were still under the purview of the Syariah law. 196 Even though this move aroused much general dissatisfaction amongst the Chinese where polygamy was still a norm in the 1950s,197 it was clear that the first aspect of the Singapore Dream was a nod towards the state’s respect for women. Equally important was the state’s willingness to use the law in order to bring its influence to bear by outlawing polygamy. The direction of the state’s slant towards women and the abolition of polygamy, with the exception of Muslims, hints at how much initiative the state has possessed, even though somewhat unknowingly, in the scaffolding of the Dream itself.

On this note, a sense of economic pragmatism could also be derived from the ideal of having only one spouse. The fact that Singapore was pushed into unchartered economic waters at the end of her honeymoon as a Malaysian state by August 1965 was not lost upon the PAP, who lost no time in mobilising a labour force large and quiescent enough to attract investors from the developed world. 198 To allow women to remain at home not only deprived the latter of formal employment, but much more significant was the loss to the labour force that Singapore would eventually be renowned for as she embarked upon Export Orientated Industrialisation (EOI), knowing full well that the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategies that she had drafted were no longer relevant when she was severed from the Malaysian common market.199 1.2 “2 - Children” Perhaps the only element of the first Singapore Dream that was explicitly stated to be a by-product of the state’s machinations, the notion of having only “2children”, keeping with the official replacement rate of fertility, was explicitly stated by Senior Minister

Goh to be an imperative of the 1960s and 1970s, 200 where overpopulation was one of the many bugbears that post-WW II Singapore had to tackle alongside other pressing economic and social problems. 201 The ideological seeds of having two children were sown during this very period, and this component marked an instance where the nation-state had set the contours for the first Singapore Dream.

The family and private decisions, throughout the antinatalist phase from 1966-1982, 202 justified state intervention and control simply because it was no longer perceived as a private affair, but one that could potentially derail and jeopardise the development of Singapore in the larger scheme of things. Family planning, as it was understood by the Family Planning Association (FPA), framed its objectives in a manner where family planning was essential if Singapore is to “mitigate the evils of ill-health and overcrowding.” 203 A norm of a Singaporean nuclear family possessing two children was therefore cast in the mould of the state’s agenda. By doing so, according to the White Paper on Family Planning in Parliament in 1965, women in Singapore could be “liberate(d)…from the burden of raising an unnecessarily large number of children and as a consequence increase human happiness for all.” 204 Inter alia, the two children norm mirrored the government’s success in anti-natal campaigns that called for married couples to adhere to the “Two (children) is Enough” policy, 205 notably through a combination of policies that ranged from offering easier access to contraceptive devices and drugs at fifty two clinics run by the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board (SFPPB) in tandem with the Ministry of Health across the island to the legalisation of induced abortion via the Abortion Act of 1969 in order to reduce the nation-state’s fertility rate.206

195 “Women’s Charter (Chapter 353),” Singapore Statutes Online (SSO), last

200 Goh, Live Our Dreams, Section 4.

modified May 1, 2015,

201 Saw Swee-Hock, The Population of Singapore: Third Edition, (Singapore:

http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/viewPrint.w3p;page=0;query=DocI

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publishing, 2012), 188.

d%3A%22f0897dd7-1f3a-45a9-b1e7-

202 Theresa Wong and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, “Fertility and the Family: An

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Overview of Pro-Natalist Population Policies in Singapore,” Asian MetaCentre

196 Chew Hui Min, “Eight questions on bigamy in Singapore answered,” The

Research Paper Series No. 12 (June 2003): 6.

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203 Saw, The Population of Singapore, 188; Irene Lim, “Singapore's first family

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197 Leong Wai Kum, “Fifty Years and More of the Women’s Charter of

204 Saw, The Population of Singapore, 192 and 193.

Singapore,” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (July 2008), 7-9.

205 Mauzy and Milne, Singapore Politics Under the People’s Action Party, 52.

198 Edwin Lee, Singapore: The Unexpected Nation (Singapore: Institute of

206 Saw, The Population of Singapore, 192-193 and 196; Shirley Hsiao-Li Sun,

Southeast Asian Studies Publishing, 2008), 267; Mauzy and Milne, Singapore

Population Policy and Reproduction in Singapore: Making Future Citizens (New

Politics Under the People’s Action Party, 4 and 68.

York: Routledge, 2012), 63.

199 Norman G. Owen, “Economic and Social Change,” in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume Two, Part Two: From World War II to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 155 and 158-159.

43 Throughout this period, for example, civil servants were dis-incentivised from having more than two children, and sterilization for employees in the public sector who already had two children was not only encouraged, but rewarded with unrecorded leave days following their operations.207 For the purpose of this paper, the nation-state appealed to Singaporeans of the need to deal with widespread unemployment and poor urban living conditions, 208 thus the state needed to concentrate what little resources she had upon national development, rather than having to incur the opportunity costs of diverting the national budget towards the expansion of other public services necessary to cope with an increasingly burgeoning population, such as healthcare facilities and schools.209 1.3 “3 - Room Flat” With regards to the afore-mentioned components of the Singapore Dream, the 3-Room Flat ideal was also born from the seeds of national development. High fertility rates, combined with the Singapore Improvement Trust’s (SIT) less than successful attempts at resettling Singaporeans into public housing created another political tinderbox that the PAP had to resolve.210 The then-PM Lee Kuan Yew went as far as to contend that the political longevity of the PAP literally hinged upon the success of Lim Kin San to deliver affordable and high-rise public housing to the many Singaporeans who were still living in conditions of squalor and squatter-like settlements.211 At the same time, the 1961 and 1968 Bukit Ho Swee fires and the devastating scale of the homelessness that was left in the wake of the flames had proven to Singaporeans about the need to turn to safer forms of housing, 212 in contrast to the dangers of living in densely populated settlements of a poor quality. The state’s goal of moving the population into flats built by the Housing Development Board (HDB) allowed the state to “integrate (these communities) into the state-sanctioned formal economy” in a relatively smooth and successful manner, 213 despite some nostalgic calls for a return to the more carefree lifestyles associated with the kampongs by those

relocated into HDB flats. 214 This represented a dovetailing of interests on the part of both the state and Singaporeans, given that the state too had a vested interest in reacquiring once-occupied settlements for her redevelopment projects.

The “3-Room Flat” ideal demonstrated a hunger for better material living standards among Singaporeans.

HDB flats were first constructed with the goal of reaping the political loyalties of Singaporeans at the ballot box after the PAP had successfully housed a nation. The first phase of the construction revolved around minimalist and simple one or two room apartments, albeit with infrastructure and reliable utilities, thus the ideal of a “Three-room flat” in the first incarnation of the Singapore Dream, a facet that was more or less available to the middle-working classes by the 1980s where the state guaranteed the availability and affordability of 3-room flats to at least 90% of households.215 The search for a “3-Room Flat” as a piece of the first Singapore Dream can thus be traced to a pragmatic state which had to rely on minimalism in order to house its new pool of potential electorates.216 As an extension to the improvement in the living standards of Singaporeans, the relatively uneventful process of relocation and the 3-Room flat’s pride of place in the first Singapore Dream underscores much more than a place for Singaporeans to stay in. Keeping the hostile geopolitical context that Singapore was mired in and the subsequent souring of her relationship with Malaysia after Singapore’s expulsion in 1965,217 the movement from the shanty squatters into HDB flats was a symbolic move on the part of the state to relocate her own citizens, metaphorically, out of the squatters and slums that reeked of insecurity and instability. The shift into flats provided by the HDB provided a much more hard-wearing image that contrasted against the clutter and chaos of these squatters, implying that the state, and by extension,

207 Saw, The Population of Singapore, 283.

213 Loh Kah Seng, Squatters into Citizens: The 1961 Bukit Ho Swee Fire and

208 Wong and Yeoh, “Fertility and the Family: An Overview of Pro-Natalist

the Making of Modern Singapore (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of

Population Policies in Singapore,” 6.

Australia, 2013), 2-3.

209 Wong and Yeoh, “Fertility and the Family: An Overview of Pro-Natalist

214 Loh Kah Seng, “History, Memory, and Identity in Modern Singapore:

Population Policies in Singapore,” 6.

Testimonies from the Urban Margins,” The Oral History Review 36 (1)

210 Valerie Chow, “Public housing in Singapore,” Singapore Infopedia, 2009,

(Winter/Spring 2009):15-17.

accessed April 27, 2016,

215 “Report of the Cost Review Committee 1996: Executive Summary,”

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_1585_2009-10-26.html.

Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, November 1, 1996, last modified May

211 Lam Peng Er, “The Organisational Utility Men: Toh Chin Chye & Lim Kin

31, 2012,

San,” in Lee’s Lieutenants: Singapore’s Old Guard ed. Lam Peng Er and Kevin

https://www.mti.gov.sg/ResearchRoom/Pages/Cost%20Review%20Committee

YL Tan (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1999), 18.

%20Report%20(1996).aspx.

212 “3,000 Victims Lose Homes,” The Straits Times, November 25, 1968.

216 Lam, “The Organisational Utility Men,” 18.

217 Lily Zubaidah Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World: Building and Breaching Regional Bridges (New York: Routledge, 2009), 29-35.

44 Singaporeans were willing to stand up to regional challenges.

Equally significant was the introduction of the racial housing quotas, an initiative that gained a momentum of its own after the race riots of 1965. A sense of banal nationalism has been built into the Singapore Dream:218 a 3-roomed HDB flat, wherever it might be located in, was still subjected to the rule of having a ratio of neighbours within the block that corresponded with the Chinese-Malay-Indian-Others (CMIO) formula in the ratio of roughly around 75 percent Chinese, 17 percent Malays and 8 percent Indians. 219 This was much more than an act of piecemeal accommodation, but one that demonstrates how important a 3-Room flat was to the identity of Singapore. While one might acquire a 3-room flat, and based on the premise that the family, and by extension, the block of flats itself was a microcosm of the state, it proves how Singaporeans of different races can live in harmony with one another, in contrast with her counterparts across the causeway, where racial tensions and ethno-nationalism continued to haunt Malaysian politics.220 1.4 “4 - Wheeled Car” The car appears to be an anachronistic accompaniment to the first three components of the Singapore Dream since it reflects more than a want rather than a tangible need that directly compromised the well-being of Singaporeans who were deprived of one. On this note, it might not appear to fit into the paradigm of the first Singapore Dream, but when the “1,2,3,4” formula was juxtaposed against a postcolonial Singapore where public transport was barely developed at best, any vehicle with “4-wheels” can be understood as a literal need. The British, after having conferred upon Singapore a nascent and an underdeveloped transport network run by a loose group of Chinese bus companies, had effectively made the “4-Wheeled car” a technical need as well,221 until better public transport systems were being developed. Chin, this regard, asserted that the British administration had only created a transport system that only served to meet the needs of its colonial master where the British merely “(facilitated) motor car movement (instead of) meeting the transport needs of the populace.”222 Thus, a car could be understood

as a luxurious means to a practical end in a Singapore where public transport systems were virtually nonexistent.

1.5 Conclusion: A Family-Centric Aspiration?

This section concludes with an examination of the findings that could be drawn from an individual analysis of the components that makes up the Singapore Dream. The 1,2,3,4 formula, as per the first part of this section, has been conceived in a geopolitically hostile regional environment that included, but was not limited to – the raising of interracial tensions not only within Singapore, but with the Malaysian federal government in Kuala Lumpur and the looming danger of attacks masterminded by an increasingly bellicose Sukarno during Konfrontasi.223 With these regional threats posed to Singapore in mind, and the uncertainty that Singapore faced with her expulsion from Malaysia has served to raise more concerns than breaths of relief in 1965, it was unsurprising that the first Singapore Dream revolved around the well-being of one’s own family. 224 This pro-family orientation of the first incarnation of the Singapore Dream reflected the realism and the uncertainty that Singaporeans had about Singapore’s position in the region, where the pursuit of the “1,2,3,4” formula mirrored the low hanging economic fruits that Singaporeans struggled to attain. It is hard to miss the parallels that can be drawn between the Singapore Dream and the state’s vision throughout this period – the hard-work and satisfaction derived from owning the components that made up the “1,2,3,4” formula so that one’s family could be raised in peace also fed into the state’s goal of peddling a disciplined labour force to multi-national companies (MNCs). If the “1,2,3,4” formula that fuelled the wellbeing of one’s family represented a stream running parallel to the PAP’s vision of establishing an economically prosperous and socially stable society, they certainly ran into a common ocean known as national development by the end of the late 1970s.

2. The Second Singapore Dream: The “5Cs” Under the state’s guiding hand and the prudent captainship of individuals such as Goh Keng Swee and Albert Winsemius,225 Singapore stepped into the

218 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2010),

222 Ibid, 81-84.

5.

223 Yow Mun Cheong, “The Political Structures of Independent States” in The

219 Chua Beng Huat, “Communitarianism Without Competitive Politics,” in

Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume Two, Part Two: From World War

Communitarian Politics in Asia, ed. Chua Beng Huat (New York: Routledge,

II to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 123; Lee Kuan

2009), 90.

Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times

220 Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World, 50-52.

Editions Pte Ltd., 1998), 511-523.

221 Chin Hoong Chor, “Urban Transport Planning in Singapore,” in Planning

224 Chua, “Communitarianism Without Competitive Politics,” 94.

Singapore: From Plan to Implementation ed. Belinda Yuen (Singapore:

225 Lee, Singapore: The Unexpected Nation, 266-271; Mauzy and Milne,

Singapore Institute of Planners, 1998), 81-83.

Singapore Politics Under the People’s Action Party, 66 and 67.

45 1970s as a member of one of the Four Asian Tigers,226 alongside other developmental states who also enjoyed unprecedented economic growth and rising Gross Domestic Products (GDP). By the 1980s, the “5Cs” have permeated the minds of working, middleclass Singaporeans, who sought to fulfil their own materialist aspirations. 227 This shift supposedly mirrored the abandonment of the family-centric auspices that underpinned the first Singapore Dream.

Replacing the latter was the worship of unbridled greed and materialism.

2.1: Cash and Credit Cards The ideal of possessing both cash and credit cards represent the importance of material wants of Singaporeans in an age of economic prosperity. For the purpose of this paper both ‘Cs’ are fundamentally similar in the sense that they meet almost the same ends, albeit on slightly different tines. While cash is appreciated for its liquidity and flexibility as a medium of monetary exchange,228 the possession of a credit card goes beyond a means of conducting economic transactions in Singapore. The possession of a credit card, in the second Singapore Dream, can be understood as a status symbol as well as an expression of one’s purchasing power, given that strict rules govern credit card ownership. Individuals applying for a credit card, for example, need to demonstrate an earning power that places them within an income bracket of more than S$30,000 per annum according to the regulations set by the Monetary Authority of Singapore.229

outstrips those of the more Spartan offerings of HDB flats and estates,232 particularly initial projects such as the “one-room emergency flats” during the 1960s that have been constructed with the goal of resettling a population into apartments with access to public utilities and sanitation during more tumultuous years.233 2.3: Car The car has also found its way into the “5Cs”. With an increase in the number of cars on the roads of Singapore the Vehicle Quota System (VQS) was introduced in May 1990 which required potential car owners to bid for a Certificate of Entitlement (COE) that entitled the owner to possess and use a vehicle for a decade. 234 The latter’s rise has only served to increase in recent years, reaching S$92,100 at its peak for Category A of the bidding process in 9 January 2013. 235 The COE, and by extension, the means of being able to afford a means of private transport, unlike the first incarnation of the Singapore Dream, was no longer a necessity given that the public transport system in Singapore has entered its more mature phase with the completion of the Woodlands Mass Rapid Transport (MRT) extension line in 1996. 236 Accordingly, the car has become a status symbol given that it has become all but unobtainable for those of the highest income brackets.

2.4: Country Club Membership

By June 1996, a Straits Times Survey has noted that “six in 10 young Singaporeans” have expressed an interest in owning their own private property as a means of financial security. 230 Coupled with an average increase in the real income per capita by seven percent annually during the first twenty five years after her independence,231 rising aspirations for condominiums and private housing are now the norm.

The scale of amenities offered by condominiums

Finally, the need for a country club membership to complete the equation of the second incarnation of the Singapore Dream lends credence to the (PAP’s) belief that the aspirations and goals of Singaporeans have taken a materialistic tone for the worst. Given that the costs of joining an upper-end country club such as that of the Singapore Island Country Club has peaked at S$102,000 in October 1998, 237 country club membership has itself become a Veblen good, a sentiment best exemplified in the 2006 movie Singapore Dreaming where the housewife Siew Luan complained that her husband was wasting his time by going for an interview to ascertain his status as a

226 Rashmi Umesh Arora and Shyama Ratnasiri, "Recent Growth Experiences

University Press, 2003), 101 and 102; Lee, Singapore: The Unexpected Nation,

of Asian Tigers: Where does India Stand?," International Journal of Social

329 and 330.

Economics 42 (2): 143 and 144.

234 Soi Hoi Lam and Trinh Dinh Toan, “Land Transport Policy and Public

227 Soon, “Choice: The Sixth ‘C’.”

Transport in Singapore,” Transportation 33 (2006): 175-176; Tan Say Tin et al.,

228 “Liquidity,” Investopedia, accessed April 27, 2016,

Economics in Public Policies: The Singapore Story (Singapore: Marshall

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity.asp.

Cavendish Education, 2010), 59.

229 Nguyen Hoang Viet, “The Law Relating to Credit Cards in Singapore” (PhD

235 “COE Prices Since 2002,” SGCharts, accessed April 27, 2016,

thesis, National University of Singapore, 2006), 39.

http://coe.sgcharts.com/.

230 Wang Hui Ling, “Six in 10 Young People Eye Private Property,” The Straits

236 Stephanie Ho, “Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system,” Singapore Infopedia,

Times, June 28, 1996.

November 5, 2013, accessed April 27, 2016,

231 Owen, “Economic and Social Change,”159.

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_2013-11-05_131443.html.

232 Wang, “Six in 10 Young People Eye Private Property.”

237 Goh Soo Li, Low Jaan Nerng and Seng Gek Mui, “Valuation of Country

233 Lily Kong and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, Politics of Landscapes in Singapore:

Club Memberships in Singapore” (Applied Research Project, Nanyang

Constructions of 'Nation': Space, Place and Society (New York: Syracuse

Technological University, 1998-9), 11.

2.2: Condominium (Private Housing)

46 member of a country club when he “(doesn’t) do any sports”. 238 The ability to be a member within these clubs not only comes with a degree of exclusivity given the nature of these institutions, but it also proves that one possesses the monetary means of purchasing an expensive membership in the first place.

2.5 Comparing the Dreams: A ‘Paradigm Shift’?

Historians and academicians, at this point, might have congratulated themselves at having catalogued such a change in ideals, before bemoaning the shift in the societal values treasured by Singaporeans. The thenSenior Minister (SM) Lee Kuan Yew made a reference to the second Singapore Dream where “material success was not everything in life”, before noting that his own Singapore Dream was one of more ideological and noble pursuits. 239 Tommy Koh likewise suggested that there was a shift in the goals, and by extension, the values of Singaporeans, where he noted that he dreams of a Singapore that is “less obsessed with money” in the 2000s. 240 This was in stark contrast with his first two earlier dreams as a school boy in colonial Singapore and as an adult in 1962 where “families would earn enough income to enable them to live decently” and “Singapore to succeed economically (and) to create enough jobs for our unemployed” respectively, 241 seems to be underscoring the paradox of wealth in contemporary Singapore, a sentiment echoed by SM Goh. 242 Koh, like Lee and Goh, in their understanding of the Singapore Dream, saw a ‘shift’ from an impoverished and economically desperate Singapore that could only live from hand to mouth to one that was mired in the endless pursuit of wealth.

The first two sections of this paper supposedly prove this point in a most salient fashion: the Singapore Dream began as a noble pursuit for the better life of one’s family. However, by the 1970s and 1980s, with the lure of wealth, Singaporeans have begun to move away from the salient family values that they had once held dear in the favour of materialism. Nonetheless, while the shift cannot be disputed, the rest of this section will be premised on the contention that this shift only represented a movement along a spectrum.

Singaporeans can afford to be ‘more’ materialistic with ‘less’ emphasis on the family, but to accept a periodisation and pigeonholing of the Singapore Dream into two distinctive time periods is not only a

sweeping statement, but a cherry-picking fallacy for such a line of thought assumes a distinctively clean break from ‘family-centric’ values and ‘individualistic’ goals held salient by Singaporeans.

The ideal of a ‘one spouse’ has not yet died in contemporary Singapore, despite arguments that marriage is dead. Teo argued that marriage still exists as an institution, even though that it was one that was largely guided by a cost-benefit analysis that resembled the second incarnation of the Singapore Dream.243 The point that is to be driven home here is not the simple displacement of the family in the favour of individualistic materialism. Teo, in this light, contended that the entire contract of marriage has become a highly economic affair; when funds in one’s Central Provident Fund (CPF) can be used to pay for public properties in 1968,244 prospective couples have been known to coordinate the monthly payments of their new flats with their applications for public housing to coincide exactly with event of tying the knot itself.245 Significantly, this proves the worth of my thesis in this section, where the first incarnation of the Singapore Dream did not simply vanish and the Second Singapore Dream took over on a de novo basis.

Indeed, given the rising costs of property in Singapore – even subsidised public housing – it is not far-fetched to argue that the ‘materialist’ second Singapore Dream reflected economic realities rather than a radical shift in mentality. Just as money was necessary for the upbringing of a family in the first incarnation of the Singapore Dream, the second Singapore Dream’s emphasis on physical wealth should not be read as an abandonment of familial ties for personal luxury. Instead, such facile readings should be contextualised against a Singapore plagued by rising costs of living and expectations. Clearly, both incarnations of the Singapore Dream negotiated and adapted to the needs of one another, where social institutions that were pivotal to the well-being of the first Singapore Dream (in this case, marriage, which can be understood as the first component of the original Singapore Dream) embroidered itself into the socio-economic norms that embodied the second Singapore Dream. Admittedly, this intertwining was done “in a (blatant and explicit) quest where (Singaporeans) seek to play a game…that serves to maximise their material benefits” where these traits become a part of the calculative mentality that has characterised Singaporeans, 246 the latter whom have handled their marital affairs in a managerial and

238 “Singapore Dreaming 美滿人生 (2006 Film),” Youtube Video, 1:41:19,

241 Ibid: 305 and 306

posted by “Kyros Koh,” March 5, 2015,

242 Goh, Live Our Dreams, Sections 5-7.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uyPOMWsnoBs.

243 Youyenn Teo, Neoliberal Morality in Singapore: How Family Policies Make

239 Chaung Peck Ming, “Chase that Rainbow, SM Tells the Young,” The

State and Society (New York: Routledge, 2011), 45-47.

Business Times, June 8-9, 1996.

244 Chua Beng Huat, Political Legitimacy and Housing: Stakeholding in

240 Tommy Koh, “The Singapore of my Dreams,” Southeast Asian Affairs,

Singapore (London, New York: Routledge, 1997), 23.

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2009): 308.

245 Teo, Neoliberal Morality in Singapore, 60 and 61.

246 Ibid, 6 and 7.

47 systematic fashion not unlike the mantra of ‘pragmatism’ preached by the PAP.

guarantee, at least in part, that the worth of one’s property would appreciate in value over time.

By 2010, despite the doomsday connotation attached to a paper as ominous as that of ‘The Great (unreachable) Singapore Dream?’, Au-Yong’s findings suggested that the Singapore Dream is a malleable concept, changing in terms of its makeup when the original aspirations of young Singaporeans fall increasingly out of the reach.247 Among his list of interviewees, Au-Yong singled out a Mr. Huang, who acknowledges his interest in acquiring the “5Cs”, yet Huang also noted that he might very well turn to a “Bdream”, which is essentially the “1,2,3,4” paradigm.248 Clearly, both versions of the Singapore Dream co-exist together on the same page and are not necessarily dislodged with the introduction of newer goals. Expectations of Singaporeans have been reduced, too often, into a tunnel-vision perspective where the 5Cs were prioritised ahead of everything else, which Au-Yong proves otherwise. Contrary to conventional periodisation of the Singapore Dream into two “different” manifestations, these two sets of values, while seemingly antithetical, prima facie, had blurred into one another, refuting the contemporary faith in a linear process where a once family-centric society moved towards an individualistic and materialistic one.

3. Made in the Likeness of a ‘Meritocratic’ and ‘Pragmatic’ State

An initial study of the 3-room flat in the first embodiment of the Singapore Dream, for example, suggests that the goal was one driven out of a deepseated desire to ensure that one’s family possesses decent accommodation. However, the 3-Room flat was to be as much as a financial investment as it was meant to be a place for one’s family to dwell in. 249 Admittedly, the idea of having to move out of an apartment that one has had called home might not appear to be a very comforting prospect, but it cannot be denied that this was what the state had envisioned.

The 3-room flat, or public property in general, had the propensity to rise in value, given that the PAP had launched a series of upgrading schemes that served to accentuate the monetary worth of flats. 250 While the PAP’s goal was to create a Singapore where Singaporeans had a physical stake in maintaining the well-being of the nation, 251 the purchase of public property is guided as much by a desire to have a place to stay, as much as a certainty that the state would

Throughout the first part of this paper, I have explained how the first Singapore Dream, and partially the second, had life breathed into them by policies adopted by the state. However, the analysis of the Singapore Dream’s outcomes cannot be the end in mind when a comprehensive understanding of the concept is desired. The Singapore Dream, true to its namesake, is as much a process as it was an ideal.

With regards to the latter, given that it has already formed the bulk of this paper, little more mention will be made, beyond occasional reference to the Dreams’ desired outcomes. I will argue that the over-emphasis on the two ideologies of ‘pragmatism’ and ‘meritocracy’ have served to mould a Singapore Dream in the state’s very own likeness, with a tint of realism and a belief in ‘every man for himself’. The Singapore Dream, particularly in its second incarnation, needs to be considered from this ideological dimension. Policies, inter alia, can only go so far unless they are substantiated by a brand of ideology that is cognisant with the views of its population. This contextual change, as I will contend in the second part of this essay, has been largely driven, paradoxically, by the PAP’s insistence that it is a pragmatic entity.

3.1: The Singapore Dream as a Process: ‘Meritocracy’ To begin with, the vulnerability of Singapore and the “politics of survival” have been transformed into a discourse that has been actively invoked by the PAP. According to the PAP, given the geopolitical uncertainties and small population size of Singapore, there is a need for talented individuals to run the nation-state.

According to the PAP’s conceptualisation of the need for talented individuals to be rewarded if their loyalties are to be retained, there is a need for Singapore to be ‘meritocratic’, an ideology that the PAP adheres to in contrast to “cultural favouritism…nepotism and corruption” from the “lowest to the highest levels” of Malaysia.252 Mauzy and Milne describes the case for meritocracy as a case where “each individual’s social and occupational position is determined by individual

247 Jeremy Au-Yong, “The Great (Unreachable?) S’pore Dream,” The Straits

251 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000

Times, April 17, 2010.

(Singapore: Times Media Private Limited, 2000), 116 and 117.

248 Ibid.

252 Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World: Building and Breaching Regional

249 Tan Say Tin et al., Economics in Public Policies: The Singapore Story, 109.

Bridges, 65.

250 Lee Kuan Yew et al., Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2011), 94-95.

48 achievement, not political or economic influence; not race, class or parentage”.253 By the mid-1980s, parents have been known to encourage their children to pursue their studies with greater enthusiasm, believing that an academiccentric future could increase the number of opportunities for their children to succeed in the days to come.254 Likewise, in the foreword penned for the aptly-named anthology of success stories named Living the Singapore Dream, SM Goh describes the case where Singaporeans from humble backgrounds “highlight the value of hard work and a willingness to learn…(within) a system which accords equal opportunity to all and which maximises individual potential”,255 a concept explicated by the number of individuals who possessed less than advantageous positions in society, yet were able to achieve prestigious and high-paying jobs in contemporary Singapore, at the time of compiling the said publication.

Thus, what could be understood from the discourse of meritocracy, at least in theory, implies that the material gains prevalent in the first two incarnations of the Singapore Dream are possible for all individuals regardless of their origin or affiliation.

The process by which the Singapore Dream is to be fulfilled, despite criticism that it has created a society that is not only technocratic and one whose evaluation is based on examinations and standardised tests, 256 cannot be understood outside of the context of meritocracy set in motion by the government. At least in name, one’s position and opportunity for advancement in society is determined by one’s effort and skills, and the rewards that accompany the effort have, more often than not, dovetailed with the individual components of the first two Singapore Dreams.

3.2: The Oxymoronic 1990s: The ‘Singapore Dream’ Manifested Overseas?

In this light, a context needs to be taken into account.

When it was clear that for some Singaporeans, the Singapore Dream might not be manifested in Singapore, given the rising costs of living that have supposedly put their material aspirations out of reach,

some of them were prompted to migrate overseas in search of lower costs of living.257 By 1996, when the indubitably more-materialistic second phase of the Singapore Dream has permeated the nation’s consciousness, the then-Senior Minister (SM) Lee Kuan Yew was prompted to address the concerns of Phua Mei Pin, an intern at the Straits Times after she had expressed her pessimism at the possibility of attaining the Singapore Dream of a “car” and “owning a piece of this country” as “property prices escalate.”258 Singaporeans, according to this series of exchanges in the press, have “considered emigrating overseas to countries like Australia or America”, ironically, in the pursuit of their own Singapore Dream.259 This trend was aptly summed up by Edwin Lee where “their dream of owning a home and a car seemed unattainable,” 260 despite SM Lee being “puzzled” by the migration of people overseas.261 Thus, there exists a paradoxical relationship where there was nothing distinctively ‘Singaporean’ of the Singapore Dream, given that more footloose and capable Singaporeans are not only willing, but are able to go overseas in order to manifest it. This section will then sustain the contention that a dedication to ‘pragmatism’, and by extension, the need for Singapore to maintain a ‘meritocratic society’ has not only shaped the process by which the Singapore Dream is to be achieved on the part of Singaporeans, but how these two ideologies have taken a momentum of their own. In this regard, the author will argue that the ideological landscape has been re-shaped by the population, who use the very ideologies reached by the state in order to justify their own interpretation of the Singapore Dream on their own terms.

The “survival discourse” peddled and repeatedly invoked by the PAP has served to justify the state’s highly realistic approach towards her foreign policies with the predominantly Muslim states that make up the Malay archipelago of Southeast Asia, 262 a notion that was not lost upon Singapore, a predominantly Chinese state.263 In her management of regional ties with her larger Malay-Muslim neighbours in the form of Malaysia and Indonesia, according to Rahim, Singapore has demonstrated a fair amount of insincerity and opportunism, to the extent of lacking in diplomatic sensibility such as by inviting the Israeli President Chaim Herzog to tour the country in 1986

253 Mauzy and Milne, Singapore Politics Under the People’s Action Party, 56.

259 Ng Wei Joo, “Dream on but not just of brick and mortar,” The Straits Times,

254 Carl A. Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control (New

June 9, 1996.

York: Routledge, 2006), 147.

260 Lee, Singapore: The Unexpected Nation, 567 and 568.

255 Goh Chok Tong, foreword to Living the Singapore Dream by Tan Yong

261 Chaung, “Chase that Rainbow, SM Tells the Young.”

Soon (Singapore: SNP International Publishing, 2007), 13.

262 Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World: Building and Breaching Regional

256 Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control, 152.

Bridges, 84-89.

257 Kong and Yeoh, Politics of Landscapes in Singapore, 105.

263 Yow, “The Political Structures of Independent States”, 122.

258 Phua Mei Pin, “When the marathon finish line keeps moving further away,” The Straits Times, May 29, 1996.

49 despite Muslim opposition against Israeli actions in Palestine, 264 statements which have been brushed aside by the PAP’s justification that it needed partners who were able to ensure Singapore’s survival and prosperity in a geopolitically hostile region. 265 What this created is an image of a Singapore that was ready to throw her lot into entities who are not only frowned upon by her regional neighbours as untrustworthy or damaging to their interests as predominantly Islamic nation-states, a notion demonstrated by the late MMLee in his memoirs where he requested for Israeli expertise in building up Singapore’s armed forces upon independence. 266 Rahim contended that the choice of relying upon Israeli expertise might have had “greatly pleased” Lee Kuan Yew and the thendefence minister Goh Keng Swee, for Israel was still able to maintain her sovereignty and prosper despite being encircled by a host of hostile Muslim states, a parallel that was not lost upon Singapore’s very own position in Southeast Asia.267 The state thus justifies its management of foreign policies as such. Given that Singapore is constantly surrounded by rivalling states who are hostile to Singapore’s very own existence, the latter has constantly justified her foreign policies on the grounds of realism, even if this motion comes at the cost of straining diplomatic ties with Singapore’s immediate neighbours.

Perhaps the most controversial of all is the fact that public servants, and likewise, ministers in Singapore are among the highest paid in the world as of the time of writing this paper. The then-PM Lee Kuan Yew pushed for this policy in 1993, arguing that the salaries of public servants and ministers should be pegged to that of the private sector, a proposal that was subsequently approved by parliament in 1994.268 This contentious issue has been likewise advocated on the grounds of ‘meritocracy’ and ‘pragmatism’. On the part of cultivating a ‘meritocratic society’, the argument goes that those who possess the best skills of ensuring Singapore’s progress on both the political and economic fronts deserve an appropriate amount of remuneration that commensurate with the amount of effort and time that they had devoted to their charges.269 On the latter, the high salaries were seen as the most effective way to deter corruption, on the grounds that civil servants, when not properly compensated, would look for cracks within the civil system that they could exploit to their own financial

gain. 270 Sentiments like this was reflected by a comment where “those who are paid the best are not necessarily the wealthiest”, 271 implying that Singaporean should not only refrain from complaining about the high salaries enjoyed by the political elite, but instead, should be grateful that these elites have managed to put in place a system that contrasts with the inherently-flawed systems in countries who still obstinately adhere to highfalutin beliefs about a “noble calls” to serve in politics. 272 However workable this scheme appears to be upon initial analysis, it cannot be denied that the corporatizing of the relationship that the state shared with her citizens only served to erode the basis of moral legitimacy that the previous had over the latter.

In the name of pragmatism, the justification for high ministerial salaries “bound(ed) (the people and government) together in a relationship based on mutual interests rather than lofty notions of the common good,” 273 an ideological precedent that would not only be replicated, but appropriated by Singaporeans keen on manufacturing a Singapore Dream based on their own comprehension of the term, rather than how the state envisions it to be.

All these very well-documented cases and works of scholarship, prima facie, do not appear to answer the question as to why the Singapore Dream had ‘evolved’ into its second incarnation and much more importantly, as to why Singaporeans have decided to turn overseas to fulfil these materialistic dreams.

Nonetheless, I believe that the state has subtly conditioned Singaporeans about the right to shelf debates about what is apprehensive and acceptable in the favour of what has worked, given that those who are in position to make such decisions have ‘rightfully’ deserved the means to do so under the credo of meritocracy.

A Singapore Dream was thus created in the state’s likeness, even if it meant that neo-liberal values and a fundamentally capitalistic ideology had dominated the socio-political landscape of Singapore, an outcome that Chua Beng Huat articulated as “intense competition (drives) hyper-individualism and

264 Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World: Building and Breaching Regional

269 Benjamin Wong and Xunming Huang, “Political Legitimacy in Singapore,”

Bridges, 95.

Politics & Policy 38 (3) (2010): 532.

265 Clarence Chang, “MM Lee on Ensuring S'pore's future as 'Special Red Dot',”

270 Jon S.T. Quah, “Combating Corruption in Singapore: What Can Be Learnt?,”

The New Paper, September 17, 2006.

Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management 9 (1) (2001): 33.

266 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 31.

271 Chua Beng Huat, “Singapore in 2007: High Wage Ministers and the

267 Rahim, Singapore in the Malay World: Building and Breaching Regional

Management of Gays and Elderly,” Asian Survey 48 (1) (January/February

Bridges, 94.

2008): 56.

268 Lee Kuan Yew et al., Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going,

272 Lee Kuan Yew et al., Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going,

120.

122 and 125-126.

273 Wong and Huang, “Political Legitimacy in Singapore,” 525 and 538.

50 intensification of class divisions”. 274 To be sure, it is difficult to draw a direct link between the years of culminated foreign and public policies that have driven Singaporeans to adopt this more ‘pragmatic’ take of going overseas to fulfil their own Singapore Dreams, but one cannot shake off the fact that the increased emphasis upon individual well-being is a product that had germinated from the seeds of ‘pragmatism’ and ‘meritocracy’ that have been sown by the state since the 1960s. In support of this section’s thesis, two case studies where the public’s Singapore Dream have been explicitly moulded, if not guided, by the twin ideologies of pragmatism and meritocracy will be raised prior to concluding this section.

Pragmatism, in this regard, has spilled over to the government’s unwillingness to offer cash and monetary rewards to the masses as far as it is possible.

This mindset can be partially attributed to Lee Kuan Yew’s preference to create a “fair, not a welfare society”,275 but it is clear that the PAP had generally refrained from offering handouts and preferred to distribute the nation-state’s gains in an indirect manner or what has been popularly termed as “supplyside socialism” by George Yeo in 1997. 276 With regards to section 1.3 of this paper, and the then-PM Goh’s belief that there was need for the state to match the developments and amenities of public housing with private housing and condominiums, part of the state’s funding has been channelled into older HDB estates that are 15 years or older in order to ensure that the aspirations of Singaporeans could be met. 277 Paradoxically, these upgrading measures, despite Goh’s belief that such efforts will “improve the value of (Singaporeans’) homes and the beauty of its environment”,278 did not serve to placate expectations for private housing.

Rather, according to Kong and Yeoh, this had only served to exacerbate the demand for private housing where ironically, the “public-housing landscape, rather than being a symbol of progress and modernity… (has become) a symbol of entrapment and class status immobility” for Singaporeans longing for private housing.279 Indeed, the law of diminishing

marginal return to Singaporeans did not hold water in this regard; instead of curtailing the demand for private housing as a status symbol, the reverse occurred where the smallest gaps that distinguish one’s status has become even more tangible than before. To be able to own a piece of private property was much more than a status symbol, but rather, a willingness for oneself to be completely detached, at least in theory, from what is understood as unwarranted government interference.280 Meritocracy and the competitive elitism that it has bred in the form of an aggressively competitive ideology better known as being “kiasu,”281 are at best two sides of the same coin. In July 2000, the controversial debate about scholars on public scholarships breaking their bonds whilst overseas has crept into the public’s consciousness. The controversy revolved around scholarships where talented Singaporeans have considered breaking their bonds before selling their talent “to the highest bidders.”282 In this regard, Mauzy and Milne noted that the absconding scholars justified their actions in accordance with a window of opportunity opened for them by scholarships since these students “have been told from birth to grab opportunities.” 283 Despite the then-Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong condemning these absconders for “describ(ing) the bond as an instrument of exploitation or servitude” when these scholarships holders have been fortunate enough to secure such a “precious opportunity”, 284 the contrast between what the state demands from its citizens and what it has done in both the fields of foreign and domestic policies could not have had been more jarring. On the one hand the nation-state argued and justified her controversial policies on the grounds where the ends justified the means, yet on the other the political elite had criticised these absconders as burdening the republic financially even though the latter have merely seen their engagement with the government in terms of a well-earned cost-benefit relationship, rather than one based on genuine dedication and loyalty.

274 Chua, “Communitarian Politics in Asia,”14.

http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/gct19920306.pdf.

275 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 116.

278 Ibid.

276 George Yeo, Speech by BG (NS) George Yeo, Minister for Information & the

279 Kong and Yeoh, Politics of Landscapes in Singapore, 100.

Arts and Second Minister for Trade & Industry, at the Triennial Delegates

280 Mauzy and Milne, Singapore Politics Under the People’s Action Party, 92.

Conference on Thursday, 3 April 1997 at 9:30AM, National Archives of

281 Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control, 158.

Singapore, accessed April 27, 2016,

282 Mauzy and Milne, Singapore Politics Under the People’s Action Party, 190.

http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/1997040303/yybg19970403s

283 Ibid.

.pdf.

284 Lee Hsien Loong, Speech by DPM Lee Hsien Loong at PSA (Open)

277 Goh Chok Tong, Speech by Prime Minister at the Launch of Demonstration

Scholarship Presentation Ceremony on 22 July 2000, accessed April 27, 2016,

Phase of the Upgrading Programme at the Car Park next to BLK 61, Marine

http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-

Drive, on Friday, 6 March 1992 at 8:00 AM, National Archives of Singapore,

html?filename=2000072208.htm.

accessed April 27, 2016,

51 3.3: Conclusion: The Singapore Dream as the State’s ‘Success Trap’ Thus, the Singapore Dream, particularly in its second and indubitably more materialistic manifestation, has been riddled with a series of ideological ironies and paradoxes which have, more often than not, have been set in motion by the state’s once-salient adherence to the concepts of ‘meritocracy’ and ‘pragmatism’. The danger of relying so heavily upon these two ideologies resulted in the creation of an increasingly educated population who was no longer keen on remaining at the receiving end of the state’s pontificating.

Rather, the new middle-class, in an attempt to make their Singapore Dream a reality, have manipulated the state’s professed loyalty to the twin doctrines of ‘meritocracy’ and ‘pragmatism’ to their own advantage, in order to fulfil the Singapore Dreams on their own terms. This mentality, as this section has shown, has taken on multiple forms, be it through migrating overseas in order to fulfil their desire of owning property or a car, or through the breaking of bonds. In the latter instance, have become springboards for the best and the brightest to leave Singapore in search of greener pastures, justifying their morally questionable deeds on the grounds that the state is in no higher moral position to admonish or criticise their opportunism.

4: Uncertain Prospects: The Singapore Nightmare

The Singapore Nightmare, in this regard, could be understood as the dark counterpart of the Singapore Dream where aspirations for a better Singapore have grown increasingly out of reach. To be sure, the ground that the Singapore Nightmare spans is much greater than that of the Singapore Dream, given the non-tangible connotations associated with the Nightmare instead of the more concretely evaluated and assessed Singapore Dream. Thus, the author will choose to focus on three elements of the Singapore Nightmare as points worthy of further research: the gradual death of an ideologically driven Singapore, the widening disparities between those who have already achieved the Singapore Dream and those who have yet to do so and the plight of cultural industries that do not fall into the state’s understanding of an artistic paradigm.

4.1: Socio-Political Apathy: The Rise of a “Soulless” Society As part of the late-MM Lee Kuan Yew’s attempt to create a Singapore that was free from the sociopolitical turmoil of the 1950s, 285 Singaporeans have been conditioned to abstain from the ‘chaotic’ and liberal democratic politics that has been typically associated with the West has on the grounds that Singapore cannot afford to lose the wealth and security that she has enjoyed to domestic uncertainty, where the “short-sighted” wants that contradict the policies put in place by an “expert and paternalistic government that knows better than the ordinary citizen” need to be swept aside.286

The final section of this paper deals with a controversial facet of the Singapore Dream: the Singapore Nightmare. In contrast to the earlier sections, which have dealt almost exclusively with tangible and material gains, this part slants towards the more immaterial aspirations of Singaporeans. The Singapore Dream, as per its definition at the very beginning of this paper, is a phenomenon and a series of aspirations that can be defined according to different interests and perspectives. While the bulk of Singaporeans have chased the “5Cs”, others have felt that this direction can only spell doom for a fledgling nation that is completely ‘soulless’ and deprived of an unifying ideology, whereas those who have fallen behind a Singapore driven by neo-liberal economics have bemoaned the inability to achieve even a fraction of the Singapore Dream by the end of their lifetimes.

The PAP’s persistent justification of her approach towards politics in the name of ‘pragmatism’ in order to “ensure continuous economic growth…(which has become the) singular criterion for initiating and assessing all government activities, in terms of how said acts will aid or retard this growth,”287 has created a politically quiescent Singapore, as detailed in the second part of this paper. Rising living standards and an increasingly affluent population has created a Singapore where the shelving of more idealistic goals in the pursuit of more tangible and material outcomes has not gone by without attracting criticism amongst some of the political elite, particularly the ‘Old Guard’ of the PAP, the latter whom no longer see a need to constrain themselves to the Party’s official take on policies given that they are no longer in positions of executive power. 288 Lam described Dr. Toh Chin Chye of the ‘Old Guard’ as the “most outspoken backbencher,”289 a trait exhibited by Toh who openly lamented in a 1997 Radio Corporation of Singapore

285 Yow, “The Political Structures of Independent States”, 124.

287 Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore

286 Kenneth Paul Tan, “The Ideology of Pragmatism: Neo-liberal Globalisation

(London: Routledge, 1997), 68.

and Political Authoritarianism in Singapore,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 42

288 Lam, “The Organisational Utility Men,” 15.

(1) (2012): 87.

289 Ibid, 12.

52 Interview that Singapore was an entity that drowned in her own success. He felt that the material prosperity resulted in a generation that was without a driving ideology and soul, unlike the Singaporeans of the 1950s and 1960s who “took the plunge into politics without calculating their costs or the risks and the benefits to be gained.”290 Nevertheless, Toh himself was also involved in some of the PAP’s most controversial policies, such as the restructuring of the National University of Singapore’s administrative and student body, an act that cemented the state’s role as a central figure in Singapore’s academia. 291 It is therefore somewhat ironic that Toh’s Singapore Nightmare in his twilight years – a “younger generation who are meek…calculating…(and) less independent-thinking and lacking in initiative,”292 was in fact a product of his own making, despite Toh never admitting to have set these irrevocable forces into motion throughout his lifetime.293

might become increasingly distant for the generations to come.295 The danger that the Singapore Dream might appear unreachable in the days to come has been raised, at least in part by Au-Yong in 2010 where “nearly every younger Singaporean…is convinced he is facing a harder struggle and a steeper climb than the preceding generation.”296 Despite receiving greater attention in the press and in the consciousness of Singaporeans, how this looming danger is to be addressed by the PAP has yet to be satisfactorily answered by a state who is by and large affiliated with neo-liberal capitalism and economics, 297 which explains the prevalence of the Nightmare’s said manifestation where aspiring and young middle-class Singaporeans no longer feel that their efforts would amount to anything worthwhile throughout their lives.

4.3: Arts Driven by Capitalistic Ends: Side-lined Communities

4.2: Widening Economic Chasms: Increasingly Unobtainable Ends By the 1990s, despite Singapore’s spectacular success on the economic front and her success as one of the countries who had driven the East Asian economic miracle, cracks within the system have been observed as the demand for skills have taken a turn towards rewarding those whose skills are in the greatest demand, such as information technology and managerial qualifications, whereas those who had once built their careers in labour-intensive manufacturing have seen their incomes stagnate. 294 Social and income polarisation, once a smaller imperative in Singapore prior to the 1990s, have become the norm. Those who were once at the lower rungs of society have aspired to fulfil at least the first incarnation of the Singapore Dream, the so-called “middle class standard,” had originally done so without entertaining the prospect that this aspiration

Political ideologies and economics aside, the Singapore Dream’s focus on material possessions and wealth has effectively side-lined the arts, particular those of an independent variety. The arts scene in Singapore as of 1992, with the publication of the Singapore: Global City of the Arts Report, has not only fallen under the guiding hand of the state, the latter whom wasted little time in transforming an ‘authentically’ Singapore arts scene into an appendage of the engine of economic growth, 298 but as a means of “present(ing) a liberal face to attract creative talent” as well.299 The prospect where a state that had resorted to “lofty pronouncements” about her successful management of a society according to a set of uniquely ‘Asian Values’ of “Confucianism (and) Asianisation”, 300 would have supported independent art forms which stereotypically represented the ‘decadent’ and ‘yellow culture’ of popular western culture would have remained increasingly unlikely in the days to come.301 The idea where unorthodox art forms would be

290 Leo Suryadinata, ed., Southeast Asian Personalities of Chinese Descent: A

296 Au-Yong, “The Great (Unreachable?) S’pore Dream.”

Biographical Dictionary Volume I (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian

297 Tan, “The Ideology of Pragmatism,” 84.

Studies Publishing, 2012), 1201.

298 Terence Chong, The Theatre and the State in Singapore: Orthodoxy and

291 Lam, “The Organisational Utility Men,” 10-12.

Resistance (New York, Routledge, 2011), 36-37.

292 Suryadinata, ed., Southeast Asian Personalities of Chinese Descent, 1201.

299 Tan, “The Ideology of Pragmatism,” 76.

293 Lam, “The Organisational Utility Men,” 13.

300 Ibid, 73. Also see: Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of

294 Nasir and Turner, The Future of Singapore: Population Society and the

Control, 133.

Nature of the State, 112-116; Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture

301 Chong, The Theatre and the State in Singapore, 22 and 23; Lily Kong, Ching

of Control, 159.

Chia-ho and Chou Tsu-Lung, Arts, Culture and the Making of Global Cities:

295 Koh Buck Song, “What is S’pore Dream can’t be realised?,” The Straits

Creating New Urban Landscapes in Asia (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward

Times, May 27, 1996; Phua, “When Marathon Finish Line Keeps Moving Further

Elgar Publishing, 2015), 84.

Away,”, “Material Dream That’s Reached its Limits,” The Straits Times, May 31, 1996; Chuang, “Chase that Rainbow, SM Lee tells the Young.”

53 publicly presented (with the exception of a few independent art spaces such as the Substation) 302 in the full view of the mainstream media who is largely constrained to painting the multi-racial and multireligious harmony that Singapore was supposed to represent has likewise stagnated. 303 At best, these artists can survive, but to be able to push their way into an arts scene that is dictated by the terms of the state in terms of funding remains a distant dream, 304 if not a Nightmare given that the arts in Singapore has been strangled by the state’s keenness to promote ‘elite’ and ‘global’ art that is cognisant of Singapore’s ‘First World’ status.305 For these independent artists, there is nothing praiseworthy about the state’s take on cultural policies, since these artists have never have been, and quite unlikely will be, a part of the state’s cultural cum economic policies in the days to come.

by the state to reformulate the Singapore Dream in its favour.

6. Conclusion: Singaporeans

“Material Dream That’s Reached its Limits.” The Straits Times. May 31, 1996.

All in all, to say that the Singapore Dream is doomed is to be overly pessimistic. Yet, to say that the prospects remain bright for those mired in the Singapore Nightmare is to be desperately Panglossian.

A change in mind-sets, if the very notion of a Singapore Dream is to live on, needs to come, not only from the state and the PAP, but from the grassroots as well.

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57

Singapore – Efficient, Clean, Pragmatic?

A Second Look at the Characteristics Of Singapore Chang En En School of Humanities History Undergraduate

Abstract - Singapore is a clean, efficient and pragmatic country. Or is it? Through Foucault’s theory of Truth, this paper primarily questions the accepted image of modern-day Singapore and argues that those in power have constructed these characteristics. Additionally, the paper suggests that the leadership continues to maintain this image until today, which will be discussed through two case studies – the removal of Bukit Brown Cemetery and Sungei Road Flea Market. By re-examining the current narrative, this article hopes that readers will continue to query accepted ‘truths’ and explore alternative definitions.

Keywords – Sungei Road Flea Market, thieves market, Bukit Brown Cemetery, the Singapore image

Introduction Singapore, a country that developed from a third world status to that of a first world nation in a couple of decades, is deemed by many as a success story of development. In particular, because of an unexpected independence and no natural resources, many saw this development as a big feat. In addition, Singapore is known globally to be at the forefront of modernisation and advances in technology. Other characteristics that define Singapore include a disciplined work-force and an emphasis on a developed sustainable environment even as economic progress was encouraged.306 A part of this is reflected in the city’s clean streets and areas.

However, more than the physical environment, the social environment is also considered ‘clean’ with few ‘polluting’ elements, such as prostitution and gambling.307 However, this pristine image becomes subjected to re-analysis when considering Michel Foucault’s Theory of Truth — the accepted truth is merely a construct by those in power. In this essay, ‘Truth’ will be defined as the Singapore narrative and image

of being a developmental miracle, or having economic and environment sustainability, and a society with a strong moral fabric. With Foucault’s tool in mind, the Singapore Truth urges for reanalysis and begs these questions — how far is the image of Singapore controlled and constructed by those in power? Moreover, is this control still ongoing today? This essay has two objectives. (1) To reveal the ruling body’s hand in constructing and controlling Singapore’s image after independence in 1965. (2) To suggest that there is a continuation of the crafting of Singapore’s image in the present day.

The essay begins by looking to the past to reexamine the formation of these characteristics, followed by the discourse between activists and the government in relation to the redevelopment of public space in Singapore, especially those thought to contain heritage and tradition. This will be shown through two case studies, Bukit Brown Cemetery and Sungei Road Flea Market. Both were chosen because of the similar narrative that occurred and more importantly, due to the slightly different responses received from the government that allows for deeper analysis. The use of Foucault’s theory on truth will be used as a tool to examine this narrative throughout the essay.

History of the Singapore Image Singapore stands at a unique position in history with inhabitants coming from various geographical places under the British colonial rule. Hence, loyalties were to these ‘different ‘homelands’ and not the island itself.’308 With an immigrant population and varying loyalties, it was thus an unexpected mammoth task for the ruling government to create a nation in 1965, when independence was forcefully thrust upon Singapore. In addition to a lack of uniting element, there were other problems such as high unemployment, overcrowding and the loss of access to a much bigger market, Malaysia. 309

306 Victor R. Savage, ‘Singapore’s Environmental Ideology,’ in Imagining

308 Eddie C.Y. Kuo, ‘The Making of a New Nation: Cultural Construction and

Singapore, edited by Kah Choon Ban, Anne Pakir, and Chee Kiong Tong, 210–

National Identity in Singapore,’ in Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in

239 (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), 211.

Singapore, Chua Beng Huat, 101-123 (Singapore: Dept. of Sociology National

307 Lily Kong and Brenda S. A. Yeoh, The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore:

University of Singapore, 1991), 101.

Constructions of ‘Nation’ (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 32.

309 Kong and Yeoh, The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore, 30.

58 During post-independence, the ruling government had two objectives: to legitimise their rule and to achieve hegemonic rule over the state.310 To achieve these aims, economic development was necessary as this would improve the standard of living of the people, leading people to support the ruling body as they have proven their ability to guide the nation. In order to achieve economic development, the ‘ideology of survival’ 311 became a rallying point.

This ideology convinced people that the survival of the nation rested solely on modernisation. As a result, Singaporeans reacted and behaved in certain ways that embraced the idea of modernisation, which subsequently developed into a new social and cultural order.312 This new social discipline 313 became the primary importance of hard work, which permeated all areas of an individual’s life. In addition, for modernisation to occur, it was thought ‘necessary to reject all links to the past and tradition.’ 314 Thus, heritage and modernisation was a priority as compared to heritage.

As such, the emphasis placed on rapid modernisation, pragmatism and a disciplined work-force and society was adopted because of the dire context then and the ruling party’s goals to achieve rapid economic development and growth. The economic success became the basis of pride and self-identification for Singaporeans, reinforcing modernisation and economic development as key elements of the Singapore identity.315 However, per Foucault’s tool on truth, these ingrained values of the economic miracle were in actuality advocated and encouraged by the authorities, with few Singaporeans questioning other narratives besides the economic miracle or other accounts that run parallel to that of the Singapore rapid development and success.

and places to remove social/moral and physical pollution.’316 This formed a new image of Singapore as one that was socially disciplined, modern and ‘sanitised.’ Hence, behind the clean streets and cultured public stands those in power to organise, reshape and define Singapore. Many who did not fit into this image, became absent from the public eye.

For example, after gaining self-governance in 1959, Singapore embarked on a campaign aimed at eradicating 黄色文化 (Huang Se Wen Hua), which translates to ‘yellow culture.’ ‘Yellow Culture,’ directly translated from Chinese, referred to the cultural vices of society of which prostitution was an element.317 Brothels were driven underground with many being disguised as hotels and residences and the concept of the ‘call-girl’ emerged. ‘Call-girls’ were prostitutes that visited clients rather than working within the restricted confines of a brothel. 318 Other groups included in this eradication included rock-and-roll music, gambling dens, and adult magazines. 319 This campaign that used a twopronged approach —‘attacking activities… of social morality and security’ and ‘seeking the cultivation of a healthy culture,’320 — soon led to a clean public environment/space, void of social ills. This longest and most extensive campaign lasted until the 1980s, 321 showed the commitment of the government to eliminating social/moral evils of society and simultaneously allowing for the integration of this image to become the norm and represent Singapore. This image, currently accepted, is hence seen to be seeded by the government and gradually turned into a defining characteristic of Singapore. Moreover, this ‘truth’ of the Singapore’s image continues to be reflected in modern day Singapore, reinforcing the ‘clean’ image. This will be demonstrated subsequently.

An additional characteristic of the Singapore image is the clean physical environment. However, it was not only the physical environment that has been ‘cleaned’, but also the social environment. With the development of the new social order that pervaded through society, there was a “cleaning up’ of people

The following case studies examines this narrative in modern day Singapore and reveals that this ‘truth’ is still being reinforced and shaped by the ruling party today. Although there has been a slight change towards becoming a more inclusive society, Singaporean society remains largely controlled and

310 Ibid, 31.

315 Kong and Yeoh, The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore, 45 and 46.

Loh Kah Seng, ‘Within the Singapore Story: The Use and Narratives of History

316 Kong and Yeoh, The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore,32.

in Singapore,’ Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian

317 Lau Yu Ching, ‘The Anti-Yellow Culture Movement, 1953-1961: Morality

Studies Vol. 12, No. 2(1998):2.

and the Language of Decolonising Singapore,’ Master of Arts Thesis paper

311 Loh, ‘Within the Singapore Story: The Use and Narratives of History in

(National University of Singapore, 2016), 88 and 89.

Singapore,’ 2.

318 David Brazil, No Money No Honey (Singapore: Angsana Books, 1996), 164.

312 Kuo, The Making of a New Nation: Cultural Construction and National

319 Lau, ‘The Anti-Yellow Culture Movement, 1953-1961: Morality and the

Identity in Singapore, 105.

Language of Decolonising Singapore,’ 88-90.

313 Social discipline is ‘the compliance with guidelines of behaviour established

320 ‘Healthy culture based on Malayan Outlook,’ The Straits Times, June9, 1959.

by democratically elected decision-makers and designed to attain national goals.’

321 Lee, S. H, ‘Less ado about men with long hair: Officialdom closes half an

As defined by Stella Quah.

eye to Seventies ban,’ The Straits Times, March 9, 1986, 12.

Stella Quah, ‘Social Discipline in Singapore,’ Southeast Asian Journal of Social

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19860309-

Science 14(1983): 269.

1.2.21.9 (Last accessed Aug12, 2018).

314 Loh, ‘Within the Singapore Story: The Use and Narratives of History in Singapore,’3.

59 dominated by the figures in power and aligned closely to the ongoing narrative crafted since 1965.

Case Study 1 – The Sungei Road Flea Market The Sungei Road Flea Market, more commonly known as the Thieves’ Market, had existed in Singapore since the 1930s.322 The Thieves’ Market is known to sell everything from trinkets and old photos to clothes and a wide range of electronic items. Besides selling goods, there are stallholders who provide services like repairing watches and shoes.323 With the government requiring no rent and a loose need for a permit,324 this flea market had been a constant source of affordable products for customers, especially those from a lower income bracket. Just as the name suggests, the Thieves’ Market originally sold goods that were obtained illegally. However, it soon proceeded to sell second hand products or factory rejects. A second meaning to this colloquial name underscores the affordable price at which customers bought the goods - hence, 'a great steal.'325 Located along the boundaries of Sungei Road and Pasar Lane, the Thieves’ Market is situated on prime land surrounded by shopping centres, industrial buildings, educational institutions, religious places and residential buildings. Having survived for eight decades through the Japanese Occupation and the end of British rule in Singapore, the Thieves’ Market eventually became a victim to the rapid modernisation of Singapore due to its location. 326 The Thieves’ Market is not new to such demands and struggle between them and the government over the land. As early as the 1970s, the Thieves’ Market was threatened by resettlement and urbanisation works, with the government trying to resettle peddlers into proper government-built markets.327 The 1970s also saw the demolishment of some stalls for the

widening of the Rochor Canal. Another wave of demand came in the 1990s when the Rochor Canal was expanded once again. 328 Despite the constant expansion threatening the vendors of the Thieves’ Market, the Thieves’ Market remained popular to Singaporeans. However, this ongoing struggle between the government — trying to control the space — and the stall owners, reached its peak in 2011 and 2017.

In 2011, this space was at risk when plans for the Jalan Besar station were announced. This new Mass Rapid Transport (MRT) station caused the area to shrink by half329 and hence increased Singaporeans’ attention to the Thieves’ Market. Yet, this attention was still considerably less compared to 2017, when the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) and National Environment Agency (NEA) confirmed the permanent closure of the Thieves’ Market on the grounds of future residential use.330 This sparked an outcry amongst citizens, activists and vendors themselves petitioning for a change in the decision.

This move caused many Singaporeans to voice their opposition through different mediums and methods.

Some wrote to The Straits Times, the main Englishlanguage newspaper, while others used their personal blogs to document the place. There was also a group created on social media platform Facebook — Save Sungei Road Flea Market 331 — that tried to garner enough support. Even with differing voices and methods, most had their sights set on preserving the Thieves’ Market, with a subaim of finding new places, provided by the government, for the displaced vendors.

Those who opposed the demolition of the Thieves’ market had three main arguments. First, the Thieves’ Market is part of Singapore’s heritage, culture and tradition. Second, the Thieves’ Market is the only economically free market in Singapore. Third, the Thieves’ Market is the only source of income for many vendors. Eventually, the Thieves’ Market was

322 The Forgotten People by Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and

327 National Heritage Board, ‘Sungei Road Flea Market,’ Roots, last updated 11

Information, ‘Sungei Road Thieves Market - NHB Version,’ Youtube Video,

July 2017. https://roots.sg/learn/resources/virtual-tours/sungei-road-flea-market

04:16. Posted [May 9, 2013]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrlF5lrgEhE.

(Last accessed Aug 11, 2018).

323 Ibid.

328 ‘Sungei Road Thieves’ Market – From Beginning Till the End,’ Remember

324 Kristen Han, ‘Singapore aggressively markets its heritage, but it’s letting an

Singapore, July 10, 2017. https://remembersingapore.org/2017/07/10/sungei-

authentic piece of cultural history vanish,’ Quartz, April 12, 2017.

road-thieves-market-history/ (Last accessed Aug 11, 2018).

https://qz.com/954073/singapore-is-clearing-away-actual-heritage-as-it-curates-

329 Kelly Ng, ‘End of a chapter for Sungei Road flea market,’ TodayOnline,

brand-new-experiences-around-its-past/. (Last accessed Nov 21, 2017).

updated July 9, 2017.

325 Benson Ang, ‘See Sungei Road flea market in dioramas,’ The Straits Times,

http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/end-chapter-sungei-road-flea-market.

Nov13,

(Last accessed Nov 24, 2017).

2016.

https://www.straitstimes.com/lifestyle/arts/turning-trash-to-

treasure. (Last accessed Jun 4, 2018).

330 Melody Zaccheus, 'Sungei Road flea market to make way for future homes,’

326 Han, ‘Singapore aggressively markets its heritage, but it’s letting an

The Straits Times, Feb 15, 2017. http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/sungei-

authentic piece of cultural history vanish,’ Quartz, April 12, 2017.

road-flea-market-to-make-way-for-future-homes. (Last accessed Nov 21, 2017).

https://qz.com/954073/singapore-is-clearing-away-actual-heritage-as-it-curates-

331 Save Sungei Road Market, Facebook,

brand-new-experiences-around-its-past/. (Last accessed Nov 21, 2017).

https://www.facebook.com/pg/savesungeiroadmarket/about/?ref=page_internal.

(Last accessed Nov 23, 2017).

60 permanently closed on July 10, 2017.332 These three arguments and the response of the government will be analysed through Foucault’s theory of Truth, to gain a better understanding on this discourse.

Firstly, activists argue that the Thieves’ Market is an integral part of Singapore’s heritage, culture and tradition and hence this place should remain. As mentioned above, the Thieves’ Market existed since the 1930s; 333 evolving together with the changing social and economic landscape. In addition, many vendors have had at least 20 to 30 years of selling goods; and their lives, memories and unique ways of marketing have become a tradition.334 This was the main reason used and seen across the various articles and comments. Comments such as 'Sungei Road market is an 80-year old living street culture,' or 'Sungei Road is probably the last of a heritage that has evolved naturally,'335 is seen as a reflection of the public’s common opinion of the Thieves’ Market.

This sentiment can be summed with this open letter to government agencies asking, 'And what will replace all the goodness of this historic landmark?´ 336 Government agencies acknowledge the site’s history and memories but responded that the environment has changed and is evident when looking at the vendors, buyers and variety of goods sold. 337 This implies that to the government, the Thieves’ Market heritage value does not outweigh the potential economic value. A new meaning is suggested where the statement implies the government’s need to justify its pragmatic goal to redevelop the place, reminding once again that the Singapore image is still being heavily controlled by those in power. The image of Singapore as a pragmatic society, where ‘concrete’ needs such as space and development outweigh ‘soft’ values such as ‘heritage’, is once again seen with the loss of a traditional site to redevelopment. The second argument, which will be elaborated in the next paragraph, reinforces the creation of the Singapore

image by suggesting an underlying motive for redevelopment.

Secondly, the Thieves’ Market is a free market and the only one in Singapore that was left. The Thieves’ Market is considered a free market as no permit is required, nor any rent paid to the government. 338 Many felt it was a pity to lose an ‘organically formed flea market,’339 which provided a contrasting image to modern Singapore – an orderly and regulated society. To this, there were no direct replies from the government agencies but one that indirectly dealt with the nature of the Thieves’ Market — hawking.

The government agencies stated that these street trades "should only be allowed to continue in designated venues.’340 This statement brings to the surface the idea of control and regulation and perhaps suggests that under the veneer of redevelopment, the government does not want to entertain the idea of a free market because it is deemed as a place with no rules and regulation and hence considered ‘illegal’ in the eyes of the law. In addition, because the Thieves’ Market had no proper disposal system, physically pollution occurred and affected the residents who voiced their disgust. 341 Thus, the relocation solves the physical and perhaps the social pollution with the government being able to better track and control the vendors’ action as shifting requires vendors to be issued a permit and vendors are now under proper government-built locations.342 This thus preserves Singapore’s image as an orderly and regulated place. The final argument, elaborated in the next paragraph, pushes this idea of ‘truth’ further and reveals the extent to which those in power constructs the truth.

Finally, the Thieves’ Market should be preserved, as this is the stallholders’ livelihood. The vendors, with at least 80% above the age of sixty, depended on the Thieves’ Market as their only source of income.

There were originally government measures that sought to relocate the vendors to other sites.

Subsequently, the vendors wrote a letter to the

332 ‘Sungei Road Thieves’ Market to shut for good on July 10,’ TODAYonline,

338 Roots.sg, Sungei Road Flea Market, last updated July 21, 2017.

Feb 14,2017.

https://roots.sg/learn/resources/virtual-tours/sungei-road-flea-market.(Last

https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/sungei-road-thieves-market-close-

accessed Nov 23, 2017).

good-july-10. (Last accessed Jun 4, 2018).

339 Zaccheus, 'Sungei Road flea market to make way for future homes,'

333 Ibid.

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/sungei-road-flea-market-to-make-way-

334 The Forgotten People by Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and

for-future-homes. (Last accessed Nov 21, 2017).

Information, ‘Sungei Road Thieves Market - NHB Version,’

340 Ibid.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrlF5lrgEhE.

341 Ang Zyn Yee, ‘Thieves Market closure ends nightmare for resident,’ The

335 Ibid.

Straits Times, Feb 25, 2017.

336 Angela Low, ‘An Open Letter to the URA/NEA: Don’t Destroy the Sugei

http://www.straitstimes.com/forum/letters-in-print/thieves-market-closure-ends-

Road Flea Market,’ PopSpoken, Sep 22, 2015.

nightmare-for-resident. (Last accessed Nov 26, 2017).

http://popspoken.com/opinion/2015/09/an-open-letter-to-uranea-dont-destroy-

342 Melody Zaccheus, ‘Decades-old Sungei Road flea market to shut for good;

the-sungei-road-flea-market. (Last accessed Nov 21, 2017).

July 10 will be its last day,’ The Straits Times, Feb 14, 2017.

337 Melody Zaccheus, ‘Decades-old Sungei Road flea market to shut for good;

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/decades-old-sungei-road-flea-market-to-

July 10 will be its last day,’ The Straits Times, Feb 14, 2017.

shut-for-good-july-10-will-be-its-last-day. (Last accessed Aug 11, 2018).

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/decades-old-sungei-road-flea-market-toshut-for-good-july-10-will-be-its-last-day. (Last accessed Nov23, 2017).

61 government, proposing four other sites in which they felt more comfortable. This was rejected and the government proposed other places with the incentive of rent being waived in the first year and a 50% rebate in the second year.343 However, even with the new placement, the free nature of the stallholders resulted in many being overlooked by the scheme and hence eradicated without help. An interesting angle of this discourse looks at Singapore’s move towards an inclusive society. In one of his speeches, PM Lee defined an inclusive society as ‘one where everybody benefits from the progress of the nation.’ 344 However, this case study clearly shows that not everyone benefits from the progress of the nation; more critically, those who do not fit the ‘clean’ Singapore image are sidelined by those in power who crafted the characteristics of the Singapore image.

Case Study 2 – Bukit Brown Cemetery (BBC) Bukit Brown Cemetery (BBC) is the final resting place for over 200 000 residents of Singapore since the 19th century. It officially became a municipal cemetery in 1922 for the Chinese who needed more space to bury their dead. It has been closed since 1973, however the cemetery has remained untouched for the most part and continues to be the site for Chinese ancestral rituals like Qing Ming,345 where relatives gather to clean up the grave site of their ancestors and pay their respects. Bukit Brown is the final resting place of many pioneers of Singapore, including famous individuals like Chew Boon Lay and Gan Eng Seng, and other less wellknown but equally important pioneers who contributed to building the society.346 Even the type of materials used to build these tombstones and the carving on them are integral parts of Singapore history.347 Moreover, BBC is home to a large amount

of animal species and its biodiversity is remarkable, for instance, the 94 bird species that have made BBC its home, including a number of endangered species.348 In recent years, the authorities have announced the exhumation of graves in BBC to make way for redevelopment. BBC is located along the Pan-Island Expressway (PIE), a highway that connects the west of Singapore to the east and is hence a common and major transport route for most Singaporeans, resulting in traffic congestion. The traffic congestion is predicted to increase by 20% by 2020. 349 The Land Transport Authority (LTA) has thus sought to reduce traffic congestion by expanding the highway to an eight-lane road.350 This however, cuts through BBC and has been the cause for much alarm and debate among the public. The discourse between activists and the government that will be subsequently summarised, seeks to demonstrate the level of control that the government has in pushing forth the idea of a pragmatic Singapore and hence reinforcing the ‘truth’ that Singapore is pragmatic and heritage comes second.

There was significant public outcry in 2011 with the announcement of an eight-lane highway which will cut through BBC.351 An ongoing debate between the people and the government looked to seek a compromise between the demolishment of the graves and the preservation of a site full of history.

The same group of activists put forth two main arguments. Firstly, BBC is rich in heritage and history - it is the final resting place not only of the pioneers of Singapore but also of material culture and techniques used at that time to build the tombs, such as textiles from Europe. 352 This was key evidence of Singapore’s connectivity with the rest of the world in the 1900s. In response to this, the state decided to fund the documentation of graves that were to be exhumed. This was then presented in ‘The

343 Zaccheus, 'Sungei Road flea market to make way for future homes,'

348 Ibid, 5 and 6.

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/sungei-road-flea-market-to-make-way-

349 Pan Island Expressway (PIE). Government of Singapore. Last updated Aug

for-future-homes. (Last accessed Nov 21, 2017).

27, 2013.

344 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, ‘Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien

https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/roads-and-motoring/projects/pan-

Loong at the Debate on The President's Address, 20 October 2011 at Parliament.’

island-expressway-pie.html. (Last accessed Nov 26, 2017).

Speech, Prime Minster’s Office Singapore, Oct 20, 2011. Retrieved from

350 Goh Si Guim, ‘Bukit Brown at a Crossroad; Possible Alternative,’ Bukit

http://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/speech-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-

Brown: Living Museum

debate-presidents-address-20-october-2011. (Last accessed Jun 3, 2018).

http://www.bukitbrown.org/2014/02/bukit-brown-at-crossroad-possible.html

345 清明节 or Qing Ming Jie is a Chinese festival in which the Chinese remember

(Last accessed Nov 26, 2017).

the dead and pay respects to their ancestors.

351 Kristen Han, ‘Singapore: The Fight to Save Bukit Brown,’ The Diplomat,

‘Grave Concerns, Banyan’ The Economist, Apr 6, 2013, https://search-proquest-

Oct 30, 2013. https://thediplomat.com/2013/10/singapore-the-fight-to-save-

com.ezlibproxy1.ntu.edu.sg/docview/1324416329?accountid=12665.

bukit-brown/. (Last accessed Nov 25, 2017).

(last accessed Jun 3, 2018).

352 Statement by Singapore Heritage Society, ‘Singapore Heritage Society's

346 Terence Chong And Chua Ai Lin, ‘The Multiple Spaces Of Bukit Brown,’

response to road alignment through Bukit Brown,’ Mar 20, 2012.

in Public Space In Urban Asia, ed. William SW Lim (Singapore: World

https://www.facebook.com/notes/singapore-heritage-society/singapore-

Scientific Pub., 2014), 27.

heritage-societys-response-to-road-alignment-through-bukit-

347 Singapore Heritage Society, Bukit Brown Wayfinder: A Self-Guided Walking

brown/333132433401066. (Last accessed Nov 26, 2017).

Trail (Singapore, 2017), 23 and 24.

of History and Heritage,

Mar

24,

2013.

62 Bukit Brown Cemetery Documentation Project,’353 a website dedicated to the documentation of BBC. Additionally, many books, journals and even videos were published. Some of these publications include Bukit Brown Wayfinder: A Self-Guided Walking Trail and Liberation 70: A Book on WW2. Despite the steps outlined to ensure a key part of the heritage of Singapore is not lost, there was still opposition citing that documentation was not sufficient as the landscape would be vastly altered.354 Secondly, the environment of BBC has high levels of biodiversity. The government responded to these statements with proposed methods of building a flyover355 across the area, in the effort to protect the flora and fauna. However, Singapore Heritage Society opposed this suggestion as the demolishment process still involved key landmarks, which are crucial to social memory. 356 There were many articles written and arguments put forth by the Singapore Heritage Society, National Heritage Board, civil social groups and individuals through social media. Despite all the efforts, by 2013, 4000 graves had been exhumed with the total land of BBC shrunk by half.357 Much of the narrative could not be covered within these few paragraphs due to the massive amount of information and the ongoing debate over the redevelopment of BBC. BBC has not seen the last of its fight against redevelopment, as plans for housing development by 2030 due to the increasing population have been announced. 358 However, this essay has captured the salient points from the activists’ campaign as well as the responses from the government. Yet the most important point is the outcome of the debate - exhumation still occurred and the PIE is in the midst of being expanded.

Though the action from the government to document these graves can be perceived to be a compromise, the original plans proposed by those in power were not affected, reemphasising the ‘truth’ of efficiency over culture and heritage. This reaffirms the image of Singapore as a pragmatic nation and demonstrates the continued domination of those in power to shape and promote the Singapore image. Even though this discourse reflects activists questioning the image of

Singapore developing at the expense of heritage and culture, the final decision remained in the hands of those in power, and they continued to craft and reinforce the Singapore image of efficiency and pragmatism.

This case study differs slightly from the Thieves’ Market because a compromise of sort was made. As seen from the previous case study on the Thieves’ Market, an underlying motive to redevelop Sungei Road Flea Market may be to maintain the image of a ‘clean’ and regulated Singapore. Hence, within five months, the second phase for complete closure of the Thieves’ Market occurred while BBC remained open to a conversation that lasted from 2011. This suggests that a compromise for the BBC plans arose because it did not interfere with any characteristics of the clean and regulated image of Singapore. A part of the discourse shows that there was no action taken by the government when questioned after they rejected plans for alternative methods proposed by the activists.359 The BBC case study reinforces the idea that those in power continues to shape the Singapore image according to their definitions. In addition, this case study highlights another concept of Foucault — the idea of power — when power is exercised by those who control it limits the social actions of the other. In this case, the government exercised its power to push forth the expansion of the land hence limiting the activists’ actions and preventing their goals to preserve Bukit Brown Cemetery.

A simple question however remains. Why should the government continue to interfere in Singapore’s narrative and image? Perhaps an answer can be found when looking at two different groups of people affected by this – Singaporeans and tourists/foreign investors. As mentioned earlier, when Singapore first became independent, there was a lack of commonality between the different races and religions. Thus, by presenting Singapore as an efficient and advanced country, this helped provide not only economic prosperity but also a shared experience, hence reducing disputes and becoming a common denominator. However, perhaps an even more crucial reason is the idea of presenting

353 For more information, ‘The Bukit Brown Cemetery Documentation Project,’

357 Singapore Heritage Society, Bukit Brown Wayfinder, 4.

http://www.bukitbrown.info/#. (Last accessed Jun 4, 2018).

358 Kirsten Han, ‘Land-Starved Singapore exhumes its cemeteries to build roads

354 Singapore Heritage Society, Bukit Brown Wayfinder, 4.

and malls,’ The guardian, Aug 7, 2015.

355 Banyan, ‘Singapore’s Heritage Elegy for Urban Graveyard,’ The Economist,

https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/aug/07/land-starved-singapore-

Apr 1, 2013.

exhumes-its-cemeteries-to-build-roads-and-malls. (Last accessed Nov 25, 2017).

https://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/04/singapores-heritage.

(Last

359 Statement by Singapore Heritage Society, ‘Singapore Heritage Society's

accessed Nov 25, 2017).

response to road alignment through Bukit Brown,’

356 Statement by Singapore Heritage Society, ‘Singapore Heritage Society's

https://www.facebook.com/notes/singapore-heritage-society/singapore-

response to road alignment through Bukit Brown,’

heritage-societys-response-to-road-alignment-through-bukit-

https://www.facebook.com/notes/singapore-heritage-society/singapore-

brown/333132433401066. (Last accessed Nov 26, 2017).

heritage-societys-response-to-road-alignment-through-bukitbrown/333132433401066. (Last accessed Nov 26,2017).

63 Singapore in a favourable light to foreign investors and tourists. This continued intervention, preservation and promotion of a certain image, history and culture could stem from their expectations – an efficient, clean, modernised and advanced Singapore. With no natural resource and Singapore heavily dependent on foreign investors and tourists, those in power would be motivated to continue striving for an image acceptable and liked by the investors and tourists, hence the continued mediation. These are just some proposed reasons and there are many other influences, which could be expanded in another essay.

Conclusion This essay has traced the history of Singapore’s image since 1965 to the present and using Foucault’s theory on ‘truth,’ demonstrated that Singapore’s image of a clean, orderly and pragmatic society was indeed crafted and shaped by those in power. This construction and reinforcement of the ‘truth’ continues even in modern day Singapore as seen through the two case studies. One must note that the government does not always stand as a hegemonic entity and can at times present a less-than-united front; however, that will be analysed in a separate essay.

This essay has thus unveiled the ‘truth’ of Singapore’s image and proposed a few reasons for the continued control over modern day Singapore.

This is in the hope that the reader will begin to understand the motivations of those in power and uncover the different narratives and image that run parallel to that of the current accepted ‘truth’ of Singapore.

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65

British, Dutch, Japanese or Chinese? The Sugar King Inheritance Dispute in Pre-war Singapore Jeremy Goh School of Humanities History Graduate

Abstract - Many scholars have examined the life of Oei Tiong Ham, popularly known as the “Sugar King of Java”, and highlighted his success in building up the Oei Tiong Ham Concern — the largest business conglomerate based in the Dutch East Indies. This paper builds upon the historiography of Oei by exploring a legal case and family dispute, termed the Sugar King Inheritance Dispute, which took place after his death in colonial Singapore. Through an examination of this case study with the aid of legal documents and newspaper reports, it argues that the geographical mobility of prominent overseas Chinese entrepreneurs gave rise to the citizenship problem — a dilemma concerning the multiple conflicting nationalities of Southeast Asian Chinese — during the colonial period. In so doing, this paper illustrates the complexity surrounding Oei’s citizenship status during the early twentieth century, and how he used colonial laws to his advantage.

Keywords – Chinese business history, Wills, Inheritance, Nationality

Introduction Oei Tiong Ham (黄仲涵) was the second son of Oei Tjie Sien (黄志信), a Taiping (太平) rebel who escaped from Xiamen (厦门) to Semarang in the mid-19th century. 360 The latter started a small business, selling bowls and porcelain saucers in

Semarang’s Chinese Quarter.361 A hard worker, the elder Oei “bargained doggedly (and) haggled over each copper coin, (reinvesting) profits into more bowls, saucers and rice, (managing) to save in the process”.362 At night, he leaned his stomach against his desk’s drawer to “ease the hunger pains”.

Subsequently, Oei set up the Kian Gwan Trading Company (建源公司) in 1863, specialising in the rice trade.363 He died in 1890, leaving the company in the hands of Oei Tiong Ham. 364 The younger Oei had a good start, as a retired German consul handed him 300,000 guilders.365 He took a risk by using this money to invest in the sugar industry. By the late1890s, he owned five sugar cane mills which produced 101,500 tons of sugar per year. 366 This gave him the nickname of Sugar King. 367 His gamble paid off, owing to increased world demand for sugar during this period, which brought him massive profits.368 Oei Tiong Ham reinvested these profits into other businesses, such as opium, coffee, rubber and warehousing, turning Kian Gwan into a conglomerate.369 Owing to his economic influence, the Dutch appointed him as the Major of the Chinese in Semarang. 370 Subsequently, with the implementation of the 1910 Dutch Nationality Law, he became a Dutch subject.371 At the same time, he was a Qing subject under China’s 1909 Nationality Regulation, which recognized all Chinese, either born locally or overseas, as imperial “citizens”.372 Existing works on Oei Tiong Ham cover these events in detail, focusing on his personal life and the

360 Oei Tjie Sien was a commander in the Taiping Army, led by Hong Xiuquan

367 “Oei Tiong Ham”, from

(洪秀全). The rebellion forces captured Nanjing (南京) in 1853. In 1864, the Qing

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_1410_2009-01-06.html.

court suppressed the rebellion and reconquered the city. See Oei Hui Lan,

368 To illustrate this, the East Indies exported 3.8 million guilders worth of sugar

“Reminscences”, in Oei Tiong Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of

to America in 1880, increasing to 25 million in 1900. See Jeroen Touwen,

Southeast Asia, Yoshihara Kunio ed. (Kyoto: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies,

“American Trade with the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies”, in Hans

Kyoto University, 1989), 22; Rhoads Murphey, A History of Asia (Essex: Pearson

Krabbendam eds, Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations, 1609–2009

Education Limited, 2014), 342–343.

(Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 278.

361 Yoshihara, “Introduction”, in Oei Tiong Ham, 23–25.

369 Liem, Raja Gula, 130–131.

362 Ibid.

370 Ko Swan Sik and Teuku Moh. Rhadie, “Nationality and International Law

363 Ibid.

in Indonesian Perspective”, in Ko Swan Sik ed, Nationality and International

364“Singapore Infopedia: Oei Tiong Ham”, last accessed 4 June 2017, from

Law in Asian Perspective (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1990), 134;

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_1410_2009-01-06.html.

371 Ibid.

365 Yoshihara, “Introduction”, in Oei Tiong Ham, 3.

372 Leo Suryadinata, The Making of Southeast Asian Nations: State, Ethnicity,

366 Liem Tjwan Ling, Raja Gula Oei Tiong Ham [Oei Tiong-ham: Sugar King]

Indigenism and Citizenship (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), 87.

(Surabaya: Liem, 1979), 135.

66 development of Kian Gwan. His biographer, Yoshihara Kunio, analysed both aspects in Oei Tiong Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of Southeast Asia. In this book, Yoshihara emphasises the end of Kian Gwan’s history in 1961, when Indonesia’s Court of Economic Crimes issued a confiscation order within a context of growing Indonesian nationalism and anti – Chinese sentiments.373 In contrast, he gives lesser attention to the legal case and family conflict over the allocation of Oei Tiong-ham’s assets after he died in 1924, which I term the Sugar King Inheritance Dispute. 374 This dispute was significant in the history of Kian Gwan and highlights another issue—the citizenship, or nationality problem of the overseas Chinese.375 In this paper, citizenship refers to “the state of living in a particular area and behaving in a (manner) that (others) who live there expect”.376 This definition is similar to the concept of domicile (住所), which was the highlight of the court case. According to English law, this refers to “the place where (one) resides as his permanent home with the fixed intention of constantly remaining there”. 377 In the Sugar King Inheritance Dispute, both terms would be used interchangeably. 378 In general, the court debated whether to acknowledge Oei Tiong Ham’s domicile in Singapore after he moved from Semarang in 1921.

This decision was important in judging the validity of his will, which Oei dictated in Singapore. Through examining the Sugar King Inheritance Dispute, I

argue that the geographical mobility of prominent overseas Chinese gave rise to the nationality problem during the colonial era. Through so doing, it adds to existing literature on this issue, which remain heavily focused on the post-war period. 379

The Sugar King Inheritance Dispute, 1924–1925 The Sugar King Inheritance Dispute started on 3 June 1924, when Oei Tiong Ham died in Singapore due to cardiac arrest.380 Local newspapers concluded that he was the richest Chinese in the world, estimating his wealth at 116 million guilders. 381 Subsequently, a family strife ensued over his will, which (1) named nine sons, out of 26 children, as his successors, (2) designated the second and sixth sons, Oei Tjong Swan (黃宗宣) and Oei Tjong Hauw (黃 宗 孝 ), to lead Kian Gwan and (3) divided cash amongst the others. 382 Oei Tiong Ham’s eldest daughter, Mrs. Wellington Koo (黄慧兰), received a million dollars from the will. 383 Nonetheless, she rushed from China to contest it.384 At the same time, she boasted that the inheritance law of China would be altered if she affected the devolution of her father’s estate.385 Oei Tiong-ham’s eldest and third son, Oei Tjong Tee (黄宗悌) and Oei Tjong Joe (黄 宗耀) joined Mrs. Wellington Koo in opposing the will.386

373 For more information on this, see Yoshihara, “Introduction”, in Oei Tiong

Hwang, Ch’ing Changing Images of the Overseas Chinese (1644–1912), Modern

Ham, 11; Tjoa Soe Tjong, “The Lawsuit Against Oei Tiong Ham Concern”, in

Asian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1981): 276–277.

Ibid, 95–106, “Interview: Oei Tjong Le”, in Ibid, 148–183; “Interview: Oei Tjong

380 “Mr Oei Tiong Ham Dead”, Singapore Free Press and Mercantile

Tjay”, in Ibid, 184–231.

Advertiser (henceforth SFP), 5 June 1924.

374 Yoshihara briefly discusses this court case in his introduction. See

381 Oei’s sugar plantations, mortgage investments in Singapore, deposits in

Yoshihara, “Introduction”, in Ibid, 7–8

England and cash accounted for 35 percent, 30 percent, 10 percent and 17 percent

375 Wang Gungwu, “Greater China and the Chinese Overseas”, The China

of his assets respectively. See “Sugar King’s Estate”, The Straits Times

Quarterly, No. 136 (1993): 926–927.

(henceforth ST), 16 July 1924; “黄仲涵遗产之报告 Huang Zhonghan yi chan zhi

376 “Cambridge Dictionaries Online”, last accessed 4 June 2017, from

bao gao [Oei Tiong-ham’s Asset Report]”, 南 洋 商 報 [Nanyang Siang Pau,

http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/citizenship.

henceforth NYSP], 17 July 1924.

377 G. H. Lloyd Jacob, “Nationality and Domicile: With Special Reference to

382 “Probate No. 195 of 1924: Last Will and Testament of Oei Tiong Ham”, 10

Early Notions on the Subject”, Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. 10 (1924): 90.

378 Nonetheless, the paper notes that the definitions of terms, such as “nationality”, “citizenship”, are problematic and complicated. Indeed, the nationality issue is an important part of the “overseas Chinese problem”. See

May 1923, National Archives of Singapore, SIT T1/31; “黄仲涵遗产之纷争 Huang Zhonghan yi chan zhi fen zheng [The Feud over Oei Tiong Ham’s Assets]”, NYSP, 21 July 1924. Yoshihara Kunio, Oei Tiong Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of Southeast Asia (Kyoto: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 1989), 138;

Leo Suryadinata, Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese, 1900-1995: A

383 “Sugar King’s Estate”, ST, 19 July 1924.

Sourcebook. 2nd ed, (Singapore: NUS Press, 1997), 86.

384 “The Peking Foreign Minister and his Talented Wife”, Malayan Saturday

379 Scholars suggest that the citizenship issue became sensitive during the postwar period, one which was closely related to the relations between the People’s Republic of China and the newly independent Southeast Asian countries. For

Post, 26 July 1924.

385 Mrs. Wellington Koo, also known as Oei Hui Lan, was the wife of V.K. Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun

顾维钧).

He represented China at the Paris Peace

instance, see Suryadinata, The Making, 85–99. Besides this period, the citizenship issue also posed a problem in earlier periods. It is notable that this problem first occurred in 1851, when the British and Qing disagreed on the legal status of an individual, Chen Qingzhen (陈庆真). A local court ordered Chen to be “beaten to death with bamboo canes”, for having connections with a secret society dealing with opium. Subsequently, the court put his corpse on a sedan and sent it to the British Consulate, triggering a diplomatic crisis. See Yen Ching-

Conference. In 1924, he was the Chinese Foreign Minister, subsequently serving as a diplomat, Prime Minister, Finance Minister and President of China. See “China and the Powers”, SFP, 11 August 1925; Stephen G. Craft. V.K. Wellington Koo and the Emergence of Modern China, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

386 Ibid

67 On 28 July, this family dispute became a court case, when Oei Tjong Swan, Oei Tjong Hauw and Oei Tiong Ham’s seventh wife, Kian Hwa Neo (何金华 ), applied for probate in the Supreme Court to execute the will. 387 Opposing this application, Oei Tjong Tee and Oei Tjong Joe argued that their father had domicile status in Java, not the Straits Settlements, thus rendering the will invalid since it was made in Singapore. 388 At the same time, they argued that Kian Hwa Neo exerted undue influence on their father as the latter made his will. 389 The Chief Justice, Sir Walther Shaw, ordered the applicants to remove Oei Tjong Hauw’s name from the proceedings, as he was underage. 390 Also, he requested both sides to prepare their arguments for subsequent court hearings.391

which included Oei Tjong Swan and Oei Tjong Hauw. 397 Following which, Aitken asked the plaintiffs to explain this sudden change. 398 Lastly, the defendants pointed out that Oei Tiong Ham lost his domicile status in the East Indies, after failing to register at the Dutch Consulate in Singapore, thus subjecting himself to China’s laws.399 Aitkens went further, suggesting that Oei Tiong Ham was a Japanese citizen. This was possible, as he obtained a Japanese passport in 1906 before the Dutch made him a subject. 400 At the same time, Carver argued that the plaintiffs would need to show Oei Tiong Ham’s intention to live permanently in Singapore, in order for him to be domiciled under the laws of the Straits Settlements.401

Subsequently, the Supreme Court heard the case from 24 October to 3 November. J. Aitken and G.C. Carver represented the defendants, Oei Tjong Tee and Oei Tjong Joe.392 The defendants put forth four points to show that Oei Tiong Ham was not domiciled in the Straits Settlements, and to prove his seventh wife’s undue influence. First, they noted that the family organised Oei Tiong Ham’s funeral on a larger scale in Java which attracted 100,000 mourners, as compared to the one which was held in Singapore. 393 Second, the lawyers argued that the bulk of his property was located in Java.

Furthermore, Oei Tjong Joe stated during a crossexamination, that his father’s residence in Java was more magnificent than his house in Singapore. 394 Third, Aitken highlighted to the court that Oei Tiong Ham made more than one will.395 In 1921, the latter dictated his first will in Semarang, listing his six wives and children as his main beneficiaries. 396 In 1922, he made another will in Singapore, which allocated the bulk of his wealth to his nine sons,

Indeed, this was the main argument of the plaintiffs—Oei Tjong Swan and Kian Hwa Neo. A.P. Robinson and R. Williamson represented them.

They presented four points to show that Oei Tiongham had domicile status in Singapore, and to refute the defendants’ claim that Kian Hwa Neo exerted undue influence on her husband. First, they argued that Oei Tiong Ham decided to stay in Singapore, so as to avoid paying excessive taxes in Java. To illustrate, the Dutch increased the income tax from 6 percent to 25 percent between 1920 and 1921. 402 Furthermore, he refused to allow Dutch inheritance laws to dictate his will, as it gave equal rights of inheritance to his sons and daughters. 403 Second, the lawyers highlighted to the court that Oei Tiong Ham indicated clearly in his latest will, that “(it) should be construed and should operate on the footing that he was domiciled in the Colony”.404 Third, Oei Tjong Swan, during a cross-examination, rebutted the defendants’ argument that the bulk of Oei Tiong Ham’s assets were located in Java.405 He mentioned that his father owned properties in Amoy and

387 “Will of Late Mr Oei Tiong Ham: Petition in Supreme Court”, SFP, 29 July

Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia”, in M. B Hooker, Law and the Chinese

1924.

in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 173–

388 Ibid. A lawyer, Mr H.D. Mundell observed the proceedings on behalf of

174; “Sugar King’s Estate: Evidence of claim to Japanese Nationality refused”,

Wellington Koo.

SFP, 31 October 1924.

389 Ibid.

400 Peter Post explained how Chinese in the East Indies obtained European

390 “黄仲涵遗产纷争之开始 Huang Zhonghan yi chuan fen zheng zhi kai shi [Oei

status through Japan. In general, the Chinese bought land from Taiwan, handing

Tiong Ham’s Inheritance Case starts]”, NYSP, 29 July 1929.

the purchase deed to the Japanese Consulate in Singapore, hence obtaining a

391 Ibid.

Japanese passport. This passport gave European status to the Chinese. See Peter

392 “Sugar King’s Wealth: Oei Tiong Ham driven from Java by taxation”, SFP,

Post, “Chinese business networks and Japanese capital in South East Asia, 1800–

24 October 1924.

1940: some preliminary observations”, in Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown ed,

393 Ibid. There was no specific mention of the number of people who attended

Chinese Business Enterprise in Asia (London: Routledge, 1995), 164.

Oei’s funeral in Singapore.

401 “Sugar King’s Wealth: Oei Tiong Ham driven from Java by taxation”, SFP,

394 “Sugar King’s Estate: Supreme Court Litigation Continued”, ST, 30 October

24 October 1924.

1924.

402 Oei Tiong Ham managed to save 350,000 guilders annually by moving to

395 “Sugar King’s Wealth: Oei Tiong Ham driven from Java by taxation”, SFP,

Singapore. See “Sugar King’s Wealth”, SFP, 24 October 1924.

24 October 1924.

403 Yoshihara, Oei Tiong Ham, 7.

396 Ibid.

404 “Sugar King’s Wealth: Oei Tiong Ham driven from Java by taxation”, SFP,

397 Ibid.

24 October 1924.

398 Ibid.

405 “Sugar King’s Estate: Supreme Court Litigation Continued”, ST, 30 October

399 Indeed, the 1912 Nationality Act of China stated that all Chinese, regardless

1924.

of birthplace, were Chinese nationals. See Leo Suryadinata, “China’s Citizenship

68 London, as well as investments worth SS$2.7 million in Singapore.406 Lastly, Robinson noted that the defendants were not on good terms with their father. 407 Oei Tjong Tee admitted, during a crossexamination, that Oei Tiong Ham refused to see him in Singapore, and he knew nothing about the intentions and movements of his father.408 With this information, Robinson argued that the latest will was not a result of Kian Hwa Neo’s influence, but Oei Tiong Ham’s wishes.409 After hearing the arguments from both sides, Sir Walther Shaw delivered judgment on 3 November, in the favour of the plaintiffs. 410 He stated that Oei Tiong-ham’s domicile status was valid under English law—(1) it was clear that he established a permanent residence in Singapore to avoid taxation back in Java and (2) he mentioned clearly in his will that he intended to be domiciled in Singapore.411 Oei Tjong Tee and Oei Tjong Joe appealed against this decision. On 25 November, the Court of Appeal upheld Shaw’s ruling. 412 The chief judge, Justice Whitley, stated that Oei Tiong Ham clearly intended to change his domicile to Singapore due to two reasons. First, he understood what domicile meant, noting that lawyers gave him a clear explanation when he made his last will in Singapore.413 Second, he moved his residence from Java to Singapore. This ended the legal battle between members of the Oei family. 414 However, animosities within the family ensued till early-1925, when Oei Tiong Ham’s children came to a consensus. 415 They agreed that every individual, other than the 9 which were named as successors, would receive 400,000 guilders from the assets.416 At the same time, members of the Oei family signed an agreement promising not to create conflict over the issue of inheritance. 417 This ended the Sugar King Inheritance Dispute.

Semarang and Singapore. It was reasonable for Aitkens to suggest that Oei Tiong Ham was a Japanese citizen, as the latter visited Japan many times. In 1906, he met Ito Hirobumi, becoming a member of the latter’s party to Europe. 418 At the same time, he was a Chinese citizen as a result of China’s 1912 Nationality Law. However, the judge, Sir Walter Shaw, was mainly concerned with the period from 1921 to 1924, when Oei moved from Semarang and spent his last years in Singapore. His domicile status remained complicated, as the British did not naturalise him as a subject. Despite this, he clearly stated in his will that his assets must be allocated as if he was domiciled in Singapore. Thus, Shaw argued that Oei knew what domicile meant, and relied on the interpretation of domicile under British law to make his decision.

In sum, the Sugar King Inheritance Dispute illustrates the complexity surrounding a Chinese individual’s citizenship status during the colonial period as he crossed various borders. Having understood colonial laws, Oei Tiong Ham used this to his advantage by moving his residence from Semarang to Singapore to lose his status as a Dutch subject without gaining another. This stroke of brilliance enabled him to avoid heavy taxation in the East Indies, and inheritance laws which went contrary to his wishes, thus saving Kian Gwan from a potential split. 419 To conclude, this paper also suggests that it may be fruitful to examine the lives of prominent overseas Chinese individualities, which would reflect their unique characteristics as compared to the general trends in different periods.

Conclusion Oei Tiong Ham’s domicile status played central stage in the Sugar King Inheritance Dispute.

Lawyers on both sides debated his citizenship status, which was problematic as he spent a considerable amount of time in various places, namely Japan,

406 Ibid. SS$ refers to the Straits Settlements Dollar.

415 “糖王遗产分配之续闻 tang wang yi chan fen pei zhi xu wen [The Sequel to the

407 “Sugar King’s Estate: Evidence of claim to Japanese Nationality refused”,

Allocation of Sugar King’s Assets]”, NYSP, 23 April 1925.

SFP, 31 October 1924.

416 Ibid.

408 Ibid.

417 Ibid.

409 Ibid.

418 Post, “Chinese business networks”, in Brown ed, Chinese Business, 164.

410 “In the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements,” 3 November 1924,

419 British law allowed one to disinherit children. Indeed, Oei Tiong-ham’s

National Archives of Singapore, SIT T1/31; “Oei Tiong Ham Will Case”, SFP,

decision allowed his conglomerate to avoid the usual Chinese tradition of

4 November 1924.

division between descendants, leading to a breakup. Hence, this legal case is of

411 Ibid.

great importance in the history of Kian Gwan, which should be further developed

412 “Oei Tiong Ham’s Estate: Appeal Against Probate Decision Dismissed”,

in another study. See “Interview: Oei Tjong Jay”, in Yoshihara, Oei Tiong Ham,

SFP, 26 November 1924.

187; Gordon Redding, “Chinese Family Business?” in Henry Yeung Wai-cheung

413 Ibid.

and Kris Olds ed, Globalisation of Chinese Business Firms (New York: St.

414 Ibid.

Martin’s Press, 2000), 45.

69 Bibliography

Suryadinata, Leo. The Making of Southeast Asian Nations: State, Ethnicity, Indigenism and Citizenship. Singapore: World Scientific, 2015.

“Probate of the Will and Codicil of Oei Tiong Ham, Esq.” National Archives of Singapore, SIT T1/31.

Yeung, Wai-cheung Henry and Olds, Kris ed.

Globalisation of Chinese Business Firms. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.

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Books Journal Articles Brown, Rajeswary Ampalavanar ed. Chinese Business Enterprise in Asia. London: Routledge, 1995.

Ching-Hwang, Yen. Ch’ing Changing Images of the Overseas Chinese (1644–1912). Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1981): pp. 261–285.

Craft, Stephen G. V.K. Wellington Koo and the Emergence of Modern China. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

Hooker, M. B. Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002.

Jacob, G. H. Lloyd. “Nationality and Domicile: With Special Reference to Early Notions on the Subject”.

Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. 10 (1924): pp. 89–114.

Ko, Swan Sik ed. Nationality and International Law in Asian Perspective. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1990.

Wang, Gungwu. “Greater China and the Chinese Overseas”. The China Quarterly, No. 136 (1993): 926–948.

Krabbendam, Hans eds. Four Centuries of DutchAmerican Relations, 1609–2009. Albany: SUNY Press, 2009.

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Kunio, Yoshihara ed. Oei Tiong Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of Southeast Asia. Kyoto: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 1989.

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Liem, Tjwan Ling. Raja Gula Oei Tiong Ham [Oei Tiong-ham: Sugar King]. Surabaya: Liem, 1979.

Murphey, Rhoads. A History of Asia. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2014.

Post, Peter. “Chinese business networks and Japanese capital in South East Asia, 1800–1940: some preliminary observations” Suryadinata, Leo. Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese, 1900-1995: A Sourcebook. 2nd ed. Singapore: NUS Press, 1997.

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70

British European Association of Singapore 1956 - 59: The Colonial Order’s Dying Breath Li Hezan Martin Edgar School of Humanities History Graduate Abstract - This essay explores Singapore’s political dynamics during the era of decolonisation through the lens of locally based British commercial elites.

Wary of the newfound wave of party-based nationalist mass politics, these individuals organised themselves into British European Association of Singapore (BEA) to exercise their traditional political right as communal leaders within a colonial society. Nonetheless, even as they navigated various avenues of power within the British imperial structure, the BEA leaders would realise that the weight of the commercial argument was diminishing as quickly as were the traditional power structures of colonial society. Instead, private commercial interests proved unable to sway the colonial authorities especially if they were not articulated within the interests of stable political decolonisation.

Significantly, the insecurities of these British organisers reflect contemporaneous fears of radical change, and the clash between the communal leadership and the nascent system of political parties.

Keywords – Decolonisation, Empire, Singapore, colonial, society, business

Introduction In April 1956, constitutional talks between the British Government and the first popularly elected Government of Singapore commenced in London.

Two months later, the British European Association of Singapore (BEA) was officially formed to protect the social and commercial interests of Singapore’s British community against the rising dangers of local nationalism. The BEA aligned itself with similar communal associations that collectively claimed to serve as a moderating influence upon the increasingly radical and unstable position that Singapore’s new mass-based political parties were adopting. However, the local colonial authorities saw things differently. Using their widespread intelligence networks, they were privy to the knowledge that Singapore’s Left was split between a moderate and a radical faction. Furthermore, British officials acknowledged that the process of decolonisation had generated its own local forces and constitutional progression was the best way to accommodate these forces peacefully—and to insure

Britain’s future interests. The local colonial authorities believed that the People’s Action Party (PAP) moderates’ socialist rhetoric was not necessarily Communist and could still be aligned with British interests. Thus they employed the full powers of the state to facilitate the political rise of certain charismatic PAP leaders amidst the sociopolitical upheavals of the late-colonial transitional period. This domestic political struggle to shape the post-colonial order, framed against the wider international struggle against Communism, made petty commercial interests seem irrelevant and even counterproductive to Britain’s interests.

Evidently, the BEA could not have seen the larger strategic picture in the same way that British officials saw it. The British commercial elites of the BEA were mostly concerned about securing their own uncertain future amidst the widespread changes that seemed to be taking place. From their perspective, the stability of the old colonial order seemed to be descending into political anarchy. The unruly masses incited by anti-colonial leftist political parties left British businessmen fearing for their future interests.

Worse still, the British Government—in all its secrecy—sometimes appeared nonchalant about these problems, a concern which was compounded with promises to grant greater constitutional powers to political parties. Resultantly, the BEA was formed to join other communal elites in challenging the overzealous political parties. In doing so, they offered the revival of the pre-Rendel colonial order: politics through conservative communal associations dominated by cautious elites. However, the local authorities were clearly unsupportive, and the BEA promptly resorted to its official connections to higher levels of British Government. They wanted to convince the British Government that Singapore’s political parties were simply too immature for selfgovernment.

This essay analyses the BEA’s efforts to establish its role as a communal leader and its subsequent efforts to exercise its political rights as such. Eventually, the BEA leaders would realise—through interactions with British officials on various levels—that the commercial argument no longer held the same weight that it had traditionally held. Private commercial interests were trivial matters within the

71 complex politics of decolonisation. I argue that even as the BEA navigated various avenues of power to make their anti-independence arguments, their efforts were eventually sidelined by the official view that commercial interests were subordinate to political considerations—unelected elitist representations were clearly made obsolete by the mass politics of the late-colonial period.

Contextualising Change in the Business of Empire Incidentally, the imperial agenda of the 1950s was shifting towards the imperatives of decolonisation.

Within this context, British policymakers did not always factor in the economic rationale as the dominant reason for decolonisation. In fact, geopolitical concerns predominated official thinking in Whitehall and the British Government generally agreed that an alliance with moderate local politicians—within a Commonwealth of Nations— would best preserve Britain’s future economic interests. 420 This post-war mentality was partly stimulated by the uncertainty of its declining influence in global affairs. 421 Britain’s decline became especially apparent after the disastrous diplomatic defeat of the Suez Crisis—which resulted in British acquiescence towards decolonisation as the most practical policy to align itself with the hegemonic influence of the United States. Harold Macmillan, who firmly believed in the unstoppable “tide of nationalism” and the global struggle against Communism, took up the mantle of leadership during this period; and his views were to shape highlevel decision making in tackling colonial issues. 422 Similarly, the promise of decolonisation was seen as a way to counter the anti-imperial rhetoric frequently employed by Communists. Even Britain’s economic policy gradually began to be decoupled from that of the Empire, as it deregulated the Stirling Area and adopted more nationally oriented policies.423 It was within this framework that the Singapore’s Colonial Office worked towards decolonisation. In fact, while successive Ministers of State for the Colonies actively assured the UK Parliament that Singapore was making strident constitutional

progress, local colonial authorities worked towards establishing the framework for local governance. 424 These efforts culminated into the creation of new local leaders in the form of elected politicians— through the workings of party politics. Perhaps inevitably, these politicians—who depended upon the legitimacy of democratic representation— employed strong nationalistic left-wing rhetoric in order to appeal to the masses. In the midst of this, the local colonial authorities anxiously sought to maintain the integrity of parliamentary politics by wielding the powers of the state against perceived subversives—who were often dangerously well connected to the masses. To the authorities, true political progress meant a stable parliamentary system under a moderate government that could seriously claim to have popular mandate. Only this would convince policymakers in Whitehall that British interest could be assured in a self-governing Singapore. Ultimately, self-government was only possible if the local colonial authorities could convince Whitehall that Singapore would remain friendly to British interests; convincing the British Government otherwise might potentially disrupt constitutional advance.

As the possibility of self-government loomed, there was good reason for Singapore-based British civilians to feel nervous. This was especially so for those of the commercial community—who held a special interest in Singapore’s administration as an outpost of Empire. British firms undoubtedly held a unique competitive advantage within the imperial order. They were ‘natives’ of the Empire and this status came with privileged access to the metropolitan politics through the ‘old Malaya’ lobbies. British mercantile interests were frequently exercised through these powerful lobby groups, which gave them the ability to cause “parliamentary embarrassment” for the Colonial Office in Britain. 425 In other words, British merchants could bypass local concerns and make demands upon higher authorities on the constitutional basis of their natural rights as British citizens. Moreover, the “plural society” under the colonial system allowed “economic gain” to predominate as the highest denominator in societal relations—which undoubtedly benefited a

420 Nicholas J. White, “Gentlemanly Capitalism and Empire in the Twentieth

Declining Empire The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968. (Cambridge:

Century: The Forgotten Case of Malaya 1914-1965” in Gentlemanly Capitalism

Cambridge University Press, 2006), 242-243.

and British Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire, ed. Raymond E. Dumett,

423 Nicholas J. White, “Government and Business Divided: Malaya, 1945-57,”

(New York: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1999), 189.

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22, no. 2 (2008): 267-68.

421 Catherine R. Schenk, "Britain’s changing position in the international

424 Constance Mary Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore: 1819 - 2005.

economy." In Twentieth-Century Britain Economic, Cultural and Social Change,

(Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 238.

ed. Francesca Carnevali; Julie-Marie Strange, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 58-

425 T.N. Harper, “The Colonial Economy under Duress” in The End of Empire

78. Britain’s foreign policy was subject to much economic pressure from the

and the Making of Malaya, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 200.

Americans as they found themselves being increasingly economically dependent

For instance, the commercial lobbies had managed to frustrate the Malayan

upon the US.

Colonial Government’s attempt to enforce export duties to finance the anti-

422 Ronald Hyam ,“‘The wind of change is blowing’: the Macmillan and

communist security efforts.

Douglas-Home governments and the end of empire, 1957–1964” In Britain's

72 mercantile racial minority. 426 However, the move towards self-government threatened to erode these traditional benefits. The imposition of a sovereign national government, which presumably operated through the mandate of its people, might emphasise parochial nationalism over economic gain.

Businesses would be legally bound to the commercial regulations of the national government, and there would be a shift towards local national considerations as opposed to the commercially conducive cosmopolitanism of Empire.

And the rapidly changing nature of contemporaneous politics in Singapore made it almost necessary for the British community to seek to be heard. Prior to the implementation of the Rendell Constitution in 1955, Singapore’s moderate elites still held enough influence to ensure that political change proceeded at a comfortable pace.

Even though, for a period before the Emergency, organisations like the Malayan Democratic Union could rally the forces of mass politics for their demands, the commercial community could still take comfort that franchise rights were still limited to a generally conservative elite minority.427 In 1948, the only serious party to compete was the Singapore Progressive Party, founded by upper-class members of society, which won half of the seats in the 1948 election and ensured the continuance of stable constitutional reforms. Although they were not fully representative of the masses, the new Legislative Council held considerable influence as the Emergency Regulations effectively stifled the organisation of any potential rivals that might arise from popular left-wing politics.

With the lifting of the Emergency Regulations in 1953, the way was paved for greater political activity outside of the Legislative Council. In the same year, the Colonial Office began to recognise that the existing Legislative Council was unrepresentative of the masses and appointed a Constitutional Commission to study the prospects of greater constitutional advancements. 428 The Commission’s efforts culminated into the implementation of the 1955 Rendel Constitution—which was designed to arouse an interest in self-government by expanding franchise rights and transferring considerable power to the new Legislative Assembly. 429 Significantly, the Rendel Commission argued that seats in the legislature should no longer be reserved for the three Chambers of Commerce. The Chambers of

Commerce protested this decision in a memorandum stressing the vital role of commerce in the development of Singapore. However, the Colonial Office remained resolute that special representation was impedimentary to the development of party politics. 430 Commercial interests had to be represented through, and be subordinate to, elected representatives. The sudden relaxation of policies inhibiting political organisation beyond the boundaries of the Legislative Council gave an opportunity for the masses to air their grievances: voices calling for a more liberal society based on anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism became axiomatic principles. This heralded a fundamental shift in the local political landscape; power now laid in politicians who could wield the forces of mass politics instead of the elitist politics that characterised Singapore’s old colonial system.

More importantly, the relaxation of the Emergency Regulations also allowed new mass-based political parties such as the Labour Front and the PAP to promulgate their left-wing ideas and ride on the waves of the prevailing anti-colonial sentiments. The 1955 Singapore General Elections was seen as a test bed for the new Rendel Constitution, which was believed to better represent the realities of public opinion. It surprised everyone: the nascent ‘radical’ socialist parties trumped the commercially oriented right-wing conservatives to form both the Government and the Leader of the Opposition. This new development also marked the shifting political norm towards the left. Indeed, leftist rhetoric seemed to be the only way for politicians to truly connect with the masses. As the de-facto opposition leader, the PAP was forced to adopt a more radical position—as compared to the Labour Front—to seek popular recognition as the representative of leftwing politics.431 Although the PAP only held 4 out of 25 elected seats in the Legislative Assembly, its true influence was proportionately greater than its parliamentary representation suggests. Since its inception, the PAP was effectively composed of two factions, which shared a common goal of fostering anti-colonial nationalistic sentiments amongst the Chinese working class. The PAP was a tenuous alliance between the radical-left Middle Road group with access to a vast network within the Chinese community and a moderate English-speaking faction that were well adept at exploiting the workings of

426 John Sydenham Furnivall, “The Plural Society” in Colonial Policy and

429 Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore 1945-1955, (Singapore:

Practice, (Cambridge University Press, 1948), 308. To which one might also add

Singapore University Press, 1973), 58.

that the British community held a distinct advantage based on their racial origins.

430 Gillis, Singapore Civil Society and British Power, 161-162. This proved to

427 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore: 1819 – 2005, 238.

be an accurate prediction when the Democratic Party formed by the Chinese

428 E. Kay Gillis, Singapore Civil Society and British Power, (Singapore:

Chamber of Commerce—in response to the loss of its legislative seats—proved

Talisman, 2005), 138-139.

to be a failure in the 1955 elections.

431 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore: 1819 – 2005, 260-261.

73 British constitutional politics. 432 In fact, the PAP was crucial in rallying the multitude of left-wing organisations into a politically effective force after 1955. 433 Incidentally, the Rendel Constitution had created conditions for the voices of disgruntled workers and student to develop into mass protests against colonial injustice. In the PAP’s bid to usurp the left-wing position, it portrayed itself as a zealous leader of the anti-colonial movement and framed the contemporaneous Labour Front Government as a perpetuator of colonial injustice. As such, its political stance, which was the result of a volatile consensus, made it a symbol of Singapore’s radical left during the 1950s—albeit one that was constitutionally accepted.

To many observers then, the chaotic state of affairs that resulted from constitutional developments seemed to prove that a system of political parties was simply impractical in Singapore. Immediately after taking office, the new Labour Front government was tested by the Hock Lee Bus Riots, which resulted in widespread chaos and an eventual curfew. The event was publicly perceived as a left-wing challenge to the new Establishment and David Marshall’s refusal to take strong action was seen as a victory for the radical left—epitomised by the PAP. 434 In fact, many elites would have agreed with the accusation that the rioting was the fault of “the PAP and their covert Communist supporters… [who wanted] industrial unrest”.435 As such, the possibility that the Labour Front Government—which was struggling to cope with a volatile left-wing opposition in its own legislature—might attain full internal selfgovernment someday was an alarming possibility.

Especially since the Communists seemed to have successfully infiltrated the Government through constitutional methods.

A British Communal Association as a Voice for Moderation Consequently, as Singapore trudged towards selfgovernment under uncertain circumstances, the British commercial community in Malaya began to consolidate its challenge to constitutional development. At the time, the possibility of selfgovernment would have seemed to be a menacing

possibility; considering that Whitehall had just conceded full self-government Federation of Malaya in the January Constitutional Conference. In response, several British head of firms— with business interests in Malaya—formed the Malayan Commercial Association of Great Britain (MCAGB) to represent “the UK end of British business operations”. Its efficacy depended on its close connections with leading UK policymakers, postimperial government departments and its relations to local Malayan commercial organisations. 436 Just as the constitutional talks began on April 1956, the MCAGB made its first move to challenge the notion of granting full internal self-government to Singapore. Its delegation cited the danger of communist subversion, which would have negative implications for British interests on both the economic and geopolitical front. Specifically, it raised the issue of the “powerful left-wing dominated by Chinese Communist sympathisers in the PAP”, which was poorly handled by Marshall’s Government that “exists on sufferance based on only 27% of the votes… [from] 6% of the total electorate”. 437 Eventually, the voice in which the MCAGB was a part of triumphed when the negotiations failed due to Britain’s insistence on retaining control over internal security.

Conversely, during the latter part of the 1950s, the Colonial Office had hoped for constitutional development, as they feared an unfavourable decolonisation if they overstayed their welcome.

While constitutional development allowed a multitude of political organisations to emerge, the British kept a watchful eye on political development through its pervasive intelligence networks and plotted to facilitate “the rise of a chosen individual into a highly placed position among those ideologically opposed to British rule”. 438 Even so, the actions of the local authorities were restrained by the socio-political realities, and they had to accommodate to whichever political party that proved to receive popular mandate. Despite being initially frowned upon, the rapid rise and widespread popularity of the PAP made the party an ideal candidate for such a scheme; the PAP moderates could develop its own networks amongst the masses

432 Dennis Bloodworth, "PAP: The Loveless Marriage." In The Tiger and the

436 Nicholas J. White Introduction to British Business in Post-Colonial

Trojan Horse, (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2011), 131-140.

Malaysia, 1957-70: Neo-Colonialism or Disengagement? (London: Rutledge

433 Gillis, Singapore Civil Society and British Power, 136.

Curzon, 2004), 13-14.

434 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore: 1819 – 2005, 263-264. The Chief

437 The National Archives of the UK (TNA): FCO 141/15004, The Malayan

Minister, David Marshall believed strongly in human rights and refused to take

Commercial Association’s Aide-Memoire for the deputation to the Minister of

stern action against the rioters. To public eyes, the new government was too weak

State at the Colonial Office on Monday- April 23 1956, “Formation of British

to take on the dissidents as the British had done so successfully during the

European Association”, 24 May 1956. pp 2-4.

Emergency.

438 Greg Poulgrain, "Lim Chin Siong in Britain’s Southeast Asian De-

435 "The Guilty Men." The Straits Times (Singapore), May 17, 1955.

colonisation." In Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, ed. Tan Jing Quee; Jomo K.S, (Selangor Darul Ehsan: INSAN, 2001), 116.

74 and channel the forces of nationalism into a controllable anti-communist force.

Specifically, the colonial authorities favoured Lee Kuan Yew and his fellow moderates within the PAP. Goode himself personally believed that in spite of Lee’s left-wing connections, he would not allow the communist to take control. 439 Moreover, politics during the period went beyond parliamentary institutions. Political leaders often made private agreements with British ministers in a bid to outmanoeuvre their competition. In this case, Lee’s familiarity with British culture and practices gave him a distinct advantage against the PAP’s Left—an advantage he readily employed. 440 To some extent then, the local colonial authorities had an informal working relationship with the PAP moderates and understood that the anti-colonial discourse was a necessity to compete against—and exploit—other radical elements. Even the seemingly uncontrollable protests fit into the local authorities’ calculations to weaken the PAP Left to the benefit of the moderates. 441 In the midst of the apparent sociopolitical upheaval of the period, the Colonial Office’s project of decolonisation was in fact a carefully orchestrated process of nurturing moderate nationalism.

Following the MCAGB’s challenge in London, Dr Withers-Payne, an influential British partner in Drew & Napier, approached Chief Secretary William Goode to notify him of the planned formation of the BEA. The local Colonial Office was quick to deduce that it was a locally based MCAGB pressure group. Dr Withers-Payne argued that the Singapore Chamber of Commerce was no longer a viable representative for the commercial community as it had been stripped of its ability to exercise its political function. He proposed that the BEA be allowed to organise so that the political rights of the British commercial community in Singapore could be properly considered and represented.442 Since the British commercial elite could no longer use the Singapore Chamber of Commerce to voice their opinions in the Legislative Assembly, they sought to revive a traditional channel of unofficial political representation: communal representation.

By identifying themselves as a communal association, the BEA legitimised their political rights within a democratic constitutional framework. They were careful to present themselves as a peaceful communal-oriented organisation that was committed to “the establishment of a single community of persons… irrespective of race, colour or creed”.443 As a communal organisation, the elites of the BEA could now claim to represent the wider British community; and their existence was justified as a positive force to protect the political rights of their community. For lack of legal premise, the local colonial authorities could do little to interdict its development. Moreover, the colonial authorities had to consider the fact that the BEA would almost definitely resort to its Whitehall connections if they were censured—and this might only lead to unnecessary embarrassment. It was in the context of this quagmire that Goode wrote a thinly veiled warning within the same letter that conceded the BEA’s right to operate: “The development of communal politics in Singapore is to be deprecated and it is distasteful that the Europeans would wish to launch a communal association… If the organisation doesn’t hurt sensitivities, I see no reason why the organisation shouldn’t develop here… [However] Do not make allegations that we are sponsoring the formation of a European Association”. 444 Essentially, the local colonial authorities were only obliged to tolerate the continuation of the BEA as it was established on constitutionally reasonable grounds of protecting British communal interests.

Navigating Symbols of Community Leadership And to do so, the British community had to consolidate themselves numerically to meet the new and hostile forces of mass politics. It was the most sensible option to ensure a voice within the traumatic socio-political transition that was occurring during the mid-1950s. Evidently, membership was restricted to the British community and consisted primarily of professionals or business owners.

Officially, the BEA pioneers claimed that they would avoid direct political involvement but would not hesitate to act as a moderating influence on local

439 Ibid., 118-119. The Colonial Office had considered Lee Kuan Yew the best

importantly, individuals who have been arrested were constitutionally barred

choice they had and employed everything in their power to facilitate his political

from standing for elections.

career.

442 TNA: FCO 141/15004, Minute by HE. The Governor, “Formation of British

440 T.N. Harper, "Lim Chin Siong and the ‘Singapore Story’." In Comet in Our

European Association”, No. 89 G.H 56/6, 9 June 1956. In a reply to Black, Goode

Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, ed. Tan Jing Quee; Jomo K.S, (Selangor Darul

expressed his distrust of the MCAGB members and their anti-independence

Ehsan: INSAN, 2001), 24.

stance. It must also be noted that the Colonial Office were suspicious as to how

441 Poulgrain, "Lim Chin Siong in Britain’s Southeast Asian De-

the idea was presented to the Commissioner-General.

colonisation",117-120. For instance, the strikes gave the state an excuse to accuse

443 "A Message from Sir Robert Scott." The BEAM Vol.1 no.1, April 1957, 1.

and detain radical PAP members. This effectively weakened their position since

The BEAM seems to have been the first BEA public communications.

it was impossible to conduct any political maneuvers from prison. More

444 TNA: FCO 141/15004, Letter from Goode to Thorne, “Formation of British European Association”, 4 July 1956.

75 political development. For them, moderate politics meant keeping local commercial interests safe from any nationalistic impulses.445 Essentially, it aimed to create a forum that would coalesce the opinions of the local British elite into a unitary voice that represented the interests of the entire British community.446 Even so, it is doubtful as to whether the organisation truly represented the wider British community. The political function of the BEA operated through unofficial channels, which were usually private backdoor politics, and it would almost appear as though a small group were stoking the fears of the larger British community to proselytise their private political agendas. The BEA was only as useful as it could grant these minority British elites the numerical backing, which directly translated into political legitimacy. Naturally, those who benefited most from the BEA continuously canvassed for increased membership and the editors of the BEAM repeatedly reminded existing members that strength comes in numbers.

The BEAM itself served as the BEA’s official mouthpiece and served to actively broadcast the BEA’s portrayal of itself as a positive force for the community. Its inaugural issue—published approximately a year after the local Colonial Office learned of the BEA—began ambitiously and announced that various sub-committees would be established “to examine the manifold ways in which the Association can be of use to the community”.

The issue also unveiled plans to set up a school and a “well-equipped modern hospital”.447 Significantly, through direct petition to the Minister of Health in Whitehall, the BEA proudly announced that they had successfully petitioned for supplies of anti-Polio vaccines that would be available to all in Singapore.448 Given anti-colonial sentiments of the time, an explicit altruistic objective was necessary to navigate local sensitivities. It was the only way they could truly portray themselves as a positive community-conscious organisation. As the BEA’s Secretary admits in an article entitled “A Call to the Critics”, the establishment of such an association was not a unanimous decision within the British mercantile community. 449 Some British nonmembers felt that the implied objectives of the BEA contravened the official project of nation building

and was simply colonialism in disguise. An altruistic objective would provide the BEA with some basis to defend itself from public accusations of its implicit political motivations; the BEA would be framed as a well-intentioned organisation that worked for the betterment of Singapore.

To strengthen its claims as a British communal association, the BEA also actively publicised their special links to the United Kingdom. When the local Colonial Office refused to promote the BEA’s cause, their legitimacy was severely compromised since officials of British origin were unwilling to lend support. In response, the leaders of the BEA approached the British Commissioner-General of Southeast Asia, Sir Robert Scott, to write a personal message to endorse the BEA’s aims for a stable society, in which they “have every reason to be proud of the part they have played in the making of modern Singapore”.450 Much like its ability to appeal directly to Whitehall for much needed polio vaccines, the Commissioner-General’s official endorsement helped enhance public impression— especially within the British community—of the BEA’s authority through official recognition.

Although the BEA continuously stressed its nonpolitical nature, it was only non-political in the officially accepted sense whereby it did not publicly engage in party politics. As an unofficial political actor, the BEA’s political influence relied on the credibility of its claims to be a recognised representative of the entire British community in Singapore.

In a sense, the BEA was also intended to defend the British way of life from the anti-British verbal attacks against their community. It would not have been easy for any British person to accept a decline in their traditional colonial prestige. Conversely, those who perceived themselves to have been subjugated under colonialism would have been quick to use the changing situation to air purported grievances. To this extent, an official BEA brochure that was designed for the purpose of canvassing for members argued that the BEA was the only way in which the British community could protect itself from being “unfairly run down”. 451 Editors of the BEAM also made it a point to repeatedly remind

445 TNA: FCO 141/15004, Letter from Goode to Thorne, “Formation of British

449 "A Call to Critics." The BEAM Vol.1 no.1, April 1957, 6.

European Association”, 4 July 1956. However, the Colonial Office was rightfully

450 "A Message from Sir Robert Scott: The Commissioner-General honours us

sceptical that commercial interests could be completely divorced from political

with a personal message for the first number." The BEAM Vol.1 no.1, April 1957,

ones.

1. In fact, the local Colonial Office remained ever suspicious of the BEA’s

446 "The Council to Hold a Public Meeting This Month." The BEAM Vol.1 no.2,

communications with British officials from other government departments.

May 1957, 1. To this end, open forums were regularly held and debates on civic

Fortunately for them, these other officials often referred the BEA’s queries back

issues were reportedly often quite heated.

to the Colonial Office.

447 "The Hospital." The BEAM Vol.1 no.1, April 1957, 2. The hospital would

451 TNA: FCO 141/15004, BEA Brochure: A Club Conversation, “Formation

come to be known as Gleneagles Hospital.

of British European Association”, 7 Feb. 1957.

448 "Polio Vaccine is Here, Available to All." The BEAM Vol.1 no.1, April 1957, 6.

76 their audiences of the traditional role that “generations of dedicated colonial administrators” have had in building both Malaya and Singapore. 452 For the BEA, these historical contributions gave the British as much right as any community to remain in Singapore. In view of the threatening political circumstances, the BEA also sought to secure the continuity of various essential services that the British community could easily access in the past.

They acquired facilities such as schools, which valued as vital to maintaining a distinctively British way of life. Yet, these efforts were also the BEA’s way of proving that its existence was indeed beneficial for the local British community; so that British people “who have hitherto remained aloof on the grounds that the BEA had nothing to offer them may… think again”.453 All these were performed, as there would have been no need for a communal association if the BEA could not convince the British community that there was a pressing need to protect their own interests.

This inclination to deny the changing social hierarchies within late-colonial society manifested most visibly in a proposed BEA sponsored hospital.

It was to operate on the best Western methods and technologies they could collectively afford and serve as the ultimate showcase of British contributions towards Singapore’s modernisation. However, the hospital’s services were limited to “Europeans and others leading or accepting a western way of life”.454 Unsurprisingly, even some within the BEA viewed the policy of segregation with disdain. During a BEA general meeting on May 23rd, 1957, most queries were directed towards the proposed hospital. One member even argued “that the continuance of a European school and the setting up of a hospital to be run on Western lines savoured of undesirable communalism calculated to foil the best efforts of the legislators to bring about a united Singapore”.455 On the official level, members of the Labour Front Government began to voice their suspicions about the underlying motivations of the BEA. The Labour Government’s Health Minister, Armand Joseph Braga, expressed his concern that there should be a European hospital that ostracised non-Europeans.

Moreover, Braga was annoyed by the implicit lack

of confidence in government hospitals. 456 While the BEA’s proposed hospital was not an intentionally hostile act, it served as a clear reflection of its leadership’s elitist self-perception and scepticism of the local government’s ability to provide essential services.

Indeed, the BEA spared no effort in its attempts to attain de-facto leadership over the local British community. It actively portrayed itself as a representative of the contemporary needs of the British community and even as a guardian of British rights in Singapore. 457 These were basic requirements if the BEA wished to establish itself as a legitimate communal leader—a position that gave them a firm and justifiable basis to make political assertions on behalf of the British community. If the BEA could claim to possess the mandate of the British community, it could embark upon its political objective of challenging the feasibility of constitutional development and party politics more effectively. To do so, it made full use of its claimed position as a British communal association to engage with various levels of British Government in its bid to challenge the political legitimacy of radical political parties.

The Political Activism of the BEA In December 1956, the BEA submitted a memorandum to request for a “fusion of various community associations into a body representative of non-party thought and feeling”. 458 A month later, the Singapore Communities Liaison Committee (SCLC) was formed and conveyed to the Chief Minister that “a very large section of the population” had good reason to fear the volatility of party politics. Furthermore, this ‘large population’, which the SCLC claimed to represent, had no confidence or allegiance to any political party. As such, the SCLC argued, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that their associations should naturally be reserved seats in the Legislative Assembly for more democratic representation of the population—free from the opportunistic imprudence of political parties.459 On the BEA’s part, they aligned itself with

452 "Merdeka." The BEAM Vol.1 no.6, September 1957, 2-3.

456 TNA: FCO 141/15004, Minute by H.E. the Governor to Goode, “Formation

453 "Tanglin School to be taken over by the BEA" The BEAM Vol.1 no.8,

of British European Association”, 5 June 1957. In Goode’s reply, he revealed that

November 1957, 1.

he agreed with Braga and described the BEA as “infernally sensitive”.

454 "The Hospital Committee Reports." The BEAM Vol.1 no.2, May 1957, 6-8.

457 A quick run through the BEAM would show that they were also trying to

455 "The Open Forum: A Report of the Meeting on May 23." The BEAM Vol.1

provide a multitude of services including insurance, education, car-sharing etc.

no.3, June 1957, 1-3. The BEA also procured the Tanglin School from Griffith

458 "Communities Representation." The BEAM Vol.1 no.1, April 1957, 4.

when she retired to ensure that British education will continue due to the,

459 TNA: CO 1030/448, Note for the Secretary of State, “Representations by

according to the BEAM, poor state of local education. Apparently, some of the

Various Associations Regarding Constitutional Developments in Singapore”,

members even compared the current efforts of the association to that of the South

n.d. By early-1957, the SCLC constituted of an alliance amongst 9 community

African apartheid.

representatives such as the: Malay union, Straits Chinese British Association, Eurasian Association, Malayan Indian Congress, British European Association,

77 the SCLC with the claim that it could represent a majority of the British community.460 All these were in fact a reaction to the second constitutional talk, through which the political parties were hoping to attain greater constitutional powers. The BEA was concerned that the political parties were making premature bids for constitutional development without first obtaining any new mandate from the people of Singapore. They proposed that they, as communal leaders, could best present popular opinion that would allow their respective communities to exercise their political rights.

However, Lim Yew Hock rebutted the SCLC’s claim to political legitimacy on the basis of being more representative of the population as the “normal processes of political representation in Singapore cover all communities”. 461 Indeed, the British Government seemed to have shared Lim’s view and the SCLC’s demands came to nothing.

Hailing from a minority group that seemed to be the unending ire of nationalist rhetoric, the BEA had valid reason to fear constitutional advance. They did in fact manage to have their presence felt in the development of the new proposed constitution. A certain segment intended to safeguard the rights of minorities initially read: “That it shall be the duty of the Government of Singapore at all times to protect the political, economic, social and cultural interests of Malaya, and other minorities domiciled in Singapore”. The BEA leaders felt that the word domiciled should be removed as it could be interpreted to mean that the government was not constitutionally bound to protect communities that do not regard Singapore as a permanent home. They were wary that the term domiciled might allow a more hostile and radical future government, such as the PAP, to adopt an unreasonable liberal interpretation of the term and exclude the rights of ‘domiciled’ British citizens. 462 Moreover, an unreasonably nationalistic government might exploit the terms of the constitution to legally expropriate business assets owned by non-domiciled individuals.

In response, Thorne wrote to the Lim Yew Hock requesting that the word be removed since the government should responsibly safeguard all minorities in Singapore. 463 Naturally, the BEA monitored constitutional developments with the understanding that, as it seemed, the PAP was a likely candidate for a future government. Its interference in constitutional developments and

acquisition of essential services was its way of securing legal safeguards against a future hostile government that would not hesitate to infringe upon the rights of British businesses.

The SCLC’s petition to the Colonial Secretary was not the only instance that the BEA attempted to use their official connections to by-pass the local authorities in pursuing their agenda. When the issue of citizenship and the ensuing question of immigration came to be raised in 1957, the BEA leaders began worrying that an inferior Singapore citizenship would have negative effects on their legal recognition as British citizens. Thorne wrote to the Commissioner-General of Southeast Asia to express the BEA’s desire to remain British citizens, along with their fear that if they registered as Singapore citizens—albeit maintaining their status as a Commonwealth citizen under the 1948 British Act— they might be obliged to give up their British citizenship under a future fully independent Singapore. Moreover, the international reputation of the new Singapore citizenship had not yet been determined and Thorne insisted that their passport might be discriminated against in spite of their Commonwealth status. 464 This would obviously be detrimental to the highly mobile British commercial community in Singapore. Put simply, the conceptualisation of citizenship would effectively remove the cosmopolitan benefits that British businessmen traditionally enjoyed while Singapore was an outpost of the British Empire. This was not favourable for members of the BEA who wanted to remain British citizens and yet continue enjoy the exclusive benefits that a Singaporean citizen would come to have.

It was thus quite clear that even as the nationalising project took place the leaders of the BEA were still intent on preserving their links to Britain. Yet, this intention must be understood beyond their commercial practicalities. There was also a sense of British national pride; and it was unthinkable that they might lose access to a land—which they believed—they had helped established. Assuming a new Singapore citizenship and abandoning old loyalties was not a favourable option in spite of its commercial logic for localised businessmen.

However, constitutional development seemed to have been increasingly accepted on the official level and the Commissioner-General simply relegated the

Tamil Muslim Union, Singapore Buddhist Association, (Singhalese), Malayan

462 “Singapore Constitutional Talks.” The BEAM Vol.1 no.2, May 1957. 2.

Indian Congress and Ceylon Tamil Association.

463 TNA: CO 1030/448, Thorne to Lim Yew Hock, “Representations by Various

460 TNA: CO 1030/448, Thorne to Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock,

Associations Regarding Constitutional Developments in Singapore”, 13 March

“Representations

1957.

by

Various

Associations

Regarding

Constitutional

Developments in Singapore”, 13 March 1957.

464 TNA: FCO 141/15086, Letter from A.F Thorne to Commissioner-General

461 TNA: CO 1030/448, Note for the Secretary of State, “Representations by

for South East Asia, “Singapore Citizenship”, 27 Nov. 1957.

Various Associations Regarding Constitutional Developments in Singapore”, n.d.

78 BEA’s concerns to the Colonial Office in London.

When the Colonial Office prompted Goode on the issue, he simply stressed that the Singaporean Legislature held a constitutional right to determine its own internal policies and the UK Government should not undermine the authority of local government. 465 Three months later, W.H.C Bailey, Thorne’s successor as President of the BEA, approached the colonial office to again request that British passports be recognised as equal to Singapore passports in terms of entry rights. Once again, the BEA’s request was rejected and they were advised “those who are not willing to identify as Singaporeans should not take out Singaporean citizenship for the good of maintaining good local feelings”.466 By late-1958, similar contentions were being raised over the proposed immigration policies in Singapore. Since 1956, the Singapore Legislative Assembly had begun advocating a ‘Malayanisation’ policy that envisioned the localisation of public services and professional posts. 467 As the local Government began to consider exercising its sovereignty on issues of immigration, the British commercial community began to worry that their supply of British expatriates might be arbitrarily ceased and their firms would also be forced to localise in terms of manpower. Once again, the BEA, along with the Singapore Chamber of Commerce, approached the Colonial Office to stress that an unreasonably nationalistic local Government might compel the Controller of Immigration to limit the entry or long-term stay that is expected of British expatriates.468 Interestingly, at about the same time, the MCAGB was demanding the right to have a preview and opportunity to make counterproposals to the draft immigration legislation. They claimed that certain “radical politicians” are adamant on eliminating expatriates and this would have negative repercussions for both the overall economy of the UK and Singapore.469 Clearly, this was a reference to the PAP and their strong rhetoric against the expatriates as an overprivileged class. In an earlier parliamentary debate regarding finance, Lee had attacked the financial

feasibility of expatriates in public service claiming that “[the expatriates] are a much-abused and maligned group of people, but I think they deserve every bit of the abuse that has been heaped upon them”. 470 Naturally, the BEA feared that PAP politicians might inherit the state mechanisms of control over citizenship and immigration and enforce anti-foreign policies to the detriment of British commercial interests. And this would presumably be conducted legally, within a constitutional framework, as the political parties could claim to represent democratic opinion. Worse still, the PAP had by this time emerged from the City Council elections as a strong contender to form the next government. In response to this development, the editors of the BEAM felt compelled to launch a series entitled “The Assemblyman”, which was a selective and negative portrayal of Lee’s parliamentary rhetoric against British businesses. 471 It was just one of the BEA’s multiple appeals to British officials that party politics was characterised by politically immature radicalism and was simply not viable if Britain had any hopes of protecting her future commercial interests.

The perfect opportunity for the BEA to make their case to the highest level of government presented itself when Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the UK, visited Singapore. Macmillan stopped over at Singapore on February 1958 as part of his Commonwealth Tour and he received a number of local delegations—one of which was the BEA’s own. Even before Macmillan arrived, the BEA had dispatched a letter to him detailing their misgivings about the political future of Singapore and sought a strong commitment from the British Government to ensure the stability of Singapore. According to them: “some antics of the recently elected representatives of the people… [within a] political structure that is wide open to exploitation and support from a very powerful and patient Communist element whose pleasure in supplanting British European expatriates

by Asian expatriates is only matched by the dismay of thousands of loyal British Asians.” 472 When they did meet Macmillan, they continued to reiterate their belief that Singapore was too

465 TNA: FCO 141/15086, W.A.C Goode to E. Melville, “Singapore

470 Singapore, Legislative Assembly, Hansard. “Appropriation Bill” (December

Citizenship”, GH 105/11(IV), 9 Jan. 1958.

12, 1956), Column 2916, (Lee Kuan Yew, Minister of Parliament). Although

466 TNA: FCO 141/15004, Passports, “Formation of British European

Lee’s comments were mostly aimed at removing expatriates from the civil

Association”, 15 Apr. 1958.

service; the BEAM framed his comments to be an attack on the European

467 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore: 1819 – 2005, 268.

expatriate community in general.

468 TNA: CO 1030/731, Letter from William Goode to J.D Hennings, Colonial

471 “The Assemblymen.” The BEAM Vol.1 no.11, February 1958. 3-8 and 14.

Office, “Immigration Policy of Federation of Malaya and Singapore. Part A.” 5

This series did not continue for a second run. It is likely that the BEA’s later

Feb. 1959, pp 2-4.

meeting Harold Macmillan changed their mind and they somehow decided to

469 TNA: CO 1030/731, Malayan Commercial Association of Great Britain to

tone down their critique of local politics.

Members of the Council of Management, “Immigration Policy of Federation of

472 TNA: FCO 141/14718, British European Association letter to Harold

Malaya and Singapore. Part A.”, Dec. 1958.

Macmillan, “Representations to the Prime Minister February 1958”, 17 Jan. 1958.

79 “premature for self-independence”. However, they also conceded that the Federation should be left to judge when Singapore’s democracy would be mature enough for full independence. 473 Within a short ten-minute meeting, Macmillan simply responded with a reinstatement that the British Government must honour its promise of selfgovernment to Singapore. He also reportedly explained the international significance of Southeast Asian decolonisation and framed “Singapore and her neighbours in their inter-related [geostrategic] importance”. 474 Put simply, Macmillan saw decolonisation within the framework of the underlying security arrangements and international relations that would ensure Britain’s future interests.

Local commercial interests were trivial concerns compared to political concerns.

In fact, the Commonwealth Tour was partly meant to make official reassurances to Commonwealth states that Britain was militarily committed to cooperating with them in maintaining Southeast Asian security even when Singapore was self-governing. 475 Moreover, he had received assurances from Lim Yew Hock that the security safeguards put in place would deny subversives from participating in elections and it was near impossible for the Communist to come to power through legitimate means—including the 1959 General Elections. 476 Constitutionally, vital issues such as internal security and defence would remain within the domain of British jurisdiction even after the new government took office, while Britain still kept its right to maintain a military presence in Singapore. To some extent, there were enough safeguards in place for Macmillan to confidently grant the post-1959 elected government more authority in its internal affairs.

Singapore. By mid-1958, the editors of the BEAM were beginning to accept the inevitably of the 1959 general elections and were calling on members to “awake a sense of civic duties among a people with no experience of having these responsibilities”. 477 The new approach that the BEA had apparently decided to take emerged most revealingly in an early-1959 meeting with visiting Colonial Office official, W.I.J Wallace. In this meeting, the delegation—not all of whom were BEA members— conceded that the PAP was likely to win the next elections and they were willing to cooperate with whichever government that comes to power.

However, they wanted Britain’s assurance that their commercial interests would somehow be protected through diplomatic representation. Preferably, a Commercial Attaché should be present in the UK Commission to represent British commercial interests. 478 This new approach proved to be more effective and it received the sympathies of the Colonial Office, which pressed the UK Government for a novel model of diplomatic representation whereby a specialised representative specifically handles commercial affairs. 479 Following this meeting, the BEA continued with its pacifist approach towards local political developments.

BEAM articles ceased making any overt criticism of local political parties. There seemed to be a clear shift towards acceptance of the inevitability of Singapore’s full internal self-government—even if the government was to be the PAP.

Conclusion

The leaders of the BEA must have sensed this, since after the encounter with Macmillan, the BEA seemed to have reconsidered their approach to the question of securing British political rights in a ‘decolonised’

Clearly, the BEA’s eventual acquiescence was largely a result of the British Government’s refusal to support their views. The leaders of the BEA were essentially practical merchants who took to politics in order to safeguard their commercial interests under difficult circumstances. As traditional beneficiaries of the cosmopolitanism under the colonial system, these elites feared the nationalistic impulses that were occurring around them. So they made attempts to convince various levels of Government that decolonisation was antithetical to future British commercial interests. However,

473 TNA: FCO 141/15004, Visit of Prime Minister Talking Points, “Formation

478 TNA: FCO 141/15265 W.I.J Wallace Informal Meeting with representatives

of British European Association”, 12 Feb. 1958. The BEA held a positive opinion

of the Chamber of Commerce and the British European Association, “U.K

of Tunku Abdul Rahman and his strong anti-communist and pro-business stance.

Commission Relations with British Business Interests in Singapore”, PO 3/27 14

474 “Visit of the Prime Minister: BEA Chairman meets Mr MacMillan.” The

Feb. 1959. pp 1-2. The delegation believed that only someone who specialised in

BEAM Vol.1 no.12, March 1958, 1.

commercial affairs could understand their unique interests. Business was not the

475 Chin Kin Wah “The Extension of AMDA” in The Defence of Malaysia and

same as international trade.

Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971, (New York:

479 TNA: CO 1030/876, Wallace to Gidden and Melville regarding meeting to

Cambridge University Press, 1983), 42-44.

Discuss the Staff of Office of the UK Commissioner, Singapore. “United

476 Albert Lau, “Decolonization and the Cold War in Singapore” in Southeast

Kingdom Commission: Singapore. Responsibility for Economic and Commercial

Asia and the Cold War, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 60-62.

Matters and for the Representations to Singapore Government on behalf of

477 “A call to play a more active part in awakening civic consciousness.” The

British Business Interests”, 14 Feb. 1959.

Recalibrated Approach to Political Change

BEAM Vol.2 no.4, August 1958. 1. This issue also took a less critical approach in its description of local legislative developments.

80 official interests went beyond the wishes of the commercial community. Contemporary Cold War geopolitics set the stage for colonial policies that aimed to groom nationalist politicians that would be strong enough to withstand Communist pressures.

Even as the PAP consolidated itself through its anticolonial and leftist rhetoric, the Colonial Office was privy to the knowledge that the PAP moderates’ position was necessitated by circumstances. Britain would have a higher chance of maintaining her commercial interests only if the moderate left triumphed; her future commercial interests hinged upon whether a political victory could be obtained in the first place. British officials in Whitehall also seemed to agree with the view that any antiindependence stance would only serve to damage Britain’s international reputation, and her relations with the locals in Singapore. In the wider geostrategic struggle, this would only serve to diminish Britain’s credibility in its fight against Communism.

On the other hand, the BEA took a narrower understanding of the politics of decolonisation and made various attempts to challenge constitutional development. After their formation, they began proposing an alternative form of representation to challenge the legitimacy of political parties: communal representation. This was essentially an attempt to revert to the conservative colonial system that preceded the 1955 Rendell Constitution.

However, the Rendell Constitution had already irrevocably altered the dynamics of power in Singapore. It ushered the beginning of mass politics and this took on a life of its own—something that even the British could only adapt to, rather than command. Within this context, unelected representation was no longer feasible as it no longer accurately represented the mass line. Furthermore, the BEA used its capacity as a British communal leader to make challenges against various legislative efforts towards establishing a sovereign state of Singapore. The British Government repeatedly rejected these efforts as these anti-independence proposals directly contravened official policy. Yet, in their attempts to restore communalism and through their repeated overtures to the British Government, the BEA’s quest to retain the status quo reflected alternative avenues of power—beyond that of political parties—that were still available during the late-colonial period.

In time, members of the BEA would have realised that cosmopolitanism would not be lost with the end of empire. The newly elected PAP Government would prove to be a ready capitalist that welcomed foreign investments. Singapore’s new leaders upheld the logic of economic progress with religious fervour and saw Western investments as valuable necessities to facilitate economic development. However, the early leaders of the BEA viewed contemporary

politics through the limits of their own temporal perspective and their assumptions—which were greatly influenced by fear and uncertainty. They could not have even remotely suspected that the politicians they feared most would seek to permanently secure socio-political discipline for economic stability—to the detriment of the radical left.

Bibliography Primary Sources Newspapers "The Guilty Men." The Straits Times (Singapore), May 17, 1955.

Legislative Debates Singapore. Legislative Assembly. Hansard.

“Appropriation Bill”, December 12, 1956.

Magazines The BEAM Vol.1 no.1, April 1957.

The BEAM Vol.1 no.2, May 1957.

The BEAM Vol.1 no.3, June 1957.

The BEAM Vol.1 no.6, September 1957.

The BEAM Vol.1 no.8, November 1957.

The BEAM Vol.1 no.11, February 1958.

The BEAM Vol.1 no.12, March 1958.

The BEAM Vol.2 no.4, August 1958.

Official Documents The National Archives of the UK: CO 1030/448, Representations by Various Associations Regarding Constitutional Developments in Singapore.

The National Archives of the UK: CO 1030/731, Immigration Policy of Federation of Malaya and Singapore. Part A. The National Archives of the UK: CO 1030/876.

United Kingdom Commission: Singapore.

Responsibility for Economic and Commercial Matters and for the Representations to Singapore Government on behalf of British Business Interests.

File FED 687/129/016.

The National Archives of the UK: FCO 141/14718, Representations to the Prime Minister February 1958, File 3/38 Supp. B. The National Archives of the UK: FCO 141/15004, Formation of British European Association, File 56/6.

The National Archives of the UK: FCO 141/15086, Singapore Citizenship, File 106/1 Vol. III. The National Archives of the UK: FCO 141/15265, U.K Commission Relations with British Business Interests in Singapore, File 234/20.

81 Secondary Sources Bloodworth, Dennis, "PAP: The Loveless Marriage." In The Tiger and the Trojan Horse. 130141. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2011.

Furnivall, John Sydenham, “The Plural Society” in Colonial Policy and Practice, 303-312. Cambridge University Press, 1948.

Gillis, E. Kay. Singapore Civil Society and British Power. Singapore: Talisman, 2005.

Harper, T.N. "Lim Chin Siong and the ‘Singapore Story’." In Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, ed. Tan Jing Quee; Jomo K.S, 3-55.

Selangor Darul Ehsan: INSAN, 2001.

------, Harper, T.N. “The Colonial Economy under Duress” in The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, 199-203. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Hyam, Ronald, “‘The wind of change is blowing’: the Macmillan and Douglas-Home governments and the end of empire, 1957 1964” In Britain's Declining Empire The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968.

241-326. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Lau, Albert, “Decolonization and the Cold War in Singapore” in Southeast Asia and the Cold War, 4366. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Poulgrain, Greg, "Lim Chin Siong in Britain’s Southeast Asian De-colonisation." In Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, ed. Tan Jing Quee; Jomo K.S, 114-126. Selangor Darul Ehsan: INSAN, 2001.

Schenk, Catherine R. "Britain’s changing position in the international economy." In Twentieth-Century Britain Economic, Cultural and Social Change, ed.

Francesca Carnevali; Julie-Marie Strange, 58-78.

New York: Routledge, 2014.

Turnbull, Constance Mary, A History of Modern Singapore: 1819 - 2005. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

White, Nicholas J. “Gentlemanly Capitalism and Empire in the Twentieth Century: The Forgotten Case of Malaya 1914-1965” in Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire, ed. Raymond E. Dumett, 175195. New York: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1999.

------, White, Nicholas J. "Government and Business Divided: Malaya, 1945-57.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22, no. 2 (2008): 251274. Accessed April 20, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086539408582927 ------, White, Nicholas J. Introduction to British Business in Post-Colonial Malaysia, 1957-70: NeoColonialism or Disengagement? London: Rutledge Curzon, 2004.

Kim Wah, Yeo, Political Development in Singapore 1945-1955. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973.

Kin Wah, Chin, “The Extension of AMDA” in The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971, 3757. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Further References White, Nicholas J. Business, Government, and the End of Empire: Malaya 1942-1957. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

82

The Other Singapore Story Christopher Lee Si Jie School of Humanities History Undergraduate

Abstract - If you have gone through the Singapore Education System, you would know The Singapore Story – our country's journey leading up to, and through independence. But with every story (and with history), there are multiple narratives to each of them. Sonny Liew's internationally-acclaimed graphic novel, The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye, seeks to present our nation's history in a different way. Probing into the realm of "what ifs" and speculation, (though that is usually frowned upon in academia), Liew has presented to the Singapore public a different side of the Singapore Story. He argues though, that he is not seeking to present a narrative that challenges the dominant one presented, but to present a history that should and ought to be inclusive. The historical novel would perhaps be the physical manifestation of a symbiotic relationship between history and fiction. And at first glance, the concepts of history and fiction seem to be at odds, bringing up a certain dichotomy between fact and fiction. However, recent scholarship and discussion have been arguing that this perceived dichotomy may not be dichotomous after all. This debate between history and fiction started forming in the 1960s when the writing of history started taking a more narrative form. When it comes to the historical novel, the issue of balance is an important point to consider. How much does the novelist push the narrative in the book but also present accurately, the knowledge and circumstance of the period in question? There are numerous issues that arise from this amalgamation – the issue of truth and the issue of accuracy. Hence, the historical novel as a form has often been a contentious one.

Keywords – Alternative Histories, The Singapore Story, Historical Representation in fiction, The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye

Introduction In Reconstructing History: The Emergence of a New Historical Society, its authors posit an interesting argument: “Only when history itself is problematized and deconstructed, when events and persons are transformed into texts, when the past is deprived of any reality and history of any truth, does the distinction between history and fiction become blurred or elided... Where once historians were exhorted to be accurate and factual, they are now urged to be imaginative and inventive. Instead of recreating the past, they are told to create it; instead of reconstructing history, to construct or deconstruct it.”480 How does this apply to the Singaporean context?

From Suchen Christine Lim, to Meira Chand and Sonny Liew, there has been no shortage of writers who have written historical novels or attempted to concise part of Singapore’s history in a novel. As with most other places, perhaps even more so in Singapore, the dominance of the national narrative of our history and development is heavy, by way of The Singapore Story. Focusing on post-colonial Singapore, I will be looking at a graphic novel (comic) by Sonny Liew, The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye, as a case study to explore the dynamics of history and fiction in the Singaporean context.

This paper will look at the relationship between history and fiction on two levels: 1. The representation of the development of Singapore, beginning with the 1950s and 60s in the comic.

2. The usage of a comic to present an alternative history to The Singapore Story.

With this two-tiered approach, I argue that the usage 480 Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Elizabeth Lasch-Quinn, ed., Reconstructing History: The Emergence of a New Historical Society (New York: Routledge, 1999), 80.

83 of fiction can be necessary (to bring up) alternative voices or alternative histories which otherwise may be difficult (to discuss in the local context).

1. Representation of Singapore Society The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye follows the story of a fictional comic artist, Charlie Chan, as he grows up during the tumultuous era of Singapore’s early development from the 1950s. The book centers around Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s as the People’s Action Party (PAP) was slowly rising to power. This graphic novel is a retelling of Singapore’s development of nationhood, and touches on certain controversial aspects of Singapore’s history. It presents an alternative history to the dominant strand of narrative in Singapore – The Singapore Story. So, what is this Singapore Story? The term was coined in 1997 when Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong launched the National Education programme in schools, declaring how “our young must know the Singapore Story – how Singapore succeeded against the odds to become a nation.”481 It is essentially a narrative that has been espoused by the old guard of the PAP, streamlining the history and development of Singapore. It was no surprise then that the first volume of Lee Kuan Yew memoirs, first published in 1998, was titled The Singapore Story. The comic is largely concerned with two central figures – Lee Kuan Yew, the country’s founding father and Lim Chin Siong, a left-wing trade union leader. Lee has been engrained in the Singaporean consciousness as the man who ushered and brought Singapore from a Third World to a First World country, where The Singapore Story is arguably synonymous with his political story.482 Lim and his story have little to no significance in Singapore’s official history today, despite Lim’s contributions as a charismatic Chinese orator who galvanised the masses against colonial rule. This dynamic plays out in the first two pages of the graphic novel with the title, which sets the tone for the rest of the book, “ 一 山 不 容 二 虎 yishanburongerhu (One Mountain Cannot Abide Two Tigers)”. The comic shows a side to side comparison of the two individuals, each detailing a summary of their contributions to the development of Singapore and their respective fates. In the comic, Lim states: “There was a moment in history when I might have become the Prime Minister of Singapore.

But they called me a communist and locked me away.” On the flip side, Lee asserts: “So I joined forces with the communists to gain independence for Singapore. But afterwards for the good of the

country, I had to crush them.”483 This was how Liew weaves in pieces of alternative history, he restrains from an outright challenge, subtly presenting them for the reader to perceive. The ending four panels of the comic are illuminating as well where Lee says, “Many regard me as an intellectual giant... a wise master in the way of ruling over men. Some have challenged the path I have chosen for Singapore. But where are they now?” Lim, respectively only has one of four panels saying “In 1996, I died of a heart attack.”484 The words of Lee suggests at a dominance of a particular narrative, and perhaps, the government’s role in enforcing them. Lim’s words are much more telling in showing how events and people can be forgotten and erased out of history, especially if you consider how quietly his death had been, contrasted to the nationwide mourning of the passing of Lee Kuan Yew. Before delving into the comic stories by Charlie Chan, we must first understand him, and it is here where Liew blurs the divide between fact and fiction.

Chan is by all accounts, a fictional character, created

by Liew for the purpose of telling his Singapore story. However, if one dives head strong into the book, he would be hard-pressed to think that Chan did not truly exist during the early years of Singapore’s development. The portrayal of Chan, as a struggling artist in 50s and 60s Singapore, is convincing. Interwoven into the narrative are old photographs and sketches with provenance such as “Drawn from memory and photographs”. 485 These little details relay the notion that Chan is anything but fictional. Moreover, the usage of a first-person narrative when he addresses the reader breaks down any barrier between Chan and the reader. Chan, in this sense, could be argued to be the embodiment of this meshing of fact and fiction, as well as an excellent medium to immerse readers into a reimagined past.

The entire book largely presents itself as a compilation of works by Chan. It is through these comics “drawn” by the fictional Charlie Chan that Liew sieves out and touches on the development of Singapore with the relationship between Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Chin Siong as a central component. As he progresses through the years, Liew snuffs out and highlights the little details and individuals that have been written out of The Singapore Story. I will be touching two major comic issues drawn by Charlie Chan which elucidates the representation of the Singapore’s political landscape during its early

481 Lee Hsien Loong, “Launch of National Education” Speech, Television

Southeast Asian Studies 33, No. 3 (Oct 2002): 546.

Corporation of Singapore (TCS) TV Theatre, May 17, 1997.

483 Sonny Liew, The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye (Singapore: Epigram

http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/1997051607/lhl19970517s.p

Books, 2015), preface.

df

484 Ibid.

482 Hong Lysa, “The Lee Kuan Yew Story as Singapore’s History,” Journal of

485 Ibid., 14.

84 developmental years. a) Invasion 1957 Vol 1.

Invasion revolves around a protagonist, Tommy Tan, who wakes up from a cryo-induced sleep 120 years later to find out that his homeworld of Lunar City has been taken over by an alien race known as the Hegemons and the alien language of Hegemonese has been forcefully imposed as the language for all official matters.486 Lunar City here is of course Singapore and the Hegemons depicts the colonial British. Hegemony is most probably the root word for the race ‘Hegemons’, and this illuminates the position that Chan considers that the British took in colonial Singapore – as imposing their hegemony on Singapore. Tommy’s motivation is to free the human race from the shackles of alien rule. 487 Lee Kuan Yew is portrayed to be a brave legal counsellor who is able to speak the alien language of Hegemonese, dealing directly with the Hegemons and helping to fight for workers’ rights with Tommy commenting that he “can’t speak a word of Hegemonese... what use could I possibly be?” Lim Chin Siong, on the other hand, is a freedom fighter who has a poor grasp of Hegemonese but has accumulated substantial support of the people. 488 This two-page scene highlights the power dynamics between the two leaders with Lee seemingly having the upper hand with his ability to negotiate and deal with the Hegemons. Chan explains that the Invasion stories were meant to reflect the “actual political landscape of the time... to expose the self-serving reasons the British had for allowing an expanded vote in the 1955 elections.”489 The narrative shifts to Chan trying, rather unsuccessfully, to get a publishing house to print Invasion. The common thread was that the publishing houses were concerned about depicting “real people” in their comics. 490 This alludes to the political climate that governs any work produced in Singapore, where such establishments are worried about commentary on political leaders. The story of Invasion not getting published is as telling as the representation of Singapore’s political landscape that grounded the story. Chan concludes the story of Invasion with Tommy in his deathbed questioning if Lim was a “Martian sympathiser” as was reported. He restrains this train of thought as he justifies Lunar City being a step “closer to being free of Hegemon rule”. 491 This is perhaps indicative of the general mindset that has been entrenched in society where “directions of political discourse, culture, and the

institutionalisation and meanings of citizenship in the country, is thus maintained by a certain sense of history – the ways in which alternatives that existed in the past are labelled and made dangerous”.492 This idea of repression of alternative voices was illustrated in a later comic issue: Sinkapor Inks Stationery and Supplies. It is a caricature comic issue on how Lee and the government has governed Singapore and dealt with who they deemed to be dissidents. b)

Satirical Comic on The Singapore Story

Perhaps no one comic in the entire graphic novel is more direct and telling on the dominant narrative of Singapore’s history than a four-page satirical comic strip on The Singapore Story. The comic strip shows Chan’s take on the Singapore Story with a member of the PAP, Ye Man Fong, taking a reporter, Wang Sha Sha through a guided tour of a new exhibition in the National Museum. As the tour proceeds, Ye introduces the various exhibits of the new exhibition to which Wang questions the narrative of each of them. Ye showcases an exhibit on the development of Singapore where he says, “we have a splendid diorama showing all the tragic fates that might have befallen Singapore had the P.A.P not been in power!” Wang comments that “Is it really fair to label everyone else ‘... Communists, crooks, thieves and opportunists’...?” To which, Ye forcefully stamps down, “Fair has NOTHING [sic] to do with it! We are simply telling it like it is! The whole truth!”493 The most interesting part of the comic strip comes at the end where Ye brings Wang to the end of the exhibit where it is dedicated to alternative views that deviate from the official Singapore Story.

The exhibit features an empty wall except for a tiny, insignificant plaque at the corner of the wall to which Wang says, “Isn’t that... a little small?” Ye scoffs, “All it takes is a little effort! That’s the problem, see!

People just can’t be bothered!”494 In the next panel, Wang highlights that this attitude of apathy and indifference is a result of the government clamping down on activism. Ye turns it around by saying that “firm hand” is required to run the country. 495 This satirical comic highlights how the national narrative has chosen to up play the strands of narrative which are in favor of the decisions and directions taken by the PAP during Singapore’s developmental years and downplay any revised views on the events that took place.

486 Ibid., 114-115.

492 Hong Lysa, “The Lee Kuan Yew Story as Singapore’s History,” Journal of

487 Ibid., 114-115.

Southeast Asian Studies 33, No. 3 (Oct 2002): 546.

488 Ibid., 119-120.

493 Liew, The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye, 211.

489 Ibid., 117.

494 Ibid., 214.

490 Ibid., 135-136.

495 Ibid., 214.

491 Ibid., 193.

85

2. Comic as a Medium for Presenting Singapore’s Alternative History Liew usage of satirical comic in his fictional work has greatly aided in the publishing of his work.

Megan LeBoeuf in her paper, "The Power of Ridicule: An Analysis of Satire," succinctly expounds on satire as an art form and its effectiveness: Satire is a powerful art form which has the ability to point out the deficiencies in certain human behaviors and the social issues which result from them in such a way that they become absurd, even hilarious, which is therefore entertaining and reaches a wide audience. Satire also has the ability to protect its creator from culpability for criticism, because it is implied rather than overtly stated. 496 The National Arts Council (NAC) originally intended to give a grant of $8000 for the creation of the novel but later rescinded that offer, citing that the novel had the potential to undermine the political legitimacy of the Singapore government along with its public institutions. To that point, Liew himself said that his aim was to write a history that was inclusive rather than one that ran opposing to the dominant narrative. To him, “The Singapore Story is part of the truth, but if you leave out the alternative histories, it’s a less accurate picture.” 497 He goes on to say that he hopes the book would encourage “readers to look at all narratives with a critical eye.”498 If Liew wanted to write an inclusive history, why adopt the art form of comics? Why not just write “actual history”? For one, artists like Sonny Liew have little to no academic qualifications for them to foray into the realm of academia with regards to the writing of history. A second reason would be the environment or lack thereof for one to produce a work that went against the grain. Jose Ruiz, a Filipino editorial cartoonist, who was working for The Straits Times said in 1992 that “political cartooning in Singapore has no future; maybe no past.”499 Additionally, the comic strips in The Straits Times are usually not political in nature, emphasising the lack of avenue for public political comics. This is perhaps why Liew’s work has received such critical acclaim – it not only presented

an alternative history but in a form where there were hardly successful precedents. Liew in the book, as a comic version of himself, questioned Chan’s decision to not publish Sikapor Inks, highlighting that perhaps was his “reluctance, in fact, stem from a fear of censure and arrest, given the PAP’s notorious antipathy towards political caricatures?” 500 Consider that there are little to no history books expounding on alternative histories in Singapore, and only in the realm of academic journals would alternative histories be found. This is mainly because most people are not exposed to and do not read academic journals. However, comics have the potential to reach a wider market where people can read and consume comics easily which are not difficult to understand. This means that the comic form, firstly, does not have the issue of academic qualifications, and secondly, overcomes the limitation of being removed from the public.

Additionally, the ease of comprehension cannot be understated where concise presentation of history is not an easy endeavour. Liew, as a comic artist, was able to overcome the limitations of the academics in reaching out to the masses.

3. Conclusion Today, there are a few books on alternative histories, like Myths of Singapore and the recently published book on Operation Spectrum. This perhaps is an indication of the government’s stance on slowly granting a wider berth for alternative voices and histories. However, it is still a complex issue. When Liew won three awards at the prestigious Will Eisner Comic Industry Awards for the book, the NAC took to Facebook to congratulate Liew, but left out the title of the book. This garnered condemnation from netizens.501 Liew, as recently as September 2017, is said to be returning grants given by the NAC for his latest work. He cites that it is “an effort to untangle himself from the compromises of state funding.” 502 Should this be the mindset of our country’s most celebrated comic artist, then would it not indicate that the country has long ways to go to create a conducive environment for alternative voices to be heard?

In conclusion, fiction in the case of The Art of

496 Megan LeBoeuf, "The Power of Ridicule: An Analysis of Satire," (Senior

500 Liew, The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye, 232.

Honors Projects, University of Rhode Island, 2007), 2

501 Olivia Ho, “NAC’s post to congratulate Sonny Liew gets criticised,” The

http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/63

Straits Times, accessed November 26, 2017,

497 Ian Johnson, “An Alternative History of Singapore, Through a Comic Book,”

http://www.straitstimes.com/lifestyle/arts/nacs-post-to-congratulate-sonny-liew-

The New York Times, accessed November 26, 2017,

gets-criticised

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/world/asia/sonny-liew-singapore-charlie-

502 Olivia Ho, “Sonny Liew to return NAC funds for new book,” The Straits

chan-hock-chye.html

Times, accessed November 26, 2017,

498 Ibid.

http://www.straitstimes.com/lifestyle/arts/sonny-liew-to-return-nac-funds-for-

499 Lim Cheng Tju, “Singapore Political Cartooning,” Southeast Asian Journal

new-book

of Social Science 25, no. 1 (1997): 125.

86 Charlie Chan Hock Chye has played an integral role as the medium for which to present an alternative history to the dominant one, especially more so in the context of Singapore. Chan when explaining his choice of touching on the themes of Invasion said, “And so it seemed to us that during such times, no fiction could be stranger, or more exciting, than the truth.”503 Perhaps, to Chan, fact and fiction are two sides of the same coin. Perhaps, as mind-boggling as it sounds, it is only through the analysis of fiction that we can uncover more facets of the truth.

Bibliography Brown, Joanne. “Historical Fiction or Fictionalised History? Problems for Writers of Historical Novels for Young Adults.” The ALAN Review 26, no. 1 (Fall, 1998).

Braudy, Leo. Narrative Form in History and Fiction: Hume, Fielding, and Gibbon. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Carroll, Richard. “The Trouble with History and Fiction.” M/C Journal 14, no. 3 (2011).

Cohn, Dorrit. “Fictional versus Historical Lives: Borderlines and Borderline Cases.” The Journal of Narrative Technique 19, no. 1 (Winter, 1989): 324.

Dawra, Preeti. “Decoding the art of storytelling.”

Mint Asia, July 3-9, 2015. http://www.meirachand.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/interview-in-Mint.pdf Ellison, Ralph, William Styron, Robert Penn Warren and C. Van Woodward. “A Discussion: The Uses of History on Fiction.” The Southern Literary Journal 1, no. 2 (Spring, 1969): 57-90.

Fox-Genovese, Elisabeth and Elisabeth LaschQuinn, ed. Reconstructing History: The Emergence of a New Historical Society. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Gwee, Li Sui, ed. Written Country: The History of Singapore Through Literature.

Singapore: Landmark Books, 2016.

Ho, Olivia. “NAC’s post to congratulate Sonny Liew gets criticised.” The Straits Times. Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.straitstimes.com/lifestyle/arts/nacspost-to- congratulate-sonny-liew-gets-criticised Ho, Olivia. “Sonny Liew to return NAC funds for new book.” The Straits Times. Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.straitstimes.com/lifestyle/arts/sonnyliew-to-return-nac-funds-for-new-book Hutcheon, Linda. A poetics of postmodernism. New York: Routledge, 1988.

Johnson, Ian. “An Alternative History of Singapore, Through a Comic Book.” The New York Times.

Accessed November 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/world/asia/so nny-liew-singapore-charlie-chan- hock-chye.html LeBoeuf, Megan, "The Power of Ridicule: An Analysis of Satire" Senior Honors Projects., University of Rhode Island, 2007. http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/63 Liew, Sonny. The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye.

Singapore: Epigram Books, 2015.

Lim, Cheng Tju. “Singapore Political Cartooning.”

Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 25, No. 1 (1997): 125-146.

Lysa, Hong. “The Lee Kuan Yew Story as Singapore’s History.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 33, No. 3 (Oct 2002): 545-557.

Poon, Angelia, Philip Holden, and Shirley Geok-lin Lim, ed. Writing Singapore: An Historical Anthology of Singapore Literature. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Roberts, Geoffrey, ed. The History and Narrative Reader. London: Routledge, 2001.

Rosenstone, Robert A, ed. Revisioning History: Film and the Construction of a New Past. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Southgate, Beverley C. History Meets Fiction.

London: Routledge, 2009.

503 Liew, The Art of Charlie Chan Hock Chye, 118.

87

Broad Benefits with the Legalization of Social Egg Freezing in Singapore Tan Jan Xiong School of Humanities History Undergraduate

Abstract - It has been known that Singapore’s birth rate has been declining over the past two decades and it shows little to no signs of improvement. There are, however, new technologies in the field of biotechnology that can help Singapore overcome population obstacles faced. One of it is social egg freezing, a process in which the biological clock of a woman is paused for reasons unrelated to medical conditions. Unlike in some other parts of the world, including countries in the Southeast Asian region, social egg freezing has been banned in Singapore.

This paper seeks to explain the benefits of lifting this ban in ways which will help Singapore secure its future both socially and economically.

Keywords – Singapore, policy planning, biotechnology, Cryopreservation, family planning, social egg freezing

Main Content Human oocyte vitrification, also known colloquially as “egg freezing”, is a procedure under which a woman freezes her oocytes – in other words her ‘eggs’ –with the intention of utilising it for a future pregnancy. It involves the extraction, vitrification and storage of eggs until the patient wishes to use them. They would then be thawed, fertilized and implanted in the uterus for pregnancy. The success of oocyte vitrification depends on various factors including the woman’s age when her eggs were frozen. 504 Oocyte vitrification is currently legal in Singapore only for medical reasons. Elective oocyte vitrification – voluntarily freezing ones’ eggs for non-medical motivations –

remains illegal. 505 Following the Singapore government’s lead of maximizing the productivity of its citizens, as well as addressing the persistent issue of a low fertility rate – as would be elaborated upon later in this paper – This white paper recommends that oocyte vitrification be made legal in Singapore regardless of motivation.

The world’s first successful delivery from a cryopreserved oocyte – a pair of twins – occurred in Singapore in 1986.506 Although success rates for egg freezing procedures are low, it has improved because of newer fast-freezing vitrification technology. 507 Some studies have even shown no significant differences in pregnancy rates between fresh or vitrified eggs, nor do vitrified eggs result in a higher risk of congenital birth defects. 508 Medical circumstances under which oocyte vitrification can be beneficial include cancer diagnosis – of which treatment may entail fertility-reducing chemotherapy, radiotherapy or medication. By freezing eggs prior to such treatment, a fair chance to conceive in future is ensured even if cancerrelated treatment causes infertility.

504 Laura Rienzi et al., “Consistent and predictable delivery rates after oocyte

506 Debra A. Gook, “History of oocyte cryopreservation,” Reproductive

vitrification: an observational longitudinal cohort multicentric study,” Human

BioMedicine Online 23, no. 3 (September 2011): 283, accessed November 10,

Reproduction 27, no. 6 (June 2012): 1607, accessed November 10, 2017,

2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rbmo.2010.10.018.

https://doi.org/10.1093/humrep/des088.

507 Nurit Winkler, “Babies After 40: Is the “Biological Clock” Really Ticking?”

505 Ministry of Health Singapore, “Social Oocyte Freezing,” Government of

in Women’s Reproductive Mental Health Across the Lifespan, ed. Diana Lynn

Singapore, last modified September 13, 2016, accessed November 10, 2017,

Barnes (New York City: Springer Publishing, 2004), 208.

https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home/pressRoom/Parliamentary_Q

508 Catrin E. Argyle, Joyce C. Harper, and Melanie C. Davies, “Oocyte

A/2016/social-oocyte-freezing.html.

cryopreservation: where are we now?” Human Reproduction Update 22, no. 4 (June 2016): 442, accessed November 10, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1093/humupd/dmw007.

88 because of the rising age at which Singaporeans are giving birth – 12.7% of babies born in 1990 had mothers above the age of 35, compared to 23.6% in 2010. 516 Lastly, social egg freezing is not unlike biological insurance, keeping open an alternative should any circumstance – such as an accident or injury – threaten fertility.

Figure 1: Statistics from Population in Brief from the Strategy Group of the Prime Minister’s Office show a steadily increasing age at which Singaporean women are starting families

Undergoing elective oocyte vitrification for social reasons – hence the term “social egg freezing” – is an increasing trend attributed to its rising social acceptability in recent years. 509 Some companies, including Apple and Facebook, may have contributed to the trend by offering to offset up to US$20,000 for egg freezing procedures as part of employee benefits. 510 Critics argue that this masculinizes the workplace since these companies are not only trying to mould women to work like men, they are also encouraging them to prioritise career over family.511 However, such moves could reduce workplace gender imbalance and encourage gender equality. 512 Furthermore, a study found career prioritization not to be the primary reason for women electing to freeze their eggs. 513 Instead, welleducated career women cite the inability to find a suitable partner as the motivation behind undergoing the procedure, using it as a stop gap measure, or she might freeze her eggs to postpone the decision of having more children.514 Essentially, motivations for social egg freezing relate to “buying time” since her eggs do not age after vitrification. Vitrified and biologically young eggs also have the benefit of reducing the risk of genetic abnormalities which are related to the age of the mother, such as Down Syndrome, since the eggs are biologically younger. 515 “Buying time” is worth considering

Some countries, such as Australia, have left oocyte cryopreservation procedures to the private sector.

Costs are expectedly high and one cycle of egg freezing procedure at Genea’s clinic in Australia costs AUD $7,000 excluding medication, with subsequent treatment packages costing less to encourage return patronage. 517 The laissez-faire approach causes egg freezing procedures to be packaged not unlike a spa package where discounts are given for bulk purchases. This approach might tempt patients – who are in this case treated more like customers – to make irresponsible decisions despite the gravity of the procedure. Consequently, women might not fully consider the risks and complications the procedure entails, nor the fact that freezing her eggs does not guarantee success in conceiving at a later stage, when presented with a good packaged deal.

Figure 2: Statistics from the Ministry of Manpower’s Labour Force in 2016 indicate a steady increase of working Singaporean women

Australia is highlighted because it is amongst the destinations for Singaporean women who want to electively freeze their eggs.518 While the procedure’s

509 Argyle, Harper, and Davies, 440.

November 10, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/04/shortage-

510 Mark Tran, “Apple and Facebook offer to freeze eggs for female

eligible-men-has-left-women-taking-desperate-steps/.

employees,” Guardian, October 15, 2014, accessed November 10, 2017,

514 https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/women-egg-

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/15/apple-facebook-offer-

freezing-why-reasons-relationships-unstable-partner-fertility-a8426711.html

freeze-eggs-female-employees.

515 Lori B. Andrews, and Nanette Elster, “Regulating Reproductive

511 PBS NewsHour, “Debating the pros and cons of freezing eggs” (interview),

Technologies,” in Family: Critical Concepts in Sociology, ed. David Cheal

posted October 22, 2014, accessed November 11, 2017,

(London: Routledge, 2003), 187.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtfMxaBocFM.

516 Theresa Tan, “Baby Come Lately,” Straits Times, July 23, 2011.

512 Jessica Bennett, “Company-Paid Egg Freezing Will Be the Great Equalizer,”

517 Genea, “How much does it cost?” Genea Limited, 2013, accessed November

Time, last modified October 16, 2014, accessed November 10, 2017,

10, 2017,

http://time.com/3509930/company-paid-egg-freezing-will-be-the-great-

https://www.genea.com.au/my-fertility/i-need-help/egg-freezing/costs.

equalizer/.

518 Report, “More single women freezing their eggs overseas,” Straits Times,

513 Jane Hansen, “Shortage of eligible men has left women taking desperate

September 16, 2016, accessed November 10, 2017,

steps to preserve their fertility, experts say,” Telegraph, July 4, 2017, accessed

89 illegality in Singapore definitely deter some Singaporeans from it, distance and high costs are not dissuading the most determined of Singapore’s highly educated female population; 48% of Singaporean women have attained university education in 2015, and a labour force participation rate of 60% in 2016. 519 The issue of social egg freezing is relevant in Singapore given the persistently low fertility rate despite government initiatives encouraging larger families, hence the issue of legalizing social egg freezing remains relevant to our society and might solve persistent population issues.520

Figure 3: Statistics from the National Population and Talent Division indicate a persistently low fertility rate

Acknowledging the growing acceptance and trend towards social egg freezing in developed and Westernized countries like Singapore is key to my recommendation of legalizing it here. Critics correctly argue that social egg freezing should remain illegal since it goes against the natural biological order.521 While the point is true and valid, since the Singapore government is unable to control its legality in other countries, and the high costs and long distances associated with such having a procedure conducted overseas has not deterred a handful of women from doing it overseas, the best way forward would be to legalize social egg freezing

with regulatory measures. Legalization would not only allow the government the benefit of anticipating the growing trend to better cope with any social changes, it would also reap broader long-term economic and political benefits.

Legalizing social egg freezing would align with the government’s agendas of maintaining economic productivity. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vivian Balakrishnan, said in 2017 that “Singapore cannot afford to slow down” or risk losing its competitive edge, echoing statements from the Minister for Manpower, Lim Swee Say, in 2015 and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in 2012.522 Given the high percentage of Singaporean women participating in the workforce, it is in the country’s best interest that women are kept in the office while at the same time, not depriving them of the opportunity to be mothers of healthy children when they are most fertile. Lim noted that slowing down would cause a brain drain, but so too would ending a career for family aspirations. 523 Social egg freezing is hence beneficial to Singapore’s capitalist driven economy, especially since it also allows women to delay the process of settling down with a suitable partner to start a family. It also serves as an opportunity to level the playing field for women. No longer would the decision between family and career inhibit women from reaching the peak in their careers, thus giving them equal opportunity for a successful career before they decide to start a family. It is unfair that the government is depriving Singaporean women a choice of both a successful career and the opportunity of motherhood when oocyte vitrification enables both. Furthermore, it will be a symbolic gesture which will further cement Singapore’s reputation as a business-friendly, financially-driven destination. This nuanced message would reinforce Singapore’s long-standing commitment to remaining economically competitive to ensure its long-term survivability.

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/more-single-women-freezing-their-eggs-

521 Lucia Martinelli et al., “Social egg freezing: a reproductive chance or smoke

overseas.

and mirrors?” Croatian Medical Journal 56, no. 4 (August 2015): 387-88,

519 Ministry of Social and Family Development, “Education & Training:

accessed November 11, 2017, https://dx.doi.org/10.3325%2Fcmj.2015.56.387.

Resident Population Aged 25 Years and Over Who Have Attained University

522 Vivian Balakrishnan, “Singapore cannot afford to slow down,” Business

Qualification,” Government of Singapore, last modified January 31, 2017,

Times, August 31, 2017, accessed November 11, 2017,

accessed

http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion/singapore-cannot-afford-to-slow-

November

10,

2017,

https://www.msf.gov.sg/research-and-

data/Research-and-Statistics/Pages/Education-Training-Resident-Population-

down; Valerie Koh, “S’pore cannot afford to go a tad slower: Swee Say,” Today,

Aged-25-Years-and-Over-who-have-Attained-University-Qualification.aspx;

August 26, 2015, accessed November 11, 2017,

Janice Tai, “Growing number of women in the workforce,” Straits Times, March

http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/spore-cannot-afford-go-tad-slower-

13, 2017, accessed November 10, 2017,

swee-say; Lee Hsien Loong, “Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/manpower/growing-number-of-women-

Economic Society of Singapore Annual Dinner,” Government of Singapore, June

in-the-workforce.

8, 2012, accessed November 11, 2017,

520 Charissa Yong, “Singapore’s total fertility rate dipped to 1.20 in 2016,”

http://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/speech-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-

Straits Times, February 10, 2017, accessed November 10, 2017,

economic-society-singapore-annual-dinner.

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapores-total-fertility-rate-dipped-to-

523 Valerie Koh, “S’pore cannot afford to go a tad slower: Swee Say,” Today,

120-in-2016.

August 26, 2015, accessed November 11, 2017, http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/spore-cannot-afford-go-tad-slowerswee-say.

90 The legalization will not only benefit economically by increasing Singapore’s female labour participation rates, it also has the potential to lift Singapore’s low fertility rate, which has been the root cause of social problems. Singapore’s inability to reach the sustainable population replacement rate of 2.10 was cited as the reason behind allowing more immigrants to sustain the growing economy. 524 This in turn has not only caused discontent amongst citizens, who blame foreigners for fewer job opportunities, but immigrants have also been central in social disorder in recent years, such as the SMRT bus drivers’ strike in 2012 and the Little India Riots, involving Chinese nationals and South Asian transient workers respectively. 525 On the contrary, social egg freezing – feared by some to destabilize the natural biological cycle and thus, the structure of society – might be the long-term solution to the low fertility rate and can instead contribute to a more stable Singaporean society by reducing reliance on immigration.526 One must remember that legalizing social egg freezing does not mean forcing it upon citizens. It is nothing more than the benefit of the option for those who see value in the procedure. Furthermore, the reality is that the government cannot prevent Singaporeans from undergoing the procedure overseas, hence anticipating the trend with regulations is the best way forward. This not only grants women the freedom to decide the procedure’s suitability for the individual, but regulation also ensures that the private sector would not be given full rein to glamourize the treatment or encourage more treatments than necessary. Not glamourizing the procedure is an important part of maintaining the social structure because it ensures the procedure remains perceived as a last resort and not a lifestyle choice. Granting Singaporean women the option to undergo such procedures demonstrates the government’s willingness and acknowledgement of its citizens to make responsible decisions for themselves, so long as there are boundaries in place; the uniquely “Singapore way” of reconciling Asian conservatism and Western liberalism. This freedom of choice, along with perceived greater equality for women at the workplace that comes from social egg freezing, also resonates with Singapore’s need – at

least in the government’s perspective – to appear Westernized, modern and progressive in what is still undeniably a Western-dominated world; a political move pertinent not only as it attempts to portray itself as a hub for biotechnology, but also to appear ideologically-aligned with the pro-liberal West. The symbolic political rapport that is built with the West allows Singapore to be viewed more favourably than Asian counterparts and can be used as political leverage to sway international relations in Singapore’s favour. This is perhaps as best exemplified during the 2018 summit between American President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un, when Singapore was seen as the perfect balance between opposing values of the liberalized West and the dictatorial nature of Juche ideology.

The legalization of social egg freezing should not present many obstacles since there are already specialist clinics in Singapore with the expertise to conduct egg freezing on medical grounds. The clinics which are currently certified to perform the procedure can continue to perform the treatment.

However, elective egg freezing may cause increased demand that may outstrip available resources. Hence, a laissez-faire approach, as in Australia, should not be adopted since this might deprive patients of medical egg freezing the promptness in receiving care or even the ability to do so should demand increase prices. Furthermore, the gravity of the procedure tends to be trivialized, as exemplified in Genea’s pricing scheme, in pursuit of profits. Instead, a regulatory body can be set up to prioritise those who require the treatment for medical reasons so that they will still be able to receive prompt medical attention even if egg freezing is an option for all women.

A tax can be levied for social egg freezing procedures to create a distinct disincentive over medical egg freezing. This borrows upon from the principle applied by the government following debates over the opening of a casino at the planned integrated resorts in 2004, ultimately deciding upon a $100 admission fee levied on Singaporeans and permanent residents who wished to enter the casino.527 In that case, the two-tiered price scheme

524 Charissa Yong, “Singapore’s total fertility rate dipped to 1.20 in 2016,”

Tan, “Govt moves against 'illegal strike',” Straits Times, November 28, 2012,

Straits

2017,

accessed November 11, 2017, Factiva; Feng Zengkun, and Rachel Au-yong,

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapores-total-fertility-rate-dipped-to-

“Riot: 28 face charges, 53 to be deported,” Straits Times, December 18, 2013,

120-in-2016; Population.sg Team, “Does immigration make sense for

accessed November 11, 2017, http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/riot-28-

Singapore,” Prime Minister’s Office, August 6, 2016, accessed November 11,

face-charges-53-to-be-deported.

2017,

526 Lucia Martinelli et al., “Social egg freezing: a reproductive chance or smoke

Times,

February

10,

2017,

accessed

November

10,

https://www.population.sg/articles/does-immigration-make-sense-for-

singapore.

and mirrors?” Croatian Medical Journal 56, no. 4 (August 2015): 387-88,

525 Kelly Tay, “Whither the hot-button issues of the previous general election?”

accessed November 11, 2017, https://dx.doi.org/10.3325%2Fcmj.2015.56.387.

Business Times, August 3, 2015, accessed November 11, 2017,

527 Glenys Sim, and Kelvin Wong, “To get into a casino, pay $100 a day or

http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-general-

$2,000 a year,” Straits Times, December 30, 2004, accessed November 10, 2017,

election/whither-the-hot-button-issues-of-the-previous-general;

Factiva.

Christopher

91 deterred Singaporeans from entering the casino to ensure that problem gambling was less likely to destabilize our society. Likewise, a two-tier pricing scheme for oocyte vitrification, where a tax is placed on elective egg freezing, would discourage those who want to undergo the procedure. Placing emphasis on medical egg freezing also highlights the less critical nature of social egg freezing when compared to medical egg freezing. The revenue collected from the tax can then be used in turn to subsidize treatments of medical oocyte vitrification, allowing medical egg freezing more affordable and accessible, and again sending a subtle message that medical grounds hold exigency over social egg freezing.

Hansen, Jane. “Shortage of eligible men has left women taking desperate steps to preserve their fertility, experts say.” Telegraph. July 4, 2017.

Accessed November 10, 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/04/shorta ge-eligible-men-has-left-women-taking-desperatesteps/.

The main beneficiaries of social egg freezing will be Singaporean women who are given an additional option not only in their search for a balance between career and family, but also for increased gender equality at the workplace by removing the glass ceiling that traditional family planning had placed.

However, legalizing social egg freezing will be for the greater national interest because of its broader political symbolism and economic benefits. By legalizing social egg freezing, Singapore can strengthen its position in a highly competitive Western-centred and globalised world, bringing it a step towards a technologically-driven future where its long-term survival cannot be guaranteed unless approached boldly and progressively.

Martinelli, Lucia et al., “Social egg freezing: a reproductive chance or smoke and mirrors?”

Croatian Medical Journal 56, no. 4 (August 2015): 387-91. Accessed November 11, 2017. https://dx.doi.org/10.3325%2Fcmj.2015.56.387.

Bibliography Andrews, Lori B, and Nanette Elster, “Regulating Reproductive Technologies.” In Family: Critical Concepts in Sociology, edited by David Cheal, 16797. London: Routledge, 2003.

Argyle, Catrin E., Joyce C. Harper, and Melanie C. Davies. “Oocyte cryopreservation: where are we now?” Human Reproduction Update 22, no. 4 (June 2016): 440-49. Accessed November 10, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/humupd/dmw007.

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